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The Liberal Dilemma


**Internationalism and the Institute of Pacific Relations in the USA,
Australia and Japan , 1919-1942**

Tomoko Akami

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Research School
of Pacific and Asian History, the Australian National
University, Canberra, Australia, August, 1995.

I declare that this work has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other university or institution. This work is entirely my own except where I indicate otherwise in the text.

Tomoko Akami

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Tomoko Akami". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the printed name.

Acknowledgments

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Abstract

In 1925, American internationalists launched an unofficial multinational conference in Honolulu, with participation of people from major Pacific rim countries including Japan, Australia and the USA. As a result, a permanent organization, the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), was founded. Through an examination of this institute, the thesis explores ideas of the 'international order' held by Wilsonian internationalists in the Asia-Pacific context in the inter-war period.

The IPR reflected the new dynamism in international politics in the 1920s, resulting from the influence of Wilsonian internationalism and the ideas of a "Pacific Age". This "Pacific Age" in the IPR context was an American construct, and reflected American confidence in the Asia-Pacific. Inspired by Wilsonian internationalism and the concept of the new era, the IPR advocated 'unofficial diplomacy', new attitudes to the Orient and a Pacific-centred perspective. It achieved certain success in these respects during the 1920s, but soon this new dynamism was lost. Although the IPR pioneered a regional-centred perspective and an idea of a regional community, it did not lead to the establishment of any regional arrangement. Instead key figures tried to make the IPR a more 'official' and world-oriented organization. As a result, the loss of the Pacific-centred perspective and American centrality became increasingly evident within the IPR.

This original IPR experiment was unsuccessful not because those who were involved in it unrealistically ignored the elements of the nation-state system and power politics, but rather because they took these elements for granted. Soon within the IPR, certain assumptions became evident. These concerned the moral justice of the 'international order', the coherence of the nation-state and existence of the colonial system, and they became increasingly evident in the operations of the IPR during the 1930s. While the nation-state assumption was not problematized among internationalists at the IPR in general, it was different for members of the Japanese Council of the IPR. Japanese military action after 1931 was seen as a challenge to the 'international order', and the dual loyalty of Japanese

internationalists both to the nation-state and the 'international community', which existed from the beginning of the internationalist movement in Japan, became problematic. The same dual loyalty, however, existed among other members of the IPR.

Despite the historicity of these assumptions, the moral justice of the 'international order' and the national coherence was not generally challenged in the discourse of international politics even after WWII. The trends which emerged within the IPR in the 1930s and 1940s, the loss of Pacific-centrality and American dominance, remained dominant in the discourse after WWII. A re-examination of the experiment of the IPR in the inter-war period can, therefore, clarify the historicity and limitations of these notions, and open the path for the possibility in a new age of the Asia-Pacific in this post-Cold War period.

A Note on Conventions

Japanese personal names throughout the thesis are presented in Japanese form—that is, with the surname followed by the given name. Exceptions to this convention are made only in the case of Japanese scholars long resident outside Japan, whose names are conventionally presented in the English literature in the form in which the given name is followed by the surname. Macron marks have been used where relevant in all cases except where the word in question appears so commonly in English without macrons that such usage has relatively become standard. I applied the latter convention to names of Japanese cities such as Tōkyō and Kyōto, names of the period such as Taishō and Shōwa, and names of regions in Japan such as Kantō and Chūgoku. These names, therefore, appear without Macron marks in this thesis.

Abbreviation


AA	: Australian Archives
ACIPR	: American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations
ACTU	: American Centre of Tokyo University
AIIA	: Australian Institute of International Affairs
AUH	: Archives of University of Hawaii at Manoa
AUM	: Archives of University of Melbourne
BIIA	: British Institute of International Affairs
BL	: Bodleian Library
BLCU	: Butler Library of Columbia University
CFR	: Council on Foreign Relations
CH	: Chatham House
FLUS	: Fisher Library of the University of Sydney
GC	: Glavor Cottage
GS	: Gaikō shiryōkan
HI	: Hoover Institute
IPR	: Institute of Pacific Relations
ISIPR	: International Secretariat of the IPR
JARC	: Japanese American Relations Committee
JCIPR	: Japanese Council of the IPR
LCH	: Library of Chatham House
LESU	: Library of English Speaking Union
LHU	: Library of Hitotsubashi University
LLSEP	: Library of London School of Economics and Politics
LSRM	: Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Collections
ML	: Mitchell Library
NLA	: National Library of Australia
OC	: Ōkubo Collection
PWW	: Paper of Woodrow Wilson
RFmA	: Rockefeller Family Archives
RFnA	: Rockefeller Foundation Archives
RIIA	: Royal Institute of International Affairs
SEDS	: Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō
TMCK	: Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai kankei ikken
TYB	: Takagi Yasaka bunko



Members, Associates, and Secretariat, 1925, Institute of Pacific Relations,
Honolulu Session, 1925

Source: *Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30–July 14, 1925: History, Organization, Proceedings Discussions and Addresses* (Honolulu: the IPR, 1925)

Map I



Map II

ISLANDS DEFENCE FRONT—Page Seven

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
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Contents

Acknowledgments.....	iii
Abstract.....	v
A Note on Convention.....	vii
Abbreviation.....	viii
Photo	
Maps I and II	
Introduction	1
Chapter 1: Liberal Internationalism and the Pacific Age.....	21
1) The Paris Peace Conference: Hopes and disillusionment of liberal internationalists.....	21
i) War and National Mobilization	22
ii) The Emergence of Non-governmental Foreign Expert Organizations	24
iii) Race, Power, and Nation.....	32
2) Wilsonian Internationalism.....	40
i) Various Streams of Internationalism.....	40
ii) The Nature of Wilsonian internationalism.....	41
iii) Wilsonian internationalism: the American Context.....	45
iv) The Institute of Politics and Wilsonians in Britain and the USA.....	52
3) Opportunity: The Pacific Age	58
i) The Pacific Age and Pan-Americanism.....	58
ii) Image of the Orient and the Pacific Age.....	64
iii) American internationalists and the Orient	69
iv) Japanese internationalists and Pan-Asianism.....	74
4) Visions and Institutions in the 1920s.....	79
i) Characteristics of Various Streams of Internationalism	79
ii) Institutions	83

Chapter 2 : Founding the Institute of Pacific Relations: American Context.....	93
1) From Vision to Influence	93
i) The Background to the Yale Club Meeting.....	94
ii) Yale club Meeting.....	107
Chapter 3: National Setting of the IPR in Japan and Australia.....	115
1) The New Australia in the Pacific and the IPR.....	116
i) Perspective: New Liberals and the New Australia.....	116
ii) The Pacific and the International Order.....	121
iii) Institutionalization: Predominance of New British Imperialism	125
iv) The Meaning of the IPR: The Regionalist Challenge to the British Order	142
2) The Nation-State and the Orient for 'Reformists' in Japan.....	160
i) Perspective	161
ii) Asianism	168
iii) The Institutional Characteristics of International Cooperationists.....	177
iv) The JCIPR: the Orient and the Pacific.....	186
v) The JCIPR and Social Reform.....	193
vi) Continuity	211
Chapter 4: Opening: The Experiment of the IPR in 1925-1927.....	214
1) The Experiment of the First Two Conferences.....	214
i) Ideals.....	214
ii) The Pacific Community	217
iii) The Orient	220
iv) Nation-state.....	238
v) Public Impact.....	247
2) Institutionalizing the IPR: the first INGO in the Pacific	250
i) Withdrawal of the YMCA	251
ii) British Participation and Institutionalizing the IPR	254
iii) Effects of British Participation	261
Chapter 5: From the Pacific to the Atlantic, 1927-1933	267
1) Re-organization: Curtis's reform plan	267
i) The Meaning of Being 'International'	268

2) The Resignation of Davis.....	280
3) Reaction and Meaning: Loss of the "Pacific Sense"	283
4) Greene's Administration 1930-1932.....	289
i) Greene's Administration.....	289
ii) The Hunt for a General Secretary.....	294
 Chapter 6: Co-option: American, and World, organization, 1933- 1942.....	 300
1) Carter's Appointment in 1933	301
2) Carter's Administration, 1933-1942.....	303
i) Carter's Visions and Policies.....	305
ii) Carter's Relations with the British Group.....	308
iii) Location of the Headquarters	315
iv) The 'Internationality' of the IPR under Carter.....	323
v) Education Schemes: Democratization and Americanization	331
vi) The "Inquiry" and the Japanese Withdrawal.....	333
3) The War and the IPR	338
 Conclusion.....	 344
 Appendix A	 352
Appendix B.....	355
Appendix C.....	357
 Bibliography	 361

Introduction

In 1927, Herbert Croly, Editor of *New Republic*, who had been involved in the formation of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) in 1923, participated the second IPR conference, and described it as an innovative experiment in terms of perception and practice in international politics.

[The IPR's] function is really novel and more radical than these delegates seemed to realize. It is an experiment in the use of the understanding in elucidating and integrating political relationship. If it carries on its work with any success, it may eventually exercise an important influence on the world of affairs in the Pacific ...¹

The IPR was experimental because it pioneered research on current affairs in the Asia-Pacific region, promoted the new concepts of the "Pacific Age" and the "Pacific community", and advocated 'unofficial diplomacy' and new attitudes to the 'Orient'.

The aims of this thesis are twofold. First, it describes the intellectual and institutional emergence of the IPR as one of the first International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO) in the Asia-Pacific region in the inter-war period. Second, it examines the nature of the 'internationalism' held by IPR members by focusing on the Institute's role as an advocate of 'unofficial diplomacy' and of new attitudes to the Orient. The main aim of the thesis, therefore, is not to assess the political influence of the IPR in foreign policy-making, but rather to illuminate the intellectual framework which shaped the Institute's creation and influenced its inter-war activities.

The term INGO is a post-WWII invention. It was first defined by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in 1948 to mean 'any international organization which is not established by intergovernmental

¹ H. Croly, 'Human Potential in Pacific Politics,' in J. B. Condliffe ed., *Problems of the Pacific, 1927* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), p. 578.

agreement'.² In the inter-war period, the term 'private international organization' was used. L. C. White's pioneering work on these organizations, published in 1933, defined the IPR as one of the 'private international organizations',³ and pointed out that the IPR was the only organization of this kind which had the headquarters in the Pacific region.⁴ White defines 'private' in terms of the nature of membership in 1933 rather than in terms of the way an organization was established.⁵ However, because he uses the term 'private' in opposition to 'public', 'official' or 'governmental',⁶ I use the term INGO for the inter-war period in this thesis.⁷

Because of its experimental and pioneering role, the IPR in the inter-war period provides a fascinating story, which had been largely neglected. After the first conference in 1925,⁸ involving the influential people mainly from the Pacific rim countries, the IPR was established as a permanent institution with its headquarters: the International Secretariat of the IPR (ISIPR): in Honolulu. After the first conference, National Councils of the IPR were founded independently in Australia, Britain, Canada, China, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, the USA and later in France, Holland and the USSR. The executive body of the Institute, the Pacific Council, consisted of representatives from these National Councils. The ISIPR organized conferences every few years (every two years in 1925-1933, and every three years in 1933-1945), which were attended by members and non-members of these National Councils. The participants met and discussed the major issues of the day, formed

² 'Arrangements of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations for Consultation with Non-Governmental Organizations, Guide for Consultations,' 30 April, 1948.

³ Layman Cromwell White, *The Structure of Private International Organizations* (Philadelphia, Penn: George S. Ferguson Company, 1933), p.130-131.

⁴ As Chapter One, Section Four clarifies, there were 'private international organizations' with headquarters located in New York, Washington D. C. and Chicago in this period, but these places were not regarded as within the region. See Chapter One, Section Four, for the details.

⁵ L. C. White, *Private International Organizations*, p.14

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.13-14.

⁷ In the same manner, White's work of 1951 uses the term INGO for the organizations which he defined 'private international organizations' in 1933. L. C. White, *International Non-Governmental organizations: Their Purpose, Methods, and Accomplishments* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1951), p.ix.

⁸ For the details of the conference, see Appendix A.

networks, and came home and publicized their experiences at the conferences.

The academic neglect of the IPR in the inter-war period has mainly been caused by the dominant image of the IPR after 1942 and especially in the 1950s. In this period, it was portrayed as a communist front organization, and was believed by some to be responsible for the American "loss of China". Many studies of the IPR, therefore, have regarded it as an American organization, and the main concern of these works has been the IPR's influence on American foreign policies towards China in the 1940s-1960s.⁹

In the inter-war period, however, the IPR was seen in a totally different way. It was regarded as 'a prestigious study and discussion group' on Asia and the Pacific.¹⁰ The IPR was significant for several reasons. One reason was its pioneering role in 'contemporary' regional studies, especially on Asia.¹¹ These works by and in association with the IPR must have influenced the way in which scholars constructed knowledge of the region: knowledge which was distributed through IPR channels and

⁹ J. N. Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations: Asian Scholars and American Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974); G. H. Davis, *The Dissolution of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944-1961*, unpublished Ph. D. thesis (University of Chicago, 1966); T. E. Carpenter III, *The Institute of Pacific Relations and American Foreign Policy*, unpublished Ph. D. thesis (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1968); and B. L. Martin, *Interpretations of United States Policy toward the Chinese Communists, 1944-1968*, unpublished Ph. D. thesis (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1968). The tendency to focus on political influence was also seen in studies of IPR related organizations in Britain and Australia. C. Thorn, 'Chatham House, Whitehall, and Far Eastern Issues, 1941-1945,' *International Affairs*, Vol.54, No.1 (January, 1978), and W. D. Forsyth, 'The Pre-war Melbourne Group of the Australian Institute of International Affairs: Some Personal Recollections,' *Australian Outlook*, Vol.28, No.1 (April, 1978).

¹⁰ R. Newman, *Owen Lattimore and the "Loss" of China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p.22.

¹¹ For the pioneering role of the IPR in Asian studies in the USA, Australia and Japan, see J. Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations*, H. Borton, Saitō M. trans., 'Nihon kenkyū no kaitakushatachi,' in Hosoya C. and Saitō M. eds., *Washington taisei to nichibei kankei* (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1978), Nick Brown, 'Australian intellectuals and the image of Asia, 1920-1960,' *Australian Cultural History*, No.9 (1990), and Hara Kakuten, *Gendai Ajia kenkyū seiritsushiron* (Keisō shobō, 1984). The IPR promoted regional studies on the Asia-Pacific region not only in English speaking countries, but also in France and Holland.

contributed to images in academia, press and governmental circles. Furthermore the knowledge constructed through the IPR not only reflected the intellectual paradigm of the time, but also influenced later works in area studies and International Relations because it defined the initial framework of these fields in their formative period.¹²

Besides this knowledge, the experience which the IPR provided in the inter-war period was important. Its conference was one of the very few occasions where 'unofficial' but influential figures from within and outside Asia exchanged their ideas. John Fairbank describes IPR conferences in the 1920s and 1930s as 'important events, peopled with leading personalities and charged with excitement'. He further states that 'foreign offices, corporations, and the press took them seriously, and participants were often profoundly influenced by the experience'.¹³

The IPR's entire operations were new and experimental. The Institute promoted the concept of the "Pacific Age" and the "Pacific community", and attracted many in various countries, who saw a new opportunity in the Pacific. In other words, the IPR was an organ in initiating and disseminating ideas through the conferences. At a time when there was no model to follow in the region, its members tried to transform their visions into reality through the institutions of the ISIPR, National Councils and the various other activities of the IPR such as research programs.

Fairbank argues that 'the IPR in its day stood almost alone as the protagonist of international integration in the Pacific area'.¹⁴ By 'international integration', Fairbank means the extension of 'international stability and justice' into the region, and he emphasizes the significance of

¹² Regarding the influence of British members of the IPR in the International Relations in Britain, see Roger Morgan, 'The Study of International Politics,' in R. Morgan ed., *The Study of International Affairs: Essays in Honour of Kenneth Younger* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p.277, and Richard Higgott and Dian Stone, 'The Limits of Influence: Foreign Policy Think Tanks in Britain and the USA,' *Review of International Studies*, Vol.21 (1994), pp.1-20.

¹³ John Fairbank, 'William L. Holland and the IPR in Historical Perspective,' *Pacific Affairs*, Vol.52, No.4 (Winter, 1979-1980), p.589.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.587.

the IPR in 'the advancement of the integration of the international society'.¹⁵ Recent studies on the IPR have begun to recognize this aspect, and to see the IPR not as an American organization, but an INGO, and its role in the regional integration.¹⁶ As the result of this shift of the perspective, scholars started to see the IPR beyond American context, and a few works have examined the IPR in the Japanese context in the inter-war period.¹⁷ Nakami's work concludes that the immediate influence of the IPR on governmental policies and public opinion-making was insignificant in Japan in the inter-war period.¹⁸

The crucial question which has remained to be asked, however, concerns the nature of this 'international society' or 'international community', which the IPR was perceived to have promoted. In other words, what was the nature of the internationalism which IPR members advocated in the inter-war period? How was their internationalism implemented in the institutions of the IPR, and how was their internationalism seen in various countries? In this thesis, I take the nature of internationalism as a central theme, and examine it by analysing how IPR members accommodated concepts such as the nation-state, unofficialness, the Orient and the Pacific in their visions of the 'international community'. In this way, I hope to illuminate the possibilities and limitations of the experiment of the IPR as well as of the 'international community' they imagined.

An examination of perceptions of the 'international community' or the 'international order' in this period is important because it can contribute

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Lawrence Woods, *Asia-Pacific Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Organizations and International Relations* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993), Yamaoka Michio, *Ajia Taiheiyō jidai ni mukete: Sono zenshi to shite no taiheiyō monaai chōsakai to taiheiyō kaigi* (Hokuju shuppan, 1991) and Pekka Korhonen, 'The Concept of the Pacific Age in History,' a paper presented at the Seventh International Conference of the European Association of Japanese Studies, Copenhagen, 22-26, August, 1994.

¹⁷ Nakami Mari, 'Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai to Nihon no chishikijin,' *Shisō*, No. 728 (February, 1985), and Katagiri Nobuo, 'Senkanki taiheiyō jidai no anzen hoshō imēji,' *Yokusai seiji*, No. 102 (February, 1993).

¹⁸ Nakami M., 'Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai,' p.116-117.

to a re-evaluation of Wilsonian internationalism. Those who were involved in the IPR in various countries were mainly Wilsonian internationalists. Their experiment at the IPR, therefore, presents a rare case study to examine the nature of Wilsonian internationalism in the non European context.

The term 'internationalism' in this thesis refers to visions of the 'international community' and activities to promote these visions. Internationalists tried to transform these visions into institutions. While peace was one important goal of these visions, this did not mean that war was rejected as a means of achieving peace. Internationalism was, therefore, a part of the peace movement, but not identical to pacifism.¹⁹

Internationalism in the inter-war period was based on inter-state activities. It included both 'non-governmental' and 'governmental' activities, but the distinction between them was ambiguous. This ambiguity originated from the perception of the state as a monolithic entity, and the strong tendency of internationalists to identify with the nation-state. The historicity of the assumption of a unified nation-state and of the 'internationalism' based on this assumption has been clarified by recent works on transnationalism.²⁰ These works define 'internationalism' as inter-state or inter-governmental activities,²¹ and transnational relations as 'sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the

¹⁹ I take Ceadel's definition of 'pacifism'. According to him, pacifism denies war as always wrong. For the position which sees war is sometimes necessary to achieve peace, he uses the term 'pacifism'. M. Ceadel, *Pacifism in Britain, 1914-1945: The Defining of a Faith* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p.3.

²⁰ These works intend to fill a gap in state-centred discourse by emphasizing non-governmental relations. Joseph S. Nye Jr and Robert O. Keohane, 'Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction,' in R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye Jr eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp.ix-x.

²¹ Some dismiss internationalism as inherently inefficient and insignificant. Samuel P. Huntington, 'Transnational organizations in world politics,' in Richard Little and Michael Smith eds., *Perspectives on World Politics* (New York: Routledge, 1991, second edition), pp.214-215. But others such as Keohane and Nye acknowledge a more positive side to it. Keohane and Nye, 'Transgovernmental relations and international organizations,' in Little and Smith eds., *Perspectives on World Politics*, pp.230-231 and 238.

policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments'.²² While the nation-state still remains dominant in the discourse of International Relations today,²³ the emergence of the concept of transnationalism reflects changing perceptions of the state in the recent decades. The crucial point of Keohane and Nye on transnationalism, for example, is that the state is not seen as monolithic, but as a composite of sub-units. Just as transnationalism is an historical phenomenon, internationalism came into being at the specific moment when the state was seen as the ultimate entity.

An historical re-evaluation of Wilsonian internationalism is important. Current criticism or re-appraisal of Wilsonian internationalism seems to be carried out with little regard to the historical context, and without questioning the historicity of certain concepts. There is a tendency either to applaud it too readily,²⁴ or dismiss it without adequate examination. The dismissal of Wilsonianism is related to a tendency for theorists of International Relations to neglect the importance of the inter-war period.²⁵ The inter-war period was, however, a significant period in the formation not only of the discipline of International Relations, but also of the discourse of international politics in the twentieth century, and Wilsonians played a significant role in this formation.²⁶

²² *Ibid.*, p.232.

²³ J. George, *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations* (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p.72.

²⁴ Arthur Schlesinger Jr asserts, 'We are all, more or less, Wilsonians today'. A. Schlesinger Jr, 'A Living Thing is Born: Woodrow Wilson's Fight for the Federation of the World,' *Times Literary Supplement*, May 21, 1993, p.3. Francis Fukuyama's work seems to be a declaration of the triumph of Wilsonianism. F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

²⁵ Even the works which question the dominant assumptions of international politics tend to focus on the beginning of the nation-state system in the sixteenth century. Michael Banks, 'The Evolution of International Relations Theory,' in M. Banks ed., *Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective on International Relations* (Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books, 1984), p.8, Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics*, pp. 74-83, and Robert Walker, 'The Prince and "The Pauper": Tradition, Modernity, and Practice in the Theory of International Relations,' in J. Der Derian and M. J. Shapiro eds., *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (London: Lexington Books, 1989), p.29.

²⁶ The new book by R. Steel, *Temptations of a Superpower*, which is published too late to put into this thesis, seems to suggest the need to examine the nature of Wilsonian internationalism in order to put the present American foreign policy into a perspective. The book reflects the loss of the confidence of American global leadership, and its

Wilsonian internationalism constituted the core ideal of the IPR founders, and it was the main form of internationalism in this period. IPR members were inspired by Woodrow Wilson's vision for the 'international community', based on his principles for the conduct of international affairs, such as anti-imperialism, open diplomacy and self-determination. Wilson's visions attracted the minds of many for several reasons. He represented the American vision of itself as a leader in the world, and his visions reflected his belief in social reforms. These ideas gave hope for the new era, without destroying existing frameworks. Because his vision was central to the foundation of the League of Nations, I use the term "Wilsonians" or "Wilsonian internationalists" to refer to supporters not only of the Wilsonian vision, but also of the League of Nations.

One of the ideas promoted by Wilsonian internationalism was crucial in the setting of the IPR. This was the recognition of non-governmental forces in international relations. The idea originated in the principle of New Diplomacy, which meant diplomacy open to public scrutiny, as opposed to the 'old' diplomacy of secret treaties between politicians. White in his 1933 study argues the significance of non-governmental forces in the 1920s:

[Private international organizations] are more important than many of the public international organizations and exert a greater influence on international affairs. [They] come into direct contact with many more individuals The effect of this in promoting international friendship and understanding ... is undoubtedly of great importance.²⁷

central argument seems to be that the USA should improve the domestic conditions before it commit to the welfare of the rest of the world. The review article, however, seems to be too clear about the division between Democrat's and Republican foreign policies. Peter W. Rodman, 'Superpower Survives,' *Times Literary Supplement*, 9 June, 1995, p.6.

²⁷ L. C. White, *Private International Organizations*, p.12.

Similarly in 1930, Alfred Zimmern (1879–1957), a British Professor of International Politics²⁸ and ardent League supporter,²⁹ summarized the work of the League of Nations in the 1920s as follows: '[T]he most striking achievements in international policy in the last decade have not been due to the decisions of statesmen but to the 'recommendations' of experts'.³⁰ He was aware of the limitation of experts in transcending national pride or personal motives, and of the possibility that their recommendations for 'practical policies' would be dismissed as 'utopian' not because they were invalid, but because political interests were at stake.³¹ Like Zimmern, many Wilsonians were non-official 'experts' in international politics, and had similar views of their own significance. It was in this specific context that the IPR came into being in 1925. It aimed to become an 'expert' body in regional affairs, and as demonstrated in the following chapters, this goal became increasingly clear as time went on.

The growing recognition of the role of non-governmental expert bodies in international politics prompted E. H. Carr to criticize influential Wilsonians at the League of Nations in the 1920s and 1930s. While his criticism led many to mistakenly think of Wilsonians as 'utopian cosmopolitans', as Chapter One demonstrates, they in fact operated on a firm basis of the nation-state system and power politics. For Carr (1892–1982), a diplomat until his mid-forties,³² however, the true experts on foreign affairs were diplomats and soldiers, not intellectuals 'divorced from reality'.³³ 'Practice, not theory, bureaucratic training, not intellectual brilliance, is the school of political wisdom'.³⁴ While equally dismissive about 'theorist' and 'utopian' elements,³⁵ Wilsonians strongly advocated

²⁸ He was Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth in 1919–1920 and at Oxford in 1930–1944.

²⁹ A. Zimmern, 'Democracy and the Expert,' *Political Quarterly*, Vol.1 (1930), pp.13–14.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.15.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Norman Stone, 'Grim Eminence,' *London Review of Books*, 20 January–3 February, 1983, p.3.

³³ E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: A 1 Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Papermac, 1993, first published in 1939, second edition appeared in 1946), p.1.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.16.

³⁵ Zimmern criticized World Court as an academic dream. He argued the importance of immediate need rather than principle. A. Zimmern, *The Prospects of Democracy: And other Essays* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1929), pp.195 and 213.

the role of non-officials in international politics. The issue between Wilsonians and Carr was, therefore, over the role of non-governmental actors in international politics and the meaning of nation-state for these actors.

Carr's criticism influenced not only later scholars' evaluation of Wilsonian internationalism, but also their interpretation of the political events of the inter-war period. His *Twenty Years' Crisis* appeared in 1939: on the eve of WWII and at a time when the 'failure' of the League of Nations, and the Wilsonian internationalism on which it was based, was widely accepted. As the subtitle of *The Twenty Years' Crisis, An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, shows, it is the classic of the discipline of International Relations, and its influence still remains significant. In this respect, Carr's work helped to obscure the complexity of Wilsonianism, and to construct a simplistic dichotomy between pre-war and post-war.

Carr, however, pointed out the nature of the 'international order' which Wilsonians and the founders of the IPR accepted without question. He argued that the international order was determined by the dominant powers at a specific time, and peace meant the defence of the status quo of the powerful at the expense of the powerless.³⁶ While his other criticisms of Wilsonians have been widely accepted, this criticism of the nature of the 'international order' has been largely ignored not only by Wilsonians in the inter-war period, but also by later scholars. This question is crucial in understanding the Wilsonians and their reaction to Japanese military intervention in Manchuria, an incident which inevitably affected the IPR. Carr's insight on this point is important to this thesis which examines Wilsonians at the IPR headquarters and the Japanese Council of the IPR, and their relations in the 1930s.

Despite Carr's insight, some later scholars remain unchallenging about the nature of the 'international order' of the time. A recent study on Japanese internationalists, for example, defined internationalists in Japan as:

³⁶ E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, pp.78-80.

those who were ideologically committed to international institutions; those who felt Japan could not stand up against the world and were inclined to consult, and seek agreement with, foreign powers; and those who felt that Japan, who no longer had a foreign ally, should act circumspectly on the international scene.³⁷

In this definition, the absolute position of the international institutions/scene, which is used identically with the international order, is assumed. It *existed* and Japanese internationalists were expected to cooperate in it. A majority of those who participated in the discourse of international politics, including Wilsonians, not only thought that the international order *existed* 'out there', but also argued that it was inherently 'right' and had to be preserved. This assumption is crucial to an understanding of Wilsonians who seldom questioned the fundamental justice of the international order. The adjective 'idealist' as a description of Wilsonians is, therefore, misleading.

Christopher Thorne saw the same assumption at work in the judgement given at the Tokyo Tribunal, which convicted those who plotted a challenge to the international order. He quotes Justice Pal, an Indian judge at the Tribunal:

[W]hen Japan came on the field there had already been the Anglo-American economic world order leaving no space for expansion to any new power Even peaceful pursuit on the part of a new aspirant would thus involve some apprehension from their privileged participants, especially when their whole conception of the evolution of human affairs from a distant past towards a distant future was that the future belong to them only, and that others had fulfilled their destined function in history by ministering to the divinely appointed advancement of them.³⁸

This illustrates the 'historicity' of the international order which Carr pointed out. Pal's opinion, however, belonged to a minority at that time.

³⁷ Ian Nish, *Japan's Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China and the League of Nations, 1931-1933* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1993), p.8.

³⁸ IMTFE, Judgement, Vols, pp.157-158 and 732-734, cited in Christopher Thorne, *The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-33* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1973), p.418.

The 'justice' of the international order which was assumed by Wilsonians has continued to be accepted by a majority of people, including many who are dismissive of Wilsonians. This assumption has led to a simplistic, but popular perception of the dichotomy between good 'internationalists' and bad 'nationalists' in the 1930s. According to this framework, internationalists were 'out-manoeuvred'³⁹ and suppressed by nationalists.

This dichotomy was, however, false. Wilsonian internationalists did not deny the nation-state system, nor loyalty to one's own nation, as Chapter One demonstrates. A dual loyalty to the nation-state and the international community always existed. They were not utopian cosmopolitans or believers in laissez-faire. They saw state intervention as a moral good, while acknowledging the contradiction between the state's role as provider of social welfare and suppressor of individual rights. They tried to promote an international order based upon reformist principles similar to those they advocated for domestic politics. The basis of the order for them was the nation-state, and they knew that in times of crisis the nation would take priority over their commitment to the international order.

Questioning the historicity of the international order does not imply a justification of the actions resulting from the ideological challenge to that order, which took the form of Japanese military aggression in Asia during WWII, and the domestic suppression of human rights in Japan. Rather, the question should open up various issues which were marginalized and ignored by the accepted assumptions. In this way, Wilsonian internationalism can be understood not in simplistic opposition to 'nationalism', but in the context of the power structure of international politics and the national mobilization of domestic politics during the inter-war period.

The significance of the IPR increases because of its original and pioneering position in the Pacific. The thesis sees the IPR as one of the first attempts not only to advocate regional integration, but also to see the Orient as an

³⁹ I. Nish, *Japan's Struggle with Internationalism*, p.243.

emerging power. While internationalist movements and their organizations were centred mostly in Europe, the original regional emphasis and location of the IPR inevitably brought out certain issues which would not have been considered by other organizations. These issues were: the positions of the Orient (race/culture/country) and the Pacific (region) in the 'international community'.

In this thesis, I define the 'Orient' and the 'Pacific' in the sense which was used by contemporaries at the IPR. The 'Orient' is not a neutral term, but has political implications which result from its construction by the European and American powers. With this in mind, I nevertheless use the term without quotation marks. I follow the usage common in the IPR in the inter-war period. In this context, the Orient was equated with East Asia, especially Japan and China, and referred to the races/cultures/people/countries/region of East Asia. In a similar manner, I use the term the Pacific as contemporaries used it. The Pacific meant what is now called the "Asia-Pacific", although in the IPR context, the emphasis on the Pacific rim was far greater than on the Pacific islands.

For most Wilsonian internationalists in Europe, the Pacific and the Orient remained insignificant and on the periphery. Their imagined international community emerged in a specific context. The context was urban, bourgeois and Western European. But as soon as this imagination was institutionalized, it had to transcend its original context, and the relationship of this centre with the 'other' became a problem. Wilsonians were not crude imperialists. They were not military chauvinists who supported colonial exploitation or territorial expansion by military action as a desirable means. They did advocate paternalistic guidance in dealing with their colonies, and to this extent their approach was based on the assumption of the dominance of 'West' over 'East'.

This centrality and dominance of Western Europe in international politics which Carr and Wilsonians assumed was not questioned vocally among scholars in Europe and North America until after WWII. One of the most influential works in this aspect was that of Edward Said in the late 1970s. He argued the neglect of the race/culture dimension in the field of

international politics.⁴⁰ His challenge was to the dominance not only of Western Europe, but also of the USA which had been the major power after WWII. His perspective partially reflected the development of racial equality in domestic politics, such as the advancement of the civil rights movements in the USA. Carr and Wilsonians did not even contemplate questioning the dominant paradigm of the day.

While Carr, Wilsonians and even Said assumed certain relations between 'East' and 'West', Japan did not exactly fit into the power relationship of a strong 'West' and weak 'East'. It was non Euro-American, but with power. In this sense, the discourse which Said terms Orientalism, and which, he argues, promotes 'Western' domination over the 'East', loses its relevance in dealing with Japan.⁴¹ The 'Orient' as the 'other' to the dominant Euro-American powers did not, therefore, provide a united analytical identity in international politics. The form of the discourse between non Euro-American 'power' and the 'other' was more complex than one-way imposition and needs further examination.⁴²

The IPR was one of the first attempts to seek a new style of discourse with the 'Orient with power'. Significantly, it was initiated by Americans, not Europeans, with enthusiastic support from Japan and China. Unlike other INGOs of the time, the IPR focused on Asia, or what was called the Orient. Because the initial main concern at the IPR was 'race relations in the Pacific', its documents shed a new light on the racial/cultural dimension of Wilsonianism as well as the complex nature of the discourse. The source materials not only in the USA, but also in Japan and Australia, have enabled the thesis to avoid falling into a simplistic one-way portrayal of the discourse between 'West' and 'East'.

⁴⁰ Edward Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (London: Penguin Books, 1991, first published in 1978).

⁴¹ Even in the 1970s, Said sees it as one-way imposition of a dominant 'West' on a subdued 'East'. E. Said, *Orientalism*, p.3. Although he emphasizes interactive aspects in his recent work, *Culture and Imperialism*, interaction only takes the form of resistance. E. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993), especially Chapter Three

⁴² Kan Sanjun and Murai Osamu, 'Ranhansha suru Orientarizumu,' *Gendai shisō*, Vol.21, No.5 (May 1993), p.186. On the complexity of the Orient in Japan as its national identification tool, see Stephan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p.18.

The central argument of the thesis is that the IPR reflected the new dynamism of international politics in the 1920s, and pioneered 'unofficial diplomacy', new attitudes to the Orient and a Pacific-centred perspective, but that by the early 1930s this new dynamism was lost and key figures were pushing the IPR in a more 'official' and world-oriented (as opposed to regional-oriented) direction. This 'failure' of the initial experiment arose not from the 'unrealistic' nature of IPR members, but from the very perceptions implicit in the original setting of the IPR. These perceptions were a belief in the moral justice of the 'international order', an assumption of the coherence of the nation-state, and the colonial system. Except in the case of the Japanese Council of the IPR, these perceptions did not cause problems for IPR members in general, and their hold on the imaginations of key IPR figures strengthened during the 1930s. In this process, American centrality became increasingly evident within the ISIPR, IPR conferences and its projects.

In this thesis, a coherent internationalism within the IPR is not assumed. The Institute was an organization with a central secretariat and national councils, and it organized conferences every two or three years, which members and non-members attended. The 'IPR', therefore, implied various levels of organization as well as the whole: individual participants and members, National Councils, the ISIPR, the executive body (the Pacific Council) and the conferences.

To examine internationalism at the IPR and its implementation by the IPR, the thesis focuses on the ISIPR which was located in the USA, on the National Councils in Japan and Australia, and on the conferences. The ISIPR and conferences were the essential parts of the IPR's institutional structure. Because of the nature of the relationship between the ISIPR and the American Council, and because of the American initiative in creating the IPR, the American context is examined. The Japanese Council (JCIPR)⁴³ was chosen because of the position of Japan in international

⁴³ Although there were some variations in the translation, the Japanese name of the JCIPR was *Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai*, and the IPR was translated in Japanese as *Taiheiyō kaigi*. Nakami and Wilson use the term the Japan Council of the IPR, not the Japanese

politics as the first non Euro-American great power.⁴⁴ Japan's peculiar position led members of the JCIPR to question some of the assumptions about the absolute nature of the international order. The Australian Council was chosen as Australia was, in contrast to Japan, a small Pacific power with a dominant European population. Australia was also significant because of its connection with Britain, a European power which certainly differed in its understanding of politics in the Pacific. The thesis uses the British sources which have not been used in the previous studies on the IPR, and which put the IPR in a new perspective. While acknowledging the importance of other councils such as the Chinese Council, and IPR organs such as *Pacific Affairs*, *Far Eastern Survey* and other research projects, this thesis does not directly address their roles.

Covering three countries requires extensive reading in the diplomatic and intellectual history of these countries. The thesis does not claim to have exhausted the literature, but it is one of the first attempts to put forward such a synthesis. Documents were collected in Australia, Japan, the USA and Britain. They include governmental papers, but reflecting my major interest in the intellectual and institutional paradigm of the IPR, the bulk of the materials comprise administrative papers of the IPR, private papers, correspondence, biographical documents and conference proceedings.

Detailed analysis of National Councils in the domestic contexts of Australia and Japan is provided in Chapter Three, and previous works concerning internationalism and the IPR in these countries are surveyed in that chapter. The chapter contains, therefore, not only material from primary documents, but also my interpretations of secondary sources on intellectual history and diplomatic history of two countries.

Council of the IPR. Nakami M., 'Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai to Nihon no chishikijin,' and S. Wilson, 'The Manchurian Crisis and Moderate Japanese Intellectuals: The Japan Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations,' *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol.26, No.3 (1992). Both terms appear in the documents. Because the latter appeared more frequently in the documents, and also it corresponds to the names of other National Councils, I use the term the Japanese Council of the IPR in this thesis.

⁴⁴ Japan's entrance into the international system is often discussed in terms of treaties, and focused on the late nineteenth century. For example, see Suganami Hidemi, 'Japan's Entry into International Society,' Hedley Bull and Adam Watson eds., *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), and Gerit W. Gong, *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), Chapter Six.

IPR conferences presented a rare interaction between the Orient and non-Orient, and between greater powers and smaller powers. The Institute held conferences every two or three years from 1925 in the region. By focusing on participants from Japan, the Oriental great power, and Australia, the non-Oriental small power, the thesis tries to describe the complexity of these interactions. It explains the shared experience and intellectual paradigm of those who gathered at the IPR conferences, and suggests the implications of its paradigm for the domestic politics of each country.

For the documentation of the ISIPR, although acknowledging contradictory USA official reports on the IPR in the 1950s,⁴⁵ I have used only documents from the inter-war period to illustrate the issues and mental paradigms as contemporaries saw them. I have tried to construct the history of the IPR mainly based on correspondence of key figures exchanged in the 1920s and 1930s. They included Merle Davis (General Secretary of the ISIPR in 1926–1929), Jerome Greene (Chairman of the American Council in 1929–1932), Lionel Curtis (British Representative at the Pacific Council in 1927–1929) and Edward Carter (Secretary of the American Council in 1926–1933, General Secretary of the ISIPR in 1933–1946).

While the documents of the IPR at Columbia University had been used, I have also looked at those at the University of Hawaii as well as the documents related to the IPR at the Rockefeller Archives, Bodleian Library, Oxford and Chatham House. These documents add new dimensions to the image of the IPR in previous studies. They also further clarify various aspects of this experimental enterprise. One might expect these administrative papers to be dry documents, but they reflect the pioneering nature of the IPR. They are sources rich with excitement and ideas. In addition to these documents, I have looked at the editorials of

⁴⁵ US, Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Report on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Report No.2050, 82d Cong., 2nd sess., 1952 (McCarran Report) and US, Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee Pursuant to S. Resolution 23, Hearings on the State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, 3 vols., 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950 (Tydings Hearings).

the journals published by the IPR, and IPR publications on the organization as source materials to indicate the visions and directions of key figures.

I also used memoirs and diaries written by and on key figures. These memoirs were crucial not only in documenting the intellectual and institutional paradigm at the IPR, but also in detailing the lives of those who worked for the IPR as an experimental enterprise, which itself was an important context to influence their ideas and actions. Published accounts of IPR conferences by Japanese such as Tsurumi Yūsuke (1885–1973) and Hoshino Aiko were valuable. Similarly, the finding of diaries on IPR conferences by two Australians, Hessel Duncan-Hall (1891–1976) and Frederic Eggleston (1875–1954) at the National Library of Australia was crucial for portraying the complex nature of the discourse at the conferences.

Careful handling of memoirs was necessary especially because of the tormented experience during the postwar attack on the IPR or personal conflicts within the IPR. The latter was particularly true for the memoir of John Condliffe, on which Thomas's work relies for the description of the IPR in the early period. Condliffe, Research Secretary of the IPR in 1927–1937, had a personal clash with Edward Carter, then the Secretary of the American Council of the IPR (1926–1933). Since the scope of the IPR was rather diverse and wide, impressions recorded by office holders at times contradicted the evidence of the administrative documents. The contradictions themselves are revealing.

I have used biographies of some JCIPR members, such as Tsurumi Yūsuke, Maeda Tamon (1884–1962) and Iwanaga Yūkichi (1883–1939) and others who were often regarded as minor figures in terms of political influence. These biographies illuminated their ideas of the nation-state, public duty, social reform, the 'international community', the Orient and the Pacific, and their actions as 'internationalists'. I was also particularly fortunate to be able to read unpublished biographical notes of Edward Carter by his son,

William Carter,⁴⁶ and also the semi-final draft of the memoirs by the last Secretary General of the IPR, William Holland.⁴⁷

Chapter One examines the major elements which influenced the formation of the IPR: WWI and the peace process, Wilsonian internationalism, and the power dynamics in the international context. It argues that Wilsonian internationalists were world-oriented, and that they operated on the base of the nation-state system and the colonial system. They were, however, aware of the new forces in international politics. This awareness led some of them to promote the role of non-official experts in foreign affairs, and to advocate new attitudes to the Orient. Chapter Two examines the original setting of the IPR, focusing on the Yale Club meeting in New York in February 1925, and suggests the emerging direction of the IPR.

Chapter Three examines the National Councils of the IPR in Australia and Japan. It argues that members of each council pursued their ideas of the nation in the "Pacific Age" through IPR channels. The chapter illuminates the differences in their perceptions of the Pacific, which arose from different understandings of the international status quo. It also demonstrates contrasts in the nature of the relationship between each council and its respective government, and the varying expectations for the role of the IPR which resulted from these relationships.

Chapters Four, Five and Six move from National Councils to conferences and the ISIPR. Chapter Four analyses the successes and problems of the experiment of the first two conferences of 1925 and 1927, especially in terms of new attitudes to the nation-state, the Orient and the Pacific. It also examines the process of institutionalizing the IPR, in which the trend for the IPR to become a regional affairs experts' organization was increasingly clear.

⁴⁶ I thank Professor Mark Elvin for making this contact possible.

⁴⁷ I thank Professor P. F. Hooper at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and Professor Yamaoka Michio at Waseda University, Tokyo, for this copy of the draft. The memoir will be published by the time this thesis is finished. My reference in this thesis is, therefore, to the semi-final draft, not the published memoir. As for the role of W. L. Holland, see J. Fairbank, 'William L. Holland and the IPR,' pp.587-590.

Chapters Five and Six focus on a few key figures in the IPR: their visions for the IPR and concepts of 'internationality', 'non-governmentality', the Orient, the Pacific and the 'international order'; and how their visions were implemented in the structure of the organization. Chapter Five examines these issues in the context of the proposal for re-organization, and the responses to and consequences of its proposal. It argues that in this period, a strong state-focused orientation, a failure to establish new attitudes to the Orient, and the loss of a regional perspective all became evident within the IPR. The argument is not that the nature of the IPR changed, but rather that elements inherent in the original structure became increasingly manifest.

The final chapter, Chapter Six, focuses on Carter's administration, and argues that in this period, existing trends were intensified, and that the IPR became more American, nation-oriented and official-oriented. Most significant was the role of the nation-state in the organizational structure of the institution. The IPR clearly aimed to be non-governmental, and provided occasions for networking among various groups by way of gender, belief, profession and race/culture as well as nationality. Although providing the possibility of transnational alliances, however, the IPR failed to create an issue-oriented structure which might have reinforced and developed these alliances.⁴⁸ The IPR assumed, instead, a nation-state-centred structure. This character was furthered by economic and political crisis, and became particularly manifest during WWII.

⁴⁸ Willetts argues the importance of issue-oriented promotional pressure groups as transnational actors in 1982. His edited book contains the studies of the groups focused on certain issues such as Anti-Apartheid, Palestine Liberation, Human Rights, Development, Conservation of Resources, and Women. Peter Willetts ed., *Pressure Groups in the Global System: The Transnational Relations of Issue-Orientated Non-Governmental Organizations* (London: Frances Printer, 1982), pp.2-8 and 24.

Chapter One: Liberal Internationalism and the Pacific Age

The East is to be opened and transformed, whether we will or no; the standards of the West are to be imposed upon it; nations and peoples which have stood still the centuries through are to be quickened, and made part of the universal world of commerce and of ideas which has so steadily been a-making by the advance of European power from age to age.
(Woodrow Wilson, 28 January, 1904)¹

This chapter examines the intellectual and institutional context which influenced the formation of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) in 1925. The IPR was the product of three historical factors: WWI and the peace process after the war; various internationalist movements, especially Wilsonian internationalism; and the power shift in international politics. These factors are examined in the first three sections in order to illuminate the nature of Wilsonian internationalism and the implications for the Pacific. Section Four summarizes various streams of internationalism and the institutional context of these movements, and would outline the characteristics of the IPR.

1) The Paris Peace Conference: Hopes and disillusionment of liberal internationalists

This section portrays the experience of participants at the Paris Peace Conference from the USA, Britain, Japan and Australia, and illuminates the nature of the 'international order' which the conference constructed. The experiences at the conference were significant. The conference produced the League of Nations as the embodiment of Wilson's visions of the international community. Many participants in the conference became Wilsonians who supported the League and Wilson's visions. They became the core of internationalist movements, and later of the IPR,

¹ Woodrow Wilson, 'News report of an address in Monclair,' N. J., 28 January, 1904, cited in T. J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the quest for a New World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp.10-11.

in various countries.² On the other hand, the conference illuminated the problems of the order, which left profound disillusionment in some participants.

The conference also reflected the intellectual paradigm of the time. Most evident were strong democratic forces of gender, class and 'race'. The Russian revolution was going on in 1919, and socialist and women's movements were striving to gain equal political and economic rights. Not only the opinions of the powerful few, but also wider public opinion began to be seen as a significant element in foreign affairs. Furthermore, the first non Euro-American power, Japan, asserted equal rights with the Euro-American powers. Another crucial element in background to the conference was the process of national mobilization. The conference was held just after the first total war, when non-governmental parts of society had been organized for war efforts, and as a consequence, the lines between the official and unofficial were blurred.

The first half of this section focuses on groups of foreign affairs experts who felt the need for a reform of international relations, and some of whom formed non-governmental organizations of foreign affairs experts. The second half examines the problems inherent in the new international order. Wilsonians had a clear vision for non Euro-American *colonies*, but not for non Euro-American powers such as Japan. The Japanese claim at the conference, therefore, illuminated the problem inherent in the proposed new international order. It defined the race issue in international politics as being not about moral principle, but about power and national sovereignty.

i) War and National Mobilization

The First World War laid the foundations for the organization of internationalist movements in the 1920s.³ At a personal level, the

² The situation in the USA was slightly different. While some supported the cause of the League and urged American entry to the League, a majority of internationalists were sceptical and opposed to the entry. See the following section, Section Two.

³ Conceptual works on international cooperation or peace go back to the works of Hugo Grotius (1625), William Penn (1693), the Abbe de St Pierre (1713), Jeremy Bentham

experience of war had convinced many of the importance of world peace.⁴ Institutionally, it consolidated various national organizations for the purpose of international cooperation: a process which was strongly tied up with the trends of national mobilization in the first few decades of the twentieth century.

WWI mobilized individual and institutional resources for *national security*. It accelerated existing trends towards the national consolidation of various organizations for war, and therefore for official, purposes. For example, in the field of science in the USA, the National Research Council (NRC) played a leading role in the wartime national coordination of various scientific research activities, which had been carried out in corporations, research foundations, government bureaus and universities.⁵ In Japan, the NRC was also founded in 1920 for a similar purpose,⁶ but other scientific institutions such as the Institute for Physical and Chemical Research (1917) already had been established to mobilize scientists in unofficial sectors for strategic reasons.⁷

WWI also promoted official and unofficial cooperation across the borders of nation-states. The establishment of the NRC in various countries, which was initiated by the International Research Council (founded in 1919), was one example. The International Research Council was to

(1789) and Immanuel Kant (1795). Bentham opposed secret diplomacy and colonial imperialism, ideals which were realized in the Fourteen Points of Wilson. The practices and institutions of international law were established in 1899. The first Hague Conference of 1899 resulted in the formation of a court of arbitration where disputing nations were able to seek mediation or resolution.

⁴ In this sense, especially in Europe where the war was fought, these internationalists not only envisaged the ideal international community, but they were also committed to pacifism. See, for example, Martin Ceadel, *Pacifism in Britain, 1914-1945: The Defining of a Faith* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).

⁵ David F. Noble, *America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1977), p.112. Noble argues that this national coordination was a part of the process of organization of science into industry in the first three decades of the twentieth century.

⁶ It contributed to institutionalization of the scientific community. James R. Bartholomew, *The Formation of Science in Japan* (London: Yale University Press, 1989), pp.254-263.

⁷ Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *The Technological Transformation of Japan: From the Seventeenth to the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.126-127.

promote international cooperation in science after WWI.⁸ Actual war-time cooperation also occurred on an unprecedented scale. Official organizations such as the War Cabinet, the Allied Forces and various other war organizations were formed to support war efforts. Often staff were stationed in foreign countries, and worked with colleagues from other countries. Unofficial organizations worked in a similar multinational manner. The Red Cross and YMCA International, for example, organized civilians from various countries, and looked after the welfare of soldiers. Many internationalists who became key figures of the IPR came from these official and unofficial war organizations. Americans of particular importance were Newton Baker (1871–1937), Secretary of War in 1916–1921, Jerome Greene (1874–1959), Executive Secretary of the American Shipping Mission of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, London in 1917, and Edward Carter (1878–1954), Chief Secretary of the YMCA with American Expeditionary Force in France in 1917–1919.

ii) The Emergence of Non-governmental Foreign Expert Organizations

The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 brought many officials and non-officials together. It was a conference to make a peace treaty, but it was also formative, physically and intellectually, leading to the creation of an international organization, the League of Nations. Participants felt the excitement of being present at this occasion, and public expectation was high. One American recorded his excitement in witnessing the great public response to the conference. On Saturday 14 December, 1918, when Wilson's carriage passed the Champs Elysées, tens of thousands of people welcomed him. 'Wilson the Just' (le juste), one big placard said:

Looking down from our windows [at Crillon Hotel] we could see the crowds converging down the different streets into the square like a solid black stream, filling the streets from side to side. The soldiers tried to keep a single track way open for the President (Wilson) from the bridge over the Seine through the Place de la Concorde But the pressure of the crowd was so great that the line of soldiers was moved in and out until the space which they

⁸ Germany and the Central Powers were excluded from this process, much to the resentment of Germany. Daniel Kevles, "Into Hostile Political Camps": The Reorganisation of international Science in World War I, *Isis* Vol. 62 (1971), pp.47–60.

were to keep clear was all indented and twisted instead of being a straight line There may have been anywhere from fifty thousand to a hundred thousand people in the square before Wilson came.⁹

Major delegation groups stayed in grand hotels on the Champs Elysées. The Majestic housed the British delegation and Crillon the American. Each delegation numbered more than a thousand. While the ordinary people of Paris struggled to get food, these delegations wined, dined and discussed issues at these hotels, removed from war and its aftermath.

