

**A Study of Proposition and Modality**  
**Focusing on Epistemic Modals**  
**in the Japanese Language**

Kazuyuki Matsushita

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of  
the Australian National University

March 2006

# **Declaration**

Except where it is otherwise acknowledged in the text,  
this thesis is entirely my own work

Kazuyuki Matsushita

March, 2006

## Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deepest thanks to my supervisor Dr. Peter Hendriks. He has given precious advice, and encouragement throughout my candidature. In particular, he has provided me with suitable terms to solve semantic gaps between English and Japanese. I am grateful for the time he has spent on my behalf.

I wish to thank my associate supervisor Dr. Nicolette Bramley of the University of Canberra, who has provided excellent advice and criticism to improve my draft.

I could not have done without Dr. Gail Craswell, at the Academic Skills and Learning Centre, who reviewed my thesis and made significant comments on my drafts. I am also grateful to Dr. Meredith McKinney, who has carefully proofread my draft. I would like to thank Prof. Junsaku Fundō and the late Prof. Kazuo Suzuki, who have given me encouragement to continue my studies since I studied at Tokyo Kyōiku University.

Finally, I want to express my gratitude to my wife Sachiko, who read my draft conscientiously, pointed out inappropriate examples, and has supported me through hard times and good times.

Canberra, Australia  
March 2006

Kazuyuki Matsushita

## Abstract

This study discusses proposition and modality in the Japanese language, focusing on epistemic modals.

In the literature of modality recently, detailed discussions of individual modals have been made to clarify their function. However, clear definitions of proposition and modality have not yet been adequately provided. The issue about whether morphemes such as *ta* (tense/aspect) and *masu* (honorific) belong to the modality part has not yet been clarified, and the issue of clarification of the difference between the similar modals *yōda* and *rashii* remains unclear. Hence, the first main question concerns whether the sentence consists of proposition and modality (including the classification of modality). The second is how epistemic modals function (whether they express subjectivity or objectivity, and how different similar modals are). In addressing these questions, the study analyses actual examples used in novels and critical essays by use of the phrase-additional and the modal-substitutional methods. Modals used at the end of a sentence are focused on, so modality-expressions appearing at the beginning and in the middle of a sentence are excluded from the subject of this study.

This study starts with newly proposing definitions of proposition and modality to distinguish between the two, integrating the following two views: Lyons (1995)'s approach of truth-value from the logical viewpoint, and Japanese scholars such as Teramura's (1982) approach from the viewpoint of objectivity. By way of the definitions proposed here, the phrasal-discriminator between proposition and modality is established. Consequently, it is shown that any sentence expresses both proposition and modality, and that the copula *da/dearu*, the polite forms *masu* and the desiderative *tai* are propositional parts. Moreover, the new classification of modality is set up from the viewpoint of orientation into three categories: proposition-oriented, situation-oriented, and listener-oriented modality. Thereby, the modality of any sentence can be located in one of the three categories of this classification. This is supported by exploration of the various usages of *-ta* in chapter 3.

In the latter half, in examining similar modals, *nodarō* and *darō*, this study has found that *nodarō* expresses the interpretation of the specific situation, and *darō* the utterer's soft claim, and it newly categorises the relationship between judgement and situation in the *nodarō* sentence. As well, this study has clarified the difference between *yōda* and *rashii*, by introducing the concept of 'inside or outside the utterer's perceptible domain'.

The outcome of this study will contribute to a better and more precise understanding of modality in the Japanese language. In particular, the definitions of proposition and modality and the method of distinguishing them can also be applied to modality-expressions appearing at the beginning and in the middle of a sentence.

# Table of Contents

<b>Declaration</b> .....	i
<b>Acknowledgements</b> .....	ii
<b>Abstract</b> .....	iii
<b>Table of Contents</b> .....	v
<b>List of Tables</b> .....	xii
<b>List of Figures</b> .....	xii
<b>Conventions of Transcription</b> .....	xiii

## Chapter 1

<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>1</b>
1-1. Introduction.....	1
1-2. Previous literature on modality: A critique .....	2
1-2-1. Problems of Tokieda’s ‘ <i>shi</i> and <i>ji</i> ’ theory .....	2
1-2-2. Problems concerning the definition of modality .....	6
(1) Problems of Watanabe’s definition of modality.....	6
(2) Problems of categorisation by meanings and usages of modality...	8
(3) Problems of Nakau’s definition of modality .....	9
(4) Problems in applying a two-stratum structure of modality theory	10
(5) Modality regarded as a grammatical category on the sentence level	
.....	18
1-3. Research objectives.....	18
1-4. Scope of this thesis .....	20
1-5. Methodology or approach.....	21
1-6. Thesis structure .....	23

## Chapter 2

<b>Proposition and Modality</b> .....	<b>25</b>
2-1. Introduction.....	25
2-2. Proposition of a sentence .....	26
2-2-1. Definition of proposition .....	26

2-2-2. Adnominalisations leading to forfeiture of modality .....	29
2-2-3. Phrasal discriminator indicating proposition.....	30
2-3. Modality of a sentence.....	33
2-3-1. Definition of modality .....	34
2-3-2. Applications of the definition of modality .....	34
2-3-3. Modality analysed from the syntactic viewpoint.....	39
2-4. Three types of modality .....	45
2-4-1. Literature review and the classification of modality .....	45
2-4-2. Proposition-oriented modality: Epistemic modality.....	47
(1) Modality of report of prior information or fact .....	48
(2) Modality of judgement of a situation or an object .....	50
(a) Assertion.....	50
(b) Conjecture.....	51
(c) Scepticism.....	51
2-4-3. Situation-oriented modality: Affective modality.....	55
(1) Emotive modality .....	55
(2) Volitional modality.....	60
(3) Sensitive modality .....	61
2-4-4. Listener-oriented modality: Conative modality.....	62
Conative modality .....	62
2-5. Characteristics of epistemic modality.....	67
2-5-1. Categories of epistemic modality .....	67
2-5-2. Characteristics of epistemic modality .....	69
2-5-3. Epistemic modals expressing conjectural judgement.....	71
2-6. Three remaining issues .....	76
2-6-1. Mood and modality .....	77
2-6-2. Copula .....	79
2-6-3. Polite forms <i>masu</i> and <i>desu</i> .....	81
2-7. Conclusion .....	85

### Chapter 3

<b>Various usages of the past/tense marker <i>-ta</i> .....</b>	<b>87</b>
---	-----------

3-1. Introduction.....	87
3-2. Meanings of <i>-ta</i> .....	89
3-2-1. General meaning and modality.....	89
3-2-2. Inability to explain usage of <i>-ta</i> in terms of a single core meaning	90
3-2-3. Four core meanings of <i>-ta</i> .....	94
(1) Past .....	94
(2) Perfect.....	95
(3) Relative before .....	98
(4) Continuation (State of things) .....	99
3-2-4. Sentence final usage of <i>-ta</i> from the syntactic point of view .....	100
3-2-5. Proposition composed by core meaning.....	101
3-3. Usages expressing proposition-oriented modality .....	103
3-3-1. Categorisation of proposition-oriented modality of <i>-ta</i> in the literature .....	103
3-3-2. Classification of proposition-oriented modality of <i>-ta</i> .....	105
(1) General ‘confirmation’ usage of <i>-ta</i> with no connotation .....	106
Declarative sentences .....	107
‘Reminiscence’ usage of <i>-ta</i> .....	109
Expressions for <i>jikkyo-chūkei</i> ‘broadcasting on the spot’ .....	110
(2) Special confirmation usage with a certain connotation.....	111
‘Counterfactual suppositions’ usage of <i>-ta</i> .....	112
‘Regret/review’ usage of <i>-ta</i> .....	113
3-3-3. Characteristics of proposition-oriented modality of <i>-ta</i> .....	114
3-4. Usages expressing situation-oriented modality .....	117
‘Feelings produced by certain situations’ usage .....	117
‘Remembrance’ usage of <i>-ta</i> .....	122
3-5. Usages expressing listener-oriented modality .....	124
‘Urge to action’ usage of <i>-ta</i> .....	125
‘Manifestation of volitional acceptance’ usage of <i>-ta</i> .....	128
3-7. Conclusion .....	130

## Chapter 4

<b>A Study of <i>Nodarō</i> in Comparison with <i>Darō</i>.....</b>	<b>133</b>
4-1. Introduction.....	133
4-2. Previous reviews on <i>nodarō</i> .....	137
4-3. Internal structure of the <i>nodarō</i> sentence .....	142
4-3-1. Front-conjecture type of <i>nodarō</i> .....	143
4-3-2. Focus-conjecture type of <i>nodarō</i> .....	144
(1) Complementary constituents .....	144
(2) Interrogatives.....	145
(3) Adverbial clauses .....	146
(4) Causal clauses <i>kara/node</i> having two interpretations.....	146
4-3-3. <i>Darō</i> with only the front-conjecture type.....	148
4-3-4. Topicalisation in focus-conjecture type of <i>nodarō</i> .....	151
4-4. Relationships between judgements and situations in the <i>nodarō</i> sentence .	
.....	154
4-4-1. Identifying the objective core of the judgement from the context	155
(1) Preceding sentences.....	155
(2) Following sentences .....	156
(3) Same sentences.....	157
4-4-2. <i>Darō</i> not requiring a situation related to the judgement.....	157
4-4-3. Seven representative relationships .....	159
(1) Causes why the specific situations have occurred.....	160
(2) Reasons why the specific situations have arisen .....	160
(3) Implication hidden behind the specific situations .....	161
(4) Background behind the specific situations.....	162
(5) Purpose/Intention of the specific situations.....	163
(6) Details of the specific situations.....	164
(7) Natural consequence resulting from the specific situations .....	165
4-5. <i>Nodarō</i> showing the interpretation of a situation for identification .....	167
4-5-1. <i>Nodarō</i> showing the interpretation of a situation through inference..	
.....	167
4-5-2. <i>Darō</i> showing a soft claim that the proposition is true .....	171

4-6. Differences between <i>darō</i> and <i>nodarō</i> through phrase-additions and substitutions .....	173
4-6-1. Additional phrases to distinguish between the two modals .....	173
4-6-2. Examinations into the substitution of <i>darō</i> for <i>nodarō</i> .....	176
(1) General cases in which <i>darō</i> cannot be substituted for <i>nodarō</i> ...	176
(a) The focus-conjecture usage of <i>nodarō</i> .....	176
(b) <i>Nodarō</i> used in agreement with interrogatives such as <i>naze</i> ‘why’ .....	177
(c) <i>Nodarō</i> used to interpret the situation appearing in front of the utterer .....	178
(2) Rare cases in which <i>darō</i> can be substituted for <i>nodarō</i> .....	179
(a) Interrogatives appearing immediately before <i>darō/nodarō</i> ... ..	180
(b) ‘ <i>Sore wa sō darō/na-nodarō</i> ’: Approval/sympathy to what is said.....	182
(c) ‘ <i>Dokoni aru darō/nodarō</i> ’ (nowhere) for a rhetorical question .....	182
(d) Rare cases in which the <i>nodarō/darō</i> sentence can be regarded as the interpretation of a certain situation .....	183
4-7. Conclusion .....	184

## Chapter 5

<b>A Study of Epistemic Modals <i>Yōda</i> and <i>Rashii</i> .....</b>	<b>186</b>
5-1. Introduction.....	186
5-2. Review of previous literature.....	187
5-2-1. Simple dichotomous views with unclear definition .....	188
(1) Direct/indirect evidence theory .....	188
(2) Subjectivity/objectivity theory .....	192
5-2-2. Partial characteristics of <i>yōda/rashii</i> found by scholars.....	195
(1) More/less responsibility view.....	195
(2) Direct/indirect experience view.....	196
(3) Degree of certainty view .....	198

5-2-3. Views focusing on the utterer's attitude of how s/he recognises the subject expressed by <i>yōda/rashii</i> .....	199
(1) Examination of 'descriptiveness of observation and inference' theory .....	199
(2) Examination of the <i>hikiyose/hikihanashi</i> theory .....	202
5-3. Two prominent features of <i>yōda/rashii</i> from data analysis .....	204
5-3-1. <i>Rinjōsei</i> : A characteristic of <i>yōda</i> .....	204
5-3-2. Explicitness of evidence: A characteristic of <i>rashii</i> .....	209
5-4. Core function of <i>yōda</i> .....	212
5-4-1. Analysis of the three usages of <i>yōda</i> .....	212
5-4-2. Proposal of a hypothesis of the core function of <i>yōda</i> .....	216
5-5. Core function of <i>rashii</i> .....	217
5-5-1. Analysis of three usages of <i>rashii</i> .....	217
5-5-2. Proposal of the hypothesis of the core function of <i>rashii</i> .....	221
5-5-3. Examination of three usages of <i>rashii</i> from the viewpoint of the hypothesis .....	222
5-6. Evidence of the Hypothesis .....	223
5-6-1. Cases in which <i>yōda</i> is acceptable ( <i>*rashii</i> ).....	225
(1) Interrogatives.....	225
(2) Appearances .....	226
(3) Familiarity .....	227
(4) The utterer's own investigation.....	228
(5) Speciality (job, study and technique) .....	228
(6) Reliable and acceptable information .....	229
(7) Euphemistic usage of <i>yōda</i> .....	230
5-6-2. Cases in which <i>rashii</i> is acceptable ( <i>*yōda</i> ) .....	232
(1) Unawareness.....	232
(2) Other person's state of mind.....	233
(3) Unfamiliarity .....	234
(4) Investigation by other people .....	235
(5) Non-speciality .....	236
(6) Generalising something thoughtlessly.....	236

(7) Hearsay usage of <i>rashii</i> .....	237
5-6-3. Analysis of the case in which both <i>yōda</i> and <i>rashii</i> are acceptable ...	
.....	238
5-7. Conclusion .....	243
<b>Chapter 6</b>	
<b>Conclusion</b> .....	<b>245</b>
6-1. Introduction.....	245
6-2. Main outcomes of the study.....	245
6-3. Implications for the study of modality.....	249
<b>Bibliography</b> .....	251
<b>Index of Sources</b> .....	261

## List of Tables

Table 4-1. Ratio of six modals appearing in the novels: <i>darō</i> , <i>nodarō</i> , <i>kamoshirenai</i> , <i>nokamoshirenai</i> , <i>nichigainai</i> and <i>nonichigainai</i> .....	135
Table 5-1. Ratio of appearance of <i>rinjōsei</i> in the <i>yōda/rashii</i> sentence.....	206
Table 5-2. Ratio of explicitness and implicitness of evidence.....	211

## List of Figures

Fig 1-1. Two-Stratum Structure of modality.....	11
Fig 2-1. Modality of judgement .....	54
Fig 3-1. General confirmation usage of <i>-ta</i> in proposition-oriented Modality ...	116
Fig 3-2. Special confirmation usage of <i>-ta</i> in proposition-oriented Modality ....	116
Fig 3-3. ‘Feeling’ usage of <i>-ta</i> in emotive modality .....	124
Fig 3-4. ‘Remembrance’ usage of <i>-ta</i> in emotive modality .....	124
Fig 3-5. ‘Urge to action’ usage of <i>-ta</i> in listener-oriented Modality.....	130
Fig 3-6. ‘Manifestation of volitional acceptance’ usage of <i>-ta</i> .....	130
Fig 5-1. Figurativeness, conjecture and euphemism of <i>yōda</i> .....	215
Fig 5-2. Way of thinking of <i>rashii</i> in the conjecture usage .....	222
Fig 5-3. Substitutionability between <i>yōda</i> and <i>rashii</i> .....	225

## Conventions of Transcription

### Romanisation

Romanisation in this thesis follows the Hepburn system. For example:

ああ aa→ā, うう uu→ū, おう ou→ō, いう iu (or yuu)→yū,  
しゃ sha, しゅ shu, しょ sho, ちゃ cha, ちゅ chu, ちょ cho.

### Abbreviations

ACC accusative case

NOM nominative case

PROP proposition

MOD modality

SFP sentence final particle

### Marks indicating of whether the example is appropriate

The marks ‘ $\phi$ ’, ‘\*’ and ‘#’ in front of examples indicate the appropriateness of example expressions, as follows:

\*X...X is not acceptable. This is a case in which it is unnatural or ungrammatical.

#X...X sounds unnatural, even if it is grammatically correct. In this case X is not appropriate in the context, although in a certain context it might be acceptable.

X...no mark ‘ $\phi$ ’ means that X sounds natural and is grammatically correct. It indicates appropriateness and acceptability.

### Sources of examples

The expression in the Japanese language is given in italics. The sources of examples are shown in parentheses. Unless otherwise noted, all translations and examples are mine.



# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1-1. Introduction

This thesis investigates proposition and modality, particularly epistemic modality in the Japanese language. Proposition, according to Lyons (1995: 150), is defined as “the bearers of truth and falsity” in a sentence. Mikami (1959) and Teramura (1982) consider proposition as the objective part of a sentence. That is, proposition can be regarded as expression removing the utterer’s inner feelings or thoughts. In contrast, modality in linguistics is regarded as an expression of the utterer’s attitude or opinion in a sentence (Lyons 1995; Palmer 1986). According to Lyons (1977: 451-452), sentential adverbs occurring in the initial position, such as frankly, fortunately, possibly and wisely, “are used by the speaker in order to express, parenthetically, his opinion or attitude towards the proposition that the sentence expresses or the situation that the proposition describes.” This can be considered as the definition of modality, particularly epistemic modality. Also, Palmer (1986: 16-17) states that modality can “be defined as the grammaticalization of speakers’ (subjective) attitudes and opinions” and that “subjectivity is clearly basic” in modality (Palmer’s parentheses). In Japanese linguistics, Nakau (1979) semantically defines general modality as an expression of the utterer’s mental attitude at the time of utterance ‘now’. Thus, it can be seen that modality is regarded as an expression of the utterer’s inner feelings or thoughts at the time of utterance.

Modality is not expressed at the level of individual words but at the level of a sentence. It therefore should be investigated at the sentence level because a sentence must always contain both proposition and modality (Watanabe 1971: 92; Teramura: 1982: 51). Proposition also appears at the sentence level. Proposition

expresses the objective content of a sentence while modality expresses the utterer's mental attitude referring to the proposition. The ways of expressing modality involve morphological categories (such as words or morphemes) and phonetic categories (such as intonation or stress). Modality is expressed by such elements appearing at the sentence-level.

One of the ways of expressing modality in the Japanese language is to use auxiliary verbs at the end of a sentence, such as *darō* or *kamoshirenai*, while in the English language auxiliary verbs such as 'will' or 'may' appear between the subject and the verbs. Auxiliary verbs, *jodōshi* in Japanese, have been treated as an important element of a sentence by many scholars (Yamada 1908; Matsushita 1924; Hashimoto 1955; Tokieda 1941) ever since Fujitani (1778) first draw attention to the auxiliary as an important constituent of the Japanese sentence. Investigating sentence-final expressions in the Japanese language has thus been an important way of studying the expression of an utterer's mental attitude. This is because various elements, including voice, aspect, tense and mood, and also honorifics in different written/spoken forms, appear at the end of Japanese sentences. Modality can also be well expressed at the end of a sentence by such means as auxiliary verbs and conjugated forms of verbs. Hence, this thesis focuses on sentence-ending expressions in the Japanese language, particularly epistemic modals.

## **1-2. Previous literature on modality: A critique**

The study of modality in linguistics is relatively new, and this is also the case in Japanese linguistics. This section will review previous studies of modality, identifying problems remaining to be solved. The review of literature begins with an analysis of Tokieda's (1941) '*shi* and *ji*' theory, because in Japanese linguistics his work is the first study of modality, and concludes by setting up a new definition of modality.

### **1-2-1. Problems of Tokieda's '*shi* and *ji*' theory**

In the study of modality Tokieda (1941) proposed a theory that has been

influential in the Japanese linguistic world. Tokieda considered particles and auxiliary verbs as forms in which the utterer's attitude appears, and his '*shi* and *ji*' theory states that the constituents of a sentence are semantically analysable into two elements: the *shi* element and the *ji* element. "The *shi* concept is the name for a word having a conceptual process" (1941: 231) and is "an expression of an objectified concept" (1950: 60). Nouns, verbs and adjectives are included in this category (1950). In contrast, "the *ji* concept is a form which does not involve a conceptual process" (1941: 231-232) but is "an expression of the speaker's standpoint on the matter or situation being represented" (1950: 162). Conjunctions, exclamations, particles and auxiliary verbs are subsumed in this category (1950). The concepts behind these two terms are semantically very similar to those of proposition and modality. A proposition is "an object of the speaker's objective description of a phenomenon or mental picture" (Teramura 1982: 51) and is "the part of a sentence representing objectified matters or situations" (Nitta 1989: 1). These definitions are almost the same as Tokieda's *shi*. Also, Lyons's and Palmer's "the speaker's attitude" is closely equivalent to Tokieda's *ji*. Therefore, Tokieda can be said to be a pioneer in focussing on proposition and modality in Japanese linguistics.

The *shi* and *ji* theory is proposed not only from a semantic approach but also from a syntactic approach. In terms termed '*ireko-gata*' ('nest of boxes' style'<sup>1</sup>) structure, the syntactic structure of a Japanese sentence, Tokieda (1941: 311-320) explains that *shi* is syntactically subsumed by *ji*:  $[[shi] ji]$  or  $shi \subset ji$ . Nitta (1989: 1 and 1997: 125) states that proposition is semantically and syntactically subsumed by modality. Nitta's view can be seen to be similar to Tokieda's 'nest of boxes style structure' theory.

However, there are certain problems in Tokieda's theory. Let us consider the following sentence.

- (1) *Sakura ga sai ta.* (Tokieda 1950: 247)  
 Cherry NOM blossom have  
 'The cherry has blossomed.'

---

<sup>1</sup> '*ireko-gata*' (入れ子型). *Ireko* ('nest of boxes') refers to boxes which can be consecutively contained within bigger ones, forming a single box which has smaller ones inside.

In example (1), according to Tokieda's theory, the noun *sakura* 'cherry' and the verb *saku* 'to blossom' are *shi* because they carry the concept while the nominative case *ga* and the past or perfect marker *ta* are *ji* because they do not. Firstly, let us focus on the case particle *ga* from the semantic viewpoint. The nominative case particle *ga*, according to Tokieda's theory, is "an expression of the speaker's standpoint on the matter or situation being represented". However, the nominative case particle *ga* shows the grammatical relationship between the cherry and the verb *saku* 'blossom', but does not show the utterer's standpoint or view. Case particles such as *ga* or *o* are not meaningful in themselves in the sense of having dictionary meaning though they do have a grammatical meaning, so it can be said that they do not include a concept unlike verbs and nouns.<sup>2</sup> That may be so, but it cannot therefore be said that they express the utterer's standpoint. This inconsistency can be seen in this example. Secondly, let us consider *ga* from the viewpoint of the 'nest of boxes style structure' theory. According to this theory, *shi* is subsumed by *ji*, so sentence (1) can be described by  $[[Sakura] ga \cdot saku] ta$ . Also, *sakura* 'cherry' is in turn subsumed by *ga*, as  $sakura \subset ga$  or  $[[sakura] ga]$ . However, surely it is impossible to decide clearly whether *sakura* 'cherry' is subsumed by *ga*, although  $[[Sakura ga saku] ta]$  might be acceptable. In this case, however, the subsumption structure of *ga* does not seem to be the same as that of *ta*. This confusion resulting from the theory is because the distinction between word-level and sentence-level is not made. The *shi* and *ji* theory is forced morphologically to function at the word-level (the level of parts of speech), including case particles. In fact, a word-level and a sentence-level must be strictly distinguished. This is a crucial weak point in Tokieda's theory.<sup>3</sup>

Furthermore, the 'zero-symbol' (■ for  $\phi$ ) presents a contradiction in his theory (1950: 101, 140, 236 and 248). The 'zero-symbol' is devised to explain a sentence which does not have *ji* at the end of the sentence, as in *inu ga hashiru* 'The dog runs'. If the sentence ends in *shi* with no *ji*, the sentence breaks the rule

<sup>2</sup> *Keijoshi* 'special particles' such as *wa* and *mo* show the speaker's intention. *Sakura wa saita*. 'At least cherry blossoms have bloomed.' *Sakura mo saita*. 'Cherry blossoms have bloomed the same as other flowers.' So, *ga* cannot be dealt with in the way similar to *wa* and *mo*.

<sup>3</sup> Mikami (1953: 20-24) also states that it is unreasonable to divide parts of speech into two elements, either *shi* or *ji*, and wonders whether particles *ga*, *o* and *ni* belong to the *ji* category.

that *shi* must be subsumed by a final-position *ji*. In order to maintain consistency, *ji* is indispensable in the sentence *inu ga hashiru* ‘the dog runs’. For this reason, the zero-symbol was brought into his theory as a special form, as in

[[*Inu ga hashiru*]■] (1950: 258)…………(A)  
 ‘The dog runs ■’

As can be seen above, the zero-symbol ■ subsumes [*Inu ga hashiru*]. In a sentence, according to Tokieda (1954), every word including an auxiliary must belong to either *shi* or *ji*.<sup>4</sup> However, this theory cannot explain the following sentence:

(2) (He said to his dog)  
 “*Hashire.*”  
 ““Run!””

*Hashire* ‘run!’ in example (2) is a verb so it belongs to *shi*. Since *shi* must be subsumed by *ji*, *Hashire* ‘run!’ must likewise be followed by the zero-symbol as the *ji*, as in

[[*Hashire*] ■]…………(B)

The zero-symbol of (A) [[*Inu ga hashiru*] ■] shows the utterer’s assertion whereas that of (B) [[*Hashire*] ■] shows the utterer’s command to the dog. Therefore, in spite of the use of the same symbol ■, different meanings are produced, which Tokieda’s theory cannot explain. However, if we consider that the verbs *hashiru* ‘run’ and *hashire* ‘run!’ appearing at the end of a sentence have both *shi* and *ji*, this problem can be easily solved. That is to say, the conclusive form *hashiru* in this case expresses the utterer’s assertion and the imperative form *hashire* expresses the utterer’s demand. Hence, we can recognise that the verb expresses its meaning as the *shi* while the conjugated form of the verb expresses the utterer’s attitude as *ji*. The utterer’s attitude expressed by the conjugated form of

<sup>4</sup> Tokieda (1954) maintains that the word in the sentence is never used with performing both roles of *shi* and *ji*, namely *shi* and *ji* are in non-continuity. Mikami (1959: 116) opposes Tokieda’s non-continuity theory, demonstrating that although *ike* ‘go’ and *ikō* can be regarded as a single word, they consist of both *shi* and *ji*.

verbs can be said to be ‘mood’, which is a grammatical category expressing modality. Thus, the contradiction shown in the zero-symbol is also a weak point.

Tokieda’s theory, despite these weak points, has led scholars to the recognition that modality is an important subject for the clarification of Japanese grammar. This thesis will utilize the positive points of the dualistic *shi* and *ji* theory and the ‘nest of boxes style structure’ theory at the sentence-level but not at the morphological word-level to conduct a further investigation into proposition and modality.

### **1-2-2. Problems concerning the definition of modality**

Various scholars have developed theories of proposition and modality on the basis of Tokieda’s theory, by introducing the sentence-level viewpoint (Watanabe1971; Teramura 1984; Nakau 1979; Nitta 1989, 1991 and 1997; Masuoka 1987 and 1991).

#### **(1) Problems of Watanabe’s definition of modality**

Watanabe (1971) develops the concept of Tokieda’s *ji* and *shi*, contributing to the following: (1) the definition of modality and (2) the categorisation of usage of modality.

Watanabe’s first contribution (1971: 106-107) is that he more precisely defines proposition and modality in terms of *jojutsu-naiyō* ‘descriptive content’ for proposition and *chinjutsu* ‘expressive and conclusive expressions’ for modality.<sup>5</sup> Watanabe regards *chinjutsu* as a concept having the function of forming a relationship between the object and the utterer or between the hearer and the utterer. Thus, the term *chinjutsu* equates with modality, although hitherto scholars used the term with a different meaning. This definition of modality is noted as important because it led to the eventual classification of modality from the viewpoint of semantic-functional structure. Nitta (1989: 2), Masuoka (1991) and Nakau (1994) have built on Watanabe’s view with two categories: (1)

---

<sup>5</sup> Others have various terms for proposition and modality in addition to *jojutsu-naiyō* ‘descriptive content’ and *chinjutsu* ‘expressive and conclusive expressions’. *Koto* ‘thing’ and *mūdo* ‘mood’ are used by Mikami (1959: 117 and 123) and Teramura (1982: 51). Also, *dikutum* ‘dictum’ and *modus* ‘modus’ (Haga 1978: 37), *genpyōjitai* ‘the situation or state of utterance’ and *genpyōtaido* ‘the attitude of utterance’ (Nitta 1989), and *meidai* ‘proposition’ and ‘modality’ (Masuoka 1987: 9) have all used for proposition and modality.

‘propositional modality’ and (2) ‘modality for utterance and transmission’. ‘Propositional modality’ is conceived as relationship between the object and the utterer, while ‘modality for utterance and transmission’ is the relationship between the hearer and the utterer. Thus, it can be seen that Watanabe’s definition of modality provided a subtle hint for the establishment of this classification of modality. This thesis follows these scholars in adopting this classification of the ‘two-stratum structure of modality’.

The second of Watanabe’s contributions (1971:100-101 and 107) is that he proposes that *chinjutsu* is semantically categorised into five types: (1) modality for assertion; (2) modality for questions; (3) modality for exclamations; (4) modality for appealing; (5) modality for calling.<sup>6</sup> The above five types correspond to interrogative, declarative, exclamatory, imperative and appealing (for calling) sentences, respectively (1971: 107).<sup>7</sup> It can be seen that his proposition works at the level of the sentence, so this attempt at a categorisation of modality is commendable.

However, two weak points can be seen in Watanabe’s view. Firstly, Watanabe (1971: 106) regards expressions with no predicates as sentences, as with *Sakura yo!* (an appealing sentence) and *Ōi!* ‘Hallo!’ (a call). There is room for argument as to whether or not these expressions constitute independent propositions. These two examples, in fact, do not seem to constitute their own propositions, and if there is no proposition in an expression, the expression cannot be regarded as a sentence. Secondly, the categorisation of the five types lacks an expression of modality for conjectural judgement, which is one of the key expressions for modality. His declarative sentences might include conjectural sentences, but he does not refer to epistemic modals (such as *darō* ‘will’) in his categorisation. He only refers to ‘assertion’ in declarative sentences. It would seem that the reason for the lack of ‘conjectural judgement’ is that his categorisation is set up from the viewpoint of the sentence-type, not from that of modality itself.

---

<sup>6</sup> Watanabe’s examples (1971:101) are *Sakura no hana ga saku?* ‘Do cherry blossoms start flowering?’ (for questions), e.g., *Sakura no hana ga saku.* ‘Cherry blossoms start flowering.’ (for assertion), *Sakura no hana ga saku!* ‘Cherry blossoms start flowering!’ (for exclamation), *Sakura yo!* ‘Oh Cherry!’ (for appealing), e.g. *Ōi!* ‘Hallo!’ (for a call).

<sup>7</sup> With regard to Tokieda’s ‘zero-symbol’, Watanabe (1953) accepted it first, but later he (1971: 97-99) seems to retract it in order to accept the assertive modality.

## (2) Problems of categorisation by meanings and usages of modality

Teramura (1984: 61-62) draws attention to conjectural expressions as a category of modality missing from Watanabe's categorisation, and semantically categorises modality into five categories through an analysis of the conjugated form of verbs: (1) *kakugen* 'assertion'; (2) *gaigen* 'conjecture'; (3) *ishi* 'volition'; (4) *kan'yū* 'invitation'; (5) *yōkyū* 'demand/request'.<sup>8</sup> Noting that mood expresses modality, he proposes that (1) 'assertion' is expressed by basic forms (conclusive forms) and past forms of verbs (such as *tabe-ta* 'ate'), (2) 'conjecture' by conjectural/volitional forms and past conjectural forms; (3) volition by basic forms, conjectural/volitional forms and imperative forms; (4) invitation by conjectural/volitional forms; (5) demand/request by basic forms (conclusive forms) and imperative forms. Teramura gives three new categories of modality; 'conjecture', 'volition' and 'invitation', which are not shown in Watanabe's category. Teramura's above categorisation is proposed from the viewpoint of the conjugated form of verbs, namely 'mood'. 'Mood' is a morphological category. Watanabe's three categories —'questions', 'exclamations' and *yobikake* 'calls', which are not analysable by the conjugation form of verbs— disappear in Teramura's categorisation.

The division by Teramura and Watanabe into numerous subcategories is inadequate to the overall function of modality. Such a division would in turn produce more subcategories such as anger, hesitation, sorrow, and so on. Hence, the classification of modality must be established by the characteristics of the function of modality related to the proposition in the sentence. The classification of modality is one of the subjects of this study.

This thesis will propose that propositional modality can be classified into three categories by way of the characteristics of the function from the viewpoint of the relationship between the proposition (or the situation) and the utterer's attitude: (1) proposition-oriented modality; (2) situation-oriented modality; and (3) listener-oriented modality, as shown in chapter 2.

---

<sup>8</sup> Teramura's terms 確言 *kakugen* and 概言 *gaigen* can be translated by 'assertion' and 'conjecture', respectively.

### (3) Problems of Nakau's definition of modality

Nakau (1979) contributes to the study of modality, particularly (1) the definition of modality and (2) the characteristics of modality. Nakau (1979: 224) defines modality only from the semantic point of view, as follows:

Firstly, modality is the expression of the speaker's mental attitude but not the second/third person's attitude. ... Secondly, the speaker's attitude is at the time of utterance, but not at past or future time. (My translation)

This definition rests on three conditions: (1) the utterer (not the second or third person but the first person); (2) the mental attitude (not outer life); (3) the present time at the time of utterance (not the past or future time). These can be integrated into one phrase, 'the utterer's attitude at the time of utterance'. This phrase is influential in Japanese linguistics and is pervasively used.

Also, comparing Japanese with English, Nakau establishes that modality in itself cannot be denied with the negative form, and that modality in itself cannot become the object of questions.

Nakau's definition of modality, however, is too broad to determine whether or not some words, even such as verbs, express modality by themselves. Nakau regards the following verbs as examples expressing propositional modality,<sup>9</sup> stating that the verbs *omou* 'I think that', *mieru* 'I see', *iwazaru-o-e-nai* 'I cannot but say', *shira-nai* 'I do not know' and *wakara-nai* 'I do not understand' express "modality of truth judgement".<sup>10</sup> According to Nakau, the verb phrases *to-iwareru* 'It is said' and *to-kiku/to-kiiteiru* 'I hear/I am told that' express "modality of judgement withholding". "Modality of (dis)approval" is expressed by, for example, *(o)gimon-ni-omou* 'I doubt', *utagawashiku-omou* 'I disbelieve', *dōka-to-omou* 'I deny/don't say', *watashi wa mitome-nai* 'I don't admit', *(ni)dōi-shi-kaneru* 'I disapprove', *sansei-deki-nai*, 'I cannot approve', *(ōni)-sansei-da* 'I approve'. "Modality of value judgement" is expressed by, for example, *zannen-ni-omou* 'I am sorry', *fushigi-ni-omou* 'I wonder', *kii-ni-kanzuru*

<sup>9</sup> Nakau (1994: 54) categorises 'sentence-modality' (propositional modality) into five categories: "modality of truth judgement", "modality of judgement withholding", "modality of (dis)approval", "modality of value judgement" and "modality of deontic judgement".

<sup>10</sup> Nakau (1994: 55) includes a desiderative expression *kyōchōshi-tai* 'I want to emphasise' and sentence-final particles *yo* and *ne* in this category 'modality of truth judgement'.

‘It feels strange to me’ and *mōshiwake-naku-omou* ‘I am sorry/ I apologise’. “Modality of deontic judgement” is expressed by, for example, *tsumori-da* ‘I am going to’, (to) *yakusoku-shi-masu* ‘I promise’, *chikai-masu* ‘I swear’, and *onegai-shi-masu/tanomi-masu* ‘Could you please...?’ Thus, performative verbs are included in this category.


The problem with Nakau, however, is that his definition is too broad by virtue of his semantic viewpoint. He is not aware of the distinction between proposition and modality and regards many expressions having the utterer’s emotion or feeling as modality. This definition thus includes not only verbs but also adjectives or predicates among the forms expressing modality. If so, these adjectives could be said to express modality. However, is this view reasonable? In these cases, if such predicate-words (verbs, adjectives and adverbs) express modality, does he maintain that the words do not convey the propositional contents of the sentences? Or does he have any way to explain the question? Unfortunately, Nakau has provided no answers to this question. That is to say, following Nakau’s view, the distinction between proposition and modality is unclear. He does not refer to whether or not such words belong in the propositional category, though he maintains that they express modality. His understanding results from his sole reliance on the semantic view. Therefore, a more precise definition of modality is required, adding the syntactic viewpoint.

#### **(4) Problems in applying a two-stratum structure of modality theory**

From the viewpoint of the semantic-functional structure of modality, modality can be classified into two categories: (1) ‘propositional modality’ from the relationship between the object (proposition) and the utterer; and (2) ‘modality for utterance or transmission’ (Nitta 1989 and 1991b; Nakau 1994; Masuoka 1991). According to Nitta (1989: 2), ‘propositional modality’ is a grammatical expression related to how the utterer grasps propositions, and ‘modality for utterance or transmission’ is a grammatical expression related to how the utterer represents her/his inner feelings or thoughts. Nakau (1994: 15) employs the term ‘S-modality’ (sentence-modality) for the former and the term ‘D-modality’ (discourse- modality) for the latter. Following the previous studies (Nitta 1989,

Nakau 1994 and Masuoka 1991), this thesis adopts the semantic-functional structure theory with two strata, ‘propositional modality’ and ‘modality for utterance or transmission’

The ‘two-stratum structure of modality’ theory (‘propositional modality’ and ‘modality for utterance or transmission’) represents the semantic and syntactic structure of a sentence. According to Nitta (1989: 3), ‘propositional modality’ is semantically and syntactically subsumed by ‘modality for utterance or transmission’ but the opposite never occurs. Let us consider the following example, *ame ga furu darō ne* ‘It will rain tomorrow, won’t it?’ On the one hand, the *darō* form expresses ‘propositional modality’ because the utterer’s attitude of conjectural judgement of the proposition is expressed by *darō*. On the other hand, the *ne* form expresses ‘modality for utterance or transmission’ because *ne* is used towards the listener to prompt or assume the listener’s agreement with the utterer.<sup>11</sup> *Darō* and *ne* are different in function. Semantically and syntactically *darō* subsumes the proposition while *ne* subsumes both proposition and *darō*. This can be shown by [[[*ame ga furu* PROP] *darō* PM] *ne* UM] (PROP=proposition; P<sub>M</sub>=propositional modality; U<sub>M</sub>=Modality for utterance and transmission). This semantic and syntactic structure can be figured in the following tree-diagram.



**Fig 1-1. Two-Stratum Structure of modality**

<sup>11</sup> ‘Modality for utterance or transmission’ (U-modality) is a characteristic category in the Japanese language since because it could be said that this category cannot be seen in the English language. The tag question looks similar but is different.

This can be interpreted as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} S &\rightarrow S_2 + U_M \\ S_2 &\rightarrow S_1 + P_M \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} U_M &\rightarrow (\text{Modality for utterance and transmission}) \\ S_1 &\rightarrow \text{PROP (Proposition)} \\ P_M &\rightarrow (\text{Propositional Modality}) \end{aligned}$$

This phrase structure rule is equivalent to the above tree-diagram.

This thesis will represent the two semantic-syntactic categories of modality in terms of ‘P-modality’ for  $P_M$  and ‘U-modality’ for  $U_M$ . U-modality semantically and syntactically subsumes both the proposition and P-modality in a sentence. A sentence can be generally shown as

$$\text{Sentence} \rightarrow [ [ [ \text{Proposition} ] \text{P-modality} ] \text{U-modality} ]$$

U-modality is optional and is not always expressed in the sentence. In contrast, P-modality is fundamentally expressed in the sentence.

The above definition of a two-stratum structure of modality allows clear recognition of the two types of modality. At least the following two problems can be solved by this definition, especially from the syntactic viewpoint. Firstly, Nitta (1989), Masuoka (19991) and Nakau (1994) regard the two polite forms of *desu* (the polite form of *da*) and *masu* (the polite form following the adverbial forms of verbs) as U-modality forms.<sup>12</sup> Semantically this view is acceptable but syntactically it is unacceptable. Let us consider the following sentences:

- (3) (Eddie, the trainer of Naitō, said to ‘me’)  
 “10,000 *doru* are *ba*, *Yanagi to demo*, *dare to demo*, (*Naitō wa taisen*)  
*deki-masu-ne*.” (Sawaki: 756)  
 “‘If we have 10,000 dollar, Naitō can have a boxing match with whomever,  
 even with Yanagi.’”

<sup>12</sup> Backhouse (1993: 43 and 114) regards *da/dearu/desu* as the copula. It would seem that *da/dearu* can be regarded as the same suffix, and that *desu* is their polite form. This view might require further investigation from a historical viewpoint but tentatively this thesis regards these forms as the same suffixes in order to progress the discussion.

- (4) ('I' am talking about a place to meet on the phone)  
 “*Basho wa Yokohama ga ii-kana?*”  
 “*Wazawaza warui-desu-yo. .....jimu de machi-awase-mase-n-ka.*” (Sawaki: 37)  
 ‘ “Would you Yokohama be a good place to meet?”  
 “That would be a lot of trouble for you ..... Why don’t we meet at the boxing gym? ”’

In examples (3) and (4), {*masu + ne*} and {*desu +yo*} can be seen, respectively. The two forms *ne* and *yo* belong to the same category, U-modality. The two polite forms *masu* and *desu* are used together with the U-modality forms. From the syntactic viewpoint, a form with a certain syntactic category can be either a U-modality form or a non-U-modality one in a sentence. Two forms having the same syntactic category cannot appear together in a sentence. If *masu* and *desu* expressed U-modality, they could not appear together with *yo* and *ne* expressing U-modality. Hence, the appearance of *masu* and *yo* (as well as *masu* and *ne*) invites the view that *masu* and *yo* together (as well as *masu* and *ne*) must be regarded as forms situated in different categories. Therefore, the polite forms *masu* and *desu* must be differentiated from U-modality.<sup>13</sup> In addition, *desu* and *masu* are used from the viewpoint of attitudes to the listener (or the people in the conversation). In contrast, U-modality is concerned with how the utterer expresses or transmits the proposition with P-modality to the listener.

Furthermore, sentence-final particles *yo* and *ne* are differently treated by linguists. Nakau (1994: 55) situates sentence-final particles *yo* and *ne* as P-modality but Nitta (1989: 3) regards them as U-modality. This thesis regards *yo* and *ne* as typical U-modality forms because these particles appear after, not before P-modality. This is proved by examples (5) and (6) below.

- (5) (Nobuo ask a question to his mother)  
 “*Okāsama. Shikashi, kono yo ni tadashii hito wa hontōni hitori mo ori-mase-n-ka.*”  
 “*Inai-deshō-ne.*” (Miura: 310)

<sup>13</sup> The sentence-final particle *yone* expressing U-modality can be considered as a combined form, *yo* plus *ne*, because it behaves as a single particle with both their functions, by which the utterer asks the listener for the confirmation of what s/he believes. For example, (Nobuo does not know that his father has another child, trying to confirm it) “*Uso-da-i. Otō-sama, Uso-desu-yone.*” ““You are telling a lie. Papa, it is a lie, isn’t it?”” (Miura: 39) In addition, although this chapter considers *masu* and *desu* as verb/noun suffixes not U-modality, this issue is discussed in the next chapter.

“Mum. But is there actually no one in the world who is always right?”  
 “No one, I think *-ne*”

- (6) (Nobuo’s colleague is talking to Nobuo)  
 “*Shunin mo tōtō Asahikawa ni eiten to kimatta-sōda-yo.*” (Miura: 524)  
 “I heard that at length our chief was promoted and transferred to  
 Asahikawa.”

In (5) *deshō* (the polite form *darō*) is a P-modality form and is subsumed by *ne*. In (6) *sōda* expressing hearsay is a P-modality form and is subsumed by *yo*. *Ne* and *yo* never appear immediately before P-modality forms because *Inai-ne-deshō* and *kimatta-yo-sōda* are grammatically incorrect. Syntactically P-modality appears before U-modality. Hence, the above two instances of the polite forms and the sentence-final particles show that the *desu* and *masu* forms are excluded from U-modality, and that the sentence-final particles such as *ne* and *yo* are included by U-modality. Thus, the two-stratum structure of modality theory can be used to refine the concept of modality.

### ***Positions of affective, exclamatory and demand expressions***

Although Nitta (1989), Nakau (1994) and Masuoka (1991) adopt the ‘two-stratum structure of modality’ theory, they have not given a clear explanation of which category — P-modality and U-modality — the following three items belong to: (1) *hyōshutsu* ‘affective expressions’; (2) exclamation; (3) demand or request expressions.

Firstly, Nitta (1989) and Masuoka (1991) place (*jōi*-)*hyōshutsu* (‘an affective expression (of feeling/volition)’) in U-modality, based on sentence-type. However, it is questionable to regard ‘an affective expression’ as U-modality. Let us consider Nitta and Masuoka’s examples below.

- (7) a. (volition)  
*Kotoshi koso ganbarō.* (Nitta 1989: 5)  
 ‘I will try my best especially this year’  
 b. (desire)  
*Mizu ga nomi-tai.* (Nitta 1989: 5)  
 ‘I want to drink water.’  
 c. (desire)  
*Ashita tenki ni nāre.* (Nitta 1989: 5)

- I pray that it is fine tomorrow.’
- d. (feeling or emotion)  
*Dō-shiyō-mo-naku sabishii*. (Masuoka 1991: 81)  
 ‘I feel incredibly lonely.’
- e. (invitation/proposal or volition)  
*Konokoto wa hayaku wasure-yō*. (Masuoka 1991: 81)  
 ‘Shall we forget such a thing / You might as well forget such a thing.  
 or I will forget such a thing.’

As can be seen in example (7) above, each sentence expresses the utterer’s inner feelings or thoughts, so it might seem to express modality. However, is it clear which part is the proposition, which part the P-modality and which part U-modality in each sentence? No clear explanation is provided. In examples (7a) and (7e), volition or invitation/proposal is expressed by the volitional marker *u* (*ō* or *yō*). Can the volitional marker be regarded as U-modality? In example (7b) the desiderative marker *tai* expresses the utterer’s desire. Can the desiderative marker be regarded as U-modality? In example (7c) the imperative conjugated form *nare* is used and thereby prayer (rather than desire) is expressed. Does the mood express U-modality? In example (7d) feeling/emotion is expressed by the adjective *sabishii* ‘lonely’. Does the adjective express U-modality? Does not the adjective express the proposition? Answers to these questions are required from the viewpoint of proposition and modality. The reason for the lack of clear explanations of them is that Nitta and Masuoka consider that U-modality is the same as sentence-type. Hence, ‘affective expression’ needs to be clarified by the analysis of proposition and modality. This is discussed in the next chapter.

Also, it is questionable to regard ‘exclamation’ as U-modality, as Masuoka (1991: 87-88) does. Masuoka confounds modality and sentence-type, as shown by his example below:

- (8) a. *Zeitaku-da-nā*. (Masuoka: 1991: 87)  
 b. *Kireina hana-da-nā*. (Masuoka: 1991: 87)  
 c. *Ryokō ni iki-tai-nā*. (Masuoka: 1991: 87)

Masuoka considers the above sentences, including the sentence-final particle *nā* as the exclamation-type, namely U-modality. Sentence (8c) has both the desire morpheme *tai* and the exclamatory marker *nā*. Masuoka explains that the desire

expression is similar to the exclamatory expression. However, no sufficient explanation has been made from the viewpoints of proposition and modality. Masuoka seems to regard the *nā* form as U-modality. If ‘exclamation’ were always expressed only by *nā*, it might be able to be considered as U-modality. However, ‘exclamation’ is not always expressed by *nā*, but *nante* *~(no) darō* ‘what a ~ it is!’ is also used as follows:

- (9) (Getting home, Nobuo has read the letter from Yoshikawa)  
*Jittori-to kubisuji no asebanu no ga hukai-datta.*  
 “*Nante mushi-atsui hi darō.*”  
*Sakki kara Nobuo wa onaji koto o tsubuyai-te-i-ta.* (Miura: 387)  
 ‘ “Nobuo was uncomfortable because the back of his neck was slightly damp with sweat.  
 — What a muggy day! —”  
 Nobuo had been muttering the same words repeatedly to himself for quite a while.’

The *nante* *~(no) darō* ‘what a ~ it is!’ is not explained by Masuoka, but it seems that the *nante* *~(no) darō* ‘what a ~ it is!’ form behaves as an expression of P-modality. This is because the proposition ‘it is a muggy day’ or the situation which the proposition expresses is emotively recognised by the utterer. Hence, it can be said that the *nante* *~(no) darō* ‘what a ~ it is!’ form expresses P-modality.<sup>14</sup>

The two examples (8) and (9) above show that the *nā* form expresses U-modality while the *nante* *~(no) darō* ‘what a ~ it is!’ expresses P-modality. Thus, ‘exclamation’ expresses both P-modality and U-modality (which Masuoka regards it as), so it is inappropriate simply to regard ‘exclamation’ as U-modality. This implies that the concept of modality should be differentiated from that of the sentence-type, and that each form should be investigated from the viewpoints of proposition and modality (P- and U-modality). In addition, although Nakau (1994: 66-67) places exclamatory expressions such as *aa* ‘Ah! or Oh!’, *itai* ‘Ouch! or Ow!’, *shimatta* ‘Oh, no!’ and *baka* ‘stupid’ into the category of ‘affective expression’, his examples are close to ‘a shout’ or ‘a cry’ which is strongly connected to the intonation or stress of an utterance. Nakau regards these

<sup>14</sup> Nitta (1991b: 23) states that ‘exclamation’ seems to be an expression form which belongs to propositional modality, although Nitta (1989: 49-52; 1991b: 68-71) withholds his conclusion about the precise position of ‘exclamation’ as a further subject to investigate.

examples as U-modality, but he also has not given a clear explanation for this reason. The next chapter will consider this unsolved problem.

Thirdly, the expression ‘demand or request’ is differently regarded in the literature as P-modality by Nakau (1994) and as U-modality by Nitta (1989) and Masuoka (1991). Unlike both Nitta and Masuoka’s views, Nakau (1994: 57-58) regards it as P-modality in terms of deontic modality with examples, {adverbial form + *-ro* ‘do!’}, {adverbial form + *-te-kure* ‘do it for me!’}, {adverbial form + *-te-hoshii* ‘I want you to do something’} and so on.<sup>15</sup> Let us consider the following sentences taken from Nitta and Masuoka:

- (10) a. *Kochira e koi*. (Nitta 1989: 5)  
       ‘Come here!’  
       b. *Mō sukoshi yomu kara sakini ne-te-kure*. (Masuoka 1991: 80)  
       I want to read some more, so go to bed without waiting for me.’

In example (10), *koi* ‘come!’ and *-te-kure* ‘I want you to do something!’ express ‘demand’ or ‘request’. The two forms are both the imperative of the verbs and are related to their propositions because the utterer asks the listener to execute the proposition. Hence, it can be said that P-modality is expressed by ‘mood’ (the conjugated forms). On the level of communication, however, the listener is pressured to do something by the utterer or the expression, so it might seem that these sentences express U-modality. In either case, since the expressions place pressure on the listener to do something and produce nuances of obligation, it might be possible to say that they express deontic modality. Thus, whether the imperative mood expresses P-modality or U-modality is a problem in need of clarification. This issue is also taken up in the next chapter.

As can be seen above, when the two-stratum structure of modality theory is applied to the above three expressions, each expression must be analysed from the viewpoints of proposition, P-modality or U-modality. The above problems are the focus of this thesis.

---

<sup>15</sup> According to Crystal (1980: 98), deontic is “a term derived from modal logic and used by some linguists as part of theoretical framework for the analysis of MODAL VERBS and related STRUCTURES in LANGUAGE. Deontic modality is concerned with the logic of obligation and permission.” Following this, this thesis uses this term deontic modality as modals expressing obligation and permission.

### **(5) Modality regarded as a grammatical category on the sentence level**

With regard to the definition of modality, the following three points are important. First, modality is a concept that functions on the sentence-level but not the word-level. Second, modality is the opposite of proposition and expresses the utterer's attitude to the proposition. Third, the semantic role of modality and two-stratum structure of modality theory must be considered in a definition of modality. On the basis of the literature review above, modality is newly defined here as follows:

Modality is a grammatical category (including semantic and syntactic categories) at the level of a sentence, expressing 'the utterer's attitude' at the time of utterance. Modality is categorised into P-modality and U-modality. Semantically and syntactically, P-modality is related to the proposition of a sentence and subsumes the proposition, while U-modality is related to the representation of the sentence and subsumes the proposition and P-modality.

The standard on which to base decisions about the distinction between the propositional part and the modality part must be investigated. Further definitions of proposition and modality are discussed in the next chapter.

## **1-3. Research objectives**

This thesis has three research objectives. The first objective is to clarify the characteristics of epistemic modality through the definitions of proposition and modality. Although this study focuses on epistemic modality, to begin with, an overview of proposition and modality must be clarified to settle the position of epistemic modality. So far three problems have been seen in the literature review of modality. First, the definition of modality of Nakau (1979) is too broad. Second, the meaning and usage of modality must be categorised according to the classification of modality (particularly P-modality), which has not yet adequately occurred. Third, the positions of 'affective', 'exclamatory' and 'demand or request' expressions are unclear among modality expressions. These problems are related to the definitions of proposition and modality, and to the classification of modality. They are able to be resolved by setting up more precise definitions and

clearer classification. Hence, this study will attempt not only to define them, but also to classify modality by the analysis of characteristics of its function.<sup>16</sup> This investigation is carried out in order to clarify the position of epistemic modality in modality.

The second objective is to clarify the borderline between proposition and modality, particularly in a sentence which has the tense marker *-ta*. In the literature the borderline between them is not clearly demonstrated. Even though the tense marker *-ta* is typically regarded as a standard demonstrating a non-modality element, the reason for this, according to Nitta (1991b: 54-55), is that the utterer's attitude at the time of utterance cannot be expressed by the *-ta* form. Masuoka (1999: 46 and 51-52) regards tense as a propositional element, though he excluded tense (even polarity) from this earlier (1991: 42-44).<sup>17</sup> It is important to determine whether the *-ta* form belongs to proposition or modality for the clarification of the question of boundary.<sup>18</sup> In addition, this thesis investigates boundary on the assumption that such a thing can be found, since this study takes the view that a sentence consists of two elements: a propositional element and a modality element.<sup>19</sup>

The last objective is to clarify differences between modals having similar morphemes or functions. This thesis selects (1) *darō* and *nodarō* and (2) *yōda* and *rashii*, because it is very difficult to explain the differences between them. Firstly, for example, the forms *darō* and *nodarō* are morphologically similar, with either an absence or presence of the *no* segment. The difference between these two forms is the main question of interest. In the literature, the characteristics of *nodarō* have been discussed (Kuramochi 1980; Okuda 1984; Nakahata 1998). However, the difference between *nodarō* and *darō* is still unclear, not only because the terms are not easy to understand, but also because examples which their views cannot explain can be seen.<sup>20</sup> Secondly, *yōda* and *rashii* are very

---

<sup>16</sup> These are discussed in chapter 2.

<sup>17</sup> Masuoka (1999: 46 and 48-49) states himself that he has altered his thought on the range of proposition to include tense.

<sup>18</sup> This is discussed in chapter 3.

<sup>19</sup> Watanabe (1971: 92), Teramura (1982: 51) and Nitta (1991b: 17) advocate this view, which seems to be derived from Tokieda's (1940) *shi* and *ji* theory. In the analysis of English sentences, Fillmore (1968: 23-24) adopts a dichotomy of sentence in terms of proposition and modality, though he regards many categories (not only mood but also negation, tense, and aspect) as modality elements.

<sup>20</sup> This is discussed in chapter 4.

similar to each other in their usage. The two modals have been studied by many scholars (e.g. Okamura 1969; Kashiwaoka 1980, Teramura 1984, Hayatsu 1988, Nakahata 1990, Tanomura 1991, Ōshika 1995, Kikuchi 2000). One of the most persuasive views is the ‘observation/description of *yōda* and inference of *rashii*’ theory (Nakahata 1990, Kojima 1996; Kikuchi 2000). However, even this theory does not adequately explain all examples. Thus, further investigation is required to solve this problem, including the re-examination of previous theories.<sup>21</sup>

#### 1-4. Scope of this thesis

The objects for the investigation are seven auxiliary verb modals: *darō*, *kamoshirenai*, *nichigainai*, *yōda*, *rashii*, and *(suru)sōda*, which are frequently used in everyday conversation. The reason for the selection is that whenever these modals are used in the present form at the end of a sentence, the utterer’s own present attitude or judgement is expressed but not the second/third person’s. These modals show how the utterer recognises the proposition or the situation which the proposition expresses.<sup>22</sup> P-modality is focused on but U-modality is not the subject.

Modals expressing obligation/permission (or propriety) such as *nakerebanaranai* ‘must’ or *bekida* ‘should’ are excluded from the subject of the immediate investigation. While in English ‘must’ or ‘should’ are regarded as deontic modals by Palmer (1986 and 2001) and Lyons (1977 and 1995), in the Japanese language *nakerebanaranai* (could be equivalent to ‘must’) or *bekida* (to ‘should’) seem to be propositional elements, even if they express obligation/permission (or propriety). This is because they take interrogative forms such as *nakerebanaranai+kai* and *bekidesu+ka*; moreover, *koto* ‘a thing’ can follow them to make noun-clauses, such as *nakerebanaranai+koto* and *bekidearu+koto*. The above two aspects, (1) interrogatives and (2) nominalisation by *koto* ‘a thing’, show that these forms are propositional elements. So *nakerebanaranai* ‘must’ or

<sup>21</sup> This is discussed in chapter 5.

<sup>22</sup> Teramura’s (1979: 71) describes the seven modals in the expression of 「概言的に状況を報道する表現」 “*gaigen-teki ni jōkyō o hōdō suru hyōgen*” which can be translated by “they express the report/news of a situation in general terms” in English. ‘*Gaigen-teki*’ seems to imply epistemic modality.

*bekida* ‘should’ are not classed as epistemic modals or deontic modals in the Japanese language and hence are not the focus of this thesis.<sup>23</sup>

Also, explanatory modals such as *noda* or *wakeda* (Teramura 1979: 71), which are compound modals morphologically formed with an abstract noun plus a copula, are excluded from the study. Although they are P-modality forms, they are semantically different from the above epistemic modals because they can express already-known information whereas the epistemic modals cannot.

Particles *wa* and *mo* and other special particles such as *sura*, *sae*, *dake*, and *bakari* express modality of informational salience. These forms are related to P-modality expression. However, since they do not appear at the end of a sentence, they are also excluded. For the same reason, sentence-adverbs such as *osoraku* ‘perhaps’ and introductory remarks such as *saiwaina-kotoni* ‘fortunately’ are excluded.

Modality is concerned with sentence-meaning but not with utterance meaning. Sentence meaning and utterance meaning must be carefully differentiated. The concept of utterance meaning includes both the utterance-intention of the utterer and the utterance-interpretation of the listener, so utterance-meaning can be regarded as the ‘communicative meaning of utterance’. However, the study of modality does not refer to what the communicative meaning is. The communicative meaning of utterance is paralinguistic and is beyond modality. This view can also be applied to performative verbs such as *yakusoku-suru* ‘I promise’. If the communicative meanings of performative verbs are dealt with as expressions at the level of illocutionary act, the subject is beyond modality, but if they are dealt with as expressions at the sentence level, they can become the object of modality, as with ‘volitional’ modality as expressed in ‘I promise’. Thus, this thesis discusses modality but not paralinguistic expressions.

## 1-5. Methodology or approach

This thesis adopts mainly two approaches: an example-illustration approach and a

---

<sup>23</sup> Nitta (1991b: 71) points out that it is not acceptable to bring ‘deontic modality’ uncritically into the modality discussion of the Japanese language, though he regards *nakerebanaranai* ‘must’ and *bekida* ‘should’ as *fukujiteki* ‘attached’ modality-form.

context approach.

Firstly, the example-illustration approach makes use of actual examples which are used in modern Japanese novels, because modality must be considered on the basis of linguistic facts. Scholars such as Nagano (1951), Tanaka (1969) and Yoshida (1971) have produced important results through the analysis of many examples. Considering linguistic facts as crucial, this thesis adopts the example-illustration approach. This approach could be said to be a bottom-up approach rather than a top-down approach.

Secondly, a context approach is also taken. The context is related broadly to word, sentence and text. The term ‘context’ can be considered to imply the situations or circumstances which help to make the sentence meaning (or the utterance meaning) clear. As Lyons (1968: Deixis 9-3-2) states, the concept of context broadly includes the things which have been talked about, and the shared knowledge of the speaker and the listener. The context is brought to the sentence and expressed by the utterer at the ‘zero-point’ of utterance, which is the idealistic centre of the utterance, ‘I’ (the utterer), ‘here’ (the utterance place) and ‘now’ (the time of utterance). Modality is also expressed at the ‘zero-point’ in a way similar to utterance. Hence, the context of the utterance is the same as that of sentence which expresses modality. Conditions of modality appearing at the end of a sentence cannot be understood without analysis of the context which is brought to the ending part of a sentence such as epistemic modals.

This thesis also makes use of two methods: ‘a modal-substitution’ method and ‘a phrase-addition’ method. The former is used to test whether or not one modal can be substituted for another modal in a sentence. This method works effectively in the case of examining how differently modals work. Through analysing the condition of both substitution and non-substitution between modals, the differences between them can be recognised from the viewpoints of semantics, syntax or context. The latter, the phrase-addition method, involves adding a certain phrase to the sentence or part of the sentence. This is used to examine whether or not the new expression followed by a certain phrase is grammatically and contextually appropriate. When the new expression is grammatically and contextually appropriate, this result shows that it has the concept implied by the

phrase. Thus, the phrase functions cogently as a measure for grasping whether or not the sentence or the part of sentence implies a certain concept. This method is, for example, used to distinguish between proposition and modality.

## 1-6. Thesis structure

The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 proposes a definition of proposition, building on the scholars Lyons (1995: 44), Kaplan (1995: 33) and Japanese scholars such as Teramura (1982: 51). Lyons and Kaplan approach proposition from the logical viewpoint while the Japanese scholars approach it from the viewpoint of objectivity. These views are integrated into a new definition of proposition. It then demonstrates a certain phrasal standard for judging which part of the sentence is the propositional one. Second, this chapter also proposes a more precise definition of modality, adding the distinction in truth-value between proposition and modality, and classifies modality through analysis of its function, clarifying the positions of epistemic modality and the property of modality ('assertion', 'conjecture', self-questions, exclamations, volition, questions of the listener, appealing/demand and invitation). Finally, this chapter examines whether words (such as verbs) and unclear morphemes (such as *-tai*) belong to the propositional part of the sentence or to the modality part by applying both the new definitions and the phrasal-standard.

Chapter 3 explores the modality of *-ta* through analysis of *-ta* usage for the purpose of investigating whether *-ta* expresses proposition, modality, or both proposition and modality. To this end, the chapter uses both the definitions of proposition and modality, and the classification of modality proposed in chapter 2. This chapter is concerned with the sentence-final expression of *-ta* which is polysemous. While the meaning of *-ta* is generally related to temporality (past or perfect), there is a case where *-ta* has no relation to its temporal meaning. This chapter shows that the modality expressed in the former case is different from the modality in the latter case. This chapter also classifies the usage of *-ta* from the viewpoint of proposition and modality, demonstrating the syntactic features of the *-ta* sentence with tree diagrams.

Next, chapters 4 and 5 investigate differences among epistemic modals which function similarly at the end of a sentence; namely, (1) *darō* and *nodarō* and (2) *yōda* and *rashii*. The aim is to identify distinctive features of the four modals, built on the classifications of chapter 2. Example illustration and contextual approaches are taken to explore the conditions of usage through the analysis of the context. Both chapters also use the substitution method to clarify the difference between the four modals. Chapter 4 explores the modal *nodarō* to clarify its characteristics in comparison with those of *darō*. This chapter attempts to reinforce Nakahata's (1998: 29 and 40; See 1-3) view from the semantic viewpoint, investigating the distinctive features of *nodarō* through clarifying the relationship between situation and judgement in the context. This chapter also examines the syntactic features of *nodarō*, particularly the scope of *nodarō* in a sentence, to clearly show the difference between *nodarō* and *darō*, by demonstrating which part of the sentence is focused on as the utterer's conjectural judgement. Chapter 5 proposes semantic definitions of *yōda* and *rashii* through clarification of the semantic features of the two modals. In doing this, this chapter examines the meanings and usages of *yōda* and *rashii* by analysing both previous studies and examples collected from modern Japanese novels and critical essays of the *Asahi* newspaper. An analysis of the data of examples is statistically made using two indexes: (1) the presence/absence of *rinjōsei* 'the utterer is present in the scene with the subject for her/his judgement'; (2) the explicitness/implicitness of grounds for conjectural judgement.

Finally, chapter 6 will conclude with the overall findings and significance of this thesis, suggesting areas for further research.

**Chapter 2**

<b>Proposition and Modality .....</b>	<b>25</b>
2-1. Introduction.....	25
2-2. Proposition of a sentence .....	26
2-2-1. Definition of proposition .....	26
2-2-2. Adnominalisations leading to forfeiture of modality .....	29
2-2-3. Phrasal discriminator indicating proposition.....	30
2-3. Modality of a sentence.....	33
2-3-1. Definition of modality .....	34
2-3-2. Applications of the definition of modality .....	34
2-3-3. Modality analysed from the syntactic viewpoint.....	39
2-4. Three types of modality .....	45
2-4-1. Literature review and the classification of modality .....	45
2-4-2. Proposition-oriented modality: Epistemic modality.....	47
(1) Modality of report of prior information or fact .....	48
(2) Modality of judgement of a situation or an object .....	50
(a) Assertion.....	50
(b) Conjecture.....	51
(c) Scepticism.....	51
2-4-3. Situation-oriented modality: Affective modality.....	55
(1) Emotive modality .....	55
(2) Volitional modality.....	60
(3) Sensitive modality .....	61
2-4-4. Listener-oriented modality: Conative modality.....	62
Conative modality .....	62
2-5. Characteristics of epistemic modality.....	67
2-5-1. Categories of epistemic modality .....	67
2-5-2. Characteristics of epistemic modality .....	69
2-5-3. Epistemic modals expressing conjectural judgement.....	71
2-6. Three remaining issues .....	76
2-6-1. Mood and modality .....	77
2-6-2. Copula .....	79

2-6-3. Polite forms <i>masu</i> and <i>desu</i> .....	81
2-7. Conclusion .....	85

Figure

Fig 2-1. Modality of judgement.....	54
-------------------------------------	----

# Chapter 2

## Proposition and Modality

### 2-1. Introduction

A sentence is considered to consist of proposition and modality (Nakau 1979: 223; Teramura 1982: 51; Nitta 1989: 1 and 1997: 125; Masuoka 2000: 87). According to Nakau (1979: 223), “proposition is an expression of a certain situation (an event, a state of things, an action, a process and so on) which the speaker has chosen from the real world”, “a description of the objectified world”, whereas “modality is an expression of the speaker’s psychological response to the situation”, “the description of the subjective attitude of the speaker’s inner world”.<sup>1</sup>

The view that a sentence comprises these two strata is taken not only by Japanese linguists but also by Fillmore (1968), who uses the terms ‘proposition’ and ‘modality’.<sup>2</sup> The viewpoint that the Japanese sentence semantically and syntactically consists of these two elements has been accepted widely in Japanese linguistics since Tokieda (1941). Following these scholars, this thesis adopts this view.

The first aim of this chapter is to propose more precise definitions of proposition and modality, for a better understanding of these two elements. Particularly, by integrating ‘true or false’ theory (Lyons 1995:44) and ‘objectification’ theory (Teramura 1982: 51), a definition of proposition is offered and a key phrase whereby proposition can be specified is also proposed. A more

---

<sup>1</sup> These quotations are translated into English from Japanese. Unless otherwise noted, all translations and examples are the author’s.

<sup>2</sup> Fillmore (1968: 23-24) states that case and case categories are included in propositional elements whereas not only mood but also negation, tense and aspect are included in the elements of modality. It is controversial whether the negation, tense and aspect can be included in the elements of modality at least in the Japanese language.

precise definition of modality is also built on the definition of it in chapter 1 with the help of ‘true or false’, and then the syntactic feature ‘subsumption’ is demonstrated. The second aim is to classify modality by the use of the function, and particularly the orientation, of modality rather than by sentence-type, clarifying the characteristic of epistemic modality.

To this end, this chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, the first two sections 2-2 and 2-3 define both proposition and modality. Next, section 2-4 proposes the classification of modality in the Japanese language: proposition-oriented, situation-oriented modality, and listener-oriented modality. Section 2-5 discusses the characteristics of epistemic modality. Finally, section 2-6 discusses mood, the copula *da* and polite forms (*masu* and *desu*) in terms of whether they belong to proposition or modality, in light of these new definitions.

## **2-2. Proposition of a sentence**

This section initially defines the proposition of a sentence through the review of previous literature in section 2-1-1. Next, the following two subsections discuss the acceptability of the definition. Subsection 2-1-2 argues that the propositional part of a sentence can become a adnominalised clause by the addition of the abstract noun *koto* ‘thing’, demonstrating that non-proposition (id est modality) cannot appear in the *koto* clause. Finally, subsection 2-1-3 proposes the phrase *koto o shitte-iru* ‘know that ~’ as a discriminator in order to distinguish between the propositional and the non-propositional part of a sentence.

