Walmsley, Lachlan2023-07-311059-7123http://hdl.handle.net/1885/294648Radical enactivism (REC) and similar embodied and enactive approaches to the mind deny that cognition is fundamentally representational, skull-bound and mechanistic in its organisation. In this article, I argue that modellers may still adopt a mechanistic strategy to produce explanations that are compatible with REC. This argument is scaffolded by a multi-agent model of the true slime mould Physarum polycephalum.The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Funding was provided by Australian Research Council (Grant No. ARC FL13)application/pdfen-AU© The Author(s) 2019, Article Reuse GuidelinesMinimal cognitionradical enactivismmechanistic explanation202010.1177/10597123188245442022-06-05