Jackson, FrankPettit, Philip2025-05-232025-05-2397801992533649781383039337ORCID:/0000-0003-2310-9132/work/184098075ORCID:/0000-0002-0355-3896/work/184100234http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=78649333591&partnerID=8YFLogxKhttps://hdl.handle.net/1885/733752450The contents of certain intentional states are broad or context00ADbound. The contents of some beliefs (and desires and hopes) depend on how things are outside the subject in addition to depending on how things are inside the subject.’ What implications does this have for the functionalist theory of mind? In this essay we defend the simplest reply to this question.24enPublisher Copyright: © in this volume Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith 2004.functionalistimplicationsintentionaloccupantpsychological2024-01-0110.1093/oso/9780199253364.003.000678649333591