Timor, Indonesia, and the Region: an Australian view+
Professor Rafe de Crespigny*

HISTORY OF EMPIRE

From the time of Vasco da Gama, the spread of Portuguese power was a heavy strain upon the homeland. Through the enterprise of Albuquerque, Portugal controlled sea trade through bases from Socotra and Ormuz to Goa and Diu, Malacca and Macao, while garrisons came largely from marriages between Portuguese and local people, united by Catholic Christianity and fierce loyalty to the empire.

East Timor was a sixteenth-century outpost of Malacca, trading in sandalwood and slaves. Though the Portuguese held their place after the arrival of the Dutch and the loss of Malacca in 1641, they never held full authority, and the Netherlands East Indies defined the territory ever more closely. There was endemic local unrest, and minimal investment from the weak imperial power.

Though Portugal was neutral in the Second World War, Dutch and Australian troops entered the territory and the Japanese sent troops. The Australians inflicted casualties, but by 1943 the Japanese controlled all but the Portuguese colonial capital of Dili, and Timorese who helped the Allies suffered badly. A memory remained, however, of possibilities from the outside world, some began to look to Darwin rather than distant Lisbon, and Australian servicemen remembered the people with affection

In 1945 East Timor returned to Portugal. The economy, however, was devastated and the Salazar government in Lisbon paid little attention. Capital works, many with forced labour, concentrated on Dili while the hinterland remained isolated. Schooling, strongly influenced by Catholic missions, was limited, the only higher education was in Portugal, and the few secondary graduates generally became teachers, officials or soldiers. The economy was dominated by Chinese and Portuguese companies, coffee was 90% of exports, and two-thirds of the tiny official budget came from Lisbon.

In 1975 East Timor was under-developed both in human resources and physical economy. There are historical reasons but small justification for the way the impoverished Portuguese empire maintained its rule, rejecting foreign help and refusing opportunity to their subjects.

DE-COLONISATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION

International pressure for de-colonisation, however, was strong. In east New Guinea Australia was moving towards self-government, and when Portuguese Goa and Diu were seized by India in 1961, regardless of frontiers, world opinion approved such integration to the homeland. Few cared that after 400 years the "liberated" people had little in common with their neighbours.

Soon afterwards, however, as Britain sought to create the independent federation of Malaysia, Sukarno asserted claims to all of Borneo. By 1965 "Confrontation" was at its height, and Australian soldiers were fighting Indonesians to support the embryonic state. The coup of September 1965 and the fall of Sukarno reflected the unease of Indonesian military with the conflict, the more so as American intervention in Vietnam demonstrated firm interest in regional stability. So Malaysia was established, and Indonesia entered a period of over thirty years under General Suharto.

The election of the Australian Labor Party under Prime Minister Whitlam in 1972 meant increasing enthusiasm for national independence movements. Australia withdrew support for the United States in Vietnam, the government applauded new states like Sierra Leone, and independence for Papua New Guinea accelerated: PNG obtained full international status in 1975, the same time as crisis developed in Timor.

THE DEPARTURE OF PORTUGAL AND THE INDONESIAN OCCUPATION

In Timor, there was resentment of colonial rule but no such rebellion as in Africa. The territory, however, was poor, with few resources and a fragmented society. Local politics were, and remain, dependent rather upon private rivalries than common ambitions and agreed policies.

As the Portuguese prepared to depart, three factions emerged. The União Democrática Timorense [UDT], Catholic small-holders or officials, wanted federation with Portugal, the Associacão Popular Democrática Timorense [APODETI] sought integration with Indonesia, while the Associacão Social Democrática Timor [ASDT] demanded independence. Generally most popular, ASDT soon changed its name to Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente [FRETILIN], echoing FRELIMO in Mozambique, where the leader Ramos Horta had spent some time.