### **2-2-1. Definition of proposition**

The proposition of a sentence is generally regarded as the concept opposed to modality. The terms proposition and modality, which Fillmore (1968) uses, are pervasively used by such scholars as Lyons (1977 and 1995) and Palmer (1979, 1986 and 2001). The terms *meidai* and *modaritei* are also used in Japanese linguistics as equivalents for proposition and modality, respectively.

In the literature, two views of proposition can be seen. The first is represented by Lyons (1995), who states:

With regard to descriptive (or propositional) meaning, it is a universally acknowledged fact that languages can be used to make descriptive statements which are true or false according to whether the propositions that they express are true or false. (Lyons 1995: 44)

Further, Lyons (1995) discusses the difference between propositions and sentences, as follows:

Granted that propositions are defined to be the bearers of a determinate and unchanging truth-value, it is quite clear that they must be distinguished from sentences. (Lyons 1995: 141) Propositions, not sentences, are the bearers of truth and falsity. (Lyons 1995: 150)

Thus, it can be seen that Lyons' view of proposition is concerned with the bearer of truth-value in a sentence.<sup>3</sup> It would seem that he considers 'truth-value' from a logical viewpoint.

On the other hand, in Japanese linguistics, proposition is considered as the objective part of a sentence, excluding the subjective part (Watanabe 1971; Mikami 1959; Haga 1978; Teramura 1982; Nitta 1997; Masuoka 2000). Teramura (1982: 51) defines *koto* 'thing' expressing proposition as a subject of the speaker's utterance, who objectively describes a phenomenon or mental picture, and Masuoka (1989: 19) regards *meidai* 'proposition' as the objective core of an expression. Thus, in Japanese linguistics, proposition can be said to be an expression of a situation or an objective core which has not passed through the filter of the utterer's inner world, represented by judgement, feeling, attitude etc.

Lyons' view of proposition and the view found in Japanese linguistics are not incompatible. The part expressing truth-value in Lyons' definition can be considered the same thing as the part expressing a situation or an objective core which has not passed through the filter of the utterer's inner world. Let us examine the following sentence.

---

<sup>3</sup> In addition, Kaplan (1995: 33) states "a proposition is the meaning of a sentence, that which can be true or false. A proposition is independent of language, that is, the same proposition can be expressed in English, Swahili, French, or Japanese."

- (1) (Seeing the beautiful sunset)  
*Ashita hareru darō.*  
 ‘It will be fine tomorrow.’

Firstly, Lyons’s view is taken to explain example (1). The part expressing the truth-value is *ashita hareru* [*koto*] ‘that tomorrow is fine’ (the part excluding *darō*). Hence, the part *ashita hareru* ‘tomorrow is fine’ can be regarded as the proposition of the sentence. In contrast, the *darō* form shows the utterer’s attitude to the proposition, namely his judgement, and this attitude (judgement) itself cannot be judged in terms of true or false. So the *darō* part can be regarded as the non-propositional part (or the modality part).

Secondly, according to Japanese linguists’ view, the situation or objective core which has not passed through the filter of the utterer’s inner world is expressed by the part *ashita hareru* ‘tomorrow is fine’. Conversely, the *darō* form is a marker explicitly showing the utterer’s attitude (judgement) which has been passed through the filter of the utterer’s inner world. The former *ashita hareru* ‘tomorrow is fine’ shows an objectified situation or state, whereas the latter *darō* form shows the utterer’s attitude in judging the high probability of the occurrence of the situation. Hence, the part *ashita hareru* ‘tomorrow is fine’ is the propositional part while the *darō* form is the non-proposition part.

The above examination leads to the conclusion that the referent of the proposition is the same in both views, which is simply described from the different viewpoints. Lyons’s view notes the logic of propositions while Japanese linguists emphasise the objectivity of propositions.

Therefore, the proposition of a sentence can be defined by way of combining the logical view and the ‘objective’ view as follows:

### **Definition of proposition**

The proposition of a sentence is an expression of a situation or an objective core which is an object of truth or falsity, and which has not passed through the filter of the utterer’s inner world.

### 2-2-2. Adnominalisations leading to forfeiture of modality

In a Japanese sentence, the propositional part can be adnominalised and become a noun clause. In the example (1), the propositional part *ashita hareru* ‘tomorrow is fine’ can be adnominalised by adding the abstract noun *koto* ‘thing’. The new adnominalised clause is *ashita hareru koto* ‘that tomorrow is fine’, which also gives the proposition of the sentence.<sup>4</sup> While the propositional part can be adnominalised by the addition of *koto*, the non-propositional part (the modality part) cannot. For example:

- (2) *Ashita hareru darō*. ‘It will be fine tomorrow.’  
 →a. ? *Ashita hareru darō koto* (*o kitai-shi-ta*.)  
 ‘I expect that it will be fine tomorrow.’  
 →b. *Ashita hareru koto* (*o kitai-shi-ta*.)  
 ‘I expect that it will be fine tomorrow.’

Sentence (2a) has *darō* whereas sentence (2b) does not. Sentence (2b) with no *darō* is more natural than sentence (2a), though *darō* plus *koto* is very occasionally used.<sup>5</sup> Hence, it can be confirmed that the propositional part can be naturally followed by *koto* while the non-propositional part usually cannot. Thus, adnominalisation using *koto* is an effective way to distinguish between proposition and non-proposition (or modality).

When sentences are adnominalised, a certain change is produced. The change is the forfeiture (or loss) of modality (= non-proposition). The conjectural judgement of a sentence disappears by virtue of the sentence adnominalisation. This is a feature of modality. Let us consider the following example:

- (3) (The utterer does not know that Hanako is learning Japanese calligraphy. He has seen Hanako’s good writing, and says to someone)  
 a. *Hanako wa shodō o narrate-iru-yo*.  
 ‘I have judged that Hanako is learning Japanese calligraphy.’  
 →b. (adnominalising) *Hanako ga shodō o narrate-iru koto wa ii kotoda*

<sup>4</sup> Mikami (1953:117) uses *koto* and classifies sentences into five types: (1) *A ga dōkō suru koto* ‘that A does something’; (2) *A ni B ga dōkō suru koto* ‘that B does something to A’; (3) *A ga dōkō de aru koto* ‘that A is something’; (4) *A ni B ga dōkō de aru koto* ‘that B is something to A’; and (5) *A ga B de aru koto* ‘that A is B’. It would thus seem that *koto* is helpful to show sentence-types.

<sup>5</sup> Watanabe (1971: 132) points out that *darō* modifying a noun is an “immature” expression which is used as in the translation of a European language as in *mata ome ni kakareru darō hi o tanoshimi ni shi-tei-masu*. ‘I am looking forward to the day I see you again.’ I completely agree with Watanabe’s view.

*to miteiru.*

‘I recognise that it is good that Hanako is learning Japanese calligraphy.’

The context of sentence (3a) is that the utterer does not have any knowledge or information on whether Hanako is learning Japanese calligraphy. In example (3) two points are to be noted. The first point is that sentence (3a) includes the utterer’s conjectural judgement whereas the underlined part in sentence (3b) does not. If a certain adverb such as *kitto* ‘surely’ or *osoraku* ‘probably’ were used in sentence (3a), it would make the conjectural judgement more explicit. In contrast, in sentence (3b) the adnominalised clause *Hanako ga shodō o naratte-iru koto* ‘that Hanako is learning Japanese calligraphy’ indicates definite knowledge or information, namely a fact, in which there is no room for conjecture. Thus, the utterer’s conjectural judgement appearing in (3a) disappears through the adnominalisation as shown in (3b). This phenomenon can be regarded as the forfeiture (or loss) of modality in the adnominal clause.

The second point is that the sentence-final particle *yo* in (3a) which expresses U-modality disappears in (3b). The reason for this is that *yo* shows the semantic sign that the utterer is speaking to the listener, though there is a syntactic restriction that the sentence-final particle *yo* can appear only at the end of a sentence. It is evident that U-modality such as *yo* cannot appear in a *koto* clause. The above examination of the two points leads to the view that the modality of the sentence disappears in the *koto* clause although the propositional part appears.

### 2-2-3. Phrasal discriminator indicating proposition

This subsection proposes a discriminator indicating the propositional part in the sentence, by making use of the conclusion of the previous part 2-2-2 that in the *koto* clause, while proposition can appear, modality cannot. The discriminator is shown below.

#### **Phrasal discriminator for proposition:**

~ *koto o shitteiru.*

‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that ~.’<sup>6</sup>

First, let us examine whether or not this discriminator can distinguish between proposition and modality.

- (4) (The utterer, who is in Canberra in early December, imagines Hokkaidō in winter)
- a. *Imagoro Hokkaidō de yuki ga futteiru-darō.*  
 ‘It must be snowing by now in Hokkaidō + *darō*.’  
 →a’. *Imagoro Hokkaidō de yuki ga futteiru koto o shitteiru. (darō →ϕ)*  
 ‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that it is snowing by now in Hokkaidō.’  
 →a’’. \* *Imagoro Hokkaidō de yuki ga futteiru-darō koto o shitteiru.*  
 ‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that it is snowing by now in Hokkaidō + *darō*.’

Example (4a) expresses the utterer’s conjunctural judgement. The result of the test using the phrasal discriminator is shown in sentences (4a’) and (4a’').<sup>7</sup> Sentence (4a’) sounds natural and grammatically appropriate, while sentence (4a’') sounds unnatural and grammatically not appropriate because of the presence of *darō*. Hence, this shows that *imagoro Hokkaidō ga yuki ga futteiru (koto)* ‘that it is snowing by now in Hokkaidō’ is the propositional part in the sentence, and that the *darō* part is excluded from the propositional part. In other words, as *darō* cannot occur within the clause, it can be regarded as a modal by nature. Thus, it can be seen that the phrasal discriminator works effectively to distinguish between proposition and non-proposition.

Next, let us examine whether or not truth-value is shown in the *koto* clause of the discriminator through adopting a presupposition test. This test is carried out through a transformation of the sentence to confirm that the content of the *koto* clause is the presupposition of the sentence. When the original sentence is changed to a negative sentence, the presuppositional part cannot be affected by it,

---

<sup>6</sup> This discriminator is not precisely equivalent to the English phrase ‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that ~’. The *koto* form is a formal noun which is modified by a clause having an adjective or a verb, and is grammatically different from the complementiser ‘that’. However, this chapter uses this English phrase as a translation for ease of understanding of the sentence meaning. It might be better to translate the Japanese phrase as ‘I (you or s/he) know(s) of -ing’ or ‘I (you or s/he) know(s) about -ing’ (though the ‘-ing’ is a gerund).

<sup>7</sup> In the *koto* clause, the special particle *wa* is changed to the particle *ga* (or *o*) which explicitly shows the case.

though the non-presuppositional part is directly affected.<sup>8</sup> Example (4) is continuously used below:

- (5) →a. *Imagoro Hokkaidō de yuki ga futteiru koto o shitteiru.*  
 ‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that it is snowing by now in Hokkaidō.’  
 →b. *Imagoro Hokkaidō de yuki ga futteiru koto o shira-nai.*  
 ‘I (you or s/he) do not know that it is snowing by now in Hokkaidō.’

In example (5) above, sentence (5a) with the discriminator is changed to a negative sentence (5b). On the one hand, the sentence-meaning of (5a) becomes different from that of (5b). The predicate *shitteiru* ‘know’ is directly affected by the transformation into a negative sentence. On the other hand, the content of the *koto* clause in both sentences is unchanged ‘it is snowing by now in Hokkaidō’, which shows that it is not affected by the transformation. The reason for this is that the unchangeable part is the presupposition of the sentence. The verb *shitteiru* ‘know’ implies that the *koto* clause is the presupposition of the sentence. If *sozōsuru* ‘imagine’ or *omou* ‘think’ is used instead of *shitteiru* ‘know’ (as in ‘I imagine/think that it is snowing by now in Hokkaidō’), the statement naturally ceases to be a presupposition. Consequently, the content of the *koto* clause can be regarded as the presuppositional part, which implies that it is true by virtue of the verb *shitteiru* ‘know’ in the sentence being the discriminator.

The reasonability of the discriminator is supported by sentence adverbs (modal adverbs) such as *kitto* ‘surely or certainly’ and *osoraku* ‘probably or maybe or perhaps’. The discriminator can also examine whether or not the sentence-adverb belongs to modality. Let us test the following example with *kitto* ‘surely or certainly’:

- (6) a. *Kitto imagoro Hokkaidō de yuki ga futteiru wa.*  
 ‘Surely it will be snowing by now in Hokkaidō.’  
 →b. \* *Kitto imagoro Hokkaidō de yuki ga futteiru wa koto o shitteiru.*  
 →c. *Kitto Imagoro Hokkaidō de yuki ga futteiru koto o shitteiru. (wa→φ)*  
 ‘A certain person surely knows that it will be snowing by now in Hokkaidō’

---

<sup>8</sup> This method for presupposition is demonstrated in Koizumi’s (1990: 202) study and this thesis has attempted to apply it to the question of acceptability of the discriminator.

In sentence (6a), *kitto* ‘surely’ modifies the part *imagoro Hokkaidō wa yuki ga futteiru* ‘it is snowing by now in Hokkaidō’, so it is a sentence adverb. In sentence (6b) above, the sentence is grammatically incorrect because the final particle *wa* (which is used by females) is not the propositional part. Sentence (6c) is natural because the *wa* particle is removed. Note that in sentence (6c) the adverb *kitto* ‘surely’ modifies only the verb *shitteiru* ‘know’ but does not modify the other part. The *kitto* is syntactically excluded from the content of the *koto* clause by virtue of the discriminator, as with  $\sim$  *koto o kitto shitteiru* ‘A certain person surely knows that  $\sim$ ’. This is because *kitto* is not compatible with the presupposition showing ‘true’. This examination implies that *kitto* is modal, not propositional. The example below is taken from a novel:

- (7) a. *Yanagi wa bokushingu ga dekiru jōtai ni nai to Sai wa itte-i-ta. Sono kotoba ni osoraku uso wa nai.* (Sawaki: 1125)  
 ‘Sai was saying that Yanagi is not in good condition for a boxing match. This is probably not a lie.’  
 →b. *Sono kotoba ni osoraku uso ga nai koto o shitteiru.*  
 A Certain person (or I) probably knows that this is not a lie.’

Example (7) shows that *osoraku* ‘probably’ is related only to *shitteiru* ‘know’ in sentence (7b), and is not related *sono kotoba ni uso wa nai* ‘this is not a lie’ which *osoraku* ‘probably’ originally modifies in (7a). The adverb *osoraku* is syntactically excluded from the *koto* clause by the discriminator. Hence, this plainly shows in (7a) that ‘probably’ is not propositional but modality.

The above examination leads to the conclusion that while the propositional part of a sentence can be grasped by virtue of the discriminator *koto o shitteiru* ‘I ‘you or s/he know(s) that  $\sim$ ’, the modality part is excluded from the *koto* clause by the discriminator.<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> Lyons (1977: 806) is concerned about modal verbs used in conditional sentences. He points out that “what is excluded from conditional clauses is the expression of subjective epistemic modality; and this is for the obvious reason that everything that comes within the scope of the conditional operator (“if *p*, then *q*”) must be part of the propositional content” showing an example *If it may be raining, you should take your umbrella.*” This is an interesting statement.

## 2-3. Modality of a sentence

This section investigates the nature of modality. There are three themes: (1) definitions of modality; (2) applications of the definition; (3) the analysis of modality from a syntactic viewpoint. Although a definition of modality has been given in 1-2-2-5, chapter 1, the first subsection 2-3-1 proposes a more precise definition of modality, defining its features by means of the proposition defined in section 2-2. Using the definitions of modality, subsection 2-3-2 then examines whether verbs, adjectives (at the end of sentences) and adverbs can be regarded as the propositional part or the modality part of a sentence. Subsection 2-3-3 syntactically analyses the subsumption-structure in a juxtapositional sentence, providing evidence for the view that the propositional element is subsumed by the modality element.

### 2-3-1. Definition of modality

From the viewpoint of the relationship between proposition and modality, the characteristics of modality reveal the following two points. First, while proposition is an object for judgement of ‘true or false’, modality is not. Modality is an expression of something which emerges from inside the utterer’s mind. The inner world itself cannot be denied or affirmed. Hence, modality in itself cannot become an object which is subject to concepts of ‘true or false’. Second, while a proposition has not passed through the filter of the utterer’s inner world, modality has done so. Thus, modality is not the situation or objective core which the utterer expresses. These two characteristics are crucial distinctions between modality and proposition. Consequently, these two points need to be added to the definition of modality shown in chapter 1 (See subsection 1-2-2-5):<sup>10</sup>

#### **Addition to the definition of modality:**

Modality is an expression of what has emerged from the utterer’s inner world and cannot become the object of ‘true-false’ judgement. Modality is also an expression of what has passed through the filter of the utterer’s inner world and not of the situation or objective core.

---

<sup>10</sup> The definition in subsection 1-2-2-5 is that modality is a grammatical category (including semantic and syntactic categories) at the level of a sentence, expressing the utterer’s attitude’ at the time of utterance.

### 2-3-2. Applications of the definition of modality

The definition of modality can be applied to the cases where words such as verbs, adjectives and adverbs show the utterer's attitude. It is unclear whether or not these belong to the modality part, as pointed out in chapter 1 (See subsection 1-2-2-3). Let us examine this issue through both the definition and the discriminator *koto o shitteiru* 'I (you or s/he) know (s) that ~'.

To begin with, verbs at the end of sentences are examined. Nakau's examples (1994: 55-58) which he regards as P-modality are used for the investigation. Nakau (1994: 54-58) categorises 'S-modality' (equivalent to my P-modality) into five categories: (1) truth judgement, (2) judgement withholding, (3) (dis)approval, (4) value judgement and (5) deontic judgement. His representative verbs (1994: 55-58) are shown below:<sup>11</sup>

- 1) Verbs expressing modality of truth judgement  
(*to*)-*omou* 'I think that', *omowareru* 'spontaneously think that~', (*yōni*)  
*-mieru* 'I see' and *iwazaru-o-e-nai* 'I cannot but say'
- 2) Verbs expressing modality of judgement withholding  
*to-iwareru* 'It is said' and *to-kiku/to-kiiteiru* 'I hear/I am told that'
- 3) Verbs expressing modality of (dis)approval  
(*o*)*gimon-ni-omou* 'I doubt', *utagawashiku-omou* 'I disbelieve' and *watashi wa mitome-nai* 'I don't admit'
- 4) Verbs expressing modality of value judgement  
*zannen-ni-omou* 'I am sorry' and *fushigi-ni-omou* 'I wonder'
- 5) Verbs expressing modality of deontic judgement  
(*to*)-*yakusoku-shi-masu*, 'I promise' and *chikai-masu* 'I swear'

Nakau regards the three underlined verbs, *omowareru* 'spontaneously think that~', *to-iwareru* 'It is said' and *to-kiku* 'I hear/I am told that' as modality forms. This is acceptable because they are beyond the judgement of 'true or false'. However, the other verbs above can be regarded as propositions because they can become objects of 'true or false' judgement. If they belong to the propositional part of a sentence, they can pass the test by using the discriminator *koto o shitteiru* 'I (you or s/he) know(s) that ~' for the confirmation of whether or not they are propositional.

---

<sup>11</sup> This subsection has selected representative Japanese verbs from Nakau's examples (1994: 55-59).

- 1) *omou* ‘I think that’ → *omou koto o shitteiru* ‘you or s/he know (s) that I think that ~’  
 ● *omowareru* ‘I spontaneously think that~’ →? *omowareru koto o shitteiru* ‘you or s/he know (s) that I spontaneously think that~.’  
*(yōni)mieru* ‘I see’ → *(yōni)mieru koto o shitteiru* ‘you or s/he know (s) that I see that ~’.  
*iwazaru-o-e-nai* ‘I cannot but say’ → *iwazaru-o-e-nai koto o shitteiru* ‘you or s/he know (s) that I cannot but say ~.’
- 2) ● *to-iwareru* ‘It is said’ →? *to-iwareru koto o shitteiru* ‘you or s/he know (s) that it is said ~’  
 ● *to-kiku* ‘I hear/I am told that’ →? *to-kiku koto o shitteiru* ‘you or s/he know(s) that I hear/I am told that ~.’  
*to-kiiteiru* ‘I hear’ → *to-kiiteiru koto o shitteiru* ‘you or s/he know(s) that I hear/I am told that ~.’
- 3) (o)*gimon-ni-omou* ‘I doubt’ →(o)*gimon-ni-omou koto o shitteiru* ‘you or s/he know (s) that I doubt that ~.’  
*utagawashiku-omou* ‘I disbelieve’ → *utagawashiku-omou koto o shitteiru* ‘you or s/he know (s) that I disbelieve that ~.’  
*watashi wa mitome-nai* ‘I don’t admit’ → *watashi ga mitome-nai koto o shitteiru* ‘you or s/he know (s) that I don’t admit ~.’
- 4) *zannen-ni-omou* ‘I am sorry’ → *zannen-ni-omou koto o shitteiru* ‘you or s/he know (s) that I am sorry ~.’  
*fushigi-ni-omou* ‘I wonder’ → *fushigi-ni-omou koto o shitteiru* ‘you or s/he know (s) that I wonder ~.’
- 5) (to)-*yakusoku-shi-masu*, ‘I promise’ → *yakusokusuru koto o shitteiru* ‘you or s/he know (s) that I promise.’  
*chikai-masu* ‘I swear’ → *chikau koto o shitteiru* ‘you or s/he know (s) that I swear.’

As shown above, while the three verbs with the mark ‘●’, *omowareru* ‘spontaneously think that~’, *to-iwareru* ‘It is said’ and *to-kiku* ‘I hear/I am told that’, cannot pass the test using the discriminator, the other verbs can. The following examples using the three verbs are shown to confirm this:

- (8) a. *Yoshikawa no kyūryō to, Yoshikawa no haha no shitate-shigoto dake de wa (Fujiko ga ) isha ni kakaru koto wa muri to omowareru.* (Miura: 471)  
 ‘It seems (spontaneously) that it is impossible for Fujiko to see a doctor even if Yosikawa’s wage and the money her mother makes from sewing are pooled.’  
 →b *Fujiko ga isha ni kakaru koto ga muri to omowareru.*  
 →c \* *Fujiko ga isha ni kakaru koto ga muri to omowareru koto o shitteiru*  
 ‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that it seems (Spontaneously) that it is impossible for Fujiko to see a doctor.’

- (9) a. *Minamata-byō wa, sengo no kōgai no genten to iwareru.* (*Tenseijingo* in the *Asahi* Newspaper: 2004.10.16)  
 ‘Minamata disease is said to be the starting point of post-war industrial pollution.’  
 →b \* *Minamata-byō ga, sengo no kōgai no genten to iwareru koto o shitteiru.*  
 ‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that Minamata disease is said to be the starting point of post-war industrial pollution.’
- (10) a. *Atene de wa gorin o mae ni nora-inu ga hokaku-sare-ta-to-kiku.* (*Tenseijingo* in the *Asahi* Newspaper:2004.8.14)  
 ‘We hear that ownerless dogs were caught in Athens before the Athens Olympics.’  
 →b \* *Atene de wa gorin o mae ni nora-inu ga hokaku-sare-ta-to-kiku koto o shitteiru.*  
 ‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that we hear that ownerless dogs were caught in Athens before the Athens Olympics.’

As shown above, the three verbs cannot pass the test using the discriminator. In examples (8) and (9), the sentence meaning changes from the ‘spontaneity’ of sentences (8a) and (9a) to the ‘passive’ meaning of sentences (8c) and (9b), so the asterisks are placed in sentences (8c) and (9b). Sentence (10b) is grammatically incorrect. Similarly, (*to*)-*mieru* ‘look’ cannot pass the same test, as follows:

- (11) a. “*(Sayama wa) 14-ka ni Tokyo o tatta to-mieru-na ”*  
*Kakarichō wa ressha-shokudō no hizuke o minagara itta.* (Matsumoto: 45)  
 ‘ “It seems to me that Mr Sayama left Tokyo on the 14<sup>th</sup>”,  
 said the subsection chief (the police detective) looking at the receipt of the train restaurant.’  
 →b. \* *(Sayama ga) 14-ka ni Tokyo o tatta to-mieru koto o shitteiru.*  
 I (you or s/he) know(s) that it seems to me that Mr Sayama left Tokyo on the 14<sup>th</sup>.

As can be seen in sentence (11b), the sentence is not acceptable. All these four verbs including *mieru* ‘look’ follow the quotation marker *to*. When these verbs follow *to*, they can be regarded as modal verbs expressing modality. Conversely, the other verbs in Nakau’s above examples can be regarded as propositional because they can pass the test. Hence, a small number of verbs function as modal verbs. Such specific verbs expressing modality are (besides the four above), for

example, (to) *yū* ‘it is said’, (to) *iwareru* ‘it is said’, (to) *sareru* ‘it is said’, and (to) *kanjirareru* ‘I feel’. These verbs are all related to perception or sense, hearing, seeing or feeling. Thus, it can be said that when perceptive verbs follow *to*, they express modality. However, unlike the perceptive verbs following *to*, most verbs in general should be regarded as propositional.

Next, adjectives at the end of sentences are examined. Use of discriminator shows them to be propositional, as shown below:

(12) (Emotional adjective)

a. *Masaya wa itta. “Sonnani iroiro-na otoko o tedama-ni totte, demo, korosare-chimaccha nannimo nara-nai...”*

“*Sōne. Sore mo kanashii-wa-ne.*” *to Nobuko wa tsubuyaku-yōni itta.*

(Akagawa: 797)

‘Masaya said “Even if she had twisted many men round her little finger, these came to nothing because she was killed.”

“Right. That’s sad.” murmured Nobuko.’

→b. “*Sore mo kanashii-wa-ne.*”

“That’s sad.””

→c. *Sore ga kanashii koto o shitteiru. (mo → ga, and wa-ne → φ)*<sup>12</sup>

‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that that is sad.’

In example (12) above, *kanashii* ‘sad or sorrowful’ is an emotional adjective which seems to express the utterer’s attitude to the situation at the utterance time. Sentence (12b) is tested by the discriminator in (12c), showing that *sore ga kanashii* ‘that is sad’ is propositional. Thus, it can be said that when such an emotional adjective appears at the end of a sentence, it expresses proposition. Masuoka (1991: 81) regards the adjective *sabishii* ‘lonely’ at the end of the sentence (*dōshiyō mo naku sabishii* ‘I feel lonely beyond control’) as U-modality as shown in 1-2-2-4, chapter 1. However, the adjective *sabishii* ‘lonely’ can be regarded as propositional because it can also pass the test using the discriminator. Thus, it can be generalised that emotional adjectives (e.g. *tanoshii* ‘happy/enjoyable’, *ureshii* ‘joyful/delightful’, *kurushii* ‘hard/trying’ *hazukashii* ‘embarrassing’) can be regarded as an expression of proposition, even though they

<sup>12</sup> The final form *wa-ne* is excluded in the *koto* clause because the form can be regarded as expressing modality. The transformation is also made from *mo* to *ga* here. This is because *keijoshi* ‘special particle’ *mo* has the possibility to relate to *shitteiru*. In order to avoid such confusion, *ga* is used instead of *mo*.

are used to express the utterer's attitude at the utterance time.<sup>13</sup>

Finally, adverbs are examined, although they do not appear at the end of sentences. They can be regarded as propositional, as in:

- (13) (At the boxing match Ōto was hit by Naitō )  
 a. *Ōto wa kōnā no hashira ni motare-nagara, yukkurito kuzure-ochi-ta.*  
 'Leaning on the pole at the corner, Ōto slowly collapsed.' (Sawaki: 660)  
 →b. *Ōto wa yukkurito kuzure-ochi-ta.* 'Ōto slowly collapsed.'  
 →c. *Ōto ga yukkurito kuzure-ochi-ta koto o shitteiru. (wa → ga)*  
 'I (you or s/he) know(s) that Ōto slowly collapsed.'

In example (13), *yukkurito* 'slowly' is an adverb expressing the situation. The boxer Ōto is knocked down. The adverb 'slowly' expresses the utterer (the narrator)'s attitude at the utterance time because 'slowly' is an expression evaluated by the utterer. However, the adverb 'slowly' cannot be regarded as expressing modality because, as shown sentence (13c), it can pass the test using the discriminator. Thus, 'slowly' must be regarded as propositional.

The above examination leads to the conclusion that verbs (except for perceptive verbs following *to*), adjectives and adverbs can be regarded as propositional.<sup>14</sup> As shown so far, the definitions and the discriminator serve effectively as criteria for the distinction between proposition and modality in the Japanese language.

### 2-3-3. Modality analysed from the syntactic viewpoint

This section adopts the view that the propositional element is subsumed by the modality element in the sentence, a view taken by many scholars (Sakakura 1974, Haga 1978: 35; Nitta 1989 and 1999, Masuoka 1991), which developed from Tokieda's *ireko-gata* 'nest of boxes-style structure' theory that *shi* is subsumed by *ji* (See subsection 1-2-1). However, satisfactory evidence of the subsumption

<sup>13</sup> The discriminator works syntactically and semantically to distinguish between proposition and modality. Although the adjective-predicate sentence expresses modality, it seems that the conclusive form ('mood') used to end the sentence expresses certain modality in the case of adjectives in the way similar to verbs. To be precise, it would seem that the abstract conclusive form belongs to the propositional element while the conclusive morpheme *i* expresses modality. This issue is discussed in 2-6-1.

<sup>14</sup> With regard to adverbs, *Meidaijūkusi* such as *osoraku* 'probably or perhaps' can be regarded as expressing modality while the other types of adverbs would be as propositional elements. Further elaboration will be required but the principle is shown for the present.

structure has not yet been provided in spite of the promising hypothesis. This subsection syntactically investigates the subsumption structure of a sentence to more precisely probe the syntactic features of modality. This examination will contribute to providing evidence for the subsumption structure of the two elements theory.

This subsection analyses the intra-structure of a sentence using a juxtapositional sentence. A juxtapositional sentence has two predicate verbs which appear in the middle and at the end of the sentence. This method focuses on the relationship between the first predicate verb in the middle of a sentence and the auxiliary (and the morpheme) at the end of the second predicate verb. While the second verb at the end of a sentence is always related to the element at the verb end (including morphemes, auxiliary verbs and conjugated parts of the verb), the first predicate verb is not always related to the element(s) at the end of a sentence. If it is related, it can be said that the element subsumes the first verb, and vice versa. Thus, in a sentence it is possible to determine whether or not the element at the end of the second verb subsumes the first predicate verb. This is a new approach to clarifying the subsumption-structure of a sentence.

Let us consider the following juxtapositional sentence. This sentence has two verbs: the first verb *taberu* ‘eat’ and second verb *nomu* ‘drink (alcohol)’, and the subject of the two verbs is the same, *rikishi* ‘sumo wrestlers’.

- (14) *Rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku (osake o) nomu.*  
 ‘Sumo wrestlers eat a lot of food and drink a lot of alcohol.’

Using example (14) above, epistemic modals, aspect, tense, voice and polarity are investigated in sequence. First, the epistemic modals, *darō*, *kamoshirenai*, *nichigainai*, *yōda*, *rashii* and *(suru)sōda*, are examined.

- (15) *Rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku (osake o) nomu {*darō/kamoshirenai/ nichigainai* /*yōda/rashii/(suru)sōda*}.*  
 ‘Sumo wrestlers eat a lot of food and drink a lot of alcohol + epistemic modals.’

In example (15) above, the epistemic modals are related to both ‘eat’ and ‘drink’.

Hence, this sentence can be explicated into sentence (16a) below by using the representative modal *darō* and the conjunctive *soshite* ‘and’.

- (16) a. *Rikishi wa yoku taberu darō, soshite, yoku (osake o) nomu darō.*  
 ‘Sumo wrestlers eat a lot of food + darō, and sumo wrestlers drink a lot of alcohol + darō.’  
 →a’ [[*Rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku (osake o) nomu*] *darō*]

As shown in (16a), the juxtapositional sentence (15) can be divided into the two parts having *darō* above. This implies that the epistemic modal *darō* subsumes both verbs. Thus, the structure of sentence (16a) can be explicated into (16a’) in square brackets. (16a’) indicates that *darō* subsumes [*Rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku (osake o) nomu*] including the two verbs, ‘eat’ and ‘drink’. The part ‘sumo wrestlers eat a lot of food and drink a lot of alcohol’ is the propositional part of the sentence, while *darō* is the modality part. This is supported by the use of the discriminator *koto o shitteiru* ‘I (you or s/he) know that ~’. The sentence *rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku (osake o) nomu koto o shitteiru* ‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that ‘sumo wrestlers eat a lot of food and drink a lot of alcohol’ sounds natural, while the sentence *rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku (osake o) nomu darō koto o shitteiru* sounds unnatural. Hence, in the former sentence the part before the discriminator constitutes the propositional part whereas in the latter sentence *darō* constitutes modality. Therefore, it can be said that the epistemic modal subsumes the proposition of the sentence.

Second, *teiru* (allomorph *deiru*) expressing aspect and *ta* (allomorph *da* such as *oyoi-da* ‘swam’) expressing tense are examined.

- (17) a. *Rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku (osake o) non-de-iru.*  
 ‘Sumo wrestlers eat a lot of food and drink a lot of alcohol + *te-iru*.’  
 a’. *Rikishi wa yoku tabe-teiru, soshite, yoku (osake o) non-de-iru.*  
 ‘Sumo wrestlers are eating a lot of food and they are drinking a lot of alcohol.’  
 →a’’. [[*Rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku (osake o) nomu*] *-de-iru*]

In example (17) *te-iru* (=de-iru) is related to both verbs ‘eat’ and ‘drink’, so sentence (17a) can be explicated into sentence (17a’) adding *-teiru* and *soshite* ‘and’. Sentence (17a) can be shown by (17a’’) via the analysis of sentence (17a’).

Thus, it can be said that *teiru* subsumes the part before it. In a way similar to the examination of *teiru*, the tense marker *ta* (the allomorph *da*) has the same subsumption structure as follows:

- (18) a. *Rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku (osake o) non-da.*  
 ‘Sumo wrestlers eat a lot of food and drink a lot of alcohol + *da*.’  
 a’. *Rikishi wa yoku tabe-ta, soshite, yoku (osake o) non-da.*  
 ‘Sumo wrestlers ate a lot of food and they drank a lot of alcohol.’  
 →a’’. [[*Rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku (osake o) nomu*] -da]

Sentence (18a) is explicated into (18a’), and can be shown by (18a’’). This shows that *ta* expressing tense subsumes the part before it.

In contrast, the following examination of voice will show that it is different from the epistemic modal, the aspect marker and the tense marker in subsumption structure. Let us consider example (19) with the causative marker (*s*)*aseru*:<sup>15</sup>

- (19) The causative voice  
 a. ? (*Kono mise de*) *rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku (osake o) nom-aseru.*  
 ‘At this restaurant sumo wrestlers eat a lot of food, and they make/let someone drink a lot of alcohol.’  
 a’. *Rikishi wa yoku tabe, soshite, yoku (osake o) nom-aseru.*  
 ‘Sumo wrestlers eat a lot of food, and they make/let someone drink a lot of alcohol.’  
 →a’’. [ [*Rikishi wa yoku tabe*], [*yoku (osake o) nom-aseru*] ]

Sentence (19a) sounds unnatural because the first predicate part and the second one are unbalanced in spite of the juxtapositional sentence. This is caused by the linguistic phenomenon that the causative form *-aseru* is related only to ‘drink’ but not to ‘eat’. That is, the non-causative form (*taberu* ‘eat’) and the causative one (*nom-aseru* ‘make/let someone drink’) is badly balanced, producing unnaturalness. As shown in (19a’’), the causative form *-aseru* cannot subsume the first verb. Similarly, the passive form (*r*)*areru* has the same structure of causative voice.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> The causative marker has two forms: *aseru* and (*s*)*aseru*. The first verb-type such as *kaku* ‘write’ and *yomu* ‘read’ are followed by *aseru*, as with *kak-aseru* ‘make/let someone write’ and *yom-aseru* ‘make/let someone read’. The second verb-type such as *taberu* ‘eat’ and *miru* ‘look at’ are followed by *saseru* as with *tabe-saseru* ‘make/let someone eat’ and *mi-saseru* ‘make/let someone look at’.

<sup>16</sup> The passive marker also has two forms: *areru* and *rareru*. The examples of the first verb-type are e.g.

## (20) The passive voice

- a. ? (*Kono mise de*) *rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku (osake o) nom-areru.*  
 ‘At this restaurant sumo wrestlers eat a lot of food, and their alcohol is drunk by someone.’
- a’. *Rikishi wa yoku tabe, soshite, yoku (osake o) nom-areru.*  
 ‘Sumo wrestlers eat a lot of food, and their alcohol is drunk by someone.’  
 →a”. [ *Rikishi wa yoku tabe* ], [ *yoku (osake o) nom-areru* ]

Sentence (20a) also sounds unnatural because in spite of the juxtapositional sentence, the active voice ‘eat’ and the passive voice ‘be drunk’ are unbalanced. The passive form *-areru* is related only to the second verb ‘drink’ but not to the first verb ‘eat’. Thus, sentence (20a) can be explicated into sentence (20a’) and shown by (20a”). Hence, the passive form *-areru* cannot subsume the first verb.

Through these two examinations of the causative and passive voices, it can be seen that voice is related only to the second verb. Hence, voice does not indicate a subsumption structure in a sentence because it does not involve the first verb. In addition, the causative form *-(s)aseru* and the passive form *-(r)areru* can be regarded as verb-suffixes because these morphemes form the derivatives following the original verb-stems.

Finally, the negative marker *nai* expressing polarity is examined in the same way as with voice.

(21) The negative marker *nai*

- a. ? *Rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku (osake o) noma-nai.*  
 ‘Sumo wrestlers eat a lot of food, and they do not drink a lot of alcohol.’
- a’. *Rikishi wa yoku tabe, soshite, yoku (osake o) noma-nai.*<sup>17</sup>  
 ‘Sumo wrestlers eat a lot of food, and they do not drink a lot of alcohol.’  
 →a”. [ *Rikishi wa yoku tabe* ], [ *yoku (osake o) noma-nai* ]

Sentence (21a) sounds unnatural because the affirmative verb ‘eat’ and the negative verb ‘do not drink’ are badly balanced. As shown in sentence (21b), the negative form *-nai* is related only to ‘drink’ but not to ‘eat’. The syntactic structure of sentence (21a) is shown by (21a”) through the analysis of sentence

---

*nusum-areru* ‘be stolen’ and *nagur-areru* ‘be hit’ while the example of the second verb-type are e.g. *tabe-rareru* ‘be eaten’ and *mi-rareru* ‘be looked at’.

<sup>17</sup> *Rikishi wa yoku taberuga, (osake wa) noma-nai.* This sentence is more natural, but (21a’) is used only to show the juxtaposition.

(21a'). The negative marker *nai* is related to the verb in front, so it functions as a suffix which forms the negative-derivative verb following the original verb *nomu* 'drink'. Hence, it can be said that the *nai* form has no relation to the subsumption-structure of the sentence.<sup>18</sup>

Therefore, the above examinations lead to the conclusion that while the aspect marker *teiru*, the tense marker *ta* and epistemic modals such as *darō* create a subsumption structure in a sentence, voice and polarity do not.

In addition, from the viewpoint of the syntactic sequence, the sequence order of the predicate part of a sentence is: verb (including suffixes), aspect, tense, and epistemic modality (U-modality optionally appears at final position). The sequence of sentence elements is shown below:

- (22) a. *Rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku non de-i-ta-darō.*  
 'Sumo wrestlers were eating a lot of food and drinking a lot of alcohol + *darō*.'  
 →a' [[[[*Rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku nomu] *teiru*] *ta*] *darō*]*

Example (22) above shows that [*Rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku (osake o) nomu]* is subsumed by aspect, and the part including aspect is subsumed by tense; moreover, the part including both aspect and tense is subsumed by the epistemic modal *darō*.<sup>19</sup> The part [*rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku nomu]* 'sumo wrestlers eat a lot of food and drink a lot of alcohol' can be regarded as the core part of the sentence. The part [[[[*Rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku nomu] *teiru*] *ta*]] can be regarded as the propositional part because it can pass the test using the discriminator *koto o shitteiru* 'I (you or s/he) know that ~' as follows:*

- (23) a. \* *Rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku non-deita-darō koto o shitteiru.*  
 b. *Rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku non-deita koto o shitteiru. (*darō* → $\phi$ )*  
 c. *Rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku non-deiru koto o shitteiru. (*ta* → $\phi$ )*  
 d. *Rikishi wa yoku tabe, yoku nomu koto o shitteiru. (*teiru* → $\phi$ )*

<sup>18</sup> Yamada (1908: 363-366 and 943-944) expresses auxiliary verbs with the term *fukugobi* 'a complex segment serving as a verb-tail' which is complicatedly derived from the verb. However, it would seem that the morphemes expressing only voice and polarity can be regarded as suffixes.

<sup>19</sup> These modals are not suitable for Yamada's (1908) *fukugobi* (See the footnote on the preceding page). It is impossible to regard them as suffixes of verbs because these auxiliary verbs have the role of subsumption.

Sentence (23a) sounds unnatural while sentences (23b), (23c) and (23d) are natural. This implies that *darō* is the modality part while the other part is the propositional part. Thus, it can be said that the core part of a sentence is subsumed by aspect and tense and the propositional part including aspect and tense is subsumed by the modality form such as *darō*.<sup>20</sup> This subsumption-structure is shown below.

Sentence → [[[core part] aspect and tense] epistemic modals]

Taking the syntactic viewpoint, this subsection has refined the concept of modality including proposition through the examination of the subsumption structure of a sentence.

## 2-4. Three types of modality

This section proposes a new classification of modality through both a review of literature and the analysis of characteristics of modality function, explaining each category.

### 2-4-1. Literature review and the classification of modality

This subsection reviews previous studies and then proposes a classification of modality. Existing Japanese classifications of modality (Nitta 1989, Nakau 1994 and Miyazaki 2002) remain problematic. Firstly, Nitta (1989: 41) proposes two categories of P-modality: (1) the affective group and (2) the epistemic group. His view does not include expressions such as demand expressions spurring the listener into action, and he regards this expression as a type of sentence which is the same as U-modality (1989: 5). This section adopts his two semantic categories. The demand expression, however, should be included as P-modality because it is related to the proposition of a sentence. The modality of demand can be regarded as an expression of the utterer's expectation that the propositional content will be realised through the listener's action. This section will classify modalities,

---

<sup>20</sup> This subsection has shown that the tense marker *ta* can be regarded as part of the propositional part of a sentence. Since it has various usages, chapter 3 attempts to analyse the function of *ta* in detail from the viewpoint of proposition and modality.

including the demand expression, not classified by Nitta.

Secondly, Nakau (1994: 54-58) classifies P-modality into five subcategories as discussed in subsection 2-3-2.<sup>21</sup> However, Nakau's categorisation is made only from the semantic viewpoint. Although he regards his examples of Japanese verbs as P-modality, most verbs can be considered as the propositional part. This section attempts to classify modality from a more inclusive viewpoint.

Thirdly, Miyazaki (2002: 1-15) proposes three categories of modality: (1) *jikkō* 'action' (subcategories volition/invitation and demand/request) (2) *jojutsu* 'description' (*hyōka* 'assessment' *ninshiki* 'awareness') (3) *gimon* 'question' (question/doubt and *kakunin-yōkyū* 'asking the listener for confirmation'). This is a relatively new attempt. He maintains (2002: 14) that modality can basically be divided into two categories, *jikkō* 'action' (subcategories: (a) *ishi* 'volition' *kan'yū* / 'invitation'; (b) *meirei* 'command' / *irai* 'request') and *jojutsu* 'description' (subcategories: (a) *hyōka* 'assessment'; (b) *ninshiki* 'awareness/recognition'). In spite of defining modality as a dichotomy, he then adds another category *gimon* 'question' (subcategories: (a) *shitsumon/utagai*; (b) *kakunin-yōkyū* 'confirmation and request'), to the two categories. That is, he moves from a dichotomy of modality to a trichotomy without clear explanation. This is due to lack of clarity in his standards of classification.<sup>22</sup> However, his subcategories are reasonable, and so they will be rearranged below from a different viewpoint, namely that of orientation.

Next, building on the critical review of literature, this subsection proposes a new classification of three types of modality through the analysis of examples of a Japanese sentence from the viewpoint of the function of modality; namely, three different orientations of modality, as follows:

### **Three types of modality**

#### **(1) Proposition-oriented modality**

<sup>21</sup> His categories are (1) modality of truth judgement; (2) that of judgement withholding; (3) that of (dis)approval; (4) that of value judgement; and (5) that of deontic judgement.

<sup>22</sup> Miyazaki (2002: 8) states that mood is regarded as most important for modality. However, modality is expressed in a variety of ways, such as epistemic modals, sentence-final particles, special particles in the middle of a sentence, and speech sounds (stress or intonation), as well as mood. Thus, Miyazaki's classification is open to argument.

- (2) Situation-oriented modality
- (3) Listener-oriented modality

Proposition-oriented modality is the case in which modality addresses the proposition. Situation-oriented modality is the case in which modality addresses the situation implied by the proposition. Listener-oriented modality is the case in which modality addresses the listener.<sup>23</sup>

From the semantic viewpoint, the above classification of modality reflects three different attitudes of the utterer which are related to the proposition. In the first category, the utterer's attitude is concerned with how to recognise the proposition of a sentence. In the second category the utterer's attitude is concerned with the affective inner world projected towards the situation implied by the proposition. In the third category, the utterer is concerned with conatively conveying the proposition to the listener. Thus, the utterer's attitude in each category can be regarded as epistemic modality, affective modality and conative modality, which correspond to proposition-oriented modality, situation-oriented modality and listener-oriented modality, respectively.<sup>24</sup> In addition, exclamatory expressions, volitional expressions and demand expressions, which are not clearly explained in the literature, can be classified into situation-oriented (affective modality), situation-oriented and listener-oriented (conative) modality, respectively. The details are considered in the following subsections.

#### **2-4-2. Proposition-oriented modality: Epistemic modality**

Proposition-oriented modality addresses the proposition. It expresses the utterer's recognition of the proposition of the sentence. Proposition-oriented modality is not affective, so it does not express the utterer's feeling or volition. Also, it is not listener-oriented modality requiring a listener as a presupposition, so in this expression the utterer can talk to herself/himself without a listener.

The category of proposition-oriented modality subsumes several

---

<sup>23</sup> This section deals with P-modality, not U-modality, and attempts to categorise P-modality. Although U-modality such as *yo* and *ne* is used premising that the speaker has her/his listener(s), this issue (the listener-orientation concerning U-modality) is excluded from the subject of this section.

<sup>24</sup> Nitta (1991: 18-19) expresses proposition-oriented modality in terms of 言表事態めあてのモダリティ *genpyō-jitai meate no modariti* while Miyazaki (1999: 2) uses in terms of 事柄めあてのモダリティ *kotogara-meate no modariti* 'a matter-oriented modality'.

subcategories of modality shown in the literature review in subsection 1-2-2. Watanabe's two categories (1971:100-101 and 107), 'assertion' and 'question', which more precisely means 'self-question', are included in this category, although 'question directed towards the listener' is not (See 1-2-2-1, chapter 1). Also, Teramura's (1984: 61-62) following two categories are subsumed by this category: (1) *kakugen* 'assertion' expressed by basic forms (= conclusive forms) and past forms of verbs such as *as tabe-ta* 'ate' (2) *gaigen* 'conjecture' expressed by conjectural forms such as *darō* or *rashii* (See 1-2-2-2, chapter 1). As well, this category includes Miyazaki's (2002: 1-15) two categories: (1) *jojutsu* 'description' (*hyōka* 'assessment' and *ninshiki* 'awareness'); and (2) *gimon* 'self-question/doubt', but *shitsumon* 'questions directed towards the listener and *kakunin-yōkyū* 'asking the listener for confirmation' are excluded from this category, although Miyazaki includes both in his 'question' category.

Proposition-oriented modality can be divided into two categories by factuality: (1) Report of prior information, a fact or a phenomenon; and (2) judgement of a situation or an object which the utterer recognises. The second category can be divided into three subcategories according to the content of the utterer's recognition of a situation or object: (1) assertion; (2) conjecture; and (3) scepticism, as shown below.

### **Proposition-oriented modality**

1. Report of prior information, a fact or a phenomenon
2. Judgement of a situation or an object recognised
  - (1) Assertion
  - (2) Conjecture
  - (3) Scepticism

#### **(1) Modality of report of prior information or fact**

Modality of 'report' is used to express knowledge, a fact or a phenomenon before the utterer's eyes. The conclusive form (of a verb, an adjective, the copula *da* and tense marker *ta*) is generally used in this modality, optionally using the U-modality form such as *yo*. For example:

- (24) **Knowledge**  
(Looking at the train)

*“Are wa, Kyūshū no Hakata-yuki no tokkyū-da-yo. ‘Asakaze’-gō-da.”*  
*Yasuda wa, onna hutari ni sō oshieta. (Matsumoto: 20)*  
 ‘“That train is the special express for Hakata in Kyūshū. Its name is the *Asakaze-express*”, Yasuda said to the two women.’

In example (24), ‘that train is the special express for Hakata in Kyūshū’ is expressed on the basis of the utterer’s prior knowledge. This modality of report is expressed by the conclusive form of *da* at the end of the sentence. Simultaneously *da* expresses its proposition because the part including *da* can pass the test using the discriminator as with *Are ga, Kyūshū no Hakata-yuki no tokkyū-dearu koto o shitteiru* ‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that that train is the special express for Hakata in Kyūshū’. The *dearu* form is the attributive (or adnominal) form of *da*.<sup>25</sup> The following example expresses a fact using the conclusive form at the end of the sentence.

**(25) A Fact**

(When the police detective Torikai asked the station employee the colour of her overcoat, he said to Torikai)

*“Onna wa nezumi-iro no bōkan kōto no shita ni, ebicha-iro no kimono o kite-imashi-ta.”* (Matsumoto: 116)  
 ‘“The woman wore a maroon kimono under a grey overcoat.”’

Here, the station employee is talking to the detective about the past-fact which he witnessed. The conclusive form of *ta* expresses the modality at the end of the sentence. Simultaneously the part including *ta* expresses the proposition because that part can pass the test using the discriminator, as with *Onna ga nezumi-iro no bōkan kōto no shita ni, ebicha-iro no kimono o kitei-ta koto o shitteiru* ‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that the woman wore a maroon kimono under a grey overcoat’.<sup>26</sup> Example (26) below is an example involving a phenomenon:

**(26) Description of Phenomenon**

(Three people—Nobuko, Junko and Saegusa—visited Otō’s house)

<sup>25</sup> The copula *da* (or *dearu*) is discussed in 2-6-2 from the viewpoints of proposition and modality. Following Backhouse (1993: 43 and 114), this section regards *da/dearu/desu* as the same copula. The adnominal (or attributive) form of *da/dearu* is *dearu/desu*, so the *dearu* form is used here to be followed by the formal noun *koto*.

<sup>26</sup> The test using the discriminator excludes *masu* from the *koto* clause, but the polite form *masu* cannot simply be regarded as the modality form. The polite form *masu* is discussed in 2-6-3.

*“Mon ga aite-masu-yo” to Saegusa ga itte, kōshi no tobira o hirai-ta.*  
*“Haitte-mi-mashō. (Akagawa: 453)*  
 ‘ “The door is open (= unlocked),” said Saegusa, opening the latticed door.  
 “Let’s go in.” ’

The underlined sentence *mon ga aite-masu-yo* ‘the door is open’ is a descriptive expression of the phenomenon in front of the utterer’s eyes. The part *ai-te-masu* simultaneously expresses the proposition because that part can pass the test using the discriminator, as with *Mon ga aite-(i)ru koto o shitteiru* ‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that the door is open’. This examination leads to the view that modality of report is expressed by the conclusive form at the end of the sentence, and simultaneously the part including this form can be regarded as the propositional part of the sentence.

## **(2) Modality of judgement of a situation or an object**

Modality of judgement is used to express the utterer’s judgement of a situation or an object which s/he recognises. The subcategories of modality of judgement are (a) ‘assertion’, (b) ‘conjecture’ and (c) ‘scepticism’.

### **(a) Assertion**

The modality of ‘assertion’ is used to express the utterer’s assertive judgement of a situation or an object which the utterer recognises. It is an expression of what is regarded as true, regardless of whether it is actually true or false. In other words, assertion is an expression of the utterer’s recognition that s/he does not accept the possibility of occurrence of a different situation, or the possibility of a different (or opposite) recognition of an object. For example:

### **(27) (Evaluation)**

(Nobuo’s grandmother was asserting her opinion. He could not admit that he had been damaged by the tradesman’s child of low rank because he believed what his grandmother always said)

*“Nagano-ke wa shizoku-desu-yo. Chōnin no ko to wa chigaimasu”*

*Sobo no Tose wa itsumo Nobuo ni itte-i-ta. (Miura: 27)*

‘Grandmother Tose always said to Nobuo, “The Nagano family is descended from samurai with high status. You are different from a tradesman’s child.”’

(28) (The Chief Cabinet Secretary scolds the Commissioner General of the National Police Agency)

“*Kusaki-kun! Subete kimi no sekinin-da-yo.*” (Inoue: 185)

““Kusaki-kun! All responsibility lies with you.””

In example (27), the utterer expresses her opinion. However, she does not accept a different (or an opposite) view, e.g. that Nobuo is not different from the tradesman’s child. Also, in example (28) the utterer does not accept the possibility that someone else has responsibility for it. With regard to the forms of these expressions, the modality of assertion is expressed using a conclusive form of a verb (as with *chigaimasu* ‘different’ in (27)), a copula (as with *da* in (28)) and an adjective, optionally having U-modality forms *yo* or *ne*.

### (b) Conjecture

The modality of ‘conjecture’ is used to express the utterer’s conjectural judgement of a situation or an object which s/he recognises. One of the characteristics is that s/he has not completely asserted her/his judgement as true. In other words, s/he accepts that there is another possibility, that a different situation might occur, or that a different judgement might be true. In this way, conjecture differs from assertion. For example:

(29) (Police detective Tanigushi is talking to Nobuko and Junko about Otō)

“*Nan-desutte!*” *Nobuko to Junko ga ikudōon-ni saken-da.*

“*Satsujin-yōgi-desu. Tabun kyō no yūgata ni wa taihosareru-deshō.*”

(Akagawa: 257)

‘ “What!” Nobuko and Junko simultaneously shouted.

“A murder suspect. Probably he will be arrested by this evening.” ’

In example (29), the utterer shows his recognition that ‘probably Otō will be arrested this evening’, and simultaneously accepts another possibility implicitly, that Otō might not be arrested this evening. This modality is generally expressed by either/both epistemic modals such as *darō* and modal adverbs such as *tabun/osoraku* ‘probably or perhaps’ or *kitto* ‘surely’.

### (c) Scepticism

The modality of scepticism is used to express the utterer’s doubt about a situation

or an object which s/he recognises. While this is equivalent to a question, it is different from ‘a question directed towards the listener’ because this modality does not presuppose a listener. Scepticism can be categorised into three subcategories: (1) Neutral self-question; (2) Rhetorical self-question; (3) Quasi-question leaning towards a conclusion. The forms expressing scepticism are typically *ka*, *kana* and *kashira*.

(1) Neutral self-question

Neutral self-question is an expression which shows that the utterer has not yet arrived at her/his conclusion about a situation or an object which the proposition indicates. The utterer’s standpoint is neither in assertion nor in conjecture but neutral. The utterer has reached no conclusion about the situation or object, so the expression is neither affirmative nor negative to the proposition. For example:

- (30) (Mrs Otō was in the hospital. Mr Otō came and saw the doctor, asking him how his wife was. Nobuko and Junko hear their conversation)  
 (Doctor) “*Maa, jiko to yū-koto mo ariemasu-ga, osoraku-wa jisatsu-shi-yō-to-nasatta-n-ja-nai-deshō-ka-ne.*”  
 (Mr Otō) “*Sono.....dareka ni korosare-kake-ta-toka...*”  
*Otō no kotoba ni, Nobuko to Junko wa kao o miawase-ta. Keiji-tachi mo, subayaku shisen o kawashi-au.*  
*Naze, fujin ga korosare-kake-ta to Otō wa kangae-ta-no-ka. Sonna riyū ga aru-nodarō-ka?*  
 (Doctor) “*Sate, sore wa...*” (Akagawa: 500)  
 ‘(Doctor) “Although there is a possibility that her carbon-monoxide poisoning might result from an accident, I think that probably she tried to kill herself.”  
 (Mr Otō) “Uh...could it be that... My wife might have been about to be killed by someone?”  
 Surprised by Otō’s words, Nobuko and Junko looked each other in the face. Also, the detectives exchanged glances.  
 (Junko or Nobuko) Why has Mr Otō thought of this? Is there any reason why he thinks so?  
 (Doctor) “Well, I don’t know...” ’

In example (30) above, the underlined part *sonna riyū ga aru-nodarō-ka?* ‘Is there any reason why he thinks so?’ is not projected towards a listener. Nobody answers the question. *Nodarōka* is used rather than *nodeshōka*, which is used on the premise that there is a listener in front of the utterer. Hence, the underlined part

can be regarded as the utterer's monologue. In the above example, the utterer has made no conclusion about whether 'there is any reason why he thinks so'.

(2) Rhetorical self-question

Rhetorical self-question is an expression showing the utterer's statement or conclusion about judging a situation or an object, rather than a question itself. In this expression, the utterer emphatically expresses what s/he wants to say using an interrogative form, as follows:

(31) (Mr Arai has returned home)

*"Tadaima" Arai Teiich wa genkan kara koe o kake-ta.*

*"Hāi. Donata?" to tsuma no koe ga kaette-kuru. 'Tadaima' to yū no ga teishu to musuko igai-ni-iru-to-demo yū-nodarō-ka? (Akagawa: 66)*

*"I'm home," said Mr Arai at the entrance.*

*"Yes, who is it?" said his wife in answer to his voice.*

*Could there be anyone else who says 'I'm home' excluding her husband and her son?*

The question underlined in example (34) is a rhetorical question because the expression implies that the utterer emphatically concludes that there cannot be anyone else. This expression is not neutral and the utterer has already arrived at her/his conclusion. Hence, it can be said that the rhetorical self-question is close to the assertive expression.

(3) Quasi-question leaning towards a certain conclusion

This quasi-question is close to conjectural judgement or assertion which is not neutral, although an interrogative form is used in this expression. In this expression, two forms are typically used: *-dewanaika* (= *janaika*) or *-nodewanaika* (= *njanaika* or *nojanaika*).<sup>27</sup> For example:

(32) (Mr and Mrs Arai are talking about his monthly salary)

*"Nee, gekkyū wa agaru-no-kashira?"*

*"Sā. Nanishiro tōsan-shi-kakatte-iru-nda. Muri-janaikana." (Akagawa: 105)*

---

<sup>27</sup> Adachi (1992) uses the expression 'questions leaning towards a certain conclusion' (*katamuki o motsu gimon-bun*). This section makes use of his term.


“Dear, I wonder if your monthly salary will rise.”

“Well. As you know, my firm is going to go bankrupt. It’s probably impossible.”

In example (32), it can be said that *muri-janaikana* ‘it’s probably impossible’ shows the utterer’s conjectural judgement, though the expression is used to express the utterer’s scepticism. In contrast, in example (33) below, it can be said that *Omae-nanka-ni nani mo deki-n-janaika* ‘You cannot do anything, can you?’ shows the utterer’s assertion rather than conjecture.

- (33) (Junko and her father are talking to each other about her job)  
 (Junko) “*Ochakumi, kopī dake-ja, josei no chisei o bakanishi-te-iru-wa-yo.*”  
 (Her father) “*Omae-nanka-ni nani mo deki-n-janaika. Taipu mo soroban mo.*” (Akagawa: 13)  
 ‘ “My job is only to serve tea and make photocopies. This mocks women’s intelligence.”  
 “You cannot do anything, can you? You can neither type nor use an abacus.” ’

Thus, it has been confirmed that modality of ‘judgement’ of a situation or an object has the following subcategories: assertion, conjecture and scepticism. These subcategories can be shown by the following triangle below.



**Fig 2-1. Modality of judgement**

Fig 2-1 shows the relationship between assertion, conjecture and scepticism.

Assertion does not accept the possibility of occurrence of a different situation, or the possibility of a different (or opposite) recognition of an object. Conjecture is an expression of accepting these possibilities. Although in conjectural expressions the utterer has reached a certain conclusion, the utterer doubts more or less that the proposition is true or that the situation occurs (or has occurred). Scepticism shows that the utterer has doubts. A situation in which the utterer has reached no conclusion is the essence of scepticism expressed as a neutral question. In the rhetorical self-question the scepticism is close to assertion, while in the expression of questions leaning towards a certain conclusion, the scepticism is close to conjecture.

### 2-4-3. Situation-oriented modality: Affective modality

Situation-oriented modality directly addresses the situation implied by the proposition. From the viewpoint of the utterer's attitude, this modality can be regarded as affective modality expressing the utterer's feeling or volition. Affective modality can be categorised into the following three subcategories: (1) Emotive modality; (2) Volitional modality; and (3) Sensitive modality, because they emerge from three different parts of the utterer's inner world.

#### (1) Emotive modality

Emotive modality is an expression of the utterer's emotion projected towards the situation which the proposition expresses. This category includes Watanabe's (1971: 106) 'exclamation' expression as in his examples *sakura no hana ga saku!* 'The cherry has come into blossom!' (See 1-2-2-1, chapter 1). Emotive modality is shown by the following example:

(34) (Arriving home, Nobuo read the letter from Yoshikawa)

*Jittori-to kubisuji no asebanu no ga hukai-datta.*

— *Nante mushi-atsui hi darō* —

*Sakki kara Nobuo wa onaji-koto o tsubuyai-te-i-ta.* (Miura: 387; example (9), chapter 1 again)

'Nobuo was uncomfortable because the back of his neck was moistening slightly with sweat.

— *What a muggy day!* —

Nobuo had been muttering the same words to himself for quite a while.'

As shown in example (34), the form *nante~(no)darō* (or *nante~(no)deshō*) ‘what ~! or how ~!’ is representatively used to express exclamation. Thus, the exclamatory sentence is typically an expression of ‘emotive modality’.<sup>28</sup>

Adjectives, verbs and nouns can also express this modality at the end of a sentence by virtue of the sentence-final conclusive form. Their forms can originally be regarded as propositional parts because they can pass the test by use of the discriminator. The sentence-final conclusive form expresses various modalities, for instance not only assertion but also exclamation. Although these emotive modality of adjectives, verbs and nouns would be included by the domain of extra-linguistic feature, unlike *nante~(no)darō* ‘What ~!’, this part of the subsection shows them below to emphasise the role of the sentence-final conclusive form.

(35) *I*-adjective

(Naitō and ‘I’ are talking about the clothes to wear to the boxing match)

“..... *Yotto-pākā no yōna-no wa, dō-darō*”

*Naitō ga itta.*

“*Soitsu wa ii!*”

*Watashi wa hazun-da koe o age-ta.* (Sawaki: 547)

‘“How about something like a parka for a yacht?” said Naitō.

“That’s a good idea!” ‘I’ cheerfully raised my voice.’

(36) *Na*-adjective

(Seeing Naitō dealing Horihata an uppercut in the sparring, Eddie says to Naitō)

*Horihata wa nokezori, hana kara chi ga shitatari-ochi-ta.* (omission)

*Watashi no yoko de damatte-mite-ita Eddie ga, jimu-jū ni hibiku ōgoe de saken-da.*

“*dame!*”

*Soshite, sarani kō-tsuzuke-ta.*

“*Ima, sore o tsukac-cha, dame!*” (Sawaki: 131)

‘Horihata bent backward, bleeding from his nose. (omission) Eddie, silently watching the sparring beside me, shouted with a loud voice which

<sup>28</sup> The form *nā* can express this emotive modality. Masuoka (1991: 87-88) regards the form *nā* as an exclamation type of sentences which expresses U-modality. This chapter, following his view, regards it as U-modality. For example:

(Nobuko has dressed up to appear on the TV program. Seeing her, Masaya is amazed)

“*Odoroi-ta-nā!* —*Marude betsujin-da-ya.*” (Akagawa: 220)

“I am amazed! You look like a totally different person.”

resounded through.

“No!”

And he went on shouting.

“No! You must not use it!” ’

(37) Verb

(The detective Taniguchi said that he was going to pay the bill in the tearoom.)

“*Ara, muri-shi-nai-de*”

“*Iya, watashi no hō ga 8-wari-gata-desu-kara*”

“*Sōka. —ii-wa-yo. Hanbun-zutsu-ni-shi-mashō. Keiji-san-tte, gekkyū sonnani yoku wa nai-n-desho?*”

*Taniguchi wa kizutsui-ta yōna kao de,*

“*Kore-gurai wa harae-masu!*”*to-itta.* (Akagawa: 544)

‘“Don’t force yourself.”

“I have had around 80 % of the meal, so I will pay’

“Is that so? —Okay, shall we pay half each? A detectives’ salary is not very good, is it?”

Taniguchi said, looking as if his pride was hurt by Junko’s words,

“I can pay at least this amount!” ’

In example (35), (36) and (37), the *i*-adjective *ii* ‘good’, the *na*-adjective *dame* ‘must not’ and the verb *harae-masu* ‘can pay’ are used, respectively. These *i*-adjective, *na*-adjective and verb in these cases explicitly show the propositional parts of the sentences, because they can pass the test using the discriminator *koto o shitteiru* as follows:

(38) a. *Soitsu wa ii!* ‘That’s a good idea!’ (example 35 again)

→ *Sore ga ii koto o shitteiru*

‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that that is a good idea.’

b. *Ima, sore o tsukac-cha, dame!* ‘You must not use *it* now!’ (example 36)

→ *Ima, sore o tsukau koto ga dame dearu koto o shitteiru.*

‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that you must not use *it* now.’

c. *Kore-gurai wa harae-masu!* ‘I can pay at least this amount’ (example 37)

→ *Kore-gurai haraeru koto o shitteiru.* (*masu* is excluded as a honorific suffix)

‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that I can pay at least this amount.’

Thus, it can be said that the part including the adjective and the verb at the end of a sentence shows the propositional part. At the same time, however, the adjectives and the verb at the end of a sentence can express their emotive modalities. In

example (35) ‘exclamation’ is expressed, in example (36) ‘refusal’ or ‘prohibition’ is expressed, and in example (37) ‘irritation’ is expressed. Even though these examples do not have special modals expressing modality, these emotive modalities are expressed. In general, assertion is expressed by the conclusive form of the adjective, but in the above emotive modality cases, the emphatic accent (= stress) serves as an important way of expressing emotive modality with the conclusive form. In the examples above, it can be seen that the ending parts are pronounced with stress, because the mark ‘!’ is attached to these parts.

With regard to the subcategory of emotive modality, *ganbō* ‘desiderative’ and *kigan* ‘optative’ expressions are also included in the same way above, as follows:<sup>29</sup>

(39) Desiderative expression

(Nobuko has become the president. Masaya is talking to Nobuko.)

“*Demo-sa, shachō-tte, ikura osoku itte mo chikoku-ni-nara-nai-n-daro?*”

“*Sō-deshō-ne*”

“*Iinā. Ore mo shachō-ni-nari-tai*”

*to Masaya ga tameiki o tsuki-nagara itta. Amari, jikkan ga komotte-iru-node, Nobuko wa warai-dashi-te-shimatta.* (Akagawa: 96)

‘“In the case of the president, no matter how late he or she comes to the office, nobody regards the president as a latecomer, do they?”

“I suppose so.”

“I am envious. I want to become a president.” said Masaya with a sigh.

The words were said with feeling, so Nobuko burst out laughing.’

In example (39), the sentence *ore mo shachō-ni-nari-tai* ‘I want to become a president’ expresses the utterer’s desire with the desiderative marker *tai*. In this case the *-tai* morpheme expresses proposition and modality. On the one hand, the morpheme *tai* conveying the meaning of desire can be regarded as propositional because *shachō-ni-nari-tai* can be followed by the discriminatore *koto o shitteiru* as in *shachō-ni-nari-tai koto o shitteiru* ‘I know that I want to become a president.’ This shows that the morpheme *-tai* is a suffix forming an *i*-adjective,

<sup>29</sup> However, Nitta (1989:5) regards the two expressions (1) desire *mizu ga nomi-tai* ‘I want to drink water’ and (2) optative *ashita tenki ni nare* ‘Be fine tomorrow!’ as U-modality. Conversely, this chapter regards the two expressions as P-modality because the form *yo* expressing U-modality can follow the sentences, as in

(1) *mizu ga nomi-tai-yo*. (2) *ashita tenki ni nare-yo*.  
Thus, both sentences can be regarded as ‘emotive’ modality in ‘affective’ modality.

originally not a modal. On the other hand, *-tai* expresses emotive modality at the end of a sentence.<sup>30</sup> Hence, *-tai* expresses both proposition and modality. Its modality is expressed by the conclusive form of the adjective with *-tai*, being accompanied by a certain stress.

(40) Optative expression

Taniguchi and Junko are very anxious about Nobuko, going by taxi to the place.)

(Taniguchi) “*Buji-de-shō-ka-ne*”

(Junko) “*Wakaru-wake-nai-desho*”

*Junko wa te o nigiri-shime-te-i-ta.*

—*Dōka, Nobuko-san ga mada buji-de-i-te-kure-masu-yōni.*—

(Akagawa; 603)

‘(Taniguchi) “Has she been harmed by Otō?”

(Junko) “There’s no way of knowing, is there?”

Junko squeezes her own hands and prays.

—I hope Nobuko is still safe!—’

In example (40), the sentence *Nobuko-san ga mada buji-de-i-te-kure-masu-yōni* ‘I hope Nobuko is still safe!’ expresses the utterer’s prayer with of the imperative form *i-te-kure*, with the optional form *yōni*.

