Simangan, Dahlia2017-05-172017-05-17b43751520http://hdl.handle.net/1885/116935Scholars continue to debate how to best rebuild post-conflict societies. Some argue that the liberal peacebuilding framework is incompatible with local contexts and therefore recommend more substantial involvement of local actors. Others suggest that the problem is not the liberal peacebuilding framework itself, but its poor implementation and therefore recommend increased emphasis on strong institutions and capacity-building. Given the ongoing liberal rhetoric of the United Nations (UN) in rebuilding post-conflict societies, this thesis contributes to this debate by asking the question, does liberal peacebuilding really work? To find out the answer, the thesis assesses the UN transitional administrations in Cambodia, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste using a comparative case-study approach. This assessment includes an evaluation of how these transitional administrations implemented their mandates and how local involvement factored into the conduct of their peacebuilding activities. It also includes an examination of the outcomes of international and local encounters and top-down and bottom-up approaches in rebuilding security, pursuing justice and reconciliation, and promoting development by obtaining personal insights from the international and local actors who were involved during the transition. This thesis thus interrogates both the liberal assumption that the liberal peacebuilding framework can promote and sustain peace and the recommendation of liberal peacebuilding critics that local actors and agencies should be better incorporated into the peacebuilding process. This thesis finds that shallow liberal peacebuilding with fragile institutions and co-opted local involvement failed to build long-lasting peace. It reveals instances when the UN transitional administrations in Cambodia, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste departed from their liberal peacebuilding objectives. They were not consistently liberal because they failed to live up to their liberal mandates and they were also not entirely peace-building because they failed to espouse the original and holistic conceptualization of peacebuilding, which includes both negative and positive peace. When confronted with threats of instability, the UN transitional administrations analysed in this thesis leant too far towards the local even at the cost of liberal values. They also demonstrated a tendency to limit local involvement to actors who they feared might incite instability. The case studies show that local involvement that is exclusive, superficial, non-representative, and politicized does not contribute to a long-lasting peace. Considering the strengths and weaknesses of both liberal peacebuilding and local involvement, this thesis proposes a middle-ground alternative or a locally-moderated liberal peacebuilding approach that integrates the local in liberal peacebuilding while consistently anchoring local involvement in liberal values. The analyses of the case studies and the recommendations drawn from them aim to contribute to informing the debates about liberal peacebuilding and to advising future international post-conflict peacebuilding missions.enUnited Nationspeacebuildingtransitional administrationsCambodiaKosovoTimor-Lestesecurityjusticereconciliationeconomic developmentThe Limits of Liberal Peacebuilding and Pitfalls of Local Involvement: Cambodia, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste in retrospect201710.25911/5d7394162c51a