Tevahitua, Raihaamana2024-10-242024-10-24https://hdl.handle.net/1885/733721741In a speech delivered less than a year ago in Nouméa, New Caledonia, French President Macron stated, ‘35 years ago, nothing was written. What you were able to do was to rise above the worst of events, the worst of fears and the worst of divisions; together, we were able to preserve peace … it is a treasure’ (Élysée 26/7/2023). On 13 May 2024, the eruption of violent disturbances across the Greater Nouméa area served as a reminder that the continuation of civilian peace in New Caledonia (NC) is the result of a deliberate and collective decision. This is equally true of its cessation. This crisis is situated within the historical context of the ‘Kanak revolts’ (1878, 1917 and 1980s) and a broader regional trend of increased political violence, characterised by a prevalence of urban riots due to grievances with the state and to ethnic conflicts (Ride 21/11/2022). In particular, the quasi-civil war of 1984–88 in NC led to the attainment of the highest degree of autonomy within the French Republic, and the promise of an independence referendum. The decolonisation process, one of the most protracted of the 20th century, has manifested in the creation of an agency in charge of the retrocession of customary lands, the reallocation of control of the nickel industry, an institutional design that, in retrospect, has favoured ‘independentists’ interests and the organisation of a cycle of three referendums on self-determination (2018–21). Despite these efforts, the ongoing unrest poses a dilemma between the process of decolonisation and democracy. Indeed, the French state has proposed a constitutional reform for provincial elections in favour of an electorate defined by 10 years residence on the basis of economic contribution and social embedding. In this way, Paris appears to equate the political legitimacy of this new electorate with that of a millennial society and a 170-year settlement bound by a ‘common destiny’. Furthermore, the political legitimacy of two referendums (2018, 2020) marked by an 80 per cent turnout is equated with that of the last referendum in 2021 which achieved a 43 per cent turnout due to the abstention of supporters of independence. In light of mounting antagonism between the loyalists (pro-France), the French state and the independence movement, how should we make sense of their power struggle? This Working Paper will attempt to elucidate the underlying factors that precipitated this upheaval, the subsequent repercussions, and the positions of the various actors involved, up until 13 June 2024.Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and TradeAuthors retain copyrightNew CaledoniaRiots2024-10-2410.25911/3CFE-CZ10