In addition, the following ‘interjections’ expressing strong feelings can be said to be an expression of emotive modality:

(41) a. Admiration: *hō, hē*

b. Astonishment, surprise or finding out: *kyā, wā, mā, ara*

c. A sigh: *hā*

d. surprise or horror (a shriek or scream): *kyā, wā, gyā*

e. Anger: *ū, ūn* (something like a roar)

f. Hesitation or inquiry: *ā, ū*

These above expressions do not have a proposition but only modality; they cannot be regarded as sentences, which must have both proposition and modality. Watanabe’s (1970: 106) modality for *uttae* ‘appealing’ (his example, *Sakura yo!* ‘Oh, cherry!’) can be included in this ‘interjection’ type of emotive modality

<sup>30</sup> The morpheme *-tai* is also used to express assertion by the conclusive form at the end of a sentence, as follows:

*Natuyasumi nani o suru tsumori?* —*Fiji-san ni nobori-tai (to omou).*

‘What are you doing this summer holiday? — (I think) I wan to climb Mt Fuji.’

which does not form a sentence. Nakau's (1994) example *shimatta* 'Oh no!' or 'Oh, my God!' is included in this interjection type. These expressions, including those in Watanabe's above category, do not form a sentence. Therefore, the interjection type of modality will not be dealt here with because the sentence is the object of this subsection.<sup>31</sup>

## (2) Volitional modality

Volitional modality is an expression of the utterer's volition to perform a certain action related to the situation. In the literature, Teramura's (1984: 61-62) 'volition' and Masuoka's (1991: 81) 'volition' (regarded as U- modality by him) can be included in this category (See 1-2-2-2 and 1-2-2-4, chapter 1). Miyazaki's (2002: 15) 'volition' (regarded as a subcategory of *jikkō* 'action' by him) is also included.

Volitional modality is generally expressed by the use of the conclusive form of verbs and the modals *u* or *yō*.<sup>32</sup>

- (42) (Some colleagues have asked Yamamoto to become the leader of the strike.)  
*Junko-san mo kono ikken de boku no koto o minaoshi-te-kureru-kamoshirenai-zo -to-Yamamoto wa omoitsui-ta. Kō-naru-to, ōharikiri-de, "Yaru! Yaru-yo!" to chikara-zuyoku unazui-ta.* (Akagawa: 656)  
 'Yamamoto had the idea that Junko might reevaluate him if he became the leader. He became enthusiastic about it, saying,  
 "I will take charge of it! I will!"  
 He strongly nodded his agreement.'
- (43) (There will be Muhammad Ali's boxing match of. 'I' and Naitō are talking about it.)  
*Naitō wa sarani kō itta.*  
 "Ore no kawari-ni, mite-kite-kudasai-yo"  
*Kimatta, ikō (=kouu)-to-watashi wa omotta. Itte, mitodoke-te-koyō.* (Sawaki: 179)  
 'Additionally, Naitō said,  
 "Go to see the match instead of me, please."

<sup>31</sup> In contrast, there are expressions which have only proposition but no modality. These expressions, such as *kōjichū* 'under construction' and *shinnyū-kinshi* 'no entry', cannot be regarded as a sentence. The element of lexical meanings is only shown without modality. Such expression is useful as a social or a public convention.

<sup>32</sup> The volitional form is morphologically transcribed by hiragana, う 'u' and よう 'you', which are pronounced as [ō] and [yō]. With regard to [ō], the irrealis form {verb-stem plus 'a'} must be followed by 'u' to make the volitional verb form. This form phonetically becomes {verb stem + [ō]} via {verb-stem +[a-u]}.

I determined to go. —I will go and see his boxing match with my own eyes—.'

In example (42), the conclusive form *yaru* 'take charge of' is used to express volitional modality. In example (43), the volitional modal forms *u* (*ikou* → *ikō*) and *yō* express volitional modality, 'I will go' and 'I will watch it', respectively. In this volitional case, there are two restriction rules. The first is that the agent of the volitional verb must be the first person, not the second/third person. The second rule is that the action must occur in the future, not in the past.

### (3) Sensitive modality

Sensitive modality is an expression of the utterer's sensation, especially through a sense of touch, projected towards the situation. For example, when someone's foot is trodden on by someone's high-heeled shoe in the train, they shout *Ita!* or *Ita-ta-ta!*. When oil spits in the pan and lands on someone, he shouts '*Achi!*' or '*Achichi!*'. These expressions belong to sensitive modality. Sensitive expressions are close to interjections such as oh! and Alas! Both sensation and interjection can be subsumed by affective modality, but they are different. Such sense-based expressions express their meanings, such as painful or hot, as proposition, while interjection does not. The former can be regarded as a sentence while the latter cannot. Sensitive modality is in general expressed by sense adjectives showing physical sensations such as hot, cold and itchy with an emphatic accent. The following is an example of sensitive modality:

(44) (Tarō tries to pull out one of Fujiwara's white hairs)

*Tarō wa sore o hiki-nui-ta. Suruto fudan mettani kanjō no takaburi o  
mise-nai Fujiwara ga*

*"**Itai!** Yose!"*

*to okotta-yōni-itta.* (Sono Ayako: 1119)

'Tarō pulled it out. Then, Fujiwara, who usually did not show any upsurge of emotion, said to Tarō as if he were angry.

*"Ouch! Stop it!"*'

In the above example, the expression *itai!* 'Ouch!' expresses sensitive modality through the stress shown by the exclamation mark '!' with the conclusive form of

the adjective *itai* ‘painful’.<sup>33</sup> The adjective expresses not only modality but also proposition. This is shown by the test using the discriminator, as with *itai koto o shitteiru* ‘I (you or s/he) know that it is painful. The proposition explicitly shows the meaning ‘painful’ in itself. Thus, this expression has both modality and proposition, unlike interjection.

#### 2-4-4. Listener-oriented modality: Conative modality

Listener-oriented modality<sup>34</sup> is expressed on the assumption that the listener is present in front of the utterer. Listener-oriented modality is not used when the utterer talks to herself/himself. Since in this expression, the utterer intends to induce the listener to take action, listener-oriented-modality can be regarded as ‘conative’ modality from the viewpoint of the utterer’s attitude.<sup>35</sup>

##### Conative modality

Conative modality is positive because the utterer induces the listener to take action. In contrast, the final particle *yo* which expresses U-modality is neither positive nor conative in spite of assuming a listener, because the utterer does not induce the listener to take action.

From the viewpoint of ‘person’ in grammar, conative modality can be divided into four cases: (1) the second person agent; (2) the first and second person agent; (3) the first person agent; and (4) non-restriction of the person agent. The first case is typical conative modality. Demand, prohibition and request expressions are included in this category. Examples are as follows:

##### (45) Demand

(The man unreasonably demanded that ‘I’ should give him the bounty of Naito )

---

<sup>33</sup> Although Nakau (1994: 67) shows the example *itai* ‘painful or ouch!’ as U-modality (See 1-2-2-4 chapter 1), this chapter cannot accept his view. The part *itai* expresses both proposition and modality (P-modality).

<sup>34</sup> Bybee (1994: 179) uses the term ‘speaker-oriented modality’ rather than ‘listener-oriented modality’, including imperative, prohibitive, optative, hortative, admiring and permissive. She states that “speaker-oriented modalities do not report the existence of conditions on the agent, but rather allow the speaker to impose such conditions on the addressee.” However, this chapter selects the term ‘listener-oriented modality’ from the viewpoint of the orientation of modality.

<sup>35</sup> In contrast, ‘non-conative’ modality can be found in U-modality such as *yo*, *ne* or *sa*. ‘Conative’ modality seems to appear only in P-modality but further research is needed to ascertain this. This chapter does not discuss U-modality because it focuses on P-modality.

“*Kii-te-ki-mashi-ta-yo. Naitō mo Eddie-san mo, manējā wa anta-ja-nai-to-itte-i-mashi-ta-yo.*”

“*Nani-o!*”

*Otoko wa saken-da.*

“*Naitō o yon-de-koi! Eddie o yon-de-koi!*”

*Watashi wa ikari o osae-kire-naku-natta.* (Sawaki: 639)

‘“I have heard of it from Naitō and Eddie. They said that you were not Naitō’s manager.”

“What!” he shouted.

“Bring Naitō here! Bring Eddie here!”

‘I was not able to hold back my anger.’

In example (45) the utterer strongly demands that the listener should bring Naitō and Eddie, by the use of the imperative form of *yon-de-kuru* ‘call and bring’. The agent of ‘call and bring’ is the second person, namely the listener.

(46) Prohibition

(The detective offered that Kitaoka could stay safely for a while at the hotel)

“*Are ga hoteru?*”

“*Sume ba hoteru, desu-yo.*”

“*Sume ba miyako to wa yū ga.....*”

“*Miyako Hoteru*”-tte no wa ii share-desu-ne”

*Keiji ga geragera waratta.*

“*Fuzakeru-na!*”

*Kitaoka ga makka-ni-natte-donatta.* (Akagawa: 558)

‘“Is that a hotel?” said Kitaoka looking at the shabby hotel.

“If you live there, it’s a hotel.”

“If you live there it’s the capital, but I haven’t heard this one.”

“It’s called Capital Hotel, see? A clever joke.”

The detective emitted a guffaw.

“None of your jokes!” Kitaoka shouted, flushing with anger.’

In example (46) the utterer prohibits the listener from joking by using the form *fuzakeru-na* in which the conclusive form of *fuzakeru* ‘joke’ combines with the prohibition particle *na*. The agent of ‘joke’ is the second person.

(47) Request

(Kaneko obtained the information that Naitō could not have his passport, and told ‘me’ about it.)

*Gizō, teire, to-itta kyōaku-na hibiki o motsu tango ga, rikai-deki-nai-mama-ni surudoku mimi ni tsuki-sasatta.*

“*Dōyū koto-na-n-desu. Yukkuri setsumeishi-te-kudasai.*” (Sawaki: 1088)

‘A forgery, a police raid. These atrocious-sounding words rang in my ears.

I could not understand why such words were used.  
 “What has happened? Please, explain it to me carefully.” ’

In example (47) the utterer requests the listener to explain the circumstances carefully through the use of the *-te-kudasai* form. The agent of the predicate verb *setsumeishi-suru* ‘explain’ is the second person.

As shown in the three examples above, the conative modalities are expressed by special forms: the imperative form in (45), the particle *na* following the conclusive form in (46), and the *-te-kudasai* form following the adverbial form in (47). These forms express P-modality because they can be followed by *yo* expressing U-modality, as in *yon-de-koi-yo*, *fuzakeru-na-yo* and *setsumeishi-te-kudasai-yo*.

Other evidence that the three forms belong to P-modality can also be given. While U-modality forms such as *yo* does not change the sentence meaning, P-modality changes it. The above three forms change the sentence meaning depending on their presence or absence. If the three forms (the imperative, the particle *na* and the *-te-kudasai* forms) are removed, the sentence meanings noticeably change. *yon-de-koi* ‘you call and bring them’ changes to *yon-de-kuru* ‘I call and bring them’, *fuzakeru-na* ‘you do not joke’ changes to *fuzakeru* ‘I joke’ and *setsumeishi-te-kudasai* ‘Please, explain it’ changes *setsumeisuru* ‘I explain it’. Hence, it is clarified that the imperative form, the prohibition particle *na* and the *-te-kudasai* form express P-modality, namely conative-modality.

In the literature, Nitta’s (1989: 5) demand example *kochira e koi* ‘Come here!’ and Masuoka’s (1991: 80) request example *mō sukoshi yomu kara sakini ne-te-kure* ‘I want to read some more, so go to bed without waiting for me’ were regarded as U-modality. However, this subsection regards these examples as P-modality because the U-modality form *yo* can follow them, as in *koi-yo* and *ne-te-kure-yo*. Also *kochira e koi* and *kochira e kuru* are different from each other in meaning, and *sakini ne-te-kure* and *sakini neru* are also different. Hence, Nitta’s demand and Masuoka’s request are included in conative modality.

In addition, in demand and request expressions, various forms are used; *-te-morau*, *-te-moraimasu*, *-te-moraemasuka*, *-te-moraemasenka*, *-te-itadaku*, *-te-itadakimasu*, *-te-itadakemasuka*, *-te-itadakemasenka*, *-te-kuremasuka*,

*-te-kuremasenka* and *-te-kudasaimasenka*, which follow the adverbial form of the verb.

Next, let us examine the case in which the agent of the predicate verb is both the second person and the first person. This is the case with invitation expressions, as in:

(48) Invitation

(Manabe encouraged Nobuko to drink)

*“Tomokaku ippai ikimashō. Sake ka bīru ka, wuisukī ka. Nan-ni shimasu?”*

*“Ano, watashi, jūsu ka nanika o.....”* (Akagawa: 360)

‘“Well, shall we have a drink? Sake, beer or whisky? What would you like?”

“Er, I would like juice or something....” ’

In example (48) the agents of the action ‘drink’ are both the first and the second person, namely both the utterer and the listener. The utterer invites the listener to drink together. The listener has to respond to the invitation, so this sentence expresses conative modality.

The third is the case where the agent of the action is the first person, namely the utterer herself/himself. The expression of the utterer’s offer to the listener is a typical case. This is used when the utterer asks if the listener accepts her/his offer or not. For example:

(49) The utterer’s offer of a certain action to the listener

(Otō is talking to his wife when he is going to the company )

*“Ja dekakeru-zo”*

*“Itte-rasshai. Takushī o denwa de yobi-mashōka? ”* (Akagawa: 124)

‘“Well, I am going.”

“Have a nice day. Shall I call a taxi on the phone?” ’

In example (49), the utterer offers her action ‘call a taxi’ to the listener. The agent of the verb is the first person, namely the utterer. The listener’s response is requested by the utterer, so this expression can be regarded as conative modality.

The fourth is the case in which the agent of the predicate verb is not restricted. In this case, the utterer asks her/his question to obtain an the answer from the listener, excluding self-question (proposition-oriented modality). For example:

- (50) Question (directed towards the listener)  
 ('I' talked to Naitō about staying in the USA)  
 “*Dono kurai?*  
 “*Kime-te-i-nai-nda. Igai-to nagaku-naru-kamoshirenai. Hantoshi-ni-naru-kamoshirenai-shi, 1-nen-ni-naru-kamoshirenai.....*”  
 “*Shigoto-desu-ka?*”  
 “.....”  
*Watashi wa kotae ni tsumatta. Shigoto de wa nakatta. Mushiro shigoto kara hanareru tameni iku -to-itte-yokatta.* (Sawaki: 33)  
 ‘ “How long?”  
 “I have not yet decided. It might be a long time. Half a year, or one year....”  
 “For work?”  
 “.....”  
 I was at a loss how to answer this. It wasn't for work. It would have been better to say that I was going abroad to forget my job.’

As shown in example (50), *Shigoto-desu-ka?* ‘for work?’ pressures the listener to respond, so the listener tries to answer the question. Thus, this conative modality has the power of forcing the listener to respond.

Two issues in the literature remain. The first issue involves the call expression which Watanabe (1971: 106) terms as *yobikake* ‘a call’. This is included in conative modality for such as *moshimoshi* ‘hey you’, and Watanabe’s example *ōi!* ‘hallo!’ A call is expressed to make the listener aware of the utterer. However, these two examples cannot be regarded as sentences because they do not have the propositions required for sentences. This is supported by the test using the discriminator. The sentence *moshimoshi* (or *ōi*) *dearu koto o shitteiru* ‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that it is ‘hey you’ (or ‘hallo’) is grammatically incorrect. Consequently, it is evident that this expression does not have a proposition. These examples express only modality.

Next, the second issue concerns Watanabe’s (1971: 107) other two categories, (1) *gimon* (though he does not distinguish between self-question and question directed towards the listener), and (2) ‘modality of *uttae* ‘appealing’ (his example, *sakura-yo!*). In these two expressions, the utterer indicates the listener to take action, so his two categories can be included in conative modality (See

1-2-2-1, chapter 1).<sup>36</sup>

Thus, setting up conative modality contributes to a refinement of the assignment of vague categories such as demand or request by way of this new classification.

## 2-5. Characteristics of epistemic modality

This section discusses the following three issues in turn: first, positioning of epistemic modality among modalities, and its subcategories, second, characteristics of epistemic modality, and third, what epistemic modals express.

### 2-5-1. Categories of epistemic modality

Epistemic modality can be positioned in proposition-oriented modality. This section reconfirms the subcategory of epistemic modality, clarifying the following two issues based on the new classification of modality discussed in section 2-4: (1) ‘Report’ modality; (2) Hearsay *sōda* modality.

Epistemic modality is the semantic category of proposition-oriented modality, which shows the utterer’s ‘recognition’ of a situation or an object implied by the proposition.<sup>37</sup> As discussed in subsection 2-4-2, this epistemic modality has two subcategories: (1) modality of report and (2) modality of judgement (assertion, conjecture and scepticism). In the literature, the second category is unanimously understood as epistemic modality, but the first category has rarely been noted as epistemic modality.<sup>38</sup> Hence, this section emphasises that the first subcategory is a subcategory of epistemic modality.

Modality of report is an expression of the situation or the object which the utterer recognises based on prior information, a fact or a phenomenon. So

---

<sup>36</sup> Miyazaki’s (2002: 1-15) ‘invitation’ and ‘demand/request’ in his subcategories of *jikko* ‘action’ and ‘questions directed towards the listener’ *kakunin-yōkyū* ‘asking the listener for confirmation’ in his subcategories of *gimon* ‘questions’ are included in conative modality.

<sup>37</sup> From the semantic viewpoint, section 2-4 has classified modality into three subcategories, (1) epistemic modality, (2) affective modality, and (3) conative modality. They can be translated into Japanese as: modality of 認識 *ninshiki*, modality of 情意 *jōi* and modality of 働きかけ *hatarakikake*, respectively.

<sup>38</sup> Tanomura (1990: 785) notes the expression of a fact, demonstrating that the sentence *aitsu wa yakuza-da* ‘that man is a member of *yakuza* ‘gang’ can be explained in two ways: (1) as fact based on already-obtained information, and (2) as the utterer’s judgement (s/he does not know if this is true).

report modality refers to the utterer's recognition of factuality. Thus, modality of report can be regarded as a subcategory of epistemic modality.

Although hearsay *sōda* is regarded as epistemic modality (Teramura 1984), the positioning of it is not clear. From the syntactic viewpoint, Teramura (1984: 223 and 255) points out that since hearsay *sōda* follows *kakugen-kei* exhibited by both the conclusive form and the tense marker *ta*, it belongs to *gaigen* ('approximate or imprecise'),<sup>39</sup> as do *darō* and *yōda*. This section reinforces his view from the semantic viewpoint.

The hearsay expression *sōda* belongs to the special case of modality of report because the utterer expresses her/his recognition of the fact that the utterer has heard of something. For example:

- (51) (Junko pick up the telephone and said)  
 “*Hai, shachō-shitsu-desu. —Ara, sō*”  
*Junko wa Nobuko (shachō) o mi-te,*  
 “*Taniguchi-keiji ga, nanika o-hanashi ga aru-sō-yo.*” (Akagawa: 254)  
 ‘ “Yes, the president's office. Oh, really...”  
 Junko looked at Nobuko (the president), saying,  
 “Detective Taniguchi says that he wants to talk to you.” ’

In example (51), *sō-yo* is used instead of *sōda*. The *sō-yo* form is a female expression used here because the utterer Junko is a woman. She understands that the detective Taniguchi wants to talk to Nobuko, and conveys his message to Nobuko. The *sōda* (*sō-yo*) expresses the utterer's recognition of the fact that the utterer Junko has heard of Taniguchi's message. Hence, the hearsay form can be considered as an expression of report modality.

The *sōda* form does not always convey the truth or falsity of propositional content. In either case, since hearsay *sōda* shows the fact of hearsay-action, it can be included in the category of report modality in epistemic modality.

---

<sup>39</sup> Teramura's *gaigen* is difficult to translate into English. According to him (1984: 224), *gaigen* means that the situation is recognised as something like this, based on whether the utterer's own observation or what the utterer hears.

### 2-5-2. Characteristics of epistemic modality

Characteristics of epistemic modality are examined here. This section demonstrates that epistemic modality has two characteristics: (1) restriction on the use of person, and (2) non-involvement in the action implied by the proposition.

The first characteristic of epistemic modality can be seen in the person of the predicate. The object which the utterer recognises is fundamentally third-person, a situation or an objective core, but not the first person (or the second person). Thus, the first person does not become the agent of the verb and also, the second person generally does not. For example:

- (52) a. Third person agent:  
*Yamada-san wa sono kaigō ni shusseki-suru-darō.*  
 ‘I guess that Mr Yamada will attend the meeting.’
- b. Second person agent:  
 ? *Anata wa sono kaigō ni shusseki-suru-darō.*  
 ‘? I guess that you will attend the meeting.’
- c. First person agent:  
 \* *Watashi wa sono kaigō ni shusseki-suru-darō.*  
 ‘? I guess that I will attend the meeting.’

In example (52a), the sentence having the epistemic modal *darō* is natural. The sentence in example (52c) is contextually not acceptable because it is strange for the utterer to guess her/his own action from the contextual viewpoint. The acceptance of the first person agent is a special case in which the utterer’s action is beyond her/his control. Thus, in the *darō* expression the first person agent is not used in the proposition. In example (52b), it is not certain whether or not the sentence is acceptable, because it depends on the context of the situation. If the utterer foretells (or predicts) the second-person’s action, the expression might be acceptable, but in general, the utterer does not contextually refer to a conjectural judgement about the second-person’s action in front of the listener, with the exception of questions directed towards the listener. Thus, contextual restriction can be seen in the second person. As a result of the above examination, it can be said that the epistemic modal has a contextual restriction on the use of the first person agent of the verb in the proposition.

Affective modality and conative modality, however, are different from

epistemic modality. In the expression of affective modality, the emotion, volition and sensation of the first person is expressed. For example, in the sentence *mā ureshii!* ‘Oh, I am happy!’, emotive modality is expressed with the first person subject. This is natural because the utterer’s own emotion is expressed. In the volitional expression, only the first-person agent is acceptable, as in *ashita ikō* ‘I intend to visit the place tomorrow’, because the utterer’s own volition is expressed as a matter of course. In the sense-based expression, also, the first person subject is naturally acceptable because the utterer’s own sense is expressed, as in *itai!* ‘It hurts me!’ The first person subject or agent is a characteristic of affective modality. Moreover, in conative modality, the utterer induces only the second person to take action or respond, as with *hayaku tabe-nasai!* ‘(You) eat it quickly’. The restriction on the use of person can also be seen as a characteristic of conative modality. Thus, one of the characteristics of epistemic modality is that the action of a third person-agent is generally judged under contextual restrictions.

The second characteristic of epistemic modality is non-involvement in the action implied by the proposition.<sup>40</sup> For example:

- (53) *Nakamura-san wa ashita kaigōni kessekisuru-darō.*  
 ‘I guess that Mr Nakamura will be absent from the meeting.’

In example (53), the *darō* expression cannot influence the proposition *Nakamura-san ga ashita kaigōni kessekisuru (koto)* because the utterer cannot participate in Mr Nakamura’s action. The utterer only shows her/his recognition of Mr Nakamura’s action. The situation or the object are beyond the utterer’s control. Also, emotive and sensitive modalities do not influence the situation or the object implied by the proposition, but the situation or the object influences the utterer. Conversely, volitional modality and conative modality are different from epistemic modality and emotive/sensitive modality. In volitional expressions, the utterer participates in the realisation of the action, explicitly showing that the agent of the action is the first person, namely the utterer herself/himself. In

---

<sup>40</sup> The term *jiko-seigyosei* ‘self-controllability’ is given in Tamura’s (1999: 24 and 28) analysis of *nakerebanaranai*. Her idea provides a clue to establish the concept of non-involvement in the action implied by the proposition.

conative expressions, the example *hayaku tabe-nasai!* ‘(You) eat it quickly’ shows that the utterer urges the listener to take action. Thus, in conative modality, the utterer participates in the realisation of the listener’s action.

This examination leads to the conclusion that while volitional and conative modalities participate in the realisation of the action, epistemic modality does not in a way similar to emotive and sensitive modalities. That is, non-participation in the action implied by the proposition is another characteristic of epistemic modality.

### 2-5-3. Epistemic modals expressing conjectural judgement

The five epistemic modals of ‘conjecture’ i.e. *darō*, *nichigainai*, *kamoshirenai*, *yōda* and *rashii* are now examined. The concept of conjecture can be divided into three categories: (1) Probability; (2) Inference; and (3) Possibility.

#### (1) Probability

The epistemic modals, *darō*, *nichigainai*, express a ‘probability’ that the proposition is true or the event (or action) will occur. The utterer recognises that the probability is relatively high because *darō* and *nichigainai* grammatically reject the acceptance of a different recognition, that the oppositel proposition is true or the opposite event (or action) of the original proposition will occur. On the other hand, *kamoshirenai* ‘maybe’ does not express such probability. This is tested by using the conjunctive *shi* which forms a juxtapositional structure. For example:

- (54) a. *Kanojo wa jikan dōri ni kuru-darō.*  
       ‘I guess that she will come on time.’  
       b. \* *Kanojo wa jikan dōri ni kuru-darō-shi, ko-nai-darō.*  
       ‘I guess that she will come on time, or I guess that she will not come on time.’

In example (54b) above, the conjunctive *shi* forms and a juxtapositional structure with the oppositional proposition *ko-nai* ‘not come’ are added to the original sentence (54a). Sentence (54b) is grammatically incorrect, which shows that the original propositional content and the oppositional proposition are incompatible.

In other words, this implies that the oppositional proposition is rejected in the *darō* expression.<sup>41</sup>

*Nichigainai* has the same characteristic as *darō*, as follows:

- (55) a. *Kanojo wa jikan dōri ni kuru-nichigainai.*  
 ‘She will come on time.’  
 b. \* *Kanojo wa jikan dōri ni kuru-nichigainai-shi, ko-nai-nichigainai.*  
 ‘She will come on time, or she will not come on time.’

As shown in example (55), sentence (55a) sounds natural but sentence (55b) is grammatically incorrect. Hence, it can be seen that in the *nichigainai* sentence, the opposite of the proposition is rejected. In contrast, *kamoshirenai* ‘maybe’ can pass this test, as follows:

- (56) a. *Kanojo wa jikan dōri ni kuru-kamoshirenai.*  
 ‘She will come on time.’  
 b. *Kanojo wa jikan dōri ni kuru-kamoshirenai-shi, ko-nai-kamoshirenai.*  
 ‘She may come on time, and she may not come on time.’

In example (56), sentence (56b) uses *shi* with the oppositional content *ko-nai* ‘not come’ of the proposition. Sentence (56b) sounds natural, which indicates that the *kamoshirenai* sentence is an expression of acceptance of opposite recognition, that the original proposition might not be true or the original event (or action) might not occur. Hence, *kamoshirenai* does not express probability, or more precisely high probability.

*Yōda* and *rashii* can be examined in the same way:

- (57) a. *Kanojo wa jikan dōri ni kuru-yōda (or rashii).*  
 ‘She will come on time + *yōda* (or *rashii*).’  
 b. *Kanojo wa jikan dōri ni kuru-yōda-shi (or kuru-rashii-shi), konai-yōde-mo-arū (kuru-rashiku-mo-arū).*  
 ‘She will come on time + *yōda* (or *rashii*), and she will not come on time + *yōda* (or *rashii*).’

As shown in example (57), sentence (57b) sounds natural. It shows that the

---

<sup>41</sup> The idea of using both *shi* forming and a juxtapositional structure is given by Miyake (1992). This chapter makes use of his idea.

opposite proposition is acceptable in the juxtaposition of the *yōda/rashii* sentence using the conjunctive *shi*. Hence, *yōda* and *rashii* sentences are expressions of the acceptance of a different situation implied by the proposition, similar to the usage of *kamoshirenai*. That is, *yōda* and *rashii* are not expressions of high probability. The above examination points to the fact that *darō* and *nichigainai* express high probability while *kamoshirenai*, *yōda* and *rashii* do not.<sup>42</sup>

The reason why *darō* and *nichigainai* express high probability can be explained from the morphological viewpoint. *Darō* can be analysed into the copula (*da* and *dearu*) plus the morpheme *u* or *mu* ([ɲ]). *Da* (and *dearu*) expresses the meaning ‘reasonability of a proposition’, and the morpheme *u* or *mu* expresses conjecture.<sup>43</sup> Thus, *darō* expresses the conjectural judgement that the proposition can be regarded as ‘reasonable’.<sup>44</sup> Hence, *darō* excludes the opposite position as unreasonable. *Nichigainai* can be analysed into three morphemes: the particle *ni*, the noun *chigai* ‘difference’ and the adjective *nai* ‘there is no (noun)’. Hence, the meaning of *nichigainai* indicates that there is no alternative. Thus, *nichigainai* also excludes the opposite idea.

This examination has refined the definition of ‘probability’ (high probability which *darō* and *nichigainai* express) as the expression of refusal of a different position.

## (2) Inference

*Yōda* and *rashii* express inference. On the basis of a certain actual phenomenon in the real world, the utterer reaches a conclusion. This expression is used with an actual phenomenon, whether it is explicit or implicit. Let us consider example

---

<sup>42</sup> Okuda (1984: 57) points out that *darō* has different degrees of certainty, though this view is shown from the viewpoint of ‘certainty’ but not ‘probability’. This section analyses the epistemic modals *darō* and *nichigainai* from the viewpoint of probability, because I have not yet discovered a reliable standard to determine the degree of ‘certainty’.

<sup>43</sup> The *darō* form can be regarded as follows. The *deara-mu* ([dearam] or [dearaɲ]) form is plausible as an original transcription form. Phonetically [m] dropped to become [deara-u], in which the first double vowels [ea] dropped [e] sound, and the second double vowels [au] became a long vowel [ō]. Eventually, the *darou* transcription form appeared, pronounced as [darō]. Both transcription forms *dearou* and *darou* are used, which are pronounced by [dearō] and [darō], respectively.

<sup>44</sup> Kuramochi and Sakata (1980: 74) regards *da* as an expression of *dantei* ‘assertion’ showing the utterer’s ‘affirmative judgement’. Taking a different view from Kuramochi, this chapter regards the copula *da* as an expression of ‘reasonability’ (= *jōri-sei* 条理性) but not as ‘assertion’. This chapter recognises that the ‘assertion’ of *da* is expressed by its mood (the conclusive form) as modality when *da* is used at the end of a sentence. Thus, this chapter strictly distinguishes between ‘reasonability’ and ‘assertion’. The new term ‘reasonability’ implies that the proposition is reasonable although *da* is included in the propositional part.

(58) below:

(58) (Junko visited Masaya's cheap flat because he was a suspect in the affair. Junko's inner thoughts are described as follows)

*Tabun, dono heya mo rusu na-nodarō. Junko wa sore demo sotto ashi o susume-te, niban-me no heya no mae e kita. Fusuma ichi-mai no to de, betsuni, kagi mo nai-yōda.* (Akagawa: 839)

'Everybody will be away from home. She did not mind this situation; she stepped ahead and reached the second room. The door is a papered sliding one and seems to have no key.'

a. *Fusuma ichi-mai no to de, betsuni, kagi mo nai-yōda.*

b. *Fusuma ichi-mai no to de, betsuni, kagi mo nai-{yōda, rashii}.*

c. \* *Fusuma ichi-mai no to de, betsuni, kagi mo nai-{darō, nichigainai, kamoshirenai}.*

As shown in example (58), the utterer is looking at the sliding door in the second room in front. The scene of a papered sliding door can be regarded as a phenomenon. The utterer draws a conclusion from the phenomenon, that the door has no key. The conclusion is strongly combined with the phenomenon. Thus, as shown in (58b), in this case both *yōda* and *rashii* are acceptable. However, as shown in (58c), *darō*, *nichigainai* and *kamoshirenai* are not acceptable because the three modals are expressions of general conjectural judgement without inference in which the phenomenon and the conclusion are strongly connected. Thus, when the utterer infers her/his conclusion from an actual phenomenon, *yōda* and *rashii* are used but *darō*, *nichigainai* and *kamoshirenai* are not.

Conversely, fictitious or imaginary propositions cannot be expressed by *yōda/rashii*. For example:

(59) (Nobuo refused Wakura's offer of marriage of his daughter, Misa, telling Wakura that he wanted to marry the sick lady, Fujiko. Wakura said to Nobuo)

*“Mā ii. Anna musume demo, Misa ni wa mata morai-te mo aru-darō. Shikashi, sono byōnin no musume-san ni wa, kimi no yōna otoko wa nido-to arawareru koto wa nai-darō.”* (Miura: 488)

'“Well, okay. Although Misa is such a daughter, another man who wants to marry her will appear again. However, for this sick lady, a man like you will not appear again.”'

a. *kimi no yōna otoko wa nido-to arawareru koto wa nai-darō.*

'A man like you will not appear again.'

- b. \* *kimi no yōna otoko wa nido-to arawareru koto wa nai*-{*yōda, rashii*}.  
 c. *kimi no yōna otoko wa nido-to arawareru koto wa nai*-{*nichigainai, kamoshirenai*}.

Sentence (59a) sounds natural, as an expression of imagining the daughter's marriage in the future, so the propositional content is in the imaginary world. In (59b), the sentence with *yōda* or *rashii* is contextually not acceptable because a certain actual phenomenon (including certain information) is necessary as a contextual condition for the use of the two modals. In contrast, in (59c), *darō*, *nichigainai* and *kamoshirenai* can be used although the three modals express different modalities. Thus, the above three modals can be used even if the proposition is imaginary (or fictitious) content. Also, the counter-factual sentence is an example of a sentence with imaginary (or fictitious) content, as follows:

- (60) (The utterer does not know their parents)  
 a. *Kono ko tachi ga marifana o sutte-iru-koto o shitara, ryōshin wa nageku* {*darō, nichigainai, kamoshirenai*}.  
 'If their parents knew that these children were smoking marijuana, they would become sad.'  
 → b. \* *Kono ko tachi ga marifana wo sutte-iru-koto o shitara, ryōshin wa nageku* -{*yōda, rashii*}.

Example (60) is the case of counter-factual sentences. While in example (60a) *darō*, *nichigainai* and *kamoshirenai* can be used, in example (60b) *yōda* and *rashii* cannot because of their grammatical incorrectness. This is because the content of the conditional clause is fictitious or imaginary, not real. Hence, in the counter-factual sentence, *darō*, *nichigainai*, and *kamoshirenai* are acceptable but *yōda* and *rashii* are not.

Therefore, in *yōda* and *rashii* expressions, the utterer can reach the conclusion through inference based on the phenomenon (or certain information).<sup>45</sup>

### (3) Possibility

Kuramochi (1980: 124) states that *kamoshirenai* is an expression in which the utterer shows a possibility simultaneously implying a negative possibility. As he

<sup>45</sup> Miyake (1995: 21) focuses on the actual phenomenon (or information) in the expressions *yōda* and *rashii*, regarding them as evidential of the judgement. He expresses *yōda* and *rashii* in terms of empirical judgement.

mentions, *kamoshirenai* can be regarded as an expression showing the presence of a possibility that the proposition is true or the event (or action) of the proposition occurs, implying the acceptance of an opposite possibility that the proposition is not true or the event (or action) does not occur.<sup>46</sup> Even when the possibility is relatively lower, it can be used. For example:

- (61) (‘I’ talked to Naitō about how ‘I’ was going abroad)  
 “*Amerika ni itte-kara sono ato no koto wa kangae-yō-to-omotte-iru.*”  
 “*Dono kurai?*”  
 “*Kime-te-i-nai-nda. Igai-to nagaku-naru-kamoshirenai. Hantoshi-ni-naru-kamoshirenai-shi, I-nen-ni-naru-kamoshirenai...*” (Sawaki: 33)  
 ‘ “After getting to America, I will think of what to do next.”  
 “How long?”  
 “I have not yet decided. It might be long. Half a year, or one year....” ’

Example (61) shows a low possibility because the utterer shows ‘I’ has not yet decided the length of the stay, and because *kamoshirenai* is used three times. In the use of *kamoshirenai*, the judgement incorporates the possibility that the opposite or different proposition is true. *Kamoshirenai* is different from *darō* and *nichigainai* in the acceptance of an opposite possibility. Thus, no matter how low the probability is, *kamoshirenai* can be used. On the other hand, *yōda* and *rashii* are different from *kamoshirenai* and are used to express the utterer’s ‘inference’ but not ‘possibility’ or ‘probability’.

## 2-6. Three remaining issues

This section discusses three issues: (1) mood and modality; (2) the copula *da*; and (3) the polite forms *masu* and *desu*. Whether or not each expression belongs to the propositional part of a sentence is examined by the use of the discriminator *koto o shitteiru* ‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that ~’.

---

<sup>46</sup> Teramura (1984: 235) states that *kamoshirenai* is an expression of simple conjecture with a lower degree of the utterer’s ‘conviction’ in comparison with *darō*.

### 2-6-1. Mood and modality

The relationship between mood and modality is examined here. Mood is a morphological category which is used for conjugated forms of verbs or adjectives. This section discusses how the conjugated form of a verb expresses modality while the basic form expresses its proposition.

Verbs (except for perceptive verbs following *to* e.g. *to mieru* ‘look’ and *to kiku* ‘I hear/I am told that’) can be regarded as the part expressing a proposition, as discussed in subsection 2-3-2. This is so regardless of the conjugated form of the verb. This is because the propositional content is carried and supported by the meaning of the verb. The part carrying the meaning of a verb is the basic form of the verb, which is abstract and theoretical. In other words, the abstract and theoretical basic form always has the ability to express its meaning as part of a proposition, and the verb’s ability is always embodied in the conjugated form in the sentence. Actually, the basic form is the same form as the conclusive and attributive forms in present Japanese.

Modality is expressed by the conjugated form of a verb but not by the basic form, which is theoretical. The conclusive form and the imperative form are selected to examine whether or not each form expresses modality at the end of a sentence. The reason for choosing these two forms is that these forms can be used without modals at the end of a sentence.

The conclusive form of a verb appears at the end of a sentence and expresses various modalities. Let us consider the following sentences having the conclusive form *taberu* ‘eat’:

- (62) a. (My wife asked if Chinese people do not like uncooked food. I answered)  
 “*Liu-san wa sashimi o taberu-yo.*”  
 ‘ “Mr Liu eats sliced raw fish.” ’
- b. (Looking at TV, the child is eating a meal very slowly. The child’s father says to his son)  
 “*Terebi o mite-inai-de taberu.*”  
 ‘ “Stop watching TV and eat it!” ’
- c. (For dinner a lamb steak is offered, but I cannot eat it. My wife says)  
 “*Ramu suki-yo. Watashi wa taberu.*”  
 ‘ “I like lamb. I will have it.” ’
- d. (The waiter recommends ‘escargots’. My wife says to me)  
 “*Taberu?*”

‘ “Would you like to eat it?” ’

Example (62a) expresses ‘assertion’ by the use of the conclusive form, example (62b) ‘demand or request’, example (62c) ‘volition’ and example (62d) a ‘question directed towards the listener’ with the rising tone. As can be seen in the above sentences, each conclusive form can express at least four different modalities. Assertion belongs to proposition-oriented modality (epistemic modality), volition belongs to situation-oriented modality (affective modality). Demand (or request) and question directed towards the listener belong to listener-oriented modality (conative modality). If the tone or intonation of the conclusive form *taberu* ‘eat’ is considered, it is also possible to express ‘anger’ with an emphatic tone. The sentence *kore mo taberu* ‘Why don’t you eat this, too?’ with a gentle and rising tone also expresses invitation. Thus, even if morphologically the same conclusive form is used, various modalities are expressed by the form. This observation leads to the view that the relationship between a certain conjugated form and a certain modality does not always have a simple one-to-one correspondence. Hence, it can be said that mood is one way of expressing modality. This would suggest that the study of modality must not be made only from the viewpoint of morphology.<sup>47</sup>

Moreover, the above four sentences include the same propositional part *taberu* ‘eat’ which is the basic form carrying the verb’s meaning. In example (62) above, the basic form is *taberu* ‘eat’. The conjugated form by which the basic form is embodied in the sentence is the conclusive form *taberu* ‘eat’. The proposition is expressed by the basic form while modality is expressed by the conjugated form.<sup>48</sup>

In the case of ‘demand’, while the proposition is expressed by the part including the basic verb, modality is by virtue of the imperative form of the verb. Let us confirm this in the following example:

---

<sup>47</sup> Teramura (1984: 61) points out that a conjugated form expresses various modality, as with examples, for example, the basic form (= the conclusive form) expresses assertion and volition.

<sup>48</sup> Mikami (1953: 21) states that the verb stem is *shi* while conjugated part is *ji*. That is to say, he seems to take the view that verb-stem expresses the proposition while the conjugated part expresses the modality of a sentence.

- (63) “*Naitō o yondekoi! Eddie o yondekoi!*”  
*Watashi wa ikari o osae-kire-naku-natta.* (Sawaki: 639, example (45)  
 again))  
 ‘“Bring Naitō here! Bring Eddie here!”  
 I was not able to hold back ‘my’ anger.’

In example (63) above, the utterer demands in anger that the listener should bring Naitō. In this sentence, on the one hand, the ‘demand’ is expressed by the imperative form *yondekoi* of *yondekuru* ‘bring’. Namely, the modality is expressed by the conjugated part of the verb. On the other hand, the proposition is the part including the basic form of the verb *yondekuru* because the discriminator can show this, as in *Naitō o yondekuru koto o shitteiru* ‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that I bring Naitō. The proposition is shown by the basic verb (carrying its lexical meaning).

In short, the verb appearing at the end of a sentence expresses both proposition and modality, by virtue of the basic form and of the conjugated form, respectively. Moreover, it can be said that mood is subsumed by modality because mood is a way of expressing modality.

### 2-6-2. Copula

This section examines whether or not the copula *da/dearu* expresses assertion and whether or not it has the subsumption-structure. Firstly, in the literature, Kuramochi (1980: 74) and Hayashi’s *Shōgakukan* dictionary (1985: 1376 and 1378) regard *da* as an expression of assertion, but this is problematic. Whether originally *da* in itself expresses assertion must be investigated. The copula *da* (or *dearu*) in the Japanese language can be regarded as propositional. This can be confirmed by the discriminator *koto o shitteiru* ‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that ~’. The following examples have a noun-predicate sentence and *na*-adjective-predicate sentence:

- (64) A noun-predicate sentence  
 (His father and his grandmother have never told Nobuo that his mother is alive. Nobuo has obtained the true information, saying.)  
 a. “*Otona nante usotsuki-da.*” (Miura: 59)  
 “‘Adults are liars.’”

→ a' *Otona ga usotsuki dearu koto o shitteiru.*  
 'I (you or s/he) know(s) that adults are liars.'

- (65) *Na*-adjective predicate sentence  
 (Nobuo talks to himself)  
 a. *Itsumo chichi wa odayaka-da.* (Miura: 160)  
 'My father is always gentle.'  
 → a' *Itsumo chichi ga odayaka dearu koto o shitteiru.*  
 'I (you or s/he) know(s) that my father is usually gentle.'

The *da* can be regarded as a functional morpheme having the lexical meaning 'reasonability'. In examples (64a') and (65a'), the propositional parts are *otona ga usotsuki dearu -koto* 'that adults are liars' and *itsumo chichi ga odayaka dearu -koto* 'that my father is always gentle', respectively. The *dearu* form can appear in the *koto* clause. These parts show the lexical meaning 'reasonability' of *da* but not modality 'assertion'. This shows that *da* in itself does not have the lexical meaning of assertion. In examples (64a) and (65a), on the other hand, the modality of assertion is expressed through the conclusive form of *da*. This can be explicated in the same way as in the case of verbs and adjectives. Thus, *da/dearu* originally does not express the meaning of assertion, but the conclusive form *da/dearu* expresses assertive modality.

Secondly, whether the copula has a subsumption-structure is investigated from the syntactic viewpoint by the use of the juxtapositional sentence. Let us consider the following example of juxtapositional sentences:

- (66) a. ? *John-san wa jitsugyōka, Ōstraria-jin-da.*  
 'John is a businessperson, Australian.'  
 b. *John-san wa jitsugyōka-de, Ōstraria-jin-da.*  
 'John is a businessperson and Australian.'

As shown in example (66), sentence (66b) with *de* is better than sentence (66a) without *de*. The reason for the unnaturalness of (66a) is that *da* is not connected to the first predicate noun *jitsugyōka* 'a businessperson'. Thus, sentence (66a) sounds lame. In contrast, the first predicate noun in sentence (66b) is followed by the copula *de* (the sentence-stopping form), so this sentence sounds natural. Hence, *da* at the end of a sentence cannot subsume the first predicate part, which is

separated from *da*.

These examinations lead to the view that the copula *da* is related only to the immediate part (noun or *na*-adjective-stem) in front, and does not have a subsumption-structure. Moreover, the copula is different from the aspect marker *teiru*, the tense marker *ta* and epistemic modals in subsumption-structure, but is similar to voice, whose morphemes ((*s*)*aseru* and (*r*)*areru*) are regarded as verb-suffixes. Hence, the copula can be regarded as a noun-suffix (following a noun). This implies that in the Japanese language, the copula behaves as a special noun-suffix and allows nouns to conjugate like verbs.

### 2-6-3. Polite forms *masu* and *desu*

As discussed in chapter 1, the polite forms *masu* and *desu* cannot express U-modality (See subsection 1-2-2-4). These forms are used on the premise that there is a listener in front of the utterer. This linguistic fact suggests that these forms might be expressions of modality. Masuoka (1991: 38) and Nakau (1979: 234 and 1994: 63-64) regard these forms as expressions of modality. Whether or not the forms *masu/desu* express modality is a difficult issue, and Miyazaki withholds his judgement on this (2002: 15). This section attempts to clarify whether or not it is appropriate to regard these polite forms as expressions of modality.

The motivation of taking up this issue is as follows. The polite forms are used to show how politely the utterer treats the listener, so they can be considered as listener-treatment expressions. Modality expression and listener-treatment expression are different issues at different levels. In other words, modality expression is an issue at the sentence level whereas listener-treatment expression is one at the communicative level or the social-cultural level.<sup>49</sup>

The examination will use two methods. The first is to use the discriminator, as used so far. The second is to use both the tense marker *ta* and the negative marker *nai*, from the syntactic viewpoint. *Masu* is first examined, followed by *desu*.

---

<sup>49</sup> Mikami (1953: 22), states that modality expressions are different from *masu* expressions because the use of *masu* depends on the social circumstance, emphasising a characteristic of *masu*, *taritsu-sei* 'heteronomy'.

Let us examine whether the polite form *masu* is an expression of modality, using the discriminator *koto o shitteiru* I (you or s/he) know(s) that ~':

- (67) a. *Maiasa hachi-ji ni ie o de-masu.*  
 'I leave for the office at eight every morning.'  
 →b. ? *Maiasa Hachi-ji ni ie o de-masu koto o shitteiru.*  
 'You (or s/he) know that I leave for the office at eight every morning.'  
 →c. *Maiasa Hachi-ji ni ie o deru koto o shitteiru. (masu→φ)*  
 'You (or s/he) know that I leave for the office at eight every morning.'

As shown in (67b), it is uncertain whether *masu* can appear in the *koto* clause of the discriminator. Use of *masu* followed by a noun is rare, so it is difficult to determine whether sentence (67b) is natural and appropriate. Sentence (67b) is possibly acceptable. In contrast, it is certain that sentence (67c) without *masu* sounds natural. Still, ambiguity remains as to whether *masu* is an expression of modality or not. However, the literature concerning *masu* shows that the case of sentence (68b) is acceptable, and that *masu* can be followed by a noun. For example, Hayashi's *Shōgakukan* dictionary (1985: 1397) and Furuta (1969: 62) gives the attributive form of *masu*, which means that *masu* is followed by a noun. Moreover, Nagano (1951: 272) provides the following example:

- (68) *Tsūkan-itashi-masu-koto wa tsukaikata o yoku oshieru-to-yū-koto-desu-ne.*  
 (Nagano 1951: 272)  
 'The thing which I have fully realised is that it is important to teach how to use it.'

Nagano's example clearly shows that *masu* can be followed by a noun, particularly the formal noun *koto* 'thing'. Also, Yoshida (1971: 262-263) gives the attributive form of *masu* with a few examples.<sup>50</sup> Thus, according to the literature, sentence (67b) is acceptable, which means that *masu* is the propositional part but not the modality part. Yet the above examination does not seem satisfactory because the conclusion relies entirely on the literature.

Whether *masu* is a propositional part is now investigated further from the

---

<sup>50</sup> Yoshida's (1971: 263) examples are as follows: *jibun no dekinai butō o hito no shi-teiru no o mi-masu-tabī ni, ~.* 'whenever I see some people dancing (I cannot dance), ~.' *Korekara o-mairi o nasaimasu-kawari-ni, ~.* 'Instead of visiting the person's grave, it is better to do ~'.

syntactic viewpoint through the tense marker *ta* and the negative marker *nai*. Consider the following two sentences with the negative marker *n* (= *nai*) and the tense marker *ta*, respectively:

- (69) The negative marker *n* (= *nai*)  
 a. *Hachi-ji ni wa ie o de-mase-n.*  
 ‘I do not leave at eight’  
 →b. ? *Hachi-ji ni ie o de-mase-n koto o shitteiru.*  
 ‘You (or s/he) know that I do not leave for the office at eight.’  
 →c. *Hachi-ji ni ie o de-nai koto o shitteiru.* (*masu*→ $\phi$ )  
 ‘You (or s/he) know that I do not leave for the office at eight.’
- (70) The tense marker *ta*  
 a. *Hachi-ji ni ie o de-mashi-ta*  
 ‘I left for the office at eight’  
 →b. ? *Hachi-ji ni ie o de-mashi-ta koto o shitteiru.*  
 ‘You (or s/he) know that I left for the office at eight.’  
 →c. *Hachi-ji ni ie o de-ta koto o shitteiru.* (*masu*→ $\phi$ )  
 ‘You (or s/he) know that I left for the office at eight.’

In examples (69c) and (70c), when *masu* is dropped, the two original sentences (69a) and (70a) can show propositions, but it is uncertain whether sentences (69b) and (70b) are natural. Note the positions of both *nai* and *ta*. Sentences (69c) and (70c) show that both the negative marker and the tense marker are the propositional parts because *nai* and *ta* appear in the *koto* clause of the discriminator. Both *nai* and *ta* appear after *mashi* (the adverbial form of *masu*). That is, *masu* is followed by *nai* and *ta*. This indicates that *masu* appearing in front of *nai* and *ta* must be the propositional part. This is because in the Japanese sentence the verb and the part following the verb strictly appear in regular sequence order.<sup>51</sup> The syntactic sequence order has no exceptions in the Japanese sentences, as follows:

- (71) a. *Ie o demase-n* ‘I do not leave home.’  
 →a’ \* *Ie o de-nai-masu.*

---

<sup>51</sup> Nakau (1979: 234) analyses the sentence *kikoe-masen* ‘I cannot hear you’, as with [*kikoe nai*<sub>prop</sub>] *masu*, pointing out that *masen* denies the proposition. As a result, he (1979: 234 and 1994 63) regards *masu* as modality. However, this subsection demonstrates that *masu* is included in the propositional part although the propositional content is *kikoe nai* (-*koto*).

- b. *Je o de-mashi-ta* ‘I left home.’  
 →b’. \* *Ieo de-ta-masu*.

The above examination, in taking the syntactic approach, leads to the conclusion that the polite form *masu* is the propositional part, not the modality part. That is, *masu* cannot express modality. This conclusion, moreover, leads to the promising hypothesis that *masu* is an honorific suffix of verbs because *masu* follows the verb immediately in front as the propositional part.

Next, whether or not *desu* expresses modality is examined in a way similar to *masu*. The *desu* form is the polite form of the copula *da/dearu*. As discussed in the previous section 2-6-2, *da/dearu* is the propositional part. Consequently, *desu* can be regarded as part of the proposition. However, use of the discriminator seems to exclude the *desu* form in the *koto* clause, as follows:

- (72) a. *Ningyō ga omiyage-desu* (*da* or *dearu*).  
 ‘The doll is a souvenir.’  
 b. ? *Ningyō ga omiyage-desu koto o shitteiru*.  
 ‘You (or s/he) know that the doll is a souvenir.’  
 c. *Ningyō ga omiyage-dearu koto o shitteiru*. (*desu*→ $\phi$ )  
 ‘You (or s/he) know that the doll is a souvenir.’

In example (72), sentence (72b) sounds unnatural although this is not certain, and sentence (72c) sounds natural. The *desu* form can be replaced by the *da/dearu* form. In sentence (72c), *dearu* (or the conclusive form and the attributive form of *da*) is evidently the propositional part. Hence, the polite form *desu* is the propositional part. Nevertheless, *desu* seems to be an excluded form in the *koto* clause. In the literature, the attributive form of *desu* is shown by parenthesis (Hayashi’s *Shōgakukan* dictionary 1985: 1396). The examples of the attributive form of *desu* followed by a noun are not shown (Nagano 1951: 260-262; Yoshida 1971: 453-485). Therefore, this subsection tentatively regards the *desu* form as an exception to the distinction between proposition and modality by way of the discriminator.

In short, the above examination leads to the conclusion that the polite forms *masu* and *desu* cannot be regarded as forms expressing modality and that these forms must be regarded as parts of a proposition.

## 2-7. Conclusion

This chapter has investigated both proposition and modality for a better and more precise understanding of them. The most significant finding in this chapter is the value of the discriminator *koto o shitteiru* ‘I (you or s/he) know(s) that ~’ in distinguishing proposition and modality. Both truth-value and objective materiality of the proposition are integrated into the discriminator, which brings the propositional part of the sentence into sharp relief. The discriminator likewise excludes the modality part from the *koto* clause. Thus, this chapter has demonstrated that the power of the discriminator serves effectively to distinguish between proposition and modality, through the examination in this chapter. This effectiveness leads to the clarification of unclear issues of whether or not verbs, adjectives and adverbs express modality. Moreover, the discriminator has contributed to the solution of the following three issues: (1) The relationship between mood and modality is that mood is subsumed by modality as a way of expression of modality; (2) the copula *da/dearu* does not express assertive modality and the conclusive form at the end of a sentence expresses assertive modality; and (3) the polite form *masu* is an honorific suffix of a verb, *desu* is the polite form of the copula *da/dearu*, and both are not expressions of modality.

The second finding is to have classified modality from the viewpoint of the orientation of modality into three categories: (1) intellectual recognition (awareness), which addresses the proposition, (2) affective inner world, which addresses the situation expressed through the proposition and (3) conative modality projected towards the listener whom the utterer requests to respond. This new classification has settled the positioning of unclear categories such as demand expressions and exclamatory expressions. Introducing the viewpoint of modality-orientation is a step forward in the clarification of modality in general.

Finally, this chapter started with the definition of both proposition and modality, particularly considering the difference between the two concepts, and has found evidence for the view that proposition is subsumed by modality from the viewpoint of subsumption-structure. It has proposed a new classification of modality, and has demonstrated the characteristics of epistemic modality. Thus, the study in this chapter has contributed to the better and more precise

understanding of proposition and modality.

The next chapter examines the tense marker *ta* which is important to clarify the border between proposition and modality in a sentence, using the findings of this chapter that have proved helpful in this endeavour.

**Chapter 3**

<b>Various usages of the past/tense marker <i>-ta</i></b> .....	<b>87</b>
3-1. Introduction.....	87
3-2. Meanings of <i>-ta</i> .....	89
3-2-1. General meaning and modality.....	89
3-2-2. Inability to explain usage of <i>-ta</i> in terms of a single core meaning	90
3-2-3. Four core meanings of <i>-ta</i> .....	94
(1) Past.....	94
(2) Perfect.....	95
(3) Relative before.....	98
(4) Continuation (State of things).....	99
3-2-4. Sentence final usage of <i>-ta</i> from the syntactic point of view.....	100
3-2-5. Proposition composed by core meaning.....	101
3-3. Usages expressing proposition-oriented modality.....	103
3-3-1. Categorisation of proposition-oriented modality of <i>-ta</i> in the literature.....	103
3-3-2. Classification of proposition-oriented modality of <i>-ta</i> .....	105
(1) General ‘confirmation’ usage of <i>-ta</i> with no connotation.....	106
Declarative sentences.....	107
‘Reminiscence’ usage of <i>-ta</i> .....	109
Expressions for <i>jikkyo-chūkei</i> ‘broadcasting on the spot’.....	110
(2) Special confirmation usage with a certain connotation.....	111
‘Counterfactual suppositions’ usage of <i>-ta</i> .....	112
‘Regret/review’ usage of <i>-ta</i> .....	113
3-3-3. Characteristics of proposition-oriented modality of <i>-ta</i> .....	114
3-4. Usages expressing situation-oriented modality.....	117
‘Feelings produced by certain situations’ usage.....	117
‘Remembrance’ usage of <i>-ta</i> .....	122
3-5. Usages expressing listener-oriented modality.....	124
‘Urge to action’ usage of <i>-ta</i> .....	125
‘Manifestation of volitional acceptance’ usage of <i>-ta</i> .....	128
3-7. Conclusion.....	130

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig 3-1. General confirmation usage of <i>-ta</i> in proposition-oriented Modality ...	116
Fig 3-2. Special confirmation usage of <i>-ta</i> in proposition-oriented Modality ....	116
Fig 3-3. ‘Feeling’ usage of <i>-ta</i> in emotive modality.....	124
Fig 3-4. ‘Remembrance’ usage of <i>-ta</i> in emotive modality .....	124
Fig 3-5. ‘Urge to action’ usage of <i>-ta</i> in listener-oriented Modality .....	130
Fig 3-6. ‘Manifestation of volitional acceptance’ usage of <i>-ta</i> .....	130

# Chapter 3

## Various Usages of the Past/Tense Marker *-ta*

### 3-1. Introduction

The past event (or action) in general can be expressed with *-ta*, although *-teiru* also expresses a ‘past’ experience, as in *Pari ni nido itte-iru* ‘I have been to Paris twice’. From the viewpoint of lexical meaning, the form *-ta* can be said to be a representative marker expressing the meaning of ‘past’. The following sentence shows the lexical meaning ‘past’ of *-ta*.

- (1) *Kinō Tōkyō ni modotta.*  
‘I came back to Tokyo yesterday.’

In (1) the sentence expresses a past event. Even if the sentence did not have the word *kinō* ‘yesterday’, the event ‘I came back to Tokyo’ would be able to be regarded as past owing to the presence of *-ta*.

However, *-ta* does not always express past events. It can also be used to express future events. Let us consider the following example:

- (2) *Ashita itta toki ni, sore ga wakaru deshō.*  
‘When you get there tomorrow, you will be able to understand it.’

In Example (2), the *-ta* of *itta* ‘get there’ does not express a past event because *itta* ‘get there’ can be regarded as a future event owing to *ashita* ‘tomorrow’. So *wakaru* ‘to be able to understand it’ is also a future event. Clearly, *-ta* does not simply express ‘past’; *-ta* has plural usages with various meanings.

From the viewpoints of proposition and modality, does *-ta* belong to proposition or modality? According to Masuoka (1991: 35 and 1999: 46), tense

belongs to proposition. This implies that the *-ta* form expresses ‘past’. However, as many previous studies have indicated, modality expresses the utterer’s ‘present’ attitude in the Japanese language (Nakau 1979 and 1999; Nitta 1991; Masuoka 1999), and ‘present’ is one of the conditions for modality. When *-ta* is used as ‘past’, does *-ta* not express the utterer’s ‘present’ attitude by virtue of the meaning ‘past’ of *-ta*? Does *-ta* belong to proposition but not to modality? It is certain that there are cases where *-ta* expresses the meaning ‘past’. When *-ta* expresses ‘past’, simultaneously does it not express something else? Whether *-ta* expresses modality at the end of a sentence is a significant issue worth examining.

The *-ta* form in itself has been insufficiently discussed from a modality point of view. In Example (1), although the *-ta* of *Kinō Tōkyō ni modotta* ‘I came back to Tokyo yesterday’ expresses ‘past’ as a part of the proposition, does it not also express modality? The *-ta* seems to express a certain ‘present’ attitude of the utterer. The ‘present’ attitude seems to be the modality of ‘confirmation’. If this is true, it leads to the view that *-ta* expresses modality at the end of a sentence.

This chapter has two purposes. The first is to clarify that *-ta* expresses modality at the end of a sentence, demonstrating the relationship between the meaning and modality of *-ta*. The second aim is to classify the usage of *-ta* with a clear explication of the overview of *-ta* from the viewpoint of proposition and modality.

To achieve these purposes, this chapter will try to arrange the meaning and usage of *-ta*, again based on previous studies. Although the usages of *-ta* have been documented in the literature, they are not classified clearly in terms of their relation with each other (Nagano 1951; Tanaka 1969; Yoshida 1971). This study will adopt the viewpoint of modality to classify them.

The discussion of this chapter consists of four parts. Firstly, Subsection 3-2 examines the lexical meaning of *-ta*.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, sections 3-3, 3-4 and 3-5 examine the usage of *-ta* according to three viewpoints of modality: (1) proposition-oriented modality, (2) emotional modality, and (3) listener-oriented modality, respectively. In particular, subsection 3-3 argue about ‘confirmation’

---

<sup>1</sup> The *ta* is a functional morpheme, so its function produces some meanings. This section uses the term lexical meaning as the meaning expressed in the dictionary in a broad sense. It might be better to express it in terms of grammatical sense.

modality, section 3-4 discusses ‘feelings’ modality which is produced by certain situations and section 3-5 examines the special usages of *-ta* projected toward the listener. Thirdly, section 3-6 illustrates the syntactic structure of *-ta* with PS rules. Section 3-7, finally, demonstrates the importance of the findings in this chapter.

## 3-2. Meanings of *-ta*

This subsection examines the lexical meaning of *-ta* related to temporality to clarify that it is directly connected to proposition in semantics as a constituent of proposition. Modality is not a constituent of proposition. This section draws on the fundamental meanings of *-ta* identified in the literature: ‘past’, ‘perfect’, ‘relative before’ and ‘continuation’ (Tokieda 1950; Nagano 1951; Kindaichi 1957; Tanaka 1969; Yoshida 1971; Teramura 1971; Kudō 1989). This section takes the view that *-ta* has cases of expressing both tense and aspect.<sup>2</sup>

Before the discussion of the fundamental meanings of *-ta*, there are two points to be noted: (1) this section recognises that *-ta* can be analysed by the separation of meaning and modality and (2) this section will not pursue the core meaning of *-ta*. Subsections 3-2-1 and 3-2-2 initially discuss these two points. Then subsections 3-2-3 investigates the four fundamental meanings, ‘past’, ‘perfect’, ‘relative before’ and ‘continuation’. Next, from the syntactic point of view subsection 3-2-4 examines the fact that the meanings ‘past’ and ‘perfect’ of *-ta* are positioned at the end of the sentence while ‘relative before’ and ‘continuation’ are not at the end of a sentence. Finally, subsection 3-2-5 tests whether the fundamental meaning of *-ta* belongs to a proposition.

### 3-2-1. General meaning and modality

In this section an analysis of *-ta* is made by the separation of grammatical sense and modality. The lexical meaning in grammatical sense and the modality of *-ta* should be thought of individually in order to analyse the usage of *-ta*. If the explanation of the general usage of *-ta* is approached only through the lexical meaning in dictionary, some cases cannot be explained.

---

<sup>2</sup> Matsushita (1930: 180-181) takes the ‘aspect’ view that the *-ta* form expresses *kanryō* ‘perfect’ as the core meaning of *-ta*, implying that *ru*-form expresses *mikanryō* ‘imperfect’.

- (3) (A seller tries to sell his goods, saying)  
 “*Yasuiyo, kore wa. Sā, katta! katta!*”  
 “Cheap! These are. Come on. Buy it! Buy it!”

In Example (3) the *-ta* form does not show the lexical meaning of ‘past’. The phrase *katta* ‘buy it!’ is not a past event because the listener (the customer) has not bought it yet. The phrase is an expression whereby the seller strongly recommends customers to buy it, and is not used without a listener. It can be seen here that a certain modality is projected towards the listener. Therefore, an analysis of *-ta* is also needed from the viewpoint of modality which is different from the viewpoint of the general meaning. Example (3) cannot be explicated from the latter view.

There is a previous study which has tried to capture the function of *-ta* using a short phrase. Yoshida (1971: 243) regards *-ta* as “a sort of auxiliary verb for temporal confirmation”, pointing to *-ta* usages such as remembrance, reminiscence and so on.<sup>3</sup> This is an important attempt to show two essential functions of *-ta*, expressing the ‘temporality’ and ‘confirmation’ overview of *-ta*. These two functions can be considered as the fundamental meaning ‘temporality’, and the modality ‘confirmation’ of *-ta*. Yoshida himself does not seem to be aware of the significance of his findings in terms of providing an overview of *-ta*, because he only enumerates the usage of his phrase along with other usages of *-ta*. Building on Yoshida’s attempt, this chapter will analyse *-ta* by distinguishing between general meaning and modality.

### **3-2-2. Inability to explain usage of *-ta* in terms of a single core meaning**

The single meaning/function advanced by the traditional approaches cannot explain the whole usage of *-ta*, because it has various usages. According to Teramura (1971: 314-318), traditional literature argues for *-ta* having a single core meaning or function, which has three streams: (1) ‘past’ in terms of tense (Kindaichi 1957, cited in Teramura 1971: 246); (2) ‘perfect’ from an aspect point

---

<sup>3</sup> Yosida (1971: 243) names *-ta* ‘*Jikansei no tashikame no dantei-ji*’ 時間性の確めの断定辞, which I translate as the English phrase above.

of view (Mitsuya 1928, cited in Teramura 1971: 246); and (3) ‘a kind of mood’ (Yamada 1908, cited in Teramura 1971: 247). While both (1) and (2) are approaches from the viewpoint of fundamental meaning, (3) is an approach from a modality point of view.

Some scholars have attempted to pursue a single core meaning of *-ta* (Kindaichi 1957: 227-229; Tanaka 1969: 145-147), regarding it as ‘the time before a certain time’ (*izen* or *yorī izen*) through the tense approach, but this chapter takes a different approach.<sup>4</sup> This chapter regards the core meanings of *-ta* as the following four differing meanings: (1) past; (2) perfect; (3) relative before; and (4) continuation. The first two categories are meanings when *-ta* appears at the end of a sentence. The last two categories apply in cases in which *-ta* appears in the subordinate clause, not in the main clause. An example of each is shown below.

- (4) a. **Past**  
*Kinō ame ga furimashi-ta.*  
 ‘It rained yesterday.’
- b. **Perfect**  
*Sudeni denwashi-mashi-ta.*  
 ‘I have already called him on the phone.’
- c. **Relative Before**  
*Ashita kari-ta hon demo asatte kaesa-nakereba-ikemasen. Zōsho-tenken no tame desu.*  
 ‘You must return the books you have borrowed by the day after tomorrow, even if you borrow books tomorrow. The library will carry out a total holdings inspection of that day.’
- d. **Continuation (the state of things)**  
*Magatta yama-michi ga doko made mo tsuzui-te-iru.*  
 ‘There is a winding mountain path which looks endless.’

The three terms, utterance time (UT), event time (ET) and standard time (ST), are used to explain the *-ta* sentence because *-ta* is related to temporality. Utterance time (UT) indicates the time when the utterer expresses a sentence. Event time (ET) means the time when the event (or action) occurs (will occur or occurred). Firstly, in example (4a), *-ta* shows ‘past’, the event time (ET) of ‘rain’ occurred earlier than UT. This can be shown by  $ET < UT$ . Thus, the *-ta* following *furu* ‘rain’

---

<sup>4</sup> Kindaichi (1988: 114) himself says that although he tried to explicate the meanings of *-ta* (which are *izen* ‘the time before a certain time’, past and perfect) with a single core meaning of *-ta*, this attempt was foolish.

can be regarded as expressing ‘past’ on the basis of UT. Secondly, in example (4b), *-ta* has the meaning ‘perfect’. Between a certain past-time and UT, the event ‘call’ occurred. The time sequence is shown by a certain past time  $< ET < UT$ , though that certain time is not specifically shown. The event ‘call’ occurred between the two times (a certain time and the utterance time), so the event ‘call’ followed by *-ta* can be regarded as ‘perfect’. Thus, this *-ta* form is considered to express ‘perfect’. Thirdly, in example (4), ‘relative before’ implies the time relation of the two events, ‘borrow’ ( $E_2$  in the subordinate clause) and ‘return’ ( $E_1$  in the main clause). The time of the event ‘return the book’ ( $E_1$ ) can be regarded as  $E_1T$  while the time of the event ‘borrow a book’ is as  $E_2T$ . With regard to the time sequence,  $E_2T$  is earlier than  $E_1T$ . That is, from the viewpoint of  $E_1T$ ,  $E_2T$  is relatively earlier  $E_1T$ , namely  $E_2T < E_1T$ . The term ‘relative before’ of *-ta* is used to express the time relationship between two events ( $E_1$  and  $E_2$ ) from the viewpoint of  $E_1T$ . Hence, in some cases  $E_2$  is ‘past’ from the viewpoint of  $E_1T$ , and in other cases  $E_2$  is ‘perfect’ from the viewpoint of  $E_1T$ . This section considers both those forms of *-ta* in the subordinate (or relative) clause as ‘relative before’. In addition, in example (4c) both  $E_1T$  and  $E_2T$  indicate future time because neither event has yet occurred at the utterance time (UT). Even if UT is past, ‘relative before’ shows the same time relation between the two events. Fourthly, in example (4d), *magatta yama-michi* ‘a winding mountain path’ expresses ‘the state of the mountain path (or the continuation of the result of the event-occurrence)’ by using *-ta*. Whether the event ( $E_1$ ) at the end of a sentence is past or non-past, the *-ta* form ( $E_2$ ) shows the continuation of the result of the event-occurrence or the state of things at  $E_1T$  in main clause. This is expressed as  $E_2T = E_1T$ . Thus, through these considerations of time, the time relationship between ET and UT in the four core meanings is expressed as follows:

- a. Past..... $ET < UT$
- b. Perfect.....A certain time  $< ET < UT$
- c. Relative before..... $E_2T < E_1T$
- d. Continuation (or state of things)..... $E_2T = E_1T$

Next, with regard to the four core meanings of *-ta*, whether one meaning can be substituted for the other meaning is examined in example (4) above. Firstly,

(4a) expresses the first meaning ‘past’. Can the other three meanings also be explained as ‘past’? The meaning ‘perfect’ in (4b) cannot be explained by the meaning ‘past’. Past indicates that the event ‘it rains’ happened ‘yesterday’, which gives a specific past-time different from the utterance time. In contrast, perfect indicates that the event (or action) ‘I call’ occurred between a certain time and the utterance time. Thus past and perfect are semantically different from each other.

