

BOOK REVIEW
Julia Lovell,
*Maoism:
A Global History.*
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2019)

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Zhang Hongtu 張宏圖 (1943-), 最後的宴會 (*The Last Banquet/ Zuihoude yanhui*, 1989)¹

In explaining the phenomenon of global interest in Mao Zedong Thought, or Maoism outside China, it is not difficult to explain why the People's Republic of China (PRC) became a significant point of reference for activists all over the world. The de-Stalinization era of the Soviet Union and Moscow's policy of peaceful coexistence, criticized by Mao as appeasement, led Mao and his acolytes to capitalize on waves of decolonization and subsequent establishment of newly independent autonomous socialist nations. China then occupied the center of world revolution, with Mao Zedong Thought and the Chinese revolutionary experience emerging in progressive thought streams worldwide. More difficult, however, is explaining why it was Maoism specifically that provided a "vocabulary" and "syntax" for political struggle in the global 1960s and beyond.² Undoubtedly, Maoism has operated as a major influence on many Communist insurgencies against oppressive regimes and the entrenched "cyclical phenomenon" of global capitalist exploitation of developing countries.³ But why did Mao's thought specifically, rather than the Soviet brand of Marxism-Leninism, resonate with radical intellectuals? How and why did it impel them to engage in activism, and in extreme cases, spearhead violent protracted movements to capture state power against numerically and technologically superior forces?

Ambitious in scope, Julia Lovell's *Maoism: A Global History* represents the most recent attempt to answer these questions. Lovell seeks to explain why the "global moral glamour" of

Mao Zedong Thought won over countless radicals—in some instances, decades after Mao had died—and how it gained traction through its encapsulation of the Chinese revolutionary anti-imperial experience (7, 53). Lovell's book joins a rich scholarly debate over the specific machinations behind Maoism's global popularity. Indeed, scholars have wrestled with different answers to Maoist China's appeal, and expressly, Mao Zedong Thought, for decades. Some highlight either its utility as a military strategy, or its materialization as a nationalist response to the limitations of the Bolshevik model of organization. Others examine Maoism's spread through the scope of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mass translation initiatives, transnational networks, the legacy of the ubiquitous *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong*, China's network of 國際友人 (international friends/*guoji youren*), and outreach efforts to host foreign activists in China that provided propagandists the chance to posit the country as the epicenter of world revolution.⁴ A particularly provocative explanation comes from Christophe Bourseiller, who declared that:

... perhaps the ultimate key of Maoism [is that as] a cultural phenomenon, it provides a comfortable place in which everyone can invest what he or she pleases. That is the reason why it appears in such heterogeneous fashion from one country to another... How would such diversity be possible, if Maoism were not, culturally speaking, a gigantic black hole?

Maoism does not exist. It has never existed. That is no doubt the explanation for its success.⁵

For Bourseiller, Maoism means different things to different people. Former undisputed world heavyweight champion “Iron” Mike Tyson, for a time the professed “baddest man on the planet,” has Mao’s face tattooed on his right arm. But before Mao became a symbol after his death, radicals everywhere, and from all walks of life, could find *something* in him and Maoism because of its malleability and flexibility of interpretation. As agents of their own reception, such radicals even regarded Maoism as a 大法寶 (magic weapon/*da fabao*) sent from heaven to aid national struggle.

Maoism *is* a weapon, and its capacity for effectiveness lies in its nature as an ideological system: a whole package that is at once critical interpretive paradigm, ideological discourse, revolutionary vocabulary, and of course, strategy for waging protracted struggle.⁶ Maoism does not exist in abstraction or singularity. Its inherent practical qualities make it open to creative adaptation in the same way that Marxism-Leninism was before, and in the same way that synergetic forms of Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam emerge in different countries. Arguably, as historian Fabio Lanza has put it, Maoism is a “political phenomenon that is valuable in itself... a series of political practices and intellectual attitudes that, while similar and connected to the Chinese experience, were also specifically situated.”⁷ Therein lays perhaps its greatest value to world revolution, and one that has spurred renewed interest in the phenomenon of *Global Maoism* not merely as a convenient term, but as a profoundly rich and multi-layered conceptual terrain.⁸

In *Maoism: A Global History*, Lovell portrays China and Maoism as *Commendatores* to the *Don Giovanni* of imperialism: ominous forces that have seemingly returned from the dead to exact revenge against all who have paid insult to them.⁹ Maoism’s “perplexing, inconsistent mutability,” Lovell notes, has made it “the creed of winners and insiders, of losers and outsiders, of leaders and underdogs, of absolute rulers, of vast, disciplined bureaucracies, and oppressed masses” (59). Its lasting appeal ultimately stemmed from its “message” of fervid anti-imperialism, advocacy for protracted struggle and the development of a vanguard party, and commitment to autonomous socialist development for all nonaligned nations (279). Thus Maoism takes the form of snapshots of Maoist elements as they manifested in far-flung polities as ranging from violent protracted struggles to the production of books, statutes, stamps, paintings, and other physical objects that I call “Mao-merobilia.”¹⁰

The book contains twelve chapters bookended by a comprehensive introduction and concise conclusion. Its opening chapters proceed chronologically “through the political, diplomatic, and cultural history of international Maoism,” most notably American journalist Edgar Snow’s *Red Star over China*, which “communicated the Maoist credo across China and the globe” (22). Definitions of what actually constitutes “Maoism” remain ever elusive and oftentimes unsatisfactory, which is why

Lovell defines Maoism in the first chapter as more than simply an “umbrella word” for Mao’s theory and practice. As a “programme,” she argues, Maoism contained core features of political violence, pragmatism, practicality, feminism (albeit drawn from his pre-Communist years to serve the present), independent- and self-criticisms, anti-imperialism, the permanence of contradictions, and the just cause of rebellion.

