Findlay, Trevor2022-11-222022-11-227315034730817-1831http://hdl.handle.net/1885/280387This paper, which was presented at the SANA/PND Conference on 'Checking The Arms Race ' held in Sydney from 13 -15 May 1988 , examines the reasons why verification of arms control and disarmament agreements 1s an inherently political undertaking. It looks at both the monitoring and compliance functions of verification and shows how both are affected by differing philosophies of verification, largely those espoused by the United States and the Soviet Union, and by the overall state of relations between the two superpowers. The paper discusses the possibility that the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Agreement her a 1 d s a convergence 1 n the po s i t ions of the two parties towards verification. Finally, several suggestions are offered as to how third parties, ike Australia , can help contribute to the verification of arms control agreements.application/pdfNuclear Arms ControlSoviet Union1988