Secondly, the meaning ‘relative before’ in (4c) cannot be explained using the meaning of ‘past’, because the event *kari-ta* is a future event (or action) although *-ta* is used. In (4d) *magatta yama-michi* ‘a winding mountain path’ is the present state of the mountain path, but not its past state. So ‘continuation’ cannot be explained by ‘past’. Therefore, ‘past’, ‘relative before’ and ‘continuation’ cannot be explained by the second meaning ‘perfect’, and ‘past’ cannot be explained by ‘perfect’.

The third meaning ‘relative before’ in (4c), however, is more complicated. In the above example, at first glance, it seems possible to explain ‘relative before’ as ‘perfect’, but *kari-ta* ‘borrow *-ta*’ means that the action finishes in the time of ‘tomorrow’, which is a specific time. Thus, the action can be regarded as ‘past’, on the basis of ‘tomorrow’. The event ‘borrow *-ta*’ does not occur between the two time; So this *-ta* should be regarded as ‘past’ in the future rather than ‘perfect’. In addition, in some cases ‘relative before’ expresses ‘perfect’ in the future. For example, *Tabetara, dekakeyō* ‘Having a meal, we will go out.’ The *ta* in *tabetara* can be considered as ‘future perfect’.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the meaning of ‘relative before’ shows the relative ‘past’ or the relative ‘perfect’ based on the time of the event of the predicate verb in the main clause, namely ‘relative time’. In this regard, ‘relative before’ is different from both ‘past’ and ‘perfect’ because ‘past’ and ‘perfect’ are based on the utterance time (UT). Since ‘relative before’ has the temporal relationship between  $E_1T$  and  $E_2T$ , it is considered as ‘relative time’ through comparing the two events (or actions),  $E_1$  and  $E_2$ .

The fourth meaning, ‘continuation (or the state of things)’ seen in (4d), is that the state of a mountain path is winding. It does not express ‘past’ or ‘perfect’

---

<sup>5</sup> The form *tara* is the irrealis form from the conclusive form of *tari*. According to Yoshida (1971: 225), the morpheme *ta* is derived from *tari*, and so I show this example with *tara*.

understood from the viewpoint of UT because it is understood from the temporal viewpoint of  $E_1T$ . When *-ta* has the meaning ‘continuation’ (or state of things),  $E_2T$  can be regarded as equal to  $E_1T$ , not UT. The meaning of ‘continuation’ is not referred to ‘before’ in temporality. Hence, ‘continuation (or state of things)’ cannot be explained by ‘relative before’.

We see from the above that it is not possible to integrate these four meanings into a single core meaning. Individual recognition of four fundamental meanings is more appropriate than persistence in the notion of a single core meaning. This chapter approaches the four core meanings of *-ta* individually.

### 3-2-3. Four core meanings of *-ta*

This subsection discusses four meanings of *-ta*, ‘past’, ‘perfect’, ‘relative before’ and ‘continuation’, in order to consolidate the foundations of investigation into the relationship between these core meanings and proposition.

#### (1) Past

The first core meaning of *-ta* is ‘past’ (or ‘simple past’), which is considered as a matter of fact by many studies (Nagano 1951; Tanaka 1969; Yoshida 1971). This *-ta* shows the temporal location of the event expressed with *-ta* from the ‘present’ point of view, which is the ‘present’ utterance time. That is, *-ta* expresses the time location when the event happened, regarding the event as a simple past one. The past event is distant from the present situation of the utterance. In other words, *-ta* does not have a temporal connection between the past event and the present situation. So the ‘past’ meaning can also be said to be ‘simple past’. An example of this ‘simple past’ is shown below.

- (5) *Kyonen Atene ni itta.*  
 ‘I went to Athens last year.’

The *-ta* in Example (5) shows that the event ‘I went to Athens’ happened in the past (last year). The *-ta* simply expresses an event which is in the past at the time of utterance, but the past event does not affect the present situation. The sentence does not show a temporal connection between the event time and the utterance

time.

The ‘Reminiscence’ usage of *-ta* belongs to the ‘past’ category. Yoshida (1971: 229) states that the past experience is equivalent to ‘reminiscence’. It is an expression of the ‘past’ situation from the ‘present’ point of view, and the content event of the reminiscence is definitely distant from the present situation of the utterance. Let us consider the following examples of ‘reminiscence’:

- (6) a. *Kodomo no koro wa pūru mo nakatta shi, oyoge-nakatta.*  
 ‘There used to be no swimming pool in my childhood and I could not swim.’  
 b. *Hajimete ni-shūkan gaikoku-ryokō o shita toki ni wa migi mo hidari mo wakara-zu orooroshi-ta.*  
 ‘When I had an two-week overseas trip for the first time, I dithered about with little knowledge of the foreign country.’

Both (6a) and (6b) express the utterer’s reminiscence in that the utterer remembers the event (action or state) from the past. A certain time is set up as a standard time by the utterer. The standard time of (6a) is *kodomo no koro* ‘in my childhood’ while the standard time of (6b) is *hajimete gaikoku-ryokō o shita toki* ‘the time when I had an overseas trip for the first time’. In some cases the length of the standard time set up by the utterer is long and in some cases short. The period of the standard time of (6a) is relatively long while that of (6b) is short.

Even though the ‘reminiscence’ expression has a certain standard time, the standard time in itself shows ‘past’. In addition, the ‘reminiscence’ expression is not related to the degree of the depth of the utterer’s nostalgia from the viewpoint of temporality. The core meaning of *-ta* in the ‘reminiscence’ expression is shown in terms of ‘past’. The reminiscence is included in the category of the meaning of ‘past’.

## (2) Perfect

The second core meaning of *-ta* is ‘perfect’ (Yoshida; 1971; Teramura 1971; Kudō 1989). The lexical meaning of ‘perfect’ is more clearly defined by Kudō (1989: 67) so this study will adopt Kudō’s definition:

*Aru settei-sare-ta jiten ni oite, sore yori mo mae ni jitsugenshi-ta undō ga*

*hikitsuzuki kakawari, kōryoku o motte-iru koto*

[When a certain time is set up as a standard time, ‘perfect’ indicates that the movement (event) occurring before the standard time has been effective till the standard time.] (My translation)

According to the above definition, ‘perfect’ involves two times: (1) an event time (ET) and (2) a standard time (ST). Moreover, the movement (event) has been ‘effective’ until the standard time. This “effectiveness” is equivalent to the explanation of Comrie (1976: 52), “the perfect indicates the continuing present relevance of a past situation”. His “present” refers to the standard time.

From the above three points (ET, ST and ‘effective’), let us consider the following example of ‘perfect’ with *-ta*:

(7) (The husband talking to his wife about a letter)

(Husband) “*Oreijō kaite kure-ta?*”

(Wife) “*Ee, mō kai-ta-wa*”

“Have you written the letter of thanks?”

“Yes, I have already done it.”

In Example (7) the words of the wife can be said to be ‘perfect’. The first and second points related to ‘time’ can be extracted from Example (7). The event time of (7) is the time when the wife wrote the letter. The standard time of (7) is the utterance time. The event time of her action ‘writing the letter’ is earlier than her utterance time. The event (action) happened before the standard time. The event time can be described as ET while the utterance time can be described as UT. In this case  $UT = ST$ . The relationship in time between ET and UT can be described as follows:

$ET < UT$  or  $ET < ST$  (which shows ‘ET before  $UT = ST$ ’)

The third aspect of ‘perfect’ is ‘effectiveness’. The effectiveness of the event (action/movement) is retained at the utterance time. This event (or action), ‘writing the letter of thanks’, has been effective until her utterance time. The finished action is relevant to the present situation. In (7) the husband does not need to write the letter of thanks in the present situation (UT) because it has already been done by his wife. Thus the *-ta* form in (7) is directly connected to the present situation. The ‘effectiveness’ lasts until the utterance time. As we see from

of the above examination, these three points satisfy Kudō's definition of 'perfect' in Example (7).

The standard time in the 'perfect' sentence is not always the utterance time, but in some cases can be a certain past time, as in

- (8) *Tazune-ta<sub>2</sub> toki, ano hito wa kitakushi-ta<sub>1</sub>-tokoro-deshi-ta.*  
'When I visited her, she had just got home.'

In Example (8), there are two events, E<sub>2</sub> 'visit' and E<sub>1</sub> 'get home'. 'When I visited her' is assumed as a standard time. The *-ta* of 'she had got home' shows that E<sub>1</sub> happened immediately before the standard time. That is, 'past perfect' is shown here. So this case can be described by E<sub>1</sub>T < ST (=E<sub>2</sub>T) < UT. The 'effectiveness' of E<sub>1</sub> 'she got home' had remained until the standard time 'when I visited her'. There was a continuing effect, i.e. that she was present at home immediately after she got home. So the *-ta* form shows the 'effectiveness' of the event E<sub>1</sub>.

In addition, 'perfect' includes not only 'completion' such as in the above Example (8), but also 'the occurrence of a new situation'. An example is shown below.

- (9) *Ōku no hito ga konpyūtā o tsukau yōni-natta.*  
'Many people have come to use computers.'

Example (9) implies that not many people used computers in the past. The sentence compares a new situation with a past situation, describing the occurrence of the new situation. This does not mean that the situation of many people using computers has been completed, but rather suggests that the situation of many people using computers has begun. The new situation suggests that the number of people not using computers will decrease over time.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> Comrie (1976: 56-61) subcategorises 'perfect' into four types, 'perfect of result', 'experiential perfect', 'perfect of persistent situation' and 'perfect of recent past'. This can be applied to *-ta* in the Japanese language as in *Mō bara o ue-ta-yo* 'I have already planted a rose', *San-kai Shidonī ni itta* 'I have been to Sydney three times', *Jūnen koko ni sun-da* 'I have lived here for 10 years', and *Tatta ima tsui-ta* 'He has just arrived', respectively.

**(3) Relative before**

The third meaning of *-ta* is ‘relative before’, which shows the temporal relationship between two events in relative terms. The two events are in both the subordinate clause/phrase and the main clause in the sentence. This idea evolved from previous studies on the core meaning of *-ta* (Kindaichi 1957; Tanaka 1969).

Three examples of ‘relative before’ are given to reconfirm the fact of the temporal location of two events with the *-ta* form.

## (10) a. (A phone call from the bookshop)

“*Koyama-san, chūmon shi-ta<sub>2</sub> hon ga tatta ima todoki-mashi-ta<sub>1</sub>.*”

“Mr Koyama, the book you ordered has just arrived.”

b. “*Ashita chūmonshi-ta<sub>2</sub> hon demo issūkan go ni todoku deshō<sub>1</sub>.*”

“Even if you order the book tomorrow, it will arrive one week later.”

c. “*Chūmonshi-ta<sub>2</sub> hon, issūkan mae ni todoi-tei-mashi-ta<sub>1</sub>-yo.*”

“The book which you ordered arrived one week ago.”

All these above examples have the phrase *chūmon-shi-ta<sub>2</sub>* ‘order (the book) + *-ta*’ (E<sub>2</sub>) and the verb *todoku* ‘arrive’ (E<sub>1</sub>). Let us consider the *-ta* of *chūmon-shi-ta<sub>2</sub>* and the predicate ‘arrive’ individually. To begin with, in (10a) the *-ta* of *todoki-mashi-ta<sub>1</sub>* ‘has just arrived’ shows ‘present perfect’. The *chūmon-shi-ta* happened before the ‘has just arrived’. Consequently, the *chūmon-shi-ta<sub>2</sub>* is earlier than ‘arrived’, which is illustrated as follows:

$$(A) E_2T(chūmon-shi-ta) < E_1T(todoku) = ST(todoku)$$

Next, in (10b) the time of ‘it will arrive after one week’ (E<sub>1</sub>) is future and the same as the action ‘order (the book)’ (E<sub>2</sub>). The *-ta* of ‘order’ is also used in the case of future. However, the temporal relationship between ‘order’ and ‘it will arrive’ is also shown in (A) above, the same as in (10a). Thirdly, in (10c), *todoi-te-i-mashi-ta* (E<sub>1</sub>) shows a past event, ‘one week ago’. The act *chūmonshi-ta* (E<sub>2</sub>) was a past event which happened earlier than ‘one week ago’. So both events happened in the past. However, their temporal sequence is the same as (10a) and (10b). All are shown by illustration (A).

It has, therefore, been confirmed that ‘relative before’ indicates the relative temporal relationship between E<sub>1</sub>T and E<sub>2</sub>T.

**(4) Continuation (State of things)**

The fourth meaning of *-ta* is ‘continuation’ (*sonzoku*) (Tokieda 1950; Tanaka 1969; Yoshida 1971). According to Tokieda (1950: 198) and Tanaka (1969: 142), the *-ta* is morphologically formed from the archaic word ‘*tari*’, which expresses ‘perfect’ and ‘continuation’ (*Sanseidō zenyaku dokka kogo jiten* dictionary 1995; *Iwanami kogo jiten* Dictionary 1974)<sup>7</sup>. It can be said that the lexical meaning of *-ta* as ‘continuation’ is taken over from the meaning of *tari* semantically as well as morphologically.

This usage ‘continuation’ is typically seen in the usage for noun-modifying. The meaning of ‘continuation’ includes the state of things. For example, the *-ta* following verbs in (11a) and (11b) indicates the state of things, modifying the nouns with *-ta*:

- (11) a. *Magatta yama-michi ga doko made mo tsuzuite-iru.* (Example (5d) again)  
 ‘There is a winding mountain path which continues endless.’  
 b. *Takaku sobie-ta Fujisan wa doko kara mi-temo kireida.*  
 ‘Mt Fuji which soars into the sky is beautiful no matter where we see it from.’

In the above examples, both *Magatta yama-michi* ‘a winding mountain path’ of (11a) and *Takaku sobie-ta Fujisan* ‘Mt Fuji which soars into the sky’ of (11a) use the *-ta* form to represent the states of the mountain path and Mt Fuji, respectively. These states can be regarded as ‘continuation’.

‘Continuation’ is also related to ‘perfect’. The situation where a certain result is lasting can be considered to belong to the category ‘continuation’, as in

- (12) *Sannen kurashi-ta ie ni wa aichaku ga aru node, hanare-taku-nai.*  
 ‘I feel attached to the house where I have lived for 3 years, so I don’t want to leave here.’

In (12) the utterer started living there three years ago. The state of living there has

---

<sup>7</sup> According to *Sanseidō-zenyaku-dokkai-kogo jiten* dictionary (1995: 720), *tari* has three meanings: (1) continuation of the state; (2) continuation of result; (3) perfect. In *Iwanami-kogo Jiten* dictionary (1974: 1433) *tari* originally expresses the progressive and continuation (of the action, function and state of verbs).

continued until now. This usage could be considered close to the usage of ‘perfect’.

The lexical meaning ‘continuation’ of *-ta* is in particular related to the usage of ‘attributes’ and ‘state of things’, as in

- (13) *Hahaoya to ni-ta kao na node sugu wakaru.*  
 ‘Her child resembles the mother so you can find her child easily.’

In (13) *ni-ta* ‘resemble or similar’ can be said to be ‘attributes’ and ‘state of things’.

### 3-2-4. Sentence final usage of *-ta* from the syntactic point of view

The four core meanings of *-ta* have individual syntactic features in the sentence. The meanings of *-ta* appearing at the end of the sentence are only ‘past’ and ‘perfect’, as can be seen in examples (5) and (7), respectively. In contrast, the meanings ‘relative before’ and ‘continuation’ do not appear at the end of the sentence.

The usage ‘relative before’ is used elsewhere at the end of a sentence. The end of the sentence is related to the utterance time as absolute tense. The ‘relative before’ shows the relative temporal location of two events as a relative tense based on the tense of the final predicate. It is not directly related to the utterance time. ‘Relative before’ does not appear at the end of a sentence but in the middle of a sentence. This section focuses on the expression at the end of a sentence, so the usage of ‘relative before’ is excluded.

Likewise, the meaning ‘continuation’ of *-ta* is not used at the end of the sentence, although it is used in the adnominal usage of *-ta*, as can be shown below.

- (14) a. *Sora ni sobie-ta Fuji-san wa ustukushii.*  
 ‘Mt Fuji rising to the sky is beautiful.’  
 b. \* *Sora ni Fuji-san ga sobie-ta.*

In (14a) the *-ta* form is used to express ‘continuation’ (the state of Mt Fuji) in the adnominal usage and the expression is natural, but (14b) sounds strange because it

is grammatically incorrect. If the meaning of (14b) were ‘perfect’, it would mean that Mt Fuji had just risen to the sky. Of course this is a counterfactual event. It is therefore clear that the *-ta* form is not used with the meaning of ‘continuation’ at the end of the sentence. As the attributive form *-ta* in the middle of the sentence, it modifies “Mt Fuji” and expresses the state of Mt Fuji.

The forms, *te-iru* and *te-i-ta*, are used when ‘continuation’ is expressed at the end of the sentence.

- (15) *Sora ni Fuji-san ga sobie-te-iru* (or *sobie-te-i-ta*).  
 ‘Mt Fuji rises (or was rising) to the sky.’

Example (15) is natural owing to the form of *te-iru* (or *te-i-ta*). The form of *sobie-te-i-ta* shows the meaning ‘past continuation’ (the past state of Mt Fuji). The *(-te)-i-ta* form consists of *(te)-iru* and *-ta*; The *te-iru* expresses ‘continuation’ while the *-ta* form expresses ‘past’, not ‘continuation’.

Therefore, it is confirmed that when *-ta* appears at the end of the sentence, the meaning of *-ta* shows either ‘past’ or ‘perfect’ but not ‘relative before’ or ‘continuation’.<sup>8</sup>

### 3-2-5. Proposition composed by core meaning

In this subsection, the relationship between core meaning and the proposition of the sentence is examined by the use of the discriminator<sup>9</sup> for a proposition. The focus is on whether the sentence having core meanings of *-ta* is a proposition.

Examination of ‘past’, ‘perfect’, ‘relative before’ and ‘continuation’ is made in turn (Examples (5), (7), (10) and (11) are used again, respectively).

- (16) (Past)  
*Kyonen Atene ni itta*. ‘I went to Athens last year.’  
 → *Kyonen Atene ni itta koto oshitteiru*.  
 ‘You (or s/he) know that I went to Athens last year.’

<sup>8</sup> There are some other usages of *-ta* in the middle of a sentence: (1) conditional usage *-tara*; (2) formalised expressions such as *~shi-ta-hō-ga-ii*; (3) a noun-modifier usage *Magatta michi* ‘a curved road’ *Āshita hōhō* ‘a method like that’ These usages of *-ta* do not express modality. Focusing on modality, this study will not discuss them.

<sup>9</sup> The discriminator is the phrase *koto o shitteiru* ‘I (you or s/he) know that ~’ (See section 2-2-3, chapter 2).

The part expressing the meaning of ‘past’ is the propositional part because the phrasal discriminator *koto o shitteiru* is acceptable in (16).

- (17) (Perfect)  
 (The husband talking to his wife about a letter)  
 (Husband) “*Oreijō kaite kure-ta?*”  
 (Wife) “*Ee, mō kai-ta-wa*”  
 “Have you written the letter of thanks?”  
 “Yes, I have already done it.”  
 → a. \**Ee, mō kai-ta-wa koto o shitteiru.*  
 → b. *mō kai-ta koto o shitteiru.* (*Ee* and *wa* →  $\phi$ )  
 ‘I know that you have already done it.’

In (17) the *-ta* form in the wife’s utterance *Ee, mō kai-ta-wa* ‘Yes, I have already done it’ expresses ‘perfect’. Sentence (17a) is grammatically incorrect, so it is not acceptable because of the presence of *Ee* ‘yes’ and *-wa* (female particle). Sentence (17b) excluding *Ee* and *wa* is a natural sentence, so it is acceptable. This means that the parts *Ee* and *wa* do not belong to the proposition in *Ee, mō kai-ta-wa* in (17). Therefore, the *-ta* form of *mō kai-ta* in (17) expressing ‘perfect’ belongs to the propositional part.

- (18) (Relative before)  
 a. “*Koyama-san, chūmon shi-ta<sub>2</sub> hon ga tatta ima todoki-mashi-ta<sub>1</sub>.*”  
 “Mr Koyama, the book you ordered has just arrived.”  
 → b. *Koyama-san ga chūmon shi-ta<sub>2</sub> hon ga tatta ima todoki-mashi-ta<sub>1</sub> koto o shitteiru.*  
 “I know that the book Mr Koyama ordered has just arrived.”

In sentence (18a) the *-ta<sub>2</sub>* form in bold shows ‘relative before’ to the *todoki-mashi-ta<sub>1</sub>* ‘arrived’. Sentence (18b) can be regarded as a natural sentence even though the polite form *mashi* appears in front of *-ta<sub>1</sub>*.<sup>10</sup> The *-ta<sub>2</sub>* form modifies *hon* ‘book’ and belongs to the propositional part. The noun-modifying *-ta<sub>2</sub>* and the noun *hon* comprises the propositional part. So the *-ta* form expressing ‘relative before’ is propositional.

---

<sup>10</sup> This chapter regards the *-masu* form as an honorific verb-suffix and recognises that *masu* can appear in the *koto* clause of the discriminator, as discussed in section 2-6-3, chapter 2.

## (19) (Continuation)

a. *Magatta yama-michi ga doko made mo tsuzui-te-iru.*

‘There is a winding mountain path which looks endless.’

→ b. *Magatta yama-michi ga doko made mo tsuzui-te-iru koto o shitteiru.*

‘I know that there is a winding mountain path which looks endless.’

The *-ta* form expressing ‘continuation’ is also propositional in (19a) above because sentence (19b) is natural with the discriminator.

The above examination thus leads to the conclusion that the *-ta* form belongs to the propositional part of the sentence, functioning as an important constituent of the proposition.

### 3-3. Usages expressing proposition-oriented modality

This section will explore the usage of *-ta* expressing proposition-oriented modality, focusing on ‘confirmation’ modality which is expressed at the end of a sentence. This is the first time such an attempt has been made. The discussion is organised as follows. Subsection 3-3-1 categorises usages of *-ta* expressing proposition-oriented modality as documented in the literature. Next, subsection 3-3-2 classifies the categories of proposition-oriented modality of *-ta* from the viewpoint of ‘confirmation’. According to the classification, the details of ‘confirmation’ modality are investigated. Finally, Subsection 3-3-3 demonstrates characteristics of the proposition-oriented modality of *-ta*.

#### 3-3-1. Categorisation of proposition-oriented modality of *-ta* in the literature

Many scholars have noted diverse usages of *-ta* for modality (Yamada 1936; Tokieda 1950; Mikami 1953; Tanaka 1969; Yoshida 1971; Teramura 1971; Matsuda 1998). Each usage of *-ta* is fully shown in the literature. However, usages of *-ta* expressing modality have not yet been categorised adequately although various examples have been shown. There has been no previous attempt to categorise fully the usages of *-ta*. This subsection will categorise various usages of *-ta* as documented in previous studies. The purpose of doing so is to establish a

foundation for classifying the proposition-oriented modality of *-ta* at the end of a sentence.

This section has selected usages of *-ta* in the literature from the viewpoint of proposition-oriented modality expressing the utterer's attitude towards the proposition.<sup>11</sup> Previous studies have shown many examples of the *-ta* usage and this study rearranges these. The result of the rearrangement can be integrated into four representative categories: (1) 'confirmation' (*kakunin*), (2) 'reminiscence' (*kaisō*), (3) 'counterfactual supposition' (*hanjitsu-kasō*), (4) 'regret/review' (*kōkai/hansei*).<sup>12</sup> Each example is shown below.

**(20) 1 'Confirmation'**

*A uchi-mashi-ta. Sachūkan, kanzen-ni yaburi-mashi-ta.* (Tanaka1969: 150)  
'He has hit the ball. The ball has passed right through the area between the left and the centre.'

**2 'Reminiscence'**

*18, 9 no koro wa 3-ri wa oyoge-ta.* (Tanaka1969: 148)  
'I used to be able to swim even 12 km when I was 18 or 19 years old.'

**3 'Counterfactual supposition'**

*"Mō sukoshi osokattara, tasukara-nakatta."* (Teramura1971: 266)  
'If it had been a little later, he would not have survived.'

**4 'Regret/review'**

(Regret that you did not buy stocks on the stock market)  
*Asoko wa kai datta.* (Teramura1971: 268)  
'I should have bought some then.'

The relationship between the above four usages and the previous studies is chronologically shown as follows. Yamada (1936: 340-351) recognises the usage of (1) 'confirmation' and emphasises the usage of (2) 'reminiscence' in the classical morphemes (verb endings) relating to the *-ta*.<sup>13</sup> Tokieda (1950: 199) regards the usage of (1) as 'confirmation', stating that the *-ta* expresses 'the utterer's position', which can be explicated as 'modality'. Tanaka (1969: 142-154)

<sup>11</sup> Non-proposition-oriented modality will be examined in sections 3-4 and 3-5.

<sup>12</sup> In Japanese, these four usages are (1) *kakunin* 確認, (2) *kaisō* 回想, (3) *hanjitsu-kasō* 反実仮想, (4) *kōkai/hansei* 後悔/反省.

<sup>13</sup> Yamada (1936: 340-351) sees 'confirmation' usage in the classical forms *tsu*, *nu*, *tari* and *shi*, and 'reminiscence' usage in the forms *ki* and *keri*.

discusses the usages of (1) ‘confirmation’ and (2) ‘reminiscence’ in an attempt to explain all usages of *-ta*. Also, Yoshida (1971: 224-251) discusses the usage of (1) ‘confirmation’, and (2) ‘reminiscence’. Teramura (1971) demonstrates the usages of (1) ‘confirmation’, and pays attention also to the usages of (3) ‘counterfactual supposition’ and (4) ‘regret/review’.

The above four usages of *-ta* must be classified from the viewpoint of ‘confirmation’ modality because there is something which cannot be explained only from the viewpoint of proposition expressing ‘past’ or ‘perfect’. The next subsection will focus on the classification of these categories.

### 3-3-2. Classification of proposition-oriented modality of *-ta*

In order to establish systematically the usage of *-ta*, this subsection classifies the above four categories of *-ta* usage from the viewpoint of ‘confirmation’. The term ‘confirmation’ means that the utterer confirms whether information in the utterer’s memory is true. The utterer has already obtained information, from which s/he extracts certain information. The ‘confirmation’ is a category of both report of factuality and recognition judging, whether something is true or not. The confirmation can be regarded as modality expressed by the *-ta* form.<sup>14</sup> The approach is to classify the proposition-oriented modality of *-ta*.

The four usages of *-ta* can be divided by either absence or presence of connotation into two categories. Connotation is an idea or feeling which a sentence invokes in addition to its primary meaning. A declarative sentence, such as *Kyonen Atene ni itta* ‘I went to Athens last year’, expresses a statement, which has no connotation but is a simple fact. In (20-2), a reminiscence sentence involves nostalgia because s/he cannot return to the past period. For example, the reminiscence sentence *kodomo no koro yoku sikarare-ta* ‘I was often scolded in my childhood’, the utterer confirms her/his past situation from the viewpoint of the present time. It is during a certain past period that the action (event) happened. The reminiscence is the process of remembering the utterer’s experience at a certain past period, longer or shorter. The distinction between reports of a past

---

<sup>14</sup> ‘Listener-oriented modality’ of *-ta* cannot express ‘confirmation’ such as *Sā, katta!* ‘Come on! Buy this!’ Also, ‘emotive modality’ usages of *-ta* cannot, such as *Mā, akireta!* ‘No! Words fail me!’. These modalities are discussed in sections 3-4 and 3-5.

event and reminiscence relies on the context.

In contrast, ‘counterfactual supposition’ and ‘regret/review’ usages have a certain connotation. The connotation in a counterfactual supposition expression is that the fact is the opposite content to the surface expression. For example, in example (20-3), *Mō sukoshi osokattara, tasukara-nakatta* ‘If it had been a little later, he would not have survived’ has the connotation ‘actually he has survived’. In ‘regret/review’ usages, the connotation is that the opposite action to the surface expression has been made. In example (20-4), *Asoko wa kai datta*. ‘I should have bought some then’ has the connotation that ‘I did not buy some then’.

Thus, the ‘confirmation’ usage of *-ta* can be categorised into a ‘general confirmation’ usage with no special connotation and a ‘special confirmation’ usage with connotation. This can be shown below.

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{‘Confirmation usage’ in proposition-oriented modality} \\ \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{General confirmation usage with no connotation} \\ \text{Special confirmation usage with connotation} \end{array} \right. \\ \text{‘Non-Confirmation usage’<sup>15</sup> of *-ta*} \end{array} \right.$$

### (1) General ‘confirmation’ usage of *-ta* with no connotation

This subsection examines the general ‘confirmation’ usage of *-ta* with no connotation, arguing that it expresses both proposition and modality.

‘Confirmation’ usage has been noted since Yamada (1936: 340-351) who recognises the usage of ‘confirmation’ in the classical verb endings *tsu* and *nu* which seem to be related to *-ta*. Tokieda (1950: 199) also found that *-ta* expresses ‘the utterer’s judgement of confirmation’ on the matter (proposition), recognising that the grammatical category of ‘confirmation’ is different from the lexical level of the meanings ‘past’ and ‘perfect’.<sup>16</sup> Tanaka (1969: 150) and Yoshida (1971: 235) also demonstrate this ‘confirmation’ usage. So it is clear in the literature that the *-ta* form expresses ‘confirmation’ modality. However, a few issues remain unclear. Tokieda has not clarified whether ‘perfect’ and ‘past’ is appropriate as the

<sup>15</sup> Non-confirmation usage of *-ta* is discussed in the following sections.

<sup>16</sup> Tokieda (1950: 199) expresses confirmation in terms of *kakunin-handan* 確認判断 ‘confirmation-judgement’.

meaning of *-ta*, although he emphasises ‘confirmation’. As regards ‘confirmation’ as one of the usages of *-ta*, Tanaka and Yoshida do not discuss whether declarative sentences usually express ‘confirmation’ modality. Therefore, this study will clarify two problems: (1) whether declarative sentences usually express ‘confirmation’ modality; (2) the relationship between ‘perfect’ and ‘past’ meanings of *-ta* and ‘confirmation’ modality.

These themes are argued in ‘general confirmation’ usage of *-ta*, namely in declarative sentences, in reminiscence sentences and in sentences for *jikkyo-chūkei* ‘broadcasting on the spot’.

### **Declarative sentences**

A declarative sentence is an expression whereby the utterer says or writes a statement which gives information in a formal or definite way. In general, the *-ta* form in the declarative sentence expresses ‘report’ modality (See section 2-4-2, chapter 2). This ‘confirmation’ is included in ‘report’ modality. So it is plausible that ‘confirmation’ is usually expressed in the declarative sentence with the *-ta* form. This is examined in verb-predicate, noun-predicate, existential, and adjective-predicate sentences.

Let us consider the following example which has verb-predicate and noun-predicate sentences:

- (21) (The innkeeper tells the detective Torikai that the guest Mr Sugawara was waiting for a phone call. The conversation continues as follows)  
 “*Sorede sono denwa wa kakatte-ki-ta-ka-ne?*”  
 “<sup>(1)</sup>*Kakatte-ki-mashi-ta. Watashi ga denwa o kii-ta-nodesu.* <sup>(2)</sup>*Hatsuka no gogo hachiji-goro deshi-ta.*” (Matsumoto)  
 ‘“Well, was there a phone call?”  
 “<sup>(1)</sup>Someone called. I took the phone and listened. <sup>(2)</sup> It was around eight pm on 20th.”’

In Example (21) the *-ta* form is twice used, in a verb-predicate sentence and a noun-predicate sentence. That ‘someone called’ in (1) is confirmed as a past fact by the utterer. In other words, the utterer introspectively states with assurance that the *-ta* sentence is true. The statement is a report of the fact, a simple past-event. With the second *-ta*, the time of the phone call is also confirmed introspectively as

a past fact. Thus, introspective confirmation can be considered as a typical and general usage of *-ta*. The reason for the term ‘introspective’ is that there is information of what s/he had already experienced, which is in the utterer’s memory. The confirmation indicates that the internal information is extracted from the utterer’s memories as a true past-fact. It is thus clear that the usage of *-ta* expresses both the core meaning ‘past’ and the modality ‘confirmation’ of *-ta* in declarative sentences. Similarly, existential and adjective-predicate sentences express both the core meaning ‘past (or perfect)’ and the modality ‘confirmation’ as in

## (22) a. Existential sentence

“*Sakki, Funabashi (jimu) no kaichō kara, denwa ga atta-yo.*” (Sawaki: 821)  
 ‘The president of Funabashi Boxing Gym called you a little while ago’

## b. Adjective sentence

“*Yōkoso, Kyōwa ne Nagano-san. Tonbo ga heya no naka ni haitte-kita-no-yo. Totemo ureshikatta-wa.*” (Miura: 543)  
 ‘Welcome. Today, Mr Nagano, a dragonfly came into my room. I was delighted.’

Also, the same point can be used to explain a sentence the *-ta* core meaning ‘perfect’. The ‘perfect’ appears in verb-predicate sentences. Let us consider the following example:

## (23) Verb-predicate sentence

(Wife Tomoko) “*Gohan wa ii-no-ne.*” to Tomoko ga kasanete kiite-kuru.

(Arai) “*Un, mō tabeta.*”

(Tomoko) “*O-furo e haittara?*”

(Arai) “*Iya, mō haitta.*” (Akagawa: 226)

“You don’t need to have dinner, do you?” asked Tomoko again.

“No, I have already had dinner.”

“Why don’t you take a bath?”

“No, I have already taken a bath.”

In the above example (23), these *-ta* forms express ‘perfect’ as a report of a fact with no connotation. Arai (Tomoko’s husband) introspectively confirms what he has already experienced during a certain period, reporting it as a fact. These two sentences simultaneously express both the meaning ‘perfect’ and the modality

‘confirmation’, which is included in ‘report’ modality.

The above investigation leads to the conclusion that it can be generalised that the declarative sentence with *-ta* at the end of a sentence usually expresses ‘confirmation’, which can be regarded as modality.

### ***‘Reminiscence’ usage of -ta***

‘Reminiscence’ usage is also a typical usage of *-ta* (Tanaka 1969: 148 and Yoshida 1971: 229-230). ‘Reminiscence’ is an expression showing what the utterer remembers from the past. Yamada (1936: 348-349) emphasises that both ‘*ki*’ and ‘*keri*’, which are classical verb endings, express ‘reminiscence’ rather than ‘past’. Both ‘*ki*’ and ‘*keri*’ seem to be historically related to the realisation of the *-ta* in semantics. These two auxiliary verbs have the meaning of ‘past’ (*Iwanami Kogo Jiten* Dictionary 1974; *Sanseidō Zen’yaku Dokkai Kogo Jiten* Dictionary 1995). Yamada (1936: 348) defines the term ‘reminiscence’ as follows:

*Kaisō to wa omoiokosu koto nari. Kako ni keiken-se-shi koto o ‘aa de atta’ ‘kō de atta’ to omoidasu koto nari. Shikashite, hito wa keiken igai no koto wa kaisōshi-e-zaru hazu nari.*

[Reminiscence is an action of remembering a past experience, as in remembering that this or that was the case. People cannot reminisce about what they did not experience.] (My translation)

This study will add ‘a standard time’ to Yamada’s definition of reminiscence, meaning a certain period of past time in which the utterer experienced something, whether shorter or longer, as already discussed in 3-2-3. So reminiscence can be defined as an act of remembering what the utterer has experienced during a certain period from the past.

The standard time is the background of ‘reminiscence’ usage. ‘Background’ means that the temporal view of the utterer is positioned at a standard time in the past, showing that the utterer is talking about events/situations which happened during the standard time.

In ‘reminiscence’ usage there are two processes: remembering the experience from her/his memory, and confirming it. These occur almost simultaneously. Confirmation is made introspectively through the process of the

reminiscence. It is important to understand that ‘reminiscence’ expression shows not only the utterer’s ‘past’ experience but also her/his ‘confirmation’. While examples of ‘reminiscence’ have been shown in example (6), subsection 3-2-3, other examples taken from Tanaka (1969: 148) are shown below. The standard times in examples (24a) and (24b) are, *ano-koro wa* ‘at that time’ (non-explicit) and *18, 9 nokoro* ‘when I was 18 or 19 years old’, respectively.

- (24) a. *Manzokuna gakureki ya shikaku o motta kyōshi nanka hitori mo inai jōtai datta.*  
 ‘There used to be no teacher who had a good educational background or qualification.’  
 b. *18, 9 no koro wa 3-ri wa oyoge-ta.* (Example (20-4) again)  
 ‘I used to be able to swim even 12 km when I was 18 or 19 years old.’

In addition, there are connotations in some ‘reminiscence’ usages of *-ta*. The utterer remembers her/his past experience in comparison with the present situation. The comparison between past and present is tacitly implied in reminiscence. For example, the connotations in (24a) and (24b) are that nowadays there are good teachers who have good educational backgrounds or qualifications, and that I cannot swim 12 km, respectively, though such connotations depend on the uttering circumstances. Moreover, the typical ‘reminiscence’ usage is accompanied by nostalgia, where the form *-monoda* is very often followed by the *-ta* form.

- (25) a. *Manzokuna gakureki ya shikaku o motta kyōshi nanka hitori mo inai jōtai datta-monoda.* (The translation is the same as (28a))  
 b. *18, 9 no koro wa 3-ri wa oyoge-ta-monoda.* (The translation is the same as (28b))

Thus, the *monoda* form is a sign of this usage. In addition, the usage of reminiscence can be distinguished from ‘report’ by the context.

### Expressions for *jikkyō-chūkei* ‘broadcasting on the spot’

In expressions used in *jikkyō-chūkei*, ‘broadcasting on the spot’, the *-ta* form is often used. When a sports announcer describes the action of players instantly, s/he does not show connotation through *-ta*. The description using *-ta* belongs to the

expression of a declarative sentence. Tanaka (1969: 150) calls this usage of *-ta* “sure statement, settlement or emphasis”<sup>17</sup> and recognises the ‘confirmation’ usage of *-ta*, pointing out that this usage prominently appears when *shunkan-dōsi* ‘punctual verbs’ are followed by *-ta*. However, an explanation of the relationship between the core meaning and modality of *-ta* is not provided.

Let us consider the following example taken from Tanaka (1969) to examine the relationship between the core meaning and modality of *-ta*:

- (26) *A uchi-mashi-ta. Sachūkan, kanzen-ni yaburi-mashi-ta. Rannā wa ima nirui o mawatte, sanrui ni tasshi-mashi-ta. Sanruida!* (Tanaka1969: 150)  
 ‘He has hit the ball. The ball has passed through the area between the left and the centre. The runner has passed the second base. He has reached the third base. This is a three-base hit!’

In example (26) the announcer is making some comments concerning a baseball game. The *-ta* form is used three times. Such expressions are often used on the TV and radio. The meaning of this *-ta* is ‘perfect of recent past’.<sup>18</sup> That is to say, this usage indicates that ‘someone has just done it’ or ‘something has just been done’. This fact is confirmed by the form *-ta*. If the form *-ru*, such as *utsu* or *uchi-masu* ‘hit’ with no *-ta*, is used instead of *uchi-mashi-ta* ‘just hit’, the listener cannot understand whether in fact he has hit or not. It is necessary for the announcer to use the *-ta* form whereby ‘perfect of recent past’ is shown because s/he must describe each event or action as a report of the fact. Momentary actions such as *uchi-mashi-ta* ‘just hit’ are instantly confirmed with *-ta* by the announcer, who effectively delivers instantaneous scenes to the listener. In *jikkyo-chūkei*, ‘broadcasting on the spot’, therefore, ‘confirmation’ is typically expressed as ‘report’ modality by the *-ta* form, while the meaning ‘perfect of recent past’ is represented as a proposition by the *-ta* form.

## (2) Special confirmation usage with a certain connotation

The ‘general confirmation’ usage of *-ta* has no special connotation and expresses

<sup>17</sup> Tanaka (1969: 150) uses *kakujutsu* 確述, *kakutei* 確定 and *kyōi* 強意 in Japanese, respectively.

<sup>18</sup> The term ‘perfect of recent past’ is taken from Comrie (1985: 60). It is also translated as *kinsetsukako* 近接過去 in Japanese by Yamada (1988: 90 and 97).

report modality concerning a simple past-fact or perfect, as seen in subsection 3-3-2. This subsection investigates another ‘special confirmation’ usage of *-ta*, that with connotation, by which the utterer confirms ‘past’ situations. The aim of the examination is to clarify whether this usage of *-ta* expresses both modality and the core meaning of *-ta*. Representatives of this usage are ‘counterfactual suppositions’ and ‘regret/review’ usage.

***‘Counterfactual suppositions’ usage of -ta***

One of the usages of *-ta* for ‘confirmation’ of ‘past’ situations is a ‘counterfactual suppositions’ usage, showing what has not happened or is not the case. The *-ta* form appears in the main clause in conditionals of counterfactual suppositions. This usage involves a particular background to the situation implying that the fact has not happened in reality. In other words, this is an expression implying the background.

The ‘counterfactual supposition’ usage is noted by Teramura (1971: 266-268), who explains that ‘the utterer insists that the event (action) had a very high possibility of occurring although it did not occur as a matter of fact’. However, he has not referred to ‘confirmation’ though he points out that this usage is a stronger expression of the utterer’s assertion. This point needs to be examined.

Let us consider the following examples taken from Teramura (1971):

- (27) a. *“Mō sukoshi osokattara, tasukara-nakatta.”* (Teramura 1971: 266)  
 ‘If it had been a little late, he would not have survived.’  
 b. (Baseball) *“Bōgai ga nakere ba hokyū deki-ta.”* (Teramura 1971: 267)  
 ‘If there had been no disturbance, I would have been able to catch the ball.’

These examples indicate that the utterer is trying to confirm the past situations analytically and introspectively. The form *-ta* syntactically encloses the conditional clause as well as the part followed by *-ta*, as in {[*Mō sukoshi osokattara, tasukara-nai*] *-ta*} in (27a) and {[*Bōgai ga nakere ba hokyū dekiru*] *-ta*} in (27b). Each past situation is confirmed by the *-ta* form. The utterer recognises the past situation in thinking back to it. The fact which did not happen is clearly shown as the connotation in this usage. In (27a) he survived in reality

because of the quick treatment. In (27b) the utterer was not able to catch the ball as a matter of fact because of the disturbance. The utterer has confirmed each past situation: in (27a) the past situation is recognised as a situation in which he was in danger of dying; in (27b) it is recognised as a situation in which it was possible to catch the ball.

Both examples demonstrate that the utterer introspectively confirms what the past situation implies by way of *-ta*. Confirmation modality means the utterer's judgement of a past situation. This confirmation is included in 'assertive' modality in modality of judgement, and is different from the confirmation of 'report' modality.

### **'Regret/review' usage of *-ta***

The *-ta* form is used to express 'regret/review'<sup>19</sup> of a certain past situation, showing what should have been done or what people should have done. The connotation is that the utterer did not do what should have been done or what people should have done. The form {noun + *datta* (*deshi-ta*)} is used in the expression. The past situation or action is considered as a not-good or worse one by the utterer. The first person to note this usage is Teramura (1971: 268-269), whose subheading reads "the utterer insists on something or reminisces about something using *-ta*, that something should have been done although it was actually not done in the past" (Teramura 1971: 268). Although he precisely explains the usage of *-ta*, he has not taken account of 'confirmation', which this study notes. The 'regret/review' usage of *-ta* is easily understood as a practical usage.

Let us consider the following examples to examine whether 'regret/review' usage expresses 'past' and 'confirmation'.

- (28) (I did not buy stocks on the stock market)  
*Asoko wa kai datta.* (Teramura 1971: 268)  
 'I should have bought some then.'

Example (28) shows that the utterer regrets that s/he did not buy stocks on the stock market, which is the connotation. It shows the utterer's present recognition

---

<sup>19</sup> The regret and review are equivalent to *kōkai* 後悔 and *hansei* 反省, respectively.

about the past situation in which s/he did not take the action. The ‘past’ meaning is expressed by the *-ta* form. Also, the utterer’s present recognition is produced confirming what the past situation was like. ‘Confirmation’ is expressed by the *-ta* form and is yielded through reviewing the past situation. So it can be said that ‘review’ of the past situation/action produces ‘regret’ via ‘confirmation’. It is evident that the ‘review/regret’ usage of *-ta* expresses both ‘past’ and ‘confirmation’.

In addition, the form *datta* or *deshi-ta* as review/regret usage of *-ta* cannot be replaced with *da* (or *desu*), as follows:

(29) a. *Asoko wa kai da.*

‘It is/was better for you to take “buy” in that case.’

Although (29) is also grammatically correct, no feelings of regret are expressed. There is only a general/neutral criticism. In order to express the feeling of regret, the presence of *-ta* is indispensable.

In addition, ‘special confirmation with connotation’ usage also expresses both modality and proposition, but the ‘confirmation’ modality belongs to ‘judgement’ modality, which shows assertion. In contrast, in the ‘general confirmation’ usage of *-ta*, the modality belongs to ‘report’ modality.

### 3-3-3. Characteristics of proposition-oriented modality of *-ta*

This subsection provides the characteristics of usages of *-ta* expressing proposition-oriented modality from two points of view—proposition and modality. It reviews the fact that *-ta* belongs to the propositional part by using the discriminator *koto o shitteiru* ‘I (you or s/he) know that ~’, and then it demonstrates the characteristics of ‘proposition-oriented modality’ usage with illustrations.

Firstly, the most important finding of this section so far is that the *-ta* form expresses ‘confirmation’ modality whenever it expresses proposition-oriented modality at the end of a sentence. Using the propositional discriminator, this subsection reconfirms that in all the *-ta* usages selected in section 3-3, *-ta* is propositional, as follows:

## (30) (A) General Confirmation (no special connotation)

## a. (Past)

“*Sakki, Funabashi (jimu) no kaichō kara, denwa ga atta-yo.* (Example (22))

‘The president of Funabashi Boxing Gym called you a little while ago’  
 →a’. *Sakki, Funabashi (jimu) no kaichō kara, denwa ga **atta** koto shitteiru.*  
 ‘I know that the president of Funabashi Boxing Gym called you a little while ago.’

## b. (Perfect)

(Wife Tomoko) “*Gohan wa ii-no-ne.*” to Tomoko ga *kasane-te kii-tekuru.*

(Arai) “*Un, mō tabeta.*”

‘You don’t need to have dinner, do you?’ asked Tomoko continuously.’

‘No, I have already had dinner.’

→b’. *Mō tabe-**ta** koto o shitteiru.*

‘I know that I have already had dinner.’

## c. (Reminiscence)

*18, 9 no koro wa 3-ri wa oyoge-ta.* (Example (28b))

‘I used to be able to swim even 12 km when I was 18 or 19 years old.’

→c’. *18, 9 no koro 3-ri oyoge-**ta** koto o shitteiru.*

‘I know that I used to be able to swim even 12 km at the age of 18 or 19 years old.’

## (31) (B) Special confirmation (special connotations)

## a. (Counterfactual supposition)

“*Mō sukoshi osokattara, tasukara-nakatta.*” (Example (25))

‘If it had been a little late, he would not have survived.’

→a’. *Mō sukoshi osokattara, tasukara-nakatta koto o shitteiru.*

‘I know that if it had been a little late, he would not have survived.’

## b. (Regret/review)

*Asoko wa kai **datta**.* (Example (26))

‘I should have bought some then.’

→b’. *Asoko ga kai **datta** koto o shitteiru.*

‘I know that I should have bought some then.’

Examples (30a), (30b), (30c), (31a) and (31b) have *-ta* form at the end of sentences. First, examples (30a), (30b) and (30c) are declarative sentences because they represent simple statements in a formal or definite way. As shown in (30a’), (30b’) and (30c’), all sentences remain natural when the discriminator phrase is attached. This result shows that these *-ta* express the meaning ‘past’ or ‘perfect’ as the propositional part. At the same time, the *-ta* form at the end of the



As shown in the above figures, both the general confirmation usage and the special confirmation usage of *-ta* can be shown by the same tree diagram. That is, the proposition-oriented modality of *-ta* is the same structure, whether the connotation is present or absent.

### 3-4. Usages expressing situation-oriented modality

The *-ta* form has a usage directly expressing the utterer's emotion such as happiness or perplexity caused by the present not past situation. This section examines situation-oriented modality (affective modality), particularly the 'emotive modality' usage of *-ta*, arguing that this particular usage of *-ta*, firstly, cannot express 'confirmation', and that this usage, secondly, does not express listener-oriented modality intentionally conveying the utterer's attitude to the listener. The following three usages of *-ta* expressing emotive modality are discussed in turn: (1) 'feelings produced by certain situations' usage (including; 'finding/realising' usage); and (2) 'remembrance' usage. These arguments have not been made before from the viewpoint of modality. Finally, this section shows the structure of the 'emotive modality' usage with tree diagrams.

#### *'Feelings produced by certain situations' usage*

One of the usages of the *-ta* form is in expression of the utterer's emotion caused directly by the stimulation of a certain situation in which the utterer sees or hears something. This section calls this usage 'feelings produced by certain situations' usage of *-ta*.<sup>20</sup> Yoshida (1971: 235) regards it as a usage 'expressing the state of the utterer's mind', giving the examples, *yokatta* 'it's good' or 'I am relieved', *komatta* 'I have a problem', *yowatta* 'I am perplexed' or 'I am at a loss' and *maitta* 'I am stumped'. Tanaka (1969: 151) considers this *-ta* usage as 'emphasis and exclamation', using the following examples:

---

<sup>20</sup> This is called *shinjō/eitan* 心情/詠嘆 in Japanese (Yoshida 1971).

- (32) a. *Korya, odoroi-ta.* (Tanaka 1969: 151)  
 ‘Oh, what a surprise this is!’  
 b. *Mā akire-ta-wa.* (Tanaka 1969: 151)  
 ‘No! Words fail me!’

The utterer’s emotion is directly expressed by the *-ta* form in both (32a) and (32b). As Tanaka states, this usage can also be called the ‘exclamation usage’ of *-ta*, because of the direct expression of feeling.

There are two issues to consider here in the ‘feeling’ usage of *-ta* : (1) absence of confirmation’ and (2) absence of listener-oriented modality. The ‘feelings’ usage, firstly, does not express ‘confirmation’. ‘Confirmation’ is related to judgement of truth or falsehood as a subcategory of recognition or epistemic modality, but the ‘feeling’ usage expressing emotive modality does not fit this category. In the case of (32a) and (32b), both sentences cannot be verified as to whether these feelings in themselves are true or false. Moreover, in general, ‘confirmation’ is used on the premise that the utterer has something to confirm, but there is nothing to confirm in this usage.

This usage semantically expresses ‘the occurrence of new feelings’. The utterer’s feeling is expressed as soon as the utterer comes in contact with (sees or hears) a certain situation which can be regarded as the present situation. The utterer apprehends what the present situation is. This temporality cannot be claimed to imply ‘past’ and it is unnatural to regard as ‘perfect’. It is reasonable to regard it as ‘present’. This is examined as follows by use of the discriminator:

- (33) (Feelings produced by certain situations)  
 a. *Korya, odoroi-ta.* ‘Oh, what a surprise this is!’ (Example (38a) again)  
 → b. \* *Korya (kore wa) odoroi-ta koto o shitteiru.*  
 → c. ? *Odoroi-ta koto o shitteiru.* (*Korya* →  $\phi$ )  
 ‘I know that I was surprised.’

Sentence (33b) is grammatically incorrect. *Korya (=kore wa)* means *kono jitai ni wa* ‘I am talking about this situation’. Sentence (33c) is grammatically correct, but in this context, it is not acceptable because it does not express surprise at the present. Hence, the *-ta* cannot be regarded as the propositional part. In other words, the *-ta* should be regarded as the modality part of the sentence.

Consequently, it can be said that in the ‘feeling’ usage, the *-ta* form expresses emotive modality, while it does not express the propositional meanings ‘past’ or ‘perfect’. This emotive modality is expressed with the apprehension of the present situation.

‘Feeling’ usage can be used without a listener. It does not intentionally show the utterer’s attitude to the listener, but is instead a type of exclamatory expression. So it can be regarded as emotional modality, which is a different category from listener-oriented modality.

The following idiomatic forms can also be regarded as ‘feeling’ usage. The *-ta* in examples (34) and (35) below expresses ‘exclamation’ using *shimeta!* ‘I’ve got it!’ or ‘That’s it!’ and *shimatta!* ‘Oh shit!’ or ‘Oh, no!’, respectively.<sup>21</sup>

(34) *Techō o mekutta.*

“***Shimatta!***”

*to omowa zu koe o age-ta no wa kinō no yūshoku o issho-ni to [Taniguchi to] yakusoku-shi-te-atta-noda. Sore mo Junko no hō kara sasotta-node-arū. Sore o kirei sappari wasure-te-i-ta.* (Akagawa: 348)

‘Junko checked her appointment book.

“Oh, no!”

She cried aloud because she realised that she had made an appointment to have dinner [with Taniguchi] yesterday. Moreover, it was Junko who had talked to him about it. She had completely forgotten it.’

a. ***Shimatta!*** ‘Oh, no!’

→ a’ \* *Shimatta koto o shitteiru.*

(This is impossible to translate but literally ‘I know that “oh no!” ’)

(35) “*Ichi-man nante tōtei dase-mase-n-yo.*”

*Watashi ga yū to, Sai ga assarito ōjita.*

“*Sore nara, kono hanashi wa kowareru-na.*”

*Watashi wa **shimeta** to omotta. Sai no kuchō ga ikanimo bazāru no oyaji-tachi to onaji yōna kajō-na sarigenasa ni yoso’oware-te-i-ta-kara-da. Sai mo kakehiki o shiyō to shi-te-iru.* (Sawaki: 950)

‘“I can’t pay 10,000 dollars. That’s big money!” said I. Mr Sai responded lightly.

“If so, this boxing match will end in failure.”

I thought ‘Good! I’ve got it!’ His tone sounded as if he was pretending to talk very casually, in a similar way to sellers at a market. I had realised that he was trying to haggle with me about the price.’

a. ***Shimeta.*** ‘Good! I’ve got it!’

<sup>21</sup> Suzuki (1976: 92) mentions these ‘*shimeta!* and *shimatta!*’ usages but he provides no explanation.

→ a' \* *Shimeta koto o shitteiru.*  
 (Literally, I know that “good! I’ve got it!”)

These phrases are idiomatic so they do not express the normal lexical meanings of the verbs, *shimaru* ‘close or shut’ (intransitive verb), and *shimeru* ‘close/shut or take/hold’ (transitive verb). Sentences (34a’) and (35a’) are grammatically incorrect and do not make sense, so it is impossible to translate them into natural English.

The *-ta* has the usage of *kizuki* ‘finding/realising’ something. This usage can be included by the usage of ‘feelings by certain situations’. Previous studies have pointed out this function (Mikami 1953; Teramura 1971; Matsuda 1998), but none of them has analysed this usage from the viewpoint of proposition and modality. It is important to clarify that the usage expresses the ‘finding/realising’ of something in the present situation as modality. The ‘finding’ usage of *-ta* is often used in everyday life. In this usage, emotion is produced when the utterer has found something that s/he has been looking for. For instance,

(36) *Mihara wa tsugitsugito (jōkyaku-meibo o) shinchōni mekutta. Sarani 5-mai-me gurai no atari de, kare wa omowazu, sakebi-goe o ageru tokoro datta.*

“*Atta!*”

—Yasuda Taturō. *Kikai-kōgu-shō. 36 sai Tokyo-to...*— (Mastumoto: 261)

‘Mihara (a detective) checked the names carefully one after another in the boarding passenger list. Around the fifth page in the list, he almost shouted unexpectedly.

“Oh! I’ve got it!”

—Yasuda Taturō. *Machine & tool dealer. Age 36. Tokyo-to ...*—’

a. *Atta!* ‘Oh! I’ve got it!’

→ a' # *Atta koto o shitteiru.* ‘I know that it was.’

Three points can be noted in the ‘finding’ seen in the above example (30). The first is that it involves a background to the utterance, which is the utterer’s expectation. Mikami’s ‘presence of expectation’ (1953: 224) and Teramura’s ‘realization of the utterer’s (past) expectation’ (1971: 272) are equivalent to this ‘finding’ category.<sup>22</sup> They both focus on ‘feelings’, and this section also agrees

<sup>22</sup> Teramura (1972: 272-273) expresses ‘finding/realising’ usage in terms of *kako no kitai no jitsugen* 過去

that this usage of *-ta* is a ‘realisation of the utterer’s expectation’. This expression has the implication that the utterer has been trying to find something before s/he utters. The expression involves a retroactive situation which has prompted the utterer’s expectation. Therefore, it can be said that the ‘finding/realising’ usage of *-ta* implies as its background a retroactive situation producing the utterer’s expectation.<sup>23</sup>

The second point is that this expression refers to the fact that the present situation agrees with the expectation. The expression *Atta!* ‘I have found it out!’ consists of {*aru* ‘there is or to exist’ + *-ta*}. Obviously, the form *-ta* does not have the core meaning ‘past’ in this usage. Its focus is precisely the present situation, where the utterer has found what s/he has been looking for. The ‘finding’ in the present situation is prominent in this usage, where the utterer apprehends that the present situation agrees with her/his expectation. This can be clarified by the use of the discriminator as shown in (36a’). Sentence (36a) does not give the meaning of ‘past’, but sentence (36a’) does.

The third point is that this usage expresses the utterer’s emotion evoked by finding what the utterer has been looking for, and the two actions, ‘finding/realising’ and ‘expressing’, are almost simultaneous. To be precise, the above expression with *-ta* is made immediately after the finding/realising. The temporal relationship between them can be described as follows: ‘finding’ ≙ ‘expressing’. The virtual simultaneity can be said to show that it is an exclamation. The simultaneity implies that the utterer’s emotion emerges in this usage. In the above example (30), the utterer’s feeling of happiness appears when s/he has found what s/he has been looking for, because the utterer’s expectation is realised.

The above examination leads to the conclusion that the ‘finding/realising’ usage of *-ta* is an expression of the present feeling evoked by finding what the utterer has been looking for. The feeling is produced when the utterer’s expectation has been realised, and it is expressed as emotive modality in the *-ta* sentence. Also, it can be said that the core meanings ‘past’ and ‘perfect’ are present only retroactively in this usage.

---

の期待の実現 ‘realisation of what the utterer expected in the past’, giving the following examples: *Basu ga ki-ta*. ‘Here comes the bus’, or ‘I realise the bus is coming.’ and *Koko ni kittle ga atta*. ‘Here is the stamp!’

<sup>23</sup> Matsuda (1998) states that the ‘finding’ usage of *-ta* have the function of retroacting to the past.

To support this, let us consider the case without the *-ta* form.

(37) *Aru* ‘there is something’ (← *Atta* ‘I have just found it.’)

As can be seen in (37), *aru* ‘there is’ or ‘to exist’ does not have a retroactive background ‘expectation’. The sentence is very general with assertive modality. So the sentence expresses no special emotion such as happiness. Hence, the *-ta* form expressing emotive modality in the ‘finding/realising’ usage is an important morpheme showing that the present situation agrees with the utterer’s expectation preserved in the utterer’s memory.

### **‘Remembrance’ usage of *-ta***

The *-ta* form also a usage in which something is recollected. Following the literature (Mikami 1953; Tanaka 1969; Yoshida 1971; Teramura 1971), this section calls this usage ‘remembrance’ usage,<sup>24</sup> as in

(38) *Aa, sōda. Kyō wa kodomo no tanjōbi datta.* (Example (20-6) again. Tanaka 1979: 153)  
‘Oh! It is my child’s birthday today!’

Teramura (1971: 269) defines this usage as that employed when “the utterer has just remembered her/his knowledge which s/he had forgotten until now”. Three different viewpoints from previous studies can be shown here: (1) background; (2) core meaning; (3) emotion.

Firstly, the ‘remembrance’ usage involves a background, which is that the utterer had forgotten what s/he should have remembered. In example (32) the utterer recognises that s/he should keep her/his child’s birthday in mind, but s/he has forgotten it until now. Suddenly s/he is reminded of it and the words are blurted out. The *-ta* form thus involves a background.

Secondly, the ‘remembrance’ usage does not express the core meaning of *-ta* ‘past’ and ‘perfect’. This is proved by the evidence that this usage is used even to express a future event.

---

<sup>24</sup> ‘Remembrance’ corresponds to *sōki* 想起 in Japanese.

- (39) a. *Ashita wa musume no tanjō-bi datta!*  
 ‘Oh! Tomorrow is my daughter’s birthday!’  
 → a’ # *ashita ga musume no tanjō-bi datta koto o shitteiru.*  
 ‘I know that tomorrow was my daughter’s birthday.’

In example (39), the *-ta* form does not express the meanings of *-ta* ‘past’ and ‘perfect’ because the word *ashita* ‘tomorrow’ showing the future is used. In (39a’), the reason for the ‘#’ is that sentence (39) shows the meaning of *-ta* ‘past’ in spite of the fact that it is a future event. Thus, in sentence (39a), the core meaning of *-ta* is absent. On the contrary, this usage shows that the utterer has just remembered the birthday in the ‘present’. The information of the birthday is in her/his memory. This expression shows that the utterer has found that the information in her/his memory agrees with the present situation, namely it is a confirmation of the present situation. This confirmation of the present situation is a characteristic aspect of situation-oriented modality of *-ta*, which has not been explained in the literature.

Thirdly, the ‘remembrance’ usage shows emotion, which is expressed through two psychological processes ‘forgetfulness’ and ‘remembrance’. Remembering what the utterer should bear in mind is followed by some emotion. For example, ‘I am happy to remember it now. I can buy a present for my daughter’, or ‘Oh no! I remembered it too late. I cannot go home to celebrate my daughter’s birthday because I am in Hokkaidō on business.’ So this usage is close to an exclamatory expression.

In addition, whether the usage of *-ta* is ‘remembrance’ usage can be verified by adding the phrase *Wasurete-i-ta-keredo, ima omoidashi-ta* ‘having forgotten it, I have just remembered it’ because there are two psychological processes ‘forgetfulness’ and ‘remembrance’.

- (40) *Aa, sōda. Kyō wa kodomo no tanjōbi datta. Wasurete-ita-keredo, ima omoidashi-ta.* (Example (32) again.)  
 ‘Oh! It is my child’s birthday today! Having forgotten it, I have just remembered it.’

Finally, as examined above, in emotive modality usages of *-ta*, the *-ta*



usages, called in this study: ‘urge to action’ usage and ‘manifestation of volitional acceptance’ usage.<sup>25</sup> Tanaka (1969: 151, 153), Yoshida (1971: 240-243) and Teramura (1971: 272) discuss the first usage while Yoshida (1971: 240) and Kindaichi (1976: 36) demonstrate the second. This is a first attempt to place these usages in the category of modality as listener-oriented modality. This subsection will analyse these two usages, verifying that they express no core meaning of *-ta* but do express listener-oriented modality. In the final part of this section, tree diagrams of these usages are shown.

### **‘Urge to action’ usage of *-ta***

The ‘urge to action’ usage of *-ta* is an expression to urge the listener to take action, and thereby the utterer’s attitude is projected towards the listener. As Yoshida (1971: 240) points out, in general the expression is often repeated twice though non-repetition is acceptable. A few examples of this usage are shown below.

- (41) *Sā, doi-ta, doi-ta. Shōgun-sama no otōri-dai.* (Tanaka 1969: 153)  
 ‘Come on! Get out of the way. Get out of the way. The shogun is coming!’
- (42) *Sā, katta katta.* (Teramura 1971: 272)  
 ‘Come on! Buy it, buy it.’

In example (41), the utterer tells the people to get out of the way for the *shōgun* ‘general’ by the use of *doi-ta* ‘Get out of the way’, while in example (42), a street vendor strongly recommends the listener to buy something by the use of *katta* ‘Buy it’. This usage can also be seen in everyday conversation, so the following example taken from a novel is more familiar:

- (43) *Takushī ga —Yukiji. Tsūyō-mon— to yū kido no mae ni tomatte-ite, mise no naka kara, ano okami ga detekuru tokoro datta.*  
 “**Matta!**”  
*Koe o kake-te Taniguchi ga tobidashi-te iku-to okami ga himei o age-sō-ni-naru.* (Akagawa: 388)  
 ‘There was a taxi in front of the wicket gate, “the side entrance of Yukiji”’.  
 The hostess was about to come out.  
 “**Wait!**”

---

<sup>25</sup> ‘Urge to action’ usage and ‘manifestation of volitional acceptance’ usage can be translated by *kōdōsaisoku* 行動催促 and *ukeire-hyōmei* 受入れ表明 in Japanese.

Taniguchi (a plain-clothes police officer) called out and rushed out. She almost screamed.'

The term 'urgent to action' needs to be justified because other scholars use different terms. According to the Japanese dictionary *Kōjien* (1998), this *-ta* is used "to urge the realisation of a certain action" while the *Shōgakukan* dictionary edited by Hayashi (1985) calls it "emphasis and light command". Tanaka (1969: 153), Yoshida (1971: 240) and Suzuki (1976: 91) call the usage 'command'. Teramura (1971: 272) also regards it as 'request or command'. This study argues for the descriptive term 'urge to action' as more appropriate because 'command' (even 'demand') sounds too strong.

This usage is characteristically used as rough language, limited to men's spoken language, as Yoshida (1971: 240) points out. It is rarely used by women towards children (though I have heard a shopgirl using it at a fish shop).<sup>26</sup> This study will add three additional characteristics: (1) no core meaning (2) the listener as the 'agent' to the action in semantics and (3) listener-oriented modality, which is different from both proposition-oriented modality and situation-oriented modality.

Firstly, the 'urge to action' expression has no lexical meaning of 'past' and 'perfect'. Examples (41), (42) and (43) above mean that the listener should 'get out of the way', s/he should 'buy it' and the hostess should 'wait', respectively. The listener's taking such actions will be welcomed by the utterer. The speaker asks the listener to take an immediate future action after the utterer's remark. This cannot be interpreted as a past action because the action has not yet been made. Consequently, the *-ta* does not express the core meanings 'past' and 'perfect'. This implies that the *-ta* form is excluded from the propositional part. This can be confirmed through a test using the discriminator, as follows:

(44) a. *Sā, katta katta*. 'Come on! Buy it, buy it.' (Example (45) again)  
 →a'. # *katta koto o shitteiru*. (*Sā*→ $\emptyset$ )

<sup>26</sup> Interestingly, Yoshida (1971: 242-243) demonstrates six command forms of 'wait': (1) *mate* 'wait!' (imperative form), (2) *machi, omachi* (adverbial form: women use this), (3) *matte* (adverbial form + *te*), (4) *matta* (adverbial form + *ta*) this section discusses, (5) *motto matō* (volitional form: persuasion/advice can be thought to be is a sort of command) and (6) *mā, matsusa* (conclusive form: persuasion/advice can also be thought to be is a sort of command).

‘I (or s/he) know that you (have) bought it.’  
 →a”. *Kau koto o shitteiru. (-ta →ϕ)*  
 ‘I (or s/he) know that you are going to buy it.’

As shown in (44a’), the *-ta* is not appropriate, because the *-ta* expresses ‘past’ in (44a’) in spite of the future action of ‘buying’. Thus, this implies that the *-ta* in (44a) serves as a modal expressing modality.

Secondly, in this expression the agent of the action is the listener, not the speaker or someone else. The agent is definitely the listener even though the agent is not explicitly shown. This point is similar to ‘demand’ expressions using imperative forms such as *Doke!* ‘Get out of the way’, *Kae!* ‘Buy it’ and *Mate!* ‘Wait!’ Thus the listener-agent is a prominent feature in this usage.

Thirdly, another salient characteristic is that the usage expresses listener-oriented modality. The proposition-oriented modality of *-ta* expresses affirmative ‘confirmation’ of the proposition and it is used without the premise that there is a listener. The emotive modality of *-ta* expresses the utterer’s emotion, regardless of whether a listener is absent or present. In contrast, the ‘urge to action’ usage always needs a listener because the utterer urges the listener to do something. The utterer’s attitude is projected toward the listener. The tone of ‘urge to action’ toward the listener is not very strong compared with a demand expression such as *kae* ‘Buy it!’, but it reaches the listener directly.

On reflection, the phenomenon of *-ta* with three types of modality usages, proposition-oriented, situation-oriented (emotive) and listener-oriented modality, is not isolated, because the epistemic modal *darō* has similar usages. The *darō* form has these three usages: (1) ‘conjecture’ usage expressing ‘proposition-oriented modality’, (2) ‘request of confirmation’ expressing ‘listener-oriented modality’, and (3) ‘exclamation’ usage (including the ‘criticism/reproach’ usage) expressing ‘emotive modality’ (situation-oriented modality).<sup>27</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup> (1) ‘Conjecture’ (proposition-oriented modality): *Kare wa sono mōshide o ukeru darō* (↘). ‘He will take the proposal.’ (2) ‘Request of confirmation’ (listener-oriented modality): *Anata wa sankā suru darō* (↗). ‘You are going to join, aren’t you?’ (3) ‘Exclamation’ (situation-oriented modality): *Kore wa nante subarashii e darō*. ‘What a beautiful picture this is!’ ‘Criticism/reproach’ *Mada-datte? Yaru tte itta darō!* (Stress on *darō*) ‘Not yet? You told me you were going to do it, didn’t you?’ (The above examples are mine).