Chapter two examines the process whereby *Red Star* pushed Mao into the global spotlight. Snow posited Maoists as champions of Chinese sovereignty and standard-bearers of anti-corruption, and Mao, in particular, as an inspirational figure whose personal charisma and success against all odds made for the ultimate underdog story. *Red Star* succeeded in capturing the hearts of its spirited readers, from Chinese liberal intellectuals-turned Maoist acolytes who read the Chinese translation to Malayan Communists in the midst of the Emergency; Eastern European partisans warding off the Nazi advance to heroic Huk rebels in wartime Philippines, then later, insurgents in the Indian subcontinent (pp. 62-63, 83-84).

In chapter three, Lovell turns to one mechanism by which American public sentiment turned against New China: “journalist-spook” Edward Hunter’s bogus view that the CCP mastered the art of “brain-washing” and were orchestrating hot wars in the Korean peninsula and Malayan archipelago. Alongside US intelligence’s near-total lack of reliable information on the country, such outlandish anxieties fostered “[b]emusement, fear, loathing, and at times an alarmed respect” among Americans towards China in the 1950s (pp. 89, 119-120).

Chapter four, on “World Revolution,” introduces Lovell’s concept of “High Maoism,” an ideology that was at the center of the global Mao cult. High Maoism, she contends, was “more about domestic *amour propre* than international realpolitik,” yet simultaneously succeeded in becoming globally relevant as a serious rival to Soviet socialist imperialism (pp. 125-126). Mao and Maoism featured prominently in the countercultural zeitgeist and were very much *en vogue* among luminaries of all sorts (supporters of Maoists in France, for instance, included Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault) in the global 1960s (pp. 146-150).¹¹

The next four chapters explore the role of exported Maoism during the Chairman’s lifetime in post-independence Indonesia, Africa, Indochina, and Euro-America. Chapter five’s title is a reference to *Tahun Vivere Pericoloso* (The Year of Living Dangerously), Indonesian president Sukarno’s 1964 state address on the nation’s nineteenth anniversary and nearly a year before the *Gerakan 30 September* (G30S) movement, an abortive coup d’état, in 1965. Lovell argues, somewhat controversially and against the extant scholarship, that *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI) leaders were “intoxicated by the militant rhetoric of Mao’s revolution in the early 1960s” (154). Here, Indonesia serves as a laboratory in which China conducted the experiment of exporting Maoism, which Lovell holds as ultimately responsible for impelling the PKI leadership to launch the anti-military G30S coup. Absent Maoism, she concludes, the tragedy of G30S “is hard to imagine” (154).

Next, Lovell shifts to the African continent as a whole to examine China's shift from recipient to donor, as the CCP provided substantial no-strings-attached aid to newly independent African governments at quite a cost to the Chinese people. By the late 1970s, Lovell notes, the CCP had committed "more than... 5 percent of its national budget into foreign aid... more than \$24 billion in international aid between 1950 and 1978... [and] 13-15 percent went to Africa" (187). Lovell also tracks the process whereby elements of Maoism took root among some of the twentieth century's most polarizing anti-imperialist African political leaders, notably Zambian first President Kenneth Kaunda, Tanzanian Prime Minister Julius Nyerere, South Africa's "Comrade President" Nelson Mandela, Colonel Mu'ammad al-Gaddafi of Libya, and onetime revolutionary-turned-kleptocrat President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. Undeniably, the degree to which each visionary leader negotiated interpretations remains debatable, but notions of a grand utopia with the Chinese example offering pathways onto its realization was cultivated through cultural diplomacy, invitations of leaders to China, scholarships, and perhaps most famously, offers of military training of armies and "freedom fighters" (190-194).

As for chapter seven, Lovell avoids trying to "re-invent the wheel" with a history of the Vietnam War or the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK aka. *Khmer Rouge*), as such studies exist already and it is not her aim.¹² Instead, she endeavors to "re-write" Maoist China's role "back into this history" in fueling "toxic and competitive nationalisms" (227). But both movements' leaders became so disillusioned with Maoism and China that they touted their own respective revolutionary uniqueness and laid claim to leadership of world revolution (260). If the Vietnam War "offered the key to a systemic criticism of America," as Susan Sontag has noted, then Maoism provided for some "a framework for that criticism" (267).¹³

In chapter eight, Lovell sheds light on "Western Mao fever," more specifically Euro-American radicalism and cultural revolution in the global/long 1960s. Mao and Maoism won appeal among civil rights activists and progressive-minded intellectuals, youth, and political figures through an emancipatory and thoroughly internationalist rhetoric. The black liberation struggle, as Mao indicated in a 1963 statement, was part of the global revolution.¹⁴ And as American civil rights leader Robert F. Williams once intimated, which Lovell quotes, Mao was "the first world leader to publicly speak out in support of the Afro-American in his struggle against racial discrimination..." (280). China's rhetorical support for radical activism to change the racist status quo did not end there. The Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) and East Bay's Black Panther Party for Self-Defense—Eldridge Cleaver dubbed Mao "the baddest motherfucker on planet earth"¹⁵—are two rich examples of the reception and adaptation of Maoism in service to black liberation, with the CCP providing "a positive model of how to build a party" (284). The "impact of the Cultural Revolution (upper case)," and Mao Zedong specifically, was therefore "part of a much more diffuse (and often liberalizing) process of cultural revolution (lower case)" (279, 304).

