Bosworth, William2023-07-172023-07-170951-6298http://hdl.handle.net/1885/294272This paper defends the use of non-cooperative game theory for analysing questions of governance. To do so it posits a way of extending the resource account of social power from cooperative games to noncooperative games in a way that side steps a range of criticism. This involves identifying tipping points in the reputations of certain agents for paying and punishing those in their thrall. These tipping points are what give threats and offers their credibility in the absence of enforcement mechanisms and stabilise the distribution of social resources in society.application/pdfen-AU© 2022 The authorshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Powergovernancebargainingbayesian gamesreputationtipping points202210.1177/095162982210818102022-05-08Creative Commons Attribution licence