***‘Manifestation of volitional acceptance’ usage of -ta***

The *-ta* form is used to express ‘manifestation of volitional acceptance’. This usage strongly shows the utterer’s volition towards the listener in response to the listener’s request.

- (45) a. *Yoshi, katta!* (Kindaichi 1976: 36 and Yoshida 1971: 241)  
 ‘Okay, I’ll buy it!’  
 b. (a customer) *5000 yen dewa?*  
 (The vendor) *Yoshi, utta!*  
 “How about 5000 yen?”  
 “Okay, it is sold!”

This study calls this usage ‘manifestation of volitional acceptance’, not ‘decision’. Although Kindaichi (1976: 36) and Yoshida (1971: 240) use the term ‘the speaker’s decision’, the usage is used when s/he accepts the listener’s request. It is not used when the utterer does not accept the listener’s request. With a negative decision the usage is grammatically incorrect as shown below.

- (46) a. *\*Yoshi, kawa-nakatta!*  
 ‘Okay, I won’t buy it!’  
 b. *\*Yoshi, ura-nakatta.*  
 ‘I see. I won’t sell it.’

Since the *-ta* form is used only when the utterer accepts the listener’s request, the descriptive terminology ‘manifestation of volitional acceptance’ is more precise.

This expression is used by men but not by women, as with the ‘urge to action’ usage of *-ta*. This subsection discusses three issues: (1) whether the core meaning of *-ta* is present or absent (2) whether the ‘agent’ of the action is the speaker or the listener and (3) whether it is listener- oriented modality or not.

First, as can be shown in Examples (45a) and (45b), the speaker (a man) manifests his volitional acceptance in answer to the listener’s request, but these actions (buying and selling) have not yet been realised because they are future actions. It is true that the utterer is about to buy/sell something, but it is only his willingness to accept the listener’s request that is explicitly shown. The lexical meanings ‘past’ and ‘perfect’ are not shown. Therefore, it is obvious that the ‘urge to action’ usage of *-ta* expresses no core meanings. This approach is different from

those of Kindaichi (1976) and Yoshida (1971). Kindaichi (1976: 36) states about *Yoshi, katta!* ‘Okay, I’ll buy it!’ that the speaker’s decision to buy it, which is made immediately before, is expressed as modality in the expression. As Kindaichi says, it might be possible to say psychologically that the speaker has finished deciding to buy it, but it is not reasonable to say that this usage expresses the core meaning ‘present perfect’. Yoshida (1971: 240) also explains that the speaker talks about the unrealised action of ‘buying’ as a definite realisable action, but this explanation is not convincing because the listener obviously has not yet bought/sold it.

The *-ta* form in the usage is not included in the propositional part. The discriminator for proposition below proves this.

- (47) a. *Yoshi, katta!* (Example (45a) again)  
 →a’. # (*Yoshi*) *katta koto o shitteiru.*  
 ‘I know that I (have) bought it.’  
 →a’’. *Kau koto o shitteiru.* (*Yoshi and -ta* → $\phi$ )  
 ‘I know that I am going to buy it.’

As shown in example (47), the *-ta* is not the propositional part and does not show the meaning ‘past’. Moreover, it can be seen that the *-ta* works as a modal expressing modality.


Second, the agent of action is the speaker. This is opposite from the ‘urge to action’ usage of *-ta*. It is clear that it is the speaker who manifests the volitional acceptance.

Third, there must be both a speaker and a listener with this usage. As this expression is projected towards the listener, it can be said that the ‘manifestation of volitional acceptance’ usage expresses listener-oriented modality.<sup>28</sup>


In summary, the above examination leads to the conclusion that in the usages expressing listener-oriented modality of *-ta*, the *-ta* does not express its core meaning and is not the propositional part, but serves only as a modal expressing modality. The structure of *-ta* expressing listener-oriented modality is figured by the use of tree diagrams, as follows:

---

<sup>28</sup> Yoshida (1971: 241) calls this usage *kinchōbun* 緊張文. His naming is persuasive because both ‘urge to action’ and ‘manifestation of volitional decision’ usages produce strained feelings in the mind of the speaker.



**Fig 3-5. ‘Urge to action’ usage of *-ta* in listener-oriented modality**



**Fig 3-6. ‘Manifestation of volitional acceptance’ usage of *-ta***

In both Figures 3-5 and 3-6, the propositional part is *kau* ‘buy’. The propositions must remove *Sā* ‘Come on!’, *Yoshi* ‘Okay!’ and *-ta* because they belong to the modal part.

### 3-7. Conclusion

It is essential to distinguish the various usages of *-ta* in elucidating the *-ta* form from the viewpoints of proposition and modality because the *-ta* form appears at the border between proposition and modality. The new classification of *-ta* proposed in this chapter contributes to a more precise understanding of the complexity of *-ta*.

The classification of the usage of *-ta* in this chapter can be summarised as follows. From the viewpoint of modality, the function of *-ta* appearing at the end of a sentence can be divided into three categories: proposition-oriented modality,

situation-oriented modality (emotive) and listener-oriented modality. In the proposition-oriented modality of *-ta*, ‘confirmation’ modality is expressed, which can be categorised into two categories, ‘general confirmation’ with no special connotation and ‘special confirmation’ with a special connotation. The former expresses ‘report’ modality while the latter expresses ‘judgement’ modality. The report modality is typically expressed in both declarative sentences (including reminiscence) and *jikkyō-chūkei* ‘broadcasting on the spot’, while the judgement modality appears in the ‘counterfactual supposition’ and ‘regret/review’ usages of *-ta*. In the case of emotive modality, ‘feelings produced by certain situations’ (including ‘findings/realising’) and ‘remembrance’ usage of *-ta* are included in the category of situation-oriented modality. In the categories of listener-oriented modality, ‘urge to action’ and ‘manifestation of volitional acceptance’ usages are included. As can be seen, these classifications also indicate through the examination of *-ta* that the relationship between a certain morpheme and a certain modality does not always have a simple one-to-one correspondence.

This chapter has also shown the relationship between the core meaning of temporality, and the modality of *-ta*. In proposition-oriented modality, *-ta* expresses both proposition with the meaning of *-ta* ‘past or perfect’, and the modality of ‘confirmation’. In contrast, in the other *-ta* usages expressing modality, the core meaning of *-ta* is absent. This has been confirmed in the cases of both emotive and listener-oriented modalities. These findings appear to provide a solution to determining the border between proposition and modality. The *-ta* form has been regarded as one of the indices to determine whether a part belongs to the proposition part of a sentence (Nitta 1991: 54; Masuoka 1991: 35-36). These studies propose that the part followed by the form *-ta* belongs to the propositional part, but understanding of the *-ta* form in itself has remained vague in terms of determining whether it belongs to the propositional or the modality part. This study has solved this problem. In addition, these findings can be applied to several auxiliary phrases with *-ta* such as *kamoshirenakatta* and *yōdatta* at the end of a sentence. That is, these examples can be explicated by the recognition of the two functions, expressing the core meanings ‘past’ and ‘perfect’, as the propositional part and expressing ‘confirmation’ modality by dint of the

sentence-ending way at the end of a sentence, as in

[[*~kamosirenakatta*] *ta*] and [[*~yōdatta*] *ta*].

The next chapter will investigate the epistemic modal *nodarō* in comparison with *darō*, focusing on the difference between the two.

**Chapter 4**

<b>A Study of <i>Nodarō</i> in Comparison with <i>Darō</i> .....</b>	<b>133</b>
4-1. Introduction.....	133
4-2. Previous reviews on <i>nodarō</i> .....	137
4-3. Internal structure of the <i>nodarō</i> sentence .....	142
4-3-1. Front-conjecture type of <i>nodarō</i> .....	143
4-3-2. Focus-conjecture type of <i>nodarō</i> .....	144
(1) Complementary constituents .....	144
(2) Interrogatives.....	145
(3) Adverbial clauses.....	146
(4) Causal clauses <i>kara/node</i> having two interpretations.....	146
4-3-3. <i>Darō</i> with only the front-conjecture type.....	148
4-3-4. Topicalisation in focus-conjecture type of <i>nodarō</i> .....	151
4-4. Relationships between judgements and situations in the <i>nodarō</i> sentence .	
.....	154
4-4-1. Identifying the objective core of the judgement from the context	155
(1) Preceding sentence .....	155
(2) Following sentence.....	156
(3) Same sentence .....	157
4-4-2. <i>Darō</i> not requiring a situation related to the judgement.....	157
4-4-3. Seven representative relationships .....	159
(1) Causes why the specific situations have occurred.....	160
(2) Reasons why the specific situations have arisen .....	160
(3) Implication hidden behind the specific situations .....	161
(4) Background behind the specific situations.....	162
(5) Purpose/Intention of the specific situations.....	163
(6) Details of the specific situations.....	164
(7) Natural consequence resulting from the specific situations .....	165
4-5. <i>Nodarō</i> showing the interpretation of a situation for identification .....	167
4-5-1. <i>Nodarō</i> showing the interpretation of a situation through inference..	
.....	167
4-5-2. <i>Darō</i> showing a soft claim that the proposition is true .....	171

4-6. Differences between <i>darō</i> and <i>nodarō</i> through phrase-additions and substitutions .....	173
4-6-1. Additional phrases to distinguish between the two modals.....	173
4-6-2. Examinations into the substitution of <i>darō</i> for <i>nodarō</i> .....	176
(1) General cases in which <i>darō</i> cannot be substituted for <i>nodarō</i> ...	176
(a) The focus-conjecture usage of <i>nodarō</i> .....	176
(b) <i>Nodarō</i> used in agreement with interrogatives such as <i>naze</i> ‘why’ .....	177
(c) <i>Nodarō</i> used to interpret the situation appearing in front of the utterer .....	178
(2) Rare cases in which <i>darō</i> can be substituted for <i>nodarō</i> .....	179
(a) Interrogatives appearing immediately before <i>darō/nodarō</i> ... ..	180
(b) ‘ <i>Sore wa sō darō/na-nodarō</i> ’: Approval/sympathy to what is said.....	182
(c) ‘ <i>Dokoni aru darō/nodarō</i> ’ (nowhere) for a rhetorical question .....	182
(d) Rare cases in which the <i>nodarō/darō</i> sentence can be regarded as the interpretation of a certain situation .....	183
4-7. Conclusion .....	184

### List of Table

Table 4-1. Ratio of six modals appearing in the novels: <i>darō</i> , <i>nodarō</i> , <i>kamoshirenai</i> , <i>nokamoshirenai</i> , <i>nichigainai</i> and <i>nonichigainai</i> .....	135
---	-----

# Chapter 4

## A Study of *Nodarō* in Comparison with *Darō*

### 4-1. Introduction

This chapter investigates the epistemic modal *nodarō*, particularly the characteristics of it in comparison with *darō*. Both *nodarō* and *darō* are modals expressing conjecture (Kuramochi 1980; Okuda 1984). There are some differences in meaning and usage between the two modals depending on the presence or absence of the *no* morpheme (Kuramochi 1980; Okuda 1984; Nakahata 1998).

Difference between *darō* and *nodarō* can be shown by making use of the modal-substitution method. In some cases, *nodarō* is suitable but *darō* is not, and vice versa. Consider the following example in which *nodarō* is appropriate but *darō* is not. The situation of (1) is a scene in which the utterer has woken up in bed to hear the sound of rain outside.

- (1) a. *Soto wa ame ga futte-iru-nodarō.*  
       ‘It must be raining outside.’  
       b. \**Soto wa Ame ga futte-iru-darō.* (\* *darō*)  
       ‘It must be raining outside.’<sup>1</sup>

*Nodarō* is used when the utterer has a clue to be able to guess what the situation is; s/he can hear the sound of falling rain although s/he does not directly look out at it. In this case, *darō* is not used. Another example (2) below has an interrogative *naze* ‘why’. Suga’s teacher utters the interrogative sentence (2). Suga has quit his

---

<sup>1</sup> The translations after the examples in this chapter are literal rather than free, prioritising the conveyance of the faithful meaning. Some may be awkward, because it is very difficult precisely to express the delicate nuances related to the difference between *nodarō* and *darō* in translation.

senior-high-school six months before he would graduate.

- (2) a. *Naze Suga-kun wa gakkō o yame-te-shimatta-nodarō.*  
 ‘I am wondering why Mr Suga left school.’  
 b. \* *Naze Suga-kun wa gakkō o yame-te-shimatta-darō.* (\* *darō*)

In (2a) the utterer is thinking of the reason why Mr Suga left school without completing the course. That Mr Suga has already quit school is regarded as a fact. In this *nodarō* sentence, the interrogative *naze* ‘why’ is uttered on the premise that the affair is a fact. In this case *nodarō* is used but *darō* is not possible. The above examples indicate that the *darō* usage has a certain restriction.

In contrast, there are opposite cases where *darō* is acceptable but *nodarō* is not. Example (3) is a scene where a disciple is boiling his master’s nose to shorten it because his master the Naigu is distressed by his long nose.

- (3) *Deshi no sō ga itta.*  
 —*Mō udatta jibun de gozarō.*  
*Naigu wa kushōshi-ta. Kore dake kii-ta no de wa, dare mo hana no hanashi to wa ki ga tsuka-nai-darō-to omotta-kara -dearu.* (\* *nodarō*) (Akutagawa: 32)  
 ‘After a while, the disciple said,  
 “It must be boiled now, I think.”  
 The Naigu smiled a forced smile. This was because he thought that if any one heard only that, he would never imagine that it was a remark about a nose.’ (Glenn W Shaw: 21)<sup>2</sup>

Hearing these words, the master thought that nobody would recognise that the disciple was talking about his master’s nose. In this case *darō* is used. If *nodarō* is substituted for *darō*, the meaning of this sentence becomes different. In the *nodarō* sentence, the master must have a definite clue that nobody recognises that his master’s nose is being talked about. In fact, however, a clue for the judgement is not shown, so *nodarō* is not appropriate. Thus, the above examples show that *nodarō* and *darō* produce some differences of meaning. The aim of this chapter is to explore the modal *nodarō* to clarify the world which *nodarō* expresses in comparison with *darō*.

<sup>2</sup> The translation is taken from “Tales grotesque and curious by Akutagawa Ryunosuke”, which is translated by Glenn W Shaw (1<sup>st</sup> edition 1930, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition 1938, p17-27: The *Hokseidō* Press 北星堂書店 Tokyo).

The question of whether modals have the *no* morpheme should not be neglected because they involve some differences, as we see with *darō* and *nodarō*. Although *darō* has been made much of because it is used very often in everyday conversation, *nodarō* does not seem to attract a great deal of attention in the literature. An investigation into frequency in use indicates that *nodarō* is also used frequently. The ratio of *nodarō* in appearance is shown in Table 5-1 below.

**Table 4-1. Ratio of six modals appearing in the novels: *darō*, *nodarō*, *kamoshirenai*, *nokamoshirenai*, *nichigainai* and *nonichigainai***

Modals Novels	<i>darō</i>	<i>nodarō</i>	<i>kamoshi renai</i>	<i>nokamo shirenai</i>	<i>nichigai nai</i>	<i>Nonichig ainai</i>
<i>Ten to sen</i> 1958	33	13	23	5	23	0
<i>Sabu</i> 1963	204	84	57	6	6	1
<i>Hanaoka Seishū no tsuma</i> 1966	29	24	8	6	13	6
<i>Chinmoku</i> 1966	53	22	28	13	29	0
<i>Shiokari tōge</i> 1968	191	61	56	17	18	0
<i>Bun to Fun</i> 1970	19	6	12	4	8	0
<i>Isshun no natsu</i> 1981	216	152	151	93	55	2
<i>Edipusu no koibito</i> 1981	66	61	29	19	57	1
<i>Onna-shachō ni kanpai!</i> 1982	124	26	60	16	21	3
<i>Total</i> 2230	935 (41.9 %)	449 (20.1 %)	424 (19.0 %)	179 (8.0 %)	230 (10.3 %)	13 (0.6 %)
Tensei-jingo (1 year) 2004.4.1-3.31 355 examples	170 (47.9%)	99 (27.9%)	63 (17.7%)	17 (4.9%)	6 (1.7%)	0 (0%)

The forms *deshō* and *nodeshō* are not included in these numbers.

The table gives the number of six modals appearing in nine Japanese novels. The six modals, which express subjectivity, are *darō*, *nodarō*, *kamoshirenai*, *nokamoshirenai*, *nichigainai* and *nonichigainai*. The nine novels are *Ten to Sen* (Points and Lines), *Sabu* (Sabu), *Hanaokaseishū no Tsuma* (Wife of Doctor Hanaokaseishū), *Chinmoku* (Silence) *Shiokari-tōge* (*Shiokari* Pass), *Bun to Fun* (Bun and Fun), *Isshun no natsu* (A Moment of Summer), *Edipusu no koibito* (The Lover of Oedipus) and *Onnashachō ni kanpai* (A Toast to the Young Lady as President of the Firm). The data from these novels indicate the frequency of the

six modals in use. The number in one year's worth of the critical essay *Tenseijingo*<sup>3</sup> from the *Asahi* newspaper is added for reference.

Table 1 shows that among the six modals, *darō* has the highest with 41.9%; the second is *nodarō* with 20.1%, the third *kamoshirenai* with 19.0%, the fourth *nichigainai* with 10.3%, the fifth *nokamoshirenai* with 8.0%, and the lowest is *nonichigainai* with 0.6%. The following three points can be noted from the data. Firstly, the frequency of *nodarō* is greater than that of *kamoshirenai*, and around twice that of *nichigainai*. Secondly, the approximate ratio of *nodarō* to *darō* usage is 1 to 2. Thirdly, among the three modals with the *no* morpheme, *nodarō* has the highest at 20.1% compared with *nokamoshirenai* (8.0 %) and *nonichigainai* (0.6%). In addition, *nodarō* in *tenseijingo* is also the second highest with 27.9%. Thus, *nodarō* can be regarded as having frequent usage. Hence, this chapter focuses on *nodarō* among the epistemic modals having the *no* morpheme.<sup>4</sup>

This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, highlighting some problems such as the unclearness of the relationship between materials of judgement and conclusion of judgement, and of the difference between *nodarō* and *darō*. Section 3 investigates the internal structure of the *nodarō* sentence, demonstrating that *nodarō* has two types of usage: front-conjecture and focus-conjecture. Section 4 explores the relationship between judgements and situations. Since the situation is deeply related to judgement, the relationship between the two factors is closely examined. Section 5 considers the essential functions of both *nodarō* and *darō*, showing the difference in the way of thinking between the two modals. From the practical viewpoint, section 6 proposes the phrases for distinguishing between *nodarō* and *darō*, and examines

<sup>3</sup> According to the *shin-eiwa chū-jiten* dictionary (2002, the Kenkyūsha publisher), *tenseijingo* is translated into 'the words of God and Man'. The meaning of *tenseijingo* seems to imply that the voice of God is shown through the words of people.

<sup>4</sup> This chapter regards *nodarō* as a modal. *Nodarō* does not have the characteristic of a noun clause because *ga-no kaken* 'ga-no interchangeability' (Mikami: 1953: 234) cannot be made. For example,

a. (*Hokkaido ni wa*)*Tanaka-san ga iku-nodarō*. 'I think that Mr Tanaka is going to Hokkaido.'

→ a'. \**Tanaka-san no iku-nodarō*. (\**ga* → *no*)

b. *Gakusei ga ōi-nodakara*,... 'Since many students are here, ...'

→ b'. \**Gakusei no ōi-nodarō kara*,... (\**ga* → *no*)

In examples (a') and (b'), noun-collapse happens because *ga* cannot be replaced by *no*. This indicates that the characteristic of a noun is lost. When *ga-no interchangeability* cannot be made in nominal phrases, Mikami (1953a: 235) called this *meishi-kuzure* 名詞くずれ 'noun-collapse'. *Nodarō* cannot be regarded as a nominaliser behaving as a noun. It is appropriate to regard it as a modal.

whether *nodarō* and *darō* can be substituted for each other. Finally, section 7 concludes the chapter, showing the main points of the differences between *nodarō* and *darō* and the significance of this research.

## 4-2. Previous reviews on *nodarō*

The epistemic modal *nodarō* has been studied by some scholars (Kuramochi 1980; Okuda 1984; Tanomura 1990; and Nakahata 1998). The aim of this section is to review the previous literature from the following three points of view: (1) the relationship between judgement and ground in the *nodarō* sentence, (2) the internal structure of the *nodarō* sentence, and (3) the characteristic differences between *nodarō* and *darō*.

Previous studies, firstly, have found that the *nodarō* sentence presupposes that the judgement is grounded (Kuramochi 1980; Okuda 1984; Nakahata 1998). Kuramochi (1980: 114) states that *nodarō* guesses are based on a matter or an affair which appears as a fact. Okuda (1984: 60) observes that a described fact is the ground for judgement and points out that the fact is faithfully given in the precedent sentence to the *nodarō* sentence. Nakahata (1998: 29 and 40) states that *nodarō* is a conjecture based on *jittai* ‘substance’. Nakahata’s ‘substance’ seems equivalent to Kuramochi’s ‘facts’ and Okuda’s ‘preceding sentences’. Even though their terms are different, the common element in their view is that the ground for conjectural judgement is existent in the context.

In some cases the grounds for judgement are not shown in the preceding sentences and in some cases the ground sentences appear after the *nodarō* sentence, although Okuda expresses the ground in terms of ‘preceding sentences’. Example (4) is followed by the ground sentence:

- (4) *O-matsuri de mo aru-nodarō. Hito ga ōzei dete-iru.*(Kuramochi 1980 : 114)  
 ‘I guess that a festival is going to be held. Many people are coming together.’

In Example (4) a certain situation shown by the part *hito ga ōzei de-te-iru* ‘many people are coming together’ is given as the ground for the judgement. The

judgement is expressed by *omatsuri demo aru nodarō* ‘a festival is going to be held’. The sentence giving the ground appears after the *nodarō* sentence. Thus, the ground for the judgement can be shown in terms of ‘preceding/following sentences’ or ‘contextual circumstances’. The finding of the relationship between ground and judgement can be regarded as important. However, the relationship between the two factors has not yet been elucidated fully.

Secondly, with regard to the internal structure of the *nodarō* sentence, Kuramochi (1980: 117) demonstrates that two types of structure can be seen in the *nodarō* sentence with a cause/reason clause. They produce two different interpretations: the main clause may describe a fact while the subordinate clause is an indefinite judgement, or vice versa. He provides the following example:

- (5) *Ki-taku-nai to itte-ita-kara, kare wa konai-nodarō.* (Kuramochi 1980:117)  
 a. ‘I think that he will not come, because he said he did not want to come.’  
 b. ‘It seems that the reason why he did not come is that he said that he did not want to.’<sup>5</sup>

In (5a) and (5b), we see two interpretations. One is a conjecture about whether or not he is coming. The part *kitakunai to itteita kara* ‘because he said he did not want to come’ is regarded as a fact. The other is a conjecture about the reason why he has not come. The utterer regards the situation where he has not come as a fact, so the object of conjecture is the reason for the fact. Thus, Kuramochi has established the view that the *nodarō* sentence with a subordinate clause for cause/reason can be interpreted into two ways. Following Kuramochi, Nakahata (1998) observes these two structures, pointing out that the structure of *nodarō* is of two types: (1) the conjecture is shown in the part including the predicate, namely *jutsugo-suiryō* ‘conjecture shown in predicate’; and (2) the focus of conjecture is shown in the non-predicate part, *jutsugo-gai-suiryō* ‘conjecture shown in non-predicate’. Nakahata’s observation proves that the second usage is not present in the *darō* sentence. The following examples of the two structures are taken from Nakahata (1998). Examples (6) and (7) shows the case of type(1) and that of type (2), respectively:

<sup>5</sup> In example (5b), the sentence shows that the utterer conjecturally judges what the reason is. Even though sentence (5b) might be unnatural, the translation tries to show the delicate difference between (5a) and (5b).

- (6) Conjecture is shown in the predicate  
*Ichi-do mo sono mae ni kankō-basu ga tomatte-iru-no o mita koto ga nai kara, futsū no kankō kōsu ni wa haitte-inai-nodarō.* (Nakahata 1998: 32)  
 ‘I have never seen the sight-seeing bus stopping in front of it. So I do not think that it is included in the general sight-seeing course.’
- (7) Conjecture is shown in the non-predicate  
*Jissai wakai hito-tachi no denwa no shikata o miru-to, annani naganaga-to nani o hanashite-iru-ndarō to omou ga...* (Nakahata 1998: 31)  
 ‘Observing young people talking on the phone, I wonder what on earth they are talking about at such great length.’

Example (6) shows the usage of ‘conjecture shown in the predicate’. The utterer conjecturally judges that *futsū no kankō kōsu ni wa haitteinai* ‘the place is not included in a general sight-seeing course’. This part appears in front of *nodarō*. In contrast, example (7) shows the usage of ‘conjecture shown in the non-predicate’. The predicate verb is *hanashi-te-iru* ‘(young people are) talking’, which is regarded as a fact by the utterer. The part *nani wo* ‘what (they are talking about)’ is the focus of conjectural judgement, and appears in the non-predicate part.

Thus, in the literature the presence of the two types of *nodarō* is confirmed. However, the latter type of *nodarō*, conjecture shown in the non-predicate, has not yet been examined fully. Where does the focus of conjecture appear in the *nodarō* sentence? What features does the types of *nodarō* have? These questions remain.

Thirdly, the difference between *nodarō* and *darō* remains an unsolved issue. Kuramochi (1980: 114-118) emphasises that *nodarō* is an expression of the utterer’s inferential judgement of cause/reason or of the relation of cause-effect on the basis of a fact or a matter (which s/he regards as a fact), while *darō* expresses probability. If so, *nodarō* would not express probability and *darō* would not express the utterer’s inferential judgement. However, it would seem that the following examples cannot be explained by his view:

- (8) *Nodarō* showing probability  
 (Yanagi suggested Mrs Otō has a sandwich. She says)  
 “*Sandoicchi? Sōne..... Amari onaka wa suite-nai-kedo, sukoshi itadakō-kashira. Kōhī to ne.*”

*Shikashi, iza sandoicchi ga hakobarete-kuru-to, Otō Hisako wa tobitsukuyōni tabehajime, atto yū-ma-ni tairagete-simatta. Osoraku, shibaraku wa nani mo tabete-inakatta-nodarō.* (Akagawa: 413)

‘“Sandwich? Um, yes.... I am not very hungry but I will have a little. With coffee.”

However, as soon as sandwiches were brought, she started to eat them greedily and finished eating them in an instant. Probably, she would have eaten nothing for a while.’

(9) *Darō* showing inferential judgement

(Nobuko, who was president of the Otō company, quit her job and thought as follows)

*Otōsangyō ni shite-mo kubi ni natta wake de wa nai. Mizukara jihyō o dashite-kita-nodakara, taishoku-kin wa tashō deru-darō.* (Akagawa: 738)

‘I was not fired from the job. I voluntarily submitted my resignation, so I should be able to get a little severance payment.’

In example (8), *nodarō* expresses a high probability that she had eaten nothing for a while. This judgement is made on the basis of her appearance of greedy eating. In example (9), the utterer’s inferential judgement is made on the basis of the relation between cause and effect. The utterer has judged that a severance payment will be brought to her because of her voluntary resignation. Thus, Kuramochi’s view is problematic.

Okuda (1984: 60) states that *darō* expresses conjecture while *nodarō* expresses both *suiryō* ‘conjecture’ and *setsumei* ‘explanation’.<sup>6</sup> That *nodarō* is an expression of conjecture is clear and common sense. He regards the characteristic of *nodarō* as also explanation. However, is this view acceptable? It does not seem that *nodarō* has an explanatory function. Explanation indicates that the utterer gives the listener a reason for something on the basis of well-known information/knowledge. In other words, explanation is not made based on uncertain information/knowledge. The content of explanation should be certain for the utterer. In contrast, *nodarō* shows that the utterer’s judgement has not yet been confirmed, and that it is not certain. *Nodarō* expresses uncertain judgement. Thus, it is not reasonable to regard *nodarō* as a modal expressing explanation. For example:

<sup>6</sup> The chapter uses *kaishaku* ‘interpretation’ as the term defining *nodarō* later. *Setsumei* ‘explanation’ is different in meaning from *kaishaku* ‘interpretation’ in that it shows the utterer’s judgement.

- (10) (In the *Kaneko* Boxing gym, boys were doing setting-up exercises.)  
*Chūgakusei kara kōkōsei kurai no osanai kaodachi no shōnen bakari-datta.*  
*Osoraku, amachua-na-nodarō.* (Sawaki: 45)  
 ‘They were all young fresh-faced high-school boys. Probably, they would all be amateurs.’

In example (10), the utterer guesses that the boys are amateurs, seeing boys with faces of high school boys doing setting-up exercises. The utterer does not know whether the boys are actually amateurs. He does not have well-known information as grounds for the judgement. The content of the judgement is not certain for the utterer. If the *nodarō* sentence is expressed to give an explanation, the utterer must give the listener the reason why young boys are doing such a thing (or why they are young and fresh-faced) on the basis of well-known information/knowledge, but this is not given. So in (10) the utterer’s explanation is not shown. What he shows is not an explanation but an interpretation, because he expresses his opinion about what the young faces mean. Hence, Okuda’s view is again problematic.

Nakahata (1998: 33) tries to explain the difference between them more clearly. He regards *nodarō* as ‘a conjecture based on substance’<sup>7</sup> while he considers *darō* as an ideational conjecture. It would seem that this analysis is very valuable for the understanding of *nodarō*. However, a few problems remain in his examination. According to his statement, *darō* expresses ‘conjecture not based on substance’. How then is the following example naturally explicated by his view?

- (11) *Darō* showing conjecture based on substance  
 (Naitō came here late. ‘I’ think that he has no other way but by the train from *Yamate* station to *Shimokitazawa* station)  
*Yokohama to Shibuya de nido mo norikaenaku-te-wa-naranai-noda.*  
*Taimingu ga warukere-ba, suguni, ni sanji-ppun no kurui wa dete-shimau-darō.* (Sawaki: 151)  
 ‘On the way to Shimokitazawa from Yamate, he has to change trains twice, at Yokohama station and at Shibuya station. I think that he will be forced to arrive here 20~30 minutes late if he misses the train.’

In example (11), *darō* can be considered to express conjectural judgement based on substance. According to Nakahata, *darō* expresses ‘an ideational conjecture’,

<sup>7</sup> *Jittai ni sokushi-ta suiryō* 実体に即した推量 can be translated by ‘a conjecture based on substance’.

but this example shows a realistic conjecture with the time-calculation of 20~30 minutes, which is based on fact. The following *darō* example also shows conjecture based on substance:

(12) A non-ideational conjecture

(Naitō says that he usually watches boxing matches. I say)

*“Demo, terebi ja amari chūkeishi-nai-kara, omou yōni mirare-nakatta -darō.”*

*Watashi ga yū to, Naoto ga kegen-sō-na hyōjō o ukabe-ta.*

*“Datte, Kōrakuen ni itte mi-te-ta-kara .”*

*“Kōrakuen-hōru ni!”*

*Igaidatta.* (Sawaki: 66)

‘ “I think that you have not been able to watch boxing matches on the TV because boxing matches are seldom broadcast,” said I.

Naitō gave me a questioning look.

“No. I went to the Kōrakuen-hall to see boxing matches.”

“The Kōrakuen-hall!” I was surprised.’

In examples (12), boxing matches are not always available on the TV. So it is natural and reasonable for ‘I’ to think that Naitō had seldom watched boxing matches on the TV. This conjectural judgement is made based on the actual situation of TV programming. In spite of Nakahata’s efforts to clarify the world of *nodarō*, his view cannot explain these examples.

Therefore, this chapter attempts to solve these issues identified through the review of the literature concerning *nodarō*.

### 4-3. Internal structure of the *nodarō* sentence

This section establishes the syntactic features of *nodarō* in comparison with *darō*. The subject of discussion is two types of conjectural judgement of *nodarō*: (1) conjectural judgement appearing immediately in front of *nodarō* (the front-conjecture type or the predicate-conjecture type), and (2) conjectural judgement appearing at a focused part distant from *nodarō* (the detachedness-conjecture type or the focus-conjecture type). Kuramochi (1980: 117) points out the two types but does not provide an adequate explanation of them. Nakahata (1998: 31) shows the two-type structure of the *nodarō* sentence

with examples. This section builds on the views of both Kuramochi (1980) and Nakahata (1998), by demonstrating, in particular, a new subcategory of the focus-conjecture type. Moreover, it syntactically clarifies that the focus-conjecture type is a characteristic of *nodarō* using topicalisation.

#### 4-3-1. Front-conjecture type of *nodarō*

*Nodarō* has two types of structure from the syntactic viewpoint. Each example is shown below. Consider the following example of the first type:

- (13) The front-conjecture type of *nodarō*  
 (As Nagano said that he wanted to go see a doctor, the boss Wakura says to him)  
*“Nagano-kun, guai ga warui-n-nara, muri o sezu-ni asa kara yasun-demo ii-n-nb hdayo. Kimi wa Hokkaidō ga hajimete-da-kara, aki ga hayakute kaze-demo hiita-n-darō.”*<sup>8</sup> (Miura: 472)  
 ‘Nagano-kun, if you feel out of sorts you can have the rest [of the day-off] from morning. Since you are living in Hokkaidō for the first time, I think that you could have caught a cold because autumn comes earlier here.’

In example (13), the part in front of *nodarō*<sup>9</sup>, which is double underlined<sup>9</sup>, shows the utterer’s conjectural judgement ‘you could have caught a cold’. The wavy underlined part ‘you are living in Hokkaidō for the first time’ is presented in the same sentence. Nevertheless, this part is regarded as a fact or a quasi-fact and is not the object of the utterer’s conjectural judgement. Thus, the utterer’s conjectural judgement is shown only in the predicate part in front of *nodarō*. This type can be called the front-conjecture type (or the predicate-conjecture type). Next, the second type of *nodarō* is shown below:

- (14) The focus-conjecture type of *nodarō*  
 (Naitō’s mother said to him that he should not have a baby, but should keep doing his best in his boxing,)  
*“Kodomo ga umare-tara, ganbarikirenaku-naru-karatte”*  
*Watashi wa Naitō no hahaoya no gekietsu to-mo ieru kangae-kata ni attōsare-ta. (Omission) Kono hageshisa ga aru kara koso kokujin to no aida-ni umareta konketsu no ko o futari mo sodateageru-koto ga*

<sup>8</sup> This chapter considers *ndarō* as equivalent to *nodarō*.

<sup>9</sup> In this chapter, the double underlined part means the part of the utterer’s conjectural judgement, and the wavy underlined part means the part which the utterer regards as a fact or a quasi-fact.

*dekita-nodarō to kangaeta.* (Sawaki: 1036)

‘Naitō said “My mother says to me, ‘If you had a baby, you could not try your best.’”

Her way of thinking, which could be regarded as fiery, overwhelmed me. I thought that it was precisely due to this fieriness, that she had been able to raise her two children, whose father was a black American.’

In example (14), the part *Kono hageshisa ga aru kara* ‘owing to her having this fieriness’ can be regarded as the focus of the conjectural judgement. The focus of the utterer’s judgement is shown in the part which is detached from *nodarō*. The part ‘she was able to raise her two children, whose father was a black American’ is regarded as fact, shown in the immediate part to *nodarō*. Thus, in the same sentence, both the focus-conjectured part and the fact-regarded part are expressed. The focus-conjectured part is detached from *nodarō*. This type can be called the focus-conjecture type (or the detachedness-conjecture type).

#### 4-3-2. Focus-conjecture type of *nodarō*

This subsection examines the focus-type of *nodarō*. The focused part does not appear in front of *nodarō*. This usage can be divided into four cases according to where the conjectural judgement of *nodarō* appears: (1) conjectural judgement appearing in *hogo-seibun* ‘complementary constituents to verbs’ (= arguments related directly to verbs); (2) in interrogatives; (3) in adverbial clauses; and (4) in causal clauses. The first two cases belong to the complementary constituents, while the clause in the last two cases can be regarded as the subordinate clause.

##### (1) Complementary constituents

The first case is that the complementary constituent to the verb (or argument related to the verb) is the focus of conjectural judgement. For example:

(15) (Naitō ’s wife is talking to me about her husband Naitō )

“*Kore kara, kono hito wa ue ni nobotte-iku-yōna ki ga suru-n-desu. Moshikashitara, nobotte-ikenai-kamoshirenai. Demo, watashi ni wa, nobotte-ikeru hito no yōni omoeru-n-desu.*”

*Sono yume ga, hitori de hataraki, Naitō ni bokushingu hitosuji no michi o ayumaseru, to yū seikatsu ni yoku taesasete-iru-nodarō.* (Sawaki: 264)

‘ “It seems to me that he will be going places in the future. It may be that

he cannot rise [in the boxing world]. However, I feel like he is a person who will go up.”

This is her dream. She is working by herself so that her husband Naitō can move forward in his boxing career. I think that this dream of hers is making her bear such a severe life with patience.

In example (15), *sono yume ga* ‘this dream of hers’ (*ga* is the nominative case) is the subjective (or nominative) complement of the predicate verb *taesasete-iru* ‘makes her bear her severe life with patience’. This part ‘this dream of hers’ is focused on as conjectural judgment. This part is apart from *nodarō* and is not included in the predicate verb. Both the part ‘she is working by herself so that her husband can move forward in his boxing career’ and the part ‘she is bearing such a severe life with patience’ are regarded as facts by the utterer. These facts are regarded as definite situations. That is, the utterer recognises that something is making her bear such a severe life with patience, as a definite situation. Something means her dream (the subjective complement) which is the focus of the utterer’s conjectural judgement.

## (2) Interrogatives

In general, interrogatives have specific focused parts in conjectural judgement and serve as typical complementary constituents (or arguments) such as *dōshite* ‘why’, *nande* ‘why’ *dokoni(dokoe)* ‘where’, *nani-o* ‘what’, *dare-ga* ‘who’ and *donoyōni* ‘how’. Interrogative sentences are generally used to question definite situations, so the usage belongs to the focus-conjecture type of *nodarō*. Consider the following example:

(16) (Nobuo’s mother does not blame his grandmother who excluded his mother from the Nagano family. Nobuo thinks as follows)

—*Nanda. Kono hito wa jibun o oidashita obāsama o, dōshite waruku iwanai nodarō.*— (Miura: 62)

‘Why? Why doesn’t she (=my mother) blame her mother-in-law who kicked her out of the family?’

In (16), the part ‘she (=my mother) does not blame her mother-in-law who kicked her out of the family’ is regarded as a fact (= a definite situation) by Nobuo. ‘I’ (= Nobuo) have a question about the fact. In addition, the focus is on *dōshite* ‘why?’.

The interrogative such as ‘why?’ is accompanied by the *no* morpheme, such as *no*, *nodesuka*, *nodarōka*, and *nodeshōka*. Another example is shown below:

- (17) (The Torikai detective thinks of the situation in which Otoki was murdered)  
 —*Otoki to yū onna wa, sono aida, doko de nani o shite-ita-nodarō*—  
 (Matsumoto: 62)  
 ‘Where and what was she doing during that period?’

As shown in example (17), *doko-de* ‘where’ and *nani-o* ‘what’ are complementary constituents. The focuses of these questions are shown by the interrogatives. The part ‘she was doing something somewhere during the period’ is a presupposition of the question, and can be regarded as a definite situation. Thus, the interrogative can be considered as the focus of conjectural judgement.

### (3) Adverbial clauses

The focus of the *nodarō* sentence also appears in an adverbial clause. Consider the following example:

- (18) (A man has run away. Nobuko wonders when he intruded into the flat)  
*Ima nigete-itta otoko—onna kamoshirenai-ga—wa, tabun Nobuko ga tsui utouto-to sofā de nemurikonde-iru aida ni haitte-kita-nodarō*. (Akagawa: 288)  
 ‘The man (or it might be a woman) has just run away. I think that he got into the flat in the period when Nobuko had fallen into a doze on the sofa.’

In example (18), the part ‘the man got into the flat’ can be regarded as a definite situation. The utterer conjecturally judges that it happened in the period when Nobuko had fallen into a doze on the sofa. The part ‘in the period when Nobuko had fallen into a doze on the sofa’ is the focus of the conjectural judgement. Thus, the focus of conjectural judgement is shown in the adverbial clause.

### (4) Causal clauses *kara/node* having two interpretations

The focus of the *nodarō* sentence also appears in a subordinate clause; typically, in causal clauses having the conjunctive particles *kara/node*. For example:

- (19) (The Torikai detective looked at the receipt (of the dining car in the train) which the victim had. ‘One person’ is shown on the receipt.)  
*“O-hitori-sama? Kono otoko wa hitori de meshi o tabeta-nodesu-nā.” to hitorigoto no yōni itta. Kakaritchō ga kikitogamete, “Sorya, kimi. Onna no hō wa tabetaku-nakatta-kara, isshoni wa ikanakatta-nodarō-yo.”*  
 (Matsumoto: 47)  
 ‘“One person? This man went to have a meal by himself, didn’t he?” said Torikai as if talking to himself.  
 The section chief became aware of his words, saying “The reason is.... You know. I guess that since the woman did not want to eat, she did not go to the dining car with him.”

In example (19), the focus of scope of conjectural judgement is on ‘since the woman did not want to eat’. The utterer regards ‘she did not go to the dining car with him’ as a fact on the basis of the receipt which the victim (a man) had. So this part is not the part showing the focus of the conjectural judgement. The focus is on the reason why the woman did not go there with him. Thus, the *nodarō* sentence with the causal clause can be separated into the focused part and the non-focused part. The focused part shows the focus of the conjectural judgement while the non-focused part shows what the utterer regards as a fact or a definite situation. This distinction between the two parts is understood by the context. Theoretically, Kuramochi (1980: 117) points out that subordinate clauses with *kara/node* have two interpretations. Actually, the context always indicates the appropriate interpretation. For example, theoretically, sentence (20) can be explained by two interpretations, which are shown in example (21):

- (20) (It is raining heavily outside. Mr Aoki has not yet come)  
*Konnani futte-iru-kara, Aoki-san wa konai-nodarō.*  
 ‘It is raining heavily + *kara* Aoki-san does not come + *nodarō*.’
- (21) Two interpretations:  
 a. ‘It is raining heavily. So I think that Mr Aoki will not come.’  
 b. ‘Mr Aoki did not come. It seems that the reason for this is that it is raining heavily.’

As shown in example (21a), one is the case in which the fact or fixed situation is ‘it is raining heavily’. The utterer conjecturally judged that ‘Aoki-san will not come’, which is the focused part. The future event is guessed at the utterance time.

In contrast, the other, as shown in example (21b), is the case in which the fact or the definite situation is ‘Mr Aoki did not come’. The reason why he did not come is guessed. The focus is on the reason for the event. The specific focused part is the *kara* clause in which the reason is shown. In (21a) and (21b), the focus is different. The focus in the former translation is a future event (or action) while that in the latter is the reason for a definite event (or action). Thus, example (21) has these two theoretical interpretations, but actually, the context of the sentence determines the appropriate interpretation. When Mr Aoki has an appointment to see the utterer at 3 o’clock, according to the utterance time the appropriate interpretation is determined. If the utterance time is 3:15, interpretation (21a) is appropriate. If the utterance time is 4:00 or later, interpretation (21b) is appropriate.<sup>10</sup> Another example is shown below:

- (22) (The Naigu with his very long nose is a Buddhist priest. His nose became a topic of conversation among people)  
*(Uwasa o suru hitobito no) naka ni wa, mata, ano hana da-kara shukkeshita-nodarō to hiyōsuru mono sae atta. (Akutagawa: 26)*  
 ‘People talked about the Naigu’s long nose. Someone remarked that it seemed that the reason why he had become a priest was that he had that unique nose.’<sup>11</sup>

The definite situation of example (22) is the fact that ‘he became a priest’. The people were talking about his long nose as being the premise for the Naigu becoming a priest. So the utterer focuses on ‘the reason for his becoming a priest’. The utterer conjecturally judged the reason why ‘he became a priest’. Thus, the context indicates the distinction between the specific focused part and the definite situation.

### 4-3-3. *Darō* with only the front-conjecture type

While *nodarō* has both usages, the front-conjecture type and the focus-conjecture type, *darō* has only the usage of the front-conjecture type. Consider the following example:

<sup>10</sup> In the above example, the waiting time (how long we need to wait for the person to come) seems different in Australia and Japan. It seems to depend on social habits (or custom).

<sup>11</sup> “Some of them even gave it as their opinion that he had probably taken to the priesthood on account of that nose.” (Translation: “Tales grotesque and curios by Akutagawa Ryunosuke” by Glenn W. Shaw: 18)

- (23) (Nobuko, who was president of the Otō company, quit her job and thought as follows)

*Otō-Sangyō ni shite-mo kubi ni natta wake de wa nai. Mizukara jihyō o dashite-kita-noda-kara, taishoku-kin wa tashō deru-darō.* (Akagawa: 738, example (9) again)

‘I was not fired from a job. I voluntarily submitted my resignation, so I should be able to get a little severance payment.

In example (23), the double underlined part ‘I should be able to get a little severance payment’ appearing in front of *darō* shows the utterer’s conjectural judgement. The part ‘I voluntarily submitted my resignation’ is regarded as a fact, so it does not show conjectural judgement. Thus, the part immediately next to *darō* shows the utterer’s judgement but the part detached from *darō* does not. *Darō* has only the front-conjecture type.

In order to generalise the view that *darō* only uses the front-conjecture type, the ‘modal-substitution’ method is taken. This is used to examine what is going on when *darō* is substituted for *nodarō*. Consider the following example,

- (24) *Nodarō* → *darō*

(The same context in example (19))

a. *Onna no hō wa tabetaku-nakatta-kara, isshoni wa ikanakatta-nodarō-yo.*” (Matsumoto: 47, example (19) again)

‘It seems that since the woman did not want to eat, she did not go to the dining car with him.’

→ b. # *Onna no hō wa tabetaku-nakatta-kara, isshoni wa ikanakatta-darō-yo.*”

‘The woman did not want to eat. So it seems that she did not go to the dining car in the train with him.’

In sentence (24a), the judgement is made based on a definite situation — ‘she did not go to the dining car in the train with him’ — which is regarded as a fact. Conversely, in interpretation of (24b) with *darō*, the situation regarded as a fact is ‘the woman did not want to eat’. The part which the utterer conjecturally judges is changed from the part ‘since the woman did not want to eat’ in (24a) to the part ‘she did not go to the dining car in the train with him’ in (24b). The difference between (24a) and (24b) is caused by the front-conjecture usage of *darō*.

Whether *darō* does not have the focus-conjecture usage can also be

examined in the following examples in which *nodarō* is used in ‘complementary constituents’, ‘interrogatives’ and ‘adverbial clauses’:

(25) A complementary constituent

(The same context in example (15): Yumiko (Naitō ’s wife) has a dream that he will be going places in the future.)

a. *Sono yume ga, hitori de hataraki, Naitō ni bokushingu hitosuji no michi o ayumaseru, to yū seikatsu ni yoku taesasete-iru-nodarō.* (Sawaki: 264)  
 ‘She is working by herself so that her husband Naitō can move forward in his boxing career. I think that this dream of hers is making her bear such a severe life with patience.’

→b. # *Sono yume ga, hitori de hataraki, Naitō ni bokushingu hitosuji no michi o ayumaseru, to yū seikatsu ni yoku taesasete-iru-darō.*  
 ‘I guess whether her dream is making her bear such a severe life.’

As shown in (25a), the situation in which she bears her severe life with patience is regarded as a fact. The focus is on her dream. In contrast, in interpretation (25b) with *darō*, what was certain fact in (25a) becomes uncertain. The utterer guesses whether her dream is making her bear her severe life with patience. The focus on her dream disappears. The difference between (25a) and (25b) results from the front-conjecture usage of *darō*.

(26) An interrogative

(The same context in example (16))

a. *Kono hito wa jibun o oidashita obāsama o, dōshite waruku iwanai nodarō.*— (Miura: 62)

‘Why doesn’t she (=my mother) blame her mother-in-law who kicked her out of the family?’

→b. ? *Kono hito wa jibun o oidashi-ta obāsama o, dōshite waruku iwanai-darō.*

‘Doesn’t this woman blame her mother-in-law?’ (Yes, she does.)’

Example (26a) above is natural and grammatically correct, but example (26b) sounds unnatural. If sentence (26b) is interpreted as a rhetorical question, it might be acceptable (although it is impossible to accept it from the context), where the meaning of it implies that she surely blames her mother-in-law. In general, the sentence having *dōshite* ‘why’ has a focus shown by *dōshite* ‘why’, so *dōshite* is accompanied with *nodarō*. The phrase “*dōshite ...darō*” is generally used to

express the rhetorical question because *darō* has no usage of the focus-conjecture type.

(27) An adverbial clause

(The same context in example (18))

a. *Ima nigete-itta otoko—onna kamoshirenai-ga—wa, Tabun Nobuko ga tsui utouto-to sofā de nemurikonde-iru aida ni haitte-kita-nodarō.* (Akagawa: 288)

‘The man (or woman) has just run away. It seems that he got into the flat in the period when Nobuko had fallen into a doze on the sofa.’

→b. *Tabun Nobuko ga tsui utouto-to sofā de nemurikonde-iru aida ni haitte-kita-darō.*

‘She thinks that when she had fallen into a doze on the sofa, the man got into the flat.’

Although in example (27a) the event ‘the man got into the flat’ is regarded as a fact, in example (27b) with *darō*, it is uncertain whether the man intruded into the flat. This is because *darō* shows the utterer’s conjectural judgement of the part immediately before *darō*.

Therefore, it can be generalised that *darō* has the syntactic feature of front-conjecture usage, but not focus-conjecture usage. In this point, *darō* is different from *nodarō*, which has both usages.

#### 4-3-4. Topicalisation in focus-conjecture type of *nodarō*

A distinction between focused and non-focused parts can be made by the topicalisation of the part implying a definite situation. A *nodarō* sentence with a specific focused part in conjectural judgement can be transformed to a topicalised/thematised sentence. The part implying a definite situation is topicalised by use of the form “~ *no-wa* ~ *nodarō*” ‘the topic will be ~’. The particle *wa* is a topic marker. The topic appears in front of *no-wa* and implies a definite situation in the *nodarō* sentence. Although Mikami (1959: 104) points out the transformation of ‘an explicit/implicit topic’ in the *noda* sentence<sup>12</sup>, this sub

<sup>12</sup> Mikami Akira (1959: 104) calls sentences with an explicit topic, *Kendai* 顕題 ‘explicit topic’ and hidden-topic sentences, *Indai* 陰題 ‘implicit topic’. He also points out that *indai*-sentences can be transformed to *kendai*-sentences in the *noda* sentence, as in

“*Dare ga kimashi-ta?*” ‘Who has arrived here?’

“*Henry ga tochakushita-n-desu.*” ‘Henry has arrived.’ (Implicit topic)

“*Tochakushi-ta-no wa Henry desu.*” ‘It is Henry who has arrived.’ (explicit topic)

section applies his idea to the focus-conjecture usage of the *nodarō* sentence. Consider the following example:

## (28) Topicalisation

(Examples (20) and (21b) in the focus-conjecture type of *nodarō*)

a. *Konnani futte-iru-kara, Aoki-san wa konai-nodarō.*

‘Mr Aoki did not come. It seems that the reason for this is that it is raining heavily.’

→ b. *Aoki-san ga konai no-wa konnani futte-iru-kara na-nodarō.*<sup>13</sup>

‘It seems that the reason why Mr Aoki did not come is that it is raining heavily.’

In example (28a), the focused part is *konnani futte-iru-kara* ‘The reason for this will be that it is raining’ while the non-focused part is *Aoki-san wa konai* ‘Mr Aoki did not come’ which is the part showing a definite situation. As shown in (28b), the part showing the fixed situation can be topicalised without changing the meaning of the *nodarō* sentence. The focus-conjecture usage of (28a) is changed to the front-conjecture usage of the *nodarō* sentence. In a way similar to the above topicalisation, the *nodarō* sentences in examples (15), (16), (18) and (19) can be topicalised as in (29), (30), (31) and (32), respectively.

(29) a. *Sono yume ga, hitori de hataraki, Naitō ni bokushingu hitosuji no michi o ayumaseru, to yū seikatsu ni yoku taesasete-iru-nodarō.* (Example (15) again)

‘She is working by herself so that her husband Naitō can move forward in his boxing career. I think that this dream of hers is making her bear such a severe life with patient.’

→ b. *Hitori de hataraki, Naitō ni bokushingu hitosuji no michi o ayumaseru, to yū seikatsu ni yoku taesasete-iru-no-wa, sono yume -na-nodarō.*

‘I think that making her bear such a severe life with patience is due to this dream of hers.

(30) a. *Kono hito wa jibun o oidashita obāsama o, dōshite waruku iwanai nodarō.*— (Example (16) again)

‘Why doesn’t this woman (=my mother) blame her mother-in-law who

---

This transformation is applied to the *nodarō* sentence in this section.

<sup>13</sup> In example (28), *nodarō* can be replaced by *darō* because of the front-conjecture usage. The more important reason for this is that the conjunctive particle *kara* showing cause/reason indicates the utterer’s interpretation of the situation. When the interpretation of a situation is not made, *darō* is not used. The issue of the replacement (substitution) of *darō/nodarō* is discussed in 4-6-2.

kicked her out of the family? ’

→b *Kono hito ga jibun o oidashita obāsama o waruku iwanai-no-wa, dōshite-na-nodarō.*

‘This woman (=my mother) does not blame her mother-in-law who kicked her out of the family. This is why? ’

(31) a. *(Otoko wa) tabun Nobuko ga tsui utouto-to sofā de nemurikonde-iru aida ni haitte-kita-nodarō.* (Akagawa: 288, example (18) again)

‘“The man (or a woman) has just run away. I think that he got into the flat in the period when Nobuko had fallen into a doze on the sofa.’

→b. *(Otoko ga) haitte-kita-no-wa, tabun Nobuko ga tsui utouto-to sofā de nemurikonde-iru aida ni na-nodarō.*

‘It seems that the time when the man got into the flat is in the period when Nobuko had fallen into a doze on the sofa.’

(32) a. *Onna no hō wa tabetaku-nakatta-kara, isshoni wa ikanakatta-nodarō.*” (Matsumoto: 47, example (19) again)

‘It seems that since the woman did not want to eat, she did not go to the dining car with him.’

→b. *Isshoni ikanakatta-no-wa, onna no hō wa tabetaku-nakatta-kara na -nodarō.*

‘It seems that the reason why she did not have a meal with the man is that she did not want to have it.’

As shown in the examples above, the definite situations in the focus-conjecture usage of *nodarō* can be topicalised. Simultaneously, the focus-conjecture type becomes the front-conjecture type by virtue of the topicalisation.

Conversely, in the front-conjecture usage in the subordinate clause (the adverbial and subordinate clauses), topicalisation of the focused part cannot occur.

For example:

(33) (‘I heard that Yamagata was saying that it was impossible to arrange a boxing match)

*Yamagata wa chikara no aru macchi-meikā dakara, sono Yamagata ga murida to yū noda-kara soko ni wa sore-nari no riyū ga aru-nodarō.*

(Sawaki: 809)

‘Yamagata is a powerful boxing impresario. He is saying that it is impossible to arrange the boxing match. Therefore, it seems that there is a certain reason why the boxing match is not realised.’

→a. *Yamagata wa chikara no aru macchi-meikā dakara, soko ni wa sore-nari no riyū ga aru-nodarō.*

‘Yamagata is a powerful boxing impresario, so it seems that there is a certain reason why the boxing match is not realised.’

→b. ? *Soko ni sore-nari no riyū ga aru-no-wa, Yamagata ga chikara no aru macchi-meikā dakara-na-nodarō.*  
 ‘? There is a certain reason’. This is because Yamagata is a powerful boxing impresario.’ (not translatable)

Sentence (33a) above can be shortened. The part *sore-nari no riyū ga aru* ‘there will be a certain reason’ is the conclusion of the utterer’s conjectural judgement. Sentence (33b) is the topicalised sentence, where the part in front of *nodarō* in (33a) is topicalised. The topic part in (33b) is regarded as a definite situation. This is different from the original sentence and thereby sentence (33b) sounds unnatural. Thus, topicalisation changes the part showing the judgement to the part showing the definite situation. This change leads to the conclusion that in the front-conjecture type of *nodarō*, it is impossible to topicalise the part of the conjectural judgement.

This examination leads to the generalised conclusion that in the focus-conjecture type of *nodarō*, the part showing definite situations in front of *nodarō* can be topicalised but in the front-conjecture type of *nodarō* topicalisation cannot be made. In addition, *darō*, which uses front-conjecture, cannot make use of such topicalisation.

#### **4-4. Relationships between judgements and situations in the *nodarō* sentence**

With the *nodarō* expression, the judgement is related to a certain situation (Kuramochi 1980; Okuda 1984; Nakahata 1998). Following the findings in the previous literature, this section attempts to investigate rigorously the semantic structure of the *nodarō* expression, clarifying the relationships between the judgement and the situation. The discussion is organised as follows. This section shows, firstly, that the situation related to the judgement is identifiable from the context as the objective core of the judgement; secondly, that *darō* does not require a certain situation related to the judgement; and thirdly, what relationships lie between the judgement and the situation.

#### 4-4-1. Identifying the objective core of the judgement from the context

The situation related to the judgement is identifiable from the context as the objective core of the judgement. This is a characteristic feature of *nodarō*. In some cases the situation is a fact while in others it is a quasi-fact.<sup>14</sup> In either case, the situation can be regarded as definite, whether of the front-conjecture type or the focus-conjecture type.

A certain situation related to the judgement appears in the context. The locations where it appears are (1) the preceding sentence, (2) the following sentence, and (3) the same sentence.

##### (1) Preceding sentences

With the *nodarō* expression, a certain situation related to the judgement (such as cause of the judgement) frequently appears in the preceding sentence. For example:

##### (34) (Junko visits Masaya's apartment)

*Mado ga aite-ite-mo, kāten ga shimatte-itari, naka no yōsu wa wakaranai. [Junko wa] shibaraku nagamete-ita-ga hito no iru kehai wa nakatta. Minna de kakete-iru-nodarō.* (Akagawa: 834)

'The windows were open but some window curtains were closed. She could not see inside. [Junko] watched the apartment for a while but there was no sign of life in the apartment. She thought that everybody had gone out.'

As shown in example (34), Junko's conjectural judgement is made on the basis of the fact that there was no sign of life in the apartment. The *nodarō* expression indicates two factors, judgement and ground. The sentence showing the ground appears immediately before the *nodarō* sentence and is identifiable from the context. The definite situation regarded as a fact naturally leads to the judgement that everybody had gone out. This specific situation can be considered as the evidence for the judgement.

In some cases, the preceding sentence of the ground is a short distance

<sup>14</sup> The 'quasi' of the quasi-fact is used to express what can be regarded as similar to a fact. The term *giji* of *giji-modaritei* 'quasi-modality' is equivalent to 'quasi'.

away from the *nodarō* sentence, as follows:

(35) ('I watched Naitō boxing)

*“Sukoshi ugoki ga omoi-nda-kedo, istumo anna chōshi-datta?”*

*Watashi ga iinaosu-to Toshiaki wa shibaraku kangaete-kara kotae-ta.*

*“Anna-datta-to omou-yo.”*

*Ima, Naitō wa hirō no pīku ni sashikakatte-iru-nodarō.* (Sawaki: 452)

‘I said, “His movements look a little slower. Is it usually like that?”

After thinking for a while, Toshiaki said, “I think that his movements are the same as usual.”

‘I thought that Naitō would be at the peak of his tiredness at present.’

In example (35), ‘his movements look a little slower’ is the ground of the judgement. Based on this fact, the utterer conjecturally judges that Naitō is at the peak of his tiredness at present. The preceding sentence showing the ground is a little away from the *nodarō* sentence. The situation related to the utterer’s judgement can be found from the context because the judgement is made on the basis of it.

## (2) Following sentences

In some cases, a certain situation related to the judgement is represented after the *nodarō* sentence, as follows:

(36) A certain situation appearing after the *nodarō* sentence

(Toshiaki takes Naitō and me in his car from Shimokitazawa to Kudan)

*Yōyaku Yanagi to no shiai ga jitsugenshi-sōni-natta koto de, ikuraka kibun*

*ga ukitatte-ita-nodarō. Watashi wa Toshiaki o aite ni itsuninaku*

*jōzetsu-datta.* (Sawaki: 1028)

‘I guess that I was in high spirits because the boxing match with Yanagi was likely to be realised. I was unusually talkative to Toshiaki.’

In example (36), the utterer regards his unusual talkativeness to Toshiaki as a fact. The cause for this is shown by the conjectural judgement that ‘I was in high spirits’ in the *nodarō* sentence. The sentence showing the situation appears after the *nodarō* sentence. Thus, the judgement is based on the specific situation in the *nodarō* sentence, and the specific situation is identifiable from the context.

**(3) Same sentences**

In the ‘focus’ usage of *nodarō*, a certain situation related to the judgement is represented in the same sentence.

- (37) A certain situation appearing in the same sentence of *nodarō*  
(The chief of the department, Ishida, is cooperating with the police in investigating Yasuda’s action)

“*Zuibun Yasuda no tame ni benjita mono-desu-ne.*”

“*Sō-to-mo toreru-ga-ne. Shikashi, Yasuda no kōdō o keisatsu ga shirabete-iru to yū-node kyōryokushite-kureta-nodarō.*” *Shunin wa bishōshite-ita.* (Matsumoto: 282)

‘“He cooperated well with Mr Yasuda.”’

“His treatment can be interpreted in that way. However, he cooperated with us; it seems that the reason for this is that he has heard that the police are investigating what actions Yasuda took”, said the section chief smiling.”’

In example (37), the wavy underlined part *kyōryoku-shite kureta* ‘He cooperated with us’ is regarded as a fact which is a definite situation. The conjectural judgement is the double underlined part including *node* ‘because’, which is focused on. In this case, the definite situation and the focused part of the judgement are clear-cut.

The above examinations lead to the conclusion that the *nodarō* expression has a certain situation related to the judgement, and that the situation is identifiable as the objective core of judgement from the context. In other words, *nodarō* is an expression involving a specific situation.

**4-4-2. *Darō* not requiring a situation related to the judgement**

Although the modal *nodarō* has a certain situation as the objective core of judgement, *darō* does not. *Darō* is crucially different from *nodarō* in this regard.

If there is not a definite situation as an object of the judgement, the *nodarō* sentence is not used. Conversely, *darō* is used without a specific situation related to the judgement, as follows:

- (38) (A boxing training camp is conducted for Naitō)  
*Kyampu ni wa, Naitō dakedenaku, onaji jimu no Murata Eijorō to Hamada Kazuaki ga sankashita. Shichi-gatsu ga shiai-yotei no Murata ni wa sukoshi*

*hayasuginai koto mo nakatta ga, Naitō hitori de wa hashirinikui-darō to yū Kaneko ya Noguchi no hairyo kara, isshoni kyampu o haru koto ni natta-noda.* (Sawaki: 1039)

‘Not only Naitō but also Eijirō Murata and Kazuaki Hamada joined the training camp. Although it is a little too early for Murata to join it because his boxing match is to be held in July, he joined it. Kaneko and Noguchi thought that if Naitō was going to run alone in the camp, it would be awkward for him, so they set up the camp for Murata and Hamada to join with Naitō.’

In example (38), the conjectural judgement is expressed by the part *Naitō hitori de wa hashiri-nikui darō* ‘if Naitō was going to run alone in the camp, the situation would be awkward for him. The definite situation indicated by the judgement cannot be identified from the context. The specific situation in the camp is not represented because the judgement is not related to it. If *nodarō* were used instead of *darō*, the judgement must refer to a specific situation. Thus, the *darō* expression does not have the specific situation related to the judgement. Another example is shown below:

- (39) (Seishū Hanaoka had a younger sister Oriku who died young.)  
(Oriku no shikyo kara) 150-nen no nochi ni, ani (=Seishū) ga *kokusai-geka-gakkai ni mitomerare, Amerika-gasshū-koku Shikago-shinai ni aru ‘Eiyo-kaikan’ ni, sono ihin to tomo-ni Otsugi to Kae ga kyōryokushite jintai-jikken ni mi o sasageta arisama o egakidashita nihonga no ōgaku ga hanabanashiku kabe ni kakerareru koto nado, saigo made ishiki no saewatatte-ita Oriku ni mo mitōse-nakatta-darō.* (Ariyoshi: 373)

‘Her brother Hanaoka Seishū was recognised by the international surgery association 150 years after Oriku died. His articles are exhibited in the Honour Hall, in Chicago, with a picture in Japanese style in which both Otsugu and Kae are depicted devoting themselves to Seishū’s experiment on a human body. Even Oriku, who had been clear-headed until her last moments, would not have been able to foresee the Honour Hall displaying the picture with his articles.’

In example (39), what can be regarded as facts (or a definite situation) are that the international surgery association recognised Hanaoka Seishū and that the picture in which both Otsugi and Kae are depicted was hung on the wall in the Honour Hall in Chicago while his articles were also displayed. This novel does not show any clue or cue for the judgement that ‘even Oriku would not have been able to foresee the Honour Hall displaying the picture.’ No relationship can be seen

between the definite situation and the judgement. Oriku cannot know what would happen 150 years after her death, as nobody knows. Thus, *darō* is used in the case in which there is no relationship between the two factors. In other words, *darō* can be used in cases in which the specific situation cannot be identified in the context.

Through the analysis of the above examples, it can be seen that the conjectural judgement of *darō* does not need a certain situation which can be regarded as the objective core as presupposition for the judgement.

#### **4-4-3. Seven representative relationships**

This subsection explores the relationships between the situation and the conjectural judgement in the *nodarō* sentence. A conjectural judgement is made on the premise that the specific situation is true, so the definite situation is logically the presupposition of the judgement. The relationship between the two factors can be categorised into the following seven types through the analysis of *nodarō* examples.

- (1) Causes of situations regarded as definite: conjecturally judging a cause.
- (2) Reasons of situations regarded as definite: conjecturally judging a reason.  
*Nodarō* can be replaced with *kara-darō*. *Kara* is a conjunctive particle.
- (3) Implications hidden behind situations regarded as definite: conjecturally interpreting what an event means.
- (4) Backgrounds of situations regarded as definite: conjecturing the background of an event.
- (5) Purpose/Intention of situations regarded as definite: conjecturally judging a purpose or intention.
- (6) Details of situations regarded as definite: conjecturally adding more details to the event.
- (7) Natural consequence/conclusion resulting from situations regarded as definite: conjecturally judging a consequence reasonably derived from the fixed situations.

In the literature, Kuramochi (1980: 114) discusses the first and second categories,

Okuda (1984: 60) the first three categories, and Tanomura (1990: 72) and Miyazaki (1998:139) points out the fourth category. This section takes the first two categories from the literature, reinforces the third and fourth categories giving more precise definitions, and newly sets up the last three categories. These seven categories are illustrated through the examples below.

### (1) Causes why the specific situations have occurred

*Nodarō* has the usage of conjecturing causes of why certain situations have occurred. The following examples of this cause relation are demonstrated:

- (40) *Tonari no heya de kyūni Ryōhei ga koe o agete-nakidashita. Hayaku kara nemutte-ita no ga ane-tachi ga shinshitsu o dehairisuru node mezameta -nodarō.* (Ariyoshi: 76)  
 “[Three-year-old] Ryōhei suddenly burst out crying in a loud voice in the next room. He had been sleeping early. He had woken up. It seems that the reason for this was that his elder sisters had been going in and out of the bedroom.’

In example (40), the definite situation is that Ryōhei (three years old) had woken up. Based on this fact, the utterer conjecturally judges that the reason for this is that his elder sisters had been going in and out the bedroom, which is the focus of the judgement. Thus, the utterer conjectures the cause of his wakening.

### (2) Reasons why the specific situations have arisen

*Nodarō* has a usage of showing the relationship between reason and consequence. The utterer focuses on the reason for the consequence. The utterer thinks about why the situation has occurred. The situation is regarded as definite by the utterer. Consider the following example:

- (41) *Edī (Naitō’s trainer) wa go-ji han ni kuru to itte-ita-ga, denwa de kyō wa yasumu to itte-kita. Fushigini omotta-ga Naitō no supāring ga mirare-nai node wa iku-dake muda to kangaeta-nodarō to handanshita.* (Sawaki: 1195)  
 ‘Eddie (Naitō’s trainer) said that he was coming at five thirty. However, he told me on the phone that he would be taking a day off today. I thought it was mysterious, but I judged that Eddie thought it would be a waste of time for him to go to the boxing gym if he could not see Naitō sparring.’

In example (41), the wavy underlined part, Eddie’s taking a day off on the phone, is regarded as a definite situation. Based on this fact, the utterer tried to judge the reason for this. The focus of the judgement is on the reason why Naitō’s trainer Eddie had taken a day-off. So ‘I’ have judged that ‘Eddie thought it would be a waste of time for him to go to the boxing gym if he could not see Naitō sparring.’ Thus, the example shows the relationship between the event and the reason for it. In this usage, *nodarō* can be replaced by *kara-darō*. The *kara* form is a conjunctive particle showing ‘reason’.