The main participants were politicians and senior government officials, but they were accompanied by many official and unofficial younger male assistants. Among these young male public servants, lawyers, businessmen, academics or journalists was the most important group of twenty-three unofficial Americans. The group was a part of the "Inquiry", a project organized in 1917 by Edward Mandell House, Wilson's foreign policy adviser.¹⁰ The major part of the concrete territorial solutions contained in the "Fourteen Points", the founding document of the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations, was furnished by this Inquiry group, and Wilson added six general principles relating to the new international order.¹¹

The Inquiry was the first non-governmental brains trust for foreign policy-making in American history. While Wilson ordered its formation, the group reflected House's opinion:¹² diplomats were equipped to handle

⁹ James T. Shotwell, *At the Paris Peace Conference* (New York: Macmillan, 1937), p.86.

¹⁰ House recruited academics, journalists and lawyers for the Inquiry. They included James Shotwell, historian at Columbia University, Walter Lippmann, journalist for *New Republic*, Sydney E. Mezes, President of the College of the City of New York and brother-in-law of House, Davis Hunter Miller, a partner in a law office of House's son-in-law, and Isaiah Bowman, Director of the American Geographical Society. Within a year, it developed into 126 specialists, mainly academics. The office was first set at the Public Library of New York. For details, see Ronald Steel, *Walter Lippmann and the American Century* (New York: Vintage Books, 1981), pp.128-134.

¹¹ Walter Lippmann was involved with the draft of the Fourteen Points, especially on the section of territorial issues in Europe. It was first entitled 'The War Aims and Peace Terms It Suggests.' When Wilson presented the Fourteen Points at Congress on 8 January 1918, Lippmann boasted, 'This is the second time that I have put words into the mouth of the President!' R. Steel, *Walter Lippmann*, p.134.

¹² T. J. Knock, *To End All Wars*, p.140.

daily problems, but were too busy to address long term issues. The State Department had no time, House concluded, to draft proposals or recruit highly trained thinkers for the job.¹³ James Shotwell (1874–1965), a principal member of the Inquiry and historian at Columbia University, described the Inquiry: 'never before had universities been mobilized for such a service ... it called for specialists whose interests lay in a different academic world from that of undergraduate instruction'.¹⁴

The formation of the Inquiry was partially due to the special relations between House and the President, but was also due to the national mobilization process for the war. Shotwell commented that the utilizing of resources outside the government was familiar to war time operations.¹⁵ The attitudes of government officials to this first experiment were not cordial, and rivalry from the State Department to an unofficial organization of 'amateurs' existed.¹⁶ To the surprise and excitement of these twenty three men from the Inquiry, however, they were brought into the actual working of the Inter-Allied Commissions. Instead of merely furnishing information, they were given responsibility to shape the terms of the Treaty.¹⁷

These Americans worked closely with British counterparts. Among the foreign experts in the British delegation was the Round Table group. The Round Table was established in London in 1909, but its origin went back to Milner's Kindergarten, a group of young Oxford graduates appointed to key administrative positions in South Africa in 1901 by Alfred Milner (1854–1925), then High Commissioner for South Africa. Branch offices of the Round Table were created in major cities of the British Commonwealth¹⁸ soon after 1909.¹⁹

¹³ Robert Shulzinger, *American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.88.

¹⁴ J. Shotwell, *The Peace Conference*, p.5.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.12–13.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.12.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.17.

¹⁸ The term began to replace the British Empire during WWI. The British Commonwealth implied more independence for the Dominions than the British Empire had done for white colonies.

¹⁹ For its origin, see John Kendle, *The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), the first three chapters, and Chapter Four on the

Members of the Round Table became leading foreign policy experts in Britain and Dominions. Because such experts were still very scarce in these countries, a large proportion of them were sent to the Peace Conference. Some of the Round Table members were government officials, such as Alfred Milner, Secretary of State for War and for the Colonies during the time of WWI, and Philipp Kerr (1882–1940), Private Secretary to Lloyd George. Others such as Lionel Curtis (1872–1955) were not government staff. The distinction between official and non-official was often blurred, because most of them were involved in war organizations during the war.

For Japan and for Dominions such as Australia, the conference was their debut on the world stage. It was the first time that Dominions had had representation separate from Britain at any major international conference. The influence of those from Japan and Australia did not match that of their British or American counterparts. Although Japan was one of the five Great Powers, major decisions were made by four Great Powers (the USA, Britain, France and Italy). One Australian observed: 'Now we feel what small potatoes we are'.²⁰ Yet their presence was in itself evidence of the 'new international order', and their views often illuminated its crucial problems.

Major Australian participants belonged to the Round Table: Robert Garran (1867–1957), John Latham (1877–1964) and Frederic Eggleston (1875–1954). The latter two became the core of the internationalist movement in Australia. From Japan, young diplomats such as Matsuoka Yōsuke (1880–1946), Yoshida Shigeru (1878–1967), Arita Hachirō (1884–1965) and Shigemitsu Mamoru (1887–1957), and the non-diplomat, Konoe Fumimaro (1891–1945), all of whom were to become key figures in inter-war diplomacy, were sent to assist the special envoy, Makino Nobuaki (1861–1949) and Saionji Kinmochi (1849–1940).

formation of Dominion branches. For the Australian Round Table movement, see Leonie Foster, *High Hopes: The Men and Motives of the Australian Round Table* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1986), especially Chapter Two.

²⁰ 'Diary of Eggleston,' 24 January, 1919, MS 423/6, NLA.

These younger experts from Australia and Japan belonged to the modern elite of university graduates, most of whom had majored in law. They were predominantly public servants. Latham and Eggleston studied law at Melbourne and both were public servants. Except for Matsuoka and Konoe,²¹ all the young Japanese were graduates of Tokyo Imperial University. They had all passed a competitive examination for the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to become career diplomats.

Europe was geographically remote from Japan and Australia. The Japanese delegation travelled to Paris from Yokohama via San Francisco, New York, Liverpool, Folkstone and Calais. The office for the Japanese delegation was in the Hotel Bristol which was not as grand as Crillon or Majestic, but was still in an elegant quarter of the Place Vendôme. The Japanese delegation numbered only a tenth of its British or American counterparts. Japan, being so far away from Europe, had to mobilize almost every Japanese who happened to be in Europe at the time for the Conference.²²

In spite of some differences, however, young American, British, Australian and Japanese experts all shared a sense of the strong force of democracy at work at the conference. Public opinion was taken more seriously not only in domestic policies, but also in foreign policies. The awareness of these democratic forces convinced them of the significance of new open diplomacy as opposed to secret diplomacy. They felt the need to adjust diplomatic machinery to the changing society both domestically and externally: a view which became dominant among Wilsonians.²³

²¹ Matsuoka went to high school and university in the USA not on any government scholarship, but privately. While earning his living, he graduated in law from Oregon University. Konoe was born into a high ranking aristocratic family and was educated mainly at Gakushūin, a school frequently attended by aristocrats. He then went on to the public school [*Ichikō*], and Tokyo Imperial University. Within a short time, he transferred to Kyoto Imperial University and graduated from there.

²² Shigemitsu Mamoru, *Shigemitsu Mamoru Gaikō Kaisōroku* (Mainichi shimbunsha, 1953), pp.38-39 and 41.

²³ Shigemitsu and Arita, for example, talked about the need for reform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and established the *Kakushin Dōshikai* (Reform Club) within the Ministry. *Ibid.*, p.44. The Ministry was reformed in October 1920 with emphasis on strengthening information collection ability and specialization on certain regions.

The new machinery was discussed by British and Americans at the time of the conference, and they formed non-governmental organizations of foreign relations in Britain and in the USA. These organizations were based on the recognition of the importance of public opinion and the need for study of increasingly complicated foreign situations. Their founders asserted the universality of their vision of the international community, and they were Atlantic-oriented in interest and focus. Participants from Dominions brought home similar ideas, and founded branches of the British organization. These organizations played a key role in international movements, which inevitably influenced the IPR activities in the various countries.

On Friday, 30 May, at the Majestic Hotel, thirty three 'British'²⁴ and Americans proposed a new institution for British and American foreign affairs experts.²⁵ The core of this Anglo-American group were from the Inquiry and the Round Table. Lionel Curtis initiated this move based on his recognition that the British needed to adjust to various new forces in international politics. One of these new forces was the USA, and he urged the importance of cooperating with this new power. By 1919, he had developed the idea that:

The British and American Commonwealth[s] are the two central pillars upon which [the peace of the world] must rest and if either crumbles, the whole structure will fall to the ground ...²⁶

His feeling also reflected the growing desire among some British groups such as the English Speaking Union,²⁷ to strengthen the ties between

Asada S., *Ryō taisenkan no nichibei kankei: Kaigun to seisaku kettei katei* (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1993), p.69.

²⁴ They included those from the Dominions such as Latham and Garran from Australia.

²⁵ Minutes on the establishment of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), Webster Paper, 3/12, LLSEP.

²⁶ Note from Curtis to the secretaries of the Round Table in the Dominions, 29 November, 1919, MS 1009/19, NLA.

²⁷ This Union was founded in 1918 to promote 'English speaking people's brotherhood' and had headquarters in Philadelphia and London. Evelyn Wrench, 'The English-Speaking Union: The Story of Its Founding' (unpublished manuscript) pp.7-9, LESU. Another organization of a similar purpose was the "British Committee on Exchange between the British and American Churches". Lynch to Wilson, 17 March, 1919, cited in Arthur S.

Britain and the USA. Curtis was convinced of the prospect of Anglo-American cooperation during the conference. Sharing a common language, Americans and British dined and discussed frequently. As a result, they felt that they understood each other better than their leaders did and better than they had expected.²⁸ Curtis outlined the main goal of the proposed organization at the Majestic: 'The British and American Commonwealths had the advantage of a common tongue to initiate interaction between foreign affairs experts of the different countries'.

The aim should be to create [an] institute like the Royal Geographical Society, with libraries where the members would study international affairs. The result of their studies could be put in the form of papers for discussion by the members. This would keep officials and publicists in touch with each other More important still, the institutes would form centres where they [the members] would converse on these subjects, just as they now conversed in the Crillon and Majestic Hotel[s].²⁹

Another new force in international politics was public opinion. Curtis thought that the experts who gathered at the conference constituted the most valuable factor in the production of *sound* public opinion.

Right public opinion was mainly produced by a small number of people in real contact with the facts who had thought out the issues involved National policy ought to be shaped by a conception of the interests of *society at large*; for it was in the advancement of that *universal* interest that the particular interest of the several nations would alone be found. It was all important, therefore, to cultivate a public opinion in the various countries of the world which kept the general interest in view.³⁰ (emphasis added)

Link ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (PWW)* Vol.56 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), p.57.

²⁸ R. Shulzinger, *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p.4. Shotwell and other Americans thought that 'the English were "all right"'. He was particularly impressed by Curtis and called him 'the brilliant young statesman of the British Commonwealth plan of British federation'. J. Shotwell, *The Peace Conference*, p.111.

²⁹ 'Minute of a meeting at the Hotel Majestic on Friday, 30 May, 1919,' Webster Paper, 3/12, LLSEP.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

Curtis' idea strikingly demonstrates his mistrust of public opinion. His view probably reflected the dominant view of the 'masses' among the intellectual elite at the time.³¹ It also illustrates, not only his confidence about what was sound and right, but also his concept of national coherence.

Three Americans and three 'British' were appointed as a provisional committee to work on the establishment of the Institute of International Affairs in each country.³² Curtis and an American, Whitney Shepardson (1890–1966), became joint secretaries. John Latham, a member of the committee, reported on the progress in February 1920:

[The] Institute of International Affairs is getting well on with its labours and has secured the most formidable list of original members. Practically everybody of any importance in England and America has joined.³³

Three Australians at the Peace Conference—Latham, Garrahan and Eggleston—became founding members of the British Institute of International Affairs (BIIA) when it was inaugurated in London in July, 1920.³⁴

The path for the American counterpart was not easy due to scepticism about American involvement in European politics among the public and foreign policy experts. Shotwell and Shepardson tried to form a sister organization of the RIIA in the USA, but it was difficult: 'American public opinion would not permit them to join with the British'.³⁵ They decided, then, to form a similar organization independent of the RIIA. Their

³¹ This view was well elaborated by Walter Lippmann's *The Phantom Public* (New York: Macmillan, 1925). For its anti-mass implication, see R. Steel, *Walter Lippmann*, pp.212–213.

³² These Americans were James Brown Scott, Director of the Inquiry, Archibald Coolidge of Harvard, and Shotwell, and three 'British' were Sydney Peel, Robert Cecil, MP of Conservative Party, and an Australian, John Latham.

³³ Latham to a secretary of the League of Nations in Paris, 23 February, 1920, MS 1009/23, NLA.

³⁴ Hazel King *At Mid-Century: A Short History of the New South Wales Branch of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1924–1980* (Sydney: AIIA, 1982), p.1. The BIIA was chartered as the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the RIIA, from 1926, and I make use of the title RIIA even for the period of 1920–1926.

³⁵ W. R. Shepardson to BIIA, July 19, 1921, cited in R. Shulzinger, *The Wise Men*, p.5.

group merged with the group of bankers and lawyers organized by Elihu Root (1845–1939), former Secretary of State in the Roosevelt administration, which was called the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).³⁶ It was incorporated as the CFR on 29 July, 1921.

iii) Race, Power, and Nation

While founders of the RIIA and the CFR were influenced by Wilson's ideas of 'new diplomacy' and argued for the need to adjust to certain new forces in international politics, they were not prepared to accommodate another new force, non Euro-American power. The case of the Japanese claim to insert a racial equality clause into the Covenant of the League of Nations illuminated the problem of Wilsonians and the new international order of the League, and the complex nature of racial issues in international politics: the issue which was to play the major role in the formation of the IPR.

Wilsonianism in Europe shared the dominant perception of the time: the centrality and the dominance of Western Europe. For them, Western Europe was without question the centre of the international community, and what they termed the 'East', existed only in the periphery of their minds. The League of Nations was concerned with self-determination, but this was mainly applied to Europe. The colonial system prevailed then, and there were very few independent countries in Asia and Africa, let alone prosperous ones.

One of the basic principles of the League, anti-imperialism, however, had significant implications for matters outside of Europe. The "Fourteen Points" called for:

'a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of populations concerned must have *equal weight* with the equitable

³⁶ This CFR was more like a social club, and its members dined monthly at the Metropolitan Club in New York. *Ibid.*, p.6.

claims of the government whose title is to be determined'.³⁷
(emphasis added)

This principle was implemented into a mandate system, and its key word was the 'advancement of civilization'. The degree of the advancement depended on the 'remoteness from the centre of civilization.

The system, however, only affected the former colonies of the defeated. In other areas, the colonial system prevailed. Furthermore, the mandate system assumed a certain power relationship between a weaker 'East' and a stronger 'West'. Thorn is critical of Wilsonians on this point: 'Nor were overt and implicit assumptions of racial superiority abandoned within this new and Western order of international brotherhood'.³⁸ Of Wilsonians in Britain, Kendle questions whether they really had faith in non-Europeans' capacity for self-rule.³⁹

The paternalism of Wilsonians may have worked in colonial contexts, but did not in the case of non Euro-American powers such as Japan, which did not fit into the assumed relationship between 'West' and 'East'. Japanese delegates at the conference challenged this relationship, by arguing for the insertion of a racial equality clause into the League's Covenant. It was a significant issue for Japan, and was one of three major aims of the Japanese delegation, not a bargaining tool for the other territorial claims.⁴⁰ Behind the Japanese claim for racial equality was the following belief, as Makino, special envoy of Japan, stated:

³⁷ 'The final draft of the Fourteen Points,' *PWW*, Vol. 45 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.525.

³⁸ Christopher Thorn, *The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-33* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1973), p.419.

³⁹ John Kendle, *The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), p.303.

⁴⁰ The claim of racial equality was one of the three issues that the delegation was instructed to pursue at the conference. The instruction said: 'In order to eliminate disadvantage of the [Japanese] Empire caused by racial prejudice, one should try some means to prevent it as long as the circumstances can allow', 'Kōwa no sandai hōshin' and 'Uiruson beidaitōryō no jūyonkajō kōryō ni taisuru iken oyobi chintao shōbun ni kansuru hōshin,' in Kajima Morinosuke ed., *Nihon Gaikōshi*, Vol.12 (Kajima kenkyūsho shuppankai, 1971), p. 63.

The League of Nations is like an international security organization Therefore, the people of the member countries of the League will share the military expenditure for the common purpose and have to sacrifice their lives if it is necessary We hoped that those people should stand on equal footing and it was natural to request an equality ...⁴¹

The Japanese delegation argued that it was a matter of principle and pride, 'for pride is one of the most forceful and sometimes uncontrollable causes of human action'.⁴² They saw the removal of racial discrimination as crucial for world peace, and denied that this implied interference in the rights of national sovereignty.⁴³ Representatives from Italy, France, Greece, Czechoslovakia and China, took the view that it was a matter of principle.⁴⁴

Makino did not, however, deny the political implications of the amendment of the discriminatory immigration laws against Japanese. When it was suggested to him that the claim should be confined to those resident in the country, not immigrants, Makino did not agree.⁴⁵ This meant that the Japanese claim for racial equality had possible implications for immigration policy, and W. M. Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia, was convinced that Japan aspired to break the White Australia Policy.⁴⁶ He played a crucial part in blocking this proposal at the conference.⁴⁷ In late May 1919, Japanese delegates received sympathetic approval for their compromise draft from the USA, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and

⁴¹ 'Diary of Nagaoka Haruzo,' in Gaimushō ed., *Nihon Gaikō Monjo: Nihon Gaikō Tsuikairoku, 1900-1935* (Gaimushō, 1983), p.504.

⁴² Minutes, 11 April, 1919, *PWW*, Vol. 57 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), p.260.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.261.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.262-264.

⁴⁵ Robert Garran, 'League of Nations: Proposed Japanese Amendment,' n. d., cited in Peter Spartalis, *The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes* (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1983), p.181.

⁴⁶ On the background of Hughes's conviction, see L. F. Fitzhardinge, 'Australia, Japan and Great Britain, 1914-1918,' *Historical Studies*, Vol.14, No.54 (April 1970), pp.250-259.

⁴⁷ In an initial stage of this proposal, House wrote: 'I understand that all the British Delegation were willing to accept the form the President, Makino, China and I agreed on excepting Hughes of Australia. He has been the stumbling block'. Diary of Colonel House, 13 February, 1919, *PWW*, Vol.55 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), p.155.

South Africa. Only Hughes remained an ardent opponent. It was not a matter of the words of the clause, Hughes argued, but the idea behind them. 'The idea was what ninety five out of one hundred of Australian people would oppose', therefore, as the representative of Australian public opinion, Hughes had to oppose it.⁴⁸

After a few more compromises, the Japanese delegation brought the proposal to the vote on 11 April, 1919. In that draft, race was substituted by nation. Makino proposed that 'the endorsement of the principle of the equality of nations and the just treatment of their nationals' should be included in the Covenant. Eleven favoured the proposal, including two from Japan, France and Italy, and one from China, Portugal, Greece, Serbia and Czechoslovakia. Wilson as chairman ruled out the proposal due to the failure to reach unanimity.⁴⁹ House described the meeting:

It was an exhibition of Anglo Saxon tenacity ... in some way we always carried our point. The Japanese brought up their amendment to the Preamble. The President was for accepting it, but Cecil, under instructions from his [British] government, could not, and since I knew that Hughes would fight it and make an inflammatory speech in the [Plenary] Session, I urged the President to stay with the British, which he did, and in a speech made the argument I gave him. It was a fine fight from start to finish and since we won I went to bed at two o'clock quite content ...⁵⁰

This shows his strong sense of Anglo-American solidarity, but more importantly that Hughes only differed in his manner, not in his points of argument, from his more sophisticated counterparts. However displeased with his manner, many shared his fear of the consequences of adopting the principle of *national* equality. An American noted in his diary on 11 April:

Concealed in the Japanese apparently simple request was the nucleus for serious trouble in the United States should it be adopted, inasmuch as it would allow the Asiatics to demand the repeal of the Asiatic Exclusion Law of the United States. However, it was not necessary for the United States, openly to oppose the

⁴⁸ 'Diary of Nagaoka,' p.499.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.498-501.

⁵⁰ Diary of Colonel House, 12 April, 1919, *PWW*, Vol.57, p.285.

suggested amendment because Australia and New Zealand through the British representatives had taken the positive opposition.⁵¹

The Canadian Prime Minister also wrote on 15 April:

Immigration and Naturalization are regarded under international law as matters of domestic concern. Further the position of Great Britain and the United States as the most important Powers on [the] League of Nations Council, and the fact that no action can be taken except by unanimous consent, seems to remove absolutely any danger of attempted interference by the League with these domestic questions.⁵²

Hughes' crudeness uncovered two fundamental problems in Wilsonian internationalism. The rationale for rejecting a racial equality clause was that it would interfere with the right of national sovereignty.⁵³ This signifies the complication of the race issue in international politics, where it was dealt as an inter-governmental issue. And those who supported the League and Wilsonian principles felt that domestic opinion, including their own, was not at all ready for racial equality.

Was it a matter of principle? Yoshida Shigeru, a diplomat and son-in-law of Makino, thought that the proposal was based on Makino's sincere concern, which originated from the experience of the anti-Japanese movement in California.⁵⁴ The issue touched people's pride, and was, therefore, very personal and emotional. Because the media further stirred the popular feeling in Japan, public pressure on him was strong. But did the Japanese delegation and public want *racial* equality? Did, for example, Makino mean all Asians should have equal rights as a principle?

⁵¹ Diary of Dr Grayson, 11 April, 1919, *PWW*, Vol.57, pp.239-240.

⁵² Borden to White, 15 April, 1919, *PWW*, Vol.57, p.373.

⁵³ Robert Cecil, a main opposer of the Japanese proposal of 11 April stated, 'The British Government realized the importance of the racial question, but its solution could not be attempted by the Commission without encroaching upon the sovereignty of States members of the League'. Minutes of a meeting of the League of Nations Commission, 11 April, 1919, *PWW*, Vol.57, p.261.

⁵⁴ Makino was Minister of Foreign Affairs when the dispute over Japanese discrimination occurred in California in 1913. Yoshida Shigeru, *Kaisō Jūnen*, (Shinchōsha, 1958), Vol.4, pp.97-98.

Racial discrimination hurt Japanese pride because the Japanese were not only treated as unequals, but also like other Asians. The replacement of the word, 'race' to 'nation' by Makino highlights this point:

I submitted a proposal to modify the Covenant ... which said that the people of the countries which had *advanced culture* and could be recognized as a member of the League should be treated as equal no matter what race or nationality they were.⁵⁵ (emphasis added)

Both Wilsonians and their critics agreed in the thinking that inequality in international politics was not a matter of race, but of nation,⁵⁶ and therefore, race in international politics was not about principle, but about nation-state and power:

The questions and conflicts which arise out of [race] have never admitted and never will admit of judicial determination; they are political questions ... and must be handled by wise and understanding statesmanship on both sides.⁵⁷

Here race loses a united force in international politics, and instead the power of the *nation*, disguised in the words 'advancement of civilization' takes over. While using the rhetoric of the new democratic forces, Japanese delegates did not deny the old imperial framework of the European powers.

Japan's reaction to the mandate system shows further the double standard of the Japanese delegates. At the conference, Japan laid claim to all former German territories in the Pacific islands north of the equator. The area became Mandate C, under terms which banned imperialistic activities such as military education and oppression of the freedom of belief of the local population. This was a far cry from the original Japanese claim for imperial annexation.⁵⁸ The Japanese delegation accepted these terms

⁵⁵ 'Diary of Nagaoka,' p.503.

⁵⁶ E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Papermac, 1993, first published in 1939), pp.165-166 and 227.

⁵⁷ A. Zimmern, *The Prospects of Democracy: And other Essays* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1929), p.191.

⁵⁸ Imaizumi Yumiko, 'Nanyō guntō inin tōchi seisaku no keisei,' in Ōe Shinobu et al eds., *Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi*, Vol. 4 (Iwanami: shoten, 1993), p.58.

reluctantly, but then demanded 'racial equality' in the other territories of Mandate C controlled by Australia and New Zealand. This was because Australia and New Zealand would apply their domestic immigration laws to these mandates, which meant that former Japanese residents would lose the rights they once had under German control. Japan's claim was overruled by the same rationale as had been used in the rejection of the racial equality clause.⁵⁹ To the 'inferior', the Japanese delegation used the old rules of imperial order, and to the 'superior', they used the rhetoric of the new international order.

The double standard of Japanese diplomacy at Versailles was criticized by contemporary Japanese. Ishibashi Tanzan, economist and journalist of *Tōyō Keizai Shimpō* argued: 'Japan demanded equal status with the Western powers, but practiced discriminatory treatment towards the rest of Asia'.⁶⁰ This remained the crucial element of Japanese foreign policy in Asia in the inter-war period. Nevertheless, the fact that Japanese were one of the first to bring the 'race' issue into international politics should be emphasized. The issue of *race* was that of *power*, and it was the power of a *nation*, not of an individual. If no non Euro-American power had existed, the problem of race would not have been acknowledged in 1919. In other words, the right to claim equal treatment was not open to every nationality, but only those who belonged to powerful nations. While the new international order differed from old imperial order primarily in manner, not in essence, certain changes became possible in the new order.

What was significant about this incident was its psychological impact. As Chapter Three, Section Two describes, it made some Japanese realize that the essence of the 'new' international order was much the same as the old imperial order, and Dower interprets the impact of the experience as wide-ranging and long-lasting.⁶¹ Piesse, Head of the Pacific Branch of the

⁵⁹ 'Diary of Nagaoka,' pp.465-477.

⁶⁰ Ishibashi Tanzan, 'Dai Nihonshugi no genshō,' *Tōyō Keizai Shimpō*, Vol.13, 1921, compiled in Ishibashi Tanzan, *Ishibashi Tanzan hyōron senshū, 1884-1973* (Tōyō keizai shimpōsha, 1990), p.215.

⁶¹ J. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp.45-47.

Australian Prime Minister's Department summed up the incident in a letter to Latham on 7 May, 1919.

How much better it would have been to accept the Japanese amendment in one of its less noxious forms and rely on the opportunities the Covenant of the League gives to protect ourselves from any unfavourable interpretation. As it is we have been perhaps the chief factor in consolidating the whole Japanese nation behind the imperialists—and it needs little imagination to see how serious that may be with Japan's new assured opportunities for expanding her power through China's resources.⁶²

Since WWII, people in various countries have interpreted this incident as one of the major factors leading to the Pacific War.⁶³

At the Peace Conference, British and American foreign experts founded non-governmental organizations in their countries, based on their visions of the international community. Australians joined this move. These institutions became the core of internationalist movements promoting the cause of the League and the new international order. This new order, however, remained ambiguous. The Japanese delegation questioned the justice of the new international order in terms of race. The Pacific, which was filled with colonies, and far beyond the horizon of many internationalists at the League of Nations, was, therefore, the crucial testing ground for the 'validity' of the new order. As this section demonstrated, the Japanese claim of 'racial equality' was not based on 'race', but the notions of power and national sovereignty. The following section focuses on the issue of the nation-state in Wilsonian internationalism.

⁶² Letter to Latham, 7 May, 1919, MS 882/5/25, NLA.

⁶³ 'Declaration of the Japanese Emperor' cited in note 3 in Asada S., *Ryō taisei kan*, p.318. A. Australian was convinced that one of the major causes of Pearl Harbour was Versailles. A. F. Thomas, 'Japan and Post War Relations,' address given on 5 September, 1944 at the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Melbourne. Harrison Moore Papers 11/1, AUM.

2) Wilsonian Internationalism

Wilsonian internationalism was central in internationalist movements in the 1920s, and it played a significant role in the IPR. This section looks at the meaning of the nation-state for Wilsonians in historical context. It argues that far from being 'utopian cosmopolitans', Wilsonian internationalists held a philosophy based on the nation-state system, and they did not question the coherent national unity. Second, it examines Wilsonian internationalism in the American context, which was the important backbone of the IPR. Third, it briefly looks at the project of Wilsonians in the USA and Britain, which became a model for the IPR. The ideals and visions of these Wilsonians were based on the belief in the greatness of their nations. Their internationalism was, in this sense, an externalized vision of their nationalism.

i) Various Streams of Internationalism

Internationalism refers to a vision for the international community and activities to promote that vision. Various streams of internationalism existed after WWI, and created the intellectual and institutional arena for the formation of the IPR. They were: 1) Wilsonian internationalism; 2) Christian humanitarian internationalism; 3) women's internationalism; 4) legalist internationalism; 5) economic internationalism; 6) socialist internationalism; and 7) new British imperialism. These categories, however, are abstractions, and intellectually and institutionally, they overlapped extensively, with the possible exception of socialist internationalism.

Wilsonian internationalism was Wilson's vision of the international community based on principles such as 'new diplomacy', anti-imperialism and self-determination. Because it laid the foundation for the establishment of the League of Nations, I use the term for activities to promote, not only Wilsonian visions, but also the cause of the League. Christian humanitarian internationalists saw the *brotherhood* of human beings and charity for the less fortunate as the foundation of the international community. For women's internationalists, female nature

was the key to making the community more peaceful. Legalist internationalism promoted the codification of actions in the international community. Economic internationalists believed that freer trade and closer economic ties would promote world cooperation and contribute to peace. For socialist internationalists, the union and rule of the working classes would make the world a better society. New British imperialists believed in the supremacy of the British way of governing and the organic union of the Commonwealth as a foundation of world peace.

ii) The Nature of Wilsonian internationalism

Among these streams, various visions for the international community existed around the time of WWI, and Wilson's idea of a league was just one among many visions for the international community.⁶⁴ While the League of Nations was not the exact embodiment of Wilsonian's ideas, it was based on them. Although scepticism and criticism existed, and the degree of the influence of the League differed from country to country,⁶⁵ the League of Nations began to be seen as the international status quo, a setting for the 'new' international order. Wilsonian internationalism became central in internationalist movements in the 1920s. New British imperialists were dominant in Britain and the Dominions, but were largely supportive of Wilsonian ideas and the League of Nations.

⁶⁴ In this thesis, the League of Nations refers to the League which was founded at the Paris Peace Conference, and I use the term a league of nations as a form of organization which many people envisaged in the same period. For various ideas of a league of nations in Britain, see Henry R. Winkler, *The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, 1914-1919* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers Press, 1952), Chapter One.

⁶⁵ Britain was a major supporter of the League, but Birn concludes that the League remained a peripheral factor in British policy-making in the inter-war period. Donald S. Birn, *The League of Nations Union, 1918-1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p.228. The Japanese government was committed to the League from the beginning. Inoki Masamichi, *Yoshida Shigeru* (Jiji tsūshinsha, 1986), pp.43-45. Japan was one of the permanent members of the Council of the League, and provided the first Vice-Director of General Affairs, Nitobe Inazō, who was succeeded by Sugimura Yōtarō in 1927. Strong opposition to the League, however, existed in some quarters from the beginning. In the case of Australia, William Hughes (Prime Minister, 1915-1923) was never a whole-hearted supporter, while his successor, Stanley M. Bruce (Prime Minister, 1923-1929), was more enthusiastic. W. J. Hudson, *Australia and the League of Nations* (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1980), p.5.

The nature of the League was complicated. It was based on Wilson's visions, which were influenced by the progressive climate of social inquiry,⁶⁶ and it is symbolic that Wilson's plan had strong support among women's and socialist associations, especially in the early stages. Against the old, secretive diplomacy, the League promoted the idea of a new, open diplomacy, which was more in touch with public opinion. It expressed progressive views on such issues as gender and social class. Agendas and committees were set up to tackle these issues. The International Labour Organization (ILO), for example, was one organization which grew out of such an agenda.⁶⁷ In all of these aspects, the League promised the capability to reform the 'faults' of the old imperial order.

The League, however, proposed reform, not revolution. As the League's failure to recognize racial equality demonstrated, it was too cautious to satisfy those who believed in more progressive reforms.⁶⁸ The League's reactionary attitudes in dealing with labour issues were criticized,⁶⁹ and some historians have argued that Wilson's new world order was intended to counter the socialist revolution in Russia in 1917.⁷⁰ While the League offered certain reforms of the old imperial order, it was also a means to preserve the established order against revolutionary forces. The League was regarded as the organ of imperial powers not only by communists or socialists, but also by some leading American internationalists.⁷¹

As argued in the Introduction and demonstrated in the previous section, Wilsonian ideas were significant in the formation of foreign affairs experts' organizations. These organizations believed in the importance of non-official players in international politics in promoting more rational, scientific and democratic ways to conduct diplomacy, which would

⁶⁶ T. Knock, *To End All Wars*, Chapter Two.

⁶⁷ J. T. Shotwell, *The Origins of the International Labour Organization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934), Vol.2, pp.387-409.

⁶⁸ Charles DeBenedetti, *Origins of the Modern American Peace Movement, 1915-1929* (New York: Kto Press, 1978), pp.17 and 27.

⁶⁹ Colonel House reported that drafts of 11 April on labour issues were reactionary and unsatisfactory by Labour opinion. House to Governor, 20 April, 1919, *PWW*, Vol.57, p.528.

⁷⁰ N. Gordon Levin Jr, *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp.7-8.

⁷¹ C. DeBenedetti, *Origins of the Modern American Peace Movement*, pp.17 and 19.

contribute to world peace. This emphasis on non-official 'experts' by Wilsonians was criticized by Carr on the grounds that 'experts' were 'theoreticians' and 'utopians'. The criticism led to a false dichotomy between 'utopian' internationalists and 'realistic' nationalists. Carr and the Wilsonians, however, shared a common intellectual paradigm, which was based on the assumptions of the nation-state system, the existing power structure and the centrality of Western Europe. Wilsonians faced, therefore, the problems inherent in their assumptions and in the structure of international politics. Some of these issues remain relevant today.

Carr argued that the backbone of Wilsonianism was the idealist school of T. H. Green, and its central concept was the strong nation-state. The school was described in 1915 as follows:

That philosophy could satisfy the new needs of social progress, because it refused to worship a supposed individual liberty which was proving destructive of the real liberty of the majority, and preferred to emphasise the moral well-being and betterment of the whole community.⁷²

It urged stronger power for the state to achieve the welfare of the society as a whole, not a system of laissez-faire which promoted the liberty of a privileged few.⁷³ The school was often termed 'New Liberalism' and had a strong influence among inter-war intellectuals in Australia,⁷⁴ and New Dealers in the USA in the 1930s.⁷⁵

The Wilsonians at the League did not question the nation-state system. Alfred Zimmern,⁷⁶ an ardent Wilsonian, for example, argued that states

⁷² Ernest Barker, *Political Thought in England, 1848 to 1914* (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1932, first published in 1915), p.11.

⁷³ Carr asserted that Wilsonians promoted laissez-faire and the interests of the privileged few. E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction of the Study of International Relations* (London: Papermac, 1991, second edition, the first edition was first published in 1939), p.43-46.

⁷⁴ See Chapter Three, Section One.

⁷⁵ Walter Lippmann discussed the end of laissez-faire and the obligation of the modern state. He gave a strong logical background for New Dealers. W. Lippmann, *The Method of Freedom* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1934), pp.24-28 and 33-36.

⁷⁶ He was Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth in 1919-1929 and at Oxford in 1930-1944.

were the building blocks of the international community.⁷⁷ 'The work of internationalism', as he argued, 'is more properly called as the work of inter-state organization'.⁷⁸ While the nation-state system had been the predominant factor of international politics since the end of the Middle Ages, the inter-war nation-state system was distinct in terms of the emergence of national mass society. The franchise was extended to much wider populations, a development which politically increased both the rights of the people and the control of the state. Economically, the inter-war economic crises reinforced belief in a self-contained 'national economy'.⁷⁹ The period also saw the phenomenon of 'national culture' emerge in various countries.⁸⁰ These movements, strongly influenced by social Darwinism and eugenic thought, mobilized people ideologically in order to strengthen the perception of a united nationhood. Tradition was re-invented to construct this modern national myth.⁸¹ Notions such as 'the unity of the nation', 'society as a whole' and 'social welfare' became important for both administrators and populations.⁸²

Wilsonians of the idealist school did not question the power structure behind the domestic order. Carr saw a coercive element in the rhetoric of social welfare deployed by these Wilsonians.

⁷⁷ A. Zimmern, *The Prospects of Democracy: And other Essays* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1929), p.166.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.79

⁷⁹ Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 132.

⁸⁰ Morris-Suzuki suggests the phenomenon of Japanese 'national culture' making happened in the 1920s-1940s. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, 'The Invention and Re-Invention of "Japanese Culture"', *Journal of Asian Studies* (Forthcoming issue, 1995), pp.4-5 and 10-13 (page numbering based on the draft). Mark H. Haller, *Eugenics: Hereditarian Attitudes in American Thought* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1963), pp.155-159, and Jonas Frykman, 'Becoming the Perfect Swede,' Paper presented at the work-in-progress seminar at the Humanities Research Centre, the Australian National University on 11 August, 1992.

⁸¹ David Cannadine, 'The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the "Invention of Tradition", c. 1820-1977,' in Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger eds., *Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp.139-150.

⁸² For example, the works of a prominent sociologist of the time, Emile Durkheim, were concerned with the unity of society. *De la division du Travail social* [Division of labour in society] was first published in Paris in 1926 and an English translation appeared in 1933. For 'society' as an imaginary construction, see Cornelius Castoriadis, Kathleen Blamey trans., *The Imaginary Institution of Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987, original published in 1975), Chapter Seven.

Once industrial capitalism and the class system had become the recognized structure of society, the doctrine of the harmony of interests acquired a new significance, and became ... the ideology of a dominant group concerned to maintain its predominance by asserting the identity of the interests with those of the community as a whole.⁸³

Zimmern and others probably used the rhetoric of state service to the society, genuinely believing that it would serve society as a whole. A lack of awareness of the power structure was evident in their vision of a coherent and harmonious society and the personified nation-state.⁸⁴ Far from being utopian cosmopolitans, they assumed not only the nation-state as a basic unit, but also the unified monolithic state as an actor in international politics. They ignored the power structure within which the 'nation' and 'national interests' were selected and constructed.

Wilsonians did not question the power structure behind the 'new' international order either. They applied the principle of anti-imperialism only to the former colonies of the Central Powers, not to the colonies of Britain or France. It was assumed that the Great Powers determined major decisions. In 1918, for example, Zimmern suggested that the institutions of the League of Nations should be based on the form of the Inter-Ally War Committee, not the War Court.⁸⁵ He also argued that the 'non-annexation' slogan was nonsense, because some areas were not in a position for self-government and 'civilized' governments were alone able to give it to them.⁸⁶

Wilsonian internationalists reflected the intellectual paradigm of the time. They did not question, but assumed the nation-state system, national coherence and power politics in the 'new international order' of the League.

iii) Wilsonian internationalism: the American Context

⁸³ E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, p.44.

⁸⁴ Zimmern wrote: 'It is as right and healthy for a state to have a foreign policy as for an individual to manifest its personality. A state without foreign policy is a dead state'. A. Zimmern, *The Prospects of Democracy*, p.214.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p.181.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p.175.

In the USA many internationalists supported Wilsonian ideas of 'new diplomacy' and anti-imperialism, but a majority were reserved in their commitment to the League of Nations. This was due to traditional American foreign policies and the party politics of the time. The idea of founding a league of nations under American leadership was supported by Democrats, Republicans and non-partisans alike. But the League of Nations was founded on the initiative of Wilson, a Democratic President, and his uncompromising and stand-offish manner alienated many otherwise ardent supporters.

More importantly, involvement with the League contradicted the core of American foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine, which stated that the USA should not become tangled with European politics, but should exercise independent leadership. The modern internationalist movements in the USA emerged from the recognition of American responsibility in European and 'world' politics. The specific purpose of the movements during WWI was not just to achieve peace, but also to get the USA directly involved in the war in order to attain peace.⁸⁷ The negotiations surrounding the establishment of the League, however, did not convince many of the possibility of American independent leadership over the world affairs, but suggested the dominance of European powers. Congress voted against American membership in the League, and the League issue complicated federal politics as well as international movements.

The history of the American internationalist movements in this period saw splits and coalitions between conventional political and ideological groupings. There were pro-League and anti-League internationalists, and the division did not necessarily coincide with that between Democrats and Republicans or progressives and conservatives.⁸⁸ While the 'peace'

⁸⁷ Ruhl F. Bartlett, *The League to Enforce Peace* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p.3.

⁸⁸ Ray Wilbur was a Republican who served as Secretary of State in the Hoover administration in 1929. He was pro-League and remained Wilsonian. Edgar Eugene Robinson and Paul Carroll Edwards eds., *The Memoirs of Ray Lyman Wilbur 1875-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), p.370. Wilbur became the first Chairman of the Pacific Council of the IPR in 1925. Historically, liberals were more concerned with domestic issues, and international involvement was not seen desirable for their reform

movement was seen as a part of social reform schemes,⁸⁹ these reforms were pursued not only by Democrats but also by Republicans. Theodore Roosevelt (President in 1901–1909) pursued Republican progressive reforms, and founded the "Progressive Party" in 1912, because he was unhappy with conservative forces in the Republican Party.⁹⁰ The split resulted in the Democrat formation of an administration in 1913–1921 under Wilson. Unity was achieved for the 1921 election, yet the progressive element in the Republican Party remained strong in the 1920s.

In the 1920s, the Republican administration (1921–1933) pursued 'independent internationalism',⁹¹ which concluded the Pact of Paris in 1928, the first international treaty to outlaw war as a means of solving inter-governmental disputes. DeBenedetti argues that it was 'the most advanced expression of the postwar Republican goal of tying the popular dream of world peace to its partisan vision of an organizing world of law and economic cooperation free from political precommitment'.⁹² Although pro-League internationalists welcomed it, the Pact did not mean a change to the Monroe Doctrine or American entry to the League.

In this context, political affiliation was not the main formative influence on international movements. Elihu Root, Republican and a major figure in internationalist movements, commented in 1923 on the irrelevance of party affiliation on certain issues such as national interests and foreign policy. Emphasizing the importance of the cause, he reduced political affiliation to a matter of custom and manner.

schemes. Those liberals opposed the League. N. G. Levin Jr, *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics*, p.254. DeBenedetti argues that although internationalists from various camps, such as conservative legalists, social reformers, feminists or Protestant church members, achieved a momentary coalition in 1923–1925, the unity was difficult in the 1920s because of their diverse views on many issues including the American entry to the League. C. DeBenedetti, *Origins of the Modern American Peace Movement*, Chapters One, Two and Three.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.236–237.

⁹⁰ R. Shulzinger, *American Diplomacy*, p.44.

⁹¹ The word was used by Robert F. Smith. R. F. Smith, 'American Foreign Relations 1920–1942,' cited in C. DeBenedetti, *Origins of the Modern American Peace Movement*, p.xi.

⁹² C. DeBenedetti, *Origins of the Modern American Peace Movement*, Chapter Four and p.235.

Judge Parker [Democratic Presidential candidate in 1904] and I belong to different parties but we are in the same *bloc* There are a lot of Republicans and Democrats in this room. Why? How many of you are Republican except because you were born and brought up Republican; and how many of you are Democrat except because you were born and brought up Democrats?⁹³

Root was against Wilson's League,⁹⁴ but there were pro-League Republicans. Thomas Lamont (1870–1948), Republican and a partner of the Morgan Bank, was one of them. He went to the Paris Peace Conference as an adviser on financial issues, and developed a faith in Wilson's vision. Lamont donated large amounts of money into organizations supporting American entry into the League. Lamont called himself 'a poor Republican ... who has faith in our present Democratic administration'.⁹⁵

This mixture of Democrats and Republicans, conservatives and progressives in internationalist movements in the 1920s became a characteristic of American members of the IPR at its foundation. They were largely pro-League, and argued for American entry to the League with certain reservations.⁹⁶ These pro-League internationalists were in a

⁹³ E. Root, 'Speech in the Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defence of the National Civic Federation, Washington, 17 January, 1923,' in Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott eds., *Men and Policies: Addresses by Elihu Root* (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1924), pp.486 and 488.

⁹⁴ Root expressed Republican official views of the opposition to Wilson's idea of the League of Nations. Firstly, the objection to the old power politics of the League system. He argued Article X of the proposed Covenant suggested the element of the old power politics. Second, the objection to the possible interference of the League in American policy. Root argued that the 'Old Politics of the Old World' of Europe was evil and that a super-government such as the Wilson's League would destroy the independence of the USA. Third, the objection to the fact that Wilson's League entirely ignored the whole system of international law. E. Root, 'Speech at a meeting under the direction of the national Republican Club, in the presidential election of 1920, New York, 19 October, 1920,' in Bacon and Scott eds., *Men and Policies*, pp.278–279.

⁹⁵ Ron Chernow argues that Lamont exposed enough liberal views on international organizations and civil liberties to make himself uniquely palatable to the Democratic intelligentsia. Ron Chernow, *The House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of Modern Finance* (New York: Touchstone, 1990), pp.206–207.

⁹⁶ The general view of the League among American members is described in Chapter Four. Notable League supporters at the IPR included a Democrat, Newton Baker, and a Republican, Ray Wilbur.

minority, because a majority argued for American independent leadership without involvement in European politics.

If political or ideological affiliation was not a good guide to these internationalists' commitment to the movements, then what were the reasons? Did they have something in common? And how were these commonalities, if any, shaped in the historical context?

While social scientists tend to analyse incidents or phenomena in terms of interest (political, economic and social), the sense of mission or service as a motivation for human action can often be neglected. This intangible element becomes important in abstract issues such as international relations. Those who were involved with internationalist movements needed not only curiosity and imagination, but also a sense of *public* spirit and service to the community. A sense of '*service*' first originated in national contexts, which modern internationalists extended to the international context.

Like those of the idealist school, Wilson expressed a sense of service to the community in his role as a reformer of domestic situation, and this was based on the observation that society was going through drastic changes.⁹⁷ The old society protected a privileged few, and the government promoted these interests,⁹⁸ but 'a new nation seems to have been created which the old formulas do not fit or afford a vital interpretation of'.⁹⁹ What was needed for a new nation was a new role for the state.¹⁰⁰ Wilson's key word in coping with the changes was progress,¹⁰¹ but in reality this progress aimed to preserve the essential feature of the existing system.¹⁰² Remaining sceptical about the centralization of too much power in the hands of the government, Wilson saw the state as an organic entity,

⁹⁷ Woodrow Wilson, *The New Freedom*, (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1916), p.27.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.16-17, 49 and 57.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.8.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p.23.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p.37.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p.38.

which would protect minorities and satisfy the majority by administrative means:¹⁰³

[I]n these great beehives where in every corridor swarm men of flesh and blood, it is ... the *privilege* of the Government, whether of the state or of the United States, as the case may be, to see that human life is properly *cared for*, and that human lungs have something to breathe.¹⁰⁴ (emphasis added)

Apart from this sense of public service for the community, internationalists in the USA shared a strong faith in American idealism. Wilson stated in 1912: '[E]ver since we were born as a nation we have undertaken to be the champions of humanity and the rights of men'.¹⁰⁵ This faith was his principal motivation for reform.

If I see somebody suffering, suffering cruelly, suffering unjustly, and believe that by the aid of force on my part I can stop the suffering, it is not a law, but an exalted passion which leads me to wish to go in and help. And there are men in this country ... who believe that we ought to intervene to stop the intolerable suffering.¹⁰⁶

This faith, coming from a sense of social justice, led him to pursue an American world mission to save the less fortunate, just as he did in domestic politics. America was unique and the ideal country to lead the world, and the world would need America: 'America is now going to be called out into an international position such as she never has occupied before'.¹⁰⁷ Although Roosevelt criticized Wilson in 1918 as 'an unpatriotic and undesirable citizen' because of his emphasis on American responsibility to the world,¹⁰⁸ Wilson's sense of responsibility came from his strong belief in the American system. While Roosevelt emphasized the power of a great nation, Wilson demonstrated the importance of its duty to serve the world, and he did so even beyond the sphere

¹⁰³ Thorsen argues that Wilson was the first American President to view the state in these terms. Niels Aage Thorsen, *The Political Thought of Woodrow Wilson, 1875-1910* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp.220 and 230.

¹⁰⁴ W. Wilson, *New Freedom*, p.23.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p.261.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.272-273.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p.278.

¹⁰⁸ *New York Times*, 7 September, 1918, cited in T. J. Knott, *To End All the Wars*, p.169.

defined by the Monroe Doctrine.

Another Republican, Elihu Root, shared a sense of America's duty to the world based on the concept of self-respect rather than social justice. Although he opposed Wilson's League of Nations, he promoted the idea of duty as a member of the 'international community'. In 1922, he wrote in the first issue of *Foreign Affairs*: 'Whether the country enters into that contract [of the League of Nations] or not, its membership of the community of nations continues with all the rights and obligations incident to that membership'. The key issue for him was self-respect: 'A self-respecting democracy ... wishes to respond fairly and fully not only to the demands of its own interests but to the moral obligations of a member of the community'.¹⁰⁹ His sense of obligation came from a different ideological position to Wilson's, but they both promoted the idea of American responsibility to the world.

These internationalists argued for American involvement with the world based on their strong belief in American ideals. The argument contributed, therefore, to reconstruction of *national* values and ideals. Herbert Croly, influential editor for the *New Republic* in 1914-1930, noted that the old days of the frontiersman and rugged individualism were over and the distinctive fact of modern times was socialization and collectivization.¹¹⁰ In the 1920s, American society went through a period of redefinition of collective national culture and values, which was essentially concerned with the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant population.¹¹¹ DeBenedetti argues that internationalists from various ideological camps conformed to this dominant climate, rather than challenging it.¹¹² As a result, American internationalist leaders, from the very beginning, did not have the logic to transcend the nation-state, but operated firmly within the framework of nation-state. The way they crossed national

¹⁰⁹ E. Root, 'A Request for the Success of Popular Democracy,' *Foreign Affairs*, No.1 (15 September, 1922), reprinted in R. Bacon and J. B. Scott eds, *Men and Policies*, p.483.

¹¹⁰ Alan Pendleton Grimes, *American Political Thought* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), p.387.

¹¹¹ Nativist movement was strong, and the membership of anti-black, anti-Catholic, and anti-Semitic Ku Klux Klan (the second KKK from 1915 to 1944) reached over three million in the inter-war period. M. H. Haller, *Eugenics*, pp.157-159.

¹¹² C. DeBenedetti, *Origins of the Modern American Peace Movement*, pp.75 and 112-113.

boundaries was not by finding unifying shared elements with others, but by extending their 'national' ideals beyond national boundaries. Some had vested interests, and many had a sense of duty and service towards the imagined international community.

iv) The Institute of Politics and Wilsonians in Britain and the USA

While visions for the international community in the USA originated from an ideal of a national democratic system, British visions were based on an ideal vision of the empire. In the 1920s, the term "British Empire" was being replaced by the term "British Commonwealth". The change reflected a new environment, with white colonies being given more independence (They were called Dominions). Debates centred on the issue of a new way of strengthening imperial ties in this context, and the centre of this discussion was the Round Table.¹¹³

Members of the Round Table also had acute awareness of the change in the nature of the society. John Kendle points out the great impact of the idealist school, especially T. H. Green, on key members of the Round Table, such as Lionel Curtis, Philipp Kerr and Alfred Zimmern. Curtis and Kerr were influenced by Green's 'view of the state as a positive and moral good, and social improvement and reform as a moral duty'.¹¹⁴ This reformist orientation brought Curtis and Kerr close to the Lloyd George faction of the Liberal Party.¹¹⁵ Some members of the Round Table were also involved with social movements such as the Workers Educational Association movement.¹¹⁶ Quigley argues that the main motivation of the Round Table for social reforms was to preserve English elitist traditions rather than to put in place measures to assist the less fortunate.