The last few chapters explore Maoism *after* Mao in violent struggles for state power in Peru, India, and Nepal, respectively, each with chapter-length focus. Chapter nine examines the origins of the Maoist *Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso* (Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path), whose leader Abimael Guzmán regarded himself first as the inheritor of Mao's revolution, then as "Presidente Gonzalo," he viewed his own *pensamiento Gonzalo* (Gonzalo Thought) as the Fourth Sword of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.

In chapters ten and eleven, Lovell explores the emergence of Maoist parties in South Asia (India and Nepal), where the "chameleon attributes" of Maoism inspired insurgency in 1967 and, later, swept local (Kerala) and national (Prachanda's Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist) political organizations into power through creative adaptation of Maoism to concrete realities in their respective polities. Neither party was earmarked for later success, and their paths were fraught with considerable peril: Indian Maoists' doctrinaire, "orthodox Maoist fixation on armed struggle" plagued the very impoverished rural poor that its leadership purported to help; in Nepal, the fractious nature of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) led to the formation of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist, and although the latter eventually seized state power after a bloody civil war, critics lambaste Prachanda's Maoists as merely "superficially Maoists" for political and revolutionary expediency (349, 416).¹⁶

By way of conclusion, Lovell returns to China for an assessment of Maoism's afterlife in the Xi Jinping era. Although "there is much about the Mao era that Xi would like to bury," she concludes, the recently appointed Chairman for Life is "steeped in Maoist heritage: in its symbolism and iconography; in its secretive, opaque party structure... in its aversion to political heterogeneity; and in its ambition to establish China as a global leader" (463).¹⁷

Lovell's *Maoism: A Global History* succeeds in bringing the history of international Maoism to a broad readership, and does so in an engaging and accessible way. As it is a popular history rather than purely an academic work—an ambitious undertaking regardless—one cannot be overly critical of its author's opting not to reference certain vital primary sources in their original languages (whether Khmer, Vietnamese, Bahasa Indonesia, or others). Surprising, however, is that Lovell sidesteps decades of PRC scholars' efforts to move away from a Mao-centric perspective of the Cold War. This colors in Lovell's descriptions of Maoist China's relations with the Global South. Most of the author's descriptions of the nature and form of such relationships are rather Cold Warrior-esque, and appear to resuscitate from dead, or to borrow from Achille Mbembe, *zombify* by some measure, a Sinocentric view of China manipulating Third World actors into doing Beijing's Cold War bidding.¹⁸ For instance, Lovell states at one point that Maoism is "[l]ike a dormant virus" (184). She sometimes frames Maoism's interpretation outside China selectively as if to place primacy on Beijing's manipulation. But Beijing had little control, if any, over how people outside China received and interpreted Maoism and Maoist propaganda, especially after Mao's death in 1976.¹⁹ Lovell's placement of Maoist

China at the center of Maoism's interpretation and practice often assumes that foreigners received the ideological discourse without input or agency. The author acknowledges Maoism's international appeal, but is seemingly less concerned with explaining how and why progressive intellectuals outside China engaged with, reinterpreted, and adapted Maoism. As in botany, a graft requires both the "insertion of a scion from a foreign plant into the stock of a native plant" and the rejection, adaptation, and acceptance of that graft.²⁰ That is the core dynamism of Maoism: it is not a rigid, monolithic scion that China sought to "graft" forcefully onto host bodies; rather, Maoism was, and is, a malleable scion that remains open to creative interpretation and adaptation and, ultimately, represents an alternative radical modernity to counter the Soviet scion.

Lovell also contends that Maoism "is useful only if we accept that the ideas and experiences it describes are living and changing, have been translated and mistranslated, both during and after Mao's lifetime, and on their journeys within and without China" (9). I would have appreciated Lovell's explanation of how one "mistranslates" Maoism, as it is itself a translation of Marxism-Leninism into the vernacular language of the Chinese revolutionary experience and historical situation.²¹ Does it make sense to seek out a singular "Maoist orthodoxy"?²² Does "mistranslating" Maoism only apply to Communist parties that lost militarily and/or politically defeated? These questions are especially compelling, and answers to them just as elusive, when one considers Bourseillier's claim above, which Lovell also quotes, that Maoism has "never existed."²³ If Maoism and the ideas that comprise it are "living and changing" and mean different things to different people, as Lovell appears to acknowledge, and its global forms are equally amorphous, then to claim that Maoism has been "mistranslated" presumes an orthodox version has ever existed, which it has not. Mao emphasized dialogic engagement with Marxism-Leninism (Sinification) and encouraged others to not merely "fondle the arrow" of theory or dogma without "shooting it to the target" (for there is no knowing without doing, and "such is the dialectical-materialist theory of the unity of knowing and doing").²⁴ Such an emphasis held firm in his engagements with his future acolytes, cautioning not to blindly follow China's Maoist course and merely repeat its mistakes.²⁵