### (3) Implication hidden behind the specific situations

*Nodarō* has the usage of conjecturing what a definite situation implies. In this case, the *nodarō* sentence shows that the utterer is searching for the meaning implied by a definite situation. Following Okuda’s (1984: 60) category ‘meaning’, which he does not define, this section sets up the category ‘implication hidden behind the situation regarded as fixed’. The utterer tries to recognise what the situation implies through the *nodarō* expression (this view is close to the fourth category ‘background’). For example:

(42) (‘I am talking to Naitō about the United States of America)

“*Amerika wa sonnani yokatta?*”

*Watashi ga tazuneru-to Naitō wa natsukashigena kuchō de kotaeta.*

“*Un, yokatta. Totemo kurashiyasu-sōdatta, oretachi ni wa.*”

*Gobi ni wa bimyōna kageri ga atta. Osoraku, oretachi to yū kotoba ni wa konketsuji, soreto mo kokujin to no konketsuji to yū imi ga fukumarete-iru-nodarō.* (Sawaki: 258)

‘ “Was America so good?”

When I asked him this, Naitō said to me with a nostalgic tone,

“Yes, indeed. America seems a comfortable place to live for us.”

His last word ‘us’ carried a special dark nuance to me. The word ‘us’ would also mean a person of mixed blood whose father is black.’

In example (42), the event which the utterer regards as a fact is his last word “us” which carries a special dark nuance for him. The utterer is searching for what the special nuance is. The utterer conjecturally judges that this implies a person of mixed blood whose father is black. In fact, Naitō is a mixed-blood child of a Japanese woman and a black American. Another example is shown below:

- (43) ('I am going to Seoul tomorrow)  
*(Souru yuki) no zen 'ya, kore koso doronawa-shiki to yū-nodarō to haji-nagara, watashi wa kankokugo no kyōsoku-bon o hirogeta. Shikashi, sore mo pēji o kutte-iru-uchi ni omoshiroku-nari, mado no soto ga shirami-hajimeru-made yomitsuzukete-simatta.* (Sawaki: 863)  
 'I think that this can be interpreted as "leaving something too late". Last night, the night before going to Seoul, I opened a Korean textbook. But I became interested in the book as I read, and so I was reading until the sky grew light.'

In example (43), the character was reading a Korean textbook until the sky grew light. This is a fact which can be regarded as definite. The utterer interprets this action as *doronawa-shiki* 'leaving something too late', similar to 'locking the stable door after the horse has bolted'. The meaning of the situation is expressed by that word. Thus, this usage indicates that the meaning of the situation regarded as fixed is equivalent to that of the conjectural part of *nodarō*.

#### (4) Background behind the specific situations

The usage of conjecturing of the background of an event is given as a characteristic of *nodarō*. Tanomura (1990: 72) shows this usage in terms of *jijō* 'the situation or the state of things' and Miyazaki (1998: 139) also states the same thing. This section expresses this usage in terms of 'background'<sup>15</sup> which can be regarded as the more precise definition. 'A logical relationship' between situation and conjecture cannot be seen. In examples (44) and (45) below, the backgrounds to events or situations are conjectured by the utterer:

- (44) *Otsugi no kite-ita mofuku wa shirotabi kara zōri ni itaru hitosoroe made, osoraku wa (Otsugi ga) yome ni kuru toki jikka no matsumoto-ke ga totonoeta mono de-atta-nodarō.* (Ariyoshi: 25)  
 'Otsugi has a complete set of mourning-dress from a pair of white tabi to a pair of Japanese zōri. Probably, the Matsumoto family [her parents] let her had the set when she got married.'

In example (44), Otsugi has a complete set of mourning-dress from a pair of white *tabi* (Japanese socks) to a pair of Japanese *zōri* (Japanese sandals). This is a fact.

<sup>15</sup> 'Back ground' is translated into *haikai* 背景 in Japanese.

A certain background lies behind the fact. Guessing this, the utterer conjecturally judges that perhaps the Matsumoto family set them up for her on her marriage. This conjecture can be regarded as judgement having a high probability.

- (45) ('I think that Naitō has not yet gone home, though the boxing match has finished)

*Tsukue no ue ni wa Naitō no yōfuku ya taoru ga chirabatte-ita. Mada hōru no dokoka ni iru koto wa machigainai. Dare kara moratta-nodarō, soba no isu ni bara no hanataba ga hitotsu muzōsani oite-atta.* (Sawaki: 670)

'Naitō's clothes and towel lay scattered on the desk. It was certain that Naitō was still somewhere in the hall. There was a bunch of roses left casually on the chair nearby the desk. Who gave this to Naitō?

In example (45) above, a bunch of roses was left casually on the chair near the desk, which can be regarded as a fact. The utterer conjectures the background behind the fact, guessing who gave the roses to Naitō.

##### (5) Purpose/Intention of the specific situations

*Nodarō* has the usage of showing purpose/intention of an action/event as the object of conjectural judgement. The purpose/intention of an action/event is the focus of the conjectural judgment in this usage. For example:

- (46) *Mado-garasu ni wa kōsen yoke no tame na-nodarō, nōkon no iro ga irerare, soto kara miru to[jimu no] naibu wa kuraku bukimini utsutta.* (Sawaki: 306)  
'The windowpanes were coloured dark blue. It seemed that the purpose of the colour was to block out the light. Looking in from the outside, 'I felt that the inside [of the gym] was dark and weird.'

In example (46), the utterer is thinking of the purpose of the dark blue coloured panes. The coloured windowpanes are regarded as a definite situation. The utterer is searching for the purpose of the colour. The utterer conjecturally judges with *nodarō* that the purpose is to block out the light, which is focused on. Another example is shown below:

- (47) (Yasuda took two women to Tokyo station where three people watched Otoki getting on the train 'Asakaze'. Later Otoki was murdered. The

detective suspects that Yasuda was the murderer)

*Yasuda ga shigeshigeto tokei o kinisita no wa, masani <asakaze> no mieru yon-pun-kan o neratta-node wa aru-mai-ka. (omission) Kono kaigi wa shitsuyō ni toritsuite-kita. —Yasuda wa nan no tame ni, sonna kōsaku o. shita-nodarō. (Matsumoto: 171)*

‘It is possible to think that the reason why Yasuda got nervous about the time, glancing at his watch, is that he was going to make use of the four short minutes when the express ‘Asakaze’ could be seen from the platform. (omission) He suspected that Yasuda did it. The detective was firmly possessed by this idea. — What did Yasuda do such a thing for?’

In example (47), Yasuda is suspected by the detective. Something happened during the four minutes when the express ‘Asakaze’ could be seen from the platform. That Yasuda made use of the four minutes is the presupposition of the detective’s judgement. The utterer thinks that it is not accidental but intentional that Yasuda was at the station at that moment with the two women. The utterer is searching for Yasuda’s intention, as in ‘What did Yasuda do such a thing for?’, which is the focus of his judgement.

#### (6) Details of the specific situations

*Nodarō* can add more details to the situation or events. In this usage, the *nodarō* sentence complements an additional content of the event to express more details.

(48) (Arai explains to his wife Tomoko that the Otō company was supported by the bank, adding that there has been a personnel reshuffle)

*“Tada...jinshin no isshin to yū yatsu de, jinji ga ohabani idō-ni-natta.*

*“Sō”*

*Tomoko wa chotto ma o oite, “anata mo?” to kiita.*

*“Sō-na-nda”*

*“Sō-na-no”*

*Ichi-do tōsanshita kaisha o tatenaosu no ni, otto no yōna shain wa musiro jama ni naru-nichigainai to Tomoko wa omotta. Sono ten Tomoko wa otto ni kanshite gen’ei wa idaite-inakatta-nodearu.*

*Mā kubi ni wa naranakatta-rashii. Sore dake de mo mōke-mono-da. Hira ni kakusagesareta-dake-de sunda-nodarō.*

*“Jā, mō kakarichō ja naino-ne.*

*“Un,” to Arai wa unazuite-itta. “Buchō ni-natta-nda” (Akagawa: 70)*

‘“However, an extensive reshuffle of the firm’s executive was carried out.”

“Is that so?” said Tomoko. After a little pause, she asked him, “How about you?”

*“Yes”*

“Really”

Tomoko thought that an employee like her husband would obstruct reconstruction of the firm. She did not cherish any illusions concerning her husband. He looked like he had not been fired, so she thought that he should just be grateful for this. She thought that he had just been demoted to an ordinary employee.

“Then, you are not the subsection chief now, are you?”

“No. I have become the chief of the department,” said Arai.’

In example (48), the part *jinji ga ōhabani idō-ni-natta* ‘an extensive reshuffle of the firm’s executive was carried out’ is regarded as a definite situation. The affair involved Arai (Tomoko’s husband). Tomoko added her own interpretation to the reshuffle affair, guessing that her husband had been demoted to an ordinary employee. Her interpretation involves a detail of the extensive reshuffle of the firm. The following example also shows a detail of the situation:

- (49) (Three people are talking about the baby of Naitō. Naitō’s father is a black)  
*“Mite-kudasai, Kono ko no te. Watashi no te yori mo, mō kuroku-nacchatte”*  
*Naitō mo, sobokuna odoroki o koe ni fukumase, sore ni tsuzuketa.*  
*“Fushigida-ne Umarete-kita toki wa kekkō shirokatta-noni, dandan*  
*kuroku-natte-iku-nda.”*  
*“Docchini nite-iru-ndaro.”*  
*Watashi ga dochira ni to mo naku tazuneruto, hutari wa dōji ni koe o ageta.*  
 “Jun!” “Ore!” (Sawaki: 1301)  
 ‘ “Look at! The baby’s hands. They have become darker than my hands.”  
 [said Yumiko.] Naitō also said with honest surprise,  
 “It’s marvellous. When she was born, she was quite white, but gradually  
 she has been getting blacker.”  
 “Whom does she resemble?” I asked, expecting that ‘neither’ would be the  
 answer. Both simultaneously raised their voices.  
 “Jun!” “It’s me.” ’

In example (49), the baby is in front of them, which is the definite situation related to *nodarō*. The relationship in looks between the baby and its parents is focused on. ‘I’ asked for more detail on this baby as to whom the baby resembled, the father or mother’ The information on this baby will be supplied in with the answer to the question.

### (7) Natural consequence resulting from the specific situations

*Nodarō* has the usage of showing a reasonable consequence resulting from the

situation of *nodarō*. The utterer considers the consequence as natural. This case has a deductive process as its characteristic. The fixed situation is considered as a presupposition, which means that it is true. The definite situation naturally leads to the consequence as reasonable. This way of thinking is different from the six usages above. The relationship between presupposition (= the fixed situation) and consequence (= conclusion) can be regarded as naturalness or reasonability for the utterer.

- (50) (I am staying at a cheap hotel. The room has no window, so I cannot distinguish between day and night. This is a drawback of this hotel. Hence, I cannot know what time it was without my watch.)

*Sono toki mo, saido tēburu no akari o tsuke, udedokei no hari o yomi, sakuya wa gozen ni-ji ni neta-no-da-kara, ima wa kitto asa no hachi-ji na-nodarō to kentō o tsukeru shimatsudatta.* (Sawaki: 338)

‘At that time, I put on the light on the bedside table before sleeping and looked at my wrist watch. Waking up, I guessed that it was 8 o’clock because I had gone to bed at 2 o’clock the night before.’

As shown in example (50), the conjectural judgement about the time (when the utterer woke up) is based on the time of sleep which can be regarded as fact. The relationship between the two factors shows ground and consequence. The utterer wakes up after six hours of sleep, which is his every-day habit. This is the presupposition of the judgement. That is, the judgement is made based on this habit, ‘my’ sleeping hours. The habit naturally leads to the consequence. The process of this way of thinking can be regarded as logical or rational. Another example is shown.

- (51) (Nobuo found it difficult to accept the believers’ ‘Amen!’. He thinks as follows)

—*Daga, are hodo no otōsama ya okāsama ga shinjite-iru shūkyō na-noda-kara, tabun ii tokoro mo aru-nodarō*— (Miura: 257)

‘Since my father and mother, who are honourable people, enthusiastically believe in the religion, I think that it has good points.’

In example (51), the wavy underlined part, ‘since my father and mother who are honourable people enthusiastically believe in the religion’, is regarded as a fixed situation, while the double underlined part, ‘I think that it has good points’, is

expressed as conjectural judgement in front of *nodarō*. The conjectural judgement is made on the basis of the former part which can be regarded as the presupposition of the judgement. The premise leads the utterer to the consequent judgement. In other words, the definite situation reasonably results in his judgement. This process of thinking can be considered as logical or rational inference.

This section has demonstrated that there are seven relationships between the definite situation and the judgement, and that the relationships between the two factors are explainable.

## **4-5. *Nodarō* showing the interpretation of a situation for identification**

This section explores distinctive characteristic of the way of thinking behind the *nodarō* expression. This is done through the analysis of the relationship between a definite situation and a conjectural judgement. The characteristic of *darō* is also investigated. That is, the following two issues are discussed: (1) *Nodarō* showing the interpretation of a definite situation and (2) *darō* showing a claim that the proposition is true.

### **4-5-1. *Nodarō* showing the interpretation of a situation through inference**

The judgement of *nodarō* is made on the premise that a situation is definite. The utterer's inference is present in the process of judgement. The conjectural judgement of *nodarō* indicates the conclusion which the utterer has arrived at by way of inference. For example:

- (52) *Tonari no heya de kyūni Ryōhei ga koe o agete-nakidashita. Hayaku kara nemutte-ita no ga ane-tachi ga shinshitsu o dehairisuru node mezameta-nodarō*. (Ariyoshi: 76 example (40) again)  
 “[Three-year-old] Ryōhei suddenly burst out crying in a loud voice in the next room. He had been sleeping early. He had woken up. It seems that the reason for this is that his elder sisters had been going in and out of the

bedroom.'

Example (52) is an example in which the cause of why the situation has occurred is shown. The part *mezameta* '[three-year-old] Ryōhei has woken up' can be regarded as a definite situation. The focus of the judgement is on the part *ane-tachi ga shinshitsu o dehairisuru node* 'the reason for this is that his elder sisters had been going in and out of the bedroom'. The process of thinking lies between the situation and the judgement. The process by which the utterer arrived at the conclusion has a premise that a certain cause results in him being woken up. This is the major premise of the inference. Hence, this inference can be regarded as deductive. The deductive inference is a characteristic of the way of thinking associated with the *nodarō* expression.

Similarly, the other six usages of *nodarō* also have major premises. For example, the same examples seen in subsection 5-4-3 are examined below. Each major premise is shown after the example. The wavy underlined part in the example indicates the specific situation related to the judgement.

(53) Reason

*Edī (Naitō's trainer) wa go-ji han ni kuru to itte-ita-ga, denwa de kyō wa yasumu to itte-kita. Fushigini omotta-ga Naitō no supāring ga mirare-nai no-de wa iku-dake muda to kangaeta-nodarō to handanshi-ta.* (Sawaki: 1195, example (41))

'Eddie (Naitō's trainer) had said before that he was coming at five thirty. However, he told me on the phone that he would be taking a day off today. I thought it was mysterious, but I judged that Eddie thought it would be a waste of time for him to go to the boxing gym if he could not see Naitō sparring.'

—— When people take a day off, they have a certain reason. (Eddie should have a reason why he takes a day-off.)

(54) Implication

"*Amerika wa sonnani yokatta?*"

*Watashi ga tazuneru-to Naitō wa natsukashigena kuchō de kotaeta.*

"*Un, yokatta. Totemo kurashiyasu-sōdatta, oretachi ni wa.*"

*Gobi ni wa bimyōna kageri ga atta. Osoraku, oretachi to yū kotoba ni wa konketsuji, soreto kokujin to no konketsuji to yū imi ga fukumarete-iru-nodarō.* (Sawaki: 258, example (42))

‘ “America is so good?”

When I asked him this, Naitō said to me with a nostalgic tone,

“Yes, indeed. America seems comfortable to live in, to us.”

His last word ‘us’ carried a special dark nuance to me. The word ‘us’ would also mean a person of mixed blood whose father is black.’

— When a word carries a special dark nuance, a certain implication is hidden behind it. (Naitō’s word with a dark nuance would have a certain implication.)

(55) A background

*Otsugi no kite-ita mofuku wa shirotabi kara zōri ni itaru hitosoroe made, osoraku wa (Otsugi ga) yome ni kuru toki jikka no matsumoto-ke ga totonoeta mono de-atta-nodarō.* (Ariyoshi: 25, example (44))

‘Otsugi has a complete set of mourning-dress from a pair of white tabi to a pair of Japanese zōri. Probably, the Matsumoto family [her parents] let her have the set when she got married.’

— When people have a special thing, there is a certain background to having it. (There would be a certain background to Otsugi’s having the set of mourning-dress with everything from a pair of white *tabi* to a pair of Japanese *zōri*.)

(56) Purpose/intention

*Mado-garasu ni wa kōsen yoke no tame na-nodarō, nōkon no iro ga irerare, soto kara miru to naibu wa kuraku bukimini utsutta.* (Sawaki: 306, example (46))

‘The windowpanes were coloured dark blue. It seems that the purpose of the colour is to block out the light. Looking in from the outside, ‘I’ felt that the inside of the gym was dark and weird’

— In general, windowpanes are not coloured, and coloured windowpanes have a certain purpose. (The windowpanes coloured with dark blue would have a certain purpose).

(57) Detail

(Arai explains to his wife Tomoko that the Otō company was supported by the bank, adding that there has been a personnel reshuffle)

“Tada...jinshin no isshin to yū yatsu de, jinji ga ohabani idō-ni-natta.

“Sō”

*Tomoko wa chotto ma o oite, “anata mo?” to kiita.*

“Sō-na-nda”

“*Sō-na-no*”

*Ichi-do tōsanshita kaisha o tatenaosu no ni, otto no yōna shain wa musiro jama ni naru-nichigainai to Tomoko wa omotta. Sono ten Tomoko wa otto ni kanshite gen'ei wa idaite-inakatta-nodearu.*

*Mā kubi ni wa naranakatta-rashii. Sore dake de mo mōke-mono-da. Hira ni kakusagesareta-dake-de sunda-nodarō.*

“*Jā, mō kakarichō ja naino-ne.*”

“*Un,*” to Arai wa unazuite-itta. “*Buchō ni-natta-nda*” (Akagawa: 70, example (48) again)

‘“However, an extensive reshuffle of the firm’s executive was carried out.”

“Is that so?” said Tomoko. After a little pause, she asked him, “How about you?”

“Yes”

“Really”

Tomoko thought that an employee like her husband would obstruct reconstruction of the firm. She did not cherish any illusions concerning her husband. He looked like he had not been fired, so she thought that he should just be grateful for this. She thought that he had just been demoted to an ordinary employee.

“Then, you are not the subsection chief now, are you?”

“No. I have become the chief of the department,” said Arai.

—— When an extensive reshuffle of the firm’s executive is carried out, many employees are involved in it. (Her husband would be involved in the reshuffle)

(58) Natural consequence

(I am staying at a cheap hotel. The room has no window, so I cannot distinguish between day and night. This is a drawback of this hotel. Hence, I cannot know what time it was without my watch.)

*Sono toki mo, saido tēburu no akari o tsuke, udedokei no hari o yomi, sakuya wa gozen ni-ji ni neta-no-da-kara, ima wa kitto asa no hachi-ji na-nodarō to kentō o tsukeru shimatsudatta.* (Sawaki: 338, example (50))

‘At that time, I put on the light on the bedside table before sleeping and looked at my wrist watch. Waking up, I guessed that it was 8 o’clock because I had gone to bed at 2 o’clock the night before.’

—— When people sleep for a certain number of hours, they naturally wake up. (‘I’ would naturally wake up after sleeping for six hours.)

As seen above, it can be confirmed that all the examples have a major premise. The process of *nodarō*’s way of thinking can be shown as follows:

A major premise → A definite situation → A conjectural judgement

This process of thinking can be regarded as deductive inference. Hence, the conjectural judgement is the interpretation of a certain situation.

In summary, the above analysis leads to the conclusion that the *nodarō* sentence is an expression showing the interpretation of a certain situation which is made through deductive inference on the basis of the major premise.

#### 4-5-2. *Darō* showing a soft claim that the proposition is true

*Darō* does not have the function of showing the interpretation of a certain situation. In contrast, *nodarō* has this function by virtue of the *no* morpheme. As demonstrated in subsection 5-4-2, one of the most important functions of the *no* morpheme of *nodarō* is to create the relationship between a certain situation and a judgement. *Darō*, not having the *no* morpheme, cannot create the relationship between the two and thereby it cannot interpret a certain situation.

Morphosyntactically, *darō* can follow a noun, *na*-adjective, *i*-adjective and a verb, but *da* can follow only a noun and *na*-adjective. *Darō* is similar to *da* showing reasonability, because both are expressions of the utterer's claim that the proposition is true. The fundamental difference between *da* and *darō* can be seen in the degree of strength of claiming that the proposition is true. When *darō* is used at the end of a sentence, *darō* sounds softer than *da/dearu* by virtue of the function of the conjecture marker *m (u)* (*darō* historically consists of the copula *da/dearu* and *mu (u)*). The conclusive form *da* at the end of a sentence sounds stronger than *darō*. For example:

#### (59) Noun predicate sentence

(The person in charge of the fire station who hurried to the scene says to Nobuko)

“*Iya, yūdoku-gasu o dasu mono ga nakatta no ga saiwaidesu-yo. Ichiban kowai no wa kemuri-da. Shikashi, koitsu wa dōmo fusinbi-kusai-desu-na*”  
(Akagawa: 400)

“Well, fortunately, there is nothing here which would cause toxic gas. Smoke is the most dangerous thing. Anyway, this is a suspected case of arson.”

a. *Ichiban kowai no wa kemuri-da.*

‘Smoke is the most dangerous thing.’

b. *Ichiban kowai no wa kemuri-darō.*

‘I think that smoke is the most dangerous thing.’

In example (59a), *Ichiban kowai no wa kemuri-da* ‘Smoke is the most dangerous thing’ can be explicated into the following two cases. The first is the case in which the utterer has already experienced the danger of smoke. The second is the case in which the utterer has knowledge of this but has not yet confirmed that the proposition is true. In both cases, the utterer asserts that the proposition is true because the utterer does not consider the possibility that a different proposition would be true. The assertion has the nuance of the utterer’s subjective confidence. On the other hand, example (59b) is a case in which the utterer has knowledge of this but has not yet confirmed that the proposition is true. This is similar to the second case of (59a). However, the *darō* form softens the assertion that the proposition is true. In this regard, *darō* is different from *da*.

In a way similar to example (59), the judgement of a future event can also be explicated as follows:

(60) (The forecast of the champion in the Sumō tournament)

a. *Konbashi mo Asashōryū ga yūshō-da.*

‘In this grand sumō tournament, too, Asashōryū will be champion.’

b. *Konbashi mo Asashōryū ga yūshō-darō.*

‘I think that in this grand sumō tournament, too, Asashōryū will be champion.’

In example (60) the future event is forecast, so it is uncertain whether Asashōryū became the champion of the sumō tournament. It is unconfirmed whether the proposition is true because the event will occur in the future. In this case, the meanings of both (60a) and (60b) are not very different, whether *da* or *darō* is used. However, (60a) with *da* sounds stronger while (60b) with *darō* sounds softer. *Darō* works to avoid direct assertion.

The above examination leads to the conclusion that although both *da* and *darō* are forms expressing the utterer’s claim (or allegation) that the proposition is true, the *darō* expression sounds softer than the *da* expression. In short, it can be said that *darō* is an expression of the utterer’s soft claim that the proposition is true.

## 4-6. Differences between *darō* and *nodarō* through phrase-additions and substitutions

*Nodarō* and *darō* must be different modals because these two modals are fundamentally not interchangeable. Only in special cases, are they interchangeable. This section examines the interchangeability (or substitutionability) between *nodarō* and *darō* through the phrase-addition method and the substitution method. First, this section demonstrates that the addition of certain phrases is effective to distinguish between *darō* and *nodarō*. Next, this subsection investigates whether *darō* can be substituted for *nodarō*.

### 4-6-1. Additional phrases to distinguish between the two modals

The phrase-addition method is used to distinguish between *nodarō* and *darō*. *Darō* is an expression of the utterer's soft claim that the proposition is true. Hence, the *darō* sentence can be added to by the following phrase:

“~to *shuchō-dekiru*” (‘I can claim/maintain so’)

For example:

- (61) (The employees are talking about their bonus.)  
 “*Deru-n-desu-ka? Nandaka kotoshi wa natsu no bōnasu nashi janaika tte uwasa-desu-yo.*”  
 “*Deru-darō. Jiki ga okureru no wa itsumo no koto-sa*” (Akagawa: 20)  
 ‘ “Will it be paid? Somehow, we have heard that our company cannot pay a bonus to us this summer.”  
 “The bonus will be paid. It is usual that it is paid late behind schedule.” ’  
 a. *Bōnasu wa deru-darō.* (\**nodarō*)  
 ‘The bonus will be paid.’  
 →a’ *Bōnasu wa deru-darō to shuchō-dekiru.*  
 ‘I can maintain that the bonus will be paid.’

As shown in example (61a’) which sounds natural, sentence (61a) can be followed by the phrase ~to *shuchō-dekiru* ‘I can maintain (or claim) so’. This shows that this phrase and the *darō* sentence are well matched. The utterer gives neither an interpretation of the present situation of this company nor the evidence of his

claim. Nevertheless, he maintains that the proposition is true with no doubt.

In contrast, *nodarō* expresses the interpretation of a definite situation related to the judgement. So the *nodarō* sentence can be added to by the following phrase:

“~*to (jitai o) kaishaku-dekiru*” (‘I can interpret the situation as this’)

For example:

- (62) (The new president Nobuko entered the president’s room)  
*Nobuko wa (shachōshitsu no) doa o aketa. Naka wa omotte-ita-yori semakatta. Hiroi, to yū bakuzento shita kioku dake ga nokotte-ita-nodarō.*  
 (Akagawa: 108) (\**darō*)  
 ‘Nobuko opened the door to the president’s office. It was smaller than she had expected. It seems that her dim memory of the spacious room was retained.’  
 a. *Hiroi, to yū bakuzento shita kioku dake ga nokotte-ita-nodarō.*  
 ‘It seems that her dim memory of the spacious room was retained.’  
 → a’. *Hiroi, to yū bakuzento shita kioku dake ga nokotte-ita-nodarō to (jitai o) kaishaku-dekiru.*  
 ‘It seems that her dim memory of the spacious room was retained. I can interpret the situation (= the reason why she felt that the president’s office was smaller) as this.’

In example (62), the fact is that she felt that the president’s room was smaller than she expected. On the basis of this fact, the utterer interprets the reason for this impression, and she judges that the impression was caused by her dim memory of the spacious room. In example (62a’) the phrase ~*to (jitai o) kaishaku-dekiru* ‘I can interpret the situation as this’ is added and the new sentence sounds natural. This shows that the phrase is harmonious with the *nodarō* sentence.

Thus, these above examinations indicate that the claim implied by the *darō* sentence can be explicitly shown by the former phrase while the interpretation implied by *nodarō* sentence can also be explicitly show by the latter phrase.

With these two phrases, the former phrase is not appropriate for *nodarō* while the latter is also not appropriate for *darō*. Consider the following example:

- (63) (The same context as in example (61))

*Bōnasu wa deru-darō. (\*nodarō)*

‘The bonus will be paid.’

→a. *Bōnasu wa deru-darō to shuchō-dekiru.*

‘I can maintain that the bonus will be paid.’

→b. # *Bōnasu wa deru-darō to kaishaku-dekiru.*

‘The bonus will be paid. I can interpret the situation as this’.

In example (63b), the situation (of the company) related to the judgement is actually not shown in the context of the original sentence. If the specific situation is not shown, an interpretation of it cannot be made. An interpretation can only be done on the premise that the specific situation is present in the context. Thus, sentence (63b) sounds unnatural. *Darō* does not serve to interpret a certain situation. The interpretation of a certain situation is discordant with *darō*.

Also, the *nodarō* sentence cannot be followed by the former phrase, as follows:

(64) (The same context as example (62))

*Naka wa omotte-ita-yori semakatta. Hiroi, to yū bakuzento shita kioku dake ga nokotte-ita-nodarō. (\*darō)*

‘The president’s room was smaller than she had expected. It seems that her dim memory of the spacious room was retained.’

→a. *Hiroi, to yū bakuzento shita kioku dake ga nokotte-ita-nodarō to (jitai o) kaishaku-dekiru.*

‘It seems that her dim memory of the spacious room was retained. I can interpret the situation as this.’

→b. # *Hiroi, to yū bakuzento shita kioku dake ga nokotte-ita-nodarō to shuchō-dekiru.*

‘I can claim that her dim memory of the spacious room was retained.’

In example (64), the original sentence shows the specific situation (= the president’s room was smaller than she had expected) which is related to the judgement. When the judgement shows the interpretation of the specific situation, the claim expressed by *darō* is not appropriate from the context, as shown in (64b). The specific relationship between the situation and the judgement is lost with the use of the phrase *~to shuchō-dekiru* ‘I can claim/maintain so’. Thus, the soft claim of *darō* that the proposition is true is not harmonious with the situation-interpretation of *nodarō*.

#### 4-6-2. Examinations into the substitution of *darō* for *nodarō*

This subsection examines two cases of *nodarō*: (1) general cases in which *darō* cannot be substituted for *nodarō* and (2) rare cases in which *darō* can be substituted for *nodarō*.

##### (1) General cases in which *darō* cannot be substituted for *nodarō*

*Nodarō*, in general, cannot be substituted for *darō*. *Nodarō* cannot be replaced by *darō* in the following three typical cases:

- (a) The focus-conjecture usage of *nodarō* (*Darō* does not have this usage)
- (b) *Nodarō* used in agreement with interrogatives such as *naze/dōshite* ‘why’
- (c) *Nodarō* used to interpret the situation in front of the utterer

The first two cases inevitably result from the examination in section 5-3. That is, since *darō* does not have a focus-conjecture usage, *darō* cannot be used instead of *nodarō* in this usage. The third is the case of interpreting the specific situation in which something has occurred (or something is occurring) in front of the utterer. These examples are illustrated below.

##### (a) The focus-conjecture usage of *nodarō*

The *nodarō* sentence in the focus-conjecture usage cannot be substituted for *darō* because *darō* does not have this usage. Consider the following example:

- (65) (The same context as in example (22), subsection 5-3-2)
- a. *Naigu wa ano hana-da-kara shukkeshta-nodarō.*  
‘Someone remarked that it seemed that the reason why the Naigu had become a priest was that he had that unique nose.
  - b. # *Naigu wa ano hana-da-kara shukkeshta-darō.*  
‘Someone said, “The Naigu has that unique nose. So it seems that he has become a priest.” ’

As shown in example (65), *nodarō* cannot be replaced by *darō* in the context. When *nodarō* is replaced by *darō*, the context of (65a) must be changed. In this case, the definite situation wavy underlined part in (65a) is changed to an unconfirmed proposition double underline in (65b).

**(b) *Nodarō* used in agreement with interrogatives such as *naze* ‘why’**

*Nodarō* is generally used in agreement with interrogatives such as *naze/dōshite* ‘why’. The interrogative is used on the premise that the sentence has a definite situation and becomes the focus of the question. Thus, the interrogative sentence can be divided into two parts: (1) an interrogative marker which is the focus of the question; and (2) a part immediately after *naze* ‘why’ showing a definite situation, which is regarded as the presupposition for the judgement. Consider the following examples:

**(66) *Naze* ‘why’**

(‘I’ heard that Naitō was going to do boxing again)

a. *Naze 4-nen-kan no kūhaku no atoni, futatabi bokushingu o hajimeyō to shita-nodarō.* (Sawaki: 19)

‘Why did he start boxing again after a four-year-break?’

→b. \**Naze 4-nen-kan no kūhaku no atoni, futatabi bokushingu o hajimeyō to shita-darō.*

In example (66a), the fact is that he started boxing again after a four-year-break. ‘Why’ arises about the situation, so *nodarō* is used. As shown in example (66b), however, the sentence is grammatically incorrect because of *darō*. The other interrogatives have the same structure, as follows:

**(67) *Nani* ‘what’**

*Seishū wa sono (monteitachi no) chūō de ippiki no mikeneko o dakikakaete-kōshōshite-ita. Nani ga atta-nodarō, to Kae wa odoraita.* (Ariyoshi: 222)

‘Seishū was laughing loudly in the middle of his pupils holding a tortoiseshell cat in his arms. What had happened? Kae [his wife] was surprised.’

a. *Nani ga atta-nodarō.*

‘What had happened?’

→b. # *Nani ga* *atta-darō.*

‘Was there anything?’ (= There was nothing.)’

**(68) *Doko* ‘Where’**

*(Shūkanshi no hito wa) Ittai doko de kiite-kita-nodarō.* (Akagawa: 465)

‘Where did [the person working in a weekly magazine publisher] hear of this affair?’

a. *Doko de kiite-kita-nodarō.*

‘Where did he hear of it?’

→b. \* *Doko de kiite-kita-darō*.

- (69) *Nanno-tame-ni* ‘What ... for’  
*Ittai dare ga, nanno-tame-ni yatte-kita-nodarō? Keisatsu no sōsa mo sunda imaninatte.* (Akagawa: 288)  
 ‘Who came here? What did the person come here for? The police had finished the investigation into the affair, nevertheless.....’  
 a. *Nanno-tame-ni yatte-kita-nodarō?*  
 ‘What did the person come here for?’  
 →b. \* *Nanno-tame-ni yatte-kita-darō?*
- (70) *Dare* ‘Who/whom’  
 a. (*Naitō wa bara no hanataba o*) *Dare kara moratta-nodarō.* (Sawaki: 670)  
By whom was he given a bunch of roses?’  
 →b. # *Dare kara moratta-darō.*  
 ‘Who gave him it?’ (= Nobody gave him.)

All examples above cannot be replaced by *darō*. In examples (67b) and (70b), *darō* is used to express a rhetorical question, so the meaning of the sentence is changed. In examples (68b) and (69b), both sentences with *darō* sound strange and are grammatically incorrect.

### (c) *Nodarō* used to interpret the situation appearing in front of the utterer

When the utterer interprets an event/affair appearing in front of her/him, *nodarō* is used but not *darō*. The utterer has not yet confirmed what has happened (or is happening), so s/he tries to interpret the event/affair by use of *nodarō*. Consider the following example:

- (71) (Nobuo decisively told Fujiko, who was lying on the futon, sick, that he had to transfer to the Asahikawa station branch. If he were to go to Asahikawa, it would become difficult to see each other)  
*Fujiko wa hitokoto mo hasshinakatta. Sotto kakebuton o mune made age, tsugini kubi made kakushi, tsuini wa supportito kao made kakushite-shimatta. Kakebuton ga kasukani ugoki, Fujiko wa sono shita de, koe o tatezu-ni naite-iru-yōdeatta. Kakebuton o motte-ita hosoi te ga, futon no naka ni kakureta. Sono hosoi te ga namida o nugutte-iru-nodarō to omou-to, Nobuo wa mune ga shimetsukerareru-yōdeatta.* (Miura: 546)  
 ‘Fujiko did not say a word. She pulled the quilt to her chest, and then hid her neck with it. She finally covered her face with it. It moved slightly. It seemed that Fujiko was weeping under it. Her slender hands grasping it were hidden under it. Imagining that Fujiko was wiping her tears with her

- slender hands, Nobuo felt tightness in his chest.
- a. *Sono hosoi te ga namida o nugutte-iru-nodarō*  
 ‘Fujiko would be wiping her tears with her slender hands.’
- b. # *Sono hosoi te ga namida o nugutte-iru-darō*.  
 ‘Fujiko would be wiping her tears with her slender hands’.

The scene in example (71) is that Nobuo is looking at Fujiko (and her movement) in front of him. He cannot see if Fujiko is weeping because she is hidden under the futon. In this case, *nodarō* is used but *darō* is not, as shown in (71b). The interpretation of the situation in front is shown only by *nodarō*. Another example is shown:

- (72) (Junko has visited Masaya who lives in a cheap apartment)  
*Junko wa 2-kai e agaru to, jitto mimi o sumashita. Imadoki no wakamono no heya nara, taitei nanika ongaku de mo kikoete-iru-monoda-ga, ima wa monooto hitotsu shinai. Tabun, dono heya mo rusu-na-nodarō.* (Akagawa: 839)
- ‘Junko went upstairs [to the flat] and listened carefully. She thought that if young people nowadays lived there, she would be able to hear music or noises produced in the rooms. However, she could not hear a thing. She thought that perhaps everybody was away from home.’
- a. *Dono heya mo rusu-na-nodarō*.  
 ‘Perhaps everybody is away from home.’
- b. # *Dono heya mo rusu-darō*.  
 ‘Perhaps everybody is away from home.’

In example (72), the utterer Junko is present in the cheap apartment. In the scene, the lack of noise can be regarded as a fact. Based on this fact, she conjecturally judges that everybody is away from home. In this case, only *nodarō* is used but not *darō*. To be precise, when *darō* is acceptable, the context must be changed. For example, if the utterer is not present in the apartment, *darō* can be used but *nodarō* cannot. This is because *darō* can express an imaginary world with her/his soft claim. The *darō* expression cannot show the interpretation of the event/affair in front of one’s eyes.

## (2) Rare cases in which *darō* can be substituted for *nodarō*

There are rare cases in which *nodarō* and *darō* can be substituted for each other. The interchangeability can be seen in the following four cases. (1) Interrogatives

appearing immediately before *darō/nodarō*; (2) ‘*sore wa sō darō/na-nodarō*’ for the expression of approval/sympathy to what is said; (3) ‘*dokoni aru darō/nodarō*’ (nowhere) in the case of the rhetorical question; and (4) rare cases in which the *darō* sentence can be regarded as the interpretation of a certain situation.

**(a) Interrogatives appearing immediately before *darō/nodarō***

In the case of interrogatives appearing immediately before *darō/nodarō*, they are substituted for each other. In this case, it is required that no verb appears between the interrogative and *nodarō/darō*.

Consider the following example:

(73) *Sono toki, doa no soto ni ashioto ga shita. Dare-darō?*

*Doa ga aite, kao o nozokase-ta-no wa, moto eigyō-buchō no Saegusa-datta.*  
(Akagawa: 110)

‘I heard the footsteps of someone outside at that moment. Who is it? (← an interior monologue) Opening the door, Saegusa, the former chief of the sales division, made an appearance.’

(A) The case of no verb (*darō/nodarō* are acceptable)

a. (*Kita no wa*) *Dare-darō?* ‘Who is it?’

→ a’. (*Kita no wa*) *Dare-na<sup>16</sup>-nodarō?*

‘Who is it?’ (*nodarō* is acceptable)

(B) The case of the verb *kita* ‘came’ appearing in front of *darō/nodarō*

b. *Dare ga kita-nodarō.* (*nodarō* is acceptable)

‘I am wondering who has come.’

→ b’. # *Dare ga kita-darō.* (*darō* is not acceptable in this context)

‘Who came?’ (= Nobody came.)

In case (A), example (73), when the interrogative *dare* ‘who’ appears immediately in front of both *darō* and *nodarō*, both sentences (73a) and (73a’) are grammatically correct and sound natural. Both sentences are front-conjecture usages, whereby the utterer tries to interpret the footstep sound. The two conditions — the front-conjecture usage and the interpretation of a certain situation — are fulfilled in the original sentence. Hence, *darō* and *nodarō* can be replaced by each other. However, case (B) is different. In case (B), the verb *kita*

<sup>16</sup> In this case, *nodarō* is accompanied by *-na-*. When a noun appears as the predicate in front of *nodarō*, *na* is required between the two.

‘came’ appears between the interrogative and *nodarō/darō*. As shown in sentence (73b), the focus-conjecture usage of *nodarō* is used in this sentence, so *nodarō* cannot be replaced by *darō*. In this case, the *darō* sentence (73b’) expresses the different meaning ‘Nobody came’, which is used as a rhetorical question. Thus, when a verb appears between interrogative and *nodarō/darō*, *darō* cannot be substituted for *nodarō*. Another example is shown below:

- (74) (Saegusa, Junko and Nobuko found that they smelled something unusual)  
 “*Gasu no nioi-ja-nai?*’ to Nobuko ga itta.  
 “*Taihenda! Doko-darō?*” (Akagawa: 457)  
 ‘ “Gas, isn’t it?” said Nobuko.  
 Saegusa cried out. “This is terrible! Where is the smell from?” ’

(A) The case of no verb (*darō/nodarō* are acceptable)

a. (*Nioi wa*) ***Doko-darō?*** ‘Where is the smell from?’

→a’. (*Nioi wa*) ***Doko-na-nodarō?*** ‘Where is the smell from?’

→a’’. (*Nioi wa*) ***Doko-kara -darō /na-nodarō?*** ‘Where is the smell from?’

(B) The case in which the verb *niou* ‘smell’ is used

→b. *Doko kara niou-nodarō*. (*nodarō* is acceptable)

‘Where is the smell from?’

→b’. # *Doko kara niou-darō*. (*darō* is not acceptable in that context)

‘Where does it smell?’ (=It smells nowhere.)

As shown in example (74A), (*Nioi wa*) *Doko-(kara)-darō /na-nodarō?* ‘Where is the smell from?’ is acceptable. (74a), (74a’) and (74a’’) are all the front-conjecture usages. The gas smell is regarded as a definite situation. The utterer tries to identify where the source of the smell is. These sentences satisfy two conditions for substitution (the front-conjecture type and the interpretation of the situation). Hence, *darō* and *nodarō* are interchangeable. In contrast, in the case of (B) above, the verb *niou* ‘smell’ is used in front of *darō/nodarō*. In this case, *nodarō* is acceptable as shown in (74b), but *darō* is not as shown in (74b’). The reason for this is that focus-conjecture usage is used in this sentence. Only *nodarō* can make use of this usage. When *darō* is used in sentence (74b’), the meaning is ‘it smells nowhere’ (a rhetorical question).’

In addition, other examples of interrogatives are shown:

- (75) When a verb appears between an interrogative and *nodarō/darō*, the two modals are not interchangeable:
- a. *Naze-darō/na-nodarō?* ‘Why?’  
→ a’. *Naze ~Verb-nodarō?* (\**darō*)
  - b. *Doshite-darō/na-nodarō?* ‘Why?’  
→ b’. *Doshite ~Verb-nodarō?* (\**darō*)
  - c. *Nanno-tame-darō/na-nodarō?* ‘For what?’  
→ c’. *Nanno-tame-ni ~Verb-nodarō?* (\**darō*)

**(b) ‘*Sore wa sō darō/na-nodarō*’: Approval/sympathy to what is said**

*Darō* and *nodarō* are used to express approval/sympathy such as *sore wa sō darō* ‘I think so, or I agree with it’ and *sore wa sō na nodarō* ‘I think so, or I agree with it’. For example:

- (76) (He is talking to his daughter about whether she wants to go to the restaurant car with her lover when he is going to have a meal)  
 “*Sōka, yappari-na. Ocha mo hoshiku-nai-to omotte-mo-ka?*”  
 “*Sōyo. Sonna toki de mo, Nitta-san no soba ni tsuite-ite-agetai-wa. Mono ga taberare-nakattara, kōhī demo totte, otsukiaisuru-wa*”  
*Sō-darō-na, to chichioya wa unazuite aizuchi o utta.* (Matsumoto: 68)  
 ‘ “ Really. That is what I expected. Even if you do not want to drink a cup of tea?”  
 “Yes. Even so, I want to stay by his side. If I am not hungry, I will order a cup of coffee to keep him company.”  
 “I quite agree with it”, said her father, showing his agreement.’  
 → a. *Sō-darō/na-nodarō.*  
 ‘I think so. I agree with it.’

As shown in example (76), the utterer shows his approval of what his daughter is saying. The *sō-darō* sentence can be regarded as showing the interpretation of the action (going together to keep the lover company). Sentence (76a) satisfies the two conditions (the front-conjecture type and the interpretation of the situation). Hence, *darō* and *nodarō* can be substituted for each other.

**(c) ‘*Dokoni aru darō/nodarō*’ (nowhere) for a rhetorical question**

When *nodarō* is used to express a rhetorical question, the use of *darō* is acceptable instead of *nodarō*. The meanings here are slightly different. *Nodarō* is slightly softer than *darō* because *darō* shows the claim that the proposition is true. However, *nodarō* and *darō* are interchangeable.

(77) *Kore ga kimi-na-no-ka. Watashi wa odoroki-nagara, aratamete sono otoko o shigeshigeto minaosa-nakereba-naranakatta. Kan no tame ni setake mo nobikira-nai, dokoka byōshitsu ni sae mieta yūutsuna shōnen-jidai no kimi no omokage wa doko-ni aru-nodarō.* (Arishima: 70)

‘I wondered whether this man was Mr Kimoto? I was surprised and I had to look at the man carefully again. [He had completely changed.] In his boyhood, he had looked like he could not have grown taller because of his peevishness. Moreover, he had looked depressed, as if he had been neurotic. [However,] I was wondering where such vestiges of his boyhood were left in his appearance.’

a. *Shōnen-jidai no kimi no omokage wa doko-ni aru-nodarō.*

‘I was wondering where such vestiges of his boyhood were left in his appearance.’ (= Nowhere to be found)

→b. *Shōnen-jidai no kimi no omokage wa doko-ni aru-darō.* (*darō* is acceptable)

‘I was wondering where such vestiges of his boyhood were left in his appearance.’ (= Nowhere to be found)

Both examples (77a) and (77b) can be regarded as rhetorical questions because these sentences indicate that the utterer cannot find any vestige of his boyhood. The *nodarō* and *darō* sentences show that the utterer tries to interpret the detail about Mr Kimoto in the front-conjecture usages. Thus, *nodarō* can be replaced by *darō*.

**(d) Rare cases in which the *nodarō/darō* sentence can be regarded as the interpretation of a certain situation**

The *nodarō/darō* sentence can be regarded as the interpretation of a certain situation in some cases. The two conditions (front conjecture usage and interpretation) must be satisfied. For example:

(78) *Ukastuna koto ni, watashi wa Ōto ga chihō no jimū ni shozokushite-iru koto o shiranakatta. Donna panfuretto ni mo ‘Takasaki Jimū Shozoku’ to atta-ga, sore wa ōnā no na-darō to yū kurai ni kangaete-ita.* (Sawaki: 504)

‘I thoughtlessly did not realise that Ōto belonged to the gym in the provinces. He was described as ‘belonging in the Takasaki Gym’ in brochures, but I thought, “Takasaki would be the name of the gym’s owner.” ’

a. *Sore wa ōnā no na-darō.*

‘I thought, “Takasaki would be the name of the gym’s owner.” ’

→b. *Sore wa ōnā no na-na-nodarō.* (*nodarō* is acceptable)

‘I thought, “Takasaki would be the name of the gym’s owner.”’

In examples (78a) and (78b), the utterer conjecturally judges that ‘it (=Takahashi) is the name of the gym’s owner’. That is, the utterer interprets Takasaki as the name of the gym’s owner (though actually the name is a place-name). Moreover, both usages are the front-conjecture types. So the two conditions for substitution are satisfied. Hence, *darō* and *nodarō* are interchangeable. In addition, with regard to the nuances, precisely, *darō* expresses the utterer’s soft claim that the proposition is true while *nodarō* expresses the utterer’s interpretation of the specific situation. In this case, examples like in the above are difficult to find, so example (78) could be considered as an exception.

The above examination leads to the conclusion that *darō* and *nodarō* are rarely interchangeable under the two conditions — the front-conjecture type and the interpretation of the specific situation. Even if the two modals can be substituted for each other in rare cases, *darō* and *nodarō* express different nuances, the soft claim and the interpretation of the specific situation, respectively.

#### 4-7. Conclusion

Through the analysis of *nodarō* and *darō*, this chapter has uncovered a number of differences between the two modals. Firstly, the chapter has established that *nodarō* evidences both front-conjecture and focus-conjecture usages while *darō* has only the front-conjecture usage, reinforcing Kuramochi’s (1980) and Nakahata’s (1998) views that *nodarō* has two types of syntactic structure. In particular, the focus-conjecture type has been analysed in detail. This type is used to show the focus of conjecture in the following four cases as representative — (1) complementary constituents to verbs (= arguments related directly to verbs), (2) interrogatives, (3) adverbial clauses, and (4) causal clauses. Moreover, using Mikami’s idea (1959: 104) about topicalisation of *noda*, this chapter has demonstrated that in the focus-conjecture type of *nodarō* the front part of *nodarō* can be topicalised and thereby the internal structure of this type is clarified.

Secondly, this chapter has demonstrated the significance of the presence

of a specific situation, building on Kuramochi's (1980) and Nakahata's (1998) views. This chapter has particularly clarified what Nakahata (1998: 33) expressed in terms of 'a conjecture based on the substance' of *nodarō*. The presence of a specific situation related to the judgement is necessary for the *nodarō* sentence while the *darō* sentence does not require it. In other words, *nodarō* is an expression involving a certain situation but *darō* is not. This chapter has clarified how the judgement of *nodarō* is related to a certain situation which can be regarded as the objective core of judgement, categorising the important relationships between judgement and situation into seven categories — (1) cause, (2) reason, (3) implication, (4) background, (5) purpose, (6) details, and (7) natural consequence.

Thirdly, this chapter has shown the distinctive characteristics of the *nodarō* function. That is, *nodarō* serves to express the interpretation of the specific situation through inference while *darō* works to show the utterer's soft claim that the proposition is true. This chapter has particularly demonstrated that *nodarō* embodies inference in the way of thinking, and that the utterer interprets the specific situation through inference.

Two additional phrases are shown in this chapter: *~to shuchō-dekiru* 'I can claim/maintain so' and *~to (jitai o) kaishaku-dekiru* 'I can interpret a certain situation as that'. The phrase-additional method is useful to understand the distinction between *nodarō* and *darō*. This chapter shows that in general, *nodarō* and *darō* cannot be substituted for each other, except in the following three cases —(1) interrogatives appearing in front of *darō/nodarō*, (2) *sore wa sō darō/na-nodarō* showing approval/sympathy for what is said, and (3) *doko-ni aru darō/nodarō* 'nowhere' for the expression of a rhetorical question.

Thus, these findings contribute to a more precise understanding of both *nodarō* and *darō* as distinctive modals even though both have the same conjectural function with high probability. The next chapter will investigate the epistemic modals *yōda* and *rashii* showing inference.

**Chapter 5**

<b>A Study of Epistemic Modals <i>Yōda</i> and <i>Rashii</i>.....</b>	<b>186</b>
5-1. Introduction.....	186
5-2. Review of previous literature.....	187
5-2-1. Simple dichotomous views with unclear definition .....	188
(1) Direct/indirect evidence theory .....	188
(2) Subjectivity/objectivity theory .....	192
5-2-2. Partial characteristics of <i>yōda/rashii</i> found by scholars.....	195
(1) More/less responsibility view.....	195
(2) Direct/indirect experience view.....	196
(3) Degree of certainty view .....	198
5-2-3. Views focusing on the utterer’s attitude of how s/he recognises the subject expressed by <i>yōda/rashii</i> .....	199
(1) Examination of ‘descriptiveness of observation and inference’ theory .....	199
(2) Examination of the <i>hikiyose/hikihanashi</i> theory .....	202
5-3. Two prominent features of <i>yōda/rashii</i> from data analysis .....	204
5-3-1. <i>Rinjōsei</i> : A characteristic of <i>yōda</i> .....	204
5-3-2. Explicitness of evidence: A characteristic of <i>rashii</i> .....	209
5-4. Core function of <i>yōda</i> .....	212
5-4-1. Analysis of the three usages of <i>yōda</i> .....	212
5-4-2. Proposal of a hypothesis of the core function of <i>yōda</i> .....	216
5-5. Core function of <i>rashii</i> .....	217
5-5-1. Analysis of three usages of <i>rashii</i> .....	217
5-5-2. Proposal of the hypothesis of the core function of <i>rashii</i> .....	221
5-5-3. Examination of three usages of <i>rashii</i> from the viewpoint of the hypothesis .....	222
5-6. Evidence of the Hypothesis .....	223
5-6-1. Cases in which <i>yōda</i> is acceptable ( <i>*rashii</i> ).....	225
(1) Interrogatives.....	225
(2) Appearances.....	226

(3) Familiarity .....	227
(4) The utterer's own investigation .....	228
(5) Speciality (job, study and technique) .....	228
(6) Reliable and acceptable information .....	229
(7) Euphemistic usage of <i>yōda</i> .....	230
5-6-2. Cases in which <i>rashii</i> is acceptable (* <i>yōda</i> ) .....	232
(1) Unawareness .....	232
(2) Other person's state of mind .....	233
(3) Unfamiliarity .....	234
(4) Investigation by other people .....	235
(5) Non-speciality .....	236
(6) Generalising something thoughtlessly .....	236
(7) Hearsay usage of <i>rashii</i> .....	237
5-6-3. Analysis of the case in which both <i>yōda</i> and <i>rashii</i> are acceptable....	
.....	238
5-7. Conclusion .....	243

### List of Tables

Table 5-1. Ratio of appearance of <i>rinjōsei</i> in the <i>yōda/rashii</i> sentence <sup>268</sup> .....	206
Table 5-2. Ratio of explicitness and implicitness of evidence .....	211

### List of Figures

Fig 5-1. Figurativeness, conjecture and euphemism of <i>yōda</i> .....	215
Fig 5-2. Way of thinking of <i>rashii</i> in the conjecture usage .....	222
Fig 5-3. Substitutionability between <i>yōda rashii</i> .....	225

# Chapter 5

## A Study of Epistemic Modals *yōda* and *rashii*

### 5-1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to investigate the epistemic modals *yōda* and *rashii*. *Yōda* is considered as expressing figurativeness and conjecture at the end of a sentence (Nagano 1951 and 1969; Yoshida 1971; Kuramochi 1980; Teramura 1984),<sup>1</sup> while *rashii* is regarded as expressing attribute and conjecture (Nagano 1951; Toyama 1969; Yoshida 1971; Kuramochi 1980; Teramura 1984). The two modals have the similar usage of conjecture since they both express the utterer's uncertain judgement. Also, both are regarded as expressing judgement based on evidence (Kashiwaoka 1980; Shibata 1982; Morita 1983; Miyake 1994 and 1995). *Yōda* and *rashii* undoubtedly are different modals used in different ways in such a situation as

- (1) a. (Looking at the dark sky, the utterer is talking to his colleague)  
*Ashita wa ame ga furu-yōda-ne.*  
 'It will rain tomorrow + *yōda*'<sup>2</sup>
- b. (He watched the weather forecast on the TV this morning which said it would rain tomorrow. He is talking to his colleague about the weather in the afternoon.)  
*Ashita wa ame ga furu-rashii-ne.*  
 'It will rain tomorrow + *rashii*'

Although these sentences are both natural, what they imply are different. Sentence

---

<sup>1</sup> Nagano (1951 and 1969) and Yoshida (1971) express conjecture using the term *futashikana dantei* 'uncertain assertion'. They demonstrate that *yōda* has other usages such as *icchi* 'agreement' *reiji* 'example'(which are not used at the end of a sentence), but this chapter selects the usages appearing at the end of a sentence. The euphemism usage of *yōda* at the end of a sentence is also discussed, to examine the essential function of *yōda*.

<sup>2</sup> Note example sentences are shown without the translation of *yōda/rashii* into English because the nuance of their meaning cannot precisely be expressed by English words (e.g. seem, look, sound, will, would, could, may, might ... etc). Hence, '+ *yōda*' and '+ *rashii*' are used in this chapter.

(1) is spoken by the speaker who is watching the dark sky. In sentence (2), in contrast, the speaker has already obtained certain information from the weather forecast on TV. In (1a), if *rashii* is used in the same context, the new sentence sounds strange. In a similar way, if in (1b) *yōda* is used in the same context, the new sentence sounds strange. Thus, there is a difference between *yōda* and *rashii*.

There have been a lot of studies on *yōda* and *rashii*. Among the studies, the view that *yōda* is used to express descriptiveness of observation while *rashii* is used to express inference is advocated by Nakahata (1990) Tanomura (1991) Kojima (1996). There is another idea that *yōda* expresses judgement based on direct evidence while *rashii* expresses judgement based on indirect evidence (Kashiwaoka 1980; Shibata 1982; Morita 1983; and Hayatsu 1988). In these approaches, however, it remains unclear whether these views can adequately explain their differences. Hence, this chapter will have an attempt to find the distinguishable axis.

Toward to this end, this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews previous studies about *yōda* and *rashii*. Section 3 examines two prominent features of *yōda* and *rashii* — *rinjōsei* ‘co-presence of the utterer and the subject of judgement’, and explicitness/implicitness of evidence— by data analysis. Next, after individually discussing the usages of the two modals, sections 4 and 5 propose the hypothesis of the core functions of *yōda* and *rashii* as the axis to distinguish between the two modals. Section 6 demonstrates real examples which contribute to establish the hypotheses about the definition of the core functions of *yōda* and *rashii*. Section 7, finally, concludes this chapter.

## 5-2. Review of previous literature

This section reviews previous studies on *yōda* and *rashii*, giving an outline of the main theories. The literature can be divided into three types of view: (1) simple dichotomous views with no clear definition; (2) views showing partial distinctive features of *yōda/rashii*; and (3) views focusing on the utterer’s attitude of how s/he recognizes the subject expressed by *yōda/rashii*. The aim of this section is to clarify the problems in each approach to assess whether or not its theory is

appropriate. The discussion is organised in order of the types shown above.

### 5-2-1. Simple dichotomous views with unclear definition

The simple dichotomous views — the direct/indirect evidence theory and the subjective/objective theory — are examined in that order.

#### (1) Direct/indirect evidence theory

The direct/indirect theory has the view that *yōda* expresses judgement based on direct grounds (or information) while *rashii* is based on indirect grounds. This is one of the representative theories on discrimination of the two modals, which is advocated by Kashiwaoka (1980), Shibata (1982), and Morita (1983).

Kashiwaoka (1980: 171) states that *yōda* has direct material as a ground while *rashii* has indirect material from outside information as a ground. The standing point of Shibata (1982: 88-90) is similar to that of Kashiwaoka. Shibata discusses the discrimination to show that the direct proof of judgement has a high certainty in the case of *yōda* while the indirect proof in the *rashii* case has a lower certainty. Consider the following example shown by Shibata, who accepts both *yōda* and *rashii* in this sentence:

- (2) *Yūbe ore wa yopparatte kenkashita-{yōda/rashii}*. (Shibata 1982: 89)  
 ‘I fought with someone when I was drunk last night + *yōda/rashii*.’

In sentence (2), according to Shibata, when there is clear evidence such as a bruise, *yōda* is used. In contrast, when the utterer hears that s/he fought last night, *rashii* is used because hearsay is indirect evidence. However, this does not clearly distinguish between direct and indirect evidence. For example, in one case, when the utterer thinks that the bruise might be caused by falling or something, the bruise cannot be regarded as direct evidence for fighting. So the decision to use either direct or indirect evidence depends on where the bruise is e.g. an arm, a hand, a leg or his face (around his eye). Moreover, there are cases where both *yōda* and *rashii* are acceptable. When the utterer hears that s/he fought last night, if he fully agrees with what is said by someone who got with him, *yōda* could be used in spite of it being indirect evidence of hearsay. In the case where the bruise

is around the utterer's eye, which is regarded as direct evidence by Shibata, *rashii* could also be used as well as *yōda* in spite of it being direct evidence. Thus, the distinction through the two types of evidence cannot explain the difference between the two modals in use. Consider another example given by Shibata:

- (3) *Kami no ke wa nagai ga, dōyara otoko {mitaida/no-yōda/rashii}*. (Shibata 1982: 93)  
 ‘Although the person has long hairs, the person is a man + *mitaida/*  
*(no)yōda/rashii*.’

The judgement is made on the appearance of the person. According to Shibata, the person's face directly seen by the utterer is direct evidence, while the person's back and hair seen by her/him is indirect evidence. Shibata concludes that the former is suitable for *yōda* while the latter is for *rashii*. However, his explanation is not clear. In the former case the sentence is generally expressed without *yōda* because it is evident whether the person is a man or a woman. Only in uncertain cases is *yōda* or *rashii* used (excluding the usage of euphemism). In the latter cases (watching her/his back and hair), both *yōda* and *rashii* seem to be acceptable. Thus, the direct/indirect ground theory is not sufficient to distinguish between the two modals.

Morita (1983: 169-173) states that *yōda* and *rashii* can be used when they can be replaced with the phrase *dōmo...to yū kanji ga suru* ‘I feel that ...’. He also explains that *yōda* is used when the evidence is internal while *rashii* is used with external evidence. Consider the following example given by Morita (1983):

- (4) a. *Kyū ni atari ga kurakunatta-tokoro o miru to, dōyara hitoame kuru-rashii*  
 (Morita 1983: 172)  
 ‘Judging from the sudden darkness in the sky, it looks like rain + *rashii*.’  
 b. *Amado ga sukkari shimatte-iru. Rusu-rashii*. (Morita 1983: 172)  
 ‘The sliding shutter is completely closed. He is away from home +  
*rashii*.’

In examples (4a) and (4b), according to Morita, *rashii* is appropriate because the judgement is made based on certain outside evidence. However, in these examples *(no) yōda* also seems to be acceptable. If so, this means that his index of the

discrimination depending on whether evidence is external or internal cannot distinguish between *yōda* and *rashii*. Consider the following example (5) provided by Morita:

- (5) a. *Atamaga zukizuki suru. Kaze o hiita-rashii.* (Morita 1983: 172)  
 ‘I have a splitting headache. I caught a cold + *rashii*.’  
 b. *Senaka ga chikuchiku suru. Mushi ni demo sasareta-rashii.* (Morita 1983: 172)  
 ‘I have a stabbing pain in my back. I have been bitten by something like a bug + *rashii*.’

In example (5), Morita remarks (1983: 172) that although *rashii* is used, *yōda* is acceptable. However, the evidence, a splitting headache and a stabbing pain, are directly obtained via the utterer’s own sense; Nevertheless, *rashii* is used. This is inconsistent with his view, but he gives no explanation of this.

Direct/indirect evidence has not been clearly defined in the literature, so this chapter defines it as follows: Direct evidence can be defined as a clue for judgement which exists in the same spatial-temporal situation with the utterer, in which a certain event happens/happened. Indirect evidence lacks either (or both) the same spatial or temporal situation, and the utterer is/was not in the situation where a certain event happens/happened.

My counterargument to the direct/indirect theory can be made by exhibiting counter examples, in which *yōda* is used in spite of having indirect ground (or evidence) while *rashii* is used in spite of having direct ground (or evidence).

### ***Rashii* is used in spite of direct evidence**

In spite of the judgement being based on indirect information (or evidence), *yōda* can be used. For example:

- (6) (The utterer is directly look at children playing at housekeeping)  
*Nobuo wa Machiko-tachi no hō o mita. (Omission)*  
 “*Hon no hitotsu-desu-keredo, dōzo oagarikudasai-mase*”  
*Sumashita Machiko no koe ni,*  
 “*Gochisō-sama-desu-wa-ne*”  
*to, Fujiko mo sumashita koe nagara, yaya adokenaku kotaete-iru. Dōyara,*

*senbei mo yōkan mo, mamagoto no dōgu ni natte-shimatta-rashii.* (Miura: 131)

‘Nobuo looked at Machiko [and Fujiko playing house]. (omission)

‘Please, have one, though I am sorry that there is not much’, said Machiko with a serious face. Fujiko answered seriously but childishly, ‘Thank you for these good things’. The rice crackers and the sweet jellied azuki-bean paste had become their tools for playing house + *rashii*.’

In example (6), the utterer Nobuo is directly watching Machiko and Fujiko playing house, so the judgement is made on the basis of direct information. The direct/indirect view specifies that *yōda* must be used in this sentence; nevertheless, *rashii* is used.

### ***Yōda* is used in spite of indirect evidence**

Also, in spite of the judgement being based on indirect information (or evidence), *yōda* can be used. For example:

(7) (The newspaper reported that the Naitō was going to comeback.)

*Naitō wa ranningu-shatsu o kite, ringu no ue de faiting-pōzu o totte-ita. Watashi wa [shinbun-] kiji o kurikaeshi yonda. Sukunakutomo, Naitō ga kamubakku shiyō to shiteiru koto wa tashikana-yōdatta.* (Sawaki: 15)

‘[in the photo] *Naitō* took the fighting pose in the ring. I read the newspaper article repeatedly. It was certain that *Naitō* was going to make a comeback + *yōdatta*.’

The article in a sports newspaper can be regarded as indirect evidence. If ‘I’ had obtained the information about *Naitō*’s comeback directly from him, then the information could be regarded as direct evidence. In this example, according to the direct/indirect theory, *rashii* must be used because of the indirect evidence; nevertheless, *yōda* is used. Hence, this example does not agree with this theory.

The above examination leads to the conclusion that the direct/indirect grounds theory cannot provide a clear method of distinguishing between *yōda* and *rashii*. Moreover, the result suggests that it is not the quality of evidence (or ground) for judgement that becomes the index of distinction between *yōda* and *rashii*, but other matters relating to the judgement, such as the utterer’s recognition of the subject for judgement.

## (2) Subjectivity/objectivity theory

Here, the subjective/objective theory is examined. There are two schools: (1) *yōda* expressing objectivity vs. *rashii* expressing subjectivity, and (2) the opposite view. Okamura (1969: 47) was the first person to advocate that *yōda* expresses objectivity while *rashii* expresses the subjectivity of the speaker. She alleges that since *yōda* has an assertion because of *da*, the degree of confidence is strong, and that the situation expressed by *yōda* is regarded as objective. She maintains that *yōda* is suitable for descriptiveness and report, claiming that *yōda* expresses objectivity. Her opinion is scarcely supported. Conversely, the opposite view to Okamura is claimed by Morita (1980), Sakata (1982), and Teramura (1984)<sup>3</sup>. Morita (1980: 508, 1983) regards *rashii* as objective judgement. That is to say, the utterer expresses objective judgement using *rashii* through external information. Sakata (1982 : 385) states that *rashii* expresses the utterer's judgement based on objective evidence, and Teramura (1984 : 250~251) states that *yōda* is a subjective conjecture which explicitly shows the utterer's subjectivity. Kamitani (1995: 571) also follows in these views.

However, in the latter view (the subjectivity of *yōda* and the objectivity of *rashii*), the definitions of *shukan* 'subjectivity' and *kyakkan* 'objectivity' are obscure, because clear definitions are not provided adequately. Although Teramura (1984: 250-251) states that the subjectivity indicates the utterer's idea or opinion, the concept remains vague.<sup>4</sup> The two terms as defined in the 'Kōjien' (5<sup>th</sup> edition) dictionary can be interpreted as follows:<sup>5</sup>

Objectivity: A reasonable idea or feeling with which many people can agree  
 Subjectivity: Utterer's idea and feeling. It is not certain whether everybody can agree with it.

<sup>3</sup> In precise, Morita does not say *yōda* is subjective and Teramura does not say *rashii* is objective. However, comparing the difference between *yōda* and *rashii*, they use the terms, objective/subjective. Therefore, it seems that it is appropriate to consider the two modals *yōda* and *rashii* as subjective and objective, respectively.

<sup>4</sup> Tokieda (1953) and Kindaichi (1953) discuss the terms *shukan* 'subjective' and *kyakkan* 'objective'. As shown in this discussion, these terms often cause confusion. Clear definitions are required when they are used as terms.

<sup>5</sup> The 'Kōjien' (5th edition) defines them as follows: Objectivity ①Subject of subjective recognition and subject of action. ②what is independent of subjective action. Subjectivity ①(philosophy) a word with the opposite meaning to objectivity. ②Idea and feeling of her/himself.

Using the general definition above, counter examples against the two subjective/objective usage of *yōda/rashii* views are demonstrated below.<sup>6</sup>

### ***Yōda* is used to express both subjective and objective judgement**

*Yōda* is used to express both subjective and objective judgement. The following example (8) is of a self-congratulatory expression:

- (8) (When ‘I’ got in the bus to the town centre from the airport, ‘I’ tried to speak Korean)  
*[Basu ni] norikomu to, suguni wakai josei no shashō ga ryōkin o chōshū ni kita. Zen’ya oboeta bakari no ayashigena kankokugo de,*  
*“Watashi, puraza-hoteru, iku”*  
*to yū to, kanojo wa nikkori waratte-unazuita. Saisaki wa yoi-yōda, to watashi wa mizukara o hagemashita. (Sawaki: 870)*  
 ‘As soon as I got in the bus, the conductor, a young lady, came to me to collect the charge. I tried to speak the Korean phrases which I had just learned last night.  
 “I am going to the Plaza-hotel.” [in Korean]  
 She nodded, smiling. I thought, “I have made a good beginning + *yōda*”, encouraging myself.’

In example (8), the part ‘I have made a good beginning + *yōda*’ is subjectively judged by the utterer because he managed to communicate to the bus conductor in Korean. Here, *yōda* is used to express subjective judgement. This example contradicts Okamura’s view.

Conversely, *yōda* is also used to express objective judgement. This means that the opposite idea to Okamura’s cannot be supported. Consider the following example:

- (9) (When I visited Naitō, he was away from home. After two hours, I visited him again.)  
*Shikashi, kondo wa mado ga shimerare, sentakumono mo torikomarete-ita. Atari wa sukkari kuraku-natte-ita-ga, heya ni wa denki mo tsuite-inakatta. Irechigaini-natte-shimatta-yōdatta. (Sawaki: 29)*  
 ‘[When I visited Naitō, the windows were open.] However, the windows were now closed. There was no washing outside. It had already become

---

<sup>6</sup> The basic nature of modality is the utterer’s inner thought, idea, emotion, etc. These forms *yōda* and *rashii* express the utterer’s inner world. In this sense, it is not appropriate to discuss subjectivity/objectivity concerning these modals. However, this discussion cannot be ignored because it has been made by scholars mentioned above who are influential with linguists.

dark but in the room the electric light was not turned on. I came just after he left + *yōda*.’

