

**Pak Ramelan**, Bendungan Djago. May 1968

(I lived at Pak Ramelan's house in Bendungan Djago for about a year. He was a journalist with the army-supported *Angkatan Bersendjata*.)

May 1968.

There were quite a large number of PKI members and supporters in Bendungan Djago – 'there are many Javanese'. Many were arrested but held for only a few days. 20 or 30 had still not returned although some of their wives had. Pak Ramelan suspects that Amir Machmud is 'soft' on the PKI because most of the 20 to 30 were fairly unimportant while the more important BD PKI leaders have been released.

After the coup the army asked the 'safe' people to prepare a list of PKI supporters which was done and apparently acted upon. Nowadays 'we treat those who were arrested but are now released with reserve and suspicion.'

The NU is also quite strong in the village. The NU members also include many Javanese, but actually they are Djakartans.

Previously the village guard was centred in the 'Pallychin?' 'We could sleep easily then'. Now Ramelan sleeps with a pistol under his pillow.

Let Kol Sugiarto S. Editor of *Angkatan Bersendjata*. October 16<sup>th</sup> 1968.

**Let.Kol. Sugiarto S.** 16 October 1968.

At the time of the coup, the Suharto forces had very few troops. Djawa and Djakarta were 'kosong'. The best Siliwangi, RPKAD etc troops were in Kalimantan. Only 'Tuhan' saved us! The coup was extremely well planned by the PKI.

Suharto's weapon against Sukarno. At Halim Sukarno agreed to broadcast in support of the coup but (apparently due to God's intervention) the transmitter at Halim was 'rusak'. Sukarno thus sent his message to RRI through Martadinata. But instead Martadinata went to Suharto. Suharto still holds the declaration of Sukarno. Later, Martadinata, the only witness, died in an aeroplane crash.

Suharto's line has always been to avoid bloodshed and civil war. This involves moving gradually and compromising. His policy toward Sukarno is to let him be, provided that he keeps out of politics.

Sugiarto thinks that Sukarno is a true Marxist. His writings have always followed those of Mao Tse-tung. His concept of Marhaenism was influenced by Mao.

Ali Sastromidjojo is 'bukan seorang bodoh'. He must have known of the PKI activity within the PNI.

Before the 1967 Special Session of the MPRS there was pressure to make Suharto president. However a meeting of the 4 AB panglima was held just before the session. Sutjipto (police) and Muljadi (Navy) both opposed the elevation of Suharto. According to Sugiarto, 9 battleships were placed in Jakarta harbour while 40 battalions of the army were on duty in Djakarta. Suharto preferred to take the title Pd Presiden. By the following year he was strong enough to become president.

Muljadi is a 'Sukarnoist'. Hartono, of KKO, was politically naïve.

*El Bahar* has taken over from *Warta Bhakti*. The Director of Information of the Navy is involved in his 'private' capacity. The two main figures are Poegoeh (nephew of Sukarno) and Tarteb (?). A body known as BMB (Badan Mulsjawarah Bahari) is behind it.

*Pelopor Baru* is a paper of the golongan non-ABRI.

On the night of the coup, Sahirman sent his servant to warn Parman but he arrived an hour too late. They were brothers.

Sugiarto is related to Ibu Tien Suharto. He heard before the coup that Suharto's father had told him that Indonesia was facing a great crisis. Suharto had to buy 7 white birds and release them. Independently Sugiarto heard that on the night of the coup a white bird was seen at Harjono's and Parman's houses. Possibly the other 5 went to the other generals' houses.



**Surjo. Pekuneg (Team Penertiban Keuangan Negara – Pekuneg). Maj.Djen Surjo**

**(Nusantara, Operasi, June 1967)**

In 1966 the Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan was regarded as ineffective and replaced by Pekuneg headed by Maj Djen Surjo.

Surjo seems to have a lot of financial and banking contacts, especially with Chinese. He.

Surjo was Suharto's financial advisor in SPRI.

Surjo's anak bersekolah luar negeri



## Cosmas Batubara, 1969

Turning point was Sukarno's 'Barisan Sukarno' speech. Before January the issue was Gestapu. After that speech the issue began to be Sukarno.

People like Chaerul Saleh were anti-Gestapu. It was only after March 11 when Chaerul broadcast on behalf of Sukarno that he was considered an enemy.

KOSTRAM was formed after 11 March by the Aksi groups but KAMI did not want to join, because all the top positions would be taken by the older people from the other fronts who nevertheless did not want to have the same mass base as KAMI. However Firdaus of KAMI wanted to join KOSTRAM.

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## Sujono Priyosusilo, Sekaralas (near Madiun), 21-25 November 1968

Sekaralas is about 1 hour by docart from Walikukun.

Population about 4,000

School – 6 Sekolah Dasar, 1 SMP

Probably about 60% of children go to school.]

Very few go to university eventually. Recently 2 who did returned to Sekaralas because they were needed by the families; one, a graduate in agriculture in technology has become a farmer and the other, a graduate in technology has become a teacher in the SMP. Neither are happy about their return. Probably they had difficulty getting employment in the city.

There is a university in Ngawi which is not so far from Walikukun (maybe a branch of some other university)

Transport.

There are two motor-cars (one owned by Jono). There are a few privately owned docarts, but over 100 bicycles.