Smaller quibbles are also worthy of mention if only to clear the record. For one, contrary to Lovell's claim that the Indonesian Communists were "intoxicated" by Maoist propaganda, none of the PKI leadership was Maoist until after G30S and Suharto's anti-Communist repression. Undeniably, DN Aidit engaged with Maoist texts in his effort to "Indonesianize" Marxism-Leninism.²⁶ But Lovell sidesteps the PKI's steadfast commitment to non-violent cooperation with Sukarno's ruling *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (PNI)—with Beijing's encouragement to do so, no less—and cross-classes alliance (a united front from above and below, so to speak) during Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*, 1957-1966).²⁷ The "Aidit group," as historian Rex Mortimer calls it, laid out its vision in the PKI's Fourth and Fifth Congresses, and while acknowledging having read Mao, Aidit sought to Indonesianize

Marxism-Leninism independently from a Maoist course and in line with the PKI's opposition to violent anti-government struggle.²⁸ The PKI did have a significant grassroots organization and the ability to win elections, but no armed cadres, not least of all because of institutional resistance to granting it cabinet seats.²⁹ The PKI leadership's stance toward the Sino-Soviet split was also primarily to assert its own independence and influence in the world Communist movement, thus a "China turn" did not occur until after G30S.³⁰ Only when Suharto and his armed forces blamed Communists for the six murdered generals in an abortive coup, and only then, did former General Secretary Sudirman (1920-1968), the lone survivor of the core five members of the PKI Politburo, propose armed struggle along Maoist lines.³¹ Thus Maoism and its violent overtones only came into play after the anti-Communist repression, and by then, the PKI was disunited between Beijing and Tirana.

The chapter "Into Africa" provides an accessible survey of PRC investment in post-independence African states, and brings to a broad audience what Deborah Brautigam's *The Dragon's Gift* did for an academic readership.³² Lovell rightly criticizes "Western cynics" and "Chinese Panglossians" for their respective "takes" on the story of China in Africa, stating that they portray Africans as "passive, simple minds, susceptible to every one of China's 'machinations'" (187). But the chapter endeavors to cover an entire continent of Maoist movements and Maoist-inspired political programs in thirty-some pages. I appreciated the author's ambition, but wondered why she did not focus on one or a few more focused case studies of countries that hosted large-scale Maoist movements (Ethiopia, Republic of Guinea, South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, or Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, among others). The broader approach often leads to all-too convenient linkages. For instance, Lovell overemphasizes Julius Nyerere's rhetorical homages to Mao. China was Tanzania's largest donor, and the major force behind the TAZARA/Uhuru Railway construction project. But Nyerere placed primacy on elements from Kantian liberalism, Fabian socialism, Catholic social teachings, and an ethos inspired by his idealized vision of a communitarian African society.³³ In fact, the very man who Lovell discusses as an African leader who visited China, Abdulrahman Babu, was among the loudest Marxist critics of Nyerere, arguing that his unwillingness to implement Maoist-inspired policies is partly what derailed the *ujamaa* villagization project.³⁴ In overemphasizing Maoism's imprint on Nyerere's ideas and implementation of his vision for Tanzania, Lovell ultimately portrays him as someone who was "susceptible" to China's "machinations" when he was, like socialists elsewhere, engaging with a foreign thought creatively (to a fault in Babu's view). Nyerere was no Maoist and there is very little evidence in his compendium of writings and policies that he ever viewed Maoism as anything more than a set of novel ideas against which to juxtapose his own.³⁵

The next chapter, on Euro-American Maoists, raises an important question that I would have liked to see *Maoism: A Global History* answer: who or what is "Maoist"? This question does not seem as trivial as it first appears. For a Maoist to be worthy of the name, they must not only subscribe to the Maoist

vision and/or own a copy of *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*, but also take an active role in interpreting, changing, and applying Maoism to certain concrete circumstances. European Maoists raiding supermarkets because it is *en vogue* to rebel seems to me a rather imperfect comparison with the Khmer Rouge guerrillas or any case study wherein Maoism was as much a means for survival as it was an ideological discourse. European Maoists' theory and practice resembles more what Lanza describes as a fascination with Maoist China "marred by orientalist attitudes and fantasies."³⁶ The coverage here at the expense of, say, a more expanded focus on the overtly Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), whose founder José Maria Sison remains in exile (and ever the Maoist today), made this particular chapter somewhat incongruous given Lovell's study of Maoists elsewhere in the Malay Archipelago.

Two of Lovell's claims raised a Spockean eyebrow for me mostly because the jury is more-or-less still out on their truthfulness. Curiously, and without reference to corroborate it, Lovell claims that Guzmán may have met Pol Pot in China when they were in Beijing, and elsewhere that Zhang Chunqiao drafted Democratic Kampuchea's constitution, the latter confirmed by only a single, rather dubious "personal communication" to Sihanouk's biographer Julio Jeldres.³⁷ The latter claim is more up for debate, but the former, that Pol Pot and Guzmán met without explication of how they communicated in said "meeting" beyond a wave hello since Pol Pot only spoke Khmer and French at the time, and Guzmán neither of those, begs the question: what sort of "meeting" was this? The precise dates and length of stay of Pol Pot's visit to Beijing are unknown, though sources date it to late 1965-early 1966 when he was a representative of the Vietnamese Worker's Party.³⁸ Guzmán visited China many times between 1965 and 1967, and stayed in the same compound as Pol Pot, the 亞非拉培訓中心 (Asia-Africa-Latin America Training Centre/*Ya-Fei-La peixun zhongxi*). Lovell identifies this rightly, although virtually every foreign Communist who visited Beijing lived in this location. She also speculates that Guzmán may have met Pol Pot in Nanjing in 1965, also without reference. But to my knowledge—and I have consulted relevant sources in Vietnamese, Khmer, Chinese, and Spanish—there is no record of these future Maoist leaders ever meeting each other in either city.³⁹ That does not mean that neither happened, but with no supporting evidence to confirm the veracity of the statement, Lovell ought to have exhibited a tad more caution before including this speculative claim in the book. This is especially true because it has appeared in a newspaper review of *Maoism: A Global History* in the *South China Morning Post*, and is now "out there," again, without any solid evidentiary basis.⁴⁰