¹¹³ It was founded in London in 1909, and major members also formed the RIIA in 1920. See the previous section about the Round Table.

¹¹⁴ J. Kendle, *The Round Table Movement*, pp.18 and 172.

¹¹⁵ H. R. Winkler, *The League of Nations Movement*, p.156. Kerr was Private Secretary to Lloyd George at the time of the Paris Peace Conference.

¹¹⁶ J. Kendle, *The Round Table Movement*, p.182. Carroll Quigley, *Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p.132. The WEA first started at Oxford, and soon spread around the country and to the dominions. On its movement in Australia, see Helen Burke, 'Social Scientists as Intellectuals,' in Brian Head and James Walter eds., *Intellectual Movement and Australian Society* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.51-56.

Founders of the Round Table felt that these traditions were in danger, and that the only way was to extend them to the working classes and the colonies, before they were destroyed by these new forces.¹¹⁷

Members of the Round Table discussed new ways of strengthening imperial ties. While favouring more independence for the Dominions, they remained ambivalent towards non-white colonies. Kendle argues:

They had no use for the Tory-jingoism and expansionist fever of the late nineteenth century. They simply held the Anglo-dominion relationship up for examination and found it sadly wanting. They also helped demolish the prejudice against granting self-government to India They were concerned about the relations of East and West, and argued that the superior position of the European in the world involved not a privilege but a "special obligation to serve".¹¹⁸

Here, the parallel between American internationalism and British 'internationalism' is clear. It was the moral duty of the powerful to serve the world, and naked imperialistic exploitation was no longer possible.

How then did these British internationalists respond to Wilsonian internationalism? They were not unanimous in their attitudes to the League of Nations nor to American Wilsonians. The league which Round Table members envisaged differed from Wilson's League.¹¹⁹ After the League came into being, some became favourable to the League of Nations. Curtis argued for Anglo-American solidarity which he maintained would complement the League. He and Philipp Kerr worked closely with Lloyd George at the Paris Peace Conference in the making of the League, and Zimmern was involved with the League after it was established. Enthusiasm for the League amongst these members created scepticism amongst the others who were more concerned with imperial issues, and who thought that support for the League was anti-imperial.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ Quigley points out that this original inspiration came from John Ruskin, the first Professor of Fine Arts at Oxford from 1870. Ruskin lectured the core members of the Round Table when they were undergraduates. C. Quigley, *Tragedy and Hope*, p.136.

¹¹⁸ J. Kendle, *The Round Table Movement*, p.302.

¹¹⁹ Their league had more limited functions than Wilson's League. H. R. Winkler, *The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, 1914-1919*, pp.156-157.

¹²⁰ J. Kendle, *The Round Table Movement*, p.290.

Even to those sceptical about the emphasis on the League over the Commonwealth, the idea of Anglo-American cooperation was appealing. The idea was often expressed as the solidarity of English speaking people, and had been promoted by the Rhodes Scholarship.¹²¹ The newly established RIIA in London and the CFR in New York were to become channels of Anglo-American cooperation. Considering the circumstances of its foundation, the RIIA must have attracted the more Wilsonian, and more American-oriented, members of the Round Table.

The CFR included many Wilsonians, and they were predominantly Europe-oriented.¹²² Its members started a joint project with the RIIA,¹²³ a project which the IPR was to look to as its model in the mid 1920s. This was the Institute of Politics. The Institute was started as a summer school in Williams College at Williamstown, Massachusetts in 1921 by Harry A. Garfield (1863–1942), President of the college and son of a former President of the USA.¹²⁴ Probably due to his connection with officials,¹²⁵ and with European diplomatic circles through the RIIA, well-known diplomats and

¹²¹ Cecil Rhodes, a mining millionaire in South Africa, set up the Rhodes Foundation to promote the solidarity of Anglo-Saxons. The foundation was the main source of the Round Table activities. The Rhodes Scholarship was also set up by this foundation and it was given to male students in the Empire, Germany and the USA to study at Oxford.

¹²² R. Schulzinger, *The Wise Men*, pp.22–23.

¹²³ The close tie between this Institute and the RIIA was evident in the attendants and the method of discussion. Curtis and Kerr were the main speakers at the first meeting of 1921. Witney Shepardson took a key role in the organization. Curtis to Shepardson, 25 February, 1925, Shepardson to Curtis, 21 July, 1925, and Shepardson to Professor Corelius, 29 July, 1925, MS Eng Hist 872, BL.

¹²⁴ James Garfield was the twentieth President who served only a few months before he was assassinated in July 1881. The tie between Harry Garfield and the Round Table may have developed while Harry Garfield read law at All Souls College at Oxford in the late 1880s. In 1887–1888, Garfield was at All Souls at Oxford and at the Inns of Court in London. Garfield became more interested in the ideas of Curtis, and discussed the first joint meeting of foreign affairs experts from the English speaking world, based on the RIIA and the CFR. Garfield went to Oxford in 1924 to discuss these matters with Curtis. Shepardson's wife, Eleanor, a niece and secretary of Curtis, helped to organize this gathering. Debora Lavin, 'Lionel Curtis and the Idea of Commonwealth,' in F. Madden and D. K. Fieldhouse eds., *Oxford and the Idea of Commonwealth* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p.113. Curtis to Shepardson, 30 March, 1923, MS Eng Hist 872, BL.

¹²⁵ In addition to having a father who was a politician, his younger brother James Garfield (1865–1950) was also active in politics. He was the Secretary of Interior under T. Roosevelt. Although he withdrew from political life in the 1920s, he must have had good connections with officials especially in the Republican Party.

politicians mainly from the USA and Europe gathered to discuss international politics, chiefly League matters, in this small town on the border of Massachusetts, Vermont and New York.¹²⁶ The event received extensive publicity in newspapers.¹²⁷

Although the Institute of Politics only lasted for a decade, it was highly regarded among many other foreign affairs institutions, including the IPR. While it was more Europe-oriented and official-oriented, the Institute was important for the IPR because of its format and its policy. It was an organization based, not on 'national' foreign affairs experts like the CFR and the RIIA, but on periodic international conferences. Its policy was 'to educate the leaders of public opinion in the new world situation'.¹²⁸ It targeted 'experts' which it defined as university teachers, officials at the Military and State Department, business people in international banking and finance, and newspaper editors and other public figures.¹²⁹ Although official representation was strong, it was inspired by the achievement of the "Inquiry" at the Paris Peace Conference, a group of non-official experts.¹³⁰ Later this idea of non-official 'foreign affairs experts' became central to the IPR.¹³¹

Does the background of the Institute of Politics suggest that Wilsonians in the USA and Britain achieved certain influence in official circles, and promoted the strong Anglo-American alliance and the identical goals for the international community?¹³² And does this mean that their kind of internationalism played a significant role in other internationalist

¹²⁶ Except for those from the USA, there were very few from non European countries (Japan, China, Turkey, Brazil and Russia). The Institute of Politics, *Its First Decade* (Williamstown, Mass: The Institute of Politics, 1931), pp.47-48.

¹²⁷ These newspaper cuttings of 1921-1931 were housed at the Library of Williams College, Papers of Institute of Politics, Series III, Vol.1-31, Library of Williams College. Numerous newspaper articles on the Institute appeared in 1921-1931. On 31 July, 1921, for example, *Boston Sunday Herald* had a very big article titled 'Viscount Bryce Gets Warm Welcome at Williamstown'. Series III, Vol.3, Library of Williams College.

¹²⁸ The Institute of Politics, *Its First Decade*, p.7.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.7.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.7-8.

¹³¹ Minutes of the meeting at the Yale Club in New York, 22 February, 1925, A 981; Org 93, AA.

¹³² C. Quigley, *The Anglo-American Establishment: From Rhodes to Cliveden* (New York: Books in Focus, 1981), pp.227-310.

organizations, such as the IPR, which modelled the Institute? As a result of their background or education, some American internationalists, especially those at the CFR, were Anglophile. Kendle and Shulzinger, in respective studies of the Round Table and the CFR, however, question the Anglo-American solidarity and its influence in official and public thinking.¹³³ Depending on the issues and timing, their solidarity and influence was not consistent. Whitney Shepardson, former Rhodes scholar and member of the CFR, for example, was deeply influenced by Curtis' work on the Commonwealth, but he had strong identity with and loyalty to 'American' values, as distinct from 'British' ones:

I always had the feeling about Curtis that he believes in his heart that the US is a temporary lost section of the British Commonwealth which some day ... will come back within the fold. I do not think he realises to any important degree that we have grown and developed along lines of our own and that we have had in this country a civilization essentially different from the British.

The key to the internationalism was, therefore, the definition of *national* values.

In the inter-war period of *national* mobilization and *national* culture building, the conflicting interests within a nation-state in international politics were often ignored by Wilsonians. The monolithic and coherent nation-state was assumed, and colonies and mandates were excluded as actors of international politics. The issue among internationalists was how to combine *national* interests with the interests of the 'international community', but the latter was also a political construct. While the imperialists could put national concerns first without reservation, the internationalists not only needed to consider their own interests, but they

¹³³ J. Kendle, *The Round Table Movement*, pp.304-305. Kerr, one of the strong promoters of Anglo-American cooperation, felt in 1940 that his attempt at Anglo-American cooperation had been futile. *Ibid.*, p.238. R. Shulzinger, *The Wise Men*, pp.247, 249 and 253. Shoup and Minter argue that there was much greater influence of the CFR on the American foreign policy. Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), p.5.

¹³⁴ Shepardson to Brandeis, 26 September, 1925, MS Eng. Hist 872, BL.

also had moral obligations to serve the international community. It was here that the real dilemma of the internationalists began.

3) Opportunity: The Pacific Age

The IPR attracted slightly different internationalist groups from the CFR, although there was an overlap of membership. Both groups were enthusiastic about Wilsonian ideas and the cause of the League of Nations. But the IPR attracted those who were interested in the Pacific and more precisely the Orient, while the CFR was more focused on Europe. Dealing much more closely with the emerging new powers in the Orient, Japan and China than European counterparts, some American internationalists strongly felt the need to change the manner of dealing with these Oriental powers, especially Japan. This was a challenge (although a limited one) to the assumed perception of 'West' and 'East'. The new perspective was based on the clear recognition by these internationalists of the power shift from Europe to the Pacific, which they termed the Pacific Age.

This section examines the third important element in the formation of the IPR: the perception of a power shift towards the Pacific in international politics. Two major factors were at work here: the rise of the USA as a world power, and the recognition of a non Euro-American power, Japan. This power shift was symbolized by the term "Pacific Age". The *Pacific* of this term was largely an American invention, not a European or a Japanese one. Reflecting the American slogan of anti-imperialism, the "Pacific Age" also indicated the possibility of new attitudes towards the Orient among Americans.

i) The Pacific Age and Pan-Americanism

World leadership was a complicated issue for the USA due to its traditional *isolationist* policy with regard to Europe. This complication did not, however, exist in foreign policy on the American continent and in the Pacific. There, Americans asserted and initiated leadership. After WWI, with the sense of a decline of the European Powers, American leadership in the Pacific became strongly pronounced. The Washington Treaty of 1922 represented this initiative in regional matters, and scholars

argued that it promoted the new international order set by the League of Nations, rather than challenging it.¹³⁵

The term for the region reflects the political and economic contexts of the time. The Pacific of the inter-war period is now called the Asia-Pacific region, reflecting the political reality of the independence of colonies in Asia and the economic reality of industrial and commercial growth in the countries of Asia. The term "Asia-Pacific" is also inclusive of non-Asian elements in the region, and therefore serves a region that includes Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA.¹³⁶ In the 1920s, the region was called the Pacific with more emphasis on the rim countries than the islands *within* it. This contrasted with other concepts, such as French 'Pacific', which focused more on the Pacific islands.

While Arif Dirlik argues that the Pacific is a Euro-American invention,¹³⁷ the 'Pacific' in the IPR context in the inter-war period was clearly an American invention. John Tilley, the British Ambassador to Tokyo, reported American enthusiasm for the Pacific in October 1928 with puzzlement and alarm.

¹³⁵ Akira Iriye, *After Imperialism: The Search for A New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp.13–22. Iriye argues that this Washington system collapsed in 1925–1926, leading to the revival of the old order. A. Iriye, *Ibid.*, pp.87–88. Hosoya argues that the 'old order' did not work in East Asia in the 1920s, and that the USA tried to accommodate China as a Pacific power, equal to the USA, Britain and Japan: a plan which Japan opposed because of its claim of 'special interests'. Hosoya C., 'Washington taisei no tokushitsu to henyō,' in Hosoya C. and Saitō M. eds., *Washington taisei to nichibei kankei* (Tokyo Daigaku shuppankai, 1978), p.34. Iriye and Dingman deny the 'unrealistic' or 'utopian' elements of the Treaty. Iriye A., *Ibid.*, p.301. R. Dingman, *Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 1914–1922* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp.215–216. And these works suggest the ambiguous nature of the new order in terms of 'new diplomacy' and 'anti-imperialism'.

¹³⁶ For the meaning of the term, the Asia-Pacific region and the role of the USA, see Tomoko Akami, 'Ōsutoraria no taiheiyō ishiki to the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1920–1930,' *Ōsutoraria kenkyū*, Vol. 5 (December, 1994), p.58. For an account of the current movement of regional institutionalization, see Richard Higgott, Andrew Cooper, and Jenelle Bonner, *Cooperation-Building in the Asia-Pacific Region: APEC and the New Institutionalism* (Pacific Economic Papers, No. 199) (Canberra: Australia-Japan Research Centre, 1991).

¹³⁷ A. Dirlik, 'The Asia-Pacific Idea: Reality and Representation in the Invention of a Regional Structure,' *Journal of World History*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring, 1992), pp.64–66.

at San Francisco I found, to my surprise, that the subject in the air was pan-Pacific relations, and particularly the international [IPR] conference which is to be held at Kyoto in 1929 There were three American speeches ... pointing out that the Pacific was now the crucial region, so to speak, of the world I heard talk of a Pacific civilization and philosophy, which was something superior to its European counterpart. I believed this was a myth.¹³⁸

Among these Americans, the power shift to the Pacific was clear. It reflected popular disillusionment with the old European powers which had caused the World War, and also an American confidence expressed in Wilsonian anti-imperialist slogans. A similar feeling was shared in Japan. Oswald Spengler's *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* was translated into Japanese and became a best-seller in the mid 1920s. The decline of Europe meant the rise of new powers and new frameworks. In 1928 Saitō Sōichi, a secretary of the Japanese YMCA and a council member of the Japanese Council of the IPR (JCIPR), thought the IPR symbolized "The Arrival of the Pacific Age":

Once there was an age when the world centred around the Mediterranean, and then came an age of the Atlantic But from now on, the world will be centred around the Pacific.¹³⁹

This centrality of the Pacific was influenced by American thinking, as Saitō quoted the words of Theodore Roosevelt.¹⁴⁰ Saitō was, however, aware that the major players in this Pacific Age were not only the USA but also Japan.¹⁴¹ Japan and China were seen as Pacific powers along with the USA and the USSR at the IPR conferences in the 1920s and 1930s. Dirlik argues that Japan did not challenge the dominance of the Euro-American Pacific, nor did it come up with an alternative vision.¹⁴² Japan did, however, eventually pursue an alternative vision for the region: Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere which led it to the Pacific War.

¹³⁸ Tilley to Lord Cushendun, October 18, 1928 A 981; Org 93, AA.

¹³⁹ Saitō Sōichi, 'Taihei'yō jidai no tōrai to sono shomondai,' *Bōeki*, Vol. 28, No.7 (July, 1928), p.18.

¹⁴⁰ Although Saitō believed that he quoted the above phrase from Roosevelt, there is no evidence to support the fact.

¹⁴¹ Saitō S., 'Taihei'yō jidai,' p.19.

¹⁴² A. Dirlik, 'The Asia-Pacific Idea,' p.73.

The Pacific Age, therefore, contained at least two main aspirations; Pan-Americanism and Japanese Pan-Asianism. They represented various forms of regionalism—visions and movements for a regional community. Both aspired to establish a new order in the Pacific, not only strategically or economically, but also morally. In this sense, regionalism differs from internationalism only in the limitation of its scope. The Pan-Asianism of Japan was equated with Pan-Americanism by Wilson and other American participants at the Paris Peace Conference.¹⁴³ In the 1920s, however, Pan-Americanism predominated over Pan-Asianism. Those who gathered at the IPR believed that there should be a new order in the Pacific and the USA should lead it.

The USA asserted its leadership on the American continent and in the Pacific by way of the Monroe Doctrine, but Roosevelt (President in 1901–1909) transformed the Doctrine from a warning to the Europeans into an American commitment to intervene whenever the United States saw 'chronic wrongdoing' amongst its neighbours.¹⁴⁴ This re-interpreted Monroe Doctrine, Pan-Americanism, was first practiced on the American continent. The Pan-American Union was established officially to promote regional cooperation with Central and Latin American countries.¹⁴⁵

American strategic and economic commitment to the Pacific strengthened in the same period. John Hay, Roosevelt's Secretary of State, maintained: 'We believe our interests in the Pacific Ocean are as great as those of any power'.¹⁴⁶ Although a late-comer, the USA became a Pacific power. It had

¹⁴³ They thought: 'it would be impossible to put in the Covenant [of the League of Nations] a reservation of the Monroe Doctrine without a similar reservation of an Asiatic doctrine of the Japanese'. Diary of David Hunter Miller, 18 March, 1919, *PWW*, Vol. 56, p.80.

¹⁴⁴ R. Schulzinger, *American Diplomacy*, p.31.

¹⁴⁵ The Pan-American Union originated from the First International Conference of American States, held in Washington D. C., in October 1889, which led to the establishment of the "International Union of the American Republics" in April, 1890. The headquarters of this "International Union" was called the "Commercial Bureau of the American Republics". It had a conference every five years. At the fourth conference at Buenos Aires in 1910, the name "Pan-American Union" was adopted. In the same year, with funds from Andrew Carnegie and member governments, a building for the Union was erected in Washington D. C. on land donated by the USA government. E. E. Robinson and P. C. Edwards eds., *The Memoirs of Ray Lyman Wilbur, 1875–1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), p.353.

¹⁴⁶ Cited in R. Schulzinger, *American Diplomacy*, p.20.

gained the Philippines, Guam and Samoa as well as Puerto Rico in 1899 as a result of the Spanish-American War, and had annexed Hawaii in 1900. It also urged the opening of markets and demanded favourable trade treatment from Japan and China from the mid nineteenth century. After WWI, the Wilsonian rhetoric of anti-imperialism gave the USA a strong position from which to criticize the existence of European powers and legitimize American advancement in the Pacific. In some American minds, the Pacific was an extended frontier where the USA should pursue its manifest destiny.

At the non-governmental level, Pan-Americanism inspired many Americans. Some argued for its extension into the Pacific, and they often had strong commercial interests. Alexander Hume Ford was one of them. Born in Charleston, South Carolina in 1868, Ford developed his career in journalism in the 1890s in Chicago. Among his colleagues was William E. Curtiss, a vocal advocate of internationalism and later the first Director of the Bureau of American Republics, the predecessor of the Pan-American Union. Ford came to Hawaii in 1907, and began the promotion of the place as a model of racial and cultural harmony. He acknowledged later that many of his ideas had grown out of his association with Curtiss and his idea of Pan-Americanism.¹⁴⁷ Ford started a monthly bulletin, the *Mid-Pacific Magazine* in 1910, and founded the Pan-Pacific Union (a direct copy of the Pan-American Union) in 1917.¹⁴⁸

Ford organized many "Pan-Pacific Conferences"¹⁴⁹ which were attended by influential members of the Pacific rim countries of the USA, Japan,

¹⁴⁷ A. H. Ford, *Genesis: Part 1*, p.269, cited in Paul F. Hooper, *Elusive Destiny: The Internationalist Movement in Modern Hawaii* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1980), p.76.

¹⁴⁸ Anonymous, 'The Pan-Pacific Union is doing for the Pacific what the Pan-American Union has done for Latin America,' *The Pan-Pacific Union Bulletin* [1923], p.11. P. F. Hooper, 'Alexander Ford: Shaping Hawaii's Image,' *Honolulu: Holiday Annual*, (November 1979), p.172.

¹⁴⁹ One conference grown out of this movement was the Pan-Pacific Science Congress in 1920. See Philip F. Rehbock, 'Organizing Pacific Science: Local and International Origins of the Pacific Science Association,' in R. MacLeod and P. F. Rehbock eds., *Nature in Its Greatest Extent: Western Science in the Pacific* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), pp.195-221. Other conferences organized by the Pan-Pacific Union were the Pan-Pacific Educational, Press and Commercial Conference (1921), the Pan-Pacific Surgical Conference (PPSC) (1928) and the Pan-Pacific Food Conservation Conference

Australia, Canada, China, New Zealand and the Philippines. He emphasized the unofficial character of the conferences, although he sought recognition from the various governments. The essence of his Pan-Pacific movement could be reduced to local commercial interests and self-promotion. Honolulu was promoted as an ideal spot for tourism, and these conferences were the best form of advertisement. Local plantation factories needed to attract cheap coloured labour, and Ford's promotion matched these local business interests. Furthermore, he loved associating with the influential and he was good at making contacts. The reality of the islands, however, was rather different from the image that Ford presented, and social and economic division was based on race.¹⁵⁰

Despite their flaws, his Pan-Pacific conferences aroused interests and enthusiasm for peace and cooperation among the participant countries. Pan-Pacific Clubs were created in these countries, and Japan took a particularly active role. In Tokyo, the Club was formed on Ford's second visit in 1924.¹⁵¹ Diplomats, businessmen, politicians, and academics—the leading men of all Pan-Pacific races—were invited to listen to speeches related to the Pacific. Many who later became members of the Japanese Council of the IPR were associated with the Club. An Osaka branch was also formed, with a stronger business emphasis. Those who gathered were patrician and male, and had business interests in the Pacific. The club set up information offices, arranged events, raised finance for activities and prepared for Pan-Pacific conferences.¹⁵² Pan-Pacific enthusiasm was taken by other organizations such as Chambers of Commerce, Rotary Clubs, the Red Cross, Chambers of Industry and Trade

(1924). For the PPSC, see A981; Conf 256 and Conf 262, AA. Also for the Food Conference, see MSS 1638/19, ML.

¹⁵⁰ P. F. Hooper, *Elusive Destiny*, pp.179–181.

¹⁵¹ His first visit was in 1922. Ko Sakatani shishaku kinen jigyōkai ed., *Sakatani Yoshirō den* (Ko Sakatani shishaku kinen jigyōkai, 1951), pp. 601–602. Ford established the custom of weekly Friday lunches at the Imperial Hotel at a cost of 1.25 yen (US\$ 0.60). Anonymous, 'The Pan-Pacific Club in Tokyo,' *The Mid-Pacific Magazine*, (May, 1924), pp.19 and 21.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, pp.17–29. Shibusawa Eiichi, a businessman and leading internationalist and philanthropist, contributed to the establishment of the Pan-Pacific Club and to its activities. Kawai Yahachi to Shibusawa, 16 July, 1924, Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō kankōkai ed., *Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō (SEDS)*, (Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō kankōkai, 1961), Vol.37, p.452.

Unions. Branches of these organizations in Japan, China, Hawaii, Australia and other countries held their own Pan-Pacific conferences.¹⁵³

Besides promoting their own agendas and interests, the conferences enforced a sense of regional coherence. Interests and personal contacts through the conferences became the important intellectual and institutional base for the IPR. Honolulu was chosen as the site for the first two IPR conferences and also as the headquarters largely because of the achievement of these Pan-Pacific conferences.

ii) Image of the Orient and the Pacific Age

What was the impact of the Pacific Age on perceptions of the Orient among Americans? It furthered interests in and anxiety about the Orient. More importantly, it made some Americans feel the need for a change in attitudes towards the Orient, which were based on the dominant assumption of a hierarchy between 'West' and 'East'.

The Pacific inspired curiosity and provided new opportunities for commerce, missions, tourism, journalism and academia. These opportunities were welcomed with fascination by a small but influential group. Interest in the Orient already existed before the 1920s. The USA had a particularly significant business and missionary presence in China. Many Americans visited China as missionaries, or through various schemes of Christian organizations such as the YMCA or universities.¹⁵⁴ To a lesser extent, American missionaries also went to Japan.¹⁵⁵ Personal

¹⁵³ Pan-Pacific Rotary Conference was held in Tokyo in 1928. See E. R. Peacock, *Second Pacific Rotary Conference* ([Melbourne]: publisher unknown, [1929]).

¹⁵⁴ Yale University took the lead amongst college missionary groups. It started a project in 1901, popularly called "Yale-in-China", which sent enthusiastic students to China for missionary work. By 1909, Yale was leading all other collegiate mission groups with its annual gift of some \$10,000 for missionary purposes. E. T. Bachmann, 'Keneth Scott Latourette: Historian and Friend,' in Wilbur C. Harr ed., *Frontiers of the Christian World Mission since 1938: Essays in honour of K. S. Latourette* (New York: Harper and Brother, 1962), p.237. The movement was inspired by the Student Volunteer Movement, and a medical branch started December 1917. Reuben Holden, *Yale in China: The Mainland 1901-1951* (New Haven: The Yale in China Association, 1964), pp.5 and 72.

¹⁵⁵ In 1920s, American missionaries in Japan accounted for only 1,600. Asada S., *Ryō taisenkan*, p.346.

contacts through missions or business provoked interest in the Orient among Americans. Friendship associations were established in major cities.¹⁵⁶ China and Japan became popular destinations for wealthy tourists. Especially in the 1920s, the flow of American tourists to Japan expanded,¹⁵⁷ and shipping companies increased the frequency of the services.

Academics turned their eyes to the region as a new field for scholarship. American anthropologists were increasingly interested in the Pacific, especially in the islands rather than the Oriental countries. As a result of this interest, the Bishop Museum in Honolulu became a centre of anthropological research in the Pacific, mainly led by staff from Yale University.¹⁵⁸ Studies on the Orient at American universities started in California from the end of the nineteenth century.¹⁵⁹ In the 1920s and 1930s, the importance of these studies was advocated, particularly by American IPR members,¹⁶⁰ although they lagged behind Europe in the mid-1930s.¹⁶¹

From all these activities, popular and academic first hand observations of the countries in the Pacific started to appear. Magazines such as *Harpers*

¹⁵⁶ The Japan Society was established in New York in 1907.

¹⁵⁷ In the 1910s, American tourists accounted for 2,000 to 5,000 annually. In 1929 it recorded 8,500, and in 1920s, total 55,368 visitors were recorded. Asada S., *Ryō taisenkan*, p.333.

¹⁵⁸ Herbert Gregory of Yale University, a geologist, became Director of the Bernice P. Bishop Museum in 1919. He was Chairman of the National Research Committee on the Pacific expedition. He became one of the major advocates of scientific cooperative research in the Pacific. He administered anthropological investigations in the Pacific. He was also a founder of the Pacific Science Association. P. Rehbock, 'Organizing Pacific Science,' p.206, and A. P. Elkin, *Pacific Science Association: Its History and Role in International Cooperation* (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1961), pp.9 and 19.

¹⁵⁹ Chinese studies were stronger than Japanese studies. H. Borton, Satō M. trans., 'Nihon kenkyū no kaitakushatachi,' in Hosoya C. and Saitō M. eds., *Washington taisei to nichibei kankei*, (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1978), pp.545 and 553-554. Lectures on Japanese studies and Japanese history started at the Yale University in 1906, at Stanford University in 1907, and at the University of California in 1911.

¹⁶⁰ Especially Jerome Greene and Edward Carter took a leading role. *Ibid.*, pp.552-553, 555-556, 560-565, 568 and 572.

¹⁶¹ There was, for example, no doctoral course in Japanese studies at American universities in the mid-1930s, and students had to go to Europe. *Ibid.*, p.563. In the late 1930s, Columbia, Harvard, California, Michigan, Washington and Hawaii Universities developed strong postgraduate courses in Japanese studies, and Japanese studies were recognized as an important and legitimate research field. *Ibid.*, pp. 568-571 and 573.

or *Christian Science Monitor* featured articles about the Orient written by correspondents in East Asia.¹⁶² Missionaries contributed to knowledge about these countries,¹⁶³ and some of their works greatly influenced the way that images of the countries and people were constructed. The view that people of these countries were *backward* and had to be enlightened was at times expressed,¹⁶⁴ and this view contributed to the justification of American 'intervention' in these countries as a moral good.¹⁶⁵

With the development of communications and transport, the Orient was nearer to the USA than ever before and interaction was growing. Tilley was especially struck by:

the wide interest felt along the [US] Pacific coast in things Japanese. Many had Japanese friends who passed backwards and forwards from Japan There is nothing strange in this, given the relative nearness of the two countries, but it brought home to me the weight of influence which America is bound to exercise on Japan as compared with England, where ... practically no interest is felt in Japan except in some special circles.¹⁶⁶

In Europe, the image of Japan was reflected in Gilbert and Sullivan's operetta *The Mikado*,¹⁶⁷ or in the Japanese *Ukiyoe* paintings which

¹⁶² The *Christian Science Monitor* started from 1908 in Boston as a daily newspaper. It was based on the Christian Science Church, which believed in the goodness of the nature of the human being. The *Monitor* sought to perform public service in the local, the national and the world community, and it was particularly popular in Mid-West and the Pacific Coast. In the 1920s, it established its position as a quality paper. In 1910, it also started the international edition, which was read widely in the world. Edwin D. Canham, *Commitment to Freedom: The Story of the Christian Science Monitor* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), pp.xv, and xvii-viii.

¹⁶³ For writings on missionary experiences, see, for example, F. H. L. Paton, *The Kingdom in the Pacific* (London: United Council for Missionary Education, 1913). One of the most popular images of China was created by a daughter of a missionary family, Pearl Buck whose *The Good Earth* (1931) received the Pulitzer Prize for fiction. Daniel B. Ramsdell argues the strong impact of American novels, such as those of Pearl Buck, on popular American images of Asian countries. D. B. Ramsdell, 'Asia Askew: U. S. Best-Sellers on Asia, 1931-1980,' *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1983), p.8.

¹⁶⁴ See, for example, Katherine Mayo, *The Isles of Fear: The Truth about the Philippines* (London: Faber and Gwyer, 1925).

¹⁶⁵ Asada S., *Ryō taisenkan*, pp.14-15.

¹⁶⁶ Tilley to Lord Cushendun, 18 October, 1928 A 981; Org 93, AA.

¹⁶⁷ *The Mikado* was first performed at the Savoy Theatre in London on 14 March, 1885.

inspired French impressionists.¹⁶⁸ But personal contacts with Japanese were minimal. There were very few Japanese immigrants or business people except for diplomats and a handful of students sent by the Japanese government or by wealthy families.

In contrast to the situation in Europe or even on the East Coast of the USA, on the West Coast, the more visible Oriental presence and geographical proximity to the Orient brought not only fascination with the Orient, but also anxiety. As the title of a book by A. T. Mahan, *The Problem of Asia* (published in 1900), suggests, Asia became not only an opportunity, but also a challenge to the USA. The problems were threefold: questions of security, economics and race. Influenced by Mahan's thinking, some started to consider strategic preparation for 'national security' on the Pacific Coast and in the Pacific.¹⁶⁹

This anxiety was increasingly addressed to Japan. The Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 convinced some Americans of its strategic potential. In 1910, an article in the *Round Table* portrayed Japan not only as a strategic power, but also as an economic power.¹⁷⁰ Japan also became a threat to American interests in China. Since the USA took the initiative in the peace treaty between Russia and Japan in 1905, it kept a close eye on Japanese expansion within China. Various agreements to respect the rights of each country¹⁷¹ were negotiated, but underlying them was a profound distrust of Japan and greater degree of compassion for victimized China within the State Department.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁸ On this movement, *Japonisme*, see Jean-Pierre Lehmann, *The Image of Japan: From Feudal Isolation to World Power, 1850-1905* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), p.54.

¹⁶⁹ Asada argues the great influence of Mahan about the centrality of the Pacific in international politics on thinking of politicians not only in the USA, but also in Europe and Japan. Asada S., *Ryō taisenkan*, p.1-50.

¹⁷⁰ A Canadian author wrote: 'British Columbia is destined to become an industrial province of Japan', Anonymous, 'Canadian Affairs', *The Round Table*, Vol. 1 (November, 1910-August, 1911), p.494.

¹⁷¹ These were the agreements of Root-Takahira (1903) and Ishii-Lansing (1917).

¹⁷² Akira Iriye, *Beichūkankei no imeji* (Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyūsho, 1965), pp.42, 47 and 52.

Racial problems on the Pacific Coast placed further strains in relations between the USA and Japan, both at diplomatic and psychological levels. Racial discrimination issues in California after 1882 mainly concerned Japanese immigrants because those from other Asian countries were already excluded. Anxiety was caused not by the hundreds of Japanese studying at American Universities or by Japanese business visitors, but by the thirty thousand Japanese immigrants who lived mostly in California.¹⁷³ As Japanese entry into the labouring classes became more visible, boycotts of Japanese shops and violence against Japanese were often reported.¹⁷⁴

There were three main periods when discrimination against Japanese immigrants in California caused high tension in diplomatic relations between Japan and the USA: 1907, 1913 and 1924. Each time, a similar popular reaction, predicting the inevitability of a clash between 'East' and 'West', and therefore of a Japanese-American war, was recorded. On the American side, it demonstrated the way Americans reacted to a situation which did not fit the familiar scenario of a strong 'West' and weak 'Orient'.

This issue was manifested in 1907 by the segregation of Asian children in San Francisco schools. The governments of Japan and the USA concluded the so-called 'gentlemen's agreement' by which the former voluntarily restricted emigration to the USA. In this period, popular literature aggravated the feeling of racial conflict and constructed a confrontational identity of 'East' and 'West'. In the USA, negative sensational images of the Orient, such as the "Yellow Peril", were promoted by the mass media.¹⁷⁵ They publicized the image of teeming Asians invading Euro-

¹⁷³ Sydney Gulick, 'Nichibei mondai ni tsuite' (Statement presented at the Tokyo Bank Club on 5 June 1923, translated into Japanese for the publication), *Ryūnon Zasshi*, July 1923, reprinted in *SEDS*, Vol.34, p.26.

¹⁷⁴ Shibusawa Masahide, *Taiheiyō ni kakeru hashi: Shibusawa Eiichi no shōgai* (Yomiuri shimbunsha, 1970), p.229.

¹⁷⁵ Jack London, 'Yellow Peril,' in J. London, *Revolution and Other Essays* (London: Mills and Boon, 1910), pp.220-237. It was originally written in Manchuria in 1904. London wrote other novels of similar topic such as *Unparalleled Invasion*. These were published by the *Atlantic Monthly* or the sensational press owned by W. R. Hearst. Shibusawa M., *Taiheiyō ni*, p.231.

American lands. These books were translated into Japanese, which accelerated hostility to the USA among the public.¹⁷⁶ Japanese created the word *Hakuka* [white peril], and emphasized imperial exploitation by white 'races'. Books and articles discussed the racial clash between yellow and white.¹⁷⁷

The pattern was repeated in 1913 and 1924. In 1913, California passed a law banning the acquisition, ownership, or long-term lease of property by foreigners who did not have the right of naturalization. This meant a ban on Japanese ownership of farms. Following protests by the Japanese government, Wilson sent out the Secretary of State to persuade California to repeal the law, an action which failed. While security problems were partially resolved by the Washington Treaty, Congress passed a law banning all Asian immigration in 1923. This meant virtually the complete exclusion of all Japanese immigrants from the USA, and is therefore popularly called the *Hainichi Iminhō* (Anti-Japanese immigration law of 1924).¹⁷⁸ The society and the government of Japan protested strongly because they thought the Japanese would be discriminated against in the same manner as other Asians to whom Japanese felt superior. Popular gatherings and protest marches were organized in Tokyo.¹⁷⁹ Again literature which predicted a fatal clash between Japan (East) and the USA (West) stirred the public in both countries.¹⁸⁰

iii) American internationalists and the Orient

¹⁷⁶ The most famous and popular novel of this kind, which argued the necessity of war between Japan and the USA was written earlier. Homer Lea, *Valor of Ignorance* (New York: Harpers and Brothers, 1909). This was translated into Japanese in 1911 and sold forty thousand copies. Shibusawa M., *Taiheiyō ni*, p.239.

¹⁷⁷ Asada S., *Ryō taisenkan*, p.291.

¹⁷⁸ The law prohibited the immigration of those who did not have the right of naturalization and it denied citizenship to children whose parents had no right of naturalization. Congress passed the law in 1923 with a majority of 323 to 71. President Coolidge signed for its implementation in 1924. Henceforth I use the term "Anti-Japanese immigration law of 1924" unless specified.

¹⁷⁹ Shibusawa M., *Taiheiyō ni*, p.417.

¹⁸⁰ Asada S., *Ryō taisenkan*, pp.338-340.

The effect of this hysterical literature cannot be overestimated. Asada argues its significance in the thinking of naval strategists in both countries, and he suggests that the issue of racial discrimination was an indirect, yet crucial reason for the Pacific War.¹⁸¹ While Wilson showed more sympathy towards the American labouring classes and supported moves against Japanese landownership in 1913, some American internationalists played key roles in the movement against the anti-Japanese immigration law of 1924. The movement mostly consisted of middle class businessmen, lawyers and religious leaders. The labouring classes on the Pacific coast felt the threat of Japanese immigration more acutely than did business or professional classes,¹⁸² and consolidated as an anti-Japanese immigration force.

This movement against Japanese discrimination also took the form of joint action by non-official individuals and groups in the USA and Japan. The channels of this transnational alliance were: Japan Society (New York); Chambers of Commerce; and church organizations. There were two important factors in this alliance. First, the strong business backup of the movement reflected the prosperity of business between Japan and the USA in the 1920s.¹⁸³ Second, the movement generally mobilized Americans who already had contact with Japan, and were referred to in Japan as *shin nichika* (pro-Japanese people). In other words, these Americans joined the movement, not only on the ground of principle, but also because of their connections.

In 1920, Wallace Alexander, who was Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce in San Francisco and a famous *shin nichika*, organized the Japan and USA joint committee to discuss the issue of Japanese discrimination and to influence government policy.¹⁸⁴ Responding to this move, Shibusawa Eiichi (1840–1931), a very influential businessman and philanthropist who donated much money to internationalist

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp.275 and 312.

¹⁸² For an example of a dispute over Asian labour and immigration, see Avner Offer, *The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation* (Melbourne: Clarendon Press, 1989), Chapters 12, 13 and 14. I owe this information to Donald Denoon.

¹⁸³ Asada S., *Ryō taisenkan*, p.343.

¹⁸⁴ Shibusawa M., *Taiheiyō ni*, p.331.

activities, organized a Japanese counterpart "*Nichibei kankei iinkai*" (Japanese American Relations Committee: JARC). Its members were businessmen and academics, and the JARC held joint meetings in Japan and the USA. It actively dealt with the exclusion issue for almost four years. Its members, organizational skills, and networks became the core of the JCIPR when it was set up in 1926.¹⁸⁵

After the law passed in 1923, these Americans organized a movement in San Francisco and New York, not for the repeal of the law, but for a quota system for Japanese immigrants. Active members included leading internationalists, many of whom were Republicans. Members included Julius Rosenbald, a philanthropic Chicago businessman, Thomas Lamont, a partner of the J. P. Morgan Bank,¹⁸⁶ Elihu Root, a Republican senator, John Mott (1865–1955), a YMCA leader of the International Student Volunteer Movement, and Henry Taft, brother of W. H. Taft and Attorney General. George Wickersham (1858–1936), former Attorney General, Republican, an influential member of the CFR and strong League supporter, was also a member. Because of his central position, the movement in New York was called the "Wickersham Movement".

Another active American in this movement was Sydney Gulick at the Oriental Section of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, based in New York.¹⁸⁷ He was a long-time friend of Shibusawa Eiichi and had lived in Japan for twenty-five years as a missionary. After discussion with the JARC members in Japan in 1923, Gulick started a one-man campaign of public lectures to 'enlighten' Americans about Japanese exclusion.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.331 and 339. Yamaoka M., 'Taiheiyō mondai kenkyūkai ni okeru nichibei kankei iinkai no katsudō,' *Shakai kagaku tōkyū* No.105 (December, 1990), p.99.

¹⁸⁶ Ron Chernow, *The House of Morgan*, p.236.

¹⁸⁷ S. Gulick, an American missionary, was known as an introducer of Japan to the USA. His books on Japan include *The Growth of the Kingdom of God* (1895), *Evolution of the Japanese*, *The White Peril in the Far East: An Interpretation of the Russo-Japanese War* and *Towards Understanding Japan: Constructive Proposals for Removing the Menace of War* (1935).

The opposition to Japanese immigration was centred in California, at the California Joint Immigration Committee in San Francisco, which consisted of such state organizations as the American Legion, the State Federation of Labor, Grange (an agricultural union association) and Native Sons of the Golden West (a citizens' association representing the upper and upper middle classes). V. S. McClatchy, a proprietor of three newspapers in San Francisco, was Secretary of the Committee in 1924, and led a campaign for Japanese exclusion. His anti-Japanese sentiment was said to have originated in his travels in Korea in 1919 where he witnessed the oppression of Koreans by the Japanese police.¹⁸⁸ McClatchy criticized Americans in the movement against anti-Japanese exclusion as being *disloyal* to a nation. He argued that 'the long established policy of the nation has been the preservation of this country for the white race'.¹⁸⁹

Other than consolidating labour interests, the Joint Immigration Committee reflected the nativist tenor of American society in the 1920s.¹⁹⁰ Not only Asians, but any ethnic group other than Anglo-Saxon Protestant was discriminated against in immigration laws.¹⁹¹ While the East Coast worried about the problems of Jews and Germans,¹⁹² the West Coast was concerned with Asian immigration.¹⁹³

¹⁸⁸ Shibusawa M., *Taiheiyō ni*, p.384.

¹⁸⁹ Cited in the letter, Gulick to McClatchy, 17 November, 1924, SEDS, Vol. 34, p.404.

¹⁹⁰ The nativist movement emerged in the USA in 1890 and reached a climax in the 1920s. Various immigration laws were set to protect 'old-stock' Americans. Mark Haller argues that emphasis upon Nordic greatness and racial purity in the 1920s influenced the movements to extend and strengthen laws barring miscegenation. M. H. Haller, *Eugenics*, pp.53-54, and 157-158.

¹⁹¹ The sentiment was anti-Jewish, anti-Catholic and anti-Negro, and around the time of WWI, anti-German. The war period created a dedication to 100 percent Americanism, and a hatred of radicals and pacifists, who were often associated with foreign names. M. Haller, *Eugenics*, p.154. Communists, socialists, and anarchists were also restricted in immigration under the Sedition Act of 1918.

¹⁹² The YMCA International Immigration Service was based in New York and dealt with problems of mainly European immigrants. LSRM/III-4/55/588, RA. A German Jewish anthropologist, Franz Boas, who was based at Columbia University, fought against the racist trend in the USA around the time of World War I, both in academia and society. C. W. Stocking, *Race, Culture and Evolution: Essays in the History of Anthropology* (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p.287.

¹⁹³ Geographical proximity explains the difference of the reaction. By the same reason, Australians were more concerned with Asian immigration than British were at the time of the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in 1902. For the protest of the Australian colonies over the issue of Japanese immigration with regard to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, see Anonymous, 'The Anglo-Japanese Alliance,' *The Round Table*, Vol. 1,

Gulick argued against McClatchy on Christian humanitarian grounds:

It is absurd now to call the United States a "whiteman's country", ... when one-tenth of our population is Negro and when there are considerable numbers of American Indians, Mexicans, Chinese and Japanese If ... you merely mean that we cherish and intend to preserve our Christian civilization with its characteristic and essential principles of liberty, equality, humanity and brotherhood, several things should be said *The belief and practice of these principles is not a matter of race or color.* It is entirely and absolutely a matter of education, of training, of personal character The Christian and democratic civilization characteristic of our country is not in the least endangered by the presence of a few score thousand Japanese [T]he preservation of our Christian citizenship depends on the practice by American citizens of these *Christian ideas and democratic principles* in our relation with all races, including Asiatics.¹⁹⁴ (emphasis added)

While Gulick was known as pro-Japan,¹⁹⁵ his rhetoric based on Christian humanitarianism presented a possibility of breaking down the dominant racial prejudice. Although labelled a disloyal American citizen, Gulick did not lack loyalty or faith in American values and citizenship. His principles, indeed, were based on his faith in American citizenship. In the mid-1920s, however, Gulick, Taft, Wallace, Lamont and Wickersham had to fight against the claim of disloyalty and 'unAmericanness' in order to act publicly against Japanese exclusion.¹⁹⁶ Through dealings with the JARC, these Americans realized that the Japanese knew a great deal about the USA, while they knew so little about Japan.¹⁹⁷ This realization was important in the formation of the IPR.¹⁹⁸ The thinking is a major

(November, 1910–August, 1911), p.123. The issue of immigration came up at the time of the renewal of the Treaty. Neville Meaney, *The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901–1914* (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1976), pp.107 and 127. Far away from the threat of Japan, South African had no problem with the renewal: 'We have never attracted Japanese immigration in large numbers'. Anonymous, 'South African Politics,' *The Round Table*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (November, 1910–August, 1911), p.350.

¹⁹⁴ Gulick to McClatchy, 17 November, 1924, *SEDS*, Vol., 34, pp.404–405.

¹⁹⁵ Asada S., *Ryō taisenkan*, p.347.

¹⁹⁶ Letters of Wickersham in protest against this legislation, *SEDS*, Vol.34, pp.157–159.

¹⁹⁷ Shibusawa M., *Taiheiyō ni*, p.350.

¹⁹⁸ Minutes of the meeting at Yale Club on 22 February, 1925, A981; Org 93, AA.

departure in the American psyche, and it was radical in the contemporary nativist context.

This new attitude was the result of American business interests, their sense of social justice or Christian humanitarianism. Adding to these elements, their realization of Japanese power probably played a significant part in their actions. Just as at the Paris Peace Conference, the issue would not have been a 'problem' if Japan had not been perceived as a great power. Neither the Japanese government nor the public would have felt any right and need to protest had they not thought they deserved the same treatment as Euro-American powers. Similarly, Americans engaged in business or professions might not have argued for the quota system for Japanese immigrants if they did not see Japan as a big power, a country important enough to consider.

iv) Japanese internationalists and Pan-Asianism

The anti-Japanese immigration law of 1924 was the second serious blow to internationalists in Japan after the rejection of the racial equality clause in the Covenant of the League of Nations. They felt that they were excluded from the ideals they believed in. Influential internationalists such as Shibusawa Eiichi and Nitobe Inazō (1862–1933) were very much disillusioned,¹⁹⁹ and many opposed the law publicly.²⁰⁰ Although the discriminatory Japanese immigration policy was pointed out as contradictory to their claims,²⁰¹ Japanese internationalists were eager to

¹⁹⁹ Shibusawa Eiichi made a speech at the Pan-Pacific club luncheon, saying that all the long-term efforts were wasted and there was no God or Buddha in this world. Shibusawa M, *Taiheiyō ni*, p.418. His letter expressing this profound grief was sent to American members of the Japanese American Relations Committee, Shibusawa to the members of the JARC, 21, April, 1924, in *SEDS*, Vol.34, p.192. George Oshiro, *Nitobe Inazō: Kokusaishugi no kaitakusha* (Chūō daigaku shuppansha, 1992), p.183.

²⁰⁰ Sakatani Yoshirō, son-in-law of Shibusawa Eiichi and the leading internationalist, wrote, 'Shiryōaru beikokujin ni uttau,' *Kokusai Chishiki*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1923), reprinted in *SEDS*, Vol. 34, pp.221–224. Yamada Sanzō, a leading expert of International Relations, also wrote, 'Beikoku jimin hōan ni tsuite,' *Ryūmon Zasshi*, Vol. 429 (1923), reprinted in *SEDS*, Vol.34, pp.224–225.

²⁰¹ Director of the Pacific Branch of the Prime Minister's Department in Australia, E. L. Piesse, who became a member of the Victorian branch of the IPR, wrote an article on this point. E. L. Piesse, 'Australia's Position in the Pacific,' *News Bulletin [of the IPR]*

achieve equality with other powers, and did not see this contradiction. Their beliefs gradually lost moral ground, but they had not given up in the mid 1920s. They thought that Americans did not realize the *injustice* of the situation, and felt the need to declare their feeling that an entirely new philosophy and new attitudes were required in the Pacific Age.

In this new Pacific Age, Japan, as a Pacific power, had to seek a new role. Sawayanagi Masatarō (1864–1927), President of the Imperial Educational Association of Japan, stated at the IPR conference in 1927:

The Pacific Ocean is gradually becoming the centre of the world, and Japan has firmly lodged in the thinking of internationally minded people as one of the important Pacific Powers. As such, Japan's future is inseparably linked with the slowly unfolding destiny of the great Pacific area.²⁰²

Sawayanagi presented a vision dominant among internationalists in Japan: the vision of a Pacific Age led by Americans with Japanese cooperation. This role was to be achieved with self-sacrifice, as Zumoto Motosada (1862–1943), another member of the JCIPR, argued:

[Japan] has irrevocably identified herself in every way with the broad and general interest of the world civilization. Scrupulously loyal to the League of Nations and the high ideals of world peace which it embodies, Japan *imposes* upon herself the role of harmonizer between the civilization of East and West. If Japan's influence counts for anything in Asia, all that influence will always be exerted in the interest of peace and harmony between East and West.²⁰³ (emphasis added)

While the 'war scare' literature during the high tension over Japanese discrimination showed clear identification of Japan with the 'East', Zumoto, like other JCIPR members, did not identify Japan or the Japanese

(March, 1927), p.3. American members of the JARC also pointed out the issue, Shibusawa M., *Taiheiyōni*, p.344. The Japanese regulation of 1899 particularly aimed to ban the immigration of Chinese labourers. Hōmushō nyūkoku kanrikyoku ed., *Shutsunyōkoku kanri to sono jittai* (Ōkurashō insatsukyoku, 1964), pp.7–8.

²⁰² Sawayanagi M., 'The Opening statement,' *Problems of the Pacific 1927* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), p.30.

²⁰³ Zumoto M., 'Japan and the Pan-Asiatic Movement,' *News Bulletin [of the IPR]*, January 1927, p.15.

with the 'East', but located them somewhere in the middle between 'East' and 'West'. On the other hand, his notion of the 'West' was simple, putting the League, Europe and the USA into the same category. The same image of Japan as a mediator with a mission as self-sacrificing harmonizer between 'East' and 'West' had been expressed by the Japanese in relation to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty (1902-1921) and the Versailles Treaty (1919).²⁰⁴ There was tension between the roles of harmonizer and *natural* leader in the crusade for Asian liberation from European powers. Those who supported the latter role for Japan advocated a union of 'Eastern' races against 'White' rule in Asia.²⁰⁵

During the last twenty years Japan had been visited by a succession of radical leaders and political adventurers from different parts of Asia for the purpose of enlisting Japanese sympathy and assistance in various propaganda against one or another of European Powers.²⁰⁶

This movement culminated as the Pan-Asiatic Congress at Nagasaki, Japan, in August 1926. Zumoto, however, denied the importance of the movement, and emphasized a cooperative spirit toward the American initiative. This attitude was common among internationalists, especially at the JCIPR, in the 1920s.