Land

There is a very large proportion of landless workers. Those who work for Jono get about 2-3000 Rps for 6 months work – but they get three meals a day. It seems that about ten work for him (although this is not completely clear to me).

Lurah

Jono's father who claims to be 78 but is probably nearer 85 is the lurah, and has been lurah since 1942. He retired from the civil service in the early 1930s.

Golongan

About 30% are pure abangan and 30% really Muslim. The rest are inbetween. The abangan and santri live in their own areas in the village.

While not all abangan were communists, all communists were abangan.

After the coup many communists were arrested but only 3 or 4 have not returned. There was no bloodshed in the post-coup period. Twice a week the ex-communists who have not been cleared must report to the lurah who gives them a short talk and they must sign their names. There were about 350, about a half of whom were women. They seemed to be quite friendly with the Priyosusilo family.

The Islamic group seems more prosperous. Their part of the village looks much better than the abangan section which looks very poor indeed. Particularly the children in the poor areas looked poorly clothed and dirty. However everywhere people looked reasonably well-fed. This season had been very good.

Crops

The rice this season was very good because of the continuous rain permitting two crops. However, the rice price has fallen from about Rp.70 per day to Rp. 30. Jono was feeling the punch.

## Coup

Jono thinks the PKI knew beforehand. Tension was rising in the village. Two weeks before, the PKI leaders held a course at Ngawi. Communists made threats to non-communists. Communist children stopped coming to the Priyosusilo house to play as they previously did. Parents of children at the new Muslim school were told to take their children from the school. Apparently there was no aksi sepihak however.

On October 1 the communists were first to know. It is doubtful that any of them were listening to the radio so they must have got the news from Walikukun. On the 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> a Pemuda Rakyat youth was spending the whole day on the veranda at the Priyosilo's.

There are about 3 or 4 members of ABRI for the village and all were very junior.

The communist leader in the village was a school-teacher.

## Mary Johnson, Solo, 1973

BUUD was introduced early in 1973. The lurah/tjamat etc are obliged to collect a quota of rice in their village and sell it at a set price to the government. The price has fallen well below the market price. In the Walikukun area the entire crop was acquired to be surrendered to the government. As a result there is much smuggling to Solo (eg. ladies with bundles on the buses).

The quotas are set based on BIMAS figures which had been inflated in the past.

The lurahs are threatened with re-tooling etc if they fail to meet the quota.

When Suharto visited an area near Solo, the tjamat rented rice for a day in order to give the impression that collection had been successful.

The villages are not paid in cash but by chits from the government. There is nervousness about whether payment will in fact be made.

There is a new bupati in one areas who was previously in Blora (?). There he was known as 'bupati jalan' because of his enthusiasm for road widening. Now all the villages have to widen their main roads to permit large vehicles to pass. This involves taking land from householders, plots etc.

Princen, December 1969

Djatim.

Sumitro had to go carefully because of the strength of KKO and Orla elements in Brawidjaja.

When Jasin came, he started cleaning up the orla which meant he had to leave the NU while at the same time protecting the PNI (Orba). Jasin is one of the 'military intellectuals' and surrounded by PSI elements.

*Djateng*

Surono cannot do away with PNI. Hadisubeno has restored the PNI to a strong force. For a while Surono was working closely with the Catholics. He is very secular himself.

In 1965 Djateng (Diponegoro) was 60/40 Orla, Brawidjaja 40/60, Siliwangi 35/65.

Moehono was close to Sutjipto in Peperti and was thus a strong supporter of Orla. However he was close to Suharto in Semarang.

Sudharmono was also an Orla element.

Opsus had its origin in Kostrad as the intel group under Ali Murtopo (also a strong supporter of Orla). Its first major operation was peace with Malaysia (Ali Murtopo and Benny).

There is considerable rivalry between Ali Murtopo, Sutopo Juwono, and Benny. Yoga has been closer to Islamic groups. Sutopo has been involved in 'Mingguan Chas'.

Yoga agrees with what Princen said about Purwadadi was true but for various reasons, this cannot be admitted.

Zulkifli Lubis has been sent to Russia on Intell business allegedly to discuss the Breznev Doctrine but in fact to fool the Russians into extending the discussion on their debt.

Suhardiman was from SOKSI and a trading PN. He supplied funds for the crushing of G-30-S. However he has had a number of failures at Berdikari – being involved in two bank crashes. He also failed to obtain credit from Taiwan (this was his main failure).

In Djatim Sarbini still had his group in Brawidjaja who were very strong. This group was still fairly pro-Sukarno in 1966, 1967,

### **Maj.Gen. Surjo (Nusantara, Operasi, June 1967**

In 1966 the Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan headed by Suprajogi was considered ineffective. So a Team Penerbitan Keuangan Negara (Pekuneg) was set up which is now part of the secretariat Negara. Pekuneg is headed by Maj.Djen Surjo.

Its function appears to be to inspect state financial transactions. If administrative irregularities are discovered, criminal irregularities are discovered, the matter is reported to the instansi concerned. If criminal irregularities are discovered, the case is handed over to the TPK/Djaksa Agung. However, according to *Nusantara*, they are very slow in discovering cases.

Surjo seems to have a lot of financial and banking contacts. He has contact with many Chinese. He arranges credit etc. The LST deal was carried out with a Chinese.

Surjo's anak bersekolah diluar negeri. He lives in Djl Sriwidjaya.