In example (9), the house looks different, compared with ‘my’ first visit two hours ago. So the utterer can objectively guess that the people there came back once but he (or his wife) went out again. Thus, *yōda* is also used in order to express objective judgement.

### ***Rashii* is used to express both objective and subjective judgement**

*Rashii* is also used to express both subjective and objective judgement. The following example shows that *rashii* is used to express subjective judgement:

- (10) (This is a scene in which boys are talking about a ghost. A boy says, ‘I hear that someone has heard the crying voice of a woman)  
 “*Ittai, dare ga sono nakigoe o kiita-no-sa*” *Nobuo wa ochitsuite-itta.*  
 “*Shiran. Shiran-keredo hontō-rashii-yo. Nā.*” [*Ōtake ga itta*].  
*Matsui ga minna no kao o mita.* (Miura: 93)  
 ‘ “Who heard the crying voice?” asked Nobuo calmly.  
 “I don’t know. I don’t know, but it is true + *rashii*. You see,” said [*Ōtake*].  
 Matsui looking at their faces.’

In example (10), the boy believes in the existence of a ghost with no evidence. The crying voice of a ghost cannot be considered as objective. Hence, it can be said that he expresses his subjective judgement using *rashii*.

Conversely, *rashii* is also used to express objective judgement, as follows:

- (11) (I came to America [Los Angeles]. I paid the hotel charges. After drinking cola, I went out.)  
*San-burokku arukuto, hageshiku hito no yukikau, hankana tōri ni deta.*  
*Hyōshiki ni yoreba, Burōdo-uei to yū tōri-rashikatta.* (Sawaki: 292)  
 ‘After walking three blocks, I arrived at a busy street where many people come and go. According to a guidepost on the street, the street name was Broadway + *rashikatta*.’

In example (11), the guidepost is an objective sign for people. The expression can be considered as the utterer’s objective judgement because many people can agree with the judgement which is made on the basis of the guidepost. Thus, *rashii* is

also used to express objective judgement.

The above examination leads to the view that *yōda* and *rashii* cannot be simply distinguished by either subjective or objective judgement. Hence, the subjectivity/objectivity theory cannot be adopted as the principle for the distinction between the two modals.

To sum up, these simple dichotomous theories — the direct/indirect evidence theory and the subjective/objective theory — are problematic. First, the definitions (direct/indirect and subjective/objective) are not clear, so the two factors cannot be clearly distinguished. Second, counter examples can be found with no difficulty. Hence, these dichotomous theories cannot be adopted.

### 5-2-2. Partial characteristics of *yōda/rashii* found by scholars

These are the more/less responsibility view, the direct/indirect experience view and the degree of certainty view.

#### (1) More/less responsibility view

The more/less responsibility view (Kashiwaoka 1980; Shibata 1982; Morita 1983; Masuoka and Takubo 1992; Hayatsu 1988; and Masuoka, 2000) indicates that *yōda* accepts some responsibility for the judgement while *rashii* accepts little responsibility like an onlooker. No counter arguments have been made to this.

According to Morita (1983:171-172), among the three modals, *yōda*, *rashii* and hearsay *sōda*, the highest responsibility is expressed by *yōda*, and the second by *rashii*, and hearsay *sōda* expresses no responsibility. As examined in subsection 4-4-3 (chapter 4), hearsay *sōda* does not include any subjectivity on the part of the judging person, so the utterer has no responsibility for the content of the *sōda* expression. Also, Masuoka and Takubo (1992) point out that the utterer draws a conclusion using *yōda* by her/himself while the utterer has a tendency to avoid the responsibility of her/his judgement by using *rashii*. The following is an example of this view:

#### (12) (I talked to Ōmiya in the editorial office)

“*Saikin no igaku ni yoruto, otoko de dōseiai-teki keikō no aru mono no yubi wa, hosonagai koto ga wakatta rashii-ne.*” (Endō, Shūsaku “*Daini yūmoa*

*shōsetsu-shū*” (The second collected humorous novels) p135 Kōdansha, cited by Shibata 1982: 89). (\**yōda*)

‘ “According to the latest medical science, people who tend to be homosexual have long thin fingers + *rashii*.” ’

In example (12), since it does not seem that in the *rashii* expression the utterer maintains it with responsibility, this view is acceptable. However, this theory cannot explain the whole *yōda/rashii*. For example:

(13) (There were police cars in front of the Otō house. Junko was going to go into the house)

“*Haira-nai-de!*” to, *keikan ni tomerareru-to*,

*Junko wa “gokurōsan” to koe o kake, “Taniguchi-san o yonde-chōdai” to itta.*

“*Taniguchi...*”

*Junko ga kiyasuku yobu-node, keikan mo menkuratta-rashii.*

“*Ano...anata wa?*”

“*Watashi? Chotto mibun wa akasenai-wa.*” (Akagawa: 720)

‘ “Don’t go in this house!” the policeman said to Junko. She said to him, “Thank you for your work” and “Please ask Mr Taniguchi to come here.”

“Taniguchi...” The policeman was quite flustered + *rashii* because she used the detective’s name so familiarly.

“Er...You are...?”

“Me? Sorry, I cannot reveal my identity.”

→a. *Keikan mo menkuratta-rashii/yōda.*

‘The policeman was quite flustered + *rashii/yōda.*’

As shown in example (13a), *yōda* can be substituted for *rashii*. In this sentence *rashii* is used but this sentence does not show that the *rashii* expression has less responsibility than *yōda*. Hence, the more/less responsibility view is one which grasps only a partial characteristic.

## (2) Direct/indirect experience view

Masuoka and Takubo (1992) claim that the utterer expresses her/his direct experience by use of *yōda* while s/he expresses her/his indirect experience by *rashii*. Masuoka and Takubo (1992: 128) define direct experience as what the utterer has experienced directly by her/himself, including visual sensation and her/his own examination of something, and by contrast, indirect experience as what is not direct experience, for example, hearsay, other’s examination...etc.

They demonstrate this with the following examples (1992 : 128):

(14) Indirect experience:

*Anohito wa dōmo kekkonshite-iru-rashii. Tanaka-kun ga kodomo to asonde-iru-no-o mita to-itte-iru.*

‘That person is married + *rashii*. Mr Tanaka is saying that he saw that person playing with a child in the playground.’

Direct experience:

*Anohito wa dōmo kekkonshite-iru-yōda. Kekkō-yubiwa o shite-ita-mono.*

‘That person is married + *yōda* because he wore a wedding ring.’

This view is acceptable. However, there are examples which use *rashii* in spite of referring to the utterer’s direct experience. The problem about how the example should be explained remains. For example:

(15) (I am surprised to hear that Yumiko is pregnant)

*“Yumiko-san ga ninshinshiteru?”*

*“Un, Edī san ga chiratto sonna koto o itte-ta-nda.”*

*“Hontoni?”*

*Watashi wa omowazu utagawashi-sōna koe o dashite-ita-rashii. Toshiaki wa kushōsuru to (omission).* (Sawaki: 906)

‘“Yumiko is pregnant?”

“Yes. Eddie told me about it.”

“Really?”

I cried doubtfully + *rashii*. Toshiaki gave a wry smile.’

In example (15) ‘I’ actually spoke with my own voice, which can be regarded as direct experience.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, *rashii* is used here. Another example is shown:

(16) (I am watching ‘Dirty Harry’ on TV at a hotel in Los Angeles)

*Sore [Terebi no ‘Dirty Harry’] o mirukoto ni necchū shi-nagara, ima jibun ga furete-iru no to onaji kūki ga sono gamen no naka ni mo nagarete-iru-noda-nā nado to kangaete-ita. Soshite, naruhodo jibun wa Amerika ni kite-iru-rashii, to yū omoi ga waite-kitari-shita.* (Sawaki: 284)

‘Enthusiastically watching the TV program [Dirty Harry], I realised that I was immersed in the same American air as that in the movie on TV. The idea produced the feeling that I was indeed staying in America + *rashii*.’

<sup>7</sup> If we interpret this *rashii* as being used from the viewpoint of Toshiaki, the indirect experience might be acceptable. This chapter does not consider the transfer of the viewpoint.

In example (16), ‘I’ had actually come to America from Japan and was staying in Los Angeles now. So this situation can be regarded as ‘my’ direct experience. Nevertheless, *rashii* is used.

Thus, there are examples where the direct/indirect experience view cannot sufficiently explain the discrimination between *yōda* and *rashii*, particularly, the case where *rashii* is used in spite of it being direct experience.

### (3) Degree of certainty view

After his direct/indirect experience theory Masuoka (2000) proposes a different view, that utterer expresses the high degree of her/his certainty using *yōda* while s/he expresses a lower degree using *rashii*. The following example is given by Masuoka (2000: 145):

- (17) a. *Machigainaku, tonari no heya ni dareka iru-yōda.*  
 ‘Surely, someone is present in the next room + *yōda*.’  
 b. ? *Machigainaku, tonari no heya ni dareka iru-rashii.*  
 ‘Surely, someone is present in the next room + *rashii*.’

Masuoka (2000: 145-148) proposes a new view that there is a difference in degree of her/his certainty between *yōda* and *rashii*, showing the following scales: (i) *yōda* can co-appear with *machigainaku* ‘surely or unfailingly’ while *rashii* cannot, (ii) *rashii* is in harmony with the expression of a low degree of certainty, because *rashii* and *machigainaku* ‘surely’ are not well-matched. However, example (17b) seems to sound natural. Moreover, can his view explain the following example?

- (18) (Oka Midori was followed by someone on a pitch-dark night)  
 a. *Otte-kuru kehai ni, Oka Midori wa furimuki-zama, baggu de aite no kao no Atari o omoikiri utta. “u!” tto aite ga umeku. Meichūshita-rashii.*  
 (Akagawa: 863)  
 ‘Oka Midori felt that someone was following immediately behind her. The moment she turned around, she hit him on his face with her bag. He groaned. She had hit the target right + *rashii*.’  
 →b. *Machigainaku meichūshita-rashii.*  
 ‘Surely, she hit him on his face.’

In (18a), even though it is dark in this situation, she tried to hit him on his face with her handbag. She should be able to feel whether the handbag has hit him. It

can be said that this sentence expresses a high degree of certainty by use of *rashii*. So, as shown in example (18b), *machigainaku* ‘surely’ is harmonious with the original sentence. Thus, this view cannot entirely distinguish between *yōda* and *rashii*.

### **5-2-3. Views focusing on the utterer’s attitude of how s/he recognises the subject expressed by *yōda/rashii***

The ‘descriptiveness of observation and inference’ theory and the ‘*hikiyose*’/‘*hikihanashi*’ (bringing a thing near to the utterer and distancing a thing from the utterer) theory are examined.

#### **(1) Examination of ‘descriptiveness of observation and inference’ theory**

The theory that *yōda* is used to describe the utterer’s observation while *rashii* is an expression conjecturing a fact by inference has been proposed by scholars (Nakahata 1990; Tanomura 1991; and Kikuchi 2000). Nakahata (1990) asserts that *yōda* is used for descriptiveness of the real world rather than the expression of fact whereas *rashii* is used for the inference of fact. According to Nakahata (1990: 32), *yōda* has no inference, describing the real world apprehended by the senses, which is prominently shown in the euphemistic usage of *yōda*. Tanomura (1991: 63) has the same standpoint, arguing on *yōda* expressing outward appearances/ impressions but not expressing the inference of fact. In contrast, according to Nakahata (1990: 29), *rashii* has inference not only in its conjectural usage but also in its hearsay usage. Tanomura (1991:63-66) maintains that *rashii* indicates an estimate of fact based on grounds. Their terms are different but what they indicate seems to be the same view.

Following Nakahata and Tanomura, Kojima (1996 : 576) states that when *yōda* is used, the outward appearance looks like X, while when *rashii* is used, the speaker infers that it is actually X. Kikuchi (2000) follows these previous studies, stating that *yōda* is used for descriptiveness of observation under the utterer’s experience without inference versus *rashii* for inference without her/his experience.

The key words of this theory are ‘descriptiveness’ and ‘inference’ which

are used as opposite concepts. According to this theory, *yōda* serves as expressing descriptiveness while *rashii* works with inference as the main function. Whether or not these two factors are appropriate for the distinction of *yōda/rashii* is examined in this subsection, which attempts to put the counter argument of these two points: (1) *yōda* also has inference the same as *rashii*, and (2) the hearsay usage of *rashii* has little inference. If these are proved, the result means that the descriptiveness of observation and inference view is not appropriate.

### Examination of *yōda*'s descriptiveness

The descriptiveness aspect of *yōda* is opposed to inference, so descriptiveness can here be regarded as having little inference. On the basis of Nakahata's view, descriptiveness can be defined as follows: Descriptiveness expresses the world apprehended by sense/perception and actual experience, with little inference. If the 'descriptiveness of observation of *yōda*' view is accepted, the following examples must be regarded as descriptiveness:

- (19) (Kishimoto, Nobuo's brother-in-law, is talking about Hokkaido)  
*"Oniisan, bokumo kekkon mae ni, Hokkaidō ni itte-mitakatta-nā. Hokkaidō ni wa, Uchimura Kanzō no deta nō-gakkō ga arimasu-kara-nē."*  
*Kishimoto wa kirisuto-shinja rashii akogare de Hokkaidō o kangaete-iru-yōdatta.* (Miura: 390)  
 ' "Brother, I also wanted to go to Hokkaido before my marriage. In Hokkaido, there is the agricultural school from which Kanzō Uchimura graduated."  
 Kishimoto was longing to go to Hokkaidō as a Christian + *yōdatta*.'

In example (19), Kishimoto's words indicates that he respects Kanzō Uchimura who was a famous Christian. The utterer Kishimoto is also a Christian. Hokkaido, Kanzō Uchimura, and Christians can be combined by inference. As a result, the utterer judges using *yōda* that Kishimoto is longing to go to Hokkaidō as a Christian. Thus, inference can be seen clearly in example (19). The above definition of descriptiveness cannot be applied to this example.

In addition, in this chapter, the term 'inference' is used with the following definition:

The process in which the utterer imagines (or thinks of) the situation on the basis of information which the utterer already has that points towards the conclusion

This definition can be applied to example (19).

Similarly, another example (20) cannot be explained by the definition of descriptiveness:

(20) “*Oniisama. Kakurenbo o shimashō-yo*”

*Machiko ga tachiagatta. Torao mo tatta. Torao no se ga sukoshi nobita-yōda to Nobuo wa nagame nagara, janken o shita.* (Miura: 147)

“Brother. Shall we play hide-and-seek?” said Machiko. She rose to her feet. Torao also stood. Seeing Torao, Nobuo thought that he had got a little taller + *yōda*. They chose the seeker by use of the game ‘paper, stone and scissors’.

In example (20) the utterer focuses on Torao’s height. Looking at Torao, Nobuo finds that he has become a little taller than before. Nobuo has noticed the height of Torao. At a glance, it seems as if this example shows descriptiveness of observation. However, the utterer Nobuo judges Torao’s height compared with Machiko’s height or his memory of Torao’s height. That is, it can be said that Nobuo’s judgement is made by inference. Thus, it is not precise that *yōda* has no inference. These examinations lead to the view that the judgement using *yōda* is also made by inference, the same as *rashii*.

### **Examination of the view that the hearsay usage of *rashii* has inference**

Nakahata’s view that the hearsay usage of *rashii* has inference is examined. Following is the counter argument to his view. Consider the following examples given by Nakahata:

(21) a. *Mekkiri samuku-natta-rashii.* (Nakahata1990: 28)

‘It has become remarkably cold + *rashii*.’

b. *Mekkiri samuku-natta-yōda.* (Nakahata1990: 28)

‘It has become remarkably cold + *yōda*.’

As Nakahata states, this usage of *rashii* in example (21a) is hearsay while in example (21b), *yōda* is used to express euphemism. According to his view, the

former shows inference while the latter shows descriptiveness. However, although the view about *yōda* is acceptable, the view about *rashii* is not acceptable. With *yōda*, the euphemistic *yōda* usage in example (21b) shows that the utterer has experienced the coldness, so s/he recognizes the coldness directly with her/his sense. There is no process of inference in this *yōda* sentence. Conversely, example (21a) with *rashii* shows that the utterer hears of the coldness from someone at a certain place which is different from the place where the utterer talks. S/he only expresses what has been said by someone, namely the verbal information which the utterer has already obtained. So, it seems that there is little inference. Thus, the hearsay usage of *rashii* with little inference is different from the conjecture usage of *rashii* with inference.

Therefore, from the viewpoint of inference and descriptiveness, it can be said that the descriptiveness of observation and inference theory is not adequate as a distinguishing scale between *yōda* and *rashii*.

## **(2) Examination of the *hikiyose/hikihanashi* theory**

The next issue is to examine the *hikiyose/hikihanashi* theory proposed by Hayatsu (1988). The terms *hikiyose* and *hikihanashi*, are translated by ‘bringing near’ (bringing a thing near to the utterer) and ‘distancing’ (distancing a thing from the utterer), respectively. She uses two indexes: (1) direct/indirect information in evidence and (2) *hikiyose* ‘bringing near’ and *hikihanashi* ‘distancing’ in psychology. *Hikiyose* ‘bringing near’ means that the utterer’s judgement grounded in indirect information (or evidence) can be psychologically pulled near her/him by use of the *yōda* although this judgement is psychologically apart from her/him. In contrast, *hikihanashi* ‘distancing’ means that the judgement grounded in direct information (or evidence) is psychologically pulled apart from her/him by *rashii* although this judgement is psychologically close to her/him. Thus, this view adopts a psychological approach, building on the direct/indirect evidence view maintained by Kashiwaoka (1980), Shibata (1982), and Morita (1983). According to Hayatsu, the direct/indirect factor takes precedence over the *hikiyose/hikihanashi* factor. In either case, the utterer’s mental state serves to determine the choice between *yōda* and *rashii*. Hence, her view can be said to be a mental

functionary view.

In the cases of *hikiyose* ‘bringing near’ usage, according to her theory, *rashii* should be used because of the judgement grounded in indirect information (or evidence), but *yōda* is actually used as follows:

- (22) *Sinbun de mimashita ga, kono aida no jishin ni yoru higai wa taihenna mono no-yōdesu-ne.* (Hayatsu 1988: 58)  
 ‘According an article in the newspaper, Mexico was badly damaged by the recent earthquake + *yōda*.’

As shown in example (22), the judgement is grounded in the newspaper which is indirect information; nevertheless, *yōda* is used. In order to explain this contradiction, Hayatsu introduces the psychological operation, *hikiyose* ‘bringing near’.

In contrast, in the *hikihanashi* ‘distancing’ usage, *rashii* is used in spite of it being direct information. Hayatsu provides the following example:

- (23) The case of avoiding her/his responsibility  
 (A mother-in-law) “*Sonnani usugi de wa kawaiō-janaika. Motto kiseteyari-nasai.*”  
 (the daughter-in-law) “*Demo, anmari atsugisaseru-to ase o kaitari ugokinikukattari de kaette yokunai-rashii-desu-yo.* (Hayatsu 1988: 55)  
 ‘I feel sorry that the child is dressed in these thin clothes. You should put more on him’  
 ‘But it is not very good to wear too many clothes, which make him sweat and slow him down + *rashii*.’

In example (23), according to Hayatsu’s opinion, the daughter-in-law’s judgement is regarded as her own judgement grounded in direct information, so *yōda* should be used, but *rashii* is actually used. She explains that by use of *rashii* the expression sounds as if the judgement were not her own, and that the expression is softened. Thus, the contradiction between direct information and *rashii* is explained by introducing the psychological operation.

However, Hayats’s explanation is not suitable. It is reasonable to explain examples with *yōda* or *rashii* by their core functions, but she does not do so. Her view has two stages: the first stage is fundamentally to use *yōda* in the case of direct information and to use *rashii* in the case of indirect information. The second

is to use *hikiyose* ‘bringing near’ with *yōda* and *hikihanashi* ‘distancing’ with *rashii*. The approach considers the psychological operation of *hikiyose/hikihanashi* as a secondary function, which means the effectiveness of *yōda/rashii*. This view is only supplementary to the direct/indirect ground view. Hence, the view does not clarify the essential difference between the two modals.

Through the review of the literature, partial features of *yōda/rashii* can be seen in the above views and theories. For example, in the previous subsection 5-2-2 the more or lesser responsibility view and the direct/indirect experience view show partial features of *yōda* and *rashii*. Also, in this subsection, as Hayatsu states, psychologically in the *yōda* expression, the judgement is made close to the utterer while in *rashii* the judgement is made at a distance from the utterer. This view is acceptable. However, these findings are partial and incomplete because they cannot cover the whole of *yōda/rashii*. A satisfactory theory must be able to explicate the entire usage of the two modals.

### **5-3. Two prominent features of *yōda/rashii* from data analysis**

This section discusses two conspicuous features of *yōda* and *rashii* unrecognised enough in previous studies, through data analysis of modern Japanese novels and critical essays<sup>8</sup>: (1) *rinjōsei* ‘the utterer is present in the scene containing the subject for her/his judgement’ and (2) the implicitness/explicitness of evidence for judgement.

#### **5-3-1. *Rinjōsei* : A characteristic of *yōda***

*Rinjōsei* is defined, and a data analysis is made. *Rinjōsei* can be defined as follows:

---

<sup>8</sup> The novels are *Ukigumo* (The Drifting Cloud), *Kokoro* (Mind), *Rashōmon* (Rashōmon) and *Hana* (The Nose) *Umareizuru nayami* (The Agony of Coming into the World), *Ten to Sen* (Points and Lines), *Hanaokaseishū no Tsuma* (Wife of Doctor Hanaokaseishū), *Shiokari-tōge* (*Shiokari* Pass), *Isshun no natsu* (A Moment of Summer), and *Onnashachō ni kanpai* (A Toast to the Young Lady as President of the Firm). The critical essays are taken from *Tenseijingo* in the *Asahi* newspaper (June, July and October in 2000).

The utterer is present in a certain spatial and temporal scene which contains the subject (or the target) for her/his judgement.<sup>9</sup>

*Rinjōsei* can be expressed in terms of ‘co-presence’ (of the utterer and the subject for her/his judgement). An example of *rinjōsei* is illustrated below:

- (24) (Yasuda’s wife said that since she had been sick for a long time, she could not be expected to recover her health suddenly. Detective Mihara cheers her up, saying)  
 “*Sore wa ikemasen-ne. Shikashi, jikō mo yōkini-narimashita-kara, okarada ni wa ii to omoimasu. Kotoshi no fuyu wa samukatta-yōdesu-kara.*”  
 (Matsumoto: 216)  
 ‘ “I am sorry to hear that. The season has become warm, so this is better for you. It was cold this winter + *yōda*.” ’

In example (24), detective Mihara expresses the coldness of the past winter. He directly experienced the coldness. The winter weather is the subject for his judgement. Thus, the utterer detective Mihara and the subject for his judgement were present spatiotemporally in the same scene.

Conversely, the following example does not have *rinjōsei* ‘co-presence’:

- (25) (In August, my brother in Tokyo called me in Canberra (in winter) on the phone, saying, “It is really muggy now in Tokyo.” Later I talked to my friend about it.)  
 “*Ani no hanashi de wa Tokyo waotoshi mo totemo mushiatsui-yōda-yo. Boku wa ano mushiatsusa o sukkari wasurete-ita.*”  
 ‘ “According to my elder brother, it is also very muggy in Tokyo this summer + *yōda*. I had completely forgotten that mugginess.” ’

In example (25) the utterer lives in Canberra. The subject of the judgement about the weather in Tokyo is spatially apart from the utterer’s place. Hence, it can be said that there is no *rinjōsei*.

Whether *rinjōsei* ‘co-presence’ is relevant in the *yōda/rashii* sentence is quantitatively investigated from ten novels<sup>10</sup> and *Tenseijingo* on the basis of the

<sup>9</sup> Miyake (1995: 188) states that *yōda* has a function of inference which is made in the scene, in terms of *suiron no genbasei* ‘inference made in the scene’. This seems to be close to the concept of *rinjōsei*.

<sup>10</sup> Shimei Futabatei’s *Ukigumo* (The Drifting Cloud) and Sōseki Natsume’s *Kokoro* (Mind) are chosen because Yoshida (1971: 323-324) historically regards the two writer as significant. He points out that not only the attribute but also the conjecture usage of *rashii* are used in *Ukigumo* in the Meiji Period and the conjecture usage of *rashii* drastically increases in Sōseki’s works.

above definition. The result is shown in table 5-1 below.

**Table 5-1. Ratio of appearance of *rinjōsei* in the *yōda/rashii* sentence**

category source	<i>Yōda</i>			<i>Rashii</i>		
	Number of examples	+ <i>Rinjōsei</i>	- <i>Rinjōsei</i>	Number of examples	+ <i>Rinjōsei</i>	- <i>Rinjōsei</i>
<i>Ukigumo</i>	18	18	0	6	6	0
<i>Kokoro</i>	33	31	2	51	44	7
<i>Rashōmon</i> and <i>Hana</i>	1	1	0	6	6	0
<i>Umareizuru nayami</i>	5	5	0	9	7	2
<i>Ten to sen</i>	32	24	8	26	5	21
<i>Hanaokaseishū no tsuma</i>	16	16	0	25	12	13
<i>Shiokaritōge</i>	48	47	1	20	10	10
<i>Isshun no natsu</i>	192	188	4	188	116	72
<i>Onnashatyō ni kanpai</i>	46	28	18	56	29	27
<i>Tenseijingo</i>	8	1	7	11	0	11
Total	399	<b>359</b>	<b>40</b>	398	235	163
(%)	100	<b>89.97</b>	<b>10.03</b>	100	59.0	41.0

[+*Rinjōsei*] indicates that there is *rinjōsei* there while [-*rinjōsei*] means no *rinjōsei*.

As the above table shows, the ratio of appearance of *rinjōsei* ‘co-presence’ in the *yōda* examples, [+*Rinjōsei*] is around 90 percent while [-*Rinjōsei*] is only 10 percent. In contrast, in the *rashii* examples, [+*Rinjōsei*] is around 60 percent while [-*Rinjōsei*] is around 40 percent. The ratio of *rinjōsei* ‘co-presence’ in *yōda* is prominent. On the other hand, the ratio of [-*rinjōsei*] in the *rashii* expression is higher than that in the *yōda* expressions, 41 percent and 10 percent, respectively. This indicates that more often *rashii* is used regardless of whether the presence or absence of *rinjōsei* ‘co-presence’.

The reason why *yōda* is frequently used with the *rinjōsei* ‘co-presence’ is that there are many cases in which the utterer recognise the subject using her/his senses. Whether or not s/he is present in the same scene as the subject for judgement can strongly influence her/his process of recognition. The representative sense is that of sight. In this regard, the ‘observation’ of *yōda* is well grounded.

However, the above table shows that the ratio of [-*rinjōsei*] of *yōda* is around 10 percent (40 examples). This ratio must be regarded as important in order to clarify the conjectural usage of *yōda*. These cases with no *rinjōsei* indicate that in the *yōda* expression the utterer's judgement can also be made without sensation. The examples of *yōda* showing no *rinjōsei* can be seen in the following three cases:<sup>11</sup>

- (i) The utterer is very familiar with the subject (situation and matter) s/he is going to recognize.
- (ii) The utterer has examined the subject (situation and matter) by her/him oneself.
- (iii) The utterer can completely appreciate the proposition of the information because the source and content of information are reliable.

The above three cases are analysed below.

#### **Case (i): The utterer is very familiar with the subject for judgement**

When the utterer is very familiar with the issue, *yōda* is used. The detective is of course well acquainted with crimes, so in the following case *yōda* is used:

- (26) (Detective Torikai was doubtful about the choice of the place for their love suicide)

*[Torikai] Jūtarō wa, Sayama Ken'ichi to Otoki to ga, dōshite kono yōna [sabishii] tokoro o shini-basho ni eranda-nodearo-ka, to omotta. Motto, dōkashita tokoro ga ari-sōni omoeru. Jōshi-sha wa taitei basho o zeitakuni sentakusuru-yōda. Onsen-chi ya kankō-chi ga sō dearu. (Matsusmoto: 86) (# rashii)*

‘[Detective Torikai] wondered why Kenichi Sayama and Otoki had chosen this desolate place as their death-place. It seems that there were other better places. In general, these who are going to die together for love extravagantly choose a beautiful place for their deaths + *yōda*, such as a hot-spring resort or a tourist resort.’

As shown in example (26), the detective was not present at the place when they died. The detective judges using *yōda* that these who are going to die together for love generally choose a beautiful place for their deaths. If he had no knowledge of love suicides, *yōda* would not be used. If it is hearsay, *sōda* might be used. Another example is:

<sup>11</sup> Although the three cases overlap, they are not dealt with in this section.

- (27) (Junko asked detective Taniguchi whether Mr Hayashi was the murderer)  
 (Junko) “*Jā, yappari, Hayashi-kun ga hannin?*”  
 (Taniguchi) “*Zannen-desu-ga, dōmo utagau yochi wa nai-yōdesu.*”  
 (Akagawa: 879) (#*rashii*)  
 ‘Junko: “So, is Mr Hayashi the murderer?”  
 Taniguchi: “Unfortunately, there is no doubt + *yōda*.”’

In example (27), the detective was not present at the scene where the homicide happened. The detective is well informed about criminal investigation. Hence, *yōda* is used to express his judgement.

**Case (ii): The utterer has examined the subject by her/him oneself**

When the utterer has obtained certain information about something through her/his examination, her/his judgement is expressed with *yōda*, not with *rashii*. For example:

- (28) (The chief investigator is talking about the relationship between Sayama (who died) and Yasuda)  
 “*Ima made shirabeta tokoro de wa, yakunin to deiri-shōnin to yū kankei o denai-yōda. Ura de tokushuna musubitsuki ga atta to yū jijitsu wa, mada ukande-konai-noda.*” (Matsumoto: ) (# *rashii*)  
 ‘According to my investigation, Sayama’s relationship with Yasuda is only that between a government officer and a merchant allowed to visit him + *yōda*. I have not yet found that they are linked behind the scenes to each other.’
- (29) *Watashi wa macchimēkā no Yamagata ni shisasareta bokusā-no na o ageta. Yamagata kara kiita toki wa wakaranakatta-ga, atode shirabete-miru-to naruhodo tegoro na aite no-yōdatta.* (Sawaki: 860) (# *rashii*)  
 ‘I showed the name of the boxer whom Yamagata, a boxing impresario, had shown to me. When I heard of the name from Yamagata, I did not know about the name. When I examined what he was like, he was a suitable boxer for Naitō + *yōdatta*.’

In examples (28) and (29), each judgement is expressed with *yōda*. The chief investigator examined personally the relationship between the dead person Sayama and the suspect Yasuda, and ‘I’ have examined what the opponent of the next match is like, respectively. Their own examination lead to their conclusion.

**Case (iii): The utterer can completely appreciate the information**

When the utterer obtains reliable information and understands it with her/his consent, *yōda* is used, not *rashii*. For example:

- (30) (The detective judges about whether Otoki had a lover, based on what the caretaker said)

*“Shikashi, Otoki ni aijin ga ita no wa tashika no yōda-ne. Kanojo wa chiisai apāto ni hitori de ita-ga, yoku kanojo-ate ni denwa ga kakatte-kita-sōda. Kanrinin no hanashi-da-to ... (omission). (Matsumoto: 276) (# rashii)*

‘“Well, it is certain that Otoki had a lover + *yōda*. She lived in a small flat. According to the caretaker [who calls a person to the phone], she often had phone calls.”’

In example (30), after she died the utterer investigates whether Otoki had a lover. He judges this based on what the caretaker of the flat said. Both the source (the caretaker) and his remark are reliable for the detective to search for the criminal. The utterer understands this judgement to his satisfaction. Hence, *yōda* is used, but in this case *rashii* is contextually not appropriate. Another example is:

- (31) (Noguchi explained to me about Naitō’s altered passport)

*Noguchi no hanashi o kiite, [Naitō ga] teire [o uketa] nado to yū ōgesana mono de nai-rashii koto ni watashi wa hitomazu andoshita. Shikashi, pasupōto ga kaizan sarete-iru koto wa tashikana-yōdatta. (Sawaki: 1090) (# rashii)*

‘I am relieved to hear Noguchi’s explanation because I have realised that the police raid [on Naitō] is exaggerated + *rashii*. However, it is certain that Naitō’s passport has been altered + *yōdatta*.’

In example (31), the utterer trusts Noguchi and his explanation so ‘I’ am convinced that the event is like this. Hence, *yōda* is used.

**5-3-2. Explicitness of evidence: A characteristic of *rashii***

In regards to explicitness and implicitness of evidence for judgement, *yōda* and *rashii* are examined by analysis of data collected from the same source as in Table 5-1. Before the result is shown, the explicitness and implicitness of evidence are demonstrated as follows:

- (32) (Example of explicitness)  
 (Toshiaki talked to me about Naitō’s financial problem. I heard that he could not pay even the rent)  
*Toshiaki ga sō [shakkin no mōshi-ire wa nai] ii-nagara setsumeisite-kureta tokoro ni yoreba, tashikani Naitō no keizai-jōtai wa kanari kiki-teki-na mono no yōdatta.* (Sawaki: 1029)  
 ‘[Toshiaki was not inclined to accommodate him with money.] According to Toshiaki’s explanation, Naitō was surely facing a serious financial crisis + yōdatta.’
- (33) (Example of implicitness)  
 (At the entrance of the firm Yamamoto and [section chief] Arai saw some colleagues gathering, and Yamamoto asked them what they were doing)  
 “Oh, Yamamoto-ka. Erai koto ni natta-ze. — A, kakarichō, ohayōgozaimasu.”  
 “Ohayō. Nanda, ittai?”  
 “Iene.... Dōyara uchi no kaisha tōsanshita-rashii-desu-yo.” (Akagawa: 22)  
 ‘“Yamamoto. A serious thing has happened. — Ah, Subsection chief, good morning, Mr Arai.”  
 “Good morning, everybody. What on earth are you doing?”  
 “Well.... Our company has gone under + *rashii*.”’

In example (32), the judgement is made on the basis of evidence which is explicitly shown by Toshiaki’s explanation (with *ni yoreba* ‘according to’). This is a case of explicitness of evidence. In contrast, in (33) the evidence of the judgement is not shown explicitly. Although the utterer might have plausible evidence (through hearing something about a meeting, or watching something which causes a meeting ...etc), the evidence is implicit here. This case can be regarded as implicitness of evidence.<sup>12</sup>

Next, the explicitness and implicitness of evidence in the *rashii* and *yōda* expressions are quantitatively examined. Table 5-2 below shows the ratio of explicitness and implicitness of *yōda/rashii*.

<sup>12</sup> In short, the term ‘evidence’ is used here to express the meaning of *konkyo* ‘what the judgement is based on’ or source, not *shōko* ‘proof’. In the expressions with *yōda* or *rashii*, explicitly or implicitly, there is ground the utterer has for her/his judgement.

**Table 5-2. Ratio of explicitness and implicitness of evidence**

category source	<i>Yōda</i>			<i>Rashii</i>		
	Number of examples	Explicitness of evidence	Implicitness of evidence	Number of examples	Explicitness of evidence	Implicitness of evidence
<i>Ukigumo</i>	18	2	16	6	3	3
<i>Kokoro</i>	33	18	15	51	32	19
<i>Rashomon and Hana</i>	1	0	1	6	2	4
<i>Umareidurunayami</i>	5	3	2	9	6	3
<i>Ten to sen</i>	32	6	26	26	20	6
<i>Hanaokaseishū no tsuma</i>	16	6	10	25	19	6
<i>Shiokaritōge</i>	48	23	25	20	16	4
<i>Isshun no natsu</i>	192	79	113	188	135	53
<i>On'nashatyō ni kanpai</i>	46	5	41	56	29	27
<i>Tensējingo</i>	8	2	6	11	9	2
Total	399	144	255	398	271	127
(%)	100	36.1	<b>63.9</b>	100	<b>68.1</b>	31.9

This table shows that the ratio of explicitness in the *yōda* expression is 36 percent while that in the *rashii* expression is nearly 70 percent. On the other hand, the ratio of implicitness of evidence is over 60 percent in the *yōda* expression while that in the *rashii* expression is around 30 percent. Hence, this result shows the following two points. Firstly, the ratio of explicitness and implicitness appears to be almost opposite between *yōda* and *rashii*. Secondly, *rashii* tends to give explicit evidence while *yōda* does not. These two points lead to the view that the *rashii* expression tends to depend on the explicitness of evidence while the *yōda* expression does not.<sup>13</sup>

Through the above analyses of the data of *yōda* and *rashii*, it can be said that *yōda* is frequently used with *rinjōsei* ‘co-presence’ whereas *rashii* is inclined to show explicitly evidence for judgement.

<sup>13</sup> In addition, although *Rashōmon* (*Rashōmon* Gate) and *Hana* ‘The nose’ by Akutagawa has a different ratio from the others, this cannot be considered as important because this would result from the small number of examples.

## 5-4. Core function of *yōda*

This section firstly analyses the sentence-ending usages of *yōda* to find the characteristics of each usage from the three viewpoints: (1) Logical relationship between subject and judgement<sup>14</sup>; (2) Inference and descriptiveness; and (3) Proposition and modality. Next, this section proposes a hypothesis about the core function of *yōda* on the basis of the previous studies, the data analyses and the analysis of the usage of *yōda* below.

### 5-4-1. Analysis of the three usages of *yōda*

*Yōda* at the end of a sentence has three usages: figurativeness (or similarity), conjecture and euphemism.<sup>15</sup> These three usages of *yōda* can be considered as expressing the state of something or someone showing what it or s/he is like. Consider the following examples:

(34) **a. Figurativeness (or similarity)**<sup>16</sup>

*Senshu ga hādorū o koeru shunkan no katachi ga utsukushii. Ashi o omoikiri nobashi, ippō no ashi o subayaku mochiageru. Zenkeishita jōtai to michisuji o yomu me ga, emono o ou shinayakana dōbutsu-no-yōda.* (11/Aug/2005 *Tenseijingo*)

‘At the moment when the hurdler jumps over a hurdle, her/his form looks beautiful. S/he stretches one leg and lifts the other leg quickly. Her/his forward-leaning posture and eyes fixed on the course look as if s/he were a lithe animal chasing game + *yōda*.’

**b. Conjecture (Inference)**

*Koki no Miura Yūichirō-san ga Eberesuto no saikōrei-tōchō-kiroku o nurikaeta. Buatsui Sherupa no sasae ga atta-sōda-ga, jitsuni tsuyoi ishi to chikara o omochi-no-yōda.* (24/May/2003 *Tenseijingo*)

‘Mr Yūichirō Miura at the age of seventy has broken the record of the oldest climber of Mount Everest. It is said that he was supported by many Sherpas, but he has a strong will and great power + *yōda*.’

<sup>14</sup> Moriyama (1995) discusses the relationship between subject and judgement. This subsection newly shows the analysis of the euphemistic use of *yōda*.

<sup>15</sup> Yoshida (1971: 326-328) shows two usages the similarity and conjecture usages. This section adds the euphemism usage of *yōda* as a sentence-ending usage of *yōda* following Nagano (1969: 316) and Kashiwaika (1980: 170).

<sup>16</sup> With regard to the figurative usage of *yōda*, it is used in both adverbial usage with the *yōni* form and noun-modifying usage with *yōna* more frequently than in sentence-ending usage. Moreover, it is difficult to distinguish between figurativeness and conjecture because examples of figurativeness accompanied by conjecture or examples of conjecture accompanied by figurativeness can be often seen in novels and essays.

### c. Euphemism

(In the car Otō and Ōhata looked at many people gathering in front of the Otō-industrial Firm. Otō told Ōhata that the employees were welcoming Otō. However, ...)

*“Otō kaere!” “Shachō wa hitori de takusanda!” “Nōnashi Otō taisei funsai!” to itta shupurehikōru ga, Junko no shidō no seika, nakanaka kimatte-iru.*

*Ōhata ga niyaniyashite, [Otō ni] “(Kangei to wa) Daibu chigau-yōda-ne” to itta.”*(Akagawa: 677)

‘ “Go back, Otō!”

“One president is more than enough!”

“Smash Otō’s incompetent regime!”

The chorus yelling was in perfect time owing to Nobuko’s guidance.

Grinning at Otō, Ōhata said to him, “This situation is very different from what you said (= ‘welcome’) + yōda.” ’

Example (34a) shows a figurative expression of *yōda*. The figure of the hurdler is expressed by a simile through *yōda*. In example (34b), in the conjecture usage of *yōda*, the utterer conjecturally judges that Mr Miura has a strong will and great power. Such actual situations are expressed through *yōda*. In example (34c), Ōhata clearly sees how the employees regard Otō; nevertheless, he intentionally vaguely expresses this using *yōda*. This is a euphemism of *yōda*.

Next, the discontinuity of the three usages (figurativeness, conjecture and euphemism) of *yōda* is considered from the above three viewpoints (logical relationship, inference and descriptiveness, and proposition and modality).

#### ***(1) An analysis of yōda usage from the viewpoint of the logical relationship between subject and judgement***

In the figurativeness (or similarity) usage of *yōda*, firstly, the relationship between subject and judgement can be figured by ‘A ≠ B’ from the logical viewpoint. ‘A’ stands for the actual subject of the judgement, while ‘B’ means the proposition expressed by *yōda*. In example (34a), *Zenkeishita jōtai to michisuji o yomu me ga, emono o ou shinayakana dōbutsu-no-yōda* ‘Her/his forward-leaning posture and eyes fixed on the course look as if s/he were a lithe animal chasing game + *yōda*’, the hurdler’s figure is compared to a lithe animal chasing game. The actual state ‘A’ of the hurdler’s figure is not equal to the lithe animal ‘B’. In contrast, secondly, the conjecture usage of *yōda* can be considered as  $A \doteq B$ . In example


(34b), [*Miura-san wa*] *jitsuni tsuyoi ishi to chikara o omochi-no-yōda* ‘Mr Miura has a strong will and great power’, the utterer recognises that the actual Mr Miura is equal or nearly equal to a person who has a strong will and great power. Thirdly, the euphemistic usage of *yōda* can be regarded as  $A=B$  because the utterer has already obtained the information that the proposition is true. In example (34c), *Kangei to wa daibu chigau-yōda-ne* ‘This situation is very different from ‘welcome’ + *yōda*’, the utterer knows about it because he is actually seeing the employees’ action indicating that they do not accept President Otō. In spite of obtaining clear information, the utterer does not directly assert it but softens the fact by making use of the uncertainty of *yōda*. In other words, although the utterer has the recognition of  $A=B$ ,  $A \approx B$  is carried to the hearer.

**(2) An analysis of the *yōda* usage from the viewpoint of inference and descriptiveness**

Figurativeness, conjecture and euphemism are analysed from the viewpoint of inference and descriptiveness. This argument has not been made inadequately in the literature. The figurative usage of *yōda* has little (or no) inference and figuratively describes the actual state of the subject<sup>17</sup>. Figurativeness expresses the state or characteristic of something in terms of some other thing. In the conjectural usage of *yōda*, the judgement is made by inference, not by descriptiveness, as discussed in the review of literature, 5-2-3. The euphemistic usage of *yōda* has no inference because the utterer has already obtained the information. It softly describes the state of something or someone. The above observations can be figured as follows:

---

<sup>17</sup> Moriyama (1995: 513) regards the figurative expression of *yōda* as expressing *zokusei* ‘attribute’. However, since this subsection regards the suffix *rashii* as expressing *zokusei* ‘attribute’, this subsection does not adopt his term.



**Fig 5-1. Figurativeness, conjecture and euphemism of *yōda***

**(3) An analysis of the *yōda* usage from the viewpoint of proposition and modality**

The three usages of *yōda* can be analysed from the viewpoint of proposition and modality. The figurative usage of *yōda* can be regarded as an expression of proposition, not as modality. This can be verified by use of the discriminator *koto o shitteiru* ‘I know that ~’, as shown chapter 2.<sup>18</sup>

(35) (Example (34) is used again and each context is the same)

**Figurativeness (or similarity)**

a. *Zenkeishita jōtai to michisuji o yomu me ga, emono o ou shinayakana dōbutsu no yōda.*

‘The huddler’s forward-leaning posture and eyes fixed on the course look as if s/he were a lithe animal chasing game + *yōda*.’

→a’. *Zenkeishita jōtai to michisuji o yomu me ga, emono o ou shinayakana dōbutsu no-yōdearu koto o shitteiru.*

‘I know that the huddler’s forward-leaning posture and eyes fixed on the course look as if s/he were a lithe animal chasing game.’

**Conjecture (Inference)**

b. *[Miura-san wa] jitsuni tsuyoi ishi to chikara o omochi-no-yōda.*

‘Mr Miura has a strong will and great power + *yōda*.’

→b’. \* *[Miura-san wa] jitsuni tsuyoi ishi to chikara o omochi-no-yōdearu koto o shitteiru.*

<sup>18</sup> As discussed in chapter 2, the phrase *koto o shitte-iru* ‘I know that ~’ as a discriminator can be used in order to distinguish between the propositional and the modality (non-propositional) parts in a sentence.

‘I know that ~.’

→b”. [*Miura-san wa*] *jitsuni tsuyoi ishi to chikara o omochi-dearu koto o shitteiru.* (*yōda* drops)

‘I know that Mr Miura has strong will and strong power.’

### Euphemism

c. *Kangei to wa daibu chigau-yōda*

‘This situation is very different from ‘welcome’ + *yōda*.’

→c’. \* *Kangei to daibu chigau-yōde aru koto o shitteiru.*

‘I know that ~.’

→c’’. *Kangei to daibu chigau koto o shitteiru.* (*yōda* drops)

‘I know that this situation is very different from ‘welcome’.’

As shown in example (35a’), in the figurative expression of *yōda*, the part including *yōda* can be regarded as propositional. In contrast, as shown in example (35b’) and (35b’), and (35c’) and (35c’), in both the conjecture and the euphemism usages the *yōda* form can also be modality. Thus, in spite of having the same form, the role of *yōda* in the sentence is different depending on which usage of *yōda* is chosen.

### 5-4-2. Proposal of a hypothesis of the core function of *yōda*

A hypothesis of the core function of *yōda* is here proposed on the basis of what has been discussed.

As discussed in 5-3-1, data analyses have shown the presence of *rinjōsei* ‘co-presence’ as the prominent feature of *yōda*, and it has also been observed that *yōda* is used in the cases lacking *rinjōsei* ‘co-presence’: (i) The utterer’s familiarity with the subject (the utterer is well acquainted with the subject); (ii) The utterer’s own investigation into the subject; and (iii) The utterer’s appreciation of the proposition through reliable evidence. Previous studies have partially given important features of *yōda*, such as observation, more responsibility, direct experience, and degree of certainty, although each view has its drawbacks. The core function of *yōda* must integrate these features, the above three, and *rinjōsei* ‘co-presence’.

A hypothesis of the core function of *yōda* in this chapter is proposed as follows:

The core meaning of *yōda* is to recognise the subject as within the utterer’s perceptible domain. The perceptible domain is the area within which the utterer can appreciate the subject through sense, experience, or knowledge/information.<sup>19</sup>

The concept of the definition, inside or outside the utterer’s perceptible domain, is introduced as a term expressing the essential function of *yōda* in this chapter. Section 5-6 will provide further evidence.

## 5-5. Core function of *rashii*

This section discusses the sentence-ending usages of *rashii* to find the core function of *rashii* from these three viewpoints: (1) Logical relationship between subject and judgement; (2) Inference and descriptiveness; and (3) Proposition and modality. These are the same viewpoints as used in the analysis of the usages of *yōda*. Next, this section proposes a hypothesis about the core function of *rashii* on the basis of the previous studies, data analyses and the analysis of the usage of *rashii* which is examined below. Finally, this section clarifies the discontinuity of the usages from the viewpoint of the hypothesis.

### 5-5-1. Analysis of three usages of *rashii*

*Rashii* at the end of a sentence has three usages: attribute, conjecture, and hearsay usages.<sup>20</sup> This section analyses the three usage of *rashii* to clarify the core function of *rashii*. Consider the following examples:

#### (36) a. Attribute

(Manabe heard that Nobuko had quit her job and he phoned Nobuko. Since he regarded her as very competent, he wants her to work at his company)

“*Tokorode, kyō wa dōsuru yotei-na-no-ka-ne?*” *to kiita.*

“*Shoku-sagashi ni dekakeru tokoro-deshita.*”

*Manabe wa waratte, “Kimi-rashii-na, mattaku.” to itte-kara*

<sup>19</sup> The ‘inside the utterer’s perceptible domain’ can be translated by *chikaku-handan-kanō-ryōiki-no-uchi* 知覚判断可能領域の内 in Japanese.

<sup>20</sup> Yoshida (1971: 319) regards the essence of *rashii* as *kyakkanteki-yōta-sei* 客観の様態性 ‘(expressing) the objective state of something or someone’ showing what they are like’. This chapter cannot accept the ‘objectivity’ of *yōda*, as discussed in chapter 4, but *yōtai* ‘what the state of something or someone is like’ is acceptable.

“*Dō-kane, chotto watashi no ofuisu e asobi ni konai-ka.*” (Akagawa: 741)  
 ‘Manabe said to her, “Well, what are you going to do today?”  
 “I am going to go out to look for a job.”  
 Manabe said smiling, “you really behave in character + *rashii*” and then  
 “Well, how about coming to my office?”’

### b. Conjecture (Inference)

(The chief detective talked to Mihara about the relationship between Yasuda and his wife)

“(omission) *Jissai, chōsasuru-to, fūfu-naka wa enman-rashii-kara-ne*”  
*Mihara wa unazuita.* (Matsumoto: 279)  
 ‘ “According to the investigation into their relationship, actually theirs is a blissful marriage + *rashii*.”  
 Mihara nodded.’

### c. Hearsay

(Toshiaki is talking to ‘me’ about Naitō’s wife)

“*Sō ie-ba, kare no okusan tsuwari-rashii-yo.*”  
 “*Yumiko-san ga ninshinshiteru?*”  
 “*Un, Edī-san ga chiratto sonna koto o itte-ta-nda.*” (Sawaki: 906)  
 ‘ “By the way, his wife has morning sickness + *rashii*.”  
 “Yumiko is pregnant?”  
 “Yes. Eddie was mentioning it.”

The three *rashii* sentences in example (36) have forms with noun (*na*-adjective stem) plus *rashii* and they are morphologically similar. However, their usages are different. First, in example (36a), *kimi-rashii* ‘you behave in character’ is used as the attributive usage of *rashii* because her behaviour shows one of her characteristics very well. In this scene it seems that her characteristic implied by *kimi-rashii* is that Nobuko behaves herself promptly and steadily. In the attributive expression of *rashii*, *rashii* always follows nouns as a suffix (e.g. *otoko-rashii* ‘manly’ *onna-rashii* ‘womanly’, *kodomo-rashii* ‘childlike’, *gakusei-rashii* ‘student-like’). Second, in example (36b), in the conjecture usage of *rashii*, the utterer conjecturally judges that theirs is a blissful marriage on the basis of the investigation. Such conjectural judgement about an actual situation is expressed through *rashii*. Third, in example (36c), Toshiaki talked to ‘me’ about what has been said by Eddie, so this usage of *rashii* is hearsay. What has been said is the state of something or someone showing how it or s/he is like.

Next, the discontinuity of the three usages (attribute, conjecture, and hearsay) of *rashii* is discussed. This subsection investigates the distinctive features

of the three usages, from the following viewpoints, which are the same ones as taken to examine the usages of *yōda* in subsection 5-4-1: (1) Logical relationship between subject and judgement; (2) Inference and descriptiveness; and (3) Proposition and modality.

***(1) An analysis of the rashii usage from the viewpoint of a logical relationship between subject and judgement***

In the attribute usage of *rashi*, the logical relationship between subject and judgement can be regarded as  $A=B$ . *Otoko-rashii* ‘manly’ and *onna-rashii* ‘womanly’ serve as *i*-adjectives and capture the attribute (or the character) of the subject for judgement. In the conjecture usage of *rashii*, the relationship can be considered as  $A \doteq B$ . Whether the judgement is true has not been confirmed, so the utterer cannot assert  $A=B$ . The relationship in the hearsay usage of *rashii* can be regarded as  $A \doteq B$  for the same reason as in the conjecture usage of *rashii*.

***(2) An analysis of rashii usage from the viewpoint of inference and descriptiveness***

From the viewpoint of inference and descriptiveness, three usages of *rashii* are analysed as follows:

The attribute usage of *rashii*: –inference +descriptiveness  
 The conjecture usage of *rashii*: +inference –descriptiveness  
 The hearsay usage of *rashii*: –inference +descriptiveness

Both attribute and hearsay usages of *rashii* have little inference but faithfully describe the subject for judgement. In contrast, in the conjecture usage of *rashii*, the judgement is made by inference.

The three usages of *rashii* are analysed from the same viewpoints as the analysis of *yōda*. The characteristic of the discontinuity of the three usages of *rashii* is discussed again in 5-5-4 after the hypothesis of the core function of *rashii*.

**(3) An analysis of the *rashii* usage from the viewpoint of proposition and modality**

Whether each usage of *rashii* belongs to the propositional or modality part is analysed from the viewpoint of proposition and modality. This can be verified by use of the discriminator *koto o shitteiru* ‘I know that ~’, as discussed in subsection 5-4-1. Example (36) is used again below:

(37) (Each context is the same as in example (36))

**Attribute**

- a. “*Sono kōdō wa kimi-rashii-na.*”  
 ‘You really behave in character + *rashii*’  
 →a’. *Sono kōdō ga kimi-rashii koto o shitteiru.*  
 ‘I know that you really behave in character.’

**Conjecture (Inference)**

- b. “*Fūfu-naka wa enman-rashii (-kara-ne)*”  
 ‘Their relationship is a blissful marriage + *rashii*.’  
 →b’. \**Fūfu-naka ga enman-(dearu)-rashii koto o shitteiru.*  
 ‘I know that ~.’  
 →b”. *Fūfu-naka ga enman-(dearu) koto o shitteiru. (Rashii drops)*  
 ‘I know that their relationship is a blissful marriage.’

**Hearsay**

- c. “*Kare no okusan tsuwari-rashii (-yo).*”  
 ‘His wife has morning sickness + *rashii*.’  
 →c’. \**Kare no okusan ga tsuwari-(dearu)-rashii koto o shitteiru.*  
 ‘I know that ~.’  
 →c”. *Kare no okusan ga tsuwari-(dearu)-koto o shitteiru. (Rashii drops)*  
 ‘I know that his wife has morning sickness.’

In the attribute usage of *rashii*, the copula *dearu* cannot be inserted between the noun (or the stem of *na*-adjective) and the suffix *rashii*, as in \**kimi-dearu-rashii*, has a different meaning, that it is uncertain that the person is you. In contrast, in both the conjecture and hearsay usage of *rashii*, the copula *dearu* can be inserted between them, as with *enman-dearu-rashii* and *tsuwari-dearu-rashii*.<sup>21</sup> In order to avoid the confusion of the suffix *rashii* and the modal *rashii*, the copula *dearu* is inserted in examples (37b’) and (37c’). As shown in example (37a’), the attribute usage of *rashii* passes the test by use of the discriminator. This means that this

<sup>21</sup> Yoshida (1971: 320) states that *dearu* is a distinguishable measure between the suffix and the auxiliary of *rashii*.

*rashii* belongs to the proposition of the sentence, as discussed in chapter 2. This is the evidence for regarding the *rashii* as a suffix forming an *i*-adjective. On the contrary, examples (37b') and (37c') cannot pass the test. These results indicate that *rashii* used in the conjecture and hearsay usages belongs to the modality part. Hence, it can be said that *rashii* works as a part of proposition in the attribute usage, while it serves as a modality part in the conjecture and hearsay usages.

### **5-5-2. Proposal of the hypothesis of the core function of *rashii***

The hypothesis of the core function of *rashii* is proposed on the basis of what has been discussed.


As discussed in 5-3-1, the data analyses have revealed a tendency for accompaniment of the explicit evidence for conjectural judgement. Also, the previous studies have partially given important characteristics of *rashii*, such as inference, less responsibility, indirect experience, and lower degree of certainty. As well, the three usages of *rashii* have been analysed above. The core function of *rashii* must include these features.

A hypothesis of the core function of *rashii* expressing modality is proposed as follows:

The core function of *rashii* is to capture the characteristics of the subject through a certain phenomenon and to recognise it by inference. The subject for judgement is outside the utterer's perceptible domain. The characteristics of the subject are embodied in the phenomenon, which can be considered as the evidence for judgement.

This definition can be figured as follows:

Through a phenomenon (Evidence for judgement)



**Fig 5-2. Way of thinking of *rashii* in the conjectural usage**

As shown in Fig 5-2, the definition consists of three factors: the phenomenon (evidence for judgement), the subject (the actual state or situation), and the judgement. The actual state or situation is, partially or entirely, embodied in a phenomenon. This is shown by the double arrow. The phenomenon is regarded as the evidence for judgement by the utterer. This is shown by the thick arrow. The subject (or target) for the utterer's judgement is the actual state or situation, which is shown by the dotted arrow. The process of the utterer's recognition is shown by the large arrow. In other words, in the conjectural usage of *rashii*, the utterer grasps the actual state's (or situation's) characteristics as the evidence for her/his judgement from the phenomenon, and recognises the actual state (or situation) by inference.

In short, the capturing of the actual state's characteristics from the phenomenon is the essential function of *rashii*, by which the utterer recognises the subject as outside her/his perceptible domain through inference. This is the core function of *rashii* which the above definition shows.

### **5-5-3. Examination of three usages of *rashii* from the viewpoint of the hypothesis**

This subsection analyses the continuity and discontinuity among the three usages of *rashii* — attribute, conjecture, and hearsay— from the viewpoint of the hypothesis.

Firstly, the attribute usage of *rashii* is a typical expression of grasping the feature of someone or something. When *ano hito wa totemo otoko-rashii*, ‘that person is very manly’ is expressed, the utterer grasps his feature as manly. Thus, the utterer describes him in terms of a certain characteristic. In this usage, significantly, the subject can be regarded as being inside the utterer’s perceptible domain. In this regard, this usage is different from both the conjecture and hearsay usages.

Secondly, the conjecture usage of *rashii* is an expression of judging what the actual state or situation is like by inference. When *ano hito wa otoko-dearu-rashii*, ‘that person is a man + *rashii*’ is expressed, the utterer judges that the person is a man by inference on the basis of the capturing of person’s characteristic although it is uncertain whether or not the person is in fact a man. The subject for judgement can be considered as being outside of the utterer’s perceptible domain.

Thirdly, the hearsay usage of *rashii* has the characteristics of both the attribute and conjecture usage. In this usage, grasping a certain characteristic from certain verbal information, the utterer reports the information’s content. Even though the utterer takes part in the process of the capturing the state’s (or situation’s) characteristic, there is little inference in that process. In this regard, this usage is similar to the attribute usage of *rashii*. This usage requires verbal information which is brought from outside the utterer’s perceptible domain, so this usage is also similar to the conjecture usage. It is possible to say that the hearsay usage is derived from conjecture usage of *rashii*.


Thus, this examination leads to the following views: (1) the capturing of the state’s characteristic is a function common to the three usages of *rashii*; (2) the conjecture and hearsay usage both have the feature that the subject is outside the utterer’s perceptible domain; and (3) inference is a distinguishable index of conjecture from both the attribute and hearsay usages.

## 5-6. Evidence of the Hypothesis

This section demonstrates the evidence for the above hypotheses concerning *yōda*

and *rashii*. The hypotheses of *yōda* and *rashii* is built on the basis of real examples of *yōda* and *rashii* carefully analysed from the viewpoint of the substitution of *yōda* for *rashii* and *rashii* for *yōda*, though both the analysis of the data shown in 5-3 and the review of the previous studies contribute to establishing the hypotheses. The analysis of real examples in the ten novels and the critical essay of *Tenseijingo*, which are used in data analysis, crucially lead to the establishment of the hypotheses. Particularly, the following two cases have been noted for the hypotheses. The first is the case in which *yōda* is acceptable but not *rashii*. The second is the opposite case in which *rashii* is acceptable but not *yōda*. In either case, the principle uniquely applying to only one of the two expressions must lie behind the example. From this viewpoint, the characteristics of *yōda* and *rashii* are individually categorised, whose categorisations are shown in this section. The special factor common to the categories showing the individual characteristics of *yōda* and *rashii* has been investigated. The investigation into the special factor leads to the view that the subject for judgement is either inside or outside the utterer's perceptible domain depending on the use of *yōda* or *rashii*. Hence, the categorisation and its examples discussed in this section indicate the evidence for the hypothesis concerning the definitions of *yōda* and *rashii*.

The substitutability of the two modals, *yōda* and *rashii*, has the following three cases: (1) *yōda* is acceptable but not *rashii*; (2) *rashii* is acceptable but not *yōda*; and (3) both *yōda* and *rashii* are acceptable. In the first two cases this section demonstrates that the subject for the utterer's judgement can be considered to being either inside or outside her/his perceptible domain as the evidence of the hypotheses, depending on *yōda* or *rashii*. The third case of the interchangeability cannot be explained by the simple dichotomous view. This section newly attempts to explain the third case from the viewpoint of the hypotheses, namely, the definitions of *yōda* and *rashii*. In other words, this section discusses the above three cases to show that the hypothesis is appropriate.



**Fig. 5-3. Substitutionability between *yōda* *rashii***

Additionally, the figurativeness usage of *yōda* is included in the first case (*\*rashii*) while the attribute usage of *rashii* is in the second case (*\*yōda*). These usages are excluded from the subject of examination in this section because these usages are propositional parts, not the modality part.

### **5-6-1. Cases in which *yōda* is acceptable (*\*rashii*)**

This subsection analyses the case in which *yōda* is acceptable but *rashii* is not, from the viewpoint of the substitution of *rashii* for *yōda* in the following categories: (1) interrogative; (2) appearances; (3) familiarity; (4) the utterer's own investigation; (5) speciality; (6) reliable and acceptable information; and (7) euphemism. The euphemism usage of *yōda* seems to be derived from the conjecture usage of *yōda* and so this section examines it. The categorisation is made through the examination of real examples.

#### **(1) Interrogatives**

Although *yōda* is used in interrogative sentences, *rashii* is not because the interrogative sentence with *rashii* is grammatically incorrect. This is one of the significant pieces of evidence supporting the hypothesis about *yōda*, which is not pointed out in the literature. The interrogative (excluding self-question) needs a listener. *Yōda* is used when the person expects the listener to answer the question. The utterer asks the question expecting that the listener can answer the question. If

it is not expected that the listener can answer the question, nobody will ask it. This indicates that the answer to the question is inside the listener's perceptible domain.

For example:

- (38) (Her daughter changed her school one month ago. The mother is anxious about her daughter, visiting her teacher to ask how she is doing)  
 “Sensei, *uchi no ko wa gakkō ni nareta-yōdesu-ka?*” (\**rashii*)  
 ‘Sir [or Miss], has my daughter become used to her new school + *yōda*?’

In example (38), the parent asks the teacher about her daughter's situation, expecting that the school teacher can answer the question. *Rashii* is not acceptable because the subject would be outside the listener's perceptible domain; namely, the utterer would think that the listener cannot answer the question.

In addition, the examples shown in categories (2)—(7) below can be analysed in a way similar to the above explanation using the index, ‘inside the utterer's perceptible domain’, so the same explanation of the examples is omitted.

## (2) Appearances

A look comes over someone's face. Appearances with emotions such as anger, surprise, and joy are visually understandable. These appearances can be considered as the subject inside of the utterer's perceptible domains. For example:

- (39) (Nobuko put out the light at the front door and was about to go out. As soon as she opened the door, she found a man in front of the door)  
 “*Kya!*” *To omowazu [Nobuko wa] koe o ageru.*  
 “*Shi, shitsureishimashita*”  
*Aite no hō ga bikkurishita-yōda.* “*Taniguchi to iimasu. Ano—keisatsu no mono desu.*” (Akagawa: 289)  
 ‘“Oh!” screamed Nobuko involuntarily.  
 “I... I'm sorry,” said the man.  
He is more surprised than she + *yōda*. “I am Mr Tanigichi. I am a police detective.”

In example (39), appearance (unlike interior mentality) is easy to understandable through the senses, particularly the sight. Incidentally, the evidence of ‘observation’ in the ‘descriptiveness of observation’ view seems to result from this fact. A similar example taken from Hayatsu (1988) is shown below:

- (40) *Kanojo no hyōjō ga issun kagetta-yōda. Nanika iyana koto o omoidashita-rashii.* (Hayatsu 1988: 54) (# *rashii*)

‘Her face clouded over for a moment + *yōda*. She was reminded of an awful thing + *rashii*.’

In example (40), *yōda* and *rashii* are used. Hayatsu (1988: 54) explains that the *yōda* form is used because the judgement is grounded on appearance, which is direct information, while the *rashii* form is used through the *hikihanashi* ‘distancing’ operation. However, her explanation seems unclear and vague. The reason why *yōda* is used in this case is that appearance is inside the utterer’s perceptible domain. Contrastively, the other person’s state of mind of her being reminded can be explained by the outside, so *rashii* is used.

### (3) Familiarity

A subject familiar to the utterer brought from her/his experience and knowledge can be expressed by *yōda* but not by *rashii*. The utterer is generally familiar with e.g. a member of her/his family, her/his hobby, or her/his experience. For example:

- (41) *‘Kyūshoku ga kiraina Hisae-chan’ no haha ga kobosu. “Sensei ga nokosanai-yōnitte ossharu-nde, totemo tsurai-yōdesu. Nanishiro anoko wa takusan taberarenai tachi de”.* (7/Apr/2004 *Tennseijinngo*) (# *rashii*)

‘The mother of Hisae who dislikes the provided lunch for schoolchildren complains about the lunch. “Her teacher tells the children not to leave any food, so my daughter has a hard time of it + *yōda* because she has a poor appetite.”

In example (41), Hisae’s mother knows her daughter’s situation well. So, *rashii* cannot be substituted for *yōda*. Another example is shown:

- (42) (Saegusa had worked inside the office as executive. However, he is now working outside the office. He says to President Manabe of the different firm)

*“Watashi mo kōshite soto o mawatte-miru-to, genba ga kawatte-iru-no ga yoku wakarimashita-yo. Soreni, watashi wa motomoto kōshite soto o aruku no ga atte-iru-yōdesu.”* (Akagawa: 272) (# *rashii*)

‘“Working outside the office, I have just recognised that the actual sites of

the sales division have changed. Working outside basically suits me fine + *yōda*.” ’

In example (42), Saegusa recognises that he likes working outside the office through his experience, so *yōda* is suitable in this case.<sup>22</sup>

#### (4) The utterer’s own investigation

As discussed in 5-3-1 (*rinjōsei* ‘co-presence’), *yōda* is used but *rashii* is not when the judgement is made on the basis of the information brought from the utterer’s own investigation. The utterer’s understandable information can be regarded as being inside her/his perceptible domain. Hence, *yōda* is used. For example:

- (43) (Example (29) is used again. Yamagata had shown a boxer’s name to ‘me’) *Watashi wa macchimēkā no Yamagata ni shisasareta bokusā-no na o ageta. Yamagata kara kiita toki wa wakaranakatta-ga, atode shirabete-miru-to naruhodo tegoro na aite no-yōdatta.* (Sawaki: 860) (# *rashii*)  
 ‘I showed the name of the boxer whom Yamagata, a boxing impresario, had shown to me. When I heard of the name from Yamagata, I did not know about the name. When I examined what he was like, he was a suitable boxer for Naitō + *yōdatta*.’

In example (43), the utterer has examined what the boxer was like, so *yōda* is used. In contrast, when the utterer does not understand this information, *rashii* is used.

#### (5) Speciality (job, study and technique)

Specialists (including scholars and technical experts) are by definition familiar with the specialist subjects and skills which are inside their perceptible domains. For example:

- (44) (Example (26) is shown again. Detective Torikai was doubtful about the choice of the place for their love suicide)  
*[Torikai] Jōshi-sha wa taitei basho o zeitakuni sentakusuru-yōda. Onsen-chi ya kankō-chi ga sō dearu.* (Matsusmoto: 86) (# *rashii*)  
 ‘[Detective Torikai] wondered why Kenichi Sayama and Otoki had chosen this desolate place as their death-place. It seems that there were other better

<sup>22</sup> This familiarity can be supported by Kamitani (1995) as follows:  
*Watashi no shitte-iru kagiri de wa, kono kēsu de wa shoyūsha wa sekinin o towarenai-yōda.* (Kamitani 1995: 563) ‘As far as I know, in this case the owner does not bear the responsibility + *yōda*.’  
 Kamitani (1995: 563) explains that when the utterer directly knows the situation, *rashii* is not used.

places. In general, these who are going to die together for love extravagantly choose a beautiful place for their deaths + *yōda*, such as a hot-spring resort or a tourist resort.

Example (44) shows a case in which the utterer Torikai has obtained information of a lovers' double suicide through his job (i.e. detective's experience). Another example:

- (45) (The writer is a linguist teaching Japanese linguistic at university)  
*Gakusei wa 'sekai-kan (世界観)' to kiite, oyoso wa 'sekai o miru mikata' kurai no imi dearu koto wa wakaru-yōdesu. Shikashi sore o kaku to naru-to 'sekai-kan (世界感)' to kaku koto ga ōi. Watashi wa nankai mo jitsurei ni deaimashita. (Ono 2002: 205) (# rashii)*  
 'When students hear someone or myself mention *sekaikan* 'world view, they can more or less understand its meaning of 'view of the world' + *yōda*. However, there are a lot of cases in which they write the word *sekai-kan* with 感 instead of 観. I have actually come across this misused character many times.'

