Asano, AkihitoEto, Takaharu2004-07-122004-09-282011-01-052004-09-282011-01-052003http://hdl.handle.net/1885/42006http://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/42006The amakudari practice in the Japanese banking system officials from the Ministry of Finance obtaining post-retirement jobs in private banks is analysed within a game theoretic framework. We consider a game in which asymmetric information between depositors and banks regarding banks riskiness exists. Banks may hire amakudari officials to signal their riskiness, even when they are not contributing to improving banks projects. Various equilibria emerge depending upon productivity of officials, depositor's risk aversion, and the riskiness of banks. We discuss the veracity of these equilibria in the Japanese economy during the bubble and its preceding periods.462410 bytes350 bytesapplication/pdfapplication/octet-streamen-AUriskamakudarisignallingJapanese banking system2003