He was also Suharto's advisor in SPRI.

Stuart Graham, 11/6/1969

Zamrood Airlines:

Originally an American company controlled by an American who had flown for Indonesia against the Dutch and later for the PRRI (John Fowler?). However after purchasing their planes and bringing them to Indonesia, they had to wait about 6 months for permission to begin operations. After that period they decided to sell out to a group of generals who immediately got permission. One of the generals is a former Cabinet Minister who was later ambassador in Rome. (Iskandar Ishak – also Director Utama HI).

Pertamina

There are about 25 companies in Indonesia with about 6 actually producing oil.

They entered production-sharing agreements with Pertamina. In the case of S's company 60:40 with Pertamina getting the 60. The area granted is reduced by a quarter each year if there is no success. Now companies have to pay \$10,000 per application, whether their application is accepted or not.

Apart from this, unofficial payments must be made to the Pertamina representative. This goes straight to his personal a/c, not to the Pertamina a/c.

## General Simatupang, November 1969, Kapita Selekta UI

During the revolution, panglima TNI was elected by the other panglima, not appointed by the government. Sudirman was therefore rather independent of the government.

When Sukarno and Hatta were arrested, the real government was the TNI. The Pemerintah Darurat at Bukittinggi had no real authority.

Simatupang committed the TNI to support the Roem- ? agreement in 1949 although many military men disagreed. Nevertheless they remained loyal to the agreement.

Hamid (?) says that Simatupang agreed to incorporate KNIL in the TNI as a unit. What Simatupang agreed to, was to incorporate some of KNIL according to the needs of the TNI. Later Hamid tried to have Simatupang killed.

It was decided to draw up a set of obligations for soldiers. Simatupang was Kas at the time. He proposed 'Pedoman Pradjurit Angkatan Perang' but he was over-ruled by those who supported the magical Sanskritized 'Sapta Marga'. Simatupang sees the value of such terms now although he is little attracted personally.

The party system lost its authority when the PNI-Masjumi coalition broke up in 1952. No longer was a stable system possible. The Masjumi then split (NU) and a group in the PNI looked to the PKI as its ally.

The 'peristiwa 17 October' was not a coup. If Simatupang had wanted to stage a coup, he could have by raising his telephone. But he did not want to because the TNI had no idea of what to do once they had power.

While everyone realised that the old system had to go, the trouble with BK's new system was the role it gave to the PKI. Probably BK thought that the PKI was essentially nationalistic with internationalistic trimmings.

The coup. The PKI were 'takut konyol-mati'. If BK died, the AD would eliminate the PKI. Therefore, they had to act. Sjam said that there were enough supporters in the AD and Aidit had no way of checking this for himself.

## T.D.Hafas, Nusantara, November 1969

Pangab Muljadi was Orba but he had to always bear in mind the KKO and Hartono who were Orla. Mokoginta and Sobiran were moved from Medan because they had been there a long time. They were not Orla.

Mokoginta is very religious. Sobiran was not tough enough to deal with PNI. Pangak Sutjipto was pro-Sukarno but ineffective. Sudirgo (Ass 1) was really pro-PKI. He has only recently been arrested. Suharto should have moved earlier.

Sarwo Edhie was moved away from Medan in 1968 partly because he was too direct with the PNI. There is a lot of smuggling in Medan – although in Sumatera smuggling has been reduced from \$300m to \$100m. The AD is involved but not officially; the money is not sent on to Djakarta.

OB Sjaaf of the AL anti-smuggling command is a good man who has played an important role in reducing smuggling.

Sukendro was not arrested in July 1967 but he was arrested in July 1968 for 5-6 days. He was head of intel in the early 1960s (??).InI

Frans Seda is Orla.

Sutjipto SH switched sides. He was made a minister by Suharto in 1966 to avoid too sharp a break with the past.

Pekuneg was not really a judicial body. It could only investigate issues on the order of the Pd Pres. Thus it was necessary to form TPK.

Surjo has been involved in AD finances since 1945. Surjo was a top man in Intendans AD before the coup, ie responsible for ordering equipment etc. Surjo is very corrupt. It was a mistake for Suharto to appoint him to Pekuneg. Surjo is from Diponegoro.

Pranoto was arrested in the middle of 1967 ?

There were two Muslim groups reported to be forming a Muslim Party – Hatta and Farakh (???). Hatta's was just a 'proof ballon' of the PNI? (I think he means the rumours that Hatta was to be appointed Ketua PNI in 1969.)

The problem of the PM was military resistance to Masjumi. Thus all Masjumi men had to be eliminated for the leadership before the party could be legalised.

The PSI people are all very clever and intellectual but they have no roots with the people. They claim that they control the golongan independent but this is untrue. The golongan independent was divided between those who saw it as a physical force (eg Omar Khayam) and those who saw it as a moral force (like Hafas himself). Omar Khayam had recently come back from USA with a doctorate in literature and knew nothing of politics. He wanted to lead the gerakan independent but it came to nothing. Masjuri also wanted to be a leader (of what?). The

Bandung group were not interested. There was also the issue of whether or not to go into the DPR. Hafaz was opposed.

A number of generals were sympathetic but the three main ones were Dharsono, Sarwo Edhie and Kemal Idris.