Somewhat related are Lovell's claims in the book's chapter on the Shining Path that characterize the Peruvian Maoists' project as "bizarrely out of its time" and "ill-suited to Peru" because "[f]ew of the preconditions for Mao's own revolution in the 'semi-colonial, semi-feudal' China of the 1940s seemed to be present: Peru in 1980 was a democracy; it was largely urban and literate; and there was no colonial invader to fight, no militant social rebellion to capitalize upon, no massive inequality of land ownership" (308). This is not entirely accurate. It is a bit

of a stretch to describe any of the Andean states as "largely urban and literate" in the 1980s, or that there was "no massive inequality of land ownership" in a country where the treatment of indigenous peoples was at the time (and remains today) especially repugnant.⁴¹ Before 1980, agrarian properties in the Highlands did not hold great economic value and productivity remained virtually non-existent. But although the Peruvian state broke up most *latifundia* by the 1980s, wealthy landowners (*gamonales*) flocked to the cities and sold their land to peasant farmers (*campesinos*) who merely reproduced the types of socioeconomic hardships that preceded them (Guzmán was able to convince poor peasants to band with him in such a climate).⁴² Lovell's claims also dispossess the Shining Path movement of its revolutionary *raison d'être*. As Peruvian anthropologist Stefano Varese describes, the Shining Path's war was one "waged by the children of indigenous peasants, by proletarianized rural peoples, and by provincial 'mestizos' against the creole and urbanized mestizos perceived as part of the oppressive bourgeois system and state. Undoubtedly a class struggle in the most orthodox Marxist tradition, it was nonetheless a class struggle permeated, shaped, and mobilized by ethnic grievances."⁴³

Also noteworthy is the near-total absence of Peruvian Marxist José Carlos Mariátegui (1894-1930), a microcosm of Lovell's keenness to posit Maoism as moment rather than ideological system with which radicals engaged using frames of reference that they had available to them already. Mariátegui was the *key* local intellectual inspiration for the Shining Path's ideology, and was someone without whom Guzmán may have never truly grasped Maoism.⁴⁴ Guzmán said as much in a 1988 interview, even going so far as to call him a would-be Maoist: "in Mariátegui... we find similar theses to those that President Mao has established at the universal level. For me specifically, Mariátegui would be Marxist-Leninist-Maoist today; and this is not speculation, it is simply a product of the understanding of the life and work of José Carlos Mariátegui."⁴⁵ Yet Lovell only credits Mariátegui for the Shining Path's namesake (321), despite the fact that Mariátegui, not Mao, diagnosed Peru as "semi-colonial and semi-feudal" in the 1920s with a view to emancipating the largely indigenous peasants from state racism and socioeconomic subjugation. Guzmán drew inspiration from Mariátegui's anti-imperialism, in particular, and after visiting China, he discovered that Mao's strategies of protracted war and revolutionary violence provided tactical elements that were absent in Mariátegui's writings.⁴⁶ Both Mariátegui and Mao (their 1920s writings, specifically) are reflected in Shining Path assessments of the nature of Peruvian society in the 1970s. It is no wonder, then, why Mao's call to apply Marxism-Leninism creatively resonated with Guzmán. After intense study in China, Guzmán appreciated Mariátegui even more as a "first rate Marxist-Leninist who had thoroughly analyzed our society."⁴⁷

Perhaps the above critiques are far too specialist for a book that seeks to reach a broader audience and spur interest in Maoism's history beyond China's bounds and long after the Great Helmsman's death. The first few chapters are wonderful and accessible investigations of the forces at work that made Mao such a heroic figure, and his thought so appealing to curious, progressive readers. They also lay out why "Red China"

became, at once, a subject of suspicion and intrigue. But once Lovell shifts her focus to Maoism outside the friendly confines of her well-established expertise of modern China, she tends to play a tad fast and loose in seemingly fitting her case studies to the Procrustean Bed of the narrative she wishes to author about Global Maoism: one that is equal parts Beijing-centric and focused on Mao's person. The result, therefore, sidesteps the requisite nuance that a study of foreign Maoist movements requires, and ought to have to represent the diversity in

motivations behind why ordinary actors risked everything to pin their radical star to the Maoist ideological system and practice of waging revolution. Well deserving of plaudits for its ambition and accessibility, but at times falling short in terms of execution, *Maoism: A Global History* is nevertheless worth reading if not only for its author's engagement with important debates and themes across a broad swath of polities at major turning points in the twentieth century.

¹ Zhang Hongtu, "Museum of My Art Only (MOMAO)," [<http://www.momao.com/>] (accessed 13 September 2019)

² Fabio Lanza, "Global Maoism," in *Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi*. (Canberra, ACT: Verso/The Australian National University Press, 2019), 85.

