Jackson, Elizabeth2020-05-13Jackson EG. The relationship between belief and credence. Philosophy Compass. 2020;e12668. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.126681747-9991http://hdl.handle.net/1885/204083Sometimes epistemologists theorize about belief, a tripartite attitude on which one can believe, withhold belief, or disbelieve a proposition. In other cases, epistemologists theorize about credence, a fine-grained attitude that represents one's subjective probability or confidence level toward a proposition. How do these two attitudes relate to each other? This article explores the relationship between belief and credence in two categories: descriptive and normative. It then explains the broader significance of the belief-credence connection and concludes with general lessons from the debate thus far.Australian Research Council, Grant/Award Number: DP170101394application/pdfen-AU© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltdbeliefbelief-firstcredencecredence-firstdegree of beliefdualismepistemic rationalityLockean thesislottery paradoxpreface paradoxreductionstatistical evidence2020-04-2110.1111/phc3.126682021-11-28