90% of foreign banks are owned by foreign Chinese. There are 10 big Chinese businessmen. However the Chinese are protected by the generals, the two most important being Surjo and Sudjono Humardani. Alamsyah is less involved with the Chinese. Alamsyah was of great service to Suharto after the coup. Before that he does not appear to have had close connections with Suharto. Nearly all the other men close to Suharto had been close to him for years. Sudjono Humardani and Suharto have the same dukun.

Ahmad Tirtasudero was with Suharto in Djogya (1949). Suryo was 'Suharto's paymaster also in KOTI.

The trouble with Suharto is that he cannot believe that his old colleagues are corrupt without very concrete evidence. It is not that they particularly serve Suharto. (except the special case of Ibnu Sutowo.

Suhardiman has made a mess of Berdikari. He has not been able to run a huge business.

## **Cosmas Batubara, 12-5-1970**

The Ketua PPMI was Bambang Kusnohadi of GMNI. Cosmas was the Wakil Ketua. After the coup, the anti-communists wanted to expel CGMI and Perhini (Chinese). GMNI only wanted to 'menonaktifkan' them. A deadlock developed and Sjarif Thojab as Men P+K was asked to call an emergency congress. Other groups were also demanding the formation of a new student organisation. Eventually a meeting was held at Thojab's house. GMNI was represented by one of Bambang's deputies. At first GMNI and GMKI were reluctant to support a new organisation. Eventually Thajab put forward a set of objectives such as crush Malaysia and Gestapu which all agreed to. Thajab then suggested a leadership consisting of PMKRI, SOMAD, Mapantjas and GMNI (plus one or two others). HMI was deliberately excluded. GMNI then said that as a party body they first had to consult the party. They would report back in the afternoon. Eventually they did not join. Next day Zamoni became Ketua Periodik.

Abdul Gafur (HMI) had earlier formed Panitia Aksi Massa Pengganjangan Kontra Gestapu in UI. This later became the UI branch of KAMI.

The first KAMI rally was held on 3<sup>rd</sup> November. GMNI (Osa) took part. A meeting of KAMI was held which decided to hold demonstrations from 10<sup>th</sup> January. Although there was no direction from AD [Angkatan Darat], officers of Kodam Djaya attended the meeting which was open. Sarwo Edhie was invited to speak to the rally.

On 15<sup>th</sup>, student leaders were invited to attend the Cabinet meeting at Bogor. However Sukarno just gave an angry speech. Afterwards Cosmas spoke to the students outside who were demanding a ban on the PKI. They accused the leaders of compromising etc. Some wanted to scale the fence which was guarded by Tjaksa (?). Cosmas then called Suharto who spoke – he said that in practice PKI had already been banned by the local panglima.

On 18<sup>th</sup> about ten student leaders, led by Cosmas, were called to the Palace. Before meeting the President, Cosmas met a KKO officer who was an adjutant (who happened to be a Catholic). He told Cosmas not to rebut the President because Bapak sedang marah. Ruslan, Seda and some others also attended. Cosmas spoke first explaining that the students wanted to be loyal to BK etc but still there were some issues to be raised. BK was angry. He accused Catholic students of scribbling on Hartini's house at Bogor slogans such as 'Pelatjur Agung'. Then Ruslan got into the debate with the GMNI (Osa) representative who was accused of insulting Ruslan etc. The meeting lasted about 3 hours.

Early in February Cosmas and others were arrested by Kodam V. The Muslims were strongly questioned for any Masjumi links. Amir Machmud strongly disliked Masjumi.

What was Kodam V's attitude to KAMI? Amir appeared to take a neutral line between the President and KAMI. However his Kepala Staf, Witono, was very sympathetic. Also Ass-5 Urip Widodo was close to KAMI. KAMI leaders were given weapons for self-defence by KODAM-5. KODAM-5 also provided some transport to go to Bogor.

In many KAMI activities, AD intell elements certainly took part. For example it was probably intell groups that took secret files in the attack on the Departemen.

After the parties statement on 10<sup>th</sup>, KAMI went to some of the party leaders. Kasimo wept. Subchan said a new statement was being prepared. KAMI prepared their own statement in which they said that the parties had been forced to sign it. Next day the parties' statement was dropped by helicopter.

Cosmas still does not know exactly what happened on 11<sup>th</sup> March. Perhaps Kemal-Ali Murtopo played a big role.

Cosmas and a KAMI delegation had a 5-hour meeting with BK in June. They were also given a meal. Afterwards BK told 'Antara' that he held discussions with KAMI which ended in lunch together, thus giving the impression that differences were settled. He asked delegations not to tell other people about the content of the discussions.

In July Cosmas went to Djatim. Surabaya was under KKO control. AD units were quartered outside the city. The Raiders (Kostrad) were at Malang. Cosmas spoke to a small meeting in Surabaya. In Probolinggo the Kodim banned the meeting.

In Medan Sobiran was probably too careful while Sarwo was not careful enough. Apart from PNI there are the Kesatuan Aksi and Pemuda Pantasila (who are mainly toughs). Sarwo treated the Kesatuan Aksi as he had in Djakarta. But they are of a different quality there. Sarwo even protected them after they were involved in murder. This was too much for other officers.

Before March 1966 there were Siliwangi troops in Djakarta housed at the GKBI headquarters.

### **Yassien (Kediri) 23 May 1970.**

Y was in Kediri at the time of the coup. He was the deputy secretary of the local NU. When the coup occurred there was much confusion. However no one did anything. During the days after the coup a few NU leaders were kidnapped and killed, but this seems to have been going on for some time.