In example (45), the utterer expresses the case in which students misuse the *kanji* character in spite of the student's understanding of the meaning of it. If he were not working at university as a specialist, he would not understand this actual situation. When a specialist talks about things being inside her/his perceptible domain, in general s/he must express this using *yōda*. In addition, the more/less responsibility view seems to be proposed on the basis of this speciality of the subject. The reason why *yōda* sounds as if it has more responsibility compared with *rashii* is that the subject for judgement is inside the utterer's perceptible domain. Thus, this explanation leads to an understanding of the more/less responsibility view.

#### (6) Reliable and acceptable information

When the utterer accepts reliable information, *yōda* is used. The subject for judgement is made based on the acceptable information, as follows:

- (46) *Shushō-kantei no tantō kisha ni yoruto, [Koizumi shushō wa] asa to hiru wa jun-wafū to yū. Chōshoku wa gohan ni misoshiru, daikon-oroshi, chirimenjako to yū no ga teiban de, ohiru wa daitai soba-rashii.* 'gyōza ni

*mega nai*, '*nama-yasai wa dai no nigate*', '*takuan ya kimuchi ni wa me mo kurenai*', '*katsu-don no katsu wa zenbu nokosu*'. *Sonna mokugeki-shōnin mo aru. Kanari suki-kirai ga aru-yōda.* (22/Mar/2005 *Tenseijingo*) (*yōda*→ # *rashii*)

'According to the newspaperperson in charge of the news from the prime minister's official residence, [Prime Minister Koizumi] has a Japanese-style meal at breakfast and at lunch. He usually takes rice, miso-soup, grated radish and young dried sardines at breakfast, and *soba* (Japanese noodles made from buckwheat) at lunch + *rashii*. 'He loves a *gyōza* (a dumpling)', 'He hates salad', 'He ignores *takuan* (yellow pickled radish) and *kimuchi* (Korean pickles)' and 'with *katsu-don* (rice in a bowl with a pork-onion omelette), he does not eat the pork'. There are such testimonies by witnesses. He is quite fussy about his food + *yōda*.'

In example (46), *yōda* is used when the information is from the witnesses' testimonies, while *rashii* is used when the information is from the newspaperperson. The subject for judgement is based on the witnesses' whose testimonies are reliable and acceptable for the writer. In contrast, the subject based on the information of the newspaperman can be regarded as being outside, so the hearsay usage of *rashii* is used.

### (7) Euphemistic usage of *yōda*

The euphemistic usage of *yōda* is used to express an introductory expression and it is also used to make judgement uncertain or soften. In the euphemistic usage, *yōda* cannot be replaced with *rashii*. The introductory expression is shown as follows:

- (47) a. *Okotoba o kaesu-yodesu-ga-ne* (Inoue: 30) (\* *rashii*)  
 'Excuse me, I am going to talk back (to you) +*yōda*, but ...'  
 b. *Nando mo yū-yōda-ga*, (Inoue: 115) (\* *rashii*)  
 'Excuse me, I am going to repeat myself (to you) +*yōda*, but ...'  
 c. *Okashina koto o yū-yōda-ga*, (Yamamoto: 733) (\* *rashii*)  
 'Excuse me, I am going to talk about a ridiculous thing +*yōda*, but ...'

Such introductory expressions are customarily used. The following example of the introductory *yōda* expression can be analysed by the hypothesis:

- (48) (Detective Mihara asked the assistant stationmaster of Tokyo station a certain question)

*“Tsukanu koto o ukagau-yōdesu ga 18-ji 30-pun no ‘Asakaze’ ga 15-ban-sen kara shuppatsusuru mae ni, 13-ban-sen hōmu ni tatte, sore o miru koto ga dekiru-deshō-ka?” to kiita. (Matsumoto: 156) (\*rashii)*

‘*“Excuse my abrupt question, but is it possible to look at the 18:30 [Express] Asakaze waiting at the 15th platform from the 13<sup>th</sup> platform before its departure?”*’

In example (48), the utterer knows what he is going to say. The content of the subject can be said to be inside his perceptible domain. The effectiveness of using *yōda* is to show softness to the listener in the beginning of the conversation.

There is also a general euphemistic usage of *yōda*. Considering the listener, the utterer uses *yōda* to avoid her/his direct assertion, because s/he can soften her/his expression by virtue of *yōda*. That is, *yōda* is used in order to avoid a situation in which the listener feels unpleasant or embarrassed. For example:

(49) (Example (34c) is used again)

(In the car Otō and Ōhata looked at many people gathering in front of the Otō-industrial Firm)

*“Otō kaere!” “Shachō wa hitori de takusanda!” “Nōnashi Otō taisei funsai!” to itta shupurehikōru ga, Junko no shidō no seika, nakanaka kimatte-iru.*

*Ōhata ga niyaniyashite, [Otō ni] “(Kangei to wa) Daibu chigau-yōda-ne” to itta.” (Akagawa: 677) (# rashii)*

‘*“Go back, Otō!”*

*“One president is more than enough!”*

*“Smash Otō’s incompetent regime!”*

The chorus yelling was in perfect time owing to Nobuko’s guidance.

Grinning at Otō, Ōhata said to him, *“This situation is very different from what you said (= ‘welcome’) + yōda.”*’

In example (49), the subject of conversation can be regarded as being inside Ōhata’s perceptible domain, because Ōhata is directly looking at the employees protesting against Otō.

Thus, the definition — *yōda* is an expression of recognizing a subject that is inside the utterer’s perceptible domain — subsumes not only conjecture but also euphemism.

The above examination has verified that the subject for judgement as inside the utterer’s perceptible domain is expressed only by *yōda*. The evidence for the establishment of this hypothesis of *yōda* lies in the above categories.

### 5-6-2. Cases in which *rashii* is acceptable (\**yōda*)

From the viewpoint of the substitutability, this subsection examines the cases in which *rashii* is acceptable but *yōda* is not. The examples can be defined with the following categories: (1) unawareness; (2) other person's state of mind; (3) unfamiliarity; (4) investigation by other people; (5) non-speciality; (6) generalising something thoughtlessly; and (7) hearsay. The hearsay usage of *rashii* seems to be derived from the conjecture usage of *rashii*, so this section takes it up. The above categorisation is the result of the examination of real examples.

#### (1) Unawareness

When the utterer is not aware of something, *rashii* is used but *yōda* is not. For example:

- (50) *Watashi wa omowazu bonyarishite-ita-rashii. Kyūni haigo de warai-goe ga shi, isu o ugokashi-tari shokki no fureau oto ga shite, ware ni kaetta. Chūshoku-ji ga sugi, resutoran kara hito no nami ga hiite-iku koroai ni natte-ita-yōdatta.* (Sawaki: 1312) (# *yōda*)

‘I became absent-minded involuntarily + *rashii*. Suddenly, someone burst into laughter behind me and [the servers] were moving chairs and collecting tableware [in the restaurant]. These noises made me recover my senses. Lunch time had passed and it was the time when people left the restaurant after finishing their lunch + *yōdatta*.’

In example (50) his unawareness is explicitly shown by the phrase *omowazu* ‘involuntarily’. The noise of collecting tableware makes him come to himself. If *yōda* were used, it would mean that the utterer has been aware of her/his absent-minded state. The *rashii* expression shows the utterer's unawareness. Another example is shown:

- (51) (The utterer Naitō is talking about his KO scene in boxing)  
*“Ano shiai, 2-raundo-datta-ka-ni, bodei o kuratte-taoreta-nda-yo-ne. Sore wa yoku wakatte-ru. Sōshite, mata, 2-dome ni pānto ago ni kuratte-taoreta-nda. Demo, soko kara oboete-inai-nda. Taoreta made wa oboeteru-kedo, okita no o oboete-inai-nda. Dakara, Edī san ga taoru o nagete, kōnā ni kakaete tsurete-ikareta toki, ā ikenē, 2-raundo de*

*owacchatta, to omotta-nda. Sōshitara, minna ga yoku yatta yoku yatta to yū janai. 6-kai no aida ni 8-do mo hikkurikaesareta no ni yoku tatakattatte. Sorede, 2-raundo ja naku, 7-raundo made tsuzuite-ita-rashii to yū koto ga wakatta-no-sa”*

“2-raundo kara 7-raundo made wa masshiro-na-noka”

“Sō, masshiro” Naitō wa sō itte-waratta. (Sawaki: 699) (# *yōda*)

‘“In that boxing match, I fell down from a body blow at the second round. I remembered this well. After that, I was hit on the chin and collapsed. However, I did not remember what happened after that. I remembered the moment of falling down but I did not remember getting up. Throwing the towel in the ring, Eddie held me and took me to the corner. At that moment, I thought that it was too bad for me to have been defeated at the second round. However, everyone said that I had fallen down eight times over six rounds; nevertheless, I had fought very well. Hearing this, I realised that I had fought until the seventh round, not till the second round + *rashii*.”

“You had a blank in your memory from the second to the seventh round, didn’t you?”

“Yes. No memory!” said Naitō laughing.”

As shown in example (51), Naitō thought that he was knocked out in the second round. Nevertheless, he had been fighting unconsciously until the seventh round. This happened outside his perceptible domain. Hence, *rashii* is used. *Oboetenai* ‘I did not remember that’ and ‘*masshiro* ‘a blank in memory’ show his lack of consciousness.

Thus, *rashii* implies that the utterer has been unaware of something which is regarded as being outside the perceptible domain. Similarly, the examples shown in categories (2)—(7) below can be analysed using the index, ‘outside the utterer’s perceptible domain’, so repeated explanation of the examples is omitted.

## (2) Other person’s state of mind

Although appearances are relatively easy to understand through the senses, another person’s state of mind is difficult to understand. In this case *rashii* is generally used, as follows:

(52) (Since Mr Sai looked like he was listening to me carefully, I talked scrupulously)

*Sai wa unazuki-nagara kiite-ita-ga, jissai wa taishite kyōmi ga nakatta-rashii. Hanashi ga owaru-to, sore o hitokoto de yōyaku shite-kureta.*

“Tonikaku, anta-tachi wa Yanagi to [bokushingu no shiai o] yaritai. Sōna-ndaro?” (Sawaki: 945) (# *yōda*)

‘Mr Sai was listening to me and nodding, but actually he was not very interested in my story + *rashii*. When I finished talking about it, he summed up my story with a short phrase:

“Anyway, in short, you want to have a boxing match with Mr Yanagi as opponent. Don’t you?” ’

- (53) (Nobuko told Masaya that she had become the president of the firm)  
*Nobuko no hanashi o, Masaya wa marude honki-ni-shinakatta-ga, Nobuko ga nando mo “Uso-janaindatte-ba” o kurikaesu to, yatto shinjiru kini-natta-rashii. “Hē! Nobuko-san ga shachō?”* (Akagawa: 94)  
 ‘Masaya did not take what Nobuko said seriously. However, she said to him repeatedly, “I am completely serious.” Masaya at last accepted it as true + *rashii*. “Oh, are you the president?” ’

In examples (52) and (53), whether he is interested in what ‘I’ am saying and whether he accepts Nobuko’s story as true are issues outside the utterer’s perceptible domain. The other person’s state of mind cannot be grasped precisely. The other person’s state of mind might also be possibly expressed by *yōda*. The condition of such interchangeability of *yōda* and *rashii* is discussed in the next subsection.

### (3) Unfamiliarity

Unfamiliarity means that the utterer has only shallow knowledge about something or little experience of something. In this case, *rashii* is used but *yōda* is not. For instance:

- (54) (Example (10) is used again. The children including Nobuo are talking about a ghost)  
 “Ittai darega sono nakigoe o kiita-no-sa” Nobuo wa ochitsuite-itta.  
 “Shiran. Shiran keredo honto-rashii-yo. Nā” [Ōtake ga itta]. Matsui ga minna no kao o mita. (Miura: 93) (# *yōda*)  
 ‘ “Who heard the crying voice?” asked Nobuo calmly.  
 “ I don’t know. I don’t know, but it is true + *rashii*. You see,” said [Ōtake]. Matsui looking at their faces.’

In example (54), the subject of a ghost is unfamiliar for children. They are not sure whether a ghost appears. Thus, this subject is beyond their comprehension. The following example implies that the writer has not experienced the *karuta*

(traditional Japanese playing cards) competition:

- (55) (The writer reports about the *karuta* competition)  
*(Karuta-kyōgi de wa) Tsukiyubi nado wa mochiron, kossetsu o suru koto mo aru-rashii.* (10/Jan/2005 *Tenseijingo*) (# *yōda*)  
 ‘[In a *Karuta* competition] spraining a finger often occurs and occasionally a finger can be broken + *rashii.*’

In example (55), the utterer’s inexperience of the *karuta* competition is shown through the *rashii* expression.

#### (4) Investigation by other people

A judgement on the basis of other people’s investigation is generally expressed with *rashii*. In this case, however, if the utterer satisfies the investigation fully and understands it completely, *yōda* can be used, as mentioned in 5-6-1. The examples of *rashii* are shown below:

- (56) *Kotoshi wa harikēn no hassei ga reinen yori mo kanari ōi-rashii.* ‘*Furorida ni totte fuun-na toshi*’ to *iwareteiru.* (6/Sep/2004 *Tenseijingo*) (# *yōda*)  
 ‘This year hurricanes have occurred much more frequently than usual + *rashii.* It is said that this year is unfortunate for Florida’

In example (56), the judgement of the frequency of occurrences of hurricane in Florida is made based on other people’s investigation. We can know this because *rashii* is used. Hence, the judgement relies on second-hand information.

- (57) *Kaimen yori 400 mētoru mo hikui tokoro ni aru Shikai ga, masumasu hikuku shizunde-iru-rashii.* *Isuraeru to Yorudan no sakai o nagareru Yorudan-gawa ga hotondo yuiitsu no suigen nanoni, ryūiki de no shusui-ryō ga fueta tame-da. Nagarekomu mizu ga heri, suii no teika ga kasokushite-iru.* (10/Jul/2000 *Tenseijingo*) (# *yōda*)  
The Dead Sea, which is located 400 meter lower than the surface of the sea, has been going down more and more + *rashii.* The Jordan River flowing between Israel and Jordan can be considered as nearly the sole source of water supply. Since the amount of water taken from the river has increased, the amount of water going into the Dead Sea has decreased. As a result, the drop in the water level of the Dead Sea is being accelerated.

In example (57), it does not seem that the writer of *Tenseijingo* has examined the

water level of the Dead Sea himself/herself. The judgement is made using the information from other people's examination.

### (5) Non-speciality

While a specialist is good at her/his special field, which is inside her/his perceptible domain, a subject outside the utterer's field is not very easy to understand. In this 'outside' case *rashii* is used. For example:

- (58) *Kono [nōsocchū to yū] byōki ga yakkai na no wa, iroirona kōishō ga arawareru kotoda. Kiwamete fukuzatsu na kikan no nō dakeni, arawarekata mo sensabanbetsu-rashii.* (9/Mar/2004 *Tenseijingo*) (#*yōda*)  
 The reason why this disease [cerebral apoplexy] is annoying is that various aftereffects appear. The brain is a very complex organ, so these appearances are diverse + *rashii*.

As shown in example (58), the writer can be regarded as non-specialist of medical science because *rashii* is used. If the utterer were a specialist of cerebral apoplexy, *yōda* would be used because the aftereffect would be the subject of her/his study (or treatment). The 'less responsibility of *rashii*' view seems to be proposed based on non-speciality, which means that the subject for judgement is outside the utterer's perceptible domain.

### (6) Generalising something thoughtlessly

It is not easy to generalise an idea from certain facts, even if the facts are found through the utterer's own experience. For example, even if the utterer has met a kind person, s/he cannot conclude that all the people living in that country are generally kind. Such an idea is not mature, and is outside her/his perceptible domain. The following example is taken from Hayatsu (1988), although she regards it as *hikihanashi* 'distancing':

- (59) (The following sentence deals with the emotional rejection sometimes felt by Japanese people as the topic)  
*Mōshiwakenai to itta kanjō ga watashi no kokoro kara kiete-simatte-ita. Amari ni tsugi kara tsugi e to nihon-gun no bankō o kikasarete-iru uchi ni, jibun ga jyōkyaku zen'in kara semerarete-iru-yōna kibun ni nari, nani o, to hanpatsushita-rashii.* (*Jibun no idaita kanjō wa*) *tashikani tanjun katsu*

*yōchi de-ari, sore ijō ni kiken na mono dearu-ga, arushu no ningen wa, hajimete kaigai ni deru-to, tokaku kōitta keikō ni ochiiri-yasui-rashii.* (Fujiwara, Masahiko *Wakaki sūgakusha no Amerika* ‘A young mathematician in the USA’ cited by Hayatsu 1988: 54 and 55) (# *yōda*)  
 ‘My emotion of apology had disappeared. Hearing of acts of cruelty by the Japanese army one after another, I felt as if I were blamed by all the passengers and I wanted to reject this + *rashii*. My feeling was not only simple and childish, but also dangerous. Some Japanese people are likely to fall into this tendency + *rashii* when they go abroad for the first time.’

In example (59), *rashii* appears twice and the second one is focused on. The utterer tries to generalise the emotional rejection as a tendency, but it is difficult to conclude this. This is because there are actually many (or some) Japanese who acknowledge the cruelty of the Japanese army in the World War II. The term ‘thoughtless generalisation’ implies that the judgement does not have adequate evidence, and that the subject for judgement is outside the perceptible domain. *Rashii* implicitly shows this.

#### (7) Hearsay usage of *rashii*

The hearsay usage of *rashii* can be explained in a way similar to the conjecture usage of *rashii* in (1) – (6) above. The hearsay usage also shows that the subject is outside the utterer’s perceptible domain. Although the conjecture usage has inference, the hearsay usage does not. In other words, the hearsay usage depends completely on verbal information. For example:

- (60) (Eddie is talking about his daughter who is a troublemaker in her school)  
 “*Wazato yatte-iru-no-ne. Hoka no gakkō ni ikitakute. Are, nani yū no? gan tsukeru? So, uchi no ko ga onna no sensei ni gan tsukeru to sugoi-rashii-no. Kowaitte, sensei ga yū-yo. ....uchi no ko bijin de kawaii-nda-kedo-ne.* (Sawaki: 498) (# *yōda*)  
 ‘ “My daughter is intentionally doing bad things because she wants to transfer to another school. What do you call it? ‘*Gantsukeru* (staring at someone)? When she does so, my daughter looks horrible + *rashii*. Her teacher was saying, “She is scary.” ..... though she is beautiful and pretty. ” ’

In example (60), Eddie directly hears about his daughter from her teacher. He says that when she stares at someone to accuse her/him falsely, his daughter looks horrible + *rashii*. His remark includes little inference. His judgement completely

depends on the information from her teacher, although he grasps the characteristic of her daughter from her teacher's word 'scary'. Thus, although the hearsay usage has little inference, the characteristic-capturing function works in a way similar to the conjecture usage of *rashii*.

The examination above leads to the view that in the conjecture and hearsay usages of *rashii* the subject for judgement can be regarded as being outside the utterer's perceptible domain. This indicates that the definition of the modal *rashii* is appropriate.

In addition, as discussed in the previous subsection, *yōda* has an interrogative usage whereas *rashii* used as conjecture or hearsay does not.<sup>23</sup> This is one of the distinctive features of *rashii*.<sup>24</sup> The reason why *rashii* has no interrogative expression is that the subject is regarded as being outside the listener's perceptible domain. Thus, the reasonability of the definition can be straightforwardly shown in what *rashii* has no interrogative expression.

Therefore, these examinations lead to the conclusion that the difference between *yōda* and *rashii* depends on whether the subject is inside or outside the utterer's perceptible domain. These examples contribute to establishing the hypotheses of the definitions of *yōda* and *rashii* as evidence.

### 5-6-3. Analysis of the case in which both *yōda* and *rashii* are acceptable

Although in the figurative (or similar) and euphemistic usages of *yōda*, and in the attributive usage of *rashii*, *yōda* and *rashii* cannot be substituted for each other, in the conjectural usage there are interchangeable cases of *yōda* and *rashii*. This subsection discusses the conditions under which *yōda* and *rashii* are interchangeable. In this case, the sentence with interchangeability must be explained from the viewpoint of the core functions of *yōda* and *rashii*. Basically, *yōda* is used when the subject for judgement is evidently inside the utterer's

<sup>23</sup> The attribute usage of *rashii* has an interrogative usage because the morpheme *rashii* is a suffix belonging to the propositional part of a sentence.

<sup>24</sup> Example (38) is shown again:

(Her daughter changed her school one month ago. The mother is anxious about her daughter, visiting her teacher to ask how she is doing) “Sensei, uchi no ko wa gakkō ni nareta-yōdesu-ka?” (\**rashii*)

‘Sir [or Miss], has she become used to her new school + *yōda*?’

perceptible domain, while *rashii* is used when it is outside. However, actually the border between inside and outside is not always clear.

When the context is neglected, both *yōda* and *rashii* would be acceptable. In this case, *yōda* and *rashii* can be interchangeable, but what is implied by each context is different. In contrast, in a certain case, the sentence meaning is nearly equal even if *yōda* and *rashii* are replaced with each other. This section particularly focuses on the clarification of the latter case. An example of the former case is:

- (61) (Looking at the sky, the utterer says)  
*Ashita mo hareru {yōda/rashii}*  
 It will also be fine tomorrow.

In example (61), through everyday experience, the utterer can judge tomorrow's weather, looking at the sky. This subject is inside the utterer's perceptible domain, so *yōda* is used. When *rashii* is used, the utterer judges through observing a certain feature, e.g. the red sky in the west. In the *rashii* case, even if the evidence for judgement is not explicitly shown, a characteristic grasped by the utterer is behind the judgement. Thus, a certain context could be guessed by use of either *yōda* or *rashii*. Thus, in this case of interchangeability, the context of the sentence is differently understood depending on the use of *yōda* or *rashii*. However, in this case, the sentence replaced by *yōda* or *rashii* is grammatically correct but the context implied by the new sentence is different. The above case is not one of primary interchangeability. Hence, the latter case of interchangeability is focused on.

The case in which both *yōda* and *rashii* can be acceptable without changing the sentence-meaning is now examined. When the subject for judgement becomes very close to inside of the utterer's perceptible domain in the *rashii* sentence, *yōda* is acceptable instead of *rashii*. This means that when the judgement in the *rashii* sentence has a high probability, *yōda* is substitutable for *rashii*. In order to examine this view, the following three factors are used as indices: (1) persuasive evidence for judgement is shown clearly (or wholly) as the feature of the subject; (2) the subject is investigated (or observed) by the utterer

oneself (not by another person); and (3) the utterer is convinced (or satisfied) that her/his judgement is true. This subsection discusses whether *yōda* is acceptable when the *rashii* sentence satisfies these three conditions.

To begin with, whether the above three conditions are fulfilled and whether *yōda* is substitutable for *rashii* are examined in the following examples.

- (62) (*At a Japanese restaurant in Pusan, 'I' heard Naitō talking about a certain boy who had worked there five years ago*)  
 a. *Naitō wa sono mise ni izen mo kita koto ga aru-rashikatta. Shujin ni, mae ni ita shōnen wa dōshitanoka to kiki, yameta-noda to shiru to, sono ko ni aitakatta-noni, to zannengatta.* (Sawaki: 185)  
 ‘Naitō had been to the restaurant + *rashikatta*. He asked the owner how the boy who had worked before at this restaurant was doing. Hearing that the boy had already quit his job, Naitō disappointedly said that he had wanted to see him.’  
 →a’. *Naitō wa sono mise ni izen mo kita koto ga aru-yōdatta*  
 ‘Naitō had been to the restaurant + *yōdaatta*.’

As can be seen in example (62a’), *yōda(yōdatta)* is acceptable instead of *rashii(rashikatta)*. With regard to the first factor, the persuasive evidence for the judgement with *rashii* is clearly shown by Naitō’s question about *mae ni ita shōnen* ‘the boy who worked at the restaurant before’ because the question indicates that Naitō experienced coming to the restaurant. With regard to the second factor, the subject is observed by the utterer himself. With regard to the third factor, the utterer ‘I’ is convinced that her/his judgement is true. Thus, the *rashii* sentence satisfies the indices. Consider another example:

- (63) (*Oka Midori was followed by someone on a pitch-dark night*)  
 a. *Otte-kuru kehai ni, Oka Midori wa furimuki-zama, baggu de aite no kao no Atari o omoikiri utta. “u!” tto aite ga umeku. Meichūshita-rashii.* (Akagawa: 863) (Example (18) in 5-2-2-(3))  
 ‘Oka Midori felt that someone was following immediately behind her. The moment she turned around, she hit him on his face with her bag. He groaned. She had hit the target right + *rashii*.’  
 →a’. *Meichūshita-yōda*.

In example (63), this sentence expresses a high degree of certainty by use of *rashii* because she would be able to feel whether the handbag has hit him. As shown in (63a’), *yōda* is substitutable for *rashii*. With regard to the indices, first,

the persuasive evidence for her judgement is clearly shown by his groan and her feeling (the tactile and auditory sense), second the subject is observed in person, and third, she is convinced that her judgement is true. Thus, the three conditions are satisfied. The examination of these two examples above suggests that when the three conditions are satisfied, *rashii* can be replaced with *yōda*. However, the following question must be examined before this section is concluded. If the three conditions are not satisfied, is *yōda* substitutable for *rashii*?

Firstly, when the *rashii* sentence lacks persuasive evidence for judgement, *rashii* cannot be replaced with *yōda*, as follows:

- (64) (Otō looked as if he had given up running away, and sulky. His wife says to him)

“*Shinpaishinai-no-yo. Anata*” to *fujin ga itta. “Mujitsu nara, kanarazu hannin ga mitsukaru-wa.”*

“*Jū-nen saki-ka? Nijū-nen-ka?*”

“*Mō hitokoe! Sanjū-nen*” to *Junko ga itta. Seri-ichi no tsumori-rashii.*

(Akagawa: 610) (# *yōda*)

‘“Don’t worry, Darling” said Otō’s wife. “You are innocent. So, the real culprit will surely be caught.”

“Ten years in the future? Or twenty years?” said Otō.

“Thirty years more” said Junko. She looked as if she were bidding against him + rashii.’

- (65) *Yonjū-nen mae no kyō ansatsusareta hazu no Kenedī moto-daitoryō wa mada ikite-iru. Eiyū-shinwa ni tsukimono no ‘uwasa’ ga kare ni tsuite mo nagareru. Issetsu de wa, Tekisasu-shū no rōjin-shisetsu de kurashite-iru-rashii.* (22/Nov/2003 *Tenseijingo*) (# *yōda*)

‘Former President Kennedy, who would have been assassinated on this day 40 years ago, is still alive. The rumour of him is abroad as a heroic myth which is always accompanied by rumour. According to one theory, he is living at a home for the aged in Texas + rashii.’

In examples (64) and (65), the evidences for the judgements are the shout ‘thirty years more’ and the rumour (including one theory). However, this evidence is not adequate for the judgements. Thus, the lack of the first factor (persuasive evidence for the judgement) leads to non-interchangeability of *yōda* and *rashii*.

Secondly, when the investigation or observation is made by other people for the utterer’s judgement, *yōda* is not substitutable for *rashii*, as shown in (4), 5-6-2. The following examples show this:

- (66) (The employees are on strike to show their disagreement about President Otō's come back. Junko talks to Nobuko about the strike)  
 “*Yarujanai-no! Shubōsha wa dare?*”  
 “*Yamamoto-san-rashii-no*”  
 “*Yamamoto-kun? — ano, fukureta Yamamoto-kun?*”(Akagawa: 668)  
 (# *yōda*)  
 ‘ “They are doing well! Who is the leader of the strike?”  
 “It is Mr Yamamoto + *rashii*.”  
 “Mr Yamamoto? Is it that plump person? ” ’
- (67) (I am talking about the person for sparring, James Callaghan)  
 “*Kyarahhan nante shitteru?*”  
*Watashi wa Naitō no hō ni kao o muketa.*  
 “*Shitteru. Soitsu mo hāfu-rashii-yo. Igirisu ka dokka-no. Dakedo-sa, soitsu wa mada yonkaisen ka rokkaisen no hazuda-kedo-na.*” (Sawaki: 857) (# *yōda*)  
 ‘ “Do you know about Callaghan?” said I, turning my face towards Naitō.  
 Naitō said, “I know. He is a person of mixed blood + *rashii*. British or something. But...he should be a four-round boy or a six-round boy.”’

In examples (66) and (67), the judgements are made completely depending on other people's information. The two *rashii* sentences do not allow a substitution of *yōda* for *rashii*. Thus, when the *rashii* sentence lacks the second factor, *yōda* is not substitutable for *rashii*.

Thirdly, in the case where the utterer is not convinced that her/his judgement is true, (is half in doubt), *yōda* is not substitutable for *rashii*. For example:

- (68) (I am about to show my passport to the young receptionist at the hotel)  
 “*Irimasen*” *Kare wa mijikaku kotaeta. Sore made watashi ga urotsuite-kita ōku no kuni de wa, pasupōto no teiji nashi ni hoteru ni tomaru koto wa dekinakatta. Shikashi, Amerika de wa hitsuyō ga nai-rashii.* (Sawaki: 282)  
 (# *yōda*)  
 ‘ “You don't have to show your passport,” said he briefly. In other countries I had visited, I could not stay at a hotel without showing it. However, in the USA, I do not have to show it + *rashii*.’
- (69) (I came to America [Los Angeles]. I paid the hotel charges. After drinking cola, I went out.)  
*San-burokku aruku-to, hageshiku hito no yukikau, hankana tōri ni deta. Hyōshiki ni yoreba, Burōdo-uei to yū tōri-rashikatta.* (Sawaki: 292)

(Example (11) in 5-2-1-(2)) (# *yōda*)

‘After walking three blocks, I arrived at a busy street where many people came and went. According to a sign on the street, the name of the street was Broadway + *rashikatta*.’

In example (68), the utterer does not make his judgement conclusively because the evidence is only one experience at the hotel. The utterer is half in doubt. In example (69), the sign is an objective indicator but the utterer is not convinced because this is an unfamiliar place name for him in Los Angeles (he is not staying in New York City, which has a Broadway). Thus, the lack of the utterer’s convincing judgement leads to the *yōda*’s non-substitutability for *rashii*.

These three factors are not always shown individually, and there are cases in which two or three factors occur together. The first two conditions — persuasive evidence and the utterer’s own investigation or observation — is finally integrated into the third condition — convincing (or satisfying) judgement. This shows that the interchangeable cases of *rashii* have a high probability. The reason for this is that the subject for judgement using *rashii* becomes closer to the inside the utterer’s perceptible domain.

## 5-7. Conclusion

The difference between *yōda* and *rashii* has been investigated in the previous studies, but the difference still remains vague. Even the descriptiveness of observation and inference theory has not yet clarified it adequately. This chapter has attempted to clarify the difference between the two modals.

This chapter has proposed the hypotheses of the core functions of *yōda* and *rashii*, particularly taking up the new concept of inside or outside the utterer’s perceptible domain. The hypotheses are derived from the characteristics of *yōda/rashii* from the data-analysis, which shows *rinjōsei* ‘the utterer is present with the subject for judgement in the same scene’ of *yōda* and the explicitness of evidence for judgement of *rashii*, and are established mostly by observation of actual examples through the substitution method. The concept of ‘inside/outside the utterer’s perceptible domain’ is the most important finding for the distinction

between the two modals.

The hypothesis of *yōda* and *rashii* has been further reinforced by demonstrating actual examples from novels and essays as evidence for the proposal. The evidence has been confirmed in the following two cases by use of the substitution method: (1) *yōda* is acceptable but *rashii* is not in the context; and (2) *rashii* is acceptable but *yōda* is not. Through the examination of the non-substitutability of *yōda* and *rashii*, this chapter has individually exhibited the various characteristics of *yōda* and *rashii* and has categorised them. The categorisation has illustrated the case of whether *yōda* or *rashii* is appropriate.

This chapter has also provided an explanation of the case of interchangeability of *yōda* and *rashii* by use of the new view that *yōda* can be used when the usage of *rashii* approaches the inside of the utterer's perceptible domain. That is to say, when the utterer expresses a high probability using *rashii*, *yōda* can be substituted for *rashii* with three conditions — (1) persuasive evidence for judgement, (2) the utterer's own investigation or (observation), and (3) convincing (or satisfying) judgement. Additionally, with regard to the hypotheses, the continuity and the discontinuity of the usages of both *yōda* and *rashii* have been demonstrated. The concept of inside the utterer's perceptible domain is common among the three usages of *yōda* — figurativeness (similarity), conjecture and euphemism. The characteristic-capturing function of *rashii* is common among the three usages of *rashii* —attribute, conjecture and hearsay — and the concept of the outside subsumes the conjecture and the hearsay usage of *rashii*.

Thus, the hypotheses proposed in this chapter will contribute to the clarification of the distinction between *yōda* and *rashii* as a distinguishable axis.

**Chapter 6**

<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>245</b>
6-1. Introduction.....	245
6-2. Main outcomes of the study.....	245
6-3. Implications for the study of modality.....	249

# Chapter 6

## Conclusion

### 6-1. Introduction

The main theme underlying the discussion throughout this study is that all sentences express both proposition and modality. In the first half, the study has discussed the issues of the definitions of both proposition and modality, the categorisation of modality at the end of a sentence, and the distinction of certain morphemes between them. In the latter half, the study has investigated how functionally epistemic modals work; concretely, it has examined the differences between similar modals. The study has answered several questions through the context-analysis of actual examples, adopting the methods of phrase-addition and modal-substitution.

This chapter provides the main findings of the thesis, reconfirming the significance of them. It then concludes with some implications for further issues on modality in the Japanese language to further develop the theory of modality.

### 6-2. Main outcomes of the study

The main findings can be categorised as follows: (1) the establishment of the concept of the sentence; (2) the establishment of clearer definitions of proposition and modality, and the discovery of a phrasal discriminator for proposition and modality; (3) a new classification of modality; and (4) the elucidation of issues concerning epistemic modals (similar functionary modals).

#### *The establishment of the concept of the sentence*

The view that a sentence consists of proposition and modality has been accepted

by scholars (Teramura 1982; Nitta 1989, 1997, 1999; and Masuoka 1987, 1991, 2000). This view can be regarded as a promising hypothesis, since no counterargument has been presented. However, the view has not been fully examined. This study, in discussing issues relating to proposition and modality, has examined whether the theory that a sentence expresses both proposition and modality can be accepted as true. The study has determined that no sentence can be formed without both proposition and modality, and the theory is supported throughout by analyses in each chapter.

This theory means that not only conjectural sentences, but also declarative, interrogative, imperative, and volitional sentences express both proposition and modality. Although each type of sentence has been studied by scholars<sup>1</sup> from the viewpoint of modality, this study has provided more detailed explanations, particularly as regards the declarative and imperative sentences that lack modals. Concretely speaking, in the declarative sentence with the copula *da/dearu*, the copula expresses both proposition and modality at the end of a sentence. It conveys both the reasonability (semantic meaning) as proposition and the utterer's assertion as modality. That is, the copula, which originally does not have the semantic meaning of assertion, expresses assertion when it is used at the end of a sentence. Hence, there is a situation in which one form expresses both proposition and modality. This points to the general rule that the declarative sentence expresses both proposition and modality which is expressed by the mood (conjugated forms of the copula and the verb). Additionally, the study has demonstrated that an expression which lacks either proposition or modality, such as an interjection (e.g. 'Oh!') or a sign (e.g. 'No, entry'), cannot be taken as a sentence. Thus, the study has shown that the two indices, proposition and modality, are a prerequisite for a sentence (chapter 2).

This study also critically examines views such as Tokieda's (1941) that one morpheme or one word definitely belongs to either proposition or modality. In the declarative sentence, while the *ta* morpheme at the end of a sentence expresses the meaning of past or perfect as proposition, it expresses confirmation as

---

<sup>1</sup> The interrogative sentence is discussed in detail by Adachi (1992, 1999), the imperative sentence by Nitta (1989, 1991, 1997) and Miyazaki (2002) and the volitional sentence by Nitta (1991b).

modality (chapter 3). Hence, the conjugated form (conclusive form) of the *-ta* form used at the end of a sentence expresses both proposition and modality, and that of the verb also does. This shows that Tokieda's zero-symbol is not required to explain modality in the declarative sentence. Furthermore, *yōda* has both a figurative and a conjectural usage. The former behaves as proposition while the latter functions as modality (chapter 5).

Thus, the study of modality has been completely freed from the view that a certain morpheme or word has a simple one-to-one correspondence with either proposition or modality.

***The establishment of clearer definitions of proposition and modality, and the discovery of a phrasal discriminator for proposition and modality***

This study has set up a clearer definition of proposition by adopting both Lyons' (1977 and 1995) 'truth-value' view, and Teramura's 'objective part of a sentence' view (Teramura 1982; and Nitta 1989 and 1997). The definition of 'proposition' in Japanese linguistics has hitherto lacked Lyons' viewpoint. The new definition of modality has also been established by way of contrast with proposition.

The thesis has also discovered the discriminator *koto o shitteiru* 'I know that ~', which is able to distinguish proposition and modality (chapter 2). This finding has contributed effectively to the solution of distinguishing proposition and modality. For example, the study has reconfirmed that the causative suffixes *-saseru* and the passive suffixes *-rareru* belong to a verb which is the propositional part. Further, it has found that the *masu* form following verbs can be regarded as an honorific suffix. Also, the desiderative *tai* and the attribute *rashii* are suffixes formed as *i*-adjectives (chapters 2 and 5). The effectiveness of the discriminator has also been empirically demonstrated in the examination of *ta*, *yōda* and *rashii* (chapters 3 and 5).

Additionally, from the viewpoint of the subsumption-structure, using juxtapositional sentences, the study has confirmed that proposition is generally subsumed by modality. The subsumption-structure of *teiru* and *ta* has seldom been discussed in the literature. The two forms, *teiru* showing aspect and *ta* showing tense and aspect, are different from the epistemic modals. Examination of these

forms has shown that both belong to the propositional part, while simultaneously relating to the subsumption-structure. Thus, it has been confirmed that the morpheme *ta* (and the *teiru* form) at the end of a sentence is positioned at the boundary between proposition and modality (chapter 2).

### ***A new classification of modality***

The third outcome of this study is a new classification of modality. In the literature, Nitta's (1989: 41) two categories of P-modality—the affective group and the epistemic group — do not include demand expressions spurring the listener into action. Nakau's (1994: 54-58) semantic categorisation is too broad to classify P-modality,<sup>2</sup> while Miyazaki's (2002: 1-15) trichotomy — *jikkō* 'action', *jōjutsu* 'description' and *gimon* 'question'— do not show clear indices and the position of the question is unclear. Hence, this study has set up a new classification of modality by way of the following three categories from the viewpoint of the orientation of modality: (1) proposition-oriented modality (intellectual recognition which addresses the proposition), (2) situation-oriented modality (affective inner world which addresses the situation expressed through the proposition), and (3) listener-oriented modality (conative modality projected towards the listener whom the utterer requests to respond)(chapter 2). Epistemic modals are positioned in the first category. Exclamatory expressions and demand expressions belong to situation-oriented modality (emotive modality) and listener-oriented modality (conative modality), respectively (chapter 2). The various usages of *ta* appear in all categories of the above classification (chapter 3).

### ***The elucidation of issues concerning epistemic modals***

In the latter half of the thesis, this study has presented new views about the following two issues concerning epistemic modals: (1) the extent of the difference between *nodarō* and *darō*; and (2) between *yōda* and *rashii*. The empirical study of chapters 4 and 5 are summarised below.

Firstly, the difference between *darō* and *nodarō* has not been widely

---

<sup>2</sup> To repeat, his five categories are shown again: (1) modality of truth judgement; (2) that of judgement withholding; (3) that of (dis)approval; (4) that of value judgement; and (5) that of deontic judgement.

noted. This study establishes the two types of *nodarō* usage —the front conjecture type and the focus conjecture type— building on Kuramochi (1984) and Nakahata (1998). The study has defined the difference between *nodarō* and *darō*: *nodarō* serves to express the interpretation of the specific situation through inference, and in contrast, *darō* works to present the utterer’s soft claim that the proposition is true. Particularly, the study has demonstrated the following new categorisation of the relationship between judgement and situation in the *nodarō* expression through the contextual analysis of examples: (1) causes of situations (2) reasons of situations (3) implications hidden behind situations (4) backgrounds of situations (5) purpose/intention of situations (6) details of situations (7) natural consequence resulting from situations (chapter 4).

Secondly, although the difference between *yōda* and *rashii* has been discussed for decades, persuasive and satisfactory theories have not been found despite each theory presenting a partial characteristic of the two modals. Hence, this study has concentrated on the analysis of actual examples through both the data-analysis and the modal-substitutional methods, and has verified that the utterer recognises the subject as being ‘inside her/his perceptible domain’ by use of *yōda* and ‘outside’ by use of *rashii*. *Yōda* and *rashii* are interchangeable in the case where the utterer is convinced of her/his judgement with a high probability. That is, when the subject expressed by *rashii* becomes closer to the inside of the utterer’s perceptible domain, *yōda* can be used instead of *rashii*. The new concepts have been set up for the new theory as a distinguishable axis between the two modals, and are supported by actual examples (chapter 5).

### **6-3. Implications for the study of modality**

The study will have contributed to a better understanding of modality (inner feelings and thoughts). Modality expressions appearing at the beginning and in the middle of a sentence were excluded from the subject of this study because the focus of this study was on modals used at the end of a sentence. However, the findings of the study can be applied to analysing the expression of modality appearing at the beginning and in the middle of a sentence in the Japanese

language. In particular, the definitions of both proposition and modality and the method using their discriminator will prove useful to such an analysis.

Modality is expressed in various places in a sentence. Modality at the beginning and in the middle of a sentence is expressed by e.g. *kōunna koto ni* ‘fortunately’, or *zannen-nagara* ‘I am afraid ~, or unfortunately’. These phrases are called sentence-adverbs. *Kitto* ‘surely or certainly’ and *osoraku* ‘probably, perhaps, or maybe’ appears both at the beginning and in the middle. Also, *wa* (the topic marker or contrast marker), *mo* ‘too, also, or even’, and emphatic particles such as *sura* ‘even’, *sae* ‘even’ and *made* ‘besides’ appear in the middle of a sentence. Sentence-final particles such as *yo*, *ne*, *zo* and *sa* can be regarded as expressing modality in the final segment of a sentence. These examples can probably be differentiated from proposition by applying the findings of this study, especially by use of the discriminator. Approaching the sentence from the viewpoint of proposition and modality seems to contribute to a new elucidation of the internal structure of the sentence in the Japanese language, namely a new grammar.

The findings and the implications of the study suggest that in the four modality expressions—at the beginning of a sentence, in the middle, at the end, and in the sentence-final part—the study of their roles in a sentence, each function, and their correlations need to be further investigated. As well, the examination of whether the classification of modality proposed in this study corresponds with the other three expressions of modality is a subject for further research. Further investigation of these subjects is indispensable to elucidating a fully comprehensive overview of modality. Furthermore, the comparison between Japanese and other languages must be a significant subject of further research to extend the present discussion. With regard to the sentence-final particle, Korean language has rich expressions while English has a few similar expressions such as the tag question. Thus, to expand understanding of the broader functioning of modality, it would be desirable to advance such study through not only a detailed examination of the local but also a comparative study across languages.

## Bibliography

- Adachi, Tarō (1992) ‘Katamuki’ o motsu gimon-bun — Jōhō-yōkyū-bun kara jōhō-teikyō-bun e — (Quasi-interrogative sentences suggestive of a certain conclusion — Changes from information-requesting sentences to information-offering sentences). *Nihongo kyōiku*, No. 75, pp. 49-61.
- Adachi, Tarō (1999) *Nihongo gimonbun ni okeru handan no shosō* (Various aspects of judgement of interrogative sentences in the Japanese language). Tokyo: Kuroshio Shuppan.
- Backhouse, A. E (1993) *The Japanese language: An introduction*. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
- Comrie, Bernard (1976) *Aspect*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Comrie, Bernard (1985) *Tense*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Crystal, David (1991) *A dictionary of linguistics and phonetics*. (3rd edition). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Fillmore, C.J. (1968) The case for case. In Emmon Bach and Robert T. Harms (Eds.), *Universals in linguistic theory*, pp. 1-88. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Fujita, Yasuyuki (1988) In’yō-ron no shikai (A view of the discussion of quotation). *Nihongogaku*, vol. 7-9, pp. 30-45.
- Furuta, Tōsaku (1969) Masu — keijō (gendaigo) (*Masu* — an honorific in current Japanese). In Matsumura Akira (Ed.), *Kotengo gendaigo joshi jodōshi shōsetsu* (A detailed explanation of particles and auxiliary verbs in the classical and current language), pp. 60-64. Tokyo: Gakutōsha.
- Glenn, W. Shaw (1938) *Tales grotesque and curious by Akutagawa Ryūnosuke*. (2nd edition). Tokyo: Hokuseidō Shoten.
- Haga, Yasushi (1954) ‘Chinjutsu’ to wa nanimono? (What is ‘Chinjutsu’?) *Kokugokokubun*, vol. 23, No. 4 (No. 236), pp. 47-61.
- Haga, Yasushi (1978) *Gendai Nihongo no bunpō* (The grammar of current Japanese). Tokyo: Kyōiku Shuppan.

- Hashimoto, Shinkichi (1955) *Kokugo-hō kenkyū* (A study of Japanese grammar).  
Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
- Hayashi, Ōki (1985) (Ed.), *Gendai kokugo reikai jiten (dai 2 han)* (Modern  
national language dictionary, explanations with examples, 2nd edition).  
Tokyo: Shōgakukan.
- Hayatsu, Emiko (1988) *Rashii to yōda (Rashii and yōda)*. *Nihongogaku*, vol. 7.  
(4-gatsu-gō), pp. 46-61.
- Kamada, Osamu (1983) *Nihongo no kansetsu wahō* (Indirect speech in the  
Japanese language). *Gengo*, vol. 12-9, pp. 108-117.
- Kamada, Osamu (1988) *Nihongo no dentatsu hyōgen* (Communication  
expressions in the Japanese language). *Nihongogaku*, vol. 7-9, pp. 59-77.
- Kamitani, Eiji (1995) *Jōdoshi yōda rashii ni tsuite* (Auxiliary verbs *yōda* and  
*rashii*). In *Miyaji Yutaka • Atsuko sensei koki kinen ron shū Nihongo no  
kenkyū* (Studies of the Japanese language — festschrift for the 70th  
birthday celebration of Prof. Miyaji Yutaka and Miyaji Atsuko), pp.  
549-573. Tokyo: Meiji Shoin.
- Kaplan, Jeffrey P. (1995) *English grammar principles and facts*. (2nd edition).  
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.
- Kashiwaoka, Tamako (1980) *Yōda to Rashii ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu* (Examination  
of *yōda* and *rashii*). *Nihongo kyōiku*, No. 41, pp. 169-178.
- Kikuchi, Yasuto (2000) ‘*Yōda*’ and ‘*rashii*’ — ‘*sōda*’ ‘*darō*’ to no hikaku o  
fukumete — (‘*Yōda*’ and ‘*rashii*’ — including a comparison with ‘*sōda*’  
and ‘*darō*’). *Kokugogaku*, vol. 51-1 (vol. 201), pp. 46-60.
- Kindaichi, Haruhiko (1953a) *Fuhenka jodōshi no honshitsu (jō)* (Nature of  
unchangeable auxiliary verbs (part one)). *Kokugokokubun*, vol. 22. No. 2,  
pp. 1-18.
- Kindaichi, Haruhiko (1953b) *Fuhenka jodōshi no honshitsu (ge)* (Nature of  
unchangeable auxiliary verbs (part two)). *Kokugokokubun*, vol. 22. No. 3,  
pp. 15-35.
- Kindaichi, Haruhiko (1953c) *Fuhenka jodōshi no honshitsu, sairon*  
—Tokieda-hakushi Mizutani-shi ryōka ni kotaete — (Second discussion  
concerning nature of unchangeable auxiliary verbs —on the

- counterargument by Prof. Tokieda and Mr Mizutani to my theory). *Kokugokokubun*, vol. 22, No. 9, pp. 49-56.
- Kindaichi, Haruhiko (1957) Toki, tai, sō, oyobi hō / temporality, voice, aspect and modality. In *Nihon bunpō kōza 1* (Japanese grammar course 1), pp. 223-245. Tokyo: Meiji Shoin.
- Kindaichi, Haruhiko (1976) Nihongo dōshi no tensu to asupekuto (Tense and aspect of Japanese verbs). In Kindaichi Haruhiko (Ed.), *Nihongo dōshi no asupekuto*, pp. 27-61. Tokyo: Mugi Shobō.
- Kindaichi, Haruhiko (1988) *Nihongo shinpan (ge)* (The Japanese language, new edition, part two). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
- Kitahara, Yasuo (1981) *Nihongo jodōshi no kenkyū* (A study of auxiliary verbs in the Japanese language). Tokyo: Taishūkan Shoten.
- Koizumi, Tamotsu (1990) *Gengai no gengogaku* (Linguistics for an understanding of implied meaning). Tokyo: Sanseidō.
- Kojima, Satoko (1996) ‘Rashii’ ni tsuite (A study of *rashii*). In *Kokugogaku ron shū —Yamaguchi Akio kyōju kanreki kinen* (A festschrift of Japanese linguistics for the 60th birthday of Prof. Yamaguchi Akio), pp. 563-578. Tokyo: Meiji Shoin.
- Kudō, Mayumi (1989) Gendai Nihongo no pāfekuto o megutte (A study of perfect in the Japanese language). In Gengogaku kenkyū-kai (The Research Society of Linguistics) (Ed.), *Kotoba no kagaku 3* (Science of language 3), pp 53-118. Tokyo: Mugi Shobō.
- Kuramochi, Yasuo and Yukiko, Sakata (1980) *Kyōshi yō hando bukku 4 Bunpō II jodōshi o chūshin to shite* (Handbook No. 4 for teachers, Grammar II —focusing on auxiliary verbs). The Japan Foundation. Tokyo: Bonjinsha.
- Lyons, John (1968) *An introduction to theoretical linguistics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University press.
- Lyons, John (1977) *Semantics 2*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lyons, John (1995) *Linguistic Semantics: an introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Makino, Seiichi and Michio, Tsutsui. (1989) *A Dictionary of Basic Japanese Grammar*. Tokyo: The Japan Times, Ltd.

- Masuoka, Takashi (1987) *Meidai no bunpō* (Grammar of proposition). Tokyo: Kuroshio Shuppan.
- Masuoka, Takashi (1991) *Modaritei no bunpō* (Grammar of modality). Tokyo: Kuroshio Shuppan.
- Masuoka, Takashi (1999) Meidai to no kyōkai o motomete (A study of the boundary between proposition and modality). *Gengo*, vol. 28. No. 6, pp. 46-52.
- Masuoka, Takashi and Yukinori, Takubo. (1992) *Kiso Nihongo bunpō* (Basic Japanese Grammar). Tokyo: Kuroshio Shuppan
- Masuoka, Takashi (2000) *Nihongo bunpō no shosō* (Various aspects of Japanese grammar). Tokyo: Kuroshio Shuppan.
- Matsuda, Fumiko (1998) Ganzen jitai byōsha ni okeru ‘ta’ no kinō — kakoji e no sakanobori o yōseisuru ‘ta’ — (The function of *ta* used to describe the situation in front the utterer — ‘*ta*’ functions as implying a retroactive situation). *Nihongo kyōiku*, No 97, pp. 72-82.
- Matsushita, Daizaburō (1977) *Zōho kōtei hyōjun Nihon kōgo hō* (Revised edition of *Hyōjun Nihon kōgo hō* (Standard spoken Japanese) published in 1930). Tokyo: Benseisha.
- Matsushita, Daizaburō (1924) *Hyōjun Nihon bunpō* (Standard Japanese grammar). Tokyo: Kigensha.
- Mikami, Akira (1953) *Gendai gohō josetsu —shintakusu no kokoromi —* (Introduction to the grammar of current Japanese — An attempt from the syntactic viewpoint). Tokyo: Tōe Shoin.
- Mikami, Akira (1959) *Shintei gendai-go-hō josetsu —Shugo wa hitsuyō-ka —* (Revised edition, Introduction to the grammar of current Japanese — Whether or not a subject is needed). Tokyo: Tōe Shoin.
- Mitsuya Shigematsu (1908) *Kōtō Nihon bunpō* (Advanced Japanese grammar). Tokyo: Meiji Shoin.
- Miyake, Tomohiro (1992) Ninshiki-teki modaritei ni okeru kanōsei handan ni tsuite (A study of judgement of possibility in epistemic modality). *Machikaneyama ronsō Nihongaku hen*, No. 26, pp. 35-47.
- Miyake, Tomohiro (1994) Ninshiki-teki modaritei ni okeru jishshō-teki handan ni

- tsuite (A study of empirical judgement in epistemic modality). *Kokugokokubun*, vol. 63, No. 11, pp. 20-34.
- Miyake, Tomohiro (1995) *Rashii to yōda* — gaigen no jodōshi — (*Rashii* and *yōda* — auxiliaries expressing approximate reports (1)). In Miyajima Tatsuo and Yoshio Nitta (Eds.), *Nihongo ruigigo hyōgen no bunpō (jō)* (Grammar of synonymous expressions in the Japanese language part one), pp. 183-189. Tokyo: Kuroshio Shuppan.
- Miyazaki, Kazuhito (1998) *Suiryō to sōzō* —darō to kotodarō — (Conjecture and imagination — *darō* and *kotodarō*). *Okayama Daigaku bungakubu kiyō*, No. 30, pp. 135-146.
- Miyazaki, Kazuhito (1999) *Modaritei-ron kara mita ‘~ to-omou’* (‘~ to-omou’ analysed from the viewpoint of modality). *Machikaneyama ronsō*, No. 33 *Nihongaku hen*, pp. 1-16.
- Miyazaki, Kazuhito, Adachi, Tarō, Noda, Harumi and Shino, Takanashi (2002) *Shin Nihongo bunpō sensho 4: Modaritei* (Selected writings of a new Japanese grammar, No.4, Modality). Tokyo: Kuroshio Shuppan.
- Morita, Yoshiyuki (1980) *Kadokawa shōjiten kiso Nihongo 2*. (Kadokawa concise dictionary, Basic Japanese 2). Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten.
- Morita, Yoshiyuki. (1983) *Nihongo no hyōgen* (Expressions in the Japanese Language). Tokyo: Sōrinsha
- Moriyama, Takurō (1992) *Bunmatsu Shikō Dōshi ‘omou’ o megutte* — Bun no imi to shite no shukansei · kyakkansei — (A study of the thinking verb *omou* at the end of a sentence — sentence meaning in terms of subjectivity or objectivity). *Nihongogaku*, vol. 11, pp. 105-116.
- Moriyama, Takurō (1995) ‘Denbun’ kō (Thinking of hearsay). *Kyōto kyōiku daigaku kokubun gakkaiishi*, No. 26, pp. 25-36.
- Moriyama, Takurō (1995) *Suiryō /hiyu · hikyō/ reiji* — yō/mitai no tagisei o megutte— (Conjecture, figurativeness/comparison, and illustration — polysemy of *yō* and *mitai*). In *Miyaji Yutaka · Atsuko sensei koki kinen ronshū* — *Nihongo no kenkyū* — (Studies of the Japanese language — festschrifts for the 70th birthday celebration of Prof. Miyaji Yutaka and Miyaji Atsuko), pp. 493-526. Tokyo: Meiji Shoin.

- Nagano, Masaru. (1951) *Gendaigo no joshi jodōshi —yōhō to jitsurei—* (Particles and auxiliary verbs in the current Japanese language — usages and examples). Kokuritsu Kokugo Kenkyūjo (The National Institute for Japanese Language). Tokyo: Shūei Shuppan.
- Nagano, Masaru. (1969) *yōda <gendaigo> (Yōda in current Japanese)*. In Matsumura Akira (Ed.), *Kotengo/gendaigo, joshi jodōshi shōsetsu* (A detailed explanation of particles and auxiliary verbs in the classical and current Japanese language), pp. 312-318. Tokyo: Gakutōsha.
- Nakada, Norio and Masao, Takeoka (1960) *Ayui sho shinchū* (A new commentary of Fujitani, Nariakira's *Ayui shō* (1778)). Tokyo: Kazama Shobō
- Nakahata, Takayuki (1990) *Futashikana handan — rashii to yōda —* (Uncertain judgement —*rashii* and *yōda*). *Mie Daigaku Nihongogaku bungaku*, No. 1, pp. 25-33.
- Nakahata, Takayuki (1998) *Nihongo no suiryō hyōgen ni tsuite—darō to mai —* (Conjectural expressions in the Japanese language — *darō* and *mai*). *Kōnan daigaku kiyō bungaku hen*, No.107, pp. 27-42.
- Nakau, Minoru (1979) *Meidai to modaritei* (Proposition and modality). In *Hayashi Eiichi kyōju kanreki kinen ron shū: Eigo to Nihongo to*. (Festschrift for Professor Hayashi Eiichi's sixtieth birthday celebration: English and Japanese), pp. 223-250. Tokyo: Kuroshio Shuppan.
- Nakau, Minoru (1994) *Ninnchi imi ron no genri / Principle of cognitive semantics*. Tokyo: Taishūkan Shoten.
- Nakau, Minoru (1999) *Modaritei o dō toraeru-ka* (An understanding of modality). *Gengo*, vol. 28, No. 6, pp. 26-33. Tokyo: Taishūkan Shoten.
- Nishide, Ikuyo (1969) *Kenkyū note I —‘Rashii’ oyobi ‘sōda’—* (Note towards a study of *rashii* and *yōda*). *Nihongo Nihonbunka*, No. 1, pp. 18-29.
- Nitta, Yoshio (1989) *Gendai Nihongo bun no modaritei no taikai to kōzō* (The system and structure of modality in the present day Japanese sentence). In Nitta Yoshio and Takashi Masuoka (Eds.), *Nihongo no modaritei* (Modality in the Japanese language), pp. 1-56. Tokyo: Kuroshio Shuppan.

- Nitta, Yoshio (1990) Jutsugo no kōzō (Structure of predicate). In Hayashi Dai (Ed), *Nihongo kyōiku hando bukku* (A handbook of Japanese teaching), pp. 525-528. The Society for Teaching Japanese as a Foreign Language. Tokyo: Taishūkan Shoten.
- Nitta, Yoshio (1991) *Nihongo no modaritei to ninshō* (Modality and person in the Japanese language). Kasukabe: Hitsuji Shobo.
- Nitta, Yoshio (1991b) Ishi no hyōgen to kikite sonzai (Volitional expressions and the presence of a listener). *Kokugogaku*, No. 165, pp. 1-13.
- Nitta, Yoshio (1997) *Nihongo bunpō kenkyū josetsu —Nihongo no kijutsu bunpō o mezashite* (Introduction of a study of Japanese grammar —for a descriptive grammar of the Japanese language). Tokyo: Kuroshio Shuppan.
- Nitta, Yoshio (1999) Modaritei o motomete (An understanding of modality). *Gengo*, vol. 28. No. 6, pp. 34-44. Tokyo: Taishūkan Shoten.
- Okamura, Kazue (1969) Rashii (*Rashii*). *Gekkan Bunpō*, vol. 1-8, pp. 46-47. Tokyo: Meiji Shoin.
- Okuda, Yasuo (1984) Oshihakari (1) (Conjecture (1)). *Nihongogaku*, vol. 3, (12), pp. 54-69.
- Okuda, Yasuo (1992) Setsumei (sono 2) — wakeda —. (Explanation (2) — *wakeda*). In Gengogaku kenkyū-kai (The Research Society of Linguistics) (Ed.), *Kotoba no kagaku 5* (Science of language, No. 5), pp. 187-219. Tokyo: Mugi Shobō.
- Ōno, Susumu, Satake, Akihiro, and Kingorō, Maeda (1974) (Eds.), *Iwanami kogo jiten* (Iwanami classical language dictionary). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
- Ōshika, Tadahisa (1995) Hontai haaku — ‘rashii’ no setsu (Grasp of true form — a theory of *rashii*). In *Miyaji Yutaka · Atsuko sensei koki kinen ron shū Nihongo no kenkyū*. (Studies of the Japanese language —festschrifts for the 70th birthday celebration of Prof. Miyaji Yutaka and Miyaji Atsuko), pp. 527-542. Tokyo: Meiji Shoin.
- Palmer, F. R. (1986) *Mood and modality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Palmer, F. R. (1990) *Modality and the English Modals* (2nd edition). New York: Longman Inc.
- Palmer, F. R. (2001) *Mood and modality*. (2nd edition) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Saeki, Tetsuo (1993) U to darō no shokunō bunka shi (The history of differentiation between *u* and *darō*). *Kokugogaku*, No. 174, pp. 16-27.
- Sakakura, Atsuyoshi 1974 *Kaitei Nihon bunpō no hanashi* (Revision, a lecture on Japanese grammar) Tokyo: Kyōiku Shuppan.
- Sakata, Yukiko (1982) Rashii (*rashii*). In the Society for Teaching Japanese as a Foreign Language (Ed.), *Nihongo kyōiku jiten shukusatsu-ban* (An encyclopaedia of the teaching of Japanese language, abbreviated edition), pp.385-386. Tokyo: Taishūkan Shoten.
- Schiffrin, Deborah (1994) *Approaches to discourse*. Ames: Blackwell Publishing Professional.
- Shibata, Takeshi (1982) Yōda rashii darō (*Yōda, rashii* and *darō*). In Kunihiro Tetsuya (Ed.), *Kotoba no imi 3 jisho ni kaitenai koto* (Meanings of language 3, omissions from dictionaries), pp. 87-94. Tokyo: Heibonsha.
- Shinmura, Ideshi (1998) (Ed.), *Kōjien* (5th edition) (1998) Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
- Sunakawa, Yuriko (1987) In'yō-bun no kōzō to kinō — inyō-bun no mittsu no ruikai ni tsuite — (Structure and function of sentences for quotation —three types of quotations). *Bungei gengo kenkyū, gengo hen*, No. 13, pp. 73-91.
- Suzuki, Kazuo, Iyo, Hiroshi, Toyama, Eiji, and Seiji, Koike (1995) (Eds.), *Zen'yaku dokkai kogo jiten* (A Classical language dictionary translated into modern Japanese). Tokyo: Sanseidō.
- Suzuki, Shigeyuki (1976) Nihongo no toki (tensu) to sugata (asupekuto) — ~shita to ~shiteita — (Tense and aspect in the Japanese language — ~shita and ~shiteita). In Kindaichi Haruhiko (Ed.), *Nihongo no asupekuto* (Aspect in the Japanese language), pp. 83-95. Tokyo: Mugi Shobō.
- Tamura, Naoko (1999) Nakerebanaranai no yōhō to meidai-yōso to no kakawari — zaruoenai, bekida, hazuda to no chikansei o tegakarini —. (The

relationship between the usage of *nakerebanaranai* and propositional factors — through examination of whether or not *zaruoenai*, *bekida* and *hazuda* can be substituted for *nakerebanaranai*). *Nihongo kyōiku*, No. 101, pp. 21-30.

Tanaka, Akio (1969) *Ta (da) — kako (kaisō) · kanryō <gendaigo> — (Ta (da) —past (reminiscence) and perfect <current Japanese>)*. In Matsumura Akira (Ed.), *Kotengo gendaido joshi jodōshi shōsetsu* (A detailed explanation of particles and auxiliary verbs in the classical and current language), pp. 142-154. Tokyo: Gakutōsha.

Tanomura Tadaharu (1990) *Bun ni okeru handan o megutte* (Judgement in the sentence). In Sakiyama, Osamu and Akihiro Satō (Eds.) *Ajia no shogengo to ippan gengogaku* (Languages in Asia and general linguistics), pp. 785-795. Tokyo: Sanseidō.

Tanomura, Tadaharu (1990) *Gendai Nihongo no bunpō I — noda no imi to yōhō* — (Grammar of current Japanese — meanings and usages of *noda*—). Ōsaka: Izumi Shoin.

Tanomura, Tadaharu (1991) *Rashii to yōda no imi no sōi ni tsuite* (Semantic differences between *rashii* and *yōda*). *Gengogaku kenkyū*, No. 10, pp. 62-77.

Teramura, Hideo (1971) ‘*Ta*’ no imi to kinō —*asupekuto · tensu · mūdo no kōbun-teki ichi-zuke* — (The usage and function of *ta* — positioning of aspect, tense and mood). In *Gengogaku to Nihongo mondai* (Japanese Linguistics and problems), pp.244-289. (Festschrift on the occasion of Professor Iwakura Tomozane’s retirement). Tokyo: Kuroshio Shuppan.

Teramura, Hideo (1979) *Mūdo no keishiki to imi (1) — gaigen-teki hōdō no hyōgen*— (The form and meaning of mood (1) — expressions for approximate report ). *Bungei gengo kenkyū gengo-hen*, vol. 4, pp. 67-89.

Teramura, Hideo. (1982) *Nihongo no shintakusu to imi I* (Syntax and Meaning in Japanese, I ). Tokyo: Kuroshio Shuppan.

Teramura, Hideo (1984) *Nihongo no shintakusu to imi II* (Syntax and Meaning in Japanese, II ). Tokyo: Kuroshio Shuppan.

Teramura, Hideo (1991) *Nihongo no shintakusu to imi III* (Syntax and Meaning

- in Japanese, III). Tokyo: Kuroshio Shuppan.
- Tokieda, Motoki (1941) *Kokugogaku genron* (Principles of Japanese linguistics). Iwanami Shoten.
- Tokieda, Motoki (1950) *Nihon bunpō kōgo-hen* (Grammar of spoken Japanese). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
- Tokieda, Motoki (1954) Shi to ji no renzoku/hirenzoku no mondai (The issue of continuity/discontinuity in *shi* and *ji*). *Kokugogaku*, No. 19, pp. 1-16.
- Tokieda, Motoki (1953) Kindaichi Haruhiko-shi no ‘Fuhenga jodōshi no honshitsu’ o yonde (A critique of Kindaichi Haruhiko’s paper ‘Nature of unchangeable auxiliary verbs’). *Kokugokokubun*, vol. 22, No. 5, pp. 55-58.
- Toyama, Eiji (1969) *rashii* <gendaigo>. (*Rashii* <Current Japanese>) In Matsumura Akira (Ed.), *Kotengo gendaido joshi jodōshi shōsetsu* (A detailed explanation of particles and auxiliary verbs in the classical and current language), pp. 223-228. Tokyo: Gakutōsha.
- Watanabe, Minoru (1971) *Kokugo kōbun-ron* (A study of syntax of the Japanese language). Tokyo: Hanawa Shobō.
- Watanabe, Minoru (1953) jojutsu to chinjutsu (Description and modality) *Kokugogaku* vol. 13-14, pp. 20-34.
- Yamada, Koeda. (1988) *Asupekuto* (Aspect). (Translation of Comrie Bernard’s (1985) *Tense*. Cambridge University Press). Tokyo: Mugi Shobō.
- Yamada, Yoshio (1908) *Nihon bunpō ron* (A study of Japanese grammar). Tokyo: Hōbunkan.
- Yamada, Yoshio (1936) *Nihon bunpōgaku gairon* (An introduction to Japanese grammar). Tokyo: Hōbunkan.
- Yoshida, Kanehiko (1971) *Genndaigo jodōdshi no shiteki kenkyū* (A historical study of auxiliary verbs in the current Japanese language). Tokyo: Meiji Shoin.

## Index of Sources

Akagawa, Jirō

*Onnashachō ni kanpai!* (A Toast to the Young Lady as President of the Firm) 1995 (1982<sup>1</sup>). [CD-ROM]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.<sup>2</sup>

Akutagawa, Ryūnosuke

*Rashōmon* (Rashomon) 1995 (1915) [CD-ROM]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.

*Hana* 'The Nose' 1995 (1916) [CD-ROM]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.

Arishima, Takeo

*Umareidurunayami* (The Agony of Coming into the World) 1995 (1918) [CD-ROM]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.

Ariyoshi, Sawako

*Hanaokaseishū no tsuma* (The Wife of Doctor Hanaokaseishū) 1995 (1966) [CD-ROM]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.

Endō, Shūsaku

*Chinmoku* (Silence) 1995 (1966) [CD-ROM]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.

Futabatei, Shimei

*Ukigumo* (The Drifting Cloud) 1997 (1887). [CD-ROM]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.

Ibuse, Masuji

*Kuroi ame* (Black rain) 1995 (1966) [CD-ROM]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.

Inoue, Hisashi

*Bun to Fun* (Bun and Fun) 1995 (1970) [CD-ROM]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.

Itsuki, Hiroyuki

*Kaze ni fukarete* (Windblown) 1995 (1972 Shinchōsha. 1968 Yomiuri Shinbun Sha ) [CD-ROM]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.

Kita, Morio

*Nire-ke no hitobito* (The House of Nire) 1995 (1971) Tokyo: Shinchōsha

---

<sup>1</sup> The number in parentheses shows the original year.

<sup>2</sup> In the index of sources the title of a work such a novel, a publication year, and a publishing house are shown in order.

Matsumoto, Seichō

*Ten to sen* (Points and lines) 1995 (1958) [CD-ROM]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.

Miura, Ayako

*Shiokaritōge* (Shiokari Pass) 1995 (1968) [CD-ROM]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.

Natsume, Sōseki

*Kokoro* (mind) 1995 (1914). [CD-ROM]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.

Sawaki, Kōtaro

*Isshun no natsu* (A Moment of Summer) 1995 (1981) [CD-ROM]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.

Sono, Ayako

*Tarō monogatari* (The Tale of Tarō) 1995 (1976). [CD-ROM]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.

Tsutsui, Yasutaka

*Edipusu no koibito* (The Lover of Oedipus) 1995 (1981). [CD-ROM]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.

Yamamoto, Shūgorō

*Sabu* (Sabu) 1995 (1963) [CD-ROM]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.

*Tenseijingo* (2000~2005)

Critical essays in the *Asahi* newspaper during 2000~2005.