However, some internationalists were more enthusiastic about Japanese Pan-Asian initiatives. A journal, *Kokusai chishiki* (International Knowledge) which promoted the cause of the League of Nations published an article in October 1926 arguing the existence of a positive and cooperative side to Pan-Asianism. Inspired by the Pan-American movement and German geopolitical thought, it argued that a *super-national* movement was the natural course to take in the 1920s. It was

²⁰⁴ It was considered a duty of Japan to police the region for Britain, not a benefit for Japan. Anonymous, 'Naval Policy and the Pacific Ocean,' *The Round Table*, Vol. 4 (December, 1913-September, 1914), p.432. The similar sense of duty was expressed at the time of the Versailles Treaty. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs thought that Japan had to cooperate with the League not because it was beneficial for Japan, but because Japan should not isolate itself from the world. Inoki Masamichi, *Yoshida Shigeru* (Jiji tsūshinsha, 1986), pp.43-45.

²⁰⁵ Sun Yat-sen tried to recruit sympathy with this movement in Japan in the 1920s.

Shibusawa M., *Taiheiyō ni*, p.433.

²⁰⁶ Zumoto M., 'Pan-Asiatic Movement,' p.15.

dismissive of colonies in Asia: Japan should not associate with other Asian non-independent countries, because this would justify the solidarity of all European countries against Asian countries. Instead, Japan should ally itself with the other independent Asian country, China. In the article, this alliance was called the *Tōa Rengō* [East Asia Association] and its aims were defined as the pursuit of economic, political and cultural cooperation in order to promote regional peace and welfare. In this way, it would, the article argued, be able to contribute to world prosperity and peace while not being objectionable to the European powers or the USA.²⁰⁷

The article also pointed out a possible danger that could ensue if regional associations took discriminatory trading measures against each other: 'If Europe and others take discriminatory measures in trade with the East Asia Association, it will be forced to take the same measures'.²⁰⁸ This concept of the East Asia Association was taken up by a military officer, Ishihara Kanji, when he established *Tōa Renmei* [East Asian League] in 1940, and the same concept appeared as the core ideology of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. While it existed from the mid 1920s, support for more assertive leadership by Japan in the region became more pronounced in various journals on international affairs in the 1930s.²⁰⁹ The Pacific Age contained inherent competing ideologies right from the beginning.

Wilson's Fourteen Points were the guiding principle of the new international order, but they did not encompass non Euro-American powers. A new order was needed not only in strategic and economic fields, but also philosophically to deal with the 'post-imperialist' system. While Iriye argues the failure of governmental attempts to establish a new order to replace the old European imperial system within the Pacific,²¹⁰ at the non-governmental level, there were attempts towards creating the new order, and these attempts carried all the excitement of a dawning new

²⁰⁷ Nagatomi Morinosuke, 'Gendai no chōkokkateki rengō undō no ichishimyaku to shite no pan-ajia undō,' *Kokusai Chishiki*, Vol. 6, No.10 (October, 1926), pp.2-13.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p.13.

²⁰⁹ Nakaya Takeyo, 'Ajia rengō wa hatashite fukanō nariya,' *Gaikō Jihō*, Vol.58, No.632 (1 April, 1931), p.290.

²¹⁰ A. Iriye, *After Imperialism*, pp.302-303.

era. The IPR attracted those who felt the need for change in the region, which was far away from Europe and populated by non Euro-Americans.

4) Visions and Institutions in the 1920s

This section briefly summarizes various streams of the internationalist movement which influenced the formation of the IPR. Then it examines an institutional aspect of these movements, and locates the IPR in this context.

i) Characteristics of Various Streams of Internationalism

In Section Two, various streams of internationalism in the 1920s were introduced. They were 1) Wilsonian internationalism; 2) Christian humanitarian internationalism; 3) women's internationalism; 4) legalist internationalism; 5) economic internationalism; 6) socialist internationalism; and 7) new British imperialism.

Significantly, Wilsonian internationalism and new British imperialism, two major streams at the IPR, were based on an idealized vision of the nation-state: the American ideal of liberal democracy in the first case, and the British way of governing in the second. They were an externalized ideology of the nation-state, and assumed a strong sense of centre of the world.

Both were born of the intellectual context of the day, and shared elements with other streams of internationalism. Both contained a strong moral sense, devoted to serve the welfare of the society. While this strong social consciousness was influenced by the New Liberalism and reformism of the time, it was also related to Christian beliefs. Wilsonian internationalism demonstrated concerns with gender and class, too, and therefore shared certain elements with women's and socialist internationalism.

In contrast to Wilsonian internationalism and British imperialism, Christian, women's and socialist internationalism were based on identities which could unite across the boundaries of nation-states. Their beliefs came from a strong sense of social or moral justice, and these streams constituted important components of the internationalist

movement in the 1920s. The case of the movement against the anti-Japanese exclusion law in the USA demonstrated that Christian, legalist and economic internationalism showed strong capacity to cross not only national boundaries, but also racial/cultural boundaries, although the base of their argument was not free from the nation-state ideology. Studies demonstrate that identities such as religion, gender and class were subjugated under the stronger identity of the nation-state in this period.²¹¹ Through words such as 'unpatriotic', 'unAmerican' or 'unJapanese', activities based on identities and interests which contradicted 'national' identity or 'national' interests were undermined or even prohibited.

Like Wilsonian internationalists and new British imperialists, legalist internationalists shared a strong sense of centre of the world. While Eurocentricity was evident, their aim was to standardize codes of actions outside of nation-state boundaries. This gave them a more 'cosmopolitan' character, not based on the nation-state, and their institutions reflected this character as will be discussed shortly.

While economic internationalism was an important part of Wilsonian internationalism,²¹² it focused, not on strong uniting identities, but on *relationships* among independent actors such as individuals, companies and governments. Its primary aim was mutual profit rather than the welfare or peace. Economic internationalism was important for a number of reasons. On the one hand, it was perceived by some as being the main cause of imperialism and warfare,²¹³ but on the other hand, it provided an

²¹¹ Ogata Sadako, 'Kokusaishugi dantai no yakuwari,' in Hosoya C. et al eds., *Nichibei kankeishi: Kaisen ni itaru jûnen* Vol.3, (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1971), pp.307-353, and C. DeBenedetti, *Origins of the Modern American Peace Movement, 1915-1929*, pp.75 and 112-113. As for women and the nation-state, Muta Kazue, 'Senryaku toshiteno onna: Meiji Taisho no "onna no gensetsu" o megutte,' *Shisô*, No.812 (February, 1992), pp.214-219. The implication of gender, class and religion in the national mobilization will be suggested in Chapter Three which deals with the domestic contexts of internationalists in Australia and Japan.

²¹² Article III of the Fourteen Points stated: 'The removal, as far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance'. 'Final draft of the Fourteen Points, 7 January, 1919,' in the *PWW*, Vol.45, p.525.

²¹³ J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1938, first published in 1902).

alternative motivation (that of maximum profit) for going beyond the nation-state boundaries, and an alternative non governmental source of support for internationalist activities. While it carried the potential to be a tool in the expansion of the nation-state, therefore, it also provided a motivation and resource for transcending national boundaries and state (official) intervention.²¹⁴

For example, the case of Thomas Lamont, partner of the Morgan Bank and ardent supporter of Wilsonian internationalism, does not fit the simplistic model of a 'merchant of death' fuelling imperial conflicts. Lamont was well known for his progressive attitudes towards social welfare. Being an international banker, pursuing profits for his bank and not necessarily for his nation, his loyalty was often to foreign clients, rather than 'national' interests.²¹⁵ In this sense, ironically both economic and socialist internationalists shared the commonality of being labelled as disloyal towards their own countries, although their loyalties were different.

A similar point can be made regarding the major (predominantly American) foundations, such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Rockefeller Foundation, although these foundations were established specifically with non-profit aims. Without funding from the above two foundations, certain internationalist activities, including the IPR, would not have happened. These foundations were vital in enabling the organization to remain 'non-governmental' in terms of funding. Berman argues that these philanthropic foundations furthered the interests of the class that controlled them by inculcating certain types of ideas and knowledge both in the USA and the 'less developed world'.²¹⁶ Later chapters suggest the

²¹⁴ Regarding elements of conflict between multinational businesses and national governments, see Louis T. Wells Jr, 'The Multinational Business Enterprise: What Kind of International organization?' in Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp.97-114.

²¹⁵ Ron Chernow, *The House of Morgan*, pp.236-237.

²¹⁶ Edward H. Berman, *The Ideology of Philanthropy: The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), p.40.

importance of the notion of public service and the belief in scientific research as factors determining the nature of the activities which the foundations assisted. Other studies also suggest that the problems of these foundations lay not in the infiltration of class ideology, but in the coordination with governmental policies.²¹⁷

While a 'socialistic' element was important for the IPR's formation, the IPR was not part of the socialist strand of internationalism in the 1920s and 1930s. This raises a question about the nature of the IPR, which was labelled as a communist front organization in the 1950s. The gap in the perception of the IPR probably occurred because those who saw the world in terms of clear dichotomies of the Cold War period failed to understand the nature of liberalism in the inter-war period. In the inter-war period of drastic changes and crises, intellectuals acutely felt the inadequacy of the existing system. They were conscious of strong democratic forces, culminating in the spread of socialist movements and the Russian Revolution. Even in the USA, New Russia captured considerable intellectual attention.²¹⁸ Most of those who were inspired by and became associated with the causes of the League of Nations and later at the IPR were *concerned* with class issues, as seen in their commitment to the International Labour Organization, but the nature of this concern was reformist, not revolutionary.²¹⁹

²¹⁷ Bell examines the complexity of the various political factors influencing the foundations in Peter D. Bell, 'The Ford Foundation as a Transnational Actor,' in Keohane and Nye eds., *Transnational Relations*, p.116 and 126-128. There is a strong element of interaction not the simple imposition, in the activities of these foundations outside the USA. Those outside the USA could make use of the ideology and resources of these foundations not only to preserve the particular interests of certain classes or regimes in the domestic politics, but conduct critical reform.

²¹⁸ Douglas Craig, 'Man Versus the State: American Intellectuals and the Triumph of Corporatism: The American Context, 1930-1949,' unpublished paper presented at History Department, Australian National University, 18 October, 1991, pp.1-2 (following page numbering in the draft of the paper).

²¹⁹ Overlap between liberalism and socialism in the inter-war period was not understood in the McCarthyist period. A progressive *liberal* thinker of the inter-war period became a communist in the cold war mental framework. For example, while some argue that Herbert Norman (associated with the IPR from 1938) was a communist and a spy for the USSR, it seems more likely that he was a conscientious intellectual who lived in the socialistic climate of the 1920s and 1930s. Although he was radical, he was never revolutionary. Roger Bowman, *Innocence is not enough: The Life and Death of Herbert Norman* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1986), pp.53 and 65. R. Bowman, 'Cold War, McCarthyism, and Murder by Slander: E. H. Norman's Death in Perspective,' in R.

ii) Institutions

How were these various visions institutionalized, and how did the issues of nation-state and race/culture manifest within these institutions? Each stream of internationalism had organizations to promote its vision within and across national borders. The League of Nations, the Permanent Court of International Justice²²⁰ and the International Labour Organization were *official* organizations, based on governmental representation and focusing on inter-governmental issues. But most internationalist organizations were non-governmental.

The following analysis of the structural characteristics of International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs) is mainly based on a Ph. D. thesis by Lyman C. White, submitted to Columbia University and published as *The Structure of Private International Organizations* in 1933.²²¹ As explained in Introduction, I use the term INGO for those organizations which were called private international organizations in the inter-war period.

Bowman ed., *E. H. Norman: His Life and Scholarship* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984). Maruyama negated the accusation of Norman being a communist, pointing out Norman's balanced view and elitist manner. Maruyama M., 'Mumei no mono eno aichaku: Herbert Norman no koto,' *Mainichi Shimbun*, April 18-19, 1957. Dower criticized a tendency among Euro-American scholars in the post-WWII period to reduce Norman to a crude Marxist, which distorted the sophistication and complexity of Norman's works on Japanese history. John Dower, 'E. H. Norman to jiyū shugōteki gakumon no gendaiteki kiki,' *Shisō*, Vol.4, No. 634, (1977), p.127.

²²⁰ The Permanent Court of International Justice was established in 1922. Despite its mention in Article 14 of the Covenant of the League, it was not an organ of the League. There was no statute to make member countries automatically belong to the Permanent Court. The International Court is its successor and was established in 1946. The United Nation Charter states that member countries belong to the court. The term 'world court' is used to describe both. Shabtai Rosenne, *The World Court: What It Is and How It Works* (Leiden: Oceania Publications, 1973), pp 21 and 27.

²²¹ Lyman Cromwell White, *The Structure of Private International Organizations* (Philadelphia, Penn: George S. Ferguson Company, 1933). The thesis was based on White's extensive first hand experience at various institutions, and was supervised by Joseph Chamberlain, expert in International Relations and leading internationalist, who later became involved with the IPR.

Although new British imperialism is included as a stream of internationalism in this thesis, White omitted its organizations such as the Round Table and the RIIA from his discussion of INGOs. Both satisfied his basic criteria for INGOs in that they possessed the following features: 1) private (non-officials, or officials with private capacity) individual or group membership; 2) the existence of a permanent organization; 3) they were not aimed at pecuniary profit; and 4) they were controlled by non-governmental authority. They were, however, ambiguous in the other criteria of membership by at least two countries, and of not having a strong national base. White used various terms for Britain (England, Britain, Great Britain and the United Kingdom). When Dominions had separate representation in an organization, they were listed as independent entries. But in cases such as the League of Nations Union, where the headquarters were in Britain and Dominion organizations were affiliates, the entry was given as Great Britain with no separate entry for the Dominions. According to White's classificatory system, the Round Table and the RIIA would be organizations of Great Britain and therefore not recognizable as INGOs.

Wilsonian internationalism was promoted by unofficial organizations. The headquarters of the International Federation of the League of Nations Societies were established in Brussels, and member associations were set up in thirty-three countries including non-member countries such as the USA and China. The British League of Nations Union was established in 1918, earlier than the foundation of the League,²²² and after 1919 it began to promote the League. Its branches were also formed in the Dominions and were affiliated to the British headquarters. The British League of Nations Union belonged to the International Federation of the League of Nations Societies. The federation was mainly a Europe-centred organization, but Japan's financial contribution was noteworthy. In 1931, when Britain's contribution was 76,179 Belgian franc, Japan made contribution of 62,209 B. francs followed by the USA with 39,404 B. francs. Other major contributors were all European.²²³

²²² For the early development of the League of Nations Union, see Winkler, *The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, 1914-1919*, especially Chapter One.

²²³ L. C. White, *Private International Organizations*, p.259.

Christian humanitarian internationalism was promoted by Christian and missionary organizations such as the World Student Christian Federation, the International Missionary Council, the International Red Cross and the World Alliance of Young Men's Christian Associations (YMCA).²²⁴ The International Red Cross was the biggest INGO in terms of membership, revenue and scale. The World Alliance and the World Student Christian Federation also included members from Asia, but their centres were in Europe. In all of these organizations the USA played a particularly prominent role.²²⁵

The International Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Equal Citizenship, the World's Women's Christian Temperance Union, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and other such organizations promoted the cause of women's internationalism. The first two showed strong representation from countries in Asia. Most notably, membership of the Temperance Union was open to 'Christian women of the world without distinction of race or colour'. The League for Peace did not confine its membership to those from nation-states, but opened it to colonies.²²⁶

Economic internationalism was promoted by international banks, International Chambers of Commerce, Rotary International and other bodies. Rotary was centred in North America with its headquarters in Chicago. It had wide representation in the countries in Asia. The number of staff employed at the headquarters was particularly large at eighty-two

²²⁴ White excluded Catholic Church from his study in 1933 because of 'its peculiar position in international law', and also because 'the head of that Church has nearly always exercised territorial sovereignty and has always maintained diplomatic relations with governments'. L. C. White, *Private International Organizations*, p.14. E. Theodore Bachmann, in describing the missionary activities of I. S. Latourette, sketches the background of missionary institutions from the late nineteenth century. E. T. Bachmann, 'Kenneth Scott Latourette: Historian and Friend,' in Wilbur C. Harr ed., *Frontiers of the Christian World Mission since 1938: Essays in honour of K. S. Latourette* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), pp.231-259. John R. Mott was a pioneer and leader of the international student Christian movement of the YMCA from the late nineteenth century. For John Mott, see Basil Mathews, *John R. Mott: World Citizen* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1934).

²²⁵ L. C. White, *Private International Organizations*, pp 227-231, 261-273 and 283-292.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.101, 103, 157-160, 182-186, 220-223 and 231-236.

people while the headquarters of many other organizations were run by very few staff or did not exist at all. Rotary's membership was restricted to males. The International Chamber of Commerce was located in Paris, and represented 1.5 million business and professional people. Both the above mentioned organizations promoted not only business interests, but more importantly high moral standards in business.²²⁷ They became part of the institutional background for the formation of the IPR.

How was the IPR located among other INGOs in the 1920s and 1930s? White includes the IPR as an INGO in his studies in 1933 and 1951. He describes it as 'one of the most interesting associations, whose contribution to scientific investigation has been outstanding',²²⁸ despite its clear regional focus in agenda and membership, and strong American representation. The following examines the IPR in terms of the characteristics of INGOs as described in White's study, and in particular analyses the IPR stance on the issues of the Orient and the nation-state.

a) Headquarters

The location of the IPR headquarters in Honolulu was most unusual for this period. Among 560 international organizations (including governmental ones) listed in the *Handbook of International Organizations* and its *Supplement*, White found that 95% were located in Europe. Paris topped the list with 128 (23%), followed by Brussels (59) and London (57) (both at 10%), then Geneva (48). In the United States, there were only eight in Washington D. C., and six in New York. In Asia, (White uses the term Asia for all areas east of Constantinople and west of the American continent, and therefore Middle Eastern countries, Australia and New Zealand were in a category of Asia) there was only one, the IPR headquarters in Honolulu.²²⁹ While White predicts the future trends towards Paris and Geneva, he does not see any move to New York or Washington D. C. in 1933. Accordingly, INGOs in the 1920s and early

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.106, 115, 162-172 and 212-220.

²²⁸ L. C. White, *International Non-Governmental organizations: Their Purpose, Methods, and Accomplishments* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1951), p.228.

²²⁹ L. C. White, *Private International Organizations*, p.126.

1930s were heavily centred in Europe. It is noteworthy that some organizations did not have fixed headquarters, and the office or home of the head of the organization became the temporary headquarters in such cases.

b) Membership

The number of members of INGOs varied substantially. The League of Red Cross Societies had member associations in sixty countries, and the total membership was 24,682,411 persons (11,181,934 in the USA, 4,121,429 in Japan; and 1,828,000 in Italy). The International Federation of Trade Unions had member unions in twenty-nine countries, almost entirely confined to Europe, with 13,516,269 members. The World Alliance of YMCA's had member associations in thirty-three countries and membership was 1,570,907 (944,421 in the USA, 176,426 in Germany, 27,790 in China, and 22,000 in Japan), with the countries of Asia well represented. Rotary International had clubs in seventy countries with 152,581 members (108,424 in the USA, 16,648 in Britain, 6,152 in Canada, and 1,679 in Australia). Interestingly, organizations from English-speaking countries with very few continental European member-countries, that is, the World's Women's Christian Temperance Union and the World's Student Christian Federation, had stronger representation in the countries of Asia. The smallest membership of 121 was that of the Institute of International Law (20 in France, 10 in Belgium, 10 in Germany, 7 in Britain, 4 in Japan).²³⁰ Figures for IPR membership are not listed in White's study, but due to its selective nature, the number must have been small. At biennial conferences, 250 was considered too many, and the meeting was often confined to around 150. If this figure was a twentieth of the entire membership of each country, the total membership would have been around 3,000. Even though this is perhaps an underestimation, the total number could hardly have been above 5,000.

In White's analysis of country membership of the selected thirty-one organizations, Britain belonged to 30, the USA to 25, Japan to 22, Australia

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.95-125.

to 20, and China to 17. As for the proportion of individual membership in these organizations, the USA topped the list, followed by Britain and five European countries, then Japan, Czechoslovakia, Australia and China. On the basis of the proportion of the membership to national population, Australia came fourth following the USA, Britain and Austria in this order, and then ten other European countries along with Canada and New Zealand, Japan is ranked as 17th.²³¹

Analysis of membership shows strong American as well as European involvement in INGOs. Australian membership is also strong, considering its population and geographical remoteness. Probably the tie with British organizations was a reason for this high representation. Japan ranks the highest among all non Euro-American countries in the participation rate in INGOs. The proportion of Euro-Americans to non Euro-Americans was probably far better balanced in IPR conferences than those of any other INGOs because its participants came from Japan, China, Korea and the Philippines as well as from the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.²³² The IPR was, therefore, unique in the composition of membership.

c) Conferences

Conferences were a crucial element in these INGOs. Without travel and conferring, they could not function. This became possible because of the dramatic technological development of transport and communications which was accelerated by WWI, and which contributed to an age of international conferences.²³³ Personal contacts, rather than exchanges of written documents, gained credibility not only among officials, but also among people in business and academia. Participants who travelled by sea began to share common visions and to contribute to common scholarship

²³¹ *Ibid.*, pp.121–123.

²³² Participating countries varied from conference to conference. See Appendix B.

²³³ For internationalization in communication, see Daniel R. Headrick, *The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). Conferences of many organizations such as the International Research Council, the Red Cross, the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), the Chambers of Commerce and the Rotary Club, were held not only in Europe, but also in the Pacific.

in many fields.²³⁴ In other words, these conferences provided a common intellectual paradigm from which the internationalists of the 1920s began to operate. White argues that conferences generally had executive power for personnel selection and policy making, but that this was not the case in the IPR.²³⁵

d) Resources

The sources of income of INGOs were subscriptions, gifts or donations and the earnings of the organization from publications, but this last source was normally very small.²³⁶ Donations from individuals or foundations, such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, usually accounted for a large amount. Although White does not mention it, the Rockefeller Foundation, another American foundation which contributed substantially to international organizations, should also be mentioned here. The latter provided the major portion of IPR funds, and its donations promoted activities of international and domestic non-governmental organizations such as the CFR, Foreign Policy Associations and the YMCA.²³⁷

Of the thirty-one INGOs White closely examined, the USA contributed the most, followed by Britain, France, Germany Canada and Japan. When he calculated these amounts per head of population, Britain came top, followed by the USA and Canada. Japan came in the 17th ranking, as the first non Euro-American country. New Zealand ranked 5th, Australia 11th, while the others were European countries.²³⁸

²³⁴ In the fields of sciences, this phenomenon of 'world' scholarship developed more rapidly. Roy and Kay MacLeod, 'The Social Relations of Science and Technology, 1914-1939,' in Carlo M. Cipolla ed., *The Fontana Economic History of Europe: The Twentieth Century Part One* (Glasgow: Williams Collins Sons, 1976), pp.301-335. Noble analyses how the centralization of national scientific institutions provided a base for international scientific organizations. He emphasizes the impact of WWI on this movement. D. Noble, *America by Design*, pp.148-160.

²³⁵ L. C. White, *Private International organizations*, p.42.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.88.

²³⁷ The files of the IPR, the CFR, and the international division of the YMCA at the Rockefeller Archives show the details of its donations.

²³⁸ L. C. White, *Private International Organizations*, pp.90-95.

Regarding the scale of annual revenue, the Zionist Organization topped with US \$ 3,737,507; Rotary International second with only a quarter of the scale at \$ 1,020,300; third, the International Red Cross with substantially less than the first two at \$ 291,150; and fourth the IPR with \$ 128,564. The IPR was followed by the World Sunday School Association at \$ 96,450; and the International Federation of Trade Unions at \$ 66,349.²³⁹ Considering the membership, and the scale and scope of the organization, the IPR's revenue is distinctly high.

e) National Base

The most striking character of INGOs in White's study is their nation based structure. He classifies the organizations according to membership. Although there are a few combined patterns, the major criterion is whether individual members belong to national organizations which are member associations of INGO, or whether they belong to the INGO directly. For the former, he uses the term, 'inter-national', and the latter, 'cosmopolitan'. His findings proved the dominance of 'international': 'by far the greatest number ... are the *inter-national* type'. Of the thirty-seven selected organizations, twenty-eight were of the 'inter-national' type. The 'cosmopolitan' type included the Institute of International Law, Institute of the Olympic Committee and the Universal Esperanto Association, while there were a few which combined both characteristics.²⁴⁰

He argues: 'Not only do national organizations seem to form a satisfactory basis for most international organizations, but international organizations tend to develop and strengthen national organizations'. Certain organizations, such as the International Federation of League of Nations Societies, the International Chamber of Commerce, and the International Federation of Trade Unions, required the formation of national groups out of local groups. Many organizations, especially the World Alliance of the YMCA and the World's Women's Christian Temperance Union, saw

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.89.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.31 and 34.

the development of local and national groups as an important part of their work.²⁴¹

Similarly, the IPR required the organization of National Councils. As White points out, the 'cosmopolitan' type is possible only with a small membership. It is noteworthy that the IPR with its relatively smaller membership took such a strong *inter-national* structure. This structure was also clear in the governing body of the IPR. While the governing body of the 'inter-national' type of INGO did not necessarily have representation from each member national group, the IPR took a strong line so as to ensure national representation as far as it was possible.²⁴² However, some other inter-national type organizations gave stronger power to certain national representatives according to the amount of financial contribution, the activities or population, while the IPR governing body gave equal weight to each national representative. The governing body of the IPR had far fewer members and met less frequently than other INGOs. This gave more power to the fewer people either at the executive body or the secretariat.

As White comments, the strong national representation structure of INGOs in the 1920s and 1930s was not necessarily ideal, but many found it satisfactory. Accordingly, the making of an international body also meant the making of national bodies, and these 'national' bodies were likely to generate a certain official or governmental orientation. As demonstrated in the following chapters, this was the case for the IPR. The development of the IPR as an international body happened at the same time as the formation of the National Councils, and from its inception it incorporated the essential problem of being at once *inter-national* and *non-governmental*.

The IPR embodied considerable potential in terms of its focus on the Pacific, and it was the first such organization in the period to have strong representation from a non Euro-American population. At the same time, it embodied the problems of internationalism and international

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp.35-36.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, p.68.

organizations of the time. The following chapters show how the IPR was constructed, and examine the intellectual and institutional implications of this experiment.

Chapter Two : Founding the Institute of Pacific Relations: American Context

1) From Vision to Influence

It was a rainy Sunday afternoon in New York on 22 February, 1925. Around half past two, at the Yale Club, near the Grand Central Station Terminal, men who were 'particularly interested in inter-racial and international questions' gathered to 'consider the plan of the proposed institute, its purpose, scope and method and the nature of American participation in it'. The proposed institute was to become the Institute of Pacific Relations later in the year. The day was chosen because it was a Sunday in a congressional recess. Busy public figures came mainly from the East Coast, and some from Chicago and the West Coast.

Invitations were sent to men who were thought to be not only *interested* but also *opinion leaders* in the fields of religion, press, business, academia and education. It was organized by the temporary executive committee, which had been discussing the institute for a few months. The committee itself also consisted of prominent men: George Blakeslee, Professor of Political Science and 'Far Eastern' specialist at Clark University in Washington D. C. and a reputable organizer of the Institute of Politics at Williamstown; John Finley, Editor of the *New York Times*; John Mott, an inspirational leader of the international student movement of the YMCA; G. A. Johnston Ross, Professor at the Union Theological Seminary, New York; Chester Rowell, an influential journalist of *World's Work Magazine*, San Francisco; James Speers, owner of a shipping company, James McCutcheon Company, New York; and Ray Wilbur, President of Stanford University.¹

The purpose of the meeting was explained in the invitation letters: 'Problems arising from the increasing intercourse between the Peoples of the Pacific Basin have inspired the proposal to hold at Honolulu an

¹ Invitation letter, 5 February, 1925 A1/2, AUH.

institute somewhat similar to the Williamstown Institute, under the auspices of an international committee made up of representatives from Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan, the Philippines, Canada, and the United States'.²

This chapter argues that the discussion at the Yale Club determined the direction of the proposed institute, which was to become the IPR, and defined the nature of the IPR in the future. It became clear that the Institute would aim to become an international non-governmental organization of regional experts, and to influence public opinion and policy-making. This original setting itself later proved to be the cause of the change in the early 1930s.³

Already two months before the meeting at the Yale Club, Merle Davis, one of the main organizers, who later became the first General Secretary of the IPR in 1926, wrote of its potential implications:

Should the eminent men meeting in such a preliminary conference decide against participating in the Hawaii meeting, it would not prevent our carrying out the original plan. However, should such a group approve and become interested in cooperation, it would mean a great enlargement of the scope and influence of the Hawaii program Practically all the men ... see in it [a] very important possible development, and agree that it may lead to our Pan-Pacific conference exerting both *a national and international influence expressed in formation of public opinion and new legislation of the first importance*.⁴ (emphasis added)

At the meeting two months later, Davis felt that the Institute would have much more influence than he had originally anticipated.

i) The Background to the Yale Club Meeting

² *Ibid.*

³ Full details will be discussed in Chapter Five.

⁴ Davis to Atherton, 26 December, 1924, A1/1, AUH.

Until the Yale Club meeting, the initiative and organization for the Institute came mainly from the YMCA.⁵ The plan was first a proposal for a YMCA conference in Honolulu concerning race relations in the Pacific, not an institute, and the Christian element was very strong in this original plan. It was particularly concerned with the disputes over Japanese immigration to the USA. In 1921, the YMCA in Honolulu proposed a conference of representatives of the countries bordering on the Pacific to meet in 1923 to deal with the problems caused by the racial relations.

This call for a conference could only happen in the context of the Pan-Pacific movement in Hawaii which A. H. Ford of the Pan-Pacific Union had started in 1917.⁶ Pan-Pacific conferences were held under the auspices of the Union and had created enthusiasm for peace and cooperation among limited but influential circles in the Pacific area. Frank Atherton (1877–1945), a philanthropic businessman in Honolulu, assisted the financing of Ford's Union and the organization of Pan-Pacific conferences.⁷ Atherton came from a prominent family which combined business with a strong missionary tradition. They were heavily involved in many local religious and philanthropic activities, including the YMCA.⁸ Ford persuaded the Honolulu YMCA to call for a conference in the Pacific.⁹ Atherton was conscious of anti-Japanese sentiment on the mainland and closely connected with Japanese groups led by Shibusawa

⁵ The origin of the IPR was described in the proceedings of the first conference in Honolulu in 1925. All are mainly introductory and descriptive. 'History and Organization,' [The IPR ed.], *Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu Session, June 30–July 14, 1925: History, Organization, Proceedings, Discussions and Addresses* (Honolulu: the IPR, 1925), pp.7–13. Here, basing on the new documents mainly at the Archives of the University of Hawaii, I analyse the nature of the original setting of the IPR.

⁶ See Chapter One, Section Three.

⁷ Report of J. O. Miller, 4 May, 1921, A981; Org 93, AA.

⁸ G. E. Allen, *Bridge Builders: The Story of Theodore and Mary Atherton Richards* (Honolulu, publisher unknown, 1970), p.195. Atherton family controlled much property, business, politics, church and education in Honolulu. Frank Atherton's parents were property owners and educators, and they were also active in missionary activities. They believed that Christianization was an important element of Americanization. Concerned with the Oriental problems in Hawaii, they established the "Mid-Pacific Institute" for the education and Christianization of the younger generation of island-born Asians. The Institute promoted the exchange program between Hawaii and Japan. *Ibid.*, pp.60, 129, 131, and 144–145.

⁹ G. E. Allen, *The YMCA in Hawaii, 1869–1969* (Honolulu: Honolulu YMCA, 1969), p.99.

Eiichi, who tried to ease this tension.¹⁰ At the end of 1921, a committee of the Honolulu YMCA met at the Pacific Club, a local gentlemen's club,¹¹ to discuss the proposed conference. The main object of the conference was, they believed, to 'discover what is fundamental and universal in Christianity and consider how this might be made a common basis of understanding and motivation for the Pacific peoples'.¹²

The Honolulu Pan-Pacific movement joined the international YMCA movement when this proposal gained the strong support of John Mott, a leader of the YMCA student movement, in 1922. In the same year, the matter was discussed with YMCA leaders in the countries of Asia, and the plan gained an enthusiastic response. As the result, the second "World's Conference of YMCA Workers among Boys" at Portschach, Austria, in May 1923, resolved on the initiative of the YMCA in Hawaii to hold a Pacific YMCA conference in Honolulu in February 1925, inviting the YMCA's National Committees of the 'nations bordering the Pacific'.¹³ They chose Hawaii because it was thought to be an ideal location for 'long time promotion of a community of interest of the people in the Pacific, and progress in the development of inter-racial understanding and good will'. A. H. Ford's Pan-Pacific Movement was largely responsible for the success of the Honolulu YMCA.

As a result of this decision, the central executive committee (the Honolulu group, composed of Hawaiian residents—six Americans, two Chinese and two Japanese) and the central committee were founded in Honolulu. The latter was an international body and comprised

¹⁰ As for Shibusawa's activities at the Japanese American Relations Committee (JARC), see Chapter One Section Three. Atherton knew Shibusawa Eiichi already in 1917 when he was invited to Japan as a member of the JARC. Atherton wrote to Shibusawa about his commitment to the cause of the JARC. Atherton to Shibusawa, 20 October, 1923, SEDS, Vol. 34, pp.81-82.

¹¹ The club was founded first as the "Mess" in 1851 and then changed to the "British Club" in 1867. It became the "Pacific Club" in 1892. B. Hyams and E. C. Cluff, *Centennial Memories of the Pacific Club in Honolulu, 1851-1951* (Honolulu: the Pacific Club, 1951), p.92. It was a British style gentlemen's club. Although it hosted many inter-racial functions of the Pan-Pacific Union and the IPR, the member list even in 1944 shows no name other than English origin. [The Pacific Club], *Annual Report, the Pacific Club 1944* (Honolulu: the Pacific Club, 1945), pp.20-23.

¹² 'History and Organization,' *Institute of Pacific Relations, 1925*, p.8.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p.9.

representatives from each member country; Australia, Canada, China, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines and the USA, and one from Hawaii. These countries were selected because of their YMCA representation. Reflecting its strong identity and initiative, Hawaii had separate representation from the mainland USA until 1929 when the two merged under American representation. Most representatives were from the YMCA. The committee sent an invitation to each National Committee of the YMCA in Australia, Canada, China, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines and the USA on 7 December 1923. The initial activities for the IPR conference began in 1924, and were conducted by the YMCA National Committees.

The task of organizing the conference and shaping the program was undertaken by the Honolulu group with the assistance of the mainland members of the central committee and the American YMCA. The main members were Atherton, Arthur Dean, President of the University of Hawaii, Charles Loomis, a YMCA officer from Hawaii, and G. A. Johnston Ross and James Speers from New York. While the Hawaii group remained central in organizing programs for the conference, developments in the mainland, especially in New York, brought a new dimension to the conference.

There were two major elements to this new dimension which led to the Yale Club meeting: the organization of an American *national* group; and the search for influence. Organizing the national group of a country was a massive task, not least on the mainland of the USA, so vast and so far away from Hawaii. The process of organizing an American *national* body influenced the nature of the IPR. Furthermore, many involved in the organization felt that influential people and substantial funding were necessary to influence official policy and public opinion making.

By April 1924, the Honolulu group made a firm decision to take the Institute of Politics at Williamstown (IPW) as a model of their project. Atherton described the proposed project in the letter to General Education Board (New York) as a 'conference or institute closely resembling that of the Williamstown Institute of Politics, although it is narrower and more

specific in its subject'.¹⁴ While there were already some organizations of foreign affairs experts, such as the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the IPW was the only one which held multinational conferences annually.¹⁵ The Honolulu group aimed to create an international conference or conference-oriented institute, like the IPW, rather than a national institute on its own. Encouraged by the success of the IPW, some organizers became more ambitious about the potential influence of the project on public opinion, and felt it crucial to secure prominent participants. The main focus of the project was, however, significantly different from the IPW: to solve racial conflict in the Pacific by free and frank discussion.¹⁶

Action was taken quickly. Almost a week after Atherton's letter to the General Education Board, the representative of the Honolulu group, Jay A. Urice, a YMCA man at the New York office, and Johnson Ross, Professor at the Union Theology Seminary in New York and a member of the central committee, met Harry Garfield, organizer of the IPW and President of Williams College, at the Century Club, New York. Garfield greeted the outline of the proposed conference 'heartily' and thought it a part of a growing trend set by the IPW. He suggested four points had led to the IPW's success: finance, personnel, method, and relations with the State Department.

Garfield emphasized 'academic freedom in a degree' and the avoidance of funds from too many sources, because they would dominate the direction of the enterprise. He explained that his way of getting prominent people was to make personal contacts with those who were the centre of the network, either in the USA or Europe. He also took great care 'to vary the viewpoints'. The "methods" he outlined were 1) the Round Table, a small group of discussion led by an expert on a subject, 2) the open Round Table, and 3) the Public Address on more general issues. No resolutions were permitted, so as to make discussions free and avoid misleading publicity. Garfield maintained that relations with the State Department

¹⁴ Atherton to General Education Board, 24 April, 1924, A1/1, AUH.

¹⁵ For its origin and the relations with the RIIA group, see Chapter One, Section Two.

¹⁶ Atherton to General Education Board, 24 April, 1924, A1/1, AUH.

had been cooperative. Secretary Hughes was enthusiastic, the department loaned maps, and staff attended the conferences unofficially. 'The State Department seemed ready to encourage such efforts as the Institute,' he said.¹⁷

While following the first three points given by Garfield, organizers of the conference in July took a more independent attitude in regard to the State Department. This was mainly because the State Department did not wish the issue of Asian exclusion to be publicized, and strong opposition from official circles to the conference was expected. There was a positive attitude to the promotion of non-official mu. national organizations among those who were involved in the preparation of the conference. This attitude will be discussed later in this chapter.

The meeting with Garfield furthered personal contacts with his social group. At the Century Club, Garfield introduced Urice and Ross to Raymond Fosdick, trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation.¹⁸ Urice and Ross tried to get Fosdick to participate in the conference and to advise on foundation money.¹⁹ A student of Garfield at Princeton in the 1900s, Fosdick was Under Secretary General at the League of Nations in 1919-1920 and became a trustee (1921-1936) and President (1936-1948) of the Rockefeller Foundation. Fosdick was influential at the Foundation, the fact which IPR members, especially in New York, fully recognized.

The involvement of Fosdick in the IPR project started earlier than the lunch at the Century Club. Atherton had already made an approach to the Foundation and Fosdick. They discussed how to apply for grants from various foundations.²⁰ As a judge of these applications, Fosdick's comments were appreciated. He was sympathetic to the IPR project from the beginning, because he saw great value in the cause and the method of its original project.

¹⁷ Memorandum of J. A. Urice, 30 April, 1924, A1/1, AUH.

¹⁸ The Rockefeller Foundation was called the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial until 1929. In this thesis, I use the term the Rockefeller Foundation for both.

¹⁹ Urice to Looms, 2 May, 1924, A1/1, AUH.

²⁰ Atherton to General Education Board, 24 April, 1924, A1/1, AUH.

Although sceptical of religion-biased projects, he showed great interest in the idea of applying Christian principles to modern problems such as racial conflicts. The idea first came to his attention in 1922 through Edward Carter's project, the "National Inquiry into the Christian Way of Life". While Carter, a YMCA man, was Secretary of the American Council of the IPR (ACIPR) in 1926-1933, his primary interest and his salary came from this project, often called the "Inquiry" (1922-1932).²¹ His office, which was to become an office of the ACIPR, and later the International Secretariat of the IPR (ISIPR), was on 129 East 52nd street, an annex of the YMCA building (135 East 52nd street) which also faced to Lexington Avenue. The aim of Carter's project was to solve the problems of international, racial and industrial relations by applying Christian principles in modern life. Fosdick wrote to the Foundation on the project:

Personally, this is one of the most unique matters that has ever been brought to my attention The question is constantly asked whether Christianity has any applicability to modern life Here is an honest attempt ... to get people all over the country to think about it. I find myself hoping that you will see your way clear to support this venture somewhat liberally Of course the study is a venture—it is even something of a leap in the dark—but it is aimed at a real goal and it is in capable hands.²²

Fosdick did have some reservations, but his sympathy was apparent. More importantly, his belief in the ability of Carter is striking. Thereafter, Carter cultivated and maintained good relations with the major staff of the Foundation, including Fosdick, who were also closely connected with other foundations. The Honolulu office's lack of this access to the foundations was one crucial element in the move of the headquarters' functions to New York in the early 1930s.

Although the basic direction of the conference was shaped by the middle of 1924, a real change came in the mid-December, just after the appointment of Merle Davis in November 1924, to organize the American

²¹ Carter took this name the "Inquiry", probably because he was inspired by the "Inquiry" organized by Colonel House for the Paris Peace Conference, and hoped the similar influence in public affairs. For House's "Inquiry", see Chapter One, Section One.

²² Fosdick to Rockefeller, 22 January, 1924, LSRM/III-2-N/47/376, RA.

representatives and the conference as a whole.²³ Around the time of his appointment, the temporary executive committee (the American committee) was formed. This committee was distinct from the central executive committee (the Honolulu group) or the central committee of international representatives. While the last two were heavily dominated by the YMCA members, the American committee consisted mainly of experts on Asia and race issues.

Davis satisfied all these criteria. He was a YMCA man, and an expert on Japan and racial problems in the USA. He was born and grew up in Japan as the son of a missionary family. He worked in Japan for many years as general secretary of the international YMCA before he took up a job of Director of the "Survey of Race Relations: A Study of the Orientals on the Pacific Coast", which was based in San Francisco.²⁴ Chairman of the executive committee of the "Survey" was Ray Wilbur, President of Stanford University, who also became a member of the American committee for the proposed conference, and later after the first conference, became the first chairman of the Pacific Council, the executive body of the IPR.

Davis was close to the Honolulu group, especially Atherton, to which he felt his primary loyalty and responsibility. Davis saw two pivotal points in the development of the project, Honolulu and New York. Davis knew various projects and institutions on the West Coast dealing with race relations, and was himself involved with one of these projects. Yet, significantly, he felt at this stage that the pivotal points were not on the West Coast but in New York. He wrote to Atherton that he would have to make New York his working centre for some time and that he would start

²³ John B. Condliffe, *Reminiscences of the Institute of Pacific Relations* (Vancouver, B. C.: Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, 1981), p.2. This booklet was given from Dr William Holland to me in March 1993 and I thank him for this copy.

²⁴ The organization was initiated in 1923 by the Institute of Social and Religious Research of New York City. The Pacific Coast was divided into five research regions, including British Columbia, and each division was supervised by local research director. E. E. Robinson and P. C. Edwards eds., *The Memories of Ray Lyman Wilbur, 1875-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), p.315.

West not before the mid-February.²⁵ While keeping his job in San Francisco, Davis headed for New York immediately after the appointment. He remained there until 18 December 1924, and returned to New York on 5 January 1925. Based at the International Committee of the YMCA, at 347 Madison Avenue, and working with the officers there (the New York group) such as Urice, he travelled frantically to various parts of the East Coast.

The direction of the IPR project became clearer in the draft of the letter, dated 19 December 1924, to John D. Rockefeller Jr. In this letter, Davis denied the central role of the YMCA, the Hawaiian group and the connection with the Pan-Pacific Union. Instead, he emphasized the similarities between the IPW and the proposed conference to bring together 'men of the East and the West for a thorough discussion of racial problems'.

The national YMCAs ... act as agents only, and do not consider this a YMCA conference. The work of the YMCA will have no place in the agenda The conference is not in the hands of a Hawaiian committee, but is directed by an international committee ...²⁶

Who was responsible for this emerging emphasis? Was it an initiative of Davis or the New York group against the wishes of the Honolulu group? Although Davis had a clear sense of the centrality of the Honolulu group, being so far away from Honolulu, he was often uncertain how far he should go in this direction:

It is somewhat difficult for me to know how far I can rightly and wisely assume responsibility and initiative. The New York Committee are leaving these to me as a representative of the Central Committee, and I am so far from you Hawaii leaders that one is in danger of going too far, or of not going far enough ...²⁷

Davis' correspondence suggests that this change happened not because of his intentions, but because of the need to secure prominent delegates and

²⁵ At this point, Davis was in San Francisco. Davis to Atherton, 30 December, 1924, A1/1, AUH.

²⁶ Draft letter from Davis to J. D. Rockefeller Jr, 19 December, 1924, A1/1, AUH.

²⁷ Davis to Atherton, 30 December, 1924, A1/1, AUH.

substantial funds. After experiencing difficulties in achieving both aims, his major concern became compiling efficient applications for funds. The advice of Raymond Fosdick played a crucial role in this process.

Although there was never any direct instruction or pressure from the Foundation, those who wrote the IPR applications for funds could not ignore the views of its influential trustees and advisers whose advice often decided the result. Consequently the applications largely shaped the IPR programs. On the other hand, this influence was only possible because IPR organizers themselves wanted the kind of prominence and influence which the trustees suggested.

Funds other than those from wealthy philanthropic foundations and individuals were limited in this period. Some organizations depended on subscriptions or the revenue from their publications, but the amount of money through this method was limited. It was also only possible when strong organizational bases were founded. Without a permanent body and with the main purpose of holding an international conference, IPR organizers needed a substantial amount of money from outside. Furthermore, as an unofficial body, they could not in principle seek government funding, although the case of the Japanese Council suggests otherwise.²⁸ The idea of relying on a few wealthy foundations or individuals attracted Garfield and Davis, because they felt that relative independence would be achieved. Funding for the first budget came from the Honolulu group (US\$ 25,000), mainly from Atherton, \$ 10,000 from Rockefeller Jr, \$ 5,000 from Carnegie Endowment, and some from wealthy philanthropists such as Julius Rosenwald (Chicago), Thomas Lamont (Morgan Bank) and other banking and shipping companies. For its size and membership, as Chapter One Section Four showed, the IPR enjoyed a relatively big budget due to the contributions of these foundations, and this fortunate situation made officers unaware of the need to cultivate other sources.

²⁸ See Chapter Three, Section Two.

On 10 December, Urice and Davis found that the application for funds for the conference written by the Honolulu group to the General Education Board had failed. Fosdick, having insider knowledge, explained the main reasons for the failure. First, an international conference was outside the Board's interests. Second, Ford gave a bad impression to the Board, when he had approached it for his Pan-Pacific conferences. They thought Ford's Pan-Pacific Union was an advertising agency, and that the proposed IPR conference was related to Ford's projects. Third and 'probably the most important factor' was the criticism of the YMCA auspices of an international project of this kind. The YMCA might be promoting its own purposes and it was not a suitable convenor for such a gathering.²⁹ Following these comments, Davis drafted an application to the Rockefeller Foundation. He also proposed the formation of the advisory board which comprised eminent men in the field who were not YMCA members.³⁰

Fosdick and the directors at the General Education Board were not alone in thinking that the project should not be built on the YMCA. Wilbur, Chairman of the American committee, noted:

I told the group backing [the conference project] that I would not care to have anything to do with it unless it would be free from any religious denominational influence. The program was changed to conform to this view.³¹

This view of Wilbur probably came from his experience of the "Survey of Race Relations". Born in a pioneering family in Mid West and brought up in the frontier of California, he lectured and practiced medicine before he became President of the Stanford University (1916-1943). Concerned with the racial tension in California, he chaired the "Survey of Race Relations". He was convinced that the results of this survey demonstrated the usefulness of Japanese agricultural labourers to the local economy and life, and a remarkable degree of Americanization among American-born Japanese and Chinese.³² Wilbur recorded that 'the survey

²⁹ Davis to Atherton, 12 December, 1994, A1/1, AUH.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ E. E. Robinson and P. C. Edwards eds., *The Memories of Wilbur*, p.317.

³² *Ibid.*, p.316.

was a new departure in American education' on race relations.³³ Based on this experience, Wilbur voiced the importance of knowledge of the 'truth' and 'facts', because he felt that misunderstanding and ignorance were the cause of problems. It is likely that Fosdick's view was not the only cause of the emphasis on 'science', but that this scientific view was also shared by the professional elite of the East and West Coasts, whom Davis wished to enlist for the conference.

Other influential advice came from Roger Greene in the Rockefeller Foundation. Born in Japan as the son of a Congregational missionary family and brought up there, Greene served as a diplomat before he took up a position at the Foundation in 1914. He was most active in the medical program of the Foundation in China in 1914-1935. His elder brother, Jerome, was a Wall Street banker at Lee and Higginson Company. Jerome was involved in the formation of the IPR, and was to play a significant role especially in 1929-1932.

Roger Greene's advice was to diversify funding of the project from American sources to overseas ones. This helped to emphasize the 'international' outlook of the project. But at the same time, despite the efforts of the staff, the IPR was never to overcome the American dominance of its funding. In other words, this is an area in which the advice of the Foundation made an impact, but was not fully put into practice. Roger Greene told Davis that Rockefeller Jr would not support a project if his money constituted more than half of the finance of an enterprise. The suggestion led Davis and the American committee to emphasize the cooperative principle and joint promotion method for finance as well as organization and program.³⁴ The principle could have led the project to become an institution funded, staffed and run cooperatively by various member countries. Wilbur supported this principle, insisting that no one country and no one religion should have preference.³⁵ The principle was expressed at the Yale Club, and later attempts were made to implement it. The IPR project was, however,

³³ *Ibid.*, p.317.

³⁴ Davis to Atherton, 30 December, 1924, A1/1, AUH.

³⁵ E. E. Robinson and P. C. Edwards eds., *The Memories of Wilbur*, p.318.

predominantly financed by American philanthropic money and staffed by Americans all through the 1920s and 1930s, and the headquarters were never located outside the USA.³⁶ Americanization was further strengthened in the 1930s.

The next crucial advice came from an official, former Ambassador to Japan Roland Morris. Morris suggested a preliminary American conference to Davis, which became the Yale Club meeting. Atherton approved, providing that 'it was deemed essential'.³⁷ John Mott strongly favoured the idea of this meeting, because he felt 'Morris presented a large challenge to their conference plan' and the meeting would be a good chance to resolve the matter.³⁸ He thought that the meeting would play a great role in defining the nature of the planned project: if it went well, then the project would have more influence on public and official thinking and might even bring about a change in immigration legislation. But if it did not, they could still hold a smaller scale conference in Hawaii.

Morris shared the negative attitude of the State Department to the proposed conference: the conference could do more harm than good by resuming debates over the immigration issue. The topic of discussion would be the debate on immigration and racial equality, provoked by the dispute over the Immigration Act of 1924, the so-called Anti-Japanese immigration act. Despite the movement to amend the act both in Japan and the USA, the State Department saw it as a settled matter.³⁹ Assistant Secretary of State, John MacMurray, told Davis in January 1925, that while it was now 'far worse to attempt to stop' the conference, official cooperation and involvement should not be sought:

We cannot forget, and you should not forget, that the Government has a very great stake in how these matters are handled I would appreciate having reports sent me on the development of the conference plans.⁴⁰

³⁶ On the discussion on the location of the headquarters, see Chapters Five and Six.

³⁷ Davis to Atherton, 26 December, 1924, A1/1, AUH.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Interview with John MacMurray, Assistant Secretary of State, 22 January, 1925, A1/2, AUH.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

Recognizing the hard task of organizers, he gave positive suggestions: the conference should face up squarely to different opinions, choose anti-Oriental groups who would not embitter the discussion, and not overdo the publicity.