On 13<sup>th</sup> October, NU held a demonstration at the PKI building. Although Y says it was planned to be peaceful, it met with PKI resistance. Y saw his friend hack open a PKI neck at the demonstration.

After this the killings commenced. NU simply rounded up communists every night. Sometimes they were killed in their homes; sometimes taken out of the town and killed. Then their bodies were thrown into the Brantas river. Not only men but sometimes their wives were also killed.

The army did nothing. It was powerless. Often it sympathised with the PKI, sometimes military men protected their own relatives in the PKI. But in general it did nothing to stop the killing.

The RPKAD never came to Kediri until August 1967.

Y himself felt sick for a month after the first killings on 13<sup>th</sup> October. When invited to take part he pleaded illness. Eventually in July 66 he fled to Jakarta. He was afraid to say anything against the killings because if he had, possibly he also would have been taken. Since then he has left the NU.

The killings continued on a big scale well into 1966. After that the army arrested communists. The army continued to kill them into 1967 and 1968. Even recently there have been reports in March of prisoners being killed in Kediri. Prisoners are taken out in trucks to

'work' in a plantation at 1 am. Y has heard chanting from a Koran in the areas at the time the prisoners began 'work'. Many people believe they are being killed.

Before the coup, since 1962, tensions were rising with the PKI insulting religion and taking the lead.

**Rachman Tolleng** (editor Mahasiswa Indonesia), 21 November 1970

Most of the KAMI leaders in Bandung were from the PSI group although not necessarily members of the PSI. (RT himself was never a member). HMI students also joined KAMI. In Djakarta PSI elements did not stand out so much in KAMI (only Soe Hak Gie, Slamet Sukanto (?) etc.

Unpad before the coup was a PNI stronghold The staff was largely PNI while students were influenced by the staff. CGMI also had members. Subadio and other PSI leaders were opposed to the provocative activities of RT etc. RT was closer to Sumitro who openly opposed BK. The PSI students had contacts with the army through the old PSI leader, Sumarno, who had been one of the founders of Siliwangi.

Many people believed that Adjie was on the side of the Orde Baru but RT always had his doubts. Adjie was abroad until the evening of 30<sup>th</sup> September. On 1<sup>st</sup> he issued a statement that was open to any interpretation on the need to save BK. Similarly his support for Barisan Sukarno is open to two interpretations. He also banned KAMI's planned 'Long March' on Djakarta. This was stopped at Tjumatris (?). In fact this was a face-saving compromise for the KAMI leaders. Adjie made it look as if they were stopped but in fact it had been agreed upon before hand.

In early March there were about 6 Siliwangi battalions in Djakarta. RT was acting as a kind of liaison officer with them. Some were pro-ORBA but others were very dubious. RT tends to believe that Adjie sent them there to protect BK. Similarly it is said that Siliwangi battalions moved to the edge of Djakarta on 11<sup>th</sup>, but with what purpose?

On 12<sup>th</sup> a mass meeting was held in Bandung to welcome the Supersemar etc. Adjie spoke. But in fact the meeting had been arranged by the Kes Aksi well in advance.

The key troops in Jakarta on 11 March were Kostread, RPKAD, Siliwangi and Kavalir. Kavalir was camped in Senayan and headed by Overste (?) Muljono (later arrested on corruption charges.) His deputy Wing Wirjawan (adik of Gens. Hartono and Hartawan). Muljono supported the Orba although his reasons are not clear.

An intel man called Suropto played an important role in creating the atmosphere. He told the Kaveleri that Kostrad was ready to move and then told Kostrad that the Kaveleri was about to move. Similarly the RPKAD was brought in. Suropto was previously with Mandala intelijen and then with Kostrad. He is a friend of RT.

It is not altogether clear how much Suharto knew of what was going on.

Adjie helped to oust Ali at the PNI Congress. This was because he was essential a soldier loyal to the Panglima. KAMI students also took part in this (RT was opposed to this participation).

Dharsono and Kemal (and also Witono) had been influenced by the PNI from the past. Kemal was involved in the October 17<sup>th</sup> affair. Thus they all opposed BK. On the other hand, Sarwo Edhy has no such record of opposition to BK.

Prof Sabini took the view in 1966 that BK should be retained as a balance to the army and Muslims. In fact the Army Seminar results were not so radical. Basically they aimed to open the way to the restorations of the PSI.

Similarly the independent group basically aimed to restore the PSI.

The Dwipartai idea was circulating in Bandung in early 1967. It seemed to imply the dissolution of the parties although this need not be immediate. For example, Suharto could have disbanded the MPRS and appointed a new one in which the party role was insignificant. However the momentum was lost.

Later Dharsono took up the idea strongly although he was never openly committed to disbanding the parties. Under pressure he withdrew somewhat and suggested a 'Dwigroup' system. RT thinks this to be wrong and does not solve anything.

## **Maj.Gen. Surjosumpeno, 26.11 1970**

Surjosumpeno was sent to Sumatra as the third commander in the effort to crush PRRI. The first two were Yani and Pranoto. He was there for 6 months in 1959. Then in 1960 he was made Panglima in West Sumatra. IN 1963 he was sent for a year's course in Seskoad but after ten months was appointed to succeed Sarbini as Panglima Diponegoro.