³ Samir Amin, "Les effets structurels de l'intégration internationale des économies précapitalistes: Une étude technique du mécanisme qui a engendré les économies dites sous-développées" [The Structural Effects of the International Integration of Precapitalist Economies: A Technical Study of the Mechanism that Generated the Underdeveloped Economies]. (PhD diss., University of Paris, 1957), 1-9, 139-141, 484-485. For an overview of Amin's solution to the cyclical phenomenon of capitalist exploitation in the global peripheries, see Samir Amin, *Imperialism and Unequal Development*. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), 109; and Matthew Galway, "Specters of Democracy: Hou Yuon and the Origins of Cambodia's Marxist Vision (1955–1975)," *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review* 31 (2019): 140n3. See also Marc Opper, *People's Wars in China, Malaya, and Vietnam*. (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2019).

⁴ On the first cluster, see Robert J. Alexander, *International Maoism in the Developing World*. (London: Praeger, 1999); William R. Heaton, "China and Southeast Asian Communist Movements: The Decline of Dual Track Diplomacy," *Asian Survey* 22, No. 8 (August 1982): 779-800; and Thomas A. Marks, *Maoist People's War in Post-Vietnam Asia*. (Chiang Mai, Thailand: White Lotus, 2007), xv. On the second, see Alexander C. Cook, ed., *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). The third cluster comprises, among others, Anne-Marie Brady, *Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); Julia Lovell, "The Uses of Foreigners in Mao-Era China: 'Techniques of Hospitality' and International Image-building in the People's Republic, 1949-1976," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 25 (December 2015): 135-158; Bill V. Mullen and Fred Ho, *Afro Asia: Revolutionary Political and Cultural Connections between African Americans and Asian Americans*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); and Matthew Johnson, "From Peace to the Panthers: PRC Engagement with Africa-America Transnational Networks, 1949-1979," *Past and Present* 218 supplement 8 (2013): 233-257.

⁵ Christophe Bourseiller, *Les Maoïstes : La folle histoire des gardes rouges français* [The Maoists : The Crazy Story of the French Red Guards]. (Paris: Plon, 1996), 300.

⁶ See Matthew Galway, "Boundless Revolution: Global Maoism and Communist Movements in Southeast Asia, 1949-1979," (PhD Diss., University of British Columbia, 2017).

⁷ Fabio Lanza, *The End of Concern: Maoist China, Activism, and Asian Studies*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017), 10, 20.

⁸ Global Maoism is the focus of my upcoming book *Global Maoism China's Red Evangelism and the Communist Movement in Cambodia, 1949-1979*, which is under review with Cornell University Press.

⁹ My thanks to John Moloney for this analogy.

¹⁰ Alex De Jong makes a similar observation, but without reference to Mao-merobilia, in his review "Maoism and Its Complicated Legacy," *Jacobin* (30 November 2019) [<https://jacobinmag.com/2019/11/maoism-global-history-julia-lovell-book-review>] (accessed 1 December 2019). My current manuscript project is entitled *Mao-merobilia: A World History of Red Collectors and the Revolutionary Symbolic Capital of Mao Collectibles*.

¹¹ Julian Jackson, "The Wind from the East: French Intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution, and the Legacy of the 1960s by Richard Wolin," *The Guardian* (13 November 2010) [<https://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/nov/13/wind-from-the-east-review>] (accessed 26 September 2019).

¹² See Li Xiaobing's forthcoming book *The Dragon in the Jungle: The Chinese Army in the Vietnam War*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).

¹³ Susan Sontag, *Trip to Hanoi*. (New York: Farrar, Giroux & Straus, 1968), 87.

¹⁴ Mao Zedong, "Statement Supporting the American Negroes In Their Just Struggle Against Racial Discrimination by U.S. Imperialism," (8 August 1963) *Peking Review* [<https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-review/1966/PR1966-33h.htm>] (accessed 26 September 2019).

¹⁵ Aaron J. Leonard and Conor A. Gallagher, *Heavy Radicals—The FBI's Secret War on America's Maoists: The Revolutionary Union/Revolutionary Communist Party 1968-1970*. (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2014), 25.

¹⁶ Surprising was Lovell's omission of major works on Nepali Maoism: Deepak Thapa's *Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal* (2003) and the pioneering scholarship of Judith Pettigrew and Sara Shneiderman, the latter of whom shone overdue light on the women of the Maobaadi.

¹⁷ On contemporary debates within China's New Left on Mao/Maoism and its place in marketized China, see Shi Anshu, François Lachapelle, and Matthew Galway, "The Recasting of Chinese Socialism: The Chinese New Left since 2000," *China Information* 32, No. 1 (March 2018): 139-159.

¹⁸ David Priestland had a similar observation regarding its Cold Warrior feel in his review of the same book. David Priestland,

“The Big Reach of the Little Red Book: The Global Influence of Maoism, from 1970s Zimbabwe to 1990s Peru,” *New Statesman* (10 July 2019) [<https://www.newstatesman.com/maoism-global-history-julia-lovell-review>] (accessed 7 October 2019). On Mbembe’s concepts of zombification/mutual zombification, see Achille Mbembe, *On the Postcolony*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), 104-105.

¹⁹ See Megan M. Ferry, “China as Utopia: Visions of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in Latin America,” *Modern Chinese Literature and Culture* 12, No. 2, Visual Culture and Memory in Modern China (Fall 2000): 236-269. For another instance when China became the subordinate party, see Andrew Mertha, *Brothers in Arms: Chinese Aid to the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).

²⁰ Huynh Kim Khanh, *Vietnamese Communism, 1925–1945*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 20-21.