Yet while Portugal was anxious to be rid of its colony, neither Indonesia nor Australia wanted a small, non-viable and potentially radical state in their neighbourhood. Discussions at London in March 1975 brought oral agreement for the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia after some nominal act of choice, like West Irian in the 1960s. Within East Timor, however,, the conservatives turned against the Portuguese, and in August UDT staged an "anti-Communist" coup and seized power in Dili. As FRETILIN counter-attacked, Portugal refused to be involved in another "colonial war" and abandoned the scene. By September FRETILIN held control, and at the end of November their leaders proclaimed a Democratic Republic of East Timor.

There is disagreement on the level of disorder, and on the potential of FRETILIN to govern, but Indonesia could not tolerate a left-wing state on its borders. Complaints about frontier encroachment during the civil war were followed on 16 September by an assault through the township of Balibó and on 8 December Indonesian forces attacked Dili and occupied the major towns. In July 1976 President Suharto proclaimed East Timor a province of Indonesia.

Though the Indonesians provided considerable funds for development, by rejecting autonomy or special status for East Timor they alienated many who might have welcomed them, and their rule never held strong support. As FRETILIN maintained guerilla warfare in the hills, there were signs of resistance even in settlements controlled by the military. A 1983 ceasefire was ineffectual, and in November 1991 a march in Dili triggered riot and repression: hundreds were killed or wounded, and it was clear East Timorese still rejected the alien regime. Jakarta, however, refused any substantial inquiry into the conduct of its troops. Control of East Timor was an article of faith: if it was questioned the matter of West Irian could also be raised, and other provinces which felt oppressed by Javanese hegemony might seek to loosen their bonds.

In the end, whether by their own brutality or the intransigence of their opponents, the Indonesians' failure to win the "hearts and minds" of the East Timorese was the greatest defeat of all, and brought the present crisis. A solution which might have been negotiated in the middle 1970s is now untenable, and the cost in men and money has been heavy. As long as the economy and the government were strong, however, the cost was bearable.

THE AUSTRALIAN ROLE 1974-1998

Portugal, moreover, had acknowledged Indonesia's interest, and Australia had no wish to quarrel with its most important neighbour. Not only was Indonesia a powerful force - that had been faced in Borneo ten years before - but Australia had good relations with the Sukarno government and other ASEAN nations, and peaceful contact with Asia was bi-partisan policy since the end of the Vietnam war. Australia had no formal ties with Timor, no justification for intervention, nor any domestic or international support for such a move.

There was, however, no enthusiasm for an independent state. Various Pacific islands had threatened to improve their economies by granting access to the Soviet Union; the possibility of a left-wing FRETILIN regime making a similar approach concerned both Canberra and Jakarta, while the United States was likewise worried about another Cuba.

Almost all agreed the ideal solution was peaceful incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia. The proposal now seems naive, but it was the best at the time, and there was no wish for armed intervention. Even as civil order broke down Australia argued against force: on 28 February 1975 Whitlam warned Suharto no Australian government would approve, and sought to confirm his restraint. "We agreed," he wrote, "that the solution which we preferred was that the territory should become part of Indonesia, but that this outcome would need to result from the properly expressed wishes of its people."

At the time of invasion Australia was in a constitutional crisis which brought the end of Whitlam's government, but even without such distraction there was no action to be taken. As refugees began to arrive in Darwin, however, calling for support, for family reunion and for the rescue of compatriots from oppression, people of good will were shocked, and the Roman Catholic church gave strong support to the Christian Timorese.

Most bitter of all, five Australian journalists were killed by Indonesian troops at Balibó in October, either in cross-fire or by execution. The deaths infuriated Australian media: no matter where they go, many Australians believe they are safe from foreigners, and journalists are convinced of their immunity. As Indonesian authorities rejected independent inquiry, the killings at Balibó maintained a running sore between the two countries.