When he went to Semarang the Division was heavily infiltrated by the PKI, but Sarbini said they were all OK. Nevertheless S was cautious because some officers had been involved in Madiun.

Usually S never listened to the radio but on 1<sup>st</sup> October – due to God's intervention – the radio was going at 7am. When he heard of Untung's coup against a Dewan Djenderal, he could not believe it. Firstly, he was very close to Yani since Peta days and secondly he knew that Untung had suddenly been posted to Djakarta (by Pranoto). Thus it looked now that Untung's move had been planned in advance.

S called a meeting of the SAD (six) Tunggal and his own staff. Some notably did not attend including Sujono Atmo, Suharman and some other members of his staff. Usman attended with a weapon. S told them that he did not believe the news and ordered Usman to broadcast to the people to keep calm. He also sent various officers out to various garrisons. He himself went to Magelang where the Garrison was ex-Madiun but there were also the artillery and cavalry. He was accompanied by one of his two adjutant (who was PKI). Katamso came up from Djogja.

He then decided to go to Salatiga. On the way, he heard Sahirman's announcement of the Dewan Revolusi in Semarang. (The pro-PKI adjutan sitting behind him in the jeep did nothing). At Salatiga he found the commander under arrest in his house. A captain then came with a pistol and tried to arrest S. S was angry and told him that he knew more about the Dewan Revolusi than the Kapten did. He then stepped into his car, took the wheel, and drove with his supir and the adjutan off to Semarang.

At Gombol he met Letkol Sugiyono who told him Semarang was under PKI control. Sugiyono suggested S return with him to Djogja. S decided to go into Semarang. Sugiyono returned to Djogja where he was killed by Katamso.

S went to his home at about 3pm. The guards saluted him which meant they were loyal. Then his pro-PKI adjutant left him. Immediately after this the telephone wires were cut.

Then the officer who had been sent to Solo (?) reported to him. S sent him to Magelang to see how things were there. He also called the Assistant in charge of Logistics, who had the keys to all the Gudang with arms and ammunition.

At about 7.30 he sent a note to Suherman saying he supported the Dewan Revolusi if it really menyelamatkan BK. He called Suherman to his house but Suherman said he would come next morning.

S then decided it would be better to go in a civilian car to Magelang. He reached Magelang at 2am. He immediately called meetings of the local military and ordered them (except the Garison) to be ready to march to Semarang. At 5.30 they left.

As they came to the hills into Semarang, they saw trucks of soldiers fleeing. S ordered the artillery not to fire on them. He believed that the ordinary soldiers did not know what it was all about. He then went into Semarang and took back the empty Kodam building.

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Four Jen (erals) were involved. S asked Suharto to send them out of Java in order to investigate who was loyal and who was not. If this had been done in Djateng, they would have fled to the PKI villages. The troops were ordered to Sumatra, Bandjarmasin, Pontianak and Menado. They went without resistance. He also called back the Brigif stationed in Sumatra. It arrived before the RPKAD.

S called Sarwo Eddy to hurry on to Solo because there were threats to burn Solo and the Bupati of Boyolali had left his position to rouse the people. After that the action was taken to crush the PKI.

Eventually Aidit was captured. He had a pistol and resisted, so he was shot. S reported this to BK who was 'diam sadja'.

Maj.Djen Sucipto, S.H., 18 June 1970

In May 1966 Sukarno was considering disbanding the MPRS and re-establishing KNIP. However, his plan had not reached a concrete stage. He was also wanting to fill the ex-PKI seats with his own supporters. One of the supporters of the plan to restore KNIP was Sartono of the PNI who was probably thinking that this was the way to 'menyelematkan' PNI. Ketua Mahkamah Agung, Wirjono, was not involved in this. At this time, Ruslan Abdulgani was not so close to the President. In fact since 1963 Subandrio had been much closer to BK than Ruslan. (When Ruslan was Menlu, Subandrio was Sekdjen Deplu; for that time Subandrio tried to by-pass Ruslan by going directly to the President. Ruslan and Subandrio had been opponent since then.)

Pernyataan ABRI 5 Mei indirectly oppose the MNIP plan by proposing the strengthening the MPRS etc in pasal 4 (c).

As far as Sutjipto remembers, BK only led two sessions of the Kab Ampera, one relating to the appointment of Dirjen, Sekdjen etc and one other. Ruslan and Leimena continued to attend Kabinet sessions but their influence was slight.

Both Yani and Parman were 'dekat dgn Sukarno'.

Sutjipto was dismissed as Ketua GV Koti due to an order issued under the name of Sukarno to 'membekukan PKI dan Ormas2nja' on 14<sup>th</sup> October. When Sutjipto met BK, he said he could not get BK's prior approval because BK was always moving about at that time.

On 11<sup>th</sup> March Suharto was sick. Sutjipto met him at his house that day. He did not order troops to appear in front of the Palace.

Prano

**Abdul Gafur**, ex-pemimpin KAMI, 23-5-70

AG was deputy Ketua of the Dewan Mahasiswa--controlled Dewan Mahasiswa of the UI. Early in October he established an UI body, the Mengganjang GESTAPU. As a HMI representative he was chairman and Hatta Mustafa (PMII) was secretary. There were also PMKRI and GMKI etc representatives. This body had no formal contact with Subchan' organisation.

