Jackson, FrankKriegel, Uriah2022-11-139780198749677http://hdl.handle.net/1885/278807Physicalism is a thesis in metaphysics: the nature of the mind and its states are such that we need no more than the physical properties to give a complete account of them. According to a priori physicalism, this thesis in metaphysics implies a thesis about a priori entailment. If the thesis in metaphysics is true, a sufficiently rich account of a subject—you, me, or … —given in physical terms a priori entails how that subject is mentally. Why do some physicalists want to make things difficult for themselves by embracing a priori physicalism; why do they believe that a posteriori physicalism—a prima facie less demanding version of physicalism—is not an option? This is the topic of this chapter. As we will see, there are a number of reasons that have or might be given.application/pdfen-AU© 2020 Oxford University PressPhysicalisma priori entailmentphysical propertiesconceptual analysisnecessary a posterioricombination problem202010.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.172021-11-28