Henry, Iain2017-05-312017-05-31b43751738http://hdl.handle.net/1885/117146The deployment of an Australian-led peacekeeping force to East Timor in September 1999 was arguably the most significant strategic decision faced by an Australian government since the Second World War. The operation posed a grave risk of military conflict with Indonesia, strained the Australia-US relationship and redefined Asian perceptions of Australia. It is therefore important to examine how this scenario arose. Data obtained in thirteen interviews with key Australian decision-makers has revealed new information about Australia’s strategic policy throughout 1998-1999. Despite having advocated an internal political settlement that would have legitimised Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor, Australia accepted Indonesia’s decision to conduct a self-determination ballot in East Timor as a fait accompli. From this point on Australia’s policy was largely reactive, working not to promote nor prevent independence but rather to ensure that the ballot was credible and accompanied by minimal violence. These efforts had to be delicately balanced against Australia’s primary strategic objectives – Indonesia’s democratic progress and the development of the bilateral relationship. Managing these conflicting objectives throughout 1999 was a significant challenge for Australia. Despite the severe violence that occurred after the ballot, Australia’s strategic policy was managed in an adroit manner that prioritised the most important objectives and avoided worst-case outcomes. Given Australia’s limited strategic options throughout 1998 and 1999, this is not an insignificant achievement.1 v. (various pagings)application/pdfen-AUAuthor retains copyrightAustraliaEast TimorTimor LesteEast Timorese independenceINTERFETJohn HowardANZUSAustralia-US alliance201210.25911/5d7239c2e4523