Sjarif Thajeb played an important role in establishing KAMI after contact was made between him and student leaders. It was planned to replace the national student organisation. GMNI attended the first meeting but did not take an active role. Later they did not attend. After that GMNI (Osa) joined KAMI.

There are quite a number of Javanese KAMI leaders but usually they have Islamic rather than 'Su...' type names.eg Zamroni, Marie Mohamed, Nurcholis Masjid etc.

Abdul Gafur's father is Atjehnese and his mother Ambonese. After graduating in medicine he joined the Air Force and now edits an AURI-supported newspaper in Surabaya. The newspaper was established when the present AURI-Kas was Panglima in Surabaya.

Kami had very close ties with Sarwo Edhie and often held consultations with him. Apart from Sarwo, they were also close to Kemal Idris and Witono. Dharsono was close to the KAMI of Bandung. (AG says that Dharsono was not in Djakarta at that time.) Although they did not hold consultation with Amir Mahmud, he did not harm KAMI.

On 18<sup>th</sup> AG was in a delegation that met Sukarno. At first Sukarno was very angry that such young people should think that they could think they could criticise the government etc but afterwards they had quite a good discussion with him.

## **Ali Sastroamidjojo, ex Ketua Urusan PNI**

14.11.1970

The definition of Marhaenisme as Marxism should be seen in its context. The PKI was on the offensive. The PNI was on the offensive. The PNI was anxious to get BK's blessing. Thus it declared itself as the 'Partai Pelopor' and adopted BK's definition of Marhaenisme. This was accepted unanimously after the acceptance of an amendment from Osa in which reference was made to God. Aidit attacked the PNI definition.

Surachman certainly did not control the PNI as Sek-Djen.

Hadisubeno came to Ali to ask about the PNI response to 'aksi sepihak'. Ali told him that every time the PKI hit, the PNI should hit back twice. Ali supported the Land Reform law which had been sponsored by the PNI in 1960. However in fact there were no 'big landlords' (eg 100 hectares) in Indonesia.

A Solo leader came to Ali. The Solo leaders wanted to campaign against the mayor of Solo. However, Ali told him not to. The important thing was to hit the PKI in the villages, not in the towns. This Solo leader then went back and claimed that Ali was pro-communist.

Surjosumeno was 'nationalist-oriented' but not pro-Ali. He permitted the BPK to hold its meeting in December in Djogya only with conditions. The PNI could not get permission to hold the congress elsewhere.

Adjie was a friend of Ali's. In 1964 the BPK had met at Lembong because it would be protected by Adjie. However by the time of the Bandung Congress, Adjie was no longer in a strong position.

The Bandung congress was held under great pressure. Many Ali supporters were arrested earlier. Also delegates had to show identification card etc to the troops at the doors. Many were rejected for technical reasons (eg no photograph). During Ali's speech could almost not be heard. Ali proposed a new united pengurus – eg Ketua from Hardi's group, Ketua 1 from Ali etc, but this was rejected. Eventually Ali had to surrender.

K.H. Musto'in Ramly, Pesantran Darul Ulum, Peterangan, 24 May 1970.

The Pesantran was founded by his grandfather and headed by his father. When his father died, he became the kiyai. At that time he was Sekjen Dep Veteran which was directly under the Kas AD (Nasution). He also studied teknik for 7 months in Koeln in the 1950s.

The pesantran is rather modern - 50% religion, 50% umum. There were both girls and boys.

There were not so many PKI in the immediate Djombang area but they were brought from Modjokerto and all over the place. They were taken to the nearby forest and killed by the Pesantran students. Tens of thousands were killed there.

The Kiyai says that if the NU could closely work with BK in the past, it should not be too difficult to work with Suharto now.

The kiyai has been asked by 'Operasi Khusus Angkatan Darat' to find young men to be sent to Malaysia to 'membendung komunisme.' He is now sending 100 who will work in perkebunan there.

**Sulaman, Sekretaris PNI, Kota Solo, 10-9-70**

In Solo the PNI was the main force against the PKI. They found it impossible to carry out Ali's policy in co-operation with the PKI. 'Kebetulan' many of the land-holders hit by the Aksi Sepihak were from the PNI. Thus it was natural that there was conflict.

After Hadisubeno cs were expelled, the Solo leaders headed by Subekti met Handi(?). After that they were replaced by a new PNI leadership in Solo in August or September.

Earlier the PNI had tried to form an alliance with Parkindo and Partai Katholik to menghantam Oetomo Ramalan. The NU were about to join but then Oetomo Ramelan offered them a seat in the BPH which they accepted. One of the conditions was to refrain from co-operating with the PNI.

The operasi menumpas Gestapu continued until about January. Djam malam was declared in particular areas and then the area was searched for communists.

In 1966-67 the PNI was involved in physical clashes with KAMI-KAPPI. A major incident occurred when KAMI students took part in 'Operasi Ampera' after the Bengawan Solo flood. GMNI students called out 'Hidup Bung Karno'. A clash took place and one Pemuda Marhaenis was killed.

Before the coup the Kepala Daerah in Klaten was PNI. However he was under great pressure from the PKI.

**Adhy Sukirno, Suluh Marhaen, Semarang, 8-9-70.**

There were clashes between PKI and PNI before Gestapu but the numbers killed were very small.

Hadisubeno was suspended in 1965 and replaced by Gub. Mochtar as Ketua I.