²¹ Nick Knight’s scholarship argued against such a pursuit regarding extant perspectives that held Maoism as an exotic offshoot of, and heterodox deviation from, a supposedly orthodox Marxism-Leninism. Nick Knight, *Rethinking Mao: Explorations in Mao Zedong Thought*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 47-52. See also Arif Dirlik, *Marxism in the Chinese Revolution*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 78-86, 97-100.

²² Bourseiller, *Les Maoïstes*, 300.

²³ Mao Zedong, “On Practice,” in *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism: Writings on Philosophy*. Nick Knight, ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), 148; and Mao Zedong, “Rectify Our Study Style, Party Style, and Writing Style,” (Beijing: 1 February 1942) in *Mao’s Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings 1912-1949. Volume VIII—From Rectification to Coalition, 1942-July 1945*. Stuart Schram and Timothy Cheek, eds., Nancy Hodes, assoc. ed. (New York: Routledge, 2015), 25-26.

²⁴ “Mao Zedong and Pol Pot,” (21 Beijing 1975), in “77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977,” Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonneson, Nguyen Vu Tungand, and James G. Herschberg, eds. (Washington, DC: Cold War International History Project, Working Paper, 1998), 191-192; and Norodom Sihanouk, *War and Hope: The Case for Cambodia*, Mary Feeney trans. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 86.

²⁵ On PKI engagements with Maoism, but outright commitment to non-violence before G30S, see Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974), 50-51.

²⁶ See DN Aidit, “The Road to People’s Democracy For Indonesia: General report to the Fifth National Congress of the CPI, March 1954,” [<https://www.marxists.org/history/indonesia/1954-AiditTheRoad.htm>] (accessed 19 September 2019); and Frank Cibulka, “The Coalition Strategies and Tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party: A Prelude to Destruction,” in *Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties*. Trond Gilberg, ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 285-303. On Beijing’s limited role, see Zhou Taomo, “China and the Thirtieth of September Movement,” *Indonesia* 98 (October 2014): 29-58; and Zhou Taomo, “Diaspora and Diplomacy: China, Indonesia, and the Cold War, 1945-1967,” (PhD Diss.,

Cornell University, 2015). On Aidit’s efforts to stamp out anti-army tendencies, see DN Aidit, *Tentang Sastra dan Sent fang Berkepribadian Nasional Mengabdikan Buruh, Tani dan Pradjurit* (Concerning a Literature and Art with a “National Identity” Serving the Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers) (Jakarta, 1964): 30-31. Large elements of Masjumi were anti-Communist, but plenty of Masjumi and *Nahdlatul Ulama* MPs were receptive to socialism and some openly advocated for parliamentary cooperation with the PKI. See Rémy Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Masyumi Party between Democracy and Integralism*. Jeremy Desmond, trans. (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2015).

²⁷ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 40. See page 43 on “unified declaration.”

²⁸ Aidit initiated a campaign of unilateral actions (*aksi sepihak*) to encourage peasants to seize lands, and the PKI apparatus to enact the government’s 1960 land reform laws. *Aksi sepihak* was a partial success, but the PKI eased up in 1964 because of “counterrevolutionary mass actions.” Nevertheless, the PKI succeeded in agitating the peasant base, and achieved “quasi-governmental status,” as Sukarno valued Communist support. Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 276-277; and David Mazingo, *Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, 1949-1967*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), 225-226.

²⁹ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, 330.

³⁰ Sudisman, *Otokritik Politbiro CC PKI* [The Self-Criticism of the Poliburo of the PKI’s Central Committee] (September 1966) [<https://www.marxists.org/indonesia/indones/1966-SudismanOtoKritik.htm>] (accessed 23 September 2019). My thanks to John Roosa for recommending this source to me in 2017. See also *People of Indonesia, Unite and Fight to Overthrow the Fascist Regime*. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1968), 32; and Olle Tornquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism: The Destruction of the PKI in Indonesia*. (London: Zed Books, 1984), 55.

³¹ Deborah Brautigam, *The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

³² See Matthew Galway, Global Maoism and the Politics of Localization in Peru and Tanzania,” *Left History* 17, No. 2 (Fall/Winter 2014):10, 21-29; Bonny Ibhawoh and J.I. Dibua, “Deconstructing Ujamaa: The Legacy of Julius Nyerere in the Quest for Social and Economic Development in Africa,” *African Journal of Political Science*, 8, No. 1 (2003): 62-63; and Goran Hyden, “Mao and Mwalimu: The Soldier and the Teacher as Revolutionary,” *Transition*, No. 34 (December 1967- January 1968): 25.

³³ See Abdul Rahman Babu, *African Socialism or Socialist Africa?* (London: Zed Press, 1981). Lovell is not the only scholar to overstress Nyerere’s supposed Maoist leanings. See Priya Lal, “Maoism in Tanzania: Material Connections and Shared Imaginaries,” in *Mao’s Little Red Book: A Global History*. Alexander C. Cook, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 96-116.

³⁴ See Julius Nyerere’s *Man and Development*. (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1974); *Freedom and Socialism: A Selection from Writings and Speeches, 1965-1967*. (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968); and *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism*. (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968).

³⁵ Lanza, *The End of Concern*, 7. Lanza cites Rey Chow, whose description of “the Maoist” and “the Orientalist” shared in a

similarly exoticist *imaginaire* of 1970s Chinese as “a puritanical alternative to the West in human form—a dream come true.” Rey Chow, *Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), 12.

