Jackson, Elizabeth2020-03-311742-3600http://hdl.handle.net/1885/202540Permissivism is the view that there are evidential situations that rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. In this paper, I argue for Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism (IaBP): that there are evidential situations in which a single agent can rationally adopt more than one belief-attitude toward a proposition. I give two positive arguments for IaBP; the first involves epistemic supererogation and the second involves doubt. Then, I should how these arguments give intrapersonal permissivists a distinct response to the toggling objection. I conclude that IaBP is a view that philosophers should take seriously.application/pdfen-AU© 2019 Cambridge University PressDoubtEpistemic SupererogationEvidencePermissivismPragmatic EncroachmentRationalitySalienceUniqueness2019-07-1110.1017/epi.2019.192022-02-27