In 1966-7 clashes certainly took place between PNI and KAMI-KAPRI but they were not really serious.

The people of Djateng are like Petruk and Semar etc. They will loyally follow any leader within certain limits. That is provided that they do not violate certain principles, because Petruk etc are really gods.

## **Subchan, Wakil Ketua MPRS, Nahdatul Ulama**

**16 April 1970**

KAP-Gestapu arose from the anti-govt activity of the 1960s. At the time of the PRRI revolt, Muslim students were divided among those who supported the revolt and those who said it was better to work within. Subchan was a leader of the second group. Through these years he held courses to train cadres who were mostly Muslims. The Catholics (including Harry Tjan) joined in later. The PSI who later claimed to have led the opposition in fact did nothing.

The PKI were pushing Sukarno to ban HMI. Sukarno was wanting to, but he was waiting for support from NU. However, contrary to Sukarno's expectation, the NU failed to support such a ban. Thus Sukarno hesitated. On 28<sup>th</sup> Sukarno addressed CGMI celebrations but still did not announce a ban on HMI. The PKI felt very frustrated.

Leimena left Subchan's group informed of what was going on. As tension was increasing, Subchan's group, including Harry Tjan (Lim Bian Kie) met on 30<sup>th</sup> to discuss the situation. That night the coup occurred. Subchan's men quickly left Jakarta to the daerah leaving only Subchan himself in Jakarta. Thus the KAP-Gestapu was formed on the 2<sup>nd</sup> and a big rally held on 4<sup>th</sup>. Similar rallies were held about the 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> in Semarang and Surabaya.

There certainly existed a Dewan Djenderal but not in the PKI's sense. However they were all pro-BK except Nasution who as usual was undecided. Nasution disliked BK personally but could never bring himself to oppose BK openly. When Subchan offered support to Nasution on 6 October, Nasution declined. From then on the Kap-Gestapu supported Suharto. Apart from the dubious Nasution, only Parman was really anti-BK. Sukendro is just a professional intelligence man – very clever but without principles (like Ali Murtopo).

On 9 November a large rally was held. (At this anti-BK overtones appeared). Ali Murtopo claimed to have obtained Rp 115 million from Chaerul Saleh for the meeting. In present times, however, this is only 3-4 million. Chaerul Saleh was trying to back two horses. The money went via Herlina and Kostrad to Harry Tjan.

On 5<sup>th</sup> December Amir Mahmud declared his loyalty to support BK. This is the AD's (Angkatan Darat) black spot like Maret 10 for partai politik.

How deliberate was the killing of the communists on the part of the army? Of course it was, they took quotas from the camps 'and handed them over to us'. Why were more killed in Djatim. In Djateng the PNI had been close to the PKI. Therefore they did not take part so enthusiastically. However in Djatim, Ansor and Pertanu (?) had been fighting with the PKI over land reform since 1964. Thus the crucial factor was the presence of 'our people'. While the killings may have gone on too far and may have been tragic from a humanitarian point of view, Subchan is inclined to the view that they were 'a blessing'.

On March 10<sup>th</sup> BK called a meeting of party leaders to condemn KAMI. PNI and Partindo agreed. Three strongly disagreed – Subchan, Kasim (Katholik) and Ahmad Sukamidjaya (IPKI). However the two other IPKI representatives eventually gave in, first Sukendro and then Ny Hidayat. Also Arudji (?) and Harsono Tjakrominatu of PSII agreed. By then Sukarno left leaving Leimena in charge. Subchan as Ketua of the Front Pantjasila was concerned that the Front remained united. He was responsible for drafting the final

compromise; that is disapproving of the 'tjara2 jang dipergunakan para pelajar, mahasiswa and pemuda itu yang akibat2nya langsung ataupun tidak langsung dapat membahayakan djalannya revolusi Indonesia dan merongrong kewibawaan PBR Bung Karno '.

After the meeting, some of the parties issued another statement declaring that they did not condemn the student's action that did not endanger the revolution. However Parkindo did not at first sign this (presumably because it contained critical references to Leimena). They then went to the Panglima2 (especially Dharsono) and said that they had done all they could. However their good name was in danger. If the panglima2 wanted a civil ally, they would have to act immediately. They acted on the 11<sup>th</sup>.

In the MPRS in 1966 a resolution was passed asking Suharto to form a government. This was passed by the Komisi. However Sukarno was angry. Eventually a compromise 'pendjanaan' was agreed on which was approved in the pleno session. Only Buyung Nasution disagreed.

Muljadi (Pangal) was not all that much a Sukarno man. However, he is an honest man of principle. He was disgusted with the way that BK's former (?) supporters now killed him (???). There was a real danger of a clash with not only the KKO but the ALRI as a whole.

Sutjipto the police chief was an opportunist who supported BK.

Although the Resolusi2 DPR took a line different to Suharto, they nevertheless helped him.

All the parties now are still led by Sukarno-appointed leaders. The younger modern leaders were still fighting in each party. According to Subchan, the modernists are doing better in the NU than elsewhere. However the masses are still traditional so it is natural that all the parties are still traditional-minded.

Suharto is not clever but he has a fine political sense. However the AD is not united in regard to his attitude on corruption when he is protecting big corruptors like Ibnu, Sordjuno (???), Surjo etc. There are also signs that Suharto is involved personally.