³⁷Julio Jeldres, “A Personal Reflection on Norodom Sihanouk and Zhou Enlai: An Extraordinary Friendship on the Fringes of the Cold War,” *Cross Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review*, No. 4 (September 2012): 61. Henri Locard cites the same, but is skeptical. Henri Locard, *Pourquoi les Khmers rouges?* [Why the Khmer Rouge?]. (Paris: Vendémiaire, 2013), 326n105. One Chinese source confirms the visit, but says nothing of Zhang’s role in drafting the DK constitution.

³⁸Matthew Galway, “From Revolutionary Culture to Original Culture and Back: ‘On New Democracy’ and the Kampucheanization of Marxism-Leninism, 1940–1965,” *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review* 24 (September 2017): 134, 143-147. As Sihanouk’s opponent, Pol Pot did not state that his 1965 visit occurred until years later in an interview with the Communist Party of Thailand, and without a specific length of stay.

³⁹Zhang Xizhen 張錫鎮 claims that Saloth Sar (沙洛特紹 in Zhang’s book) was in Beijing by autumn 1965 and stayed for three months. Zhang Xizhen, 西哈努克家族 [The Sihanouk Family]. (Beijing: Shehuikexue wenpian chubanshe, 1996), 154. David Chandler states that Pol Pot spent eleven months between 1965 and 1966 on his trip through Laos, Vietnam, China, and North Korea, arriving in Beijing in 1966 to experience the “early phase” of the Cultural Revolution. David P. Chandler, *Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 66, 69, 71-77. Philip Short claims that he landed in Beijing in December 1965 and “spent about a month there,” which coincides with Vietnamese sources and Pol Pot’s own account. Philip Short, *Pol Pot: the History of a Nightmare*. (London: John Murray, 2004), 159; Pol Pot, “Interview with Cai Ximei,” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: May 1984). Vietnamese sources: “Quan Điểm, Đường Lối, chính Sách Đối Ngoại của Đảng Cộng Sản Căm-Pu-Chia (The Outlook, Line, and External Policy of the Communist Party of Cambodia),” [Hanoi: Nhà xuất Bản Quân Đội Nhân Dân (People’s Army Publishing House), 1977]; “Bai cua Dong Chi Kieu Minh, Can Bo Dai Su Quan Viet Nam tai Nong Penh Noi ve Pon Pot va Dang cua No voi Doan Can Bo Ban Nghien Cuu Ly Luan Trung Uong tai Dai Su Quan Viet Nam (A Report by Comrade Kieu Minh, a Cadre of the Vietnamese Embassy in Phnom Penh, to a Committee of the Central Committee’s Theoretical Research Commission at the Vietnamese Embassy on Pol Pot and his Party),” [Hanoi: Thu

Viện Quân Đội Nhân Dân (TVQDND, People’s Army Library), 10 May 1980]; and Nguyen Thanh Son, “Tim Hiểu về Đảng CPC (A Study of the Cambodian Party),” (Hanoi: TVQDND, 1978-1979).

⁴⁰Kit Gillet, “Maoism: A Global History – How China Exported Revolution Around the World,” *South China Morning Post* (8 March 2019)

[<https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/books/article/2188861/maoism-global-history-how-china-exported-revolution>] (accessed 18 September 2019).

⁴¹See Gonzalo Portocarrero, *Profetas del Odio: Raíces culturales y líderes de Sendero Luminoso. Tercera Edición* [Prophets of Hate: The Cultural Roots and Leaders of the Shining Path. Third Edition]. (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú Press, 2015), 101-129, 133-134; and Orin Starn and Miguel La Serna, *Shining Path: Love, Madness, and Revolution in the Andes* (New York: WW Norton & Co., 2019), 93. My thanks to Gioconda Coello (PhD ABD, University of Wisconsin-Madison) for her insight on Andean politics and society in the 1980s.

⁴²Portocarrero, *Profetas del Odio*, 102-104.

⁴³Stefano Varese, “The Ethnopolitics of Indian Resistance in Latin America,” *Latin American Perspectives* 23, No. 2 Ethnicity and Class in Latin America (Spring 1996): 65. See also Portocarrero, *Profetas del Odio*, 133-134; and Matthew Galway, “Una Almenara Resplandeciente: El Maoismo Global y Los Movimientos Comunistas en Peru y Camboya entre 1965 y 1992 (A Shining Beacon: Global Maoism and Communist Movements in Peru and Cambodia, 1965-1992),” *Revista Asia América Latina* 1, No. 4 (December 2017): 15-47.

⁴⁴Comité Central Partido Comunista del Perú (CC PCP), *La Entrevista del Presidente Gonzalo* [An Interview with President Gonzalo]. (Lima: Ediciones Bandera Roja, 1988), 11; and Portocarrero, *Profetas del Odio*, 101-105. On Mariátegui’s thought, see José Carlos Mariátegui, *Siete ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana* [Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality]. (Lima, Peru: Empresa Editoria Amauta, 1971).

⁴⁵CC PCP, *La Entrevista del Presidente Gonzalo*, 11.

⁴⁶Matthew Galway, “Permanent Revolution 不斷革命,” in *Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi*. (Canberra, ACT: Australian National University Press, 2019), 185.

⁴⁷CC PCP, *La Entrevista del Presidente Gonzalo*, 11; and Lewis Taylor, *Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru’s Northern Highlands, 1980-1997*. (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2006), 9-20.