The governments themselves kept good relations. Australian troops held exercises with Indonesian forces, and took officers for training. Trade developed, Indonesia was a major recipient of aid, and in January 1978 Australia recognised Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, then negotiated a sea-bed treaty for oil exploration. Within East Timor, the sad enforcement and resistance continued, but Jakarta insisted it was an internal matter, while Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans observed only that Indonesia was creating a rod for its own back. Portugal, which still pressed the case, was elected to the UN Security Council ahead of Australia in 1996, many protested the imprisonment of FRETILIN leader "Xanana" Gusmão, and the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Ramos Horta and Bishop Carlos Belo. But Timor was a minor irritant compared to Indonesia's concern for sovereignty without foreign interference.

CRISIS OF INDEPENDENCE

Peaceful transition, however, will not be easy. The territory remains backward, and when Indonesia leaves it will end its economic aid. Someone else must pay, and the amount required will be considerable. And though FRETILIN has now been succeeded by a general Resistance Council of East Timor [CNRT], old jealousies and rival interests remain strong.

More serious still, in the last twenty-five years there has been immigration by Indonesian nationals, some from West Timor, but also servicemen and their families who now work in the coffee industry and other enterprises controlled by Indonesians, including the Suharto family. The newcomers are now some twenty per cent of the population, and they resent and fear independence. In recent months, moreover, many have acquired arms from the military, either by theft or gift, and groups of pro-Indonesian militia, with red and white colours to show their allegiance, have begun a program of terror. They have paraded in Dili, they have attacked and killed large numbers of people, notably in Christian enclaves, and they have driven many people from their homes and their country. Many leaders of CNRT have been forced from the island, but they have established a military wing, FALINTIL, and that organisation too is accused of political killings.

There is potential here for a small-scale Kosovo, and whether at the time of the anti-Communist coup of 1965 or in the regional conflicts presently seen in Aceh and Ambon, and the massacres of Madurese in Kalimantan, Indonesia has shown a ferocious capacity for violence in time of political uncertainty.

The present government has shown good will and concern for a peaceful resolution, but and there is considerable uncertainty about the position of General Wiranto, chief of the military, while Magawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of former President Sukarno and leader of the major opposition group, who may well be elected President in November, has spoken publicly against East Timor's secession. On the ground, moreover, amongst accusations of military tolerance and even support for the rebels, it is doubtful whether local officers are prepared to maintain order. There are now plans for unarmed soldiers and police, including Australians, to supervise the referendum under United Nations auspices, but they may well lack protection, and it is very likely the ballot will be suspect and the losing side will reject the result.

Behind the facade of a Peace Prize and the prespect of independence, therefore, is a poor territory, with the leading nationalist group affected by factions and rivalries, an armed minority prepared for civil war, and no recognised authority to keep order. Opinion is divided on what role Portugal can play, whether Indonesian forces should withdraw or preserve a transitional role, whether foreign, notably Australian, assistance will be welcomed or resented, and who is to pay the very large bill for essential aid.

Small though East Timor may be, at a sensitive time in Southeast Asia its troubles can disrupt the peace of many countries and inflict enormous damage on the long-term relations of Indonesia with its neighbours, including Australia. In recent years, Australia has sent troops under UN auspices to Cambodia, Angola and Somalia, to support local peace-keeping with neutral good-will. Now, faced with cruel possibilities on our own borders, and in a situation well beyond the political capacities of the region, we need help from outside for the good of all involved.

[*] Dr R R C de Crespigny, Master of University House and an Adjunct Professor of Asian Studies at the Australian National University, is a former Vice-President of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. He has no connection to the Australian government.

The author is grateful for advice and information to HE Zozimo Justo da Silva, Ambassador of Portugal to Australia, and to many colleagues in the Faculty and in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, particularly Professors Jim Fox, Des Ball, Alan Dupont, Harold Crouch, Jamie Mackie and Virginia Hooker, together with John Legge of Monash University and Ross Cottrill, Director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs.

Two accessible sources for contemporary history and opinion are the Australian Journal of International Affairs , published by the Institute, and The Australian newspaper. East Timor: AIIA contributions to the policy debate , edited by Professor James Cotton of the Australian Defence Force Academy, was published in Canberra and launched in May 1999 by Foreign Minister Alexander Downer.