You are attempting a very difficult task. It will require great skill and wisdom in your leaders to hold discussions on the track and not let the situation get out of hand.⁴¹

As the result of these meetings with officials, Davis gained confidence:

Mr Morris will be an able opponent but we will have present at the preliminary conference several men of equal ability like President Wilbur, Chester Rowell, Professor Wilson of Harvard and others who will put up a strong case for holding the Hawaii meeting.⁴²

These meetings with officials clarified the focus of the conference. The main issue of the project was the Orient, especially Japan and China, and the officials and professional elite who were concerned with race relations *did not perceive* any serious problem with South American countries in the mid-1920s. An official at the State Department suggested excluding the South Americans: 'the Latin countries would be liable to stand solidly with the United States against the Oriental nations'.⁴³ The representative of the Pan American Union also did not show much interest in the project, mainly because 'the Latin American countries were not specially interested in racial matters'.⁴⁴

ii) Yale club Meeting

The Yale Club meeting had two sessions: a morning one of the core members; and a general meeting in the afternoon. The morning session was attended by Davis, Wilbur, Urice, Speers, Blakeslee, Carter, Professor Stanley Hornbeck, a China specialist at Harvard, Professor Archibald Coolidge of Harvard and Editor of *Foreign Affairs* (the journal of the

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Davis to Atherton, 27 January, 1925, A1/2, AUH.

⁴³ Interview with MacMurray, 22 January, 1925, A1/2, AUH.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

CFR), C. Batchelder, former Commissioner Far Eastern Trade Bureau, and Galen Fisher, Executive Secretary of Social and Religious Research. Davis recorded: 'The morning meeting was very helpful in that it allowed the leaders to come to a uniform policy'.⁴⁵

At two-thirty, the afternoon session started. The following table shows background of the participants.

Academic	15
Press: Publisher/Journalist ⁴⁶	10
Business	7
Officers: Public Service (4)	
Non-profit foundations (4)	
League of Nation (1)	9
Religion: YMCA (5)	
Church (2)	7
Total	51 ⁴⁷

They were male professionals. The lack of women probably reflected their marginalized position, although women's groups were active in various social movements such as peace and temperance movements and were enthusiastic about the proposed conference. Davis had appealed to women's associations, mainly female suffrage groups.⁴⁸ They became an important base of IPR activities, organizing public addresses and luncheons for the IPR. Despite substantial numbers of women at IPR conferences and general support of women's associations for the IPR, however, they were not offered an important role in terms of agenda and policy decisions at the IPR. Therefore, they had to start their own organizations in 1928.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Davis' record of the Yale Club meeting, n. d., A1/2, AUH.

⁴⁶ They were publisher and/or journalist and it is hard to draw the line from the documents.

⁴⁷ The minutes of the meeting says: 'forty-one men came', but the report sent to Honolulu on 6 March attached the list of the attendants of forty-six men. Also the list of the attendants in the proceedings of the first conference shows only thirty-eight. This list of thirty eight men included five names which were not on the report of 6 March. To see the background of the attendants, or those who were likely there, I combined these two lists and analysed combined fifty-one men's background.

⁴⁸ Davis to Atherton, 12 December, 1924, A1/1, AUH.

⁴⁹ See Chapter Four.

The above table suggests that representation of religion and the YMCA was weaker than the original plan, but that it remained an important element. If the background of other professionals is more closely examined, probably missionary experience would not be negligible. Law and medicine were not represented, although some may have had university degrees in the fields.

Political affiliation is hard to identify except for a few cases, such as Chester Rowell and Wilbur, both well-known Republicans. 'Born and brought up as Republican', Wilbur was active in the party politics and known for his friendship with Herbert Hoover. Furthermore, it is hard to establish the specific positions of these participants in relation to the League of Nations.⁵⁰ For example, although a Republican, Wilbur was a strong supporter of Wilson's proposal for American entrance to the League. Herbert Croly, editor of *New Republic*, supported Wilsonian principles expressed in the "Fourteen Points", but disapproved of the way the peace was negotiated. The proceedings of IPR conferences from 1925 onwards suggest that among the participants for these conferences, including a majority of those who were at the Yale Club meeting, the validity of the League of Nations was not questioned, but that they had reservations about the American membership in the League. They felt that they could achieve Wilsonian principles outside the League, but 'in harmony and constructive relationship' with the League.⁵¹

The members of the Japanese American Relations Committee (JARC) played a significant role in the IPR, although only a few members actually attended the Yale Club meeting. Sydney Gulick of the Federal Council of Churches, a most active JARC member in the movement to amend the Immigration Act of 1924, was there, but not George Wickersham or Henry Taft, both former Attorneys General and Republicans. Wickersham was a member of the CFR, but did not join the IPR. When he was approached in late 1934, he was reluctant about his commitment due to his involvement with other 'benevolent and charitable enterprise': 'I shall not be expected

⁵⁰ See Chapter One, Section Two.

⁵¹ 'Diplomatic Relations in the Pacific,' in J. B. Condliffe ed., *Problems of the Pacific*, 1927 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928, p.172.

to do anything more than occasionally to read the publications'.⁵² Although Gulick played no major role in the IPR in the following years, other JARC members, Frank Atherton, Chester Rowell and Wallace Alexander, Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce at San Francisco, did. Probably due to the distance, the only one to attend the meeting from this group was Rowell.

The reasons for their interest in the conference project involved some personal elements. These included personal background, upbringing and curiosity. The Orient and the Pacific stirred American curiosity in this period, although this interest was not necessarily based on personal background. While there were other foreign affairs experts' organizations in the USA, the IPR was the only one which focused on the Pacific. Although some IPR members belonged to these other foreign affairs experts' organizations, this kind of fascination with the Orient and the Pacific was probably characteristic of those at the Yale Club, and later at the IPR conferences, in comparison with those who belonged only to the other organizations.

Discussion in the afternoon was marked by new attitudes to the issues of state and race.⁵³ New attitudes towards the state were expressed in the emphasis on the unofficial status of the conference. Despite the opinions of Morris and John Abbott, Vice-President of Continental and Commercial Bank of Chicago, the majority thought the proposed conference and institute should be non-governmental, because unofficial status would allow participants to talk freely and frankly. Ellsworth Huntington, Professor of Geography at Yale, stated that less official intervention would promote discussion, based on his experience at the Pan-Pacific Science Conference in Australia in 1923. Philip Brown, Professor of International Law at Princeton, also opposed official involvement: 'intelligent and democratic society would make progress on a spirit of liberality and a Christian spirit'.

⁵² Wickersham to Field, 21 November, 1934, CPR, Box 145/Wickersham, BLCU.

⁵³ The following discussion at the Yale Club is based on the minutes of the meeting. The minutes of the Yale Club meeting, 22 February, 1925, A981; Org 93, AA.

To ensure unofficial status and protect speakers' freedom, some suggested that the conference avoid resolutions, political issues and excessive publicity. Compared to the British foreign affairs experts' organizations such as the Round Table and the RIIA, which took a very discreet approach of not revealing who said what in order to protect freedom of speech, the meeting showed a relatively open attitude to publicity. At the same time, however, they were aware of another damaging force, the jingoistic press.⁵⁴

Huntington also voiced a new attitudes to Orientals, by which he meant the Japanese and Chinese:

We have to get the Orientals to tell us what they think about us. The Orientals understand us a great deal better than we understand them We have to go to the conference primarily to *learn* from the Orientals.

This attitude reflected the thinking of some Americans, who observed through their movement against Japanese discrimination that American knowledge about Japan lagged far behind Japanese knowledge about the USA.⁵⁵

There were contradictory elements, however, in these new attitudes to the state. Although they insisted on the importance of unofficial status and individual quality, participants in the conference still represented their countries. This idea of individuals representing a nation did not necessarily mean representing its government. But delegates had to have the nationality of the country they represented and had to be selected by a national committee. Coupled with their background as a member of the 'national elite', this method made it more likely that they would defend their governmental policies. On the other hand, their effort to include

⁵⁴ Jingo press became powerful around the time of the Spanish American War in 1898. Some interpreted the war as caused by the journalism. F. L. Mott, *American Journalism: A History of Newspapers in the United States through 260 Years, 1690 to 1950* (New York: Macmillan, 1950), p.539.

⁵⁵ Shibusawa Masahide referred to Taft's speech at the Bankers' Club in New York on 15 July, 1920: 'Japanese people understand us far much more than we do them. American people should have more right knowledge on the Far East'. Shibusawa M., *Taiheiyō ni kakeru hashi: Shibusawa Eiichi no shōgai* (Yomiuri shimbunsha, 1970), p.351.

people of diverse opinions implied that the IPR had the potential to lead discussions which were not based on national entities.

From the very beginning of the project, only elite men and women mattered. The common view at the meeting and later at the IPR was: 'The masses should be educated and guided' by 'opinion leaders'. The aim of conferences was to provide these leaders with the 'facts'. While it is easy to condemn this Platonic attitude of wise men's rule—'*Knowledgeable experts educating the ignorant masses*'—as paternalistic and elitist, it reflected a common attitude of the time. This attitude was dominant in various foreign affairs experts' organizations such as the RIIA and the CFR, and remained so in the following years.⁵⁶

The sense of optimism and enthusiasm at the meeting, however, should not be forgotten. The IPR grew out of the strong leadership and the faith of those who gathered for the project. The capacity to challenge governmental interests was demonstrated by Wilbur. Convinced of the findings of the "Survey of Race", he said: 'if it does not go well, we will take blame, but if it goes well, then the government will be glad'. Wilbur was 'just the man to accept such a challenge'⁵⁷

Optimism was supported by faith in science. Those at the Yale Club believed that any problem could be solved by scientific and objective methods. Rationality and science prevailed, and was mixed with their secular sense of mission as public figures. The Institute should be based on research fact-finding, which should be objective, practical and scientific. This somewhat linear view, believing in certain directions of evolution and progress, was not uncommon in the period.

⁵⁶ R. L. Sundquist described the nature of current INGOs as follows: 'In short, they engage in research brokerage-building institutions where intellectuals can work, rescuing ideas from obscurity, synthesizing them and putting them in the hands of influential people', cited in R. Higgott and D. Stone, 'The limits of influence: foreign policy think tanks in Britain and the USA,' *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 21 (1994), p.14, (emphasis added).

⁵⁷ J. B. Condliffe, *Reminiscences*, p.4. Davis repeatedly commented that Wilbur's leadership was one of the main reasons for the success of the project. Davis' recollection of the Yale Club meeting, n. d., A1/1, A1/1H, and M. Davis, 'An inside story of the Institute' [written after the first conference], p.14, Wilbur Papers, 40/5, H1.

Those who gathered for the IPR had faith and enthusiasm. They were concerned with the problems caused by racial conflicts and the IPR was a new experiment to solve these problems. They thought that new attitudes were not only necessary, but also possible in the new era of the Pacific Age. They were confident of American moral leadership in the Pacific. There was no complication in the Pacific as in European affairs. Not having soiled its hands with old-fashioned colonialism, they felt that the USA was the one nation which could lead the new age and generate new attitudes.

Most of them were not leisured men, but busy working professionals. To invest their time and money on Sundays, dinners at the clubs or meetings in business hours, and to take time off for travelling to conferences, they had to have faith, conviction, energy, money and even more importantly, excitement. After expressing his first impression that all gathered at the Yale Club felt the project to be significant and full of 'such immense possibilities for future good,' Davis wrote about this excitement:

Another impression was the amazing response of the greatest American experts in the different fields that we are proposing to discuss at Hawaii. Nearly every man who attended expressed surprise and gratification at the very unusual group of men that assembled. This gives us hope that, with the leadership and participation of such able men, we will be able to carry out to a successful finish a plan of large proportions.⁵⁸

The Yale Club meeting defined the nature of the IPR. It decided that the conference should not be one isolated event, and that they should aim to found a permanent institute to hold conferences periodically. It was an enterprise of hope and enthusiasm, caused by the desire to establish the new system in the Pacific. They aimed for an international non-governmental organization of regional experts to influence public opinion, and indirectly policy-making by this way. It was predominantly male, professional, elitist, rationalist and science-oriented, and it was initiated by Americans, and based on American philanthropic money.

⁵⁸ Davis' record of the Yale Club meeting, n. d., A1/1, AUH.

This original setting itself determined the direction of the IPR, which became increasingly clear in the 1930s. But first the next chapter examines the process and implication of the experiment of the IPR in Japan and Australia.

Chapter Three: National Setting of the IPR in Japan and Australia

The IPR reflected the intellectual paradigm of the day, but it was formed specifically in the American context. What it represented, however, varied in different countries, and it attracted certain kinds of people because of its implications. Focusing on the background of the formation of National Councils in Australia and Japan, this chapter examines what the IPR represented in these countries, and what kind of people became actively involved with the IPR. It particularly focuses on the reformist nature of these people both in domestic and international politics, and on the implication of their rhetoric: words such as nation, state, the Orient and the Pacific.

In the 1920s, the Pacific occupied an ambiguous position in relation to perceptions of the international order. The League of Nations established an international order, but this was based far away from the Pacific. The Washington Treaty, seen as an extension of the League system to the Pacific, settled some ambiguity. Different interpretations of the 'dominant' international order, however, were contested in the Pacific. This chapter argues that the IPR represented an age of new international codes of conduct, led by Americans. It provided a stimulus to those who felt the need to reform the old codes. Japanese saw in the IPR a chance to reform the attitudes to the Japanese 'race', and Australians an opportunity to achieve the vision of a more independent, new Australia in the Pacific. Their attempts contained contradictions and problems, but in both cases, a strong sense of the nation-state was clear behind their aspirations. The chapter points out the complexity of 'nationalism' for internationalists in both countries.

It also argues the importance of the sense of crisis of the inter-war period and the process of national mobilization under this pressure. While people who were involved in the IPR promoted the vision of an international community and cooperation, they were not immune from this crisis and national mobilization. The institutionalization of the IPR

in both countries took the form of creating *National Councils*. While the difference of history and the magnitude and nature of the crisis produced different consequences, these domestic movements also influenced the nature of the IPR as a 'non-governmental' 'international' organization.

1) The New Australia in the Pacific and the IPR

This section argues that the IPR gave a stimulus to some intellectuals in Australia for a vision of the new Australia in the Pacific. They felt the need for more independence from Britain, and were increasingly aware of the region they belonged to. But they were seen challenging the status quo, the British imperial order. Domestically, their biggest concerns in the 1920s and 1930s were the social and economic crises of class conflicts and depression. They felt the need to create the unity of society against disintegration, and developed the theory of responsible citizenship, based on maintenance of the standard of living and the ability to assimilate the liberal democratic system. Though they did not use crude racist arguments, it was clear that non-Europeans in the region they belonged to, as well as aboriginals in Australia, were excluded from this concept. They used the idea of the Pacific to promote the new Australia more independent from Britain, and the idea of the Orient to achieve national unity by a process of exclusion.

i) Perspective: New Liberals and the New Australia

a) New Liberals

The core group of the internationalist movement and organizations were drawn from a small circle of the urban cultured elite. They were mostly male Australian-born professionals with university degrees, such as lawyers, academics, educators, priests, ministers, journalists, business people and public servants including military officers. Many came from the intellectual tradition of New Liberalism of the late 1890s.¹

¹ Among studies dealing with the New Liberals in Australia in the late nineteenth century and the inter-war period, John Docker uses the term, New Liberals, which definition

Influenced by T. H. Green, this tradition had profoundly penetrated Australian intellectual, political, literary and religious life.² They were reformist on issues of domestic and international politics. They were concerned with social problems arising from the enlargement of democratic rights, and argued for a re-orientation of policy and philosophy to deal with these issues. They felt the need for a greater state role to serve the welfare of *society as a whole*. Criticism of laissez-faire economy and support for general social and economic reforms came from this source.³ Some New Liberals became more 'conservative' in the 1930s,⁴ but others

seems closest to mine. J. Docker, 'Can the Centre Hold?: Conceptions of State,' in Sydney Labour History Group ed., *What Rough Beast?: The State and Social Order in Australian History* (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1982). Michael Roe calls them Progressives, indicating an influence of American progressivism in Australia. M. Roe, *Nine Australian Progressives: Vitelism in Bourgeois Social Thought, 1890-1960* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1984). Stephen Alomes, more focused on the 1930s, uses the term Reformists. Stephen Alomes, *Reasonable Men: Middle Class Reformism in Australia, 1928-39*, unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Australian National University, 1979. Tim Rowes argues that Australian intellectuals felt that Australia was a purest example of T. H. Green's thought, and pursued reformist schemes which failed by 1920. He summarises the nature of New Liberals in Australia in the following: 'The intellectuals who first articulated the New Liberalism in Australia ... tried to construct an institutional base for their program of consensus-making. They saw their function as teachers of the working class and as reform-minded counsellors of the government, but they gained very little foothold or recognition for these activities. They were reformists attached to a frail political centre and by 1920 this centre had collapsed'. Although Rowes suggests that New Liberalism was a lost cause, which saw only the partial survival in the inter-war period, he argues the importance of this reformist tradition in Australian intellectual life in the twentieth century. T. Rowes, *Australian Liberalism and National Character* (Melbourne: Kibble Books, 1978), pp.22, 27-28 and 32-3. David Walker suggests the disillusionment of these New Liberals in the 1920s and 1930s. D. Walker, *Dream and Disillusion: A Search for Australian Cultural Identity* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1976), pp.198-199. Stuart Macintyre emphasizes the linkage of liberalism between the pre-1890s and twentieth century. He argues colonial liberalism constructed in the late nineteenth century was revived by Eggleston, Latham, Brookes and others who were defined as New Liberals or Progressives above. He suggests that the new emphasis on state and society of New Liberalism was already there in thoughts of colonial liberals in the pre-1890s. S. Macintyre, *A Colonial Liberalism: The Lost World of Three Victorian Visionaries* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), Chapter Five. All of these works on liberalism agree that this reformist nature has been important in forming *national* character as well as intellectual life in Australia.

² John Docker, 'Can the Centre Hold?' p.79.

³ Warren Osmond, *Frederic Eggleston: An Intellectual in Australian Politics* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1985), p.55. James Barrett, medical doctor, promoted medical and educational reforms. He was a key figure in promoting the Workers' Education Association, and also enthusiastic for the Round Table and the League of Nations movements. M. Roe, *Nine Australian Progressives*, pp.65, 71 and 78.

maintained their belief in greater state involvement for social and economic welfare in the time of depression.⁵

The core members of the internationalist movement belonged to a few social sets. For example, in Melbourne, the key figures such as John Latham (1877–1964), lawyer, (federal) politician (1922–1934) and diplomat, and Frederic Eggleston (1875–1954), lawyer, (state) politician and diplomat belonged to a social circle around Alfred Deakin (1856–1919), Prime Minister in 1903–1904, 1905–1908 and 1909–1910. Deakin was considered the father of Australian liberalism, against laissez-faire, and conscious of social reforms. In the 1920s, this set was hosted by and centred at the home of Herbert Brookes (1867–1963), son-in-law of Deakin and a wealthy pastoralist and businessman. Latham, Eggleston and Brookes were Australian-born, and joined the Round Table (an organization to promote the new British imperialism) which became the central focus of the internationalist movement. They discussed literature, politics, religion, music, and imperial and international issues. Like various societies such as the rationalist association and arts societies, internationalist organizations in Melbourne were centred on these social groups.

These social sets in metropolitan areas clustered around universities, government departments, court, churches and other educational institutions. The Workers' Education Association (WEA) (founded in 1913 in Australia) was one of the most important institutions in this context, as will be discussed later. Quite often, those in these social sets belonged to more than one organization or club, and dined and discussed together. These networks provided the intellectual milieu of the New Liberals.

⁴ Walker argues that there was disillusionment among these New Liberals in the 1920s and some took on more conservative turn. D. Walker, *Dream and Disillusion*, pp.8 and 199. Mathews argues Latham and Shann became anti-union and conservative in the 1930s. R. Mathews, *Australia's First Fabians: Middle-class Radical, Labour Activists and the Early Labour Movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.219 and 221–222.

⁵ Alomes argues that the influence of the reformist thinking was still great in the 1930s. S. Alomes, *Reasonable Men*, pp.287–289. Roe agrees with this view, that the essential belief and approach of the New Liberalism of the 1890s (or Progressivism in '... term) were repeated in the 1920s. M. Roe, *Nine Australian Progressives*, pp.316–317.

b) The New Australia and the Pacific

These New Liberals were assertive about the role of a more independent new Australia in the Pacific. Deakin was one of the pioneers of this field. He led the federation movement, and proposed strong *national* naval forces. This stronger assertion of the new Australia has to be understood in the context of the development of cultural confidence in the inter-war period. Previous studies have described this development as the rise of nationalism.⁶ The word, nationalism, however, is misleading. Those who were presented as 'nationalists' tended to be more concerned with issues in the region they lived in, than those at the other side of the globe.⁷ They were not inward looking isolationists, and this regional-awareness did not contradict the internationalist movement. In fact, they had a strong orientation towards the outside world beyond the imperial framework. In the following discussion, these 'nationalists' will be termed 'regionalists' or 'regional internationalists'.

The distinction between imperial internationalists and regional internationalists, however, was not clear-cut. Both were 'internationalist' in a sense that they felt the need for active involvement in internationalist movements and organizations. At the same time, both were 'imperialists' who believed the imperial framework, and the virtue of the British system. Probably the clearest distinction between 'imperial' and 'regional' internationalists is the latter's readiness for a change in the sense of centre.

In the 1920s, the Pacific provided the opportunity to put their vision of the new Australia into practice. Roe points out that this awareness of the Pacific was characteristic of the New Liberals (Progressives).⁸ Their

⁶ R. M. Crawford, *An Australian Perspective* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1960) and G. Serle, *From Deserts the Prophets Come: The Creative Spirit in Australia, 1788-1972* (Melbourne: Heineman, 1973). Their works focus on cultural nationalism and, therefore, mainly on artists.

⁷ Most of those who were argued to have contributed to the development of nationalism in the 1930s, such as Macmahon Ball, a political scientist at the University of Melbourne, developed an awareness of Australia's location.

⁸ M. Roe, *Nine Australian Progressives*, p.130.

attitudes to external issues were, however, complicated. Concern with domestic social welfare did not necessarily mean a similar concern for unfortunates in other countries. For many social reformers, their loyalty to the empire did not contradict their sense of social justice, either.⁹ The chief aim of British Fabians, by whom Australian New Liberals were influenced, was the promotion of the national and imperial interest.¹⁰ Roe uses the term, 'welfare imperialist', and Docker 'Liberal imperialism' to describe Australian reformers' attitudes to external issues. As Docker argues, the New Liberals' imperialism after WWI was more imperial-oriented compared with the anti-colonialism and cosmopolitanism of the earlier liberals.¹¹ Their emphasis on the greater moral role of the state led them not to cosmopolitanism, but internationalism, firmly based on the nation-state.

Their attitudes to race and the Pacific, therefore, were not simple. These attitudes were significant in the development of the new Australia's relations with the region, because they were the first group to acknowledge the importance of this relationship. They were interested in the regional issues and pioneered studies on the region. Roe points out, however, that New Liberals (Progressives in his term) had little sympathy for non-white populations,¹² and Docker argues further that they had almost an antipathy to non-white, especially Asian populations.¹³ The new Australia meant for them stronger autonomy as a nation from Britain. This enhanced not only their regional sense, but also Australia's national sovereignty. As demonstrated by William Hughes ('Prime Minister, 1915-1923) at the Paris Peace Conference, the national sovereignty of the stronger new nation-state was expressed mainly through the White Australian Policy. Similarly, New Liberals developed a unifying code, citizenship, not based on racial superiority but on

⁹ For example, on the more progressive end of the spectrum of reformism, James Barrett believed in Britain's right and duty to bestride the world, and advocated the importance of the imperial federation. M. Roe, *Nine Australian Progressives*, p.71.

¹⁰ Bernard Semmel, *Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought, 1895-1914* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1960), p.133.

¹¹ J. Docker, 'Can the Centre Hold?' p.72.

¹² M. Roe, *Nine Australian Progressives*, p.12. He points out that 'welfare imperialism derived from the benevolent duty of a master race'.

¹³ J. Docker, 'Can the Centre Hold?' p.61.

'cultural' difference which prevented non-white populations from assimilating to their system, to integrate and strengthen the *national* society.¹⁴

ii) The Pacific and the International Order

New Liberals were concerned not only with domestic, but also external issues. The main figures of the internationalist movement belonged to the (Australian) Fabian Society.¹⁵ Internationalism, however, was complicated due to Australia's lack of power and its imperial ties with Britain. While great powers pursued their visions of the international order, later comers such as Japan, or small powers such as Australia, had to have a clear understanding of the 'dominant' order, and adapt themselves to that order. Understanding the dominant order was increasingly difficult in the Pacific after WWI. A majority understood the British imperial order as the international order, and the international community as an extension of the empire. But among certain circles, there was a growing awareness of the power shift in the Pacific, from Britain to the USA, or at least, a sense that Australia could not solely depend on the British navy to protect it strategically. This led to debate as to whether the new order should displace the old one, or whether the old one should be preserved.

Australia shared the diplomatic codes and assumptions of international arrangements through its connection with Britain, but it did not have independent representation in world affairs before the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. It did not have a separate department of External Affairs until 1934 and except for one High Commissioner in London, it did not have independent diplomats until 1940.¹⁶ The inter-war years were a formative period not only for Australia's own diplomatic

¹⁴ *Ibid.* Rickard argues a similar point of race/culture as a basis for the citizenship and social unity. John Rickard, *Australia: A Cultural History* (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1988), pp.116–117.

¹⁵ R. Mathews, *Australia's First Fabians*, pp.196–200. There was a close connection between the members of the Round Table and the Fabian Society in Australia. *Ibid.*, pp.193–195.

¹⁶ From 1937 to 1940 there was an Australian Counsellor at the British Embassy, Washington D. C.

machinery, but also for the form of involvement with the internationalist organizations and movements. Australians started to assert their own national identity, rather than their affiliation to Britain, through these activities.

In the 1920s, the Pacific presented for some the opportunity for a more independent and assertive new Australia, but for others it meant a threat to the status quo. The implications of the Pacific were threefold: recognition of Japanese power: recognition of the USA presence: and Australian 'responsibility' for the mandates (gained at the Paris Peace Conference). Except for the last, these meant a possible challenge to the political, economic and social paradigm of the British Empire.

Awareness of the Pacific was enhanced by the consciousness of the importance of these two powers, Japan and the USA, and involved a mixture of fear and hope. Japan was seen as an expanding military power and a future trade partner. Both prospects suggested the need for new arrangements with Japan. Its military strength, especially after the Russo-Japanese war (1904), became a serious threat, which led to the recognition of the inadequacy of existing defence arrangements in 1907-1914.¹⁷ Hughes also provoked fear of Japan's challenge not only to national defence, but also to the White Australian Policy. Edmund Piesse (1880-1947), a Tasmanian-born lawyer and Cambridge graduate, was a head of the newly established Pacific Branch (1919-1923) at the Prime Minister's Department. He was one of the very few experts on Japan because his job was to compile information on Japanese immigration policy for the League of Nations' assemblies.¹⁸ He thought Hughes's suspicion was groundless: There was

little or nothing in the conduct of Japan to support the view which many Australians hold that she will challenge the White Australian Policy and that the future domination of Australia is

¹⁷ Anonymous, 'The Conference and The Empire,' *The Round Table*, Vol. 1, (November, 1910-August, 1911), p.390. David Sissons, *Attitudes to Japan and Defence, 1890-1923*, unpublished MA thesis, the University of Melbourne, 1956, p.48.

¹⁸ Prime Minister's Department, 'Papers Prepared in the Pacific Branch in Connection with the First Assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva, November, 1920,' A1; 1919/8756, AA.

part of her policy Living far removed from the centres of international discourse and unaccustomed to deal (sic) with external questions they [some public men in Australia] have been ready to suppose that Australia was of great importance to Japan, and ready to treat her every act with suspicion.¹⁹

Though often ignored, the prospect of Japan as a trade partner also began to be recognized in the 1910s. This recognition emerged particularly early in Sydney. In 1912, the Senate of the University of Sydney resolved that learning Japanese was most important because of its commercial potential.

Japan is a near neighbour, closely connected with ourselves by a large and increasing trade and very important also on political grounds China is a near neighbour and of political and social importance but less intimately connected with us in trade, though possibly it might be developed. Russia belongs definitely to the Pacific system and its remoteness has hitherto prevented very close relations. A change in this respect may be expected in the near future.²⁰

Accordingly, five years later, James Murdoch was appointed to the first chair of Oriental History. This, however, combined a strategic purpose because the position was coupled with teaching at the Royal Military College, Duntroon.²¹ While Japan's importance as a trade partner was argued in 1936 by a member of the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA),²² John G. Crawford (1910–1984),²³ most people saw Japan in strategic rather than economic terms in the inter-war period.²⁴

¹⁹ Draft for the article which appeared in *American Foreign Affairs* in 1926, written sometime in 1925, MS 882/9, NLA.

²⁰ 'Senate Resolution, May, 1912,' Papers of Chair of Oriental History, FLUS.

²¹ D. Sissons, 'James Murdoch (1856–1921): Historian, Teacher and Much Else Besides,' *Historical Studies*, Vol.2, 1987, p.45.

²² As described later in this chapter, the AIIA was a national body which amalgamated the branches of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) and the IPR in New South Wales (NSW), Victoria and Queensland. On the RIIA, see also Chapter One, Section One.

²³ Crawford argued this point in the debate over the Trade Diversion Policy in 1936. Along with Crawford, another member of the AIIA, Eggleston, also criticized the imperial preference of the Trade Diversion Policy. W. Osmond, *Frederic Eggleston*, p.183. On the details of the Trade Diversion Policy, see D.

Piesse felt that the conclusion of the Washington Treaty in 1922 meant that the order in the Pacific based on Anglo-American cooperation was established, and Japanese expansion would be checked.²⁵ He thought there should be not much need for gathering information on Japan for a while. He resigned his office soon after in 1923, and his writing on Japan as a military threat began only in the mid-1930s, this time as an independent writer and a member of the IPR.²⁶ In the 1920s under the succeeding Bruce-Page government, sentiment against Japan was calmed, and therefore a cooperative and friendly atmosphere was possible.

Recognition of the American presence was connected to Australia's concern at the rise of Japanese power. The Great White Fleet sent by Theodore Roosevelt was greeted with mass enthusiasm in 1908.²⁷ This symbolized a new step in strategic thinking in Australia both at official and popular levels, represented most notably by the statements of Prime Minister, Deakin.²⁸ Attitudes to the USA were, however, ambiguous. In contrast to the glorified image of the USA as a "Star of Hope" of democracy among Japanese IPR members, its images among Australian counterparts were mixed. Positive images of progressivism and efficiency existed as well as negative images of materialism and political corruption.²⁹

Sissons, 'Manchester vs. Japan: The Imperial Background of the Australian Trade Diversion Dispute with Japan, 1936,' *Australian Outlook*, Vol.30, No. 3 (1976).

²⁴ The Trade Treaty was concluded only in 1957. Even then, there was much opposition in Australia because of the anti-Japanese sentiment caused by WWII experience. Alan Rix, *Coming to Terms: The Politics of Australia's Trade with Japan, 1945-57* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986).

²⁵ D. Sissons, *Attitudes to Japan*, Chapter Five, Section II.

²⁶ E. L. Piesse, 'The Real Rulers of Japan,' *The [Melbourne] Age*, 25, 26, 27 and 29 June, 1936.

²⁷ The contemporary press reported that the mass gathering for this occasion was one of the largest and most publicised national events in Australian history, Daryl Adair, "'Pacific Parade': The American Fleet in Australia, 1908," Paper presented at the Australian Historical Association Conference, Canberra 1992, p.4.

²⁸ Deakin welcomed the Great White Fleet. He initiated Australia's independent defence system. Australian navy was created in 1909, the first among the Dominions. This move created conflict over the defence issue between Australia and Britain in 1913-1914. N. Meaney, *The Search for Security*, Chapter Nine and p.195.

²⁹ M. Roe *Nine Australian Progressives*, pp.11, 97 and 188.

The image of the Pacific, promoted by the IPR, was perceived as predominantly American. Some regional-oriented internationalists were enthusiastically involved with the IPR because it represented new attitudes to the Pacific region: a new sense of centre in the Pacific, not in Europe. As discussed in more detail later in this section, however, they had to fight against strong anti-Americanism. For a majority, the IPR and the Pacific Age meant a serious challenge to the British order.

iii) Institutionalization: Predominance of New British Imperialism

Australian members of the IPR came from various streams of internationalism. As we saw in Chapter One, the main categories of internationalism in the inter-war period were Wilsonian internationalism; Christian humanitarian internationalism; economic internationalism; women's internationalism; legalist internationalism; socialist internationalism; and new British internationalism. In Australia, new British imperialism was the dominant force.

Each form of internationalism had its own organization to promote its ideal for the international community. They were the League of Nations Union; the YMCA, International Christian Student Movement and other church organizations; the Chambers of Commerce and the Rotary Clubs; various women's organizations; the Trade Unions; and the Round Table and the RIIA.

Other organizations focused more on domestic issues. With the exception of socialist internationalists, membership of these organizations overlapped extensively with internationalist organizations. These domestically-focused organizations were the WEA (1913), the Public Questions Association (1918), the Fabian Society (1890s), and the Australian Institute of Political Science (1932). The members of these organizations were drawn mainly from upper-middle or middle class backgrounds, and they were *reformists* not revolutionaries. They felt the need for change within existing social and economic frameworks, and believed that reform was necessary to preserve these frameworks.

a) The Round Table and the Workers' Education Association

Among various streams of internationalism in the inter-war period, new British imperialism and its institutions, especially the Round table, occupied a predominant position in Australia. The Round Table's predominance can be explained by several factors. It was the earliest organization (1910) to recruit and consolidate the interests of 'internationally'-concerned people in Australia. Its dominance meant a strong shared assumption of the British imperial order. Members were male and professional, and businessmen were less well represented than in American internationalist organizations.

The nature of the Australian membership was greatly influenced by this initial setting. Lionel Curtis, a major figure in the London Round Table, travelled to the Dominions to recruit members. He came to Australia for three months in September 1910 and travelled to Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane. Branches in these cities were formed as a result.³⁰ The people to whom Curtis was introduced were urban male professionals who were already interested in his ideas of some imperial tie. The propertied class, in contrast to the professional class, was absent in Melbourne and Sydney except for a very few cases.³¹ The Round Table did not attract many men from the Labor camp, either. Foster argues that Sydney had more Labor sympathizers, while Melbourne had none except for Eggleston.³² The more open attitudes to political ideology among the Sydney group can be seen from the example of Garnet V. Portus (1883-1954). Portus, Australian-born Oxford graduate, historian and educator, was to write *Marx and Modern Thought* (1921). He was invited to join the Round Table group in Sydney late in 1920, because it sought to introduce 'a little radical leaven'.³³

³⁰ Leonie Foster, *High Hopes: The Men and Motives of the Australian Round Table* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1986), Chapter Two.

³¹ L. Foster, *High Hopes*, pp.28 and 32.

³² These Labor sympathizers were Mungo McCallum, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sydney, and R. F. Irvine, economist and social reformer, who supported the WEA movement in Sydney. L. Foster, *High Hopes*, pp.26 and 30-31.

³³ G. Portus, *Happy Highways* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1953), p.232.

The journal, the *Round Table*, was edited in London and established itself as the journal for 'internationally'-concerned people in Britain and the Dominions. Portus described the *Round Table* in 1920 as follows:

Before the *Economic Record* and the *Australian Quarterly*, no other than the *Round Table* gave continuous account of current events [of international affairs] in Australia. It was conservative in general outlook, but well-informed and reliable.³⁴

The formation of the Round Table in London in 1910 reflected an international power shift which directly affected Australia. The group advocated reforms in order to adjust to the new context and maintain the strength of the British imperial connection. The new elements in international politics were: the increasing independence of the Dominions and their growing input into imperial matters, and the rise of the new powers of the USA, Germany and Japan. The rise of Germany forced the re-location of British Naval forces to Europe, which left fewer fleets in the Pacific. The first issue of the *Round Table* featured articles on strategy in the Pacific and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.³⁵ This new element directly affected Australian *national* security, and caused much anxiety.

Eggleston voiced this anxiety to the Round Table. Although he believed in the virtue of the British system, he became more and more critical of its Anglo-centricity especially in the strategic field. Already in 1912, he saw the emergence of the Japanese empire, and felt that the existing security system was inadequate.³⁶ This regionalist inclination later led him to promote the IPR, which filled the gap he felt in Australia.

Along with the Round Table, the WEA was another influential organization in the internationalist arena, especially for the IPR. The

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.232.

³⁵ Anonymous, 'The Anglo-Japanese Alliance,' *The Round Table*, Vol. 1, (November, 1910–August, 1911), p.113–153.

³⁶ Correspondence between Eggleston and Curtis especially in 1912 and 1913 shows Eggleston's concern with the Pacific naval policy. MS Eng Hist 778 and 798, BL. As for the discussion about his view, see W. Osmond, *Frederic Eggleston*, p.61.

WEA was supported by the New Liberals,³⁷ and widened the scope of the movement in terms of social groups and intellectual dynamics. Although elitist in its nature, the founders of the Round Table were influenced by New Liberalism not only in its emphasis on the role of the state,³⁸ but also in relation to its concerns of the welfare of the working classes. The WEA movement started near Oxford, and it gained the support of progressive and social-minded scholars at Oxford University. The WEA and the Round Table were not directly connected, but their supporters overlapped. Curtis believed that 'Groups organized in the spirit of the WEA will read the *Round Table* and the Round Table studies of their own accord'.³⁹

Originally, the WEA was founded in Britain in 1903 (it became the WEA in 1906) by Albert Mansbridge, a devout Christian and Trade Unionist. Its ideal was to provide education for the working classes to 'lift themselves up through higher knowledge to higher works and higher pleasure, which if responded to, will inevitably bring about right and sound action upon municipal, national and imperial affairs'.⁴⁰ Mansbridge wanted to provide the workers with much more intensive and ambitious education than the existing extra-mural lectures. His idea materialized at Oxford University around 1907 with the support of scholars at the university. Classes were organized under a joint committee composed of representatives of the university and delegates from the trade unions and community groups affiliated with the WEA, and were conducted as university tutorial classes.⁴¹ A director of tutorial classes was appointed to supervise them as well as to do university work. The movement spread to other universities in Britain, and to Australia. To boost the activities in

³⁷ Eggleston was a supporter of the WEA, and Barret was a key figure, arranging tutorial classes of the WEA in cooperation with the University of Melbourne. M. Roe, *Nine Australian Progressives*, p.65.

³⁸ J. Kendle, *The Round Table Movement*, p.18.

³⁹ Cited in J. Kendle, *The Round Table Movement*, p.182.

⁴⁰ Roy Shuker, *Educating the Workers?: A History of Workers' Education Association in New Zealand* (Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press, 1984), p.15.

⁴¹ Helen Burke, 'Social Scientists as Intellectuals: From the First World War to the Depression,' in Brian Head and James Walter eds., *Intellectual Movements and Australian Society* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.51-52. Burke's thesis also details the British background of the WEA movement, see H. Burke, *Worker Education and Social Inquiry in Australia, 1913-1929*, unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Adelaide, 1981, Chapter One.

Australia, Mansbridge arrived in Sydney in 1913 as Director of Tutorial Classes.

While the Round Table was a closed urban elites' discussion group, the WEA had wider audience in terms of social class and geography. It reached an audience even wider than those addressed by later established internationalist organizations, such as the RIIA and the IPR. The targets and activities of the RIIA and the IPR were largely confined to the major cities of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and Hobart. Radio broadcasts of five minute talks by WEA tutors started in 1929,⁴² which further widened the audience. Probably due to the geographical environment, however, the Australian WEA remained a relatively metropolitan phenomenon with an audience consisting of middle classes as well as artisan classes.⁴³ In this sense, the Australian organization was quite different from its New Zealand counterpart.⁴⁴

This WEA network of tutors and directors was significant for the internationalist movement in Australia, particularly for the IPR. This was because it attracted those who were not only concerned with, but also had knowledge of domestic and external contemporary issues. Tutors of the WEA were quick to respond to the changing world, either of academia or politics, and ready to deal with contemporary society. They were also attuned to the new stimulus of theories of social sciences, and they introduced these to Australian academia.

The directors in Sydney and Melbourne, Meredith Atkinson (1883-1929) and Portus, were involved with various internationalist and other organizations, and publicly debated social issues. Atkinson, a thirty-one

⁴² G. Portus, *Happy Highways*, p.243.

⁴³ Eric Williams argues that the WEA brought in new stimulus to the education of the working classes in Australia. He suggests that the WEA improved the working class education which was rather neglected by the pre-1913 university extension movement. But he also suggests that previous middle-class audience remained almost intact. Eric Williams, 'The Beginnings of the Australian University Extension Movement,' in R. J. W. Selleck ed., *Melbourne Studies in Education* 1972 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1972), pp.197, 198, 202, 206 and 208.

⁴⁴ The WEA classes in New Zealand were directed to rural communities and working classes. R. Schuker, *Educating the Workers?* pp.55, 67, 87 and 91.

year-old Oxford graduate and member of the Round Table, came to Sydney to become assistant Director in 1914. His publicly pronounced pacifist view during WWI, coupled with his personal ambition, caused a bitter fight at the university. He left for Melbourne and became Professor in charge of Tutorial Classes at the University of Melbourne.⁴⁵ He published a book, *The New Social Order: A study of Post-War Reconstruction* (1919), edited journals and later joined the RIIA and the IPR.

Portus took over from Atkinson as acting Director in Sydney in 1918, and devoted himself to the job for the next sixteen years. Convinced of the importance of adult education, he was also involved in various organizations such as the IPR, the League of Nations Union, the Student Christian Movement and the Australian Institute of Political Science. Portus was interested in the new social science theories. He read and gave lectures on Marx's work on the theory of value and surplus value, and recorded that this was one of his best received classes.⁴⁶ He also pioneered the fields of Australian studies, American studies and Australian labour studies. He was an editor of *Studies in Australian Affairs* (1928), which was a part of the IPR research projects, and he wrote *The American Background* (1928), and a chapter, 'The labour movement in Australia, 1788-1914,' in *Australia, Economic and Political Studies* (1920) which Atkinson edited.

Except for the WEA classes, there were very few institutions which taught international relations, or Asian and Pacific studies in the 1920s. The University of Melbourne started a course in international relations as a part of history in 1932, and Australasian history (history of Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific after the 'discovery') in 1926, while the University of Sydney had anthropology, Oriental history (both in Arts), and international law in Law, but no course of international relations in the 1920s and 1930s.⁴⁷ Although army education and the YMCA during WWI

⁴⁵ G. Portus, *Happy Highways*, p.174.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.240-241.

⁴⁷ *The Melbourne University Calendar, 1926 and The Melbourne University Calendar, 1932* (Melbourne: Ford and Son, 1925 and 1931), *Calendar of the University of Sydney 1924* and *Calendar of the University of Sydney 1933* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1924 and 1933).

provoked an awareness of foreign relations, Portus regretfully recalled: 'How rare the books on foreign relations were!'⁴⁸ This reflected the general indifference of society. Some had developed an interest in world issues due to the World War and socialist international movement, but the interests even of most of these internationally-minded people did not go far beyond imperial issues.

Tutors at the WEA took a leading role in pioneering the new disciplines of International Relations and Pacific studies, and their interests in these fields led them to the involvement with the IPR. Especially important were Hessel Duncan-Hall (1891–1976) tutor of Tutorial Classes in Sydney, and Stephen H. Roberts (1901–1970), lecturer in Melbourne, who taught WEA classes at Bendigo, a prosperous mining town in Victoria.⁴⁹ Roberts, a member of the Round Table and the RIIA, not only introduced the new social sciences of psychology and anthropology from Europe, but also brought the Pacific to the attention of Australian academia. With the support of his mentor, Ernest Scott (1868–1939), an Englishman who became Professor of History at the University of Melbourne (1914–1936), Roberts succeeded Gordon Wood (1890–1953) as Professor of History at the University of Sydney at the age of 28 in 1929. Both Scott and Wood were members of the Round Table and the RIIA, and later involved with the IPR. Roberts's interest in continental Europe and its expansion in the Pacific re-oriented the direction of the department. His work, *Population Problems of the Pacific* (1927), Schreuder comments, drew inspiration from the 'fashionable' new social science of anthropology, and even deployed Freudian writing on 'myth' and 'taboo', while its core was based on political economy and urged the need for economic development in the Pacific.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ G. Portus, *Happy Highways*, p.173. Until WWII, international relations was part of the history school and taught by Macmahon Ball in the 1930s at the University of Melbourne. The Department of Political Science became independent during WWII and Ball became the head. I owe this information to Professor Macintyre.

⁴⁹ Deryck Schreuder, 'A "Second Foundation": S. H. Roberts as Challis Professor of History 1929–47,' in Barbara Caine and others eds., *History at Sydney, 1891–1991, Centenary Reflections* (Sydney: History Department, University of Sydney, 1992), p.31.

⁵⁰ D. Schreuder, 'A "Second Foundation"', p.32.

International Relations was one of the major subjects taught at the WEA classes. Roberts taught contemporary international politics at WEA classes at Bendigo.⁵¹ Another WEA director at the University of Tasmania introduced international politics along with economics, industrial history and sociology.⁵² Duncan-Hall promoted this discipline, too. He was a member of the Round Table, and later the RIIA, the League of Nations Union and the IPR. He was close to the Fabian Society, and his involvement with the WEA started at Oxford probably through this connection. He studied at Balliol after taking a Master of Arts degree at Sydney. He became a tutor of Tutorial Classes at Oxford, before he took up a position at Sydney. His book, *The British Commonwealth of Nations* (1920), was widely read especially among those at the Round Table. It was a legalist interpretation of the Commonwealth. He criticized closer economic integration within the British empire, and proposed various legal frameworks for the empire with the Crown as the unifying factor. For him, the Commonwealth was the base of internationalism. By promoting the idea of the 'Commonwealth', he argued, the Dominions became a 'pioneer of internationalism'.⁵³ This new British imperialism did not conflict with, but complemented the League of Nations.

The WEA was particularly important for the IPR. The six Australian representatives at the first IPR conference in 1925 included two WEA tutors, while the other four were either YMCA people or missionaries. These two were Duncan-Hall and Roberts and they became the central figures of the IPR. Why these two young men were chosen is not known. Probably they became well known as rising experts on international relations and Pacific studies among the YMCA circles, where there was also interest in adult education, and therefore some connection with the WEA. After the first IPR conference, Duncan-Hall organized the Sydney group of the IPR. Soon after, he left for Syracuse University, NY, and then worked at the League of Nations Secretariat in 1927-1939.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p.31.

⁵² H. Burke, 'Social Scientists,' p.61.

⁵³ Cited in W. Osmond, *Frederic Eggleston*, pp.99-101.

While Duncan-Hall saw his future across the Pacific, Roberts stayed in Australia and pursued his vision of the new Australia in the Pacific, which was echoed in his speech at the first IPR conference.

Australia feels that the knowledge of Pacific facts and a fair presentation of the various points of view provide the best way towards tolerance and goodwill and understanding In a word, a definite national attitude has emerged on this point [I]t is the New Australia ...⁵⁴

Roberts was strongly influenced by his mentor, Ernest Scott, who was aware of the importance of the Pacific in 1918.⁵⁵ Scott led the delegation at the IPR conferences in 1931 and 1933. Roberts' student, Jack Shepherd (1913–1944), worked in his department in 1935–1938, and served as secretary of the AIIA in charge of the IPR activities. Shepherd attended the IPR conference in 1939 and worked at IPR headquarters in New York as a researcher.

b) The League of Nations Union

The foundation of the League of Nations in 1919 gave another new stimulus to the international movement in Australia, and this was well interpreted in the British imperial framework. John Latham attended the Paris Peace Conference and was inspired by Wilsonian idealism. Coming back to Australia, Latham tried to organize an association along the lines of the British League of Nations Union. It was not an easy task. He wrote to Harold Nicolson, a British diplomat involved with League issues:

I did my best to get a Branch of the League of Nations going in Australia. I approached a number of *prominent* people and obtained provisional promises of support Difficulty was to find a secretary In August [I] got hold of an excellent man, a *cultured*

⁵⁴ S. Roberts, 'Australian View of Pacific Relations,' in [The IPR ed.], *Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session June 30–July 14, 1925: History, Organization, Proceedings, Discussions and Addresses* (Honolulu: the IPR, 1925), p.65. Schreuder argues that Roberts had a strong sense of regional identity and the confidence in this vision. D. Schreuder, 'A "Second Foundation",' p.30.

⁵⁵ Stuart Macintyre discusses Scott's interest in the Pacific and involvement with the IPR. Professor Macintyre kindly lent me his draft of Chapter Five on Biography of Ernest Scott. S. Macintyre, *A History for a Nation: Ernest Scott and the Making of Australian History* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1994).

lawyer ... then he was appointed to a position in the Solomons. In Sydney, things are a bit better. I got my friend T. R. Bavin, MP, to move He has formed an association in Sydney ... but he writes to me it is very difficult to get the *quite right sort* of people to join.⁵⁶ (emphasis added)

What was meant by 'right' can be illustrated by the background of Thomas Bavin, member of the Round Table, and a cultured, mannered and middle-of-the-road reformist.⁵⁷

Despite the difficulties, however, on 18 February 1921, Latham organized the first meeting of the Victorian branch of the LNU at Melbourne. Beside him, Atkinson, Eggleston and eight other prominent men were present.⁵⁸ Almost half were members of the Round Table. At the second meeting they resolved to affiliate with the British LNU, and decided upon office bearers, a constitution and subscription at a minimum of one shilling per year.⁵⁹ The first public meeting was held on 12 April at Town Hall, and attracted 150 people. Latham became President and Eggleston Vice President, and a General Council was elected.

The activities of the LNU were not confined to Melbourne but extended to rural centres. This feature, though shared with the WEA, differed from the approach of more urban elite oriented organizations such as the RIIA and the IPR. The Union's policy was education about the cause of the League, and churches and schools were important tools. Reflecting this policy, the General Council included the Bishops of Bendigo and Gippsland. This character made the Union more attractive than the Round Table to progressive internationalists.⁶⁰ The progressive element

⁵⁶ Latham to Nicolson, 10 November, 1920, MS 1009/1, NLA.

⁵⁷ Bavin belonged to the Progressive Party (political party in NSW) in 1920-1925, and pushed reformist schemes. M. Roe, *Nine Australian Progressives*, p.177. In the inter-war period, he was in the opposition to the Labor Party led by J. Lang (Bavin became leader of the Nationalists in 1925 and Premier of NSW in 1927-1930).

⁵⁸ These eight men were Rev. J. W. Burton, J. W. Colville, L. E. Groom, J. H. Laby, J. Monash, W. W. Phillips, H. Stead and G. Webber. Minutes of the LNU at Victoria, 18 February, 1921, MS 1009/1, NLA.

⁵⁹ Minutes of the LNU in Victoria, 23 March, 1921, MS 1009/1, NLA.

⁶⁰ Six of Roe's 'nine Australian progressives' were either members of the LNU or strong sympathizers. They were W. J. Brown, J. W. Barrett, J. H. L. Cumpston, G. A. Taylor, A. B. Piddington, and R. F. Irvine.

seems to have strengthened over the years, which aroused scepticism among other internationalist organizations.⁶¹

The constitution of the LNU in Victoria shows that Wilsonian idealism did not contradict new British imperialism. The LNU did not deny the virtue of the British empire. Like Lionel Curtis, it believed that: 'No league of nations will be effective in maintaining the freedom of the world unless the British Commonwealth achieves some organic unity'.⁶² Whether Latham agreed with the idea of 'organic' unity or not, he believed in the importance of the imperial tie.

First, [the Union] is to secure the whole hearted acceptance by the *British* people of the League of Nations as the guardian of international right, the organization of international cooperation, the finer arbiter in international differences, and the supreme instrument for removing injustice which may threaten the peace of the world. Second, it is to foster mutual understanding, goodwill, and habit of cooperation and finer dealing between the people of different countries.⁶³

Particular attitudes to race and the Pacific, and a sense of Australians' *responsibility* to govern, were explicit in the objects of the LNU in Victoria: They said that the LNU would:

guarantee the freedom of nation's act as trustee and *guardian of backward races* and undeveloped territories, maintain international order, and finally liberate mankind from the course of war.⁶⁴

For the first few years, Latham enthusiastically made addresses at churches, schools and public meetings, advocating the ideas of international cooperation and interests in international affairs, and inspiring students to be responsible for Australia's mandates in the

⁶¹ The LNU was often referred to as a propaganda body by the AIIA. A report said: 'The Council doubted the advisability of collaborating with a propaganda organization such as the League of Nations Union'. 'Report of the Council of the NSW Branch of the AIIA to the 11th Annual Meeting, For the Year Ended June 30th, 1940,' AIIA Papers, GC.

⁶² Curtis to the Dominion secretaries [of the Round Table], 29 November, 1919, MS 1009/19, NLA.

⁶³ Minutes of the LNU in Victoria, June 1921, MS 1009/23, NLA.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

Pacific.⁶⁵ The imperial element was less obvious in the constitution of the New South Wales (NSW) branch of the LNU. While it mentioned the 'protection of backward races,' the word 'British' was not used as in the constitutions of Victorian branch.⁶⁶

While the LNU cooperated with various women's organizations, its focus remained largely in Europe. Latham stated as a member of the LNU in 1926 that the League was the 'principal agent in preserving the peace of Europe upon which the peace of the world depended'.⁶⁷ Another key figure in the LNU dismissed the idea of forming the Pan-Pacific Union of Nations, since it would be 'useless unless America joined the League'.⁶⁸ In contrast to Eggleston, who saw the possibilities in the Pacific and was later actively involved with the IPR, Latham still saw the centre of the international order as being in Europe. Although he led the first trade commission tour in Asia in 1934, and became the first Australian minister to Japan in 1940, he was cautious about the shift towards the Pacific, and remained outside of the IPR.

c) The RIIA: A Modern Foreign Expert Organization

Like the LNU, the RIIA reflected the new climate after WWI, and was formed within the British imperial framework. Its outlook was, however, more elitist. Latham and Eggleston were involved with its formation, first in London, then in Australia. On their way back from the Paris Peace Conference, Latham and Eggleston attended the inauguration of the RIIA in London in July 1920.⁶⁹ Before the establishment of an Australian branch, some Australians were elected as members by Chatham House (the RIIA headquarters in London) probably during their visits to England.

⁶⁵ Notes of addresses of Latham in 1926, MS 1009/23, NLA.

⁶⁶ Constitution of the LNU, the NSW group, MS 2198/3, NLA. The box contains the correspondences of the NSW branch of the LNU from February 1921 to October 1926. Meetings were held at least once a month during the period. The documents show overlap of the members of the LNU and the IPR and the RIIA as well as the LNU's emphasis on cooperation with Christian organizations such as churches and the YMCA.

⁶⁷ Address to the LNU in Sydney, 8 March, 1926, MS 1009/23, NLA.

⁶⁸ Minute of Executive Committee (NSW branch), MS 2198/3, NLA.

⁶⁹ Hazel King, *At Mid Century: A Short History of the N.S.W. Branch of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1924-1980* (Sydney: The AIIA, 1982), p.1.

The move to form a *local* branch in Australia did not occur until mid-1923. Harold S. Nicholas (1877–1953), a Tasmanian-born judge, Oxford graduate and member of the Round Table, wrote to Margaret Cleeve, Secretary of the Chatham House: 'There is no difficulty finding a sufficient number of people in New South Wales'.⁷⁰ In June 1924, Nicholas reported that the branch in Sydney had been formed.⁷¹ Curtis told him to go ahead and that Australian members would also be members of the RIIA. Publications such as the *Report on Foreign Affairs* by the Empire Parliamentary Association and *Foreign Affairs* by the American sister organization, the Council on Foreign Relations, would be sent to those who paid a subscription.⁷² The NSW branch was the first outside Britain. Selection was totally left to local members. Curtis told Nicholas: 'We must depend on you, without the least interference with your autonomy, to select people who would be elected here'.⁷³

The original members were six prominent men, Nicholas, Bavin, Latham (Latham lived in Sydney at that time), Archibald Charteris (1873–1940), A. M. Pooley and R. C. Garcia, and except for Pooley and Garcia, all were Round Table members. Bavin, Latham and Charteris were also very active in the LNU. Charteris became President of the NSW branch of the LNU in 1923 after Bavin resigned. Garcia was a commander of the Royal Australian Navy. Pooley, a Cambridge graduate and author of books on Japan and Argentina, was the only journalist. After having worked in America, Russia, India and Asia for the *London Observer* and the *New York Times*, he became editor of the *Australian Investment Digest* in Sydney in 1924. It was probably his war time experience in Naval intelligence that brought him into this circle.⁷⁴ A bank account was opened in the name of the BIIA [RIIA], Australian Branch, with a credit balance of £ 19. 13. 11 at the Commonwealth Bank and the address was given as 167 Phillip Street, Sydney. Frank Beasley (1897–1976), a student of Charteris at the University of Sydney, Oxford graduate and Round Table

⁷⁰ Nicholas to Secretary of Chatham House (CH), 20 Jul., 1923, MS 2821/1, NLA.

⁷¹ Nicholas to Secretary of CH, 24 June, 1924, MS 2821/1, NLA.

⁷² Curtis to Nicholas, 5 August, 1924 and 28 October, 1924, MS 2821/1, NLA.

⁷³ Curtis to Nicholas, 5 August, 1924 MS 2821/1, NLA.

⁷⁴ H. King, *At Mid Century*, p.2.

member, served as the first Honorary Secretary and Treasurer till 1927, when he was succeeded by Pooley.

The connection of the RIIA in Sydney with the legal and university worlds was evident from the beginning. The main push for the formation, as King argues, came from the Scotchman Charteris, who was Professor of International Law and Jurisprudence at the University of Sydney. He was already a member of the RIIA in England. He came to Sydney to take up the post in 1920. He inspired students with the ideals of the League of Nations, and was himself involved in the LNU movement. Another two members were added to the RIIA membership list from the University of Sydney in 1925: Duncan-Hall and Arthur Sadler (1882–1970).⁷⁵ Sadler, London-born and an Oxford graduate, taught in Japan in the 1910s, and became Professor of Oriental Studies in 1922, specializing in Japanese history and language.⁷⁶ Charteris and Sadler both attended the IPR conference in Kyoto in 1929.

Communications between Sydney and Melbourne were difficult.⁷⁷ Nicholas did not know whether Australia should have one group or whether there should be sub-groups in Victoria and NSW, because they could hold very few joint meetings.⁷⁸ The Victorian branch of the RIIA was not established until late 1926, although from 1924, informal meetings were held periodically by those elected by Chatham House. Keith Officer (1889–1969), a Melbourne born diplomat, and member of the Round Table and RIIA, wrote in August 1925 about the failure to form a local branch in Melbourne:

[W]e discussed the question of the formation of a local branch of the institution on the lines of your letter of 7 Aug., 1924. We decided for the present to have regular meetings ... and leave the question ... to a later date Some of the present members showed *a reluctance to surrender their membership of the present body,*

⁷⁵ Beasley to Secretary of CH, 20 July, 1925, MS 2821/1, NLA.

⁷⁶ Paper of Chair of Oriental History, FLUS.

⁷⁷ For example, because of the difference of the width of gauges in two states, one had to change trains when crossing the state border.

⁷⁸ Nicholas to Secretary of CH, 28 January, 1924, MS 2821/1, NLA.

*which they prize, in return for membership of a local autonomous branch ...*⁷⁹

This strong loyalty to Chatham House was a distinct feature of the Melbourne group, and was to prevent not only the formation of a local branch but also amalgamation between the RIIA and the IPR later.

Nevertheless, action took place. In March 1926, another informal meeting was held at the Mitre Tavern in Melbourne and it was decided to form a local branch in April.⁸⁰ Gathered for these informal meetings were prominent professional men: Latham, Atkinson, Eggleston, Scott, Harrison Moore (1867–1935), Barrett, Brookes, and Piesse. Moore was a London-born lawyer with degrees from Cambridge and London Universities. He was Professor of Law at the University of Melbourne in 1892–1925, and involved in imperial federation issues and various international organizations, including the Round Table, the RIIA and the LNU. He was also a member of the Australian delegation to the League assemblies in 1927–1929, and led the Australian group at the fourth IPR conference in Hangchow in 1931.

Essentially the RIIA maintained elitist attitudes to public opinion similar to those of the Round Table—the wise men of expertise would educate and lead the masses. RIIA members were uncomfortable with the LNU's concept of mass propaganda. While the RIIA emphasized the importance of public opinion in foreign policy-making, it focused more on the formation of 'experts' who would enlighten the masses. It was a prototype of the modern foreign expert organization. Strongly connected to universities, it was more research-oriented than previous internationalist organizations, and was based on scientific studies of international affairs of politics, economics and law.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Officer to Secretary of CH, 25 August, 1925, MS 2821/1, NLA.

⁸⁰ Officer to Secretary of CH, 29 March, 1926, MS 2821/1, NLA.

⁸¹ In recognition of the importance of national policies encompassing the welfare of the society at large, the aims of the Institute were: To advance the science of international politics, economics and jurisprudence: To provide and maintain means of information upon international questions: To promote discussions and exchange information on these issues: To encourage and facilitate the formation of the branches in Dominion countries. In order to keep the freedom of the speakers in these discussions, the names were recorded

As its origin in the Anglo-American gatherings at the Paris Peace Conference suggests, the RIIA reflected the 'modern manner of thinking' of foreign affairs. Latham described this new mentality and its reception in Australia as follows:

[G]enerally, the attitude of Australians towards the League of Nations is lukewarm ... more or less contemptuous. The default of America has naturally produced a tremendous effect The other side [of Labor] in politics is led by Mr Hughes, whose ideas belong to the pre-war period. In short, there's almost a complete absence of the *modern manner of thinking* of which the League is the expression.⁸² (emphasis added)

Hughes, he argued, represented the old code and was dismissive of this 'modern thinking'.

His ideas belong to the pre-war period He apparently solves problems by sagely and weightily observing that it is necessary to be prepared for war, whatever paper covenant may be executed.⁸³

However, the RIIA was not the first to perceive this new paradigm. The foundation of a Pacific Branch in the (Australian) Prime Minister's Department shows a growing awareness of the importance in certain official circles not only of expert knowledge but also of control of public opinion. The aims of the branch were to

take every opportunity to assist in the instruction of the public opinion on matters within the scope of the Branch [I]t will be possible for the staff of the Branch to assist in the work of private study groups, by preparing syllabuses of reading and taking part in discussions of foreign affairs: to advise public libraries in the selection of books: to give information to newspapers and magazines: to support movements such as for the closer study of foreign affairs in the Universities, or for the foundation of periodicals for the discussion of the foreign relations of the

anonymously and the attendants should not quote the names of the speakers. The members were also not allowed to express any political statement on any issues publicly. The Royal Charter and by-laws of the RIIA.

⁸² Latham to Nicolson, 10 November, 1920, MS 1009/1, NLA.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

Commonwealth: and to take part, with discretion, in public discussions.⁸⁴

Piesse was Director of this one-man branch in 1919–1923, dealing with the issues of and collecting information on relations between Australia and Asia and the Pacific. Piesse worked especially hard on Japanese immigration issues, but inevitably his views, not to mention the principles behind the setting of the branch, were in conflict with those of Hughes. The branch was formed by the Acting Prime Minister with very little consultation with Hughes when Hughes was away at the Paris Peace Conference.⁸⁵ Piesse resigned in November 1923, and felt that 'for some time his opinion was not fully utilized by the government'.⁸⁶ While support for the principles of the branch existed, the opposition was also still strong.

The principle behind the establishment of the Pacific Branch, especially on expert knowledge and public opinion, however, seems to have been inherited by the newly formed Department of External Affairs in 1934, into which the Pacific Branch was absorbed. Including Piesse, many internationalists with similar principles experienced semi-diplomatic activities through the RIIA and the IPR, and later became diplomats. These men brought new diplomatic principles, fostered by these organizations, into the Department.

Hostility to the modern manner and thinking which the League represented did not only come from the old-fashioned Hughes, but also from the Labor Party. Latham reported:

[T]he Labor Party, originally, during the war, a strong advocate of the League of Nations, has somehow or other discerned that the League is really the ... symbol of a capitalist plot.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ 'The Pacific Branch of the Prime Minister's Department, Object and Duties,' n. d., A1; 1919/8756, AA.

⁸⁵ Peter Edwards, *Prime Ministers and Diplomats: the Making of Australian Foreign Policy, 1901–49*, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983), p.55.

⁸⁶ Piesse to Baijpai, 13 January, 1925, cited in Edwards, *Prime Ministers*, p.58.

⁸⁷ Latham to Nicolson, 10 November, 1920, MS 1009/1, NLA.

The League of Nations became an establishment organ in Labor's eyes. The Labor camp claimed that internationalists, especially the Round Table members, were un-Australian, elitist, and 'influential only in a limited circle ... in touch with some Federal Ministers, and embracing a number of imperialistic lawyers and university professors and totally out of touch with Labor opinion'.⁸⁸

iv) The Meaning of the IPR: The Regionalist Challenge to the British Order

a) The IPR and the Pacific as an American Construction

Although attracting those interested in Japan and the mandates in the Pacific, the IPR was predominantly perceived by Australians as a tool of American influence in the Pacific. Although America inspired and attracted some, the loyalty of the majority to the British empire was far stronger. As discussed in the next section, Japanese IPR members saw America as a "Star of Hope" of democratic ideals. In contrast, the attitude to the USA in Australia was one of uneasiness or scepticism. However, one form of cooperation with Americans was promoted by an organization of British origin called the English Speaking Union. The Pan-Pacific Union of Honolulu, which was one interesting episode in the initial formation of the IPR, was also involved in this promotion.

The Pan-Pacific Union encouraged some to favour Australian-American cooperation. Before the first IPR conference of 1925, some Australians attended Pan-Pacific conferences in Honolulu, China or Japan both in an official and unofficial capacity. NSW showed readiness to send delegations to these conferences, while the other states did not join this new enterprise. Joseph Carruthers (1856-1932), former Premier of NSW in 1904-1907 and member of the cabinet (in 1924), attended the Pan-Pacific Food Conservation Conference in 1924 as a representative of the NSW

⁸⁸ W. Osmond, *Frederic Eggleston*, p.98.

state government.⁸⁹ Carruthers, a personal friend of the Prime Minister Stanley Bruce (Prime Minister, 1923–1929), sought representation by the Federal Government at the conference, but the commonwealth decided not to be represented.⁹⁰

Bruce took a cordial attitude to the Pan-Pacific movement. According to the *Mid-Pacific*, the Pan-Pacific Union's journal, he was sympathetic to the League of Nations movement, and proposed to establish a similar organization in the Pacific.⁹¹ He also acknowledged that the Food Conference achieved 'very useful work', and would go 'a long way toward promoting better understanding among the people in the Pacific'.⁹²

Through this conference, Carruthers promoted an Australian-American cooperative spirit, which he referred to as a link between the English-speaking people. This concept did not contradict the British imperial tie, but reinforced it: 'Americans and Australians would always be linked together in a brotherhood as children of the same good old stock'.⁹³ He pursued this idea by re-constructing the image of Captain Cook from the existing Hawaiian perception of him as an evil captain into an image of Cook as an introducer of English civilization.⁹⁴ To celebrate the new image of Cook as a symbol of the English-speaking peoples' tie, he proposed the re-furbishing of Cook's memorial at Kaawaloa Bay in a Hawaiian island. This project, although small in scale, became a joint event supported by the governments of Australia, New Zealand, Britain,

⁸⁹ The Premier of the NSW government reported that they decided that Carruthers would represent NSW for the Pan-Pacific Food Conservation Conference. Fuller to the Governor of Hawaii, 30 January, 1924, MSS 1638/19, ML.

⁹⁰ Carruthers to the Minister of Trade and Commerce, 23 May, 1924, Carruthers to Bruce, 28 May, 1924, Carruthers to Earle Page, 29 May 1924, Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department to Carruthers, 11 June, 1924, MSS 1638/19, ML.

⁹¹ Anonymous, 'The Pan-Pacific Club in Tokyo,' *The Mid-Pacific Magazine*, (May, 1924), p.21.

⁹² Bruce to Carruthers, 1 August, 1924, MSS 1638/62, ML.

⁹³ Carruthers to Prof. Gortner, University of Minnesota, 25 November, 1924, MSS 1638/59, ML.

⁹⁴ Carruthers was troubled when he found out that Cook was seen as an evil captain by Hawaiians, and argued for the need to change this 'wrong' image. Paper given on Cook to the Royal Historical Society of NSW, 11 November, 1924, MSS 1638/60, ML.

the USA and Japan.⁹⁵ Ford and Carruthers shared the idea that Cook introduced civilization to the Pacific including Australia and New Zealand. Although others such as Herbert Gregory, (American) the Director of the Bishop Museum in Honolulu and a major figure of the Pan-Pacific Science Congress, opposed this glorified image, it is significant that Carruthers's rhetoric obtained official support in these countries. While Carruthers remained marginal at the IPR (he attended the second IPR conference), his view shows a particular way of accommodating the USA into the British imperial order.⁹⁶

In contrast to these pro-American activities which remained within the imperial framework, the IPR scheme suggested a more independent approach to the Pacific, and therefore created scepticism and hostility among imperial-oriented internationalists.

In Australia, after the first conference, the IPR was separately organized as local branches in Sydney, Melbourne and later Brisbane. The formation of the National Council did not happen until early 1930s. When these local branches were incorporated as a national council, however, it became the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA). It was the Australian counterpart of the RIIA, not a distinct national council of the IPR. The institutionalization of the IPR in Australia was, therefore, intertwined with that of the RIIA.

The organization for the first IPR conference, including the selection of delegates and the provision of secretarial personnel and offices, was done not through the Round Table or the RIIA groups, but through the YMCA.

⁹⁵ A part of the land of this planned memorial park was owned by a Japanese land syndicate. The Japanese government bought this land and endowed it to the Territory of Hawaii, MSS 1638/48 and 60, ML.

⁹⁶ The English Speaking Union was founded in London in late 1910s and later in Philadelphia to promote close ties in the Anglo-Saxon community. It still has an office in London. Articles in *Landmark*, the journal of the Union, in the 1910s and 20s, show its enthusiasm for Anglo-American cooperation through the Rhodes Scholarship, the YMCA activities and the League of Nations. A typed draft of *The English Speaking Union: The Story of Its Founding*, and *The Landmark*, (April, 1919), pp.255 and 294, and (January, 1920), p.121, LESU. There were branches in Australia, which were more like social clubs. Their American orientation was rather distinct. Lulu, Eggleston's wife, and H. Brookes were very active in this Union. W. Osmond, *Frederic Eggleston*, p.138.

This meant the injection of different elements into a group of internationalists centred around the Round Table: church people and women. The members for the first conference included four YMCA related people out of a total delegation of six. Janet Mitchel (1896–1957), daughter of a prominent educationalist,⁹⁷ and graduate of the University of London, was one of these six, and she did the IPR's initial secretarial work through the YMCA national headquarters' office in Melbourne. She was the educational secretary of the YWCA then (1924–1926), and active in the LNU. She was a member of Australian group at the IPR conferences in 1925 and 1931.

Eleanor Hinder (1893–1963) was another woman from the YMCA who made a distinct contribution to the IPR. Born in NSW and educated at the University of Sydney, she was involved in the Student Christian Movement, the WEA, the YMCA, the YWCA and the City Girls Amateur Sports Association. She became an expert on industrial relations, which led her to work for the National YMCA of China in Shanghai in 1926. She attended the first Pan Pacific Women's Conference in 1928, and the IPR conferences at Kyoto in 1929, at Hangchow in 1931, and at Mont Tremblant, Quebec in 1942. She later worked for the British Foreign Office, the ILO and the United Nations.

The YMCA in the 1920s espoused an interesting mixture of eugenics and Christian idealism. It promoted physical exercise as well as international cooperation based on Christian humanitarianism. While its journal featured IPR-related Pacific issues, its Christian humanitarian internationalism did not contradict the new British imperialism. In 1927, *Melbourne's Manhood*, the monthly journal, featured a series of articles titled 'The Pacific of the Future'. Contributors stated the importance of the IPR movement.⁹⁸ They included some Round Table members, and other

⁹⁷ Her father was Alexander Morrison, Principal of Scotch College, Melbourne.

⁹⁸ The contributors were D. D. Trainer, national secretary of the YMCA of Australia, K. H. Bailey, member of the Round Table and lecturer in History and later Law at the University of Melbourne, and G. A. Wood, Professor of Commerce at the University of Melbourne. *Melbourne's Manhood*, January, February, March, April, June, July, and August 1927.

articles in the same magazine promoted organic imperial ties.⁹⁹ This suggests some influence of the Round Table on the YMCA.

The national headquarters of the YMCA (in Melbourne) initially acted as the IPR's *national* secretariat in 1924–1925 although in this period no national unit of the IPR was yet organized. The YMCA in Melbourne organized preparatory meetings for the conference and approached the Federal Government to send official observers. They invited officials at the Prime Minister's Department to the meetings. The government made an early decision not to be involved, a judgement which was based on the report of the Commissioner in the USA: the IPR was an unofficial organization, and the conference would discuss the immigration issue.¹⁰⁰ Autonomy of the IPR from the government was, therefore, the result of government action rather than the policy of the IPR in this period.

In the process of the actual formation of the local IPR branches, the YMCA lost its control very quickly. Instead, the RIIA members took over the core positions. Coming back from the first IPR conference, Duncan-Hall was convinced of the importance of the IPR for Australia. His loyalty to the British empire did not disappear,¹⁰¹ but he was profoundly excited by this new movement. During the conference, he became keen on the idea of forming a Pacific League of Nations.¹⁰² There was something very attractive about American manners to him, and he started to consider job prospects, not just in the British empire, but in the USA and the League of Nations. After contemplating whether to work with Ford at the Pan-Pacific Union, he obtained a post at Syracuse University, New York through the connections he made at the first conference.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ *Melbourne's Manhood* featured a series of eight articles, titled as 'Problems of the British Empire' in 1926. *Melbourne's Manhood*, January, February, March, June, July, September, and November 1926.

¹⁰⁰ Note of Walter Henderson, 24 October, 1924, A981; Org 93, AA.

¹⁰¹ In his report to the government, he emphasized the importance of the British representation at the IPR conferences. H. Duncan Hall and J. B. Condliffe eds., *What of the Pacific?: A Search on Its Problems* (Honolulu, 1925), A981; Org 93, AA.

¹⁰² Duncan-Hall mentioned this idea of the League of Nations for the Pacific sometime between 25 June and 1 July, 1925, Diary of 1925, MS 5547/10, NLA.

¹⁰³ Duncan-Hall's search for his work both in Honolulu and in American universities was detailed in his diary. Diary of 1925, MS 5547/10, NLA.

Just before he left for New York, Duncan-Hall organized the Sydney group of the IPR. Being a member of the Round Table, the LNU and the RIIA, he first approached the key figures in this network, Latham and Mungo MacCallum (1854-1942). MacCallum was a Scottish-born scholar of modern languages and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sydney (1924-1927). In mid March, 1926, Duncan-Hall held the first meeting. A committee was formed to consider the possibility of establishing an IPR branch in Sydney. Charteris and Nicholas were elected to it. At the first committee meeting, Duncan-Hall suggested close cooperation between the IPR and the RIIA.¹⁰⁴

This created disturbance in an otherwise cordial and cosy group of internationalists. Beasley wrote to the London RIIA:

The danger in any proposal such as that put forward by Mr Hall is that the number of people interested in the subject is naturally limited and is largely confined to persons already members of this Branch and to persons whom we do not want to elect to this Branch for (in many cases) personal reasons. For example, several of our members are also members of the Round Table group in Sydney; the Executive and Council of the League of Nations Union also claims others; so that the list of possible members of any new institute must include many who are already members of kindred organizations. Since this branch was founded by us a few years ago, all the necessary committee work and organization has been done by Professor Charteris, Mr Nicholas, Major Longfield and myself, and we feel very proud that our efforts have resulted in the continuance of a Branch which shows every sign of a long and healthy life. At the same time we realize that if we stand aloof altogether from the new institute, the latter being supported by American propaganda and possibly appealing to a few more people because its subscription will ... be much lower, *we are in danger of being 'swamped' out of existence altogether* - and that, we feel, would be very poor recompense for the efforts of the past three years. For these reasons, *we cannot afford to ignore the existence of a new movement*, and must do something even if we do think that the new institute will prove to be only a 'flash in a pan'. You

¹⁰⁴ Beasley to Sec of CH, 30 March, 1926, MS 2821/1, NLA. Chatham House was named by Canadian Colonel Leonard who donated the money to buy the property in order to house the headquarters of the RIIA in 1923. S. King-Hall, *Chatham House: A Brief Account of the Origins, Purposes, and Method of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp.18-20.

hardly need my assurance that we all prize our membership of the British Institute, and for that reason we shall *cling more tenaciously to our independent existence*: but it is undoubtedly a time when we need your sympathetic advice.¹⁰⁵ (emphasis added)

While the NSW group discussed whether to amalgamate the IPR into the already existing RIIA, the Victorian branch was in a different situation. In Victoria the local branch of the RIIA was not formed until April 1926. Therefore the formation of the IPR branch was not a matter of whether they should amalgamate it with the local RIIA, but a matter of how they should form local branches of the IPR and the RIIA.

Anti-American sentiment, clear in Beasley's letter, was caused by Australian RIIA members' perception of the USA as a challenge to the existing imperial order. However, Chatham House thought otherwise. They wrote to Beasley to urge the formation of a single strong body.

[Y]our letter ... happened to come shortly after we had been considering the question of the representation of Great Britain at the projected meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Honolulu in Spring [1927], and after discussion at our executive Committee yesterday it was settled to send you the following telegram: 'Institute is arranging representation from Great Britain at Honolulu and suggesting similar course to Canadian members. To avoid duplication could you invite affiliation Pacific Group to Australian Institute'.¹⁰⁶

The Chatham House executive committee concluded that they could not afford to ignore the IPR movement, and realized that this must apply even more in Australia than in Britain. A single strong institute rather than a number of weaker and sectional organizations was important; otherwise, they thought, a great deal of effort might be wasted as had happened in the USA. They also felt that it was important that British interests should be represented even unofficially at the IPR conferences.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Beasley to Sec of CH, 30 March, 1926, MS 2821/1, NLA.

¹⁰⁶ Bourdillon to Beasley, 6 May, 1926, MS 2821/1, NLA.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

It is interesting to note that the RIIA in London was ready for Anglo-American cooperation, and that members in Australia remained more sceptical. Probably this was because the Round Table and the RIIA in London were prepared to adjust to changes (including growing American power) which would affect the imperial arrangement. In Australia, on the other hand, some members were attracted to these British organizations, not because of their outlook on change, but precisely in order to preserve the status quo. There were, however, others who gathered around these organizations because of their vision of change. This latter group of internationalists welcomed the new IPR movement.

Eggleston, already known for his criticism of Anglocentricism and for his assertion of the need for regional awareness, was one who realized the importance of the IPR and welcomed the amalgamation. With his experience as leader of the Australian group at the second IPR conference in 1927, he tried to convince sceptics of the importance of the amalgamation. The situation in late 1927, however, was hopeless. He wrote:

There are some funny people about. First, men like Nicholas and Laby insist that the Institute of Pacific Relations is a vehicle of American propaganda. Being on the spot and carefully watching, I had reported to them there was nothing of the kind, but they were simply incredulous. I regarded this as an insult to me and our relations are rather cool at present.¹⁰⁸

Besides Nicholas or Laby, who thought all organizations other than the Round Table unnecessary, there were also a number of people who were hostile to the IPR and the USA in general. Merle Davis, the first General Secretary of the IPR, visited Australia in 1926, and found general scepticism towards the USA. 'If the IPR can succeed in Australia, it can do so anywhere in the world,' he commented.¹⁰⁹

This anti-Americanism originated in the fear of a challenge not only to the existing imperial order, but also to their own social standing. In other

¹⁰⁸ Eggleston to Curtis, 17 November, 1927, MS 2821/1, NLA.

¹⁰⁹ IPR: Report Letter, No. IV by J. M. Davis, 14 August, 1926, A981; Org 93, AA.

words, it reflected the elitist nature of some members of the Round Table and the RIIA. The IPR set a lower subscription fee, and seems to have had a less elitist outlook than the RIIA in Australia. Eggleston thought there were a lot of cliques in Melbourne and Sydney with deep mistrust of some members of the IPR.

[T]hey [Nicholas and Laby] and others say that the members of the [IPR] in Australia are not carefully chosen, that they contain a good proportion of cranks, and that confidential things cannot be discussed before them In Melbourne we have deliberately chosen one or two Bolsheviks and extreme Labour partisans, and the other crowd will not meet them, or at any rate, discussion before them will not be free, and will, therefore, be of little value.¹¹⁰

Eggleston continued: 'Personally I am always ready to cooperate with anybody. Possibly my sympathies are too catholic, and my energies dissipated'.¹¹¹ He agreed with Curtis on the folly of duplicating internationalist organizations. One solution, he thought, was to have an inner group of the Round Table and the RIIA, discussing confidential issues, and the IPR making some sort of appeal to the public.¹¹²

While Eggleston was hopeful, others remained sceptical. Even in August 1928, Officer, now an adviser to the Department of External Affairs in the Prime Minister's Department, was adamant. The librarian at Chatham House, M. Cleeve,¹¹³ recorded a conversation with him, in which he expressed deep scepticism.

[Officer] did not think there was a possibility of the RIIA joining up with the IPR. The latter had a number of members which the RIIA could never admit with the feeling that the confidential character could be maintained.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ Eggleston to Curtis, 17 November, 1927, MS 2821/1, NLA.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ Boudillon replaced her as Secretary in 1926 and she became librarian and publishing officer at Chatham House. S. King-Hall, *Chatham House*, p.16.

¹¹⁴ Memo of Conversation with Major Keith Officer, M. E. Cleeve, 10 August, 1928, MS 2821/1, NLA.

Officer even denied the possibility of the IPR's becoming a branch of the RIIA. All the RIIA in Australia could do, he thought, was to send representatives to IPR conferences. Although he valued the research which the IPR was promoting, for him the IPR was a harmful propaganda organization.¹¹⁵

Symbolically, these more 'imperial-oriented' internationalists were against the concept of the Pacific. Officer opposed the concept of the Pacific as an entity. He thought that this notion would challenge the existing British imperial order.

[Officer] thought that the idea of the Pacific as a whole was an *incorrect* one as Australia and New Zealand tended much more towards Euro-Asia than to the eastern shores.¹¹⁶

The view was supported by other imperial-oriented internationalists. Richard Casey (1890–1976), an Australian-born diplomat and graduate of Cambridge, was member of the Round Table and the RIIA, and Australian political liaison officer in London (1924–1931) at that time. He agreed with Officer. Casey thought that there was no Pacific problem of the kind that the IPR conference suggested, but only world problems. To create any independent arrangement in the Pacific was absurd, and all matters should be dealt with by the League of Nations.¹¹⁷ To see the problem as particular to the Pacific meant an independent policy for Australia, separate from imperial arrangements and outside of the imperial framework. Although not so adamant as Officer or Casey, officials at the Prime Minister's Department, who had been dealing with IPR issues since the first contact from the YMCA in 1924, felt: 'The Pacific problem was a dangerous concept'.¹¹⁸

It took a long time from the Chatham House proposal of 1926 to achieve the amalgamation, but Sydney led the way. The amalgamation of the NSW branch was achieved in September 1929.¹¹⁹ Members of the RIIA

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ Casey to External Affairs [of Australia], 25 May, 1929, A981; Org 93, AA.

¹¹⁸ Note [of Henderson], 28 June, 1929, A981; Org 93, AA.

¹¹⁹ Buesst to Sec of CH, 6 June, 1930, AIIA file, LCH.

and the IPR decided that neither would absorb the other, so they should form a new organization to be called the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) which would affiliate independently with the headquarters of the RIIA in London and the IPR in Honolulu.¹²⁰

There was little enthusiasm in Melbourne for this scheme.¹²¹ The reason appeared to be institutional. Tristan Buesst (1894–1982),¹²² a businessman and Secretary of the RIIA in Melbourne, explained that the chief obstacle was the existence of the Bureau of Social and International Affairs (BSIA). The BSIA was established in 1928 as an incorporated body of the RIIA, the IPR, the LNU, and the Round Table, and was financed by a wealthy businessman.¹²³ It provided the office, secretarial staff, and expenses. Each organization in the BSIA shared the office, but remained independent in their activities, although the members of executive bodies overlapped. Buesst thought the amalgamation of the RIIA and the IPR would seriously prejudice the success of the BSIA, and confuse or estrange the financiers. It would also lose revenue based on the subscriptions to the RIIA and the IPR. However, they already shared a common secretariat and executive officers, therefore he thought the amalgamation should come eventually.¹²⁴

Probably behind these administrative problems, there was both a reluctance to lose the direct connections with the RIIA and a sense of prejudice towards the IPR in Melbourne. The crucial issue, RIIA members argued, was that the IPR in Victoria included non-British subjects, which the charter and by-laws of the RIIA forbade. The NSW branch at Sydney did not have non-British members, so this never became an issue. The

¹²⁰ Clunies Ross to Curtis, 12 February, 1929, Whydham to Buesst, 22 April, 1929, AIIA file, LCH.

¹²¹ Hon Sec of the RIIA in Sydney to Nicholas, 15 June, 1929, AIIA file, LCH.

¹²² He was born in England, but educated both at the Melbourne University and Oxford University. He was also member of the Round Table.

¹²³ This businessman was Edward Dayson (1886–1949), Bendigo-born and graduate of the University of Melbourne. He was member of both the Round Table and the RIIA.

¹²⁴ Buesst to Sec of CH, 6 June, 1929, and Whyndham to Sec of the RIIA, 30 October, 1929, AIIA file, LCH.

Queensland branch of the AIIA was formed in August 1931 along the lines of NSW, as an amalgamated body, and also did not have this problem.¹²⁵

The issue of amalgamation consequently brought another issue, the formation of a national body. The establishment of the national headquarters of the RIIA's local organizations, the AIIA, was delayed by the amalgamation process, but also some felt that they were not ready yet. In 1927, Officer, Latham and Nicholas opposed the idea of forming the AIIA's headquarters in Canberra. The time was not ripe because Canberra as a capital city was still developing, and many did not want to sever their relationship with Chatham House.¹²⁶

Almost five years later, on 17 August 1932, plans for the *national* headquarters of the amalgamated body, and a constitution of the AIIA were drawn up at a meeting at the University of Sydney. The constitution was brought back for the discussion in Melbourne in October and finally accepted, although the BSIA framework remained intact, and the RIIA and the IPR kept independent activities under this federated body. The integration of these two groups (the RIIA and the IPR) in Victoria did not take place until 1937.¹²⁷ The Canberra office was only formed in 1937, and the national headquarters office, the Commonwealth Council, remained in Sydney until 1951.¹²⁸

b) National Unity

Pioneering works on Australian relations with Asia and the Pacific were produced by the group of regionalists linked to the IPR,¹²⁹ with stimulation from meetings at IPR conferences, its international programs

¹²⁵ Memo of the 1932 Sydney Conference of Victorian, New South Wales and Queensland representatives of the State Branches of the AIIA, 17 August, 1932, MS 2821/1, NLA.

¹²⁶ Nicholas to Sec of CH, 27 September, 1927, MS 2821/1, NLA.

¹²⁷ Report of the AIIA, 1937-1938, says that the merger was mainly caused by the joint action in the project of the *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin*. Report of the AIIA, 1937-1938, CPR Box 120/Australian Council, BLCU.

¹²⁸ The headquarters' office was then moved to Melbourne, and in 1975 it was transferred to Canberra. I owe this information to Professor John Legge.

¹²⁹ Nick Brown, 'Australian Intellectuals and the Image of Asia, 1920-1960,' *Australian Cultural History*, No. 9 (1990), pp.82-83.

and the financial support from the IPR headquarters. A journal, the *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin* was started by the Melbourne group in 1936.¹³⁰ Other pioneering works included: F. W. Eggleston, P. D. Phillips, G. Packer, E. Scott, and S. S. Addison eds., *The Peopling of Australia* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1933); I. Clunies Ross ed., *Australia and the Far East: Diplomatic and Trade Relations* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1935); D. B. Copland and C. V. Janes, *Australian Trade Policy: A Book of Documents 1932-1937* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1937); W. G. K. Duncan ed., *Australia's Foreign Policy* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1938); J. Shepherd, *Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East* (part of the IPR Inquiry series).

Although reflecting and confined by the intellectual paradigm of the day, these works pioneered the studies of foreign policy in the region, and therefore, influenced the frameworks of later studies.¹³¹ It is noteworthy that these works were not on the region per se, but on Australia in the region. In other words, they were the first attempts to define the new Australia in relation to the region. These pioneers envisaged a stronger and more independent nation-state of Australia.

Strong nation-state building was also felt important for domestic reasons. In the 1920s and 1930s, a crucial issue was the social and economic crisis. Modernization and industrialization were, it was felt, undermining social cohesion, and social unity should be achieved. Regionalists felt that only a strong confident national entity could deal with its region without the support of great powers outside the region. For example, Eggleston was deeply concerned with the disintegration of Australian society due to class conflict. While propagating the need to develop awareness of the region,

¹³⁰ Report of the AIIA, 1937-1938, CPR, Box120/Australian Council, BLCU.

¹³¹ Brown especially suggests the importance of developmental themes in Asian studies in Australia in the 1950s and onwards, N. Brown, 'Australian Intellectuals,' p.90. One of the most influential IPR members was W. Macmahon Ball. He advocated the importance of the region in the 1930s, and after WWII, he continued to promote the agenda: the need of modifying Australian official policy to Asia. He was influential in shaping the base of Australian scholarship on Southeast Asia. Rex Mortimer, 'From Ball to Arndt: the Liberal Impasse in Australian Scholarship on Southeast Asia,' in R. Mortimer ed., *Showcase State: The Illusion of Indonesia's Accelerated Modernization* (Melbourne: Angus and Robertson, 1973), p.107.

he sought a theory to unite society.¹³² Promoting the welfare of society, regionalists strove to develop unifying codes of identity. These were often formed in terms of citizenship, and the non-European population of the region as well as Australian aboriginals were excluded from the concepts.

Australian IPR members were progressive in the sense of supporting reform of external and domestic arrangements, and the internationalist organizations—the RIIA, IPR and later the AIIA—contained some progressive elements including women, church leaders and those with socialist-leanings. Yet members were predominantly middle-class and male, and these organizations were regarded as a ‘capitalist plot’ by the Labor camp and did not gain much support in that quarter.¹³³

While endorsing ‘modern’ thinking on foreign relations in the spirit of the League, and criticising the old thinking of Hughes, ‘regional’ internationalists shared Hughes’ belief in the White Australian Policy. It will be argued in Chapter Four that Eggleston and Roberts’s promotion of the idea of the new Australia and new attitudes to the region actually protected the existing White Australian Policy. The failure of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union movement,¹³⁴ and the complicated nature of

¹³² Draft of ‘The Story of Social Integration’, MS 423/20, NLA. It was published as *Search for a Social Philosophy* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1941).

¹³³ S. Carpenter, ‘Honolulu Institute of Pacific Relations,’ *The Pan-Pacific Worker*, 1 May, 1928, p.8 and 15 May, 1928, pp.6–8.

¹³⁴ The Pan-Pacific Trade Union movement started in Australia in 1921 in order to unite workers for the anti-war movement. This was materialized at the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference in Hankow, China. It had two purposes: anti-war and anti-imperialism. The secretariat was set in Shanghai and branches in the USSR, China, Britain, France, Australia, Indonesia, the USA, Korea, Japan, and the Philippines were affiliated to this body. The editorial headquarters of the journal, *Pan-Pacific Workers*, was transferred to Sydney in late 1927 to early 1928. One of the objects of the secretariat was ‘to fight against and remove all racial and national barriers and prejudices which still divide the exploited classes and oppressed peoples’. However, the foundation of this Pan-Pacific Trade Union movement in these countries, except for the USSR, was very weak. In Australia, this movement created hostility among local labour organizations. The executives of the Australian Labor Party thought this was a dangerous movement for two reasons. First, they saw it as a threat to the hegemony of Britain, and second, a threat to “White Australia”. The Australian Workers’ Union was also hostile to this Pan-Pacific movement because they feared an alliance with Asian workers would lead to introduction of their cheaper labour into Australia. In 1929, this movement faded into an appendage of the Comintern and the regional enthusiasm was lost. Frank Farrell, *International Socialism and Australian Labour: The Left in Australia 1919–1939* (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1981), pp.126, 129, 132, 134 and 137–143. I owe this

women's movements in Australia¹³⁵ demonstrate further that 'progressiveness' in terms of class and gender did not necessarily lead to similar attitudes to race in Australia in the inter-war period. Regionalists defined the new Australia externally as a part of the Pacific and domestically as distinct from the Orient.

A strong sense of nation-state among the internationalists was shown over the issue of membership of non-British subjects. Eggleston was in a minority when he suggested that the IPR was an international body, and therefore, that membership should be open to people of any nationality. This argument was challenged by the secretary of Chatham House, who stated that although the IPR was an international body, each country had a national council whose membership was limited to its own nationality.¹³⁶ This idea of *national* representation was already strong even before the formation of the national body. Eleanor Hinder was working at the YWCA in Shanghai when she asked whether she could join the Australian delegation to the fourth IPR conference in Hangchow in 1931. There was a debate about her eligibility to be in a 'national' group due to her foreign residence. She complained that while the IPR should be a gathering of unofficial participants in their personal capacity, one could not attend the conference without joining a *national* group.¹³⁷

The institutionalization of the IPR took the form of the consolidation of various existing internationalist organizations into a united national body. The difficulty of forming the national headquarters reflected the strong desire to protect the imperial order. It also showed the practical problem of communication and the distinct sense of local identities within Australia. It is interesting to note that the nationalization of the AIIA happened at the same time as the change of direction in the IPR

reference to Frank Bonjiorno. For official documents on the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference in 1928, see A981; Conf 258, AA.

¹³⁵ Lake argues the issue of race as a complex element of the women's movement in Australia in the inter-war period. Marilyn Lake, 'A Revolution in the Family: The Challenge and Contradictions of Maternal Citizenship in Australia,' in Seth Koven and Sonya Michel eds, *Mothers of a New World: Maternalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States* (New York: Routledge, 1993), p.380.

¹³⁶ Macadam memo, 28 February, 1934, AIIA file, LCH.

¹³⁷ Hinder to Eggleston, 8 January, 1931, MS 423/14, NLA.

from the Pacific to the Atlantic (discussed in Chapter Five and Six) and of the formation of the British Commonwealth Relations Conference (1933-). At the time when the organization was put on a national footing and became the unofficial channel of communication within the Commonwealth, an opportunity to develop alternative identities in Australia in relation to the region was lost.

While members aspired to influence government policy, the Federal Government decided on non-involvement with the IPR in the initial stages. It declined invitations to the meetings and refused to offer financial help to cover the costs of the delegations.¹³⁸ Some government officials were nervous about non-officials discussing issues such as disarmament at the IPR conference in 1929.¹³⁹ The Prime Minister's Department, however, did not intervene. A note suggests confidence in the capability of the delegation members and a strong reluctance about official intervention.¹⁴⁰ The Department was not indifferent nor unsympathetic. Although it felt the concept of the Pacific dangerous, it had a fairly good knowledge of the IPR and valued the quality of its conferences and activities.¹⁴¹

This relaxed attitude of the Prime Minister's Department reflected the Department's belief that the organization was under the control of the RIIA and that it did not have to worry about the American domination.¹⁴² Official involvement with the IPR conferences started in 1942, reflecting the change of the IPR headquarters' policy towards a more official-orientation in the war situation.¹⁴³ From the eighth conference in 1942

¹³⁸ Beeby to the PM Department, 25 February, 1927, Addison to Deane, 25 February, 1927, Note of Secretary, PM Department, 8 March, 1927, A981; Org 93, AA.

¹³⁹ The Director, Investigation Branch, The Attorney General's Department to Secretary, the PM Department, 17 April, 1929, A981; Org 93, AA.

¹⁴⁰ Note of Henderson, 19 April, 1929, A981; Org 93, AA.

¹⁴¹ Walter Henderson at the Department did not hold a blind objection to the IPR activities. He was alive to all the information on the IPR and had a positive opinion of the IPR especially after meeting J. B. Cordliffe, the Research Director of the IPR, in April 1929. Note of Henderson, 29 May, 1929, A981; Org 93, AA.

¹⁴² Note of Secretary, PM Department, 29 May, 1929, A981; Org 93, AA.

¹⁴³ The ISIPR, *War and Peace in the Pacific: A Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations on Wartime and Post-war Cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East* (New York: the ISIPR, 1943), p.vi.

till the eleventh in 1950, diplomats attended the conferences, with expenses paid by the government.¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, during WWII, some AIIA members were mobilized as intelligence officers to contribute to the war effort.¹⁴⁵

The nationalization of the AIIA was part of the professionalization of various 'expert' organizations of the time.¹⁴⁶ Professionalization meant the establishment of an ethic of service to society and a status of 'expert' authority in a specialized field. Still in 1944, however, the AIIA retained a philanthropic rather than a professional element. It recorded 'the lack of members with qualifications and leisure',¹⁴⁷ and this statement suggests that the 'foreign experts' at the AIIA regarded activities for international gatherings as extra work added to their own jobs. While they were concerned with the education of the public, their emphasis was more on research than on education, and they pursued 'service' not so much to the public as to the Federal Government.

After WWII, specialists of International Relations established themselves in academia. While these academics were increasingly utilized by the Federal Government, the expertise of bureaucrats also developed. These experts also found careers in INGOs and international bodies such as the United Nations. In the inter-war period, the AIIA contributed to the training of, not only diplomats and academics, but also 'international public servants'.

¹⁴⁴ Department of External Affairs nominated P. Hasluck to join the Australian delegation for the conference in 1942, Hasluck to Clunies Ross, 13 February, 1943. And a delegate for 1942, R. J. F. Boyer, member of the Australian Broadcasting Commission and Director of the American Division, Department of Information, claimed the travel expenses from the government. For the increasing 'official' nature of the IPR, and its importance for Australia, see Watt to Hodgson, 1 December, 1943. But for the conferences of 1945 and 1950, the government reduced the amount of assistance, and urged the AIIA to send participants already stationed at the place of the conferences. Hasluck to Watt, 14 March, 1942, M1942; 6, AA.

¹⁴⁵ William Forsyth, 'The Pre-war Melbourne Group of the Australian Institute of International Affairs: Some Personal Recollections,' *Australian Outlook*, Vol.28, No.1 (April, 1978), p.44.

¹⁴⁶ Fleming argues that economists in Australia achieved the professionalization in the inter-war period. Grant Fleming, *The Early Years of the Australian Economics Community: Working Paper in Economic History*, No.183 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1995), p.4.

¹⁴⁷ Hasluck to Watt, 14 March, 1944, M1942; 6, AA.

The national organization of the AIIA coincided with the establishment of the BCRC. The latter symbolized the loss of the regional dynamism initially generated by the IPR in the mid 1920s. The IPR, however, had inspired both a regional sense and a strong sense of the new Australia, and had provided an experiential base for officials and academics who led the regionalist movement after WWII.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸ These people included Ball, Crawford and Eggleston. For J. Crawford, see H. W. Arndt, *Sir John Crawford; Research Paper No.128* (Canberra: the Australia-Japan Research Centre, 1985). Probably Eggleston's efforts to establish the Research School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National University after WWII can be seen as a part of this process of regional expert making.

2) The Nation-State and the Orient for 'Reformists' in Japan

This section argues that the problem of the members of the Japanese Council of the IPR (JCIPR) was not only their unquestioning acceptance of the nation-state, the colonial system and the role of the elite, but also the nature of the international order of the time. This acceptance was shared with members of the IPR in other countries, but they became most problematic at the JCIPR. JCIPR members initially supported the international status quo. Their position was weak, not only because of military pressure, but also because of the nature of the international order which did not have much popular support in Japan.

The JCIPR initially attracted people who supported the status quo in international and domestic politics, but who desired moderate 'reforms' within the existing framework. They were mainly Wilsonians, promoting the ideas of the League of Nations, while accepting Japan as an imperial power in Asia. They felt the need for reform of the international order to promote 'racial' equality, and they pursued this goal at the IPR. Rather than identifying with the Orient, they defined themselves as being between 'East' and 'West'. Using the term the "Pacific community", they sought a synthesis with the 'international community'. Domestically, they saw the need to make the attitudes of the old elite more 'civilized' and 'sophisticated' instead of 'militaristic'. But they had much in common with the Meiji military elite in terms of their sense of public duty and their ultimate belief in the nation.

Younger JCIPR members were more reform conscious. Being 'public figures', they identified themselves strongly with the state. In the crisis of the war situation, they were mobilized for official functions, and pursued statist reform policies, which tended to neglect individual human rights. The more concern they had for reform in the domestic context, the more they questioned the validity of the international status quo. They publicized the 'Japanese' perspective to the world. This was, however, not a sudden change in the mid-1930s, because from the beginning of internationalist movements in Japan, internationalists always played this publicist role. After the Japanese withdrawal from the League of Nations

in 1933, the JCIPR began to propose an alternative regional order, similar to the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. They became increasingly close to Asianism. In Asianist arguments, a strong identification with the Orient was evident, an identity to which JCIPR members retained an ambiguous attitude.

i) Perspective

a) International Cooperationists and Asianists

In Chapter One, it was suggested that 'nationalism' was not necessarily a concept opposed to internationalism. Most internationalists in this period, whether Wilsonian or not, believed in the nation-state system, and they had strong loyalty to and identity with their nation. This was true of internationalists in Japan, and particularly of those at the JCIPR.¹⁴⁹ The framework of 'nationalists' vs 'internationalists' is, therefore, not a useful one. Also, as suggested in the Introduction, internationalism in 'late comer' countries or non great powers had different implications from those that it had for the great powers. Rather than initiating visions for the international community, and promoting them, internationalists sought to 'preserve' the international status quo. In this sense, these internationalists were 'international cooperationists', and most internationalists in Japan during the 1920s belonged to this category.

This particular position explains why Japanese internationalists in this period were called the pro-Anglo-American faction [*eibei-ha*]. The dominant perception was that the international status quo was the League of Nations and the Washington Treaty of 1922, the Versailles-Washington system, and that the system was ruled by Anglo-American

¹⁴⁹ Nakami Mari, 'Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai to Nihon no chishikijin,' *Shisō*, No.728 (1985), p.117, Ogata Sadako, 'Kokusai shugi dantai no yakuwari,' in Hosoya et al eds., *Nichibei kankeishi: Kaisen ni itaru jūnen*, Vol.3 (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1971), p.346, Sandra Wilson, 'The Manchurian Crisis and Moderate Japanese Intellectuals: The Japan Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations,' *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol.26, No.3 (1992), p.537, and Kitaoka Shinichi, 'Nitobe Inazō ni okeru teikoku shugi to kokusai shugi,' *Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi*, Vol.4 (Iwanami shoten, 1993), p.199.

powers. The system was supported by Japanese governments of the 1920s.¹⁵⁰

Among international cooperationists, however, there was a division. The division was based on the perception about what was the most dominant force in international politics. The first faction was Wilsonian internationalism, which accepted the USA as a world leader and readily endorsed Wilsonian ideas of New Diplomacy. This faction was represented by Shidehara Kijūrō (Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1924-1925, 1926, 1929-1930 and 1931) and Makino Nobuaki. Despite strong opposition, they dominated mainstream of diplomacy in the 1920s. Although they were pro-American, rather than pro-British, most of these Wilsonians were rather vague about distinctions between the USA, Britain, other European powers and the League of Nations.

The other faction of international cooperationists was imperial internationalism, which saw the centre of international politics as still located in Europe, especially in Britain. Although accepting the USA as a new dominant power, imperial internationalists were sceptical of American leadership.¹⁵¹ They thought that the dominant framework of diplomacy was based on the old *Realpolitik* of secret treaties and military actions as a means to solve international disputes, and that this had not been greatly changed by the League of Nations. The new order of the

¹⁵⁰ Hosoya Chihiro, 'Nihon no eibeikan to senkanki no higashi Ajia,' in Hosoya C. ed., *Nichiei kankei shi 1917-1949*, (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1982), pp.4, 8 and 10. Prime Minister Hara Takashi (Kei) in 1918 ruled out the opposition and insisted on the importance of cooperation with the allied powers. Hosoya C., 'Nihon no eibeikan', p.4. The instructions which the Japanese government gave to the delegates for the Paris Peace Conference were cooperationist: 'although Japan should receive the rewards for its contribution during the war, it should avoid isolation from the other powers, especially Britain'. The instruction emphasized: 'Japan should keep in step with Britain'. 'Kōwa no sandai hōshin' and 'Uiruson beidaitōryō no jūyōnkajō kōryō ni taisuru iken oyobi chintao shobun ni kansuru hōshin,' in Kajima Morinosuke ed., *Nihon Gaikōshi*, Vol.12 (Kajima kenkyūsho shuppankai, 1971), pp.53-63.

¹⁵¹ J. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979), p.38. In the review of Dower's book, Mitani argues that Yoshida modified this scepticism to the USA and became closer to Shidehara's pro-American diplomacy which supported the Washington Treaty. Mitani Taichirō, Book review in Kindai Nihon kenkyūkai ed., *Taiheiyō sensō: Kaisen kara kōwa made* (Yamakawa shuppansha, 1982), p.488.

League was thought 'a pious experiment in a period of adjustment'.¹⁵² Although Wilsonians defined the main tone of diplomacy in the 1920s, imperial internationalists remained strong in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁵³ Both factions saw the Versailles–Washington system as the status quo and tried to preserve it, but their manners, methods and, most of all, perceptions of international politics differed. In this respect, those who supported the League of Nations in Japan were not necessarily the supporters of Wilsonian principles such as New Diplomacy. The terms "Wilsonian internationalists" or "Wilsonianians" in Japan, therefore, only refer to those who endorsed Wilsonian ideas, not necessarily the institution of the League of Nations.

Hosoya explains the differences between the diplomacy of Shidehara and Tanaka Giichi (Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1927–29) not in terms of 'nationalism' vs 'internationalism', but in terms of this different perception of the dominant power and the nature of diplomatic dealings.¹⁵⁴ Shidehara's diplomacy was pro-American and in the style of New Diplomacy, while Tanaka's was pro-British and in the manner of old *Realpolitik*.¹⁵⁵

Both camps were nationalist in the sense that they wanted to preserve the national polity [*kokutai*] and Japan's *national* interests in China. Both

¹⁵² Yoshida continued that 'imperialism had been condemned in principle, but colonial territories other than those of a defeated Germany continued to exist'. J. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, pp.46–7.

¹⁵³ Hosoya C., 'Nihon no eibeikan,' p.1.

¹⁵⁴ The difference of diplomacy to China between Shidehara and Tanaka had been explained by the dichotomy of liberal internationalist and militaristic nationalist. N. M. Bamba, *Japanese Diplomacy in Dilemma: A Comparative Analysis of Shidehara Kijuro's and Tanaka Giichi's Politics toward China, 1924–29*, unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1970. McCormack argues that both were nationalists by accepting the Japanese national interests. G. McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China, 1911–1928: China, Japan and the Manchurian Idea* (Folkestone, Kent: Dawson, 1977).

¹⁵⁵ Hosoya C., 'Nihon no eibeikan,' p. 10. Dower also suggests the difference of a degree rather than of essence. Dower describes Shidehara and Makino Nobuaki, a strong League supporter and the father-in-law of Yoshida, as 'more sanguine to Wilsonian idealism and new diplomacy in Asia'. J. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, p. 46. Asada argues that not the Versailles Treaty, but the Washington Treaty was the starting point of the New Diplomacy of the Japanese government. Asada S., *Ryō taisenkan no Nichibei kankei: Kaigun to seisaku kettei katei* (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1994), p.138.

were international cooperationists in another sense: they felt the need to cooperate with the powers and to act within what they thought to be the existing framework. The Pact of Paris, which outlawed war as a means of resolving international disputes, was concluded by the Tanaka cabinet in 1929: the same cabinet which had started military intervention in China in 1927.¹⁵⁶

Strong opposition to these international cooperationists (Wilsonian or imperial) existed in Japan from the beginning of the Versailles–Washington system. While numerous associations opposed to the system came from various points on the ideological spectrum from right to left, they can largely be categorized as Asianist. Asianism was 'regionalism' in the sense that it involved a vision of a regional community, and activity to promote the vision. As suggested in Chapter One, Section Three, regionalism was also internationalism because it was vision and activity for the community beyond the nation-state border. It differed from internationalism only in its limited scope. Asianism was, however, problematic, due to its implied challenge to the international status quo. It saw the international order as an Anglo-American imperial order. Like imperial internationalists, Asianists saw that the framework of the League was largely based on *Realpolitik*, not New Diplomacy. But they differed from imperial internationalists in seeing no distinction between the old imperial European powers and the new power of the USA. Asianist rhetoric also involved a distinctive racial emphasis. It argued that the existing imperial order exploited coloured races, and that Japan should 'correct' this injustice: the argument which became the backbone of the ideology of Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in the late 1930s.

Members of the JCIPR belonged to the international cooperationist group, and the major figures were, not imperial internationalists, but Wilsonians. They supported Wilson's visions, promoted the cause of the League of Nations, saw the USA as the most powerful new world power, and admired the USA as a model of democracy. This did not mean that

¹⁵⁶ Ōhata argues that the Tanaka cabinet signed the Pact because it wanted to obtain favours of other powers about Japanese policy to China. Ōhata Tokushirō, 'Fusen jōyaku to Nihon,' *Kokusai seiji*, Vol.28, No.2 (1964), p.83.

they were not 'imperialist'. Like Wilsonians in other countries, they accepted the colonial system. Wilsonians at the JCIPR saw Japan as an imperial power and did not question its holding of colonies in Asia,¹⁵⁷ but they proposed 'reforms' of imperial conduct. International cooperationists, both imperial and Wilsonian, denounced the right of colonies and the countries which, they judged, had little self-governing power, to be a part of the 'international community'.¹⁵⁸

b) Liberalism and Wilsonian internationalists

An examination of the nature of JCIPR members has to deal with the seemingly contradictory 'reformism' of the Wilsonians. Like Wilsonians in the USA and Britain, their reformism originated from the domestic political, economic and social context of the time. How did JCIPR members stand in the domestic politics, and how did this affect their views on external affairs?

In this examination, the key term seems to be their 'liberalism'. JCIPR members were called 'liberal internationalists' [*jiyū kokusai shugisha*] in this period. The term not only distinguished them from socialist internationalists, but also indicated their political/philosophical orientation. It reflected the general intellectual paradigm of the Taisho period (1912–1925) which was described as "Taisho democracy" as we shall see shortly. JCIPR members in general supported 'liberal' reforms. But what was the nature of their 'liberalism'?

In Chapter One, I argued that those who were involved in the IPR were influenced by New Liberalism. The core of this philosophy was a greater role for the state in the welfare of society, and an emphasis on the moral duty of the state. Previous works on Japanese liberalism [*jiyū shugi*], however, do not seem to have fully discussed the complexity of New

¹⁵⁷ Wilson argues that 'the single most important point' which JCIPR members sought to convey to non-Japanese during the 'Manchurian Crisis' was that 'Japanese claims to special rights and interests in Manchuria were legitimate'. S. Wilson, 'The Manchurian Crisis,' p.531.

¹⁵⁸ These countries which were perceived to have little self-governing power included China and the USSR. Fujisawa Chikao, 'Kokusai shugi no kiso kannen,' *Kokusai chishiki*, Vol.8, No.9 (1928), p.32.

Liberalism in the inter-war period.¹⁵⁹ Liberalism in Japan has been defined and discussed in terms of individualism and laissez-faire, and its complexity in relation to state and society has not been fully analysed.

This leads to a difficulty in locating the nation-state in liberal internationalist thinking. Scholars often implicitly saw the emphasis on the nation-state not only as 'problem', but also 'morally wrong'. Inadequate understanding of the position of the nation-state in internationalism has resulted in a simplistic dichotomy between nationalism and internationalism, or nationalistic militarism and liberalism, and this dichotomy seems to have been promoted further after WWII. John Dower summarises this view of dichotomy as a pendulum theory which suggests that power shifted between two distinct camps.¹⁶⁰

Scholars argue that two crucial weaknesses of liberal internationalists at the JCIPR were their nationalism and their elite status.¹⁶¹ This argument explains why the JCIPR shared the government approach to national interests, and was unable to convey its members' views to society at large. Underlying these arguments, however, is the implication that internationalists became, or were, identical to 'guilty' nationalists. The meaning of being 'nationalist' especially in the 1930s and the nature of the 'international community' has not been fully elaborated.

¹⁵⁹ The central figure of Japanese liberalism in this period is Ishibashi Tanzan (1884–1973). Ishibashi's thought came more from Manchester liberalism and American pragmatism than from German idealism which influenced T. H. Green. Masuda Hiroshi, *Ishibashi Tanzan kenkyū "Shō Nihon shugisha" no kokusai ninshiki* (Tōyō keizai shimpōsha, 1990), pp.3, 6 and 254. Sharon Nolte, *Liberalism in Modern Japan: Ishibashi Tanzan and His teachers, 1905–1960* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp.6 and 340. Naga Yukio, 'Nihon shihon shugi ni okeru riberarizumu no saihyōka: Ishibashi Tanzanron,' *Shisō*, No.437 (1960), p.20–21. Although Hoston states that Japanese liberalism was similar to British New Liberalism, she gives no further elaboration of New Liberalism, nor any mention of its implication for Japanese society. Instead, she uses the framework of collectivity and individuality, and Japan and the West. G. Hoston, 'The State, Modernity, and the Fate of Liberalism in Prewar Japan,' *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (1992), p.289.

¹⁶⁰ Against this framework, Dower presents the case of Yoshida Shigeru, a 'liberal' internationalist diplomat in the inter-war period, and argues that these two camps were never completely distinct. J. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, p.3–6.

¹⁶¹ Nakami M., 'Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai,' p.117, Ogata S., 'Kokusai shugi dantai,' p.346, S. Wilson, 'The Manchurian Crisis,' pp.522–528 and 537, and Kitaoka S., 'Nitobe Inazō ni okeru teikoku shugi to kokusai shugi,' p.199.

The neglect of the ambiguity of 'New Liberalism' in the 1920s and 1930s owes much to the "debate on liberalism" [*jiyū shugi ronsō*] in 1933–1936. The debate defined the 'liberalism' of the 1920s as laissez-faire and individualistic, and dismissed it as the ideology of privileged few.¹⁶² Just as Carr's criticism became dominant in evaluating Wilsonians in the 1920s, this criticism of Japanese liberalism of the 1920s seems to remain influential among later scholars.

While 'liberals' were seen as preserving the domestic status quo, those who questioned the status quo were called, not New Liberals, but *kakushin* and *kakushinha* in Japan. A pioneer of the study on *kakushin*, Itō, translates it reformism and reformists.¹⁶³ Probably, it is more precisely called 'revolutionary' reformism because his concept of *kakushin* contained a strong element of destruction [*hakai*].¹⁶⁴ While preaching the need to overcome the deadlock created by the status quo, *kakushinha* did not challenge the national polity, which they narrowly interpreted as the emperor system. This made it possible for some socialists and Marxists to join the *kakushinha*. While combining socialist rhetoric with strong patriotic and imperialistic slogans, *kakushinha* involved quite a few ex-socialists, and pursued national-socialistic schemes.¹⁶⁵ Although a positive interpretation of *kakushinha* leads to a justification of Japanese

162 Matsuzawa H.:oaki, 'Jiyū shugiron,' *Iwanami kōza, Nihon tsūshi*, Vol.18 (Iwanami shoten, 1994), pp.241 and 268–270.

163 Itō Takashi translates *kakushin* as reformism, rather than radicalism or progressivism. Interview with Itō Takashi, Tokyo, 13 June, 1994. Itō T., *Showa shoki seijishi kenkyū Rondon kaigun gunshuku mondai o meguru shoseiji dantai no taikō to teikei*, (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1991, first published in 1969), pp. 8–9. As for its formation, see Itō T., 'Nihon kakushinha no seiritsu,' *Chūō kōron*, *Rekishi to jimbutsu* (December, 1972), pp. 28–53, and 'Showa seijishi kenkyū eno ichishikaku,' *Shisō*, Vol. 624 (June, 1976), pp.222–227. *The Cambridge History of Japan* also uses this translation, reformism and reformists, for *kakushin*. Peter Duus ed., *The Cambridge History of Japan*, Vol.6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp.128 and 294.

164 Itō T., *Showa shoki seijishi kenkyū*, pp.8–9.

165 These socialists were, however, removed from the influential position. Itō T., 'Kyū sayokujin no "shin taisei" undō: Nihon kensetsu kyōkai to kokumin undō kenkyūkai,' in Kindai Nihon kenkyūkai ed., *Showaki no shakai undō* (Yamakawa shuppansha, 1983), pp.293–294. These socialistic schemes failed by the end of 1940. Itō T., *Konoeshintaisei: Taisei yokusankai e no michi* (Chūō kōronsha, 1983), pp.187–213.

military expansion in Asia,¹⁶⁶ the examination of *kakushinha* will reveal the complicated nature of the authoritarian regime. It is too simple to explain the oppression of individual freedom and military expansion in Asia purely in terms of guilty 'nationalists' associated with the military-big business complex.¹⁶⁷

How was New Liberalism located in this political context, and what was the position of the JCIPR? If *kakushin* is called 'revolutionary' reformism, the reformism of New Liberalism should be termed 'moderate' reformism. The two overlapped in several respects: they advocated a greater role for the state in the welfare of society and the moral duty of the state to serve society. The influence of New Liberalism is evident in the works of Japanese intellectuals in the 1930s. They discussed the problem of state, society and individual. Matsuzawa argues that Rōyama Masamichi (1895–1965) was one of the intellectuals who was influenced by this new stream of liberalism.¹⁶⁸ Rōyama was a leading member of the younger generation at the JCIPR. This stronger reform consciousness led younger JCIPR members closer to the *kakushinha*, as will be discussed later.

In the following section, I look first at the background of the strength of the Asianists, second at the institutional background of the internationalist movement and the JCIPR, and last at the intellectual paradigm of the JCIPR, focusing on their 'moderate reformist' aspect, and their attitudes to the nation-state, society, the Orient, the Pacific and the international community.

ii) Asianism

¹⁶⁶ Matsuo Shōichi, 'Taikai hōkoku ni yosete: Gendai handōteki rekishikan no ichitenkei—Itō Takashi,' *Rekishi hyōron* (August 1977) p.5, and G. McCormack, 'Fashizumu to Nihon shakai,' in Sugimoto Yoshio and Ross Mouer eds., *Nihonjin ron ni kansuru jūnishi: Tsūsetsu ni igiari* (Gakuyō shobō, 1982), pp.144–145.

¹⁶⁷ Maruyama also notes that this reformist aspect of Konoe's new order movement presents a problem for his fascism argument. Maruyama Masao, 'The Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Fascism', Maruyama M., *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 33.

¹⁶⁸ Matsuzawa H., 'Jiyū shugiron,' pp.276–279.

a) The Time of Crisis

The Taisho (1912–1925) and early Showa (1926 onward) period was a time of crisis. The term "Taisho democracy" implies one aspect of the trends, the expansion of democratic forces, in the Taisho Era. The first party cabinet was established in 1918, and male franchise was introduced in 1925. The first general election based on this franchise took place in 1928. This was also the result of the pressure of popular social movements. In 1920, a pro-universal franchise demonstration attracted 30,000 people at Nijūbashi, Tokyo. As manifested in the Kawasaki and Mitsubishi shipyard strikes of 35,000 workers in 1921, industrial disputes were widespread. Also in rural areas, disputes between landlords and tenants became serious issues. Furthermore, the influence of the Russian Revolution was perceived as a threat to the government. Communists and socialists were severely oppressed by the Public Peace Maintenance Law of 1925. This banned ideas and activities which challenged the national polity and private property. The law was strengthened by an amendment of 1928, which added the death penalty, further restricting freedom of expression and belief until 1945. This assisted the official imposition of a certain kind of national identity.

The political and social crisis was compounded by economic crisis. In 1923, the Kanto Earthquake, which killed 100,000 people, caused serious economic disruption. Although the recovery was rapid, financial depression hit Japan in 1927, and this was aggravated by the Great Depression of 1929. Government economic policies failed to achieve results. The population saw the political parties as corrupt and serving only big business. Among the unemployed and poor, frustration and discontent with government policies were very strong. Concepts and arguments deployed by Marxism became popular among wider populations than the limited number of socialists and communists.

Using socialistic rhetoric combined with strong imperialistic slogans, military officers and activist-thinkers such as Kita Ikki (1883–1937) and Ōkawa Shūmei (1886–1957) voiced the need for revolutionary reform. Even though they adopted military coups as their means, their schemes

remained *reformist* because they did not challenge the national polity, which they interpreted as the emperor system.¹⁶⁹ Stirring, reflecting and manipulating the anger and frustration of the population, they attacked, verbally and physically, the 'privileged class' [*tokken kaikyū*] of political leaders and influential businessmen, including international cooperationists.¹⁷⁰ Military officers who were influenced by these ideas attempted a number of military coups d'état.¹⁷¹ Their stated aims were to eliminate corruption and prepare for the new order.¹⁷²

These activists also propagated the need to reform or challenge the international order, and called for Japan's leadership to liberate 'coloured' races in Asia.¹⁷³ Not confined by the concept of the national polity, they were more aggressive in their attacks on the international status quo. Discontent with the domestic situation was strongly related to these attacks. Matsuo's work suggests that profound and wide-spread popular social movements in the Taisho period were often supportive of military expansion in Asia.¹⁷⁴ Military propaganda gained popular support by manipulating popular discontent with domestic hardships, and mobilized it to support imperial expansion in Asia. Mass media stirred the popular

¹⁶⁹ Kita (1883–1937) was a leader of the national socialist movement in the inter-war period. He used the word, revolution [*kakumei*], in his argument of *Showa ishin* [restoration] but it was not a denial of the national polity or the emperor system. He argued that Japan's evolution toward socialism was the realization of its national polity. Kita Ikki, 'Nihon kaizō hōan taikō,' published in 1926 (first published in 1919), reprinted in Takahashi Masae ed., *Gendaishi shiryō*, Vol.5 (Misuzu shobō, 1964), p.11.

¹⁷⁰ Among targeted liberal internationalists, there were Makino Nobuaki, Hara Takashi and Inoue Junnosuke. Hara Takashi (Prime Minister 1918–1921) was assassinated in 1921, and Inoue Junnosuke (Minister of Finance in 1929–1931) in 1932.

¹⁷¹ Two major ones occurred on 15 May 1932 and 26 February 1936. In the May 15th Incident, the Prime Minister was killed, and in the February 26th Incident, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Home Affairs were killed. The Emperor took a decisive position against the coup of February 26th. Nezu Masashi, *Gendaishi no danmen* – 2.26 *jiken* (Azekura shobō, 1992), pp.330–383.

¹⁷² '12 gatsu 20 ka jiken ikensho,' in Takahashi Masae ed., *Gendaishi shiryō*, Vol.23 (Misuzu shobō, 1974), pp.384–386.

¹⁷³ *Shihōshō keijikyoku*, 'Uyoku shisō hanzai jiken no sōgōteki kenkyū,' published in 1939, reprinted in Imai Kiyoshi and Takahashi Masae eds., *Gendaishi shiryō*, Vol.4 (Misuzu shobō, 1963), pp.24, 26 and 41. Yamamoto Hikosuke, 'Kokka shugi dantai no riron to seisaku' shō,' in Takahashi M. ed., *Gendaishi shiryō*, Vol.23, pp. 53–56.

¹⁷⁴ Matsuo Takayoshi, *Taisho demokurashi* (Iwanami shoten, 1994), pp. 37–39.

sentiment.¹⁷⁵ The population, however, was conscious of the injustice of the present system domestically and externally. The resulting discontent with the status quo was a significant factor in popular support for military intervention in China, and the weakness of the JCIPR in the society in general.

This period was not only one of crisis, but also one of national mobilization, and a sense of external crisis contributed to the process of creating and strengthening national unity. The external crisis was strongly felt in the form of intense pressure from Euro-American powers especially from the mid-nineteenth century. This sense of crisis caused by these powers was one of the main reasons why the Meiji government urged the need to establish a strong nation-state. With trial and error, as Gluck argues, Meiji Japan developed the ideology of nationhood.¹⁷⁶ In this process, the nation-state became an *a-priori* for most people.

The need for strong nationhood was expressed not only by state administrators, but also by many sections of the population. Probably the latter was reflecting the propaganda of the former rather than initiating the programs. Through the wide-spread use of words such as *kokumin* [nation], *shakai* [society], *gimu* [duty], *jijo* [self-help], *jichi* [self-government], *kyōka* [enlightenment], however, the population was taking part in building the concept of a strong and unified nationhood. Various groups of women, socialists and religious groups were mobilized into this discourse.¹⁷⁷

Government officials and public intellectuals coped with the external and domestic crisis as administrators.¹⁷⁸ They believed that the nation-state had to be strong and unified to cope with the crisis. They put priority on

¹⁷⁵ Daily newspapers such as *Osaka Mainichi* and *Osaka Asahi* reached more than a million circulation in 1924, and radio broadcasts started in 1925.

¹⁷⁶ Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p.4.

¹⁷⁷ Muta K., 'Senryaku to shite no onna: Meiji Taisho no 'onna no gensetsu' o megutte,' *Shisō*, No.812 (February, 1992), pp.211-230.

¹⁷⁸ For an interpretation of the public man in crisis, see Andrew E. Barshay, *State and Intellectual in Imperial Japan: The Public Man in Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 24-25.

the state over the welfare of the population, and in this sense, they were statist, rather than nationalist. The welfare of individuals ranked lower than the strength and unity of the nation-state.¹⁷⁹ Most JCIPR members were drawn from amongst these public intellectuals or state administrators, and their activities as internationalists have to be understood in this context.

b) Asianism: Challenging the 'International Order'

While there were various streams, Asianism as the ideology to challenge the international status quo was articulated by Konoe Fumimaro¹⁸⁰ (1890–1945, and Prime Minister in 1937–1939, and 1940–1941), who declared a New Order in East Asia [*Tōa shinchitsujo*] in 1938. Although born into a family closely related to the emperor, Konoe developed a sceptical attitude to the existing system from an early age.¹⁸¹ At *Ichikō* (the First Higher School) which was the most prestigious public school,¹⁸² Konoe discussed

¹⁷⁹ Probably the issue of *tenkō*, ideological apostasy, might be looked at from this perspective. Tsurumi criticizes 'liberals' who joined the authority to suppress their principles, arguing that there were alternative choices, including the death. Tsurumi Shunsuke, *Tenkō kenkyū* (Chikuma shobō, 1976), p.14–15. Takeuchi Yoshimi questions the existence of alternatives in the 1930s, and emphasizes the ambiguity between resistance and submission. Takeuchi Y., 'Kindai no chōkoku' (first published in 1959), reprinted in Yoshimoto Takaaki ed., *Nashonarizumu* (Chikuma shobō, 1964), pp.384, 394, 398, 402, 405 and 407. Barshay suggests exploring limitations of total war. A. E. Barshay, *State and Intellectual*, pp.29 and 31–32. While the importance of individual freedom and right should not be undermined, 'individualism' and 'freedom' contained elements of conservatism, and 'state' and 'society' implied progressiveness in the 1930s.

¹⁸⁰ In the official biography of Konoe by Yabe Teiji, Konoe's first name was Ayamaro, not Fumimaro. In this thesis, I use Fumimaro because it is conventionally used in academic and popular literature.

¹⁸¹ Konoe felt alienated from ordinary students by being treated as a prince. He became sceptical of people and society in general, and was uncomfortable with the aristocratic strata he belonged to. Yabe Teiji, *Konoe Ayamaro* (Fumimaro), Vol. 1 (Kōbundō, 1952), pp.28–29. Tsurumi Shunsuke points out the 'official' nature of Yabe's biography, especially on the details of Konoe's family. Tsurumi S., *Tenkō kenkyū*, p.243.

¹⁸² High schools were numbered from the order of establishment. In the late Meiji period of the 1870s, *Ichikō* became the preparatory school for the Tokyo Imperial University, which produced national elite. The sense of mission of leading the future Japan was implanted among the students. Donald Roden, *Schooldays in Imperial Japan: A Study in the Culture of a Student Elite* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp.31–41. Nakayama Shigeru, *Teikoku daigaku no tanjō: Kokusai hikaku no nakadeno tōdai* (Chōrō kōronsha, 1978), Chapters Three and Four.

literature, religion and social issues with his friends.¹⁸³ Unlike other friends who went on to Tokyo Imperial University, he transferred to Kyoto Imperial University, and studied with Kawakami Hajime, a Marxist economist, and Nishida Kitarō, a philosopher famous for his work the *Study of the Good* (1911). In 1914, while still at university, Konoe translated Oscar Wilde's 'The Soul of Man under Socialism'. This was published in the journal *Shin shichō*,¹⁸⁴ but that issue was banned. Whether his socialist sympathy was profound or shallow,¹⁸⁵ Konoe lived in a time when socialism captivated idealistic and conscientious minds.¹⁸⁶

Konoe questioned not only the domestic but also the international status quo. Before leaving for the Paris Peace Conference as a junior member in the delegation (he was twenty-eight years old), his article, 'Eibei honi no heiwa shugi o haisu', [Overcome pacifism which favours Britain and America] was published at *Nihon oyobi nihonjin* [Japan and Japanese] in December 1918. In it, he wrote:

Democracy and humanitarianism are based on the sense of equality among people. This is represented domestically by the call for the democratic rights [*minken jiyūron*] and internationally, by insistence on equal living rights [*seizon ken*] among nations The pacifism of Britain and America is a convenient peace-at-any-price principle for those who want to preserve the status quo and it has nothing to do with social justice. If Japanese intellectuals were conscious of social justice and Japan's position, they should be challenging this status quo. Instead, being indulged by the beautiful words and influenced by pacifism which is convenient for Britain and America, they desire the League of Nations as if it were a naturally given gospel. This attitude is very servile and should be denounced from the point of social justice At the coming Peace Conference, Japan would join the League, but it should insist on the exclusion of economic imperialism and

¹⁸³ Yabe T., *Konoe*, Vol. 1, p.54.

¹⁸⁴ The journal was sympathetic to the Modernism movement. Akutagawa Ryūnosuke and Kikuchi Hiroshi were representative figures.

¹⁸⁵ Yabe points out Konoe's sympathy with socialism, but Fujiwara denies any profound influence of socialism in Konoe's thought. Fujiwara Akira, *Tennōsei to Guntai* (Aoki shoten, 1978), p.204.

¹⁸⁶ Henry Dewitt Smith II, *Japan's First Student Radicals* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1972), Chapter Two.

discriminatory treatment between white and yellow races. It is not only militarism which harms social justice ...¹⁸⁷

At this stage, he was still hopeful that the League had a potential for the new order, by which economic and racial equality might be achieved. At Versailles he was quickly disillusioned: 'I saw that the hope of many people for the reform of the world based on justice was clearly betrayed at the beginning of the conference', and he concluded: 'Power still rules the world'.¹⁸⁸ His view was widely shared by the popular media. As a result, a majority of Japanese saw the faults of the League and were discontented with it from the very beginning.¹⁸⁹

Although Konoe's argument articulated the logic behind a challenge to the League system, he did not support *Realpolitik*. In fact, it was his criticism of *Realpolitik* which made him a harsh critic of the League. He saw the significance of the original spirit which produced the League. Along with international cooperationists, he promoted the cause of the League as one of the council members of the League of Nations Association in Japan. Based on his experience at Paris, Konoe urged the public to have knowledge of world affairs, and attacked militarism and fanatical patriotism.¹⁹⁰ He applied his critique of Euro-American imperial expansion to the Japanese case. Konoe's Asianism was, therefore, the logical consequence of Wilsonian ideas.

Like many others at the Paris Peace Conference, Konoe felt the need to reform diplomatic dealings and institutions,¹⁹¹ and shared similar ideas with Wilsonians. He particularly noted the importance of the media, arguing for the establishment of a propaganda organization and a strong national agency for overseas news. He also emphasized the need to recruit talent from outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as military officers, businessmen and academics, who had expert knowledge

¹⁸⁷ Itō Takeshi ed., *Konoekō seidan roku* (Chikuma shobō, 1937), pp.231-41, cited in Miwa Kimitada, *Matsuoka Yōsuke: Sono ningen to gaikō* (Chūō kōronsha, 1971), pp.60-61.

¹⁸⁸ Yabe T., *Konoe*, Vol.1, pp.89-90.

¹⁸⁹ I. Nish, *Japan's Struggle*, p.14.

¹⁹⁰ Yabe T., *Konoe*, Vol. 1, pp.111-113.

¹⁹¹ See Chapter One, Section One.

on certain issues.¹⁹² He implemented these ideas later in organizations such as *Showa kenkyūkai* (a brains trust organization for Konoe founded in 1936), to be discussed below.

Konoe, who defined the theoretical backbone of Asianism against international cooperationism, shared this acute awareness of the new forces of democracy with Wilsonians in the USA and Britain. These Wilsonians became central in the internationalist movement of their countries, the same movement which was promoted by international cooperationists in Japan. These British and Americans recognized the importance of public opinion and expert knowledge in foreign policy.¹⁹³ Konoe's view on the reform of the international order was, however, shared by some of these Wilsonians. Colonel House, for example, published 'The Need for an International New Deal' in *Liberty* in September 1935. As Konoe argued in 1918, House urged the need to reform the international order.¹⁹⁴

Konoe's criticism of fanatical patriotism did not mean that he denied the national polity. He questioned the international and domestic status quo, but his position was anti-socialist. His sense of the need for reform originated from his desire to preserve the national polity. It was the fear of revolution which made him more aware of the need to cope with popular discontent.¹⁹⁵ Despite his weakness in resisting military pressure,¹⁹⁶ closeness to the imperial family gave him charismatic power, and the expectation mounted that he would lead domestic and international reforms. Later he became a leader of *kakushinha* to which younger JCIPR members were closely associated.

¹⁹² Yabe T., *Konoe*, Vol.1, pp.90-91.

¹⁹³ British and Americans established foreign policy organizations outside the governments, such as the RIIA in London and the CFR in New York, although the complete independence of the RIIA from the government was questioned. Professor Heinz Arndt, Interview, Canberra, 17 March, 1994. In contrast, reforms of the diplomatic machinery in Japan were mostly confined in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

¹⁹⁴ Yabe T., *Konoe*, Vol.1, pp.312-313.

¹⁹⁵ Tsurumi argues that Konoe's position of counter-socialist revolution was clearer after

1940. Tsurumi S., *Tenkō Kenkyū*, pp. 231-232.

¹⁹⁶ Shōda Tatsuo, *Jūshin tachi no Showashi*, Vol. 2 (Bungei shunjū, 1981), p. 77.

Asianism in Konoe's thesis of 1918 was the logical consequence of his doubts about the 'international order'. His Asianism must have been influenced by his father, a strong advocate of Asian solidarity and Sino-Japanese alliance from the late 1890s, who promoted student exchange schemes and friendship associations between Japan and China.¹⁹⁷ *Race* was the core concept of Asianism, and this idea of the solidarity of 'Asian races' against the European powers, inspired Sun Yat-sen, an advocate of Greater Asianism.¹⁹⁸ The idea also moved activists in Asia to hold the Pan-Asiatic Congress at Nagasaki in August 1926.¹⁹⁹

Although his father opposed discriminatory attitudes to China, it is uncertain whether Konoe saw China as an equal partner. While demanding equal status for Japan with Euro-American powers, a majority of Japanese accepted Japan's supreme position in Asia. Often, the stronger the desire for equality with Euro-American powers, the more they tended to be contemptuous of China and Korea. These attitudes were common among international cooperationists as well as militarists, although there were exceptions in both camps.²⁰⁰ Asianists, therefore, argued that Japan should lead Asian solidarity against European powers. Leaving aside the

¹⁹⁷ Yabe T., *Konoe*, Vol.1, pp.10-11.

¹⁹⁸ Yabe T., *Konoe*, Vol.1, p.83. They actually met at Shanghai on Konoe's way to the Paris Conference.

¹⁹⁹ On this conference, see Grant Goodman, 'The Pan-Asiatic Conference of 1926 at Nagasaki,' *UNESCO, Fukuoka*, No.8, 1973, pp.21-29. See also Chapter One, Section Three.

²⁰⁰ Matsumoto Shigeharu (1899-1989), a journalist and promoter of the US-Japan relationship, was involved in the JCIPR from 1929. Although his main interest was in the USA, he also maintained the belief that China was an important partner for Japan. In his memoirs, he stated that there were very few who understood the Chinese nationalist movement in the inter-war period. Matsumoto S., *Showashi no ichishōgen* (Mainichi shimbunsha, 1986), p.21. Yoshino Sakuzō (1878-1933), Ishibashi Tanzan, and Ozaki Hotsumi were among a few who took an anti-imperialist stance and supported nationalism in Korea and China. Mitani Taichirō, *Taisho demokurashiron: Yoshino Sakuzō no jidai to sonogo* (Chūō kōronsha, 1984), pp.191-197, Ishibashi T., 'Chintao wa danjite ryōyū subekarazu,' and 'Chōsen bōdō ni taisuru rikai,' reprinted in *Ishibashi Tanzan hyōron senshū*, pp.162-164 and 186-189. Tsurumi S., *Tenkō kenkyū*, pp.191-193. As for a military camp, Ishihara Kanji's proposal for the Tōa renmei assumed relative equality between Japan and China, although the concept of *meishu* assumed a leadership by Japan. Some of his supporters supported the independence of Korea. After the government criticized this movement in 1941, progressive elements were gradually lost. On the analysis of the Tōa renmei, see Ikiobe Makoto, 'Tōa renmei no kihonteki seikaku,' *Ajia Kenkyū*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (April, 1975), pp.22-58.

ambiguity of the nature of this leadership, Konoe's thesis provided a powerful logic to justify military expansion. In short, Asianism challenged the international order, and had great potential support in Japan.

iii) The Institutional Characteristics of International Cooperationists

The institutional background of internationalist movements in Japan helps to clarify the characteristics of Japanese international cooperationists and JCIPR members. They were in favour of preserving the status quo. In contrast to their Australian counterparts, the distinct characteristic of Japanese internationalist movements were: the active commitment of the government, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; strong business interest in the early stages; the importance of American missionaries and Christians in Japan; the centrality of the US-Japan relationship, especially the immigration issue; and the role of charismatic figures and the connections centred upon them.²⁰¹ While sympathisers of labour movements were relatively numerous among Australian internationalists, they were inconspicuous on the Japanese side.

The categories of internationalism used in the previous chapters can apply to the Japanese case in the 1920s, with the obvious exception of British imperialism. Socialist internationalism was isolated from the rest of the internationalist movements because of the 'conservative' nature of the movements, to be discussed shortly. While the League supporters became the core of the internationalist movements in the 1920s, as already suggested, they were not necessarily supporters of Wilsonian ideals. Along with League supporters, international cooperationists (or liberal internationalists) drew on Christian groups, women's associations and business groups. These internationalist organizations included the League of Nations Associations, the YMCA and YWCA, the Women's International Peace Association [*fujin kokusai heiwa kyōkai*], Chambers of Commerce and the Banking Club.

²⁰¹ As for the last point, see Nakami M., 'Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai,' p.111, and Ogata S., 'Kokusai shugi dantai,' pp.316-317.

The first internationalist organization contained the basic characteristics of the internationalist organizations to follow. It was the Greater Japan Peace Association [*Dai nippon heiwa kyōkai*] (founded in 1906).²⁰² Its aims were to improve inter-racial and inter-national relations, to make efforts to solve international conflicts by peaceful means *if possible*, and to *maintain* peace.²⁰³ It did not, therefore, deny the use of war as a means to achieve peace, and in this sense, it was not a pacifist organization.²⁰⁴ Maintaining the peace meant *preserving* the existing international order.

Two main elements of internationalist movements, business and Christianity, were soon included in the association. Two central figures of the internationalist movement represented these elements: Shibusawa Eiichi (1840-1931), a philanthropic businessman; and Nitobe Inazō (1862-1933), a Christian, educator, colonial administrator and academic.²⁰⁵ Both were soon to play a crucial part at the JCIPR. They emphasized the moral aspect of internationalist movements, and discussed morality in terms of public service to the society and the state.

As an official of the Tokugawa bakufu and the Meiji government, and a successful businessman, Shibusawa pursued the ideal of public service. He argued that business people should pursue private profits which would contribute to public profit [*kōeki*]. This view was the basis of his strategy of professionalization and status-promotion of business people whose position in society had been low in the Tokugawa period.²⁰⁶ He was the first chairman of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce (founded in 1891), and used it to promote the business status and international activities.²⁰⁷

²⁰² Ogata S., 'Kokusai shugi dantai,' pp. 308-309.

²⁰³ *Dai nippon heiwa kyōkai kaisoku*, [Regulations of the Greater Japan Peace Association] *SEDS*, Vol. 35, p.493.

²⁰⁴ As for the definition of 'pacifism' in this thesis, see the Introduction, note 19.

²⁰⁵ Ko Sakatani shishaku kinen jigyōkai ed., *Sakatani Yoshirōden* (Ko Sakatani shishaku kinen jigyōkai, 1951), p. 585.

²⁰⁶ Kimura Masato, *Shibusawa Eiichi: Minkan keizai gaikō no sōshisha* (Chūō kōronsha, 1991), pp.17-19.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.20-22.

This sense of public service formed the basis of his philanthropic activities after his retirement in 1909 (he was then 69). He was inspired by American philanthropists such as Rockefeller and Carnegie, and was particularly impressed by the Carnegie Peace Endowment. Although he was initially sceptical of the peace movement which he saw as a part of socialism, Carnegie's activities and the persuasion of people who were involved in the Greater Japan Peace Association convinced him of its importance.²⁰⁸ His commitment to the association began in 1912, and he remained a most vocal and influential supporter of the internationalist movements until his death in 1931.

His speech, 'Peace from the Point of View of the Business World', at the association's meeting in June 1912, articulated his ideas. He praised Carnegie as a great man, and refuted the argument that war made business prosper. Business needed international morality, he continued, and peace was the ultimate goal of civilization.²⁰⁹ He shared with Wilsonians the belief that good will and high morality would make the world peaceful. It is unclear whether he envisaged an international community with a 'universal' ethical code, but his concept of 'international' morality was an extension of 'public service' to the nation-state. The government regarded Shibusawa as the leader of the business world and when they needed the support, officials made use of his influence. His beliefs, resources, connections and relations with the government gave 'respectability' and acceptance to the initial internationalist movement. As a result, major internationalist organizations at first enjoyed good funding and patronage.

While the role of Nitobe will be discussed later in detail, the strength of the influence of Christian circles in the international movement should briefly be mentioned here. American missionaries as well as Japanese Christians played an important role in the movement. The Greater Japan Peace Association was initiated by an American missionary, Gilbert

²⁰⁸ Note of Tomiyama Setsuzō, 1 May, 1936, in *SEDS*, Vol.35, pp.497-498. In March, Shibusawa contributed 500 yen to the association.

²⁰⁹ Shibusawa E., 'Jitsugyōkai yori mitaru heiwa,' *Ryūmon zasshi*, reprinted in *SEDS*, Vol. 35, pp.501-506.

Bowles, and their influence is indicated by the large number of foreigners (84) among the 562 members in 1912.²¹⁰

There were two aspects of the meaning of Christian organizations in Japan, social prestige and social justice. Reflecting the Euro-American orientation of a small but influential elite in Meiji Japan, contacts with Europeans and Americans, mainly diplomats, missionaries, business people or teachers, were often considered prestigious. Friendship societies to promote good will with these countries developed around these networks, and they comprised an important part of the internationalist movement.²¹¹ As well as these associations, major Christian organizations such as the YMCA gained acceptance and respectability. The YMCA became an office for the IPR before the formation of the JCIPR in 1926, and its close contacts with influential figures was an important element defining the nature of the JCIPR.

The role of Christian circles in promoting a social movement based on social justice should not be underestimated. Private Christian universities and other Christian associations were a minority, but contributed to various social movements including the peace movement.²¹² Particularly noteworthy was the involvement of Christian women's associations and educators. Founders of prominent Christian women's schools and universities were largely female. They were active in movements to improve women's conditions, and as in other countries, this social awareness led them to an interest in various issues, such as the

²¹⁰ Daiheiwa kyōkai ichiran, [Summary of the Greater Japan Peace Association] February 1912, *SEDS*, Vol. 35, p.496.

²¹¹ Shibusawa and his son-in-law, Sakatani Yoshirō, were involved in friendship associations to promote good will with countries such as France, Russia, Australia and the USA.

²¹² Christian societies were, however, reluctant to deal with social problems as opposed to personal problems. Although the Union Church started a department of social issues in 1919, the real commitment to social movement of the Christian Association (established in 1923) was only from 1927. It declared 'social belief' [*shakai shinjō*], which included disarmament, realization of the world without war, human rights and equal opportunity. Except for the very few, however, Christian organizations supported Japanese military expansion in China. Ogata S., 'Kokusai shugi dantai,' pp.314-316 and 333. See also Dōshisha daigaku jinbun kagaku kenkyūsho, *Senjika teikō no kenkyū*, Vol.2 (Misuzu shobō, 1969).

franchise, temperance and peace.²¹³ Reflecting women's interest in peace, eleven members in the Great Japan Peace Association were female, although they may have been foreigners.

The association illustrated another crucial character of internationalist organizations: its role was to represent a *national* voice to the world. The association aimed to enlighten people not only in Japan, but also abroad. Its journal was published in Japanese (1912–1917) and later in English, so that: 'it could contribute to making *our national character* understood *correctly* and convincing the countries of the world that Japanese were not bellicose'.²¹⁴ From the very beginning of the movement, its institution took on not only a public duty in relation to the nation-state, but also a coherent national character.

Another distinctive characteristic of the internationalist movement in Japan was the centrality of the race issue and the US-Japan relationship. These international cooperationists were concerned not only with peace, which meant no opposition to the international order, but with racial discrimination. The anti-Japanese movement in California, they thought, was the biggest threat to international peace.²¹⁵ This concern explains the centrality of US-Japan relations in internationalist organizations. The Japanese American Relations Committee (JARC), which was set up to discuss the problem in 1916, became a centre of later internationalist movements. The JARC's appeal against anti-Japanese immigration policies gained the support of Americans whose centres were the Chamber of Commerce in San Francisco and the Japan Society in New York.²¹⁶

While the main contacts were through business, the JARC included academics who were knowledgeable about the USA, such as Nitobe and

²¹³ Kishimoto Hideo and Kaigo Muneomi ed., *Nichibei bunka kōshōshi*, Vol. 3, (Yōyōsha, 1956), pp.131–136.

²¹⁴ Ko Sakatani shishaku kinen jigyōkai ed., *Sakatani Yoshirōden*, p.585 (emphasis added).

²¹⁵ Ogata S., 'Kokusai shugi dantai,' p.309

²¹⁶ See Chapter One, Section Three.

Takagi Yasaka²¹⁷ (1889–1984), both pioneers of American studies in Japan. These academics added the practice of study and discussion on current issues to the activities of internationalists. This practice represented a major shift from socially-oriented friendship societies toward something resembling 'unofficial' foreign expert bodies. These 'expert' type members of the JARC became the core of the League of Nations Association (LNA) (1920) and the JCIPR (1926).

Official involvement with the internationalist movement was not extensive in the beginning. Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted functions of the Greater Japan Peace Association and the JARC, funding came largely from business connections. Government support for internationalist organizations, however, soon increased and remained steady in the 1920s. The LNA, into which the Greater Japan Peace Association was merged in 1925, was founded in 1920 as a branch of the LNA headquarters in Brussels. The LNA had the full support of Prime Minister Hara. Hara urged business contributions, and as a result, the initial contribution to the LNA mainly came from big business.²¹⁸ In 1923, however, 20,000 yen from the National Treasury was recorded.²¹⁹ Government support peaked in 1924, with 100,000 yen.²²⁰ The Tanaka Cabinet (1927–29) was also supportive, acknowledging the importance of the Association's activities and sparing 70,000 yen in 1927 and 1928.²²¹ The amount was reduced, but still in 1931 under the Wakatsuki Cabinet with Shidehara as Minister of Foreign Affairs, the government gave 50,000 yen out of the entire donations of 80,000 yen.²²²

²¹⁷ Although Takagi is listed as Takaki in the IPR documents, scholars such as Saitō Makoto use Takagi, not Takaki. I followed the convention.

²¹⁸ Rijkai, [Minutes of the Council meeting] 20 February, 1921, *SEDS*, Vol.36, p.419.

²¹⁹ Private contributions were almost 27,000 yen. *Kaiki hōkoku*, [Fiscal report] April to September, 1923, *SEDS*, Vol.36, p.522. The LNA budgeted private contributions around 37,000 yen in 1924. 1924, *Yosan*, [Budget] *SEDS*, Vol.36, p.565.

²²⁰ Ogata S., 'Kokusai shugi dantai,' p.312.

²²¹ Tanaka to LNA, 2 May, 1927, and 24 May, 1928, *SEDS*, Vol.37, pp.132–133 and 212–213.

²²² *Kaimu hōkoku*, [Report of affairs of the association] 1931, *SEDS*, Vol.37, p.356.

Government support reflected its favourable attitude to international cooperationists.²²³ Official support gave political and social respectability to these organizations, and the involvement of influential people such as Shibusawa further strengthened this aspect. Due to this strong official backing, however, their activities were restrained from contradicting *national* interests, and concentrated on generating an officially-acceptable *correct* understanding among the people inside and outside Japan.

Members emphasized the compatibility of 'nationalism' [*kokumin shugi*] or more precisely 'statism' [*kokka shugi*] and 'internationalism' [*kokusai shugi*]. At a meeting of League supporters, Sawayanagi Masatarō (1865–1927), educationalist and leader of the JCIPR for the first IPR conference, stated: 'In order to complete *kokka shugi* [statism], we have to incorporate internationalism'. This compatibility was supported by other participants. Sakatani Yoshirō (1863–1941), the son-in-law of Shibusawa, and Zumoto Motosada, an influential journalist, emphasized that the League spirit and military preparation did not conflict.²²⁴ In the same manner, other League supporters defined 'internationalism' as based on the nation-state, and argued that it should not be confused with cosmopolitanism or the world federation movement.²²⁵

While other internationalist organizations addressed their appeals mainly to influential figures in Tokyo, the LNA did so to a wider audience. Its aim was to promote the cause of the League, its methods were propaganda and education, and its scope encompassed rural communities. It focused first on metropolitan cities in the Kansai area, such as Kyoto, Osaka and

²²³ Even after Japan's withdrawal from the League in 1933, the connection with the League was maintained. Japan sent official and unofficial committee members. All of these communications stopped in 1938 when the League decided to commit to the sanctions against Japan. Momose Takashi, *Jiten Showa senzenki no Nihon: Seido to jittai* (Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1990), p.174.

²²⁴ Kondankai, [Gathering for informal information exchange] 17 June, 1926, *SEDS*, Vol.37, pp.95–96.

²²⁵ Fujisawa C., 'Kokusai shugi no kiso kannen,' p.24, and Yamamoto 'Iono, 'Kokumin shugi oyobi kokusai shugi no saiginmi,' *Gaikō jihō*, Vol.76, No.740 (1 October, 1935), p.126. Yasutomi M., 'Taiheiyō kaigi nyōze gaikan,' *Gaikō jihō*, Vol.52, No.601 (15 December, 1929), p.57.

Kobe, then on local cities.²²⁶ By 1926, local branches were established in at least 11 prefectures outside Tokyo.²²⁷

As for propaganda, the LNA used journals and lectures. It had two journals, *Kokusai chishiki* [International knowledge] and *Sekai to warera* [The World and us], addressed mainly to intellectuals. For a wider appeal, it used lectures. Nitobe and Ishii Kikujirō (1866–1945) (Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1915) went on many lecture tours to cities all over Japan.²²⁸ The LNA also organized study meetings for educationalists to teach the cause and spirit of the League in schools, and asked newspaper owners to publicize them. It used other mass media, such as pamphlets and movies, and started to use radio around 1926.²²⁹

Probably due to its idealistic aspect, the LNA won reasonable support among students and women in metropolitan and local communities. Although, in 1926, Shibusawa regretted that total membership was only 5,000, which was a hundredth of that in Britain, students' branches accounted for more than 20 among 40 branches.²³⁰ Membership increased to 11,771 in 1932, of which 5,652 were students and 556 women. Forty-

²²⁶ Chihō senden kakuchō iinkai, [Local promotion committee] 26 March, 1924, *SEDS*, Vol.36, p.564.

²²⁷ These prefectures are Ehime, Kagawa, Shimane, Tottori, Kobe, Kyoto, Ibaragi, Osaka, Gifu, Nagasaki, and Wakayama. Except for Ibaragi and Gifu, they were all west of Osaka. Probably the LNA wanted to have a strong representation in the Kansai district, which direction eventually resulted in the promotion of the LNA in the above prefectures. Still the lack of the branches in Hiroshima and Fukuoka, other big local centres, is curious. Zenkoku shibuchō kaigi gijyōroku, [Summary of the meeting of presidents of local branches] 8 May 1926, *SEDS*, Vol.37, p.76.

²²⁸ Nitobe was reported to have lectured at 150 places in Japan in December 1924 to February 1925. Sawada Setsuzō, 'Nihon ni okeru heiwa shisō no hatten,' *Kokusai Chishiki*, Vol.5, No.11 (November, 1925), p.20.

²²⁹ Shibusawa E., 'Heiwa kinembi ni tsuite,' 11 November 1926, *SEDS*, Vol.37, p.111.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.113.

eight universities had branches of the LNA,²³¹ and the women's section became large enough to be independent in 1930.²³²

Unlike 'expert' type internationalist organizations such as the JARC and the JCIPR, the LNA penetrated society. Although the membership was still relatively limited in social background, this supports the argument that there was potential for peace and disarmament movements both in metropolitan and rural areas.²³³ On the other hand, there was a strong national mobilization process at the same time. The complex nature of these social movements, especially the roles of women, students, and socialist organizations, in rural areas, in terms of national mobilization and internationalism has not yet been fully examined.

However Euro-American oriented these organizations were, members did not ignore the importance of Asia, especially China. They promoted friendship associations and financial aid for Chinese students. Shibusawa especially saw China as a crucial business opportunity.²³⁴ The *Nikka gakkai* [Japan-China Study Association] was founded in 1918 with Shibusawa's help not only to assist Chinese students studying in Japan, but also to foster a 'correct' understanding and good will towards the Japanese people.²³⁵ The Ministry of Education contributed to this organization from 1921. In 1923, the government enacted legislation which created a special account for cultural activities between Japan and China. The official contribution, mainly consisting of the aid for Chinese

²³¹ The first student branch of the LNA was established at Waseda University, Tokyo, in 1924. Following this, universities, colleges and women's colleges, not only in the Tokyo area, but also in other areas, established branches. Each branch had 100-300 membership, and in November 1924 they organized the confederation of the student branches of the LNA [Nihon renmei kyōkai gakusei shibu]. Sawada S., 'Nihon ni okeru heiwa,' pp.19-20.

²³² Ogata S., 'Kokusai shugi dantai,' p.312. Shibusawa promoted women's peace movement, arguing that peace could not be achieved only by men. *Katei shi* 8, Vol.859, reprinted in SEDS, Vol.37, p.146.

²³³ Anti-tax increase movement was against military expansion. Matsuo T., *Taisho demokurashi*, pp.63-65. Kiyozawa Kiyoshi (1890-1945) argued against the military expansion on the base of the welfare of the society. Mitar . *Taisho demokurashiron*, pp.248-252.

²³⁴ Kimura M., *Shibusawa*, p.95.

²³⁵ Sunada Minoru ed., *Nikka gakkai nijūnen shi*, [Twenty years of the Japan-China Study Association] (1939), SEDS, Vol.36, pp.99-102.

students, accounted for the large sum of 285,692 yen in 1921–1937.²³⁶ The LNA not only focused on European issues, but also tried to cooperate with student counterparts in China.²³⁷ As well as China, Sakatani and Shibusawa were involved in friendship associations between Japan and Korea, Afghanistan and India.²³⁸

Without questioning Japan's status as an imperial power in Asia, but rather in order to strengthen Japan's imperial order, international cooperationists emphasized 'enlightened' imperial rule in the colonies. In 1919, Sakatani, for example, proposed to reform the militaristic imperial rule in Korea, and argued in favour of respect for Korean culture and language and of giving more opportunity for Koreans to fill positions in the administration. This was to appease the independence movement in Korea, which he saw as a crucial strategic position for future imperial development.²³⁹ Compared with other JCIPR members such as Sawayanagi, who placed greater emphasis on the assimilation of colonial people to 'Japanese culture',²⁴⁰ Sakatani showed much sympathy to indigenous elements. The aim of both, however, was strengthening the imperial power, and in this aspect, they differed only in manner, not in essence, from the militaristic imperialists they criticised.

iv) The JCIPR: the Orient and the Pacific

The Pacific was an uncertain element in the 'new' international order. Major countries in the Pacific, the USA and the USSR were outside the League. The Washington Treaty partially resolved these problems. It was considered to complement the League system in the region, yet it did not provide any permanent machinery for diplomatic dialogue. Even

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.117.

²³⁷ Kaimu hōkoku, No. 29, 1925, SEDS, Vol.36, p.652.

²³⁸ Sakatani was sympathetic with the Korean independence movement in 1919 and sent a letter to the Governor-General in Korea to urge the importance of recognizing Korea's own culture, and to reform the militaristic rule in Korea. Ko Sakatani shishaku kinen jigyōkai ed., *Sakatani Yoshirō den*, pp.589–591.

²³⁹ Ko Sakatani shishaku kinen jigyōkai ed., *Sakatani Yoshirō den*, pp.587–591.

²⁴⁰ Ozawa Yūsaku, 'Sawayanagi Masatarō no shokuminchi kyōikukan,' in Sawayanagi M., *Sawayanagi Masatarō zenshū*, Supplement (Kokudoshā, 1979), pp.205–212.

international cooperationists felt that there was a degree of ignorance of the region in this largely European organization,²⁴¹ and questioned the relevance of the League outside Europe.²⁴² Shibusawa stated in 1926 the need to pay more attention to the Pacific.

While things are stabilized in Europe partly due to the League of Nations, how about the Pacific? The attention of the world has come eastward. It seems the future issue lies in the Pacific. Japan as the major empire in the East should take it seriously that the urgent issue has now shifted into the East.²⁴³

The JCIPR reflected this particular sense of the Pacific centrality. In Australia, to see the Pacific as a centre and an independent entity was considered potentially subversive, and American regional initiatives caused much scepticism. Although strong scepticism of Wilsonian attitudes existed among high officials, accepting the USA as a dominant Pacific power was not difficult in Japan. This was partially because of the absence of institutional or sentimental ties with Europe, but more importantly, because from the mid-nineteenth century, the USA had been the major Pacific power with which Japan had had to deal.

The IPR represented an active American initiative to lead a new order in the Pacific, a mood symbolized by the term the Pacific Age. Those who were attracted to the IPR in Japan recognized the opportunities of this Pacific Age. While it involved two kinds of regionalism (Pan-Asianism and Pan-Americanism), international cooperationists in Japan accepted a more American perception of the Pacific-centred-world. They rejected the Asianist argument for Japan's involvement in Asia in opposition to the European powers.²⁴⁴

241 Kanzaki K., 'Taiheiyo mondai to kokusai renmei: Renmei wa oshu renmei taru bekarazu,' *Kokusai chishiki*, Vol.6, No.6 (June, 1926), pp.51-57.

242 Inoue's speech and the response, *Kokusai chishiki* (March 1926), reprinted in *SEDS*, Vol.37, p.13.

243 Shibusawa E., 'Heiwa kinembi ni tsuite,' 11 November, 1926, *SEDS*, Vol.37, p.113. Interestingly in the English translation of this speech, the part referring to the Pacific was cut, *Ibid.*, pp.114-116.

244 See Chapter One, Section Three.

American visions of the Pacific prevailed among major JCIPR members, who were pro-American and pro-New Diplomacy,²⁴⁵ although various other elements existed in the JCIPR.²⁴⁶ Pro-American attitudes were based on attraction to the values and society which the USA embodied in their minds. The ideas of the USA as a dominant power and an ideal country were closely related. Nitobe, who studied at Johns Hopkins in 1884–1886, was one of the first Japanese scholars to predict the dominance of the USA in post WWI international politics as early as in 1904.²⁴⁷ He was also a pioneer of American studies in Japan.²⁴⁸

The image of the USA as an embodiment of democracy was powerful among JCIPR members. In 1919 Nitobe wrote *'Heimindō'* which was a commoners' version of *'Bushidō'*. While the latter discussed Japanese mode of morality for warrior classes [*bushi*], equivalent to chivalry in Europe, the former extended the virtue and morality to commoners, and discussed the Japanese style of democracy based on this moral system. Takagi Yasaka, another pioneer of American studies in Japan and an active JCIPR member, also saw the USA as an ideal democracy. How to adapt this system to Japan, therefore, was their main interest.²⁴⁹ Merle Davis, the first general secretary of the IPR, visited Japan in May, 1926 and reported the importance of this *faith* in America.

I was impressed with the faith in the goodwill and justice of the United States to which many of the Japanese leaders still cling. America was the source of their idealism, and to her they still feel that they owe their training, their point of view and much of their

245 Nakagawa M., 'Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai,' p.107. On Nitobe and Wilsonianism and pro-Americanism, see Mitani T., *Taisho demokurashiron*, pp.138–141.

246 Davis noted that 'reactionary' members such as the head of 'Black Dragon Society', Uchida Ryūhei, and Editor of 'Kokumin', Tokutomi I., were also involved in the formation of the JCIPR in 1926. Davis to Wilbur, 11 May, 1926, E-12b/29, AUH.

247 Mitani T., *Taisho demokurashiron*, pp.128–129.

248 Saitō Makoto, 'Sōseiki Amerika kenkyū no mokuteki isshiki: Nitobe Inazō to "beikoku kenkyū",' in Hosoya C. and Saitō M. eds., *Washington taisei to nichibei kankei* (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1978), p.577. For the meaning of American culture in the Taisho democracy movement, see Mitani T., *Taisho demokurashiron*, pp.122–154.

249 Saitō M., 'Sōseiki Amerika kenkyū,' pp.582–583, and Saitō M. et al eds., *Amerika seishin o motomete: Takagi Yasaka no shōgai* (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1985), p.133.

culture. America had been for many years a "Star of Hope" to these men.²⁵⁰

This belief explains why they took the American anti-Japanese Immigration Act of 1924 so seriously. The law betrayed their ideals and expectations of the USA, and 'the "Star of Hope" was totally extinguished by the Exclusion Act'.²⁵¹ The ideal democracy denied equality. Once again, believers in liberal ideas were disillusioned, following on from the denial of racial equality in the Covenant of the League.²⁵²

Did this disillusion lead them to question the nature of racial politics, internalize the consequences in their attitudes to Korea or China, and take action? This racial aspect of international politics contained the potential to challenge the international order, just as did Konoe's thesis of 1918. To an extent, at the first IPR conference, they took action. They demanded, however, not 'racial' equality, but 'national equality', and claimed equality with Euro-Americans, and superiority to other Asians. The latter point was clearly demonstrated in the JCIPR's strong opposition to Korean representation at the IPR. For them, Korea was a part of Greater Japan.²⁵³ JCIPR members felt humiliated not because of the ill-treatment of Asian immigrants in general, but because the Japanese were treated like other Asians.²⁵⁴ The notion that Japan belonged to the 'West', not to the Orient was strong among JCIPR members,²⁵⁵ and this basic understanding did not lead them to the Asianist thinking of Konoe's thesis. Konoe's thesis did not comment on the nature of the relations between Japan and other Asian countries, yet identified Japan with the Orient, and challenged the order which he perceived was ruled by the 'West'.

²⁵⁰ Davis to Wilbur, 26 May, 1926, E-12b/29, AUH.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*

²⁵² For JCIPR members, this act was like a bomb. Those who believed the USA as the country of social justice were very disappointed. Nitobe and Shibusawa were also deeply wounded. Nitobe decided not to go to the USA, until the law would be repealed. Ogata S., 'Kokusai shugi dantai,' pp.320-321.

²⁵³ Nakami M., 'Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai,' p.109, and Katagiri Nobuo, 'Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai (IPR) to Chōsen chōsenjōken mondai: Chōsen gurūpu no dattai, 1925-1931,' *Hōgaku kenkyū*, Vol.59, No.1, (April, 1986), pp.45-76.

²⁵⁴ Davis to Wilbur, 26 May, 1926, E-12b/29, AUH.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

When the anti-Japanese immigration law was passed, betraying their hopes that the USA embodied their ideas, why did the JCIPR members still think the IPR would be important and useful? They thought there was still a possibility that the law could be repealed if Americans understood the situation *correctly*. They also thought that it was not the *real* USA which passed the law. Shibusawa expressed this view:

We owe too much to America, we honour her and love her too much to strike back The America that we know has not acted. It is another America, not the real America. We must be patient and give our friend time to reassert her best self and make right in her own time and her own way what seems to us to be an unjust and unreasonable act.²⁵⁶

It is striking to see this faith in the USA, and the personification of a nation. The complexities of the nation-state, or the diversities of the society are ignored. Shibusawa's America consisted of pro-Japan business people, diplomats and intellectuals, and it was the same for JCIPR members. The image was constructed from contact with the Americans they dealt with, who were middle class white Anglo-Saxon Protestant, not new immigrants, blacks, Native Americans or the working classes.²⁵⁷

Official involvement with the JCIPR was strong from the beginning. This was initially the result of the American approach rather than of Japanese official policy. Frank Atherton, a prominent businessman in Hawaii and a major organizer of the first IPR conference, contacted the Japanese Ambassador in Hawaii and Shibusawa in mid-1924. He explained that the conference was to consider human relations in the Pacific and urged Japan to send a delegation of 'influential and leading men'.²⁵⁸ The biggest agenda item of this conference was the anti-Japanese immigration act of 1924. Atherton, a member of the JARC in Honolulu, knew Shibusawa and Hanihara through the movement against this act.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁷ Saitō M., 'Nihon ni okeru kokusaigaku no senkusha': Takagi Yasaka, *Kokusaigaku kenkyū* No.1 (1987), No.19, pp.29-30.

²⁵⁸ Atherton to Hanihara, and Atherton to Shibusawa, both dated 24 July 1924, *STDS*, Vol.37, pp.458-460.

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²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁷ Saitō M., 'Nihon ni okeru kokusaigaku no senkusha I: Takagi Yasaka,' *Kokusaigaku kenkyū* No.1 (1987), No.19, pp.29-30.

²⁵⁸ Atherton to Hanihara, and Atherton to Shibusawa, both dated 24 July 1924, SEDS, Vol.37, pp.458-460.

The conduct of the Honolulu office (which became the International Secretariat of the IPR, the ISIPR, after the first conference) in using official channels to correspond with the Japanese branch was very peculiar.²⁵⁹ It was unusual because normally it used the office of the local YMCA headquarters and then National Councils after they were formed. This approach was probably a result of the JARC connection, as well as a reflection of the character of Merle Davis, the first General Secretary of the ISIPR, and his familiarity with the Japanese officials. While Davis was eager to get favourable official support from various governments,²⁶⁰ he was particularly familiar with Japanese high officials. As a member of an influential American missionary family who contributed to the Japanese educational system, he understood the system in Japan and was also a well-respected figure amongst high officials and other influential circles.²⁶¹

In response, the reaction of the Japanese government to the first IPR conference was enthusiastic. This was a marked contrast to the scepticism of the Australian government, which did not favour discussing the immigration issue at an international conference. It was informed that the conference was unofficial, and therefore, decided not to be involved with the conference.²⁶² In Japan, on the contrary, the issue was recognized as acute and important. The government took prompt steps to organize the delegation for the conference. In March 1925, an official visited Shibusawa to deliver Foreign Minister Shidehara's wish that Shibusawa would organize the matters related to this IPR conference.²⁶³ The government hosted farewell and welcome parties for the delegations to

²⁵⁹ This was not limited to the matters of the conference arrangements. When the ISIPR wanted to recruit one Japanese and one Chinese, the arrangement was done through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. First the ISIPR tried unofficial contacts, but when they proved to be unsuccessful, it contacted government officials. Debuchi to Inoue, 21 February, 1927, Debuchi to Tanaka, 4 May, 1928, Akamatsu to Tanaka, 28 March, 1929, Yoshida to Inoue, 30 April, 1929, Saitō to Yamasaki, 8 May, 1929. TMCK, Vol. 1, GS.

²⁶⁰ J. A. M. Elder to PM (Australia), 12 May, 1925, A981; Org 93, AA.

²⁶¹ John B. Condliffe, *Reminiscences of the Institute of Pacific Relations* (Vancouver, B. C.: Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, 1981), p.19. After Davis's resignation in 1929, no document suggests that key administrators of the IPR, J. Greene, Chairman of the ACIPR, and E. Carter, General Secretary of the ISIPR, used official channels to communicate with the JCIPR. TMCK, Vol. 5-9, GS.

²⁶² See the previous section on Australia.

²⁶³ [Note of the visit], 31 March, 1925, SEDS, Vol.37, p.478.

the first IPR conference and donated money to support the travel of these delegates.²⁶⁴

Official involvement with the JCIPR reached a peak at the time of the third IPR conference in Kyoto in 1929. The conference was prepared while the Tanaka cabinet (Seiyūkai) was in power, and conducted under the auspices of the Hamaguchi cabinet (Minseitō), and both administrations were supportive and involved. Besides funding 30,000 yen out of 100,000 yen budget,²⁶⁵ the government provided the participants from other countries with custom service and railway tickets in Japan, Manchuria and Korea. This was the practice, however, not only for the IPR conference, but for other international conferences such as the Pan-Pacific Science Congresses (Tokyo in 1926). It was not peculiar to the Japanese government either, since the Australian government gave similar travel concessions for the participants to the Pan-Pacific Science Congress in Australia in 1923.²⁶⁶

The IPR conference in Kyoto involved phenomenal official mobilization. Because the main issue of the conference was Manchuria, the government's stake was great. It collected reports through embassies and councils on preparatory proceedings in China, as well as the newspaper articles on the conference in the USA and China. Authorities in the prefectures where the ports were located reported the comings and goings of participants from other countries. After landing, their activities were strictly checked and reported. During the conference, reports were sent on the details of the proceedings. The JCIPR, correspondingly, consulted with the officials about the research agenda beforehand.²⁶⁷ The involvement

²⁶⁴ Out of 30,000 yen of the budget for the first IPR conference in 1925, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs paid 20,000 yen, Mitsui and Iwasaki 5,000 yen, Shibusawa 1,000 yen. The rest of 4,000 yen was allocated to eight members of the JARC. Masuda Meiroku *nisshi*, [Diary of Masuda Meiroku] 12 May, 1925, *SEDS*, Vol.37, p.485.

²⁶⁵ Inoue to Yoshida, 8 May, 1929, *TMCK*, Vol.2, GS.

²⁶⁶ The Pan-Pacific Science Congress (PPSC), which started from 1920 did not propose to be unofficial. Invitation, organization and finance of PPSC were all done through official channels. Arrangements of the PPSCs in 1923 and 1926 were all through the government, A981; Conf 256, and A981; Conf 262, AA.

²⁶⁷ For example, Inoue to Yoshida, 19 June, 1929, Uchiyama to Shidehara, 22 July, 1929, Takagi to Yoshida, 25 July, 1929, Nitobe to Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 31 July, 1929, Yoshida to Nitobe, 15 August, 1929, *TMCK*, Vol.2, GS.

continued, although to a lesser extent, in the next IPR conference in China in 1931, where the Manchurian issue was again the central topic. The government collected reports on the movements in China through embassies and councils.²⁶⁸ The documents concerning the IPR at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decreased sharply after 1932, although its active involvement continued at least until 1938.²⁶⁹

v) The JCIPR and Social Reform

Internationalist organizations supported the international status quo, which coincided with the government foreign policy in the 1920s. But this was a fragile position and much opposition existed. The racial issue in particular suggested the potential problem of this status quo. What sort of position, then, did JCIPR members hold on the domestic issues, and how did it affect their perception of the international order?

a) Supporting the Domestic Status Quo

Like other internationalists, JCIPR members initially supported the status quo of domestic politics. Reflecting this 'conservative' position, they had anti-populist attitudes. While they recognized the importance of public opinion [*yoron*], their duty was to 'educate' and lead 'intelligent and healthy' [*sōmei kenzenna*] opinion.²⁷⁰ Nakami argues that JCIPR members had stronger anti-mass attitudes than other internationalists. One JCIPR member denounced the LNA's method of enlightenment of the masses, and emphasized the importance of producing a strong

²⁶⁸ Among many reports were, for example, Yano to Shidehara, 28 January, 1931, Yoneuchi to Shidehara, 18 June, 1931, Morishima to Shidehara, 7 June, 1931, Kamimura to Shidehara, 14 September, 1931, and Murai to Shidehara, 24 September, 1931, TMCK, Vol.6-7, GS.

²⁶⁹ The last record of the government contribution was in December 1938. 5,000 yen was provided to help the travel of Takagi Yasaka to attend the IPR meeting. The government also paid 2,000 yen for the JCIPR's contribution to the IPR international headquarters. Note of *jōhōbu dai ikka shukan*, 5 December, 1938 and Wakasugi to Arita, 22 December, 1938, TMCK, Vol.9, GS. In 1939 and 1940, the government was informed about the IPR, especially on the issue of the JCIPR's withdrawal from the IPR project, the Inquiry.

²⁷⁰ Sawada S., 'Nihon ni okeru heiwa,' pp.15-17.

academic core group of foreign affairs experts.²⁷¹ The annual membership fee for the JCIPR was ten yen (in contrast to four yen for the LNA), which further limited membership.²⁷² The JCIPR was not unusual in its anti-mass attitude when compared with other organizations which aspired to become foreign affairs 'expert' bodies such as other National Councils of the IPR, the RIIA in London and the CFR in New York. Alfred Zimmern, a member of the RIIA, pointed out this danger of the expert groups of becoming anti-democratic forces.²⁷³

As a result, membership of the JCIPR was mainly confined to academics and government administrators, and this direction became stronger after Shibusawa's death. Academic orientation reflected the policy of the IPR headquarters, as well as the JCIPR's initiative: the focus on producing *scientific* data papers. The aim of the JCIPR was to do academic and practical *research* on issues related to the Pacific,²⁷⁴ and it was based on the philosophy of the founders of the IPR: if people know the 'facts', then they will have no prejudice or misunderstanding and be able to solve problems.

This academic orientation could have enhanced the JCIPR's independence from the government. But as the following argument suggests, the organization attracted a certain type of academic and public administrator, who sought an intermediary role between academia and officialdom, as an 'expert' on foreign affairs. This 'expert' orientation made the JCIPR inept as far as the propagation of their ideas and activities in the wider society was concerned. It demonstrated, therefore, the same problem as organizations in Australia, the USA and Britain had.²⁷⁵ In contrast to internationalist organizations, the Japanese government took more initiative in public relations activities through radio, the tourist bureau,

²⁷¹ Nakami M., 'Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai,' p.117.

²⁷² Kaisoku, [Regulations] SEDS, Vol.37, p.531.

²⁷³ Alfred Zimmern, 'Democracy and the Expert,' *Political Quarterly*, Vol.1 (1930), pp.13 and 24-25.

²⁷⁴ Kaisoku, SEDS, Vol.37, p.531.

²⁷⁵ For the ineffectiveness of the similar organizations in the USA, see Cohen. He does not, however, single out that elitism was the main weakness. W. Cohen, 'Aija mondai to Amerika minkan dantai,' in Hosoya C. et al eds., *Nichibei kaisen ni itaru jūnen*, pp.418-419.

and various agencies and used the JCIPR as a publicist organization, not for the audience in Japan, but for those in the 'international community', especially after its withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933.²⁷⁶

The position of the JCIPR members in domestic politics reflected the background of JCIPR members, who belonged to the upper strata of society. When the JCIPR was founded on 6 April, 1926, Merle Davis, who was visiting Japan, was pleased to see the Council included prominent figures. It was, he wrote:

well balanced, with several of their greatest publicists, religionists, business men and scientists included. Baron Sakatani, Dr Sawayanagi, Dr. J. Soyeda, Dr Anezaki are outstanding national leaders in their own spheres. There is a group of very active younger leaders on the Council The choice of Mr. J. Inoue, as Chairman of the Executive Committee, alone, insures the success ...²⁷⁷

Inoue Junnosuke (1867–1932) and Shibusawa played similar roles as channels between the JCIPR and the government. Inoue was President of the Bank of Japan in 1919–1923 and 1927–1928, and Minister of Finance in 1923 and 1929–1931. He had been actively involved with previous internationalist organizations. The Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs often communicated with Inoue on IPR matters.²⁷⁸ Inoue resigned from the chair of the JCIPR in 1929, when he was appointed as Minister of Finance, following the practice of the Chairman of the IPR executive body in order to respect the IPR's 'unofficial' character.

Although there was almost thirty years' age difference between them, Shibusawa (1840–1931) and Inoue (1867–1932) represented the first generation of internationalists at the JCIPR: members of the Meiji elite with first-hand experience in foreign countries. They had contributed to Meiji-state building, especially its financial system, and their sense of

²⁷⁶ Ōkubo Genji emphasizes JCIPR's role as a publicist organization, especially after 1933.

Ōkubo G., 'Mokuji [Contents]', reprinted by J. Dower, 'Mikan no agenda,' in Yui Daizaburō et al eds., *Tsuishō Ōkubo Genji* (Shūbidō, 1987), pp.89–90.

²⁷⁷ Davis to Wilbur, 11 May, 1926, E-12b/29, AUH.

²⁷⁸ For example, Debuchi to Inoue, 2 February, 1927, 21 July, 1927, 16 April, 1928, and 30 May, 1928, TI 'CK, Vol. 1–2, GS.

public mission was very strong. They were outspoken, given their calibre and achievements. A "strong man", as a contemporary newspaper called him, Inoue was not afraid of the government or reactionary groups in expressing his opinions.²⁷⁹ Their understanding of the international community was distinctively economic in character. Their vision of the international system focused on currency, banking and trading. International politics, especially for Shibusawa, was not elaborate or complicated. There was no incompatibility between peace and a strong nation-state, and good will should resolve conflicts. The loss of Shibusawa in 1931 and Inoue (by assassination) in 1932 not only reflected the deteriorating political environment, but also meant the loss of influential contacts for the JCIPR with the government and business world. Leaders equivalent to Shibusawa or Inoue who had strength to stand up against official policies did not re-appear.²⁸⁰

JCIPR members, however, were not necessarily hereditary members of the upper strata of society. They achieved influential positions mainly by merit and education.²⁸¹ They were mostly graduates from *Ichikō* [the First Higher School]²⁸² and Tokyo Imperial University,²⁸³ which produced

²⁷⁹ Yoshida Toshihiko, *Rekidai Nihon ginkōsosai ron* (Mainichi shimbunsha, 1976), pp.147-148.

²⁸⁰ E. Carter, Secretary of the American Council of the IPR, visited Japan in 1928, and recorded the dominance of academics within the JCIPR, cited in Nakami M., 'Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai,' p.106.

²⁸¹ By means such as adoption, extended kinship ties or scholarships, there were ways for bright boys to have good education in the first two decades of the twentieth century. To study at *Ichikō*, students had to pay a one-yen fee for the entrance examination and a yearly tuition of twenty yen in 1886. Roden argues that these rates were not extraordinary in comparison with the private colleges. Numbered high schools drew students from 'a wider spectrum of the rural and urban middle classes,' but were 'beyond the reach of working-class families'. D. Roden, *School days*, pp.51-52. But good money or background alone did not necessarily guarantee the elite education. The examination was competitive and difficult. Furthermore, there were many drop outs at higher schools.

²⁸² There were eight numbered national high schools and between 1919 and 1923, 17 high schools (not numbered) were added. Local public schools and private schools only started from 1918. Momose T., *Showa senzenki no Nihon*, p.387.

²⁸³ There were seven imperial universities in Japan before WWII. Tokyo University was founded first in 1886, succeeded by Kyoto in 1897, Tohoku in 1907, Kyushu in 1910, Hokkaido in 1918, Osaka in 1931, and Nagoya in 1939. Momose T., *Showa senzenki no Nihon*, p.393.

much of the national elite.²⁸⁴ *Ichikō* is particularly important to an understanding of the background of the JCIPR members and internationalists in general. It was the place where they obtained their inspiration and formed life-long beliefs and social ties. While women mingled into this system through marriage and friendship, they were excluded from the national elite. Because the new generation of the JCIPR was produced through these institutions, unlike the case of the LNA, women were largely excluded from the JCIPR.

b) Nitobe as a Reformer

Nitobe Inazō, who became a central figure of the JCIPR, occupied a transitional position between the older and younger generations of the JCIPR. He influenced younger generations of the JCIPR through institutions such as *Ichikō* and Tokyo Imperial University. Nakami points out his influence in terms of Wilsonian idealism.²⁸⁵ Nitobe worked as Under-Secretary at the League in Geneva in 1920-1927 and promoted the League to the public not only in Japan, but also throughout the world.²⁸⁶ But his distinctive notion of the "Christian gentleman", as a reformed version of the Meiji elite, also influenced the younger generation of the JCIPR (and internationalists in general) to have a strong reformist inclination.

²⁸⁴ At first Tokyo Imperial University put more emphasis on producing engineers for the construction of infrastructure in Meiji Japan. This emphasis was shifted to the training of government bureaucrats with a good knowledge of law. Ambitious young men began to see the law degree from Tokyo Imperial University as a common elite course. Nakayama S., *Teikoku daigaku no tanjō*, Chapter Three. Accordingly, high schools changed their character and *Ichikō*, especially, became a preparatory school for the Tokyo Imperial University. In contrast to the early emphasis on practical studies [*jitsugaku*] in early Meiji, the school shifted more towards producing 'gentlemen'. Under Minister of Education, Mori Arinori, in 1885-1889, the 'national' aspect was stressed. By the end of the nineteenth century, *Ichikō* became a place for future national elite. D. Roden, *Schooldays in Imperial Japan*, Chapter Two.

²⁸⁵ Nakami M., 'Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai,' p.106.

²⁸⁶ Nitobe was thought to be the best spokesman of the League to inspire its importance to the world. T. Burgelman, 'Nitobe Inazō as Under-Secretary General of the League of Nations, 1920-1926,' *The Journal of International Studies* (Institute of International Relations, Sophia University, Tokyo), No.14 (January, 1985), p.82. Nitobe took this job as his vocation, which all his previous experience prepared him for. Nitobe to Chase, 12 August, 1919, cited in G. Oshiro, *Nitobe Inazō*, p.173.

He first pursued the reform of the 'national' elite when he was principal of *Ichikō* (1906–1913) by cultivating *social* manners. His aim was to present an alternative model of a mannered gentleman. Before his arrival, the mentality of masculine barbarism [*bankara*] prevailed at the school, especially in the athletic clubs. Against this mentality, Nitobe tried to build a hygienic, cultural community, following the model of character-building at British public schools.²⁸⁷

Opposition was strong. Some students rebelled against Nitobe's reform in 1909, accusing him of promoting *sociality* [*shakōsei*] as a disguised form of egalitarianism, and arguing that 'the Western custom of showing respect to women at the expense of masculinity' would lead them down 'the path to degeneration'.²⁸⁸ As Roden argues, however, Nitobe's sociality was far from egalitarianism. It was based on a firm sense of social rank. He aimed at the reform of the manners, not the essence, of the Meiji elite, and the rebellion suggests that even this superficial reform caused much opposition.

Beside manners, his concept of 'sociality' implied a strong element of social reform as public duty. Nitobe often used the words 'sociality' [*shakaisei*] and 'social service' [*shakai hōshi*], but as one of his students recorded, the word *shakai* was not commonly used, and was even forbidden among certain conservative groups.²⁸⁹ The concept *shakai* [society] bridged laissez-faire liberalism and New Liberalism.²⁹⁰ Although his emphasis was on the individual self as the basis of a collective, rather than on the collective itself, he was particularly aware of the need for

²⁸⁷ Before he took up principalship at *Ichikō*, Nitobe asked the Minister of Education to send him to Britain to study British public schools such as Eton, Rugby and Harrow. His favourite author was Carlyle and he wanted to be remembered among students as Dr Arnold. Yanaihara Tadao, *Yo no sonkeisuru jimbutsu*, (Iwanami shoten, 1940), pp.199 and 219, and D. Roden, *School Days*, p.207.

²⁸⁸ D. Roden, *Schooldays*, pp.206–207.

²⁸⁹ Horikiri Zenjirō rep. ed., *Maeda Tamon: Sono un sono hito* (Maeda Tamon kankōkai, 1963), p.15.

²⁹⁰ The opening speech of Nitobe for the third IPR conference suggests the influence of T. H. Green on his concept of the society. Nitobe I., 'Kaishiki no ji,' in Nitobe I. ed., *Taiheiyō mondai: 1929 nen Kyoto kaigi* (Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai, 1930), p.85.

service to the society.²⁹¹ This position was different from that of other JCIPR members of his generation such as Ishii Kikujirō, pro-Anglo-American diplomat. In Ishii's opinion, self-help [*jijo*] was most important, and he had little sense of social service.²⁹² Nitobe's position was also different from others who argued that the collective nation was absolute and that individuals were subordinate to it.²⁹³

Nitobe's sense of the 'social' came mainly from two sources: Christian humanitarianism based on his Quaker belief; and the tradition of the Meiji elite (but a 'civilized' version of gentlemen as opposed to a masculine and militant elite). Nitobe cultivated the idea of the Christian gentleman amongst his students, but independently from Nitobe's influence, a Christian sense of social justice and service was strong at the JCIPR due to the important position of Christianity in the international movement.

Ibuka Kajinosuke (1854–1940), an early member of the JCIPR, contributed to the development of Christianity in the Meiji period. He wrote on the future of social improvement [*shakai kairyō*] in the mid-1890s. He opposed conservatism which, he argued, was fostered by the retrogressive [*taihoteki*] Sinologist school [*kangaku shugi* or *shina shugi*], and argued that progressive thoughts should prevail instead. He particularly argued the need to reform the marital relationship.²⁹⁴ Nagao Hanpei (1865–1936) was also involved with the JCIPR through the YMCA, although he became close to Nitobe while they were both in Taiwan as colonial administrators. Nagao's main contribution was to the temperance movement.²⁹⁵ Christian principles made all these individuals commit themselves to various social movements. By criticizing patriarchal values which contributed to jingoistic mentality, they must have indirectly modified that mentality. On the other hand, they did not challenge the

291 Nitobe Inazō, *Jikei roku: Kokoro no mochikata* (Kōdansha, 1982), Chapter 17.

292 Ishii Kikujirō, *Gaikō yoroku* (Iwanami shoten, 1930), pp.22 and 25.

293 This ambiguous position of Nitobe caused much controversy and criticism by scholars later. Yanaihara T., *Yo no sonkeisuru jimbutsu*, p.210.

294 Ibuka Kajinosuke to sono jidai kankō iinkai ed., *Ibuka kajinosuke to sono jidai*, Vol 2 (Sangodō, 1970), pp.393–398.

295 Ishii Mitsuru, *Nagao Hanpei den* (Kyōbunkan, 1937), Chapter 16.

imperial framework, and these Christian movements tended to treat issues as personal rather than as social. They, therefore, did not match the urgent need of the desperate or the poor for a large scale help and reform.

Another element of Nitobe's sense of 'social' came from being a government administrator. He believed in the Emperor system and the social order of the time, including the idea of "Greater Japan" and its power to serve the *backward* countries. He promoted these ideas at *Ichikō* and Tokyo Imperial University where he became Professor of colonial policy in 1913.²⁹⁶ While cultivating social manners and democratic ideals, he supported the existing system, and moulded national and colonial administrators.

The influence of Gotō Shimpei (1857–1929, and Minister for Home Affairs in 1916–1918 and 1923–1924) on Nitobe and other JCIPR members as a colonial administrator and social reformer should also be mentioned. Politically Gotō sided with those who wished to challenge the existing international order. He urged the need to ally with Russia to balance American aggression in China, and took a more military interventionist policy. The association between Gotō and Nitobe began when Gotō recruited Nitobe as a colonial administrator in Taiwan in 1901. They both came from Iwate prefecture, which provided an initial link, and later they became close friends. On the surface it was an odd match, but on issues of social reform and colonial administration, they had much in common.

Gotō was very concerned with the social welfare system, especially health and hygiene, and this awareness led him closer to some social movements, including Christian movements.²⁹⁷ Social Darwinism

²⁹⁶ Nitobe lectured at Tokyo Imperial University a few times a week when he was principle of *Ichikō*. He resigned from *Ichikō* in 1913, and became Professor at the University.

²⁹⁷ Nagao Hampei was said to be the mediator between the YMCA and Gotō, under whom Nagao worked in Taiwan. Ishii M., *Nagao Hampei den*, p.210. Gotō became involved with the YMCA, and through this connection, he became acquainted with and admired John Mott, the leader of the YMCA internationalist movement. Tsurumi Yūsuke, *Gotō Shimpei*, Vol.3 (*Gotō Shimpei denki hensankai*, 1937), pp.357–372. His attraction to the USSR could be explained by its socialist system as well as its potential role as a balancing force against the USA.

played a great role in Gotō's thought. He saw the nation as a natural and biological being, and based on this idea, he planned a social welfare policy involving health insurance, city planning and colonial administration.²⁹⁸ It was an administrator's social welfare scheme, whose aim was to strengthen the individual body in order to provide human industrial and military resources for the state. Gotō was involved with the careers of the second generation of the JCIPR, many of whom were Nitobe's students. The tradition of state administration as well as that of academia was strong in these JCIPR members.

Nitobe put his ideas of the 'social' and the 'public spirit' into practice by being a publicist. He wrote for many journals and newspapers and gave public lectures. He realized the importance of addressing the public. Fame, power, sense of mission or duty may have been the motivation. For a semi-official figure, a publicist role involves the risk of becoming a government spokesman, rather than an independent thinker.²⁹⁹ On the other hand, it showed a certain appreciation of the public, rather than distrust.

Takagi Yasaka, one of the students of Nitobe, who also became a JCIPR member, was uncomfortable with being a publicist.³⁰⁰ Personality, not only social or political position, therefore, could also determine the role of each member of the JCIPR.

c) Stronger Social Consciousness

In contrast to Takagi, the other younger members of the JCIPR who were influenced by Nitobe and Gotō had a stronger orientation towards state administration and publicist activities. They were Tsurumi Yūsuke, Maeda Tamon and Iwanaga Yūkichi, all of whom started as state

²⁹⁸ This theory seems to be based on biological Darwinism. Tsurumi Y., *Gotō Shimpei*, Vol.1 (*Gotō Shimpei denki hensankai*, 1937), pp.359-366.

²⁹⁹ While Yoshino Sakuzō, Kiyozawa Kiyoshi and Ishibashi Tarzan, as academic or journalist, consistently criticized military expansion to the continent, the semi-official status of Nitobe and the JCIPR members made them compromise on their international cooperationist position. Nakami M., 'Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai,' p.118.

³⁰⁰ Saitō M. et al ed., *Amerika seishin o motomete*, pp.25 and 80.

administrators. Maeda (1884–1962) was a public servant and a delegate for the ILO in 1923. He was fascinated by Nitobe's speeches and, with Tsurumi, became the most enthusiastic follower. Maeda described how Nitobe told him to become a social educationalist [*shakai kyōkuka*], and this idea directed his life.³⁰¹

Tsurumi (1885–1973), an author and politician, was also an enthusiastic follower of Nitobe, who also helped his marriage to a daughter of Gotō Shimpei. Tsurumi was fascinated by Wilsonian ideals, and formed the *Uiruson kurabu* [Wilson Club] in 1915. The core of this club consisted of students and old boys from the Debating Club of *Ichikō*,³⁰² and it included many later members of the JCIPR. Tsurumi was a born publicist. From his *Ichikō* days onward, his eloquence was famous. He had confidence and mannerisms which enabled him to socialize with Americans and British at overseas occasions including IPR conferences. He made a speech on contemporary Japan at the Institute of Politics at Williamstown in 1924, participated in IPR conferences in 1925–1936, and delivered public lectures in the USA, Britain and Australia. His relaxed manner, however, did not guarantee trust in the 1930s when he was seen more as a governmental spokesman than as an independent thinker.³⁰³

His proposal of New Liberalism [*shin jiyūshugi*] in 1924 represents a transitional position of international cooperationists in their attitudes to social reform, nation and the international order. Based on this principle, he formed a new political party called *Meiseitō*³⁰⁴ and the New Liberalism

301 Horikoshi Z. rep. ed., *Maeda Tamon*, p.14

302 The speakers included politicians such as Matsuoka Yōsuke and Ashida Hitoshi, businessmen such as Inoue Junnosuke and Kurokawa Shinjirō, novelists such as Arishima Takeo and Shimazaki Tōson, journalists such as Iwanaga Yūichi and Tokutomi Sohō and academics. The members and speakers included JCIPR members such as Inoue, Iwanaga, Nagao and Rōyama Masamichi (still a high school student in 1915). This club lasted at least until 1929. Kitaoka Toshiaki, 'Tsurumi Yūsuke san no omoide: Kayōkai o chūshin toshite,' in Kitaoka T. ed., *Yūjō no hito Tsurumi Yūsuke sensei* (Kamakura insatsu, 1975), pp.60–65.

303 Interview with Bill Holland, at Amherst, Mass, 19 March, 1993.

304 Tsurumi Yūsuke Papers include the documents on *Meiseitō*, but were not available in time for reference for this thesis. I thank Professor Tsurumi Kazuko for giving me permission to look at the document, and Professor Itō Takashi who showed me the contents of the documents.

Association [*Shin jiyū shugi kyōkai*] (1928–), of which Nitobe became a chairman. He urged the need to establish liberalism as a middle road ideology between conservative and communist forces. His liberalism was not the old laissez-faire liberalism, but the New Liberalism of T. H. Green.³⁰⁵ He argued the importance of the individual personality, but insisted that it should also contribute to *society as a whole*.³⁰⁶ He admitted that in accepting the importance of state intervention to protect working class interests, New Liberalism was close to socialism,³⁰⁷ and argued that this new development had occurred because of the emerging political consciousness among working classes and women. He saw that this new force was partially embodied by the universal male franchise.³⁰⁸

Tsurumi sensed not only the positive side of these movements, but also the danger. He thought that social reform was needed to protect and strengthen the nation-state against these movements.³⁰⁹

Reforms reflecting the needs of the society are the best way to protect the nation. A healthy movement to challenge the status quo is the only way to preserve the life of the nation. The [recent] prevailing mentality in Japan to challenge the status quo is the expression of the self defence instinct of the Japanese nation.³¹⁰

The influence of Gotō's idea of the nation-state as a biological being is strong in this argument which Tsurumi wrote in 1928. This was the year of the first general election based on the universal male franchise, in which he was elected as a Diet member.³¹¹

305 Tsurumi Y., 'Shin jiyū shugi no tachiba yori,' *Kaizō*, Vol.10, No.5 (May, 1928), p.26.

306 Tsurumi Y. *Chūō o ayumu kokoro*, (Shinshakai, 1927), pp.86–87.

307 *Ibid.*, p.105.

308 *Ibid.*, p.277.

309 Tsurumi argued for universal female franchise because he thought that the half of the population of the nation were women and that franchise would make women's national sense stronger and clearer. Tsurumi Y., 'Joshi kōminken fuyo ni suite,' *Toshi mondai*, Vol.7, No.3 (September, 1928), pp.13–14.

310 *Ibid.*, p.279.

311 He campaigned for the election in 1926–1928, and also promoted 'Ethics in Politics Movement' with Gotō, Sawayanagi, Nagao and others. *Nempyō* [Chronicle], in Kitaoka T. ed., *Yūjō no hito*, p.370.

The principles of New Liberalism led Tsurumi to question the international status quo, and to become closer to Asianism. He applied the principle to international politics and stated that big powers should not oppress small countries.³¹² He saw inequality between 'Caucasian' races and coloured races,³¹³ and argued that peace for Britain, the USA, the USSR and France was to preserve their benefits, but that 'real' peace would not come until Japan achieved 'justice' by abolishing these countries' racial discrimination and unfair tariffs.³¹⁴ Here, Tsurumi's perspective, based on awareness of the new forces in the domestic and international context, moves very close to Konoe's thesis of 1918.

Iwanaga Yūkichi (1883–1939) was another international cooperationist, who eventually contributed to strong *national* institution building. Iwanaga's involvement with internationalists started in his *Ichikō* days through his association with Tsurumi, Maeda and later Nitobe. After working under Gotō Shimpei in the South Manchurian Railway Company and the Ministry of Railways, Iwanaga became aware of the need to establish a national news agency.³¹⁵ The idea was based on the recognition of the importance of the public opinion and the media,³¹⁶ and strengthened by observations of the ways that Japanese policies and anti-Japanese movements in the USA were reported. He felt the need to change the domination of foreigners in reporting the events overseas in Japan, and Japanese events overseas. The establishment of a national news agency became his obsession.

Born in a very wealthy family, money does not seem to have been the main object of this business. He lost substantial sums, and his property was reduced to pay off the debt. Probably his sense of public service to the

³¹² Tsurumi Y., *C' ichikō ayumu kokoro*, p.89.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, p.329.

³¹⁴ Tsurumi Y., 'Kokusai heiwa to kokumin seigi,' *Tōyō keizai shimpō*, No.1553 (June, 1933), p.21.

³¹⁵ Toshino Inosuke ed., *Iwanaga Yūkichi kun* (Iwanaga Yūkichi kun denki hensan iinkai, 1941), pp.163–166 and 242. Overseas news had been controlled by British Reuters, and Japanese news agencies had to pay substantial sums of money to Reuters to get foreign news. Iwanaga fought for a more equal deal with Reuters, and was convinced of the need for a strong national agency, based on the model of American Associated Press.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.36–59.

'nation' played the most important part in this movement. It was seconded by the government policy of media control, which inevitably oppressed individual freedom of expression. Eager to publicize a 'correct' understanding of Japan, Iwanaga did not see the danger of totalitarian control of the media.³¹⁷

Social reform consciousness became much stronger amongst the next generation in the JCIPR and was expressed particularly strongly by Rōyama Masamichi (1895–1965). He was ten years junior to Tsurumi, but they were acquainted through the Debating Club of *Ichikō*, where old boys socialized extensively with current students. Also through this club, he was involved with the *Shinjinkai* [the New Men's Society] (founded in 1918). He was more inspired by English social democracy than Marx-Leninism, which was predominant in *Shinjinkai* in the 1920s.³¹⁸ His concept of social reform originated from his awareness of the new forces of democracy,³¹⁹ but as an elite academic of public policy Rōyama saw reform from the administrator's point of view. It was anti-socialist revolution,³²⁰ and this reformism led him close to Konoe.

The actual connection between Rōyama and Konoe was established in 1934 when Iwanaga suggested that Rōyama and Ushiba Tomohiko (1901–1990) accompany Konoe on a private trip to the USA. Iwanaga was convinced that they could help Konoe with their expert knowledge.³²¹ By then, younger JCIPR members such as Rōyama, Ushiba and Matsumoto Shigeharu (1899–1989), had been working on Manchurian issues at *Tokyo seiji keizai kenkyūsho* [Tokyo political and economic research centre] (founded in 1930). This organization later became the core of the Showa Research Association, a brains trust of Konoe.³²²

³¹⁷ He worked for the consolidation of newspapers and agencies. He was surprised to see the strong opposition from local newspapers. *Ibid.*, p.214–218.

³¹⁸ H. D. Smith II, *Japan's First Student Radicals*, pp.74 and 265.

³¹⁹ Rōyama Masamichi, *Nihon seiji dōkōron* (Kōyō shoin, 1933), pp.1–7.

³²⁰ W. M. Fletcher III, *The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp.15, 18, 23 and 36.

³²¹ Ogata S., 'Kokusai shugi dantai,' p.399.

³²² The nature of *Showa kenkyūkai* was complicated. It contained not only reformists who aimed at national socialist schemes, but also many others of different interests. Sakai Saburō, 'Showa kenkyūkai no higeiki,' *Bungei shunjū* (October, 1964), p.237.

The influence of the Association indicates the degree of the sense of crisis in the last half of the 1930s. It was a policy advisory body of 'experts' of the sort, which Zimmern advocated for international organizations. Konoe felt the need of such a body, which was free from the everyday routine of bureaucrats. The bureaucrats protested strongly against Konoe's move to rely on these expert bodies, but the influence of such bodies, especially the Showa Research Association on Konoe's policies was evident in 1938-1940.³²³

The schemes the association proposed were national socialistic in many ways. Its economic section suggested the need for a state controlled economy and a strong sense of 'public responsibility' by private companies in the time of a 'crisis'.³²⁴ After 1937 when Japan embarked on the total war with China, this 'crisis' meant the war. Rōyama worked on political reform schemes. Inspired by guild socialism and Fascist schemes in Germany and Italy, he argued that in a time of political and social crisis, society needed a strong central state power for reform.³²⁵ His ideas were reflected in the formation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association [*Taisei yokusankai*] in Konoe's New Order [*Shin taisei*] movement. Rōyama's arguments downplayed the importance of individual freedom and the political ability of the people.

Members of the Showa Research Association did not think their 'revolutionary' reform proposals would challenge the national polity, which they interpreted as the emperor system. Their schemes were promoted not only by Konoe, but *kakushin* bureaucrats. They were opposed by business and certain military sections,³²⁶ and failed in the end of 1940.³²⁷

³²³ *Ibid.*, p.108.

³²⁴ Nakamura Takafusa, 'Ryū Shintarō to tōsei keizai,' *Chūō kōron: Rekishi to jinbutsu* (April, 1974), p.71-72.

³²⁵ W. M. Fletcher III, *The Search for a New Order*, pp.35, 52, 57 and 86-87.

³²⁶ Business circles accused Ryū's schemes as being communist because the schemes suggested separation of capital and management and restriction of profit. Nakamura T., 'Ryū Shintarō,' p.73. Certain right-wing factions also alleged that the formation of the one party political system by the New Order movement would infringe the supreme

This demonstrates that more social reform orientation meant a stronger national, or more precisely, state orientation. Conscious of the problem of balancing the welfare of individuals and the strength of the nation-state, nevertheless they adopted a strategy of reform favouring government needs ahead of the population's needs. In this sense, they were statist, rather than nationalist. Their reforms were more likely to produce a totalitarian government and society than a social democratic one. The crucial dividing line between these two modes was the balance of the emphasis between the state and individuals. The balance was decided by the magnitude of a sense of crisis. But it was this sense of great crisis that brought younger JCIPR members into policy making positions. Those identified with the state as members of the national elite felt the need to create a strong nation in order to protect the 'nation' against domestic democratic forces and against other imperial forces, but this strong 'nation', in turn, suppressed individual human rights both in Japan and in Asia. A few members, such as Takagi Yasaka, remained uncomfortable with this strong reform-orientation at the JCIPR.³²⁸ These less reform-oriented JCIPR members remained ineffective in mobilizing social movements or influencing policy makers.

d) Reform of the International Order

On external issues, Rōyama did not simply attack the existing international order. Instead, he emphasized regional particularity, not because of the nature of the region, but because of the 'crisis'. In the crisis of democracy, he argued, particular adaptations were needed for particular

right of the emperor, and therefore would be against the Meiji Constitution. Itō T., 'Shin taisei undō to wa nanika,' *Chūō kōron: Rekishi to jinbutsu* (April, 1974), p.42.

³²⁷ The Showa Research Association was suppressed and dissolved. Tsurumi S., *Tenkō kenkyū* p.174, and W. M. Fletcher III, *The Search for a New Order*, p.151-153. On the suppression of socialist element at the Showa Research Association, see Chalmers Johnson, *An Instance of Treason: Ozaki Hotsumi and the Sorge Spy Ring* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990, first published in 1964).

³²⁸ Although Takagi felt the need to tackle domestic issues, rather than international issues in the mid-1930s, he was not actively involved with *Showa kenkyūkai* because of his dislike of the orientation of reformers. Saitō M. et al ed., *Amerika seishin o motomete*, p.80.

regions.³²⁹ He took two steps to reach the theory of the New Order in Eastern Asia: First, he argued that the particularity of the region was compatible with the existing international order: Second, he emphasized that the particularity of the region could become universal, and therefore, challenge the existing order.

The first view was represented by a recommendation to the Lytton Commission on Manchuria (1932), in which Rōyama pointed out the limits of the existing international system for dealing with issues in Eastern Asia. He argued that: 'international law assumed modern nation-states, therefore, had limits in application', and that 'in order to fill this gap, a new international law was needed'.³³⁰ The new system was regional law, and based on this argument, he proposed regional diplomatic machinery for the 'Far East', a regional League of Nations. The argument sought to justify the position of Japan in Manchuria, yet to be compatible with and complementary to the League.

His second view was presented in his book, *Tōa to sekai* [Eastern Asia and the world] (published in 1941). Extending the geopolitical argument of 1932, his proposals now challenged the existing international order.³³¹ This argument provided the theoretical backbone for the New Order in Eastern Asia. Rōyama's arguments were deliberately differentiated from those of Asianism, which had a stronger racial emphasis:³³² first, he denied Japan's cultural and racial identity with the rest of Asia; second, he opposed the nationalist movement in China.³³³ Instead, he emphasized universality and scientific objectivity, by clarifying that regional particularity existed not only in East Asia, but also in other parts of the world. In East Asia, Japan had to establish a new order which would be based on a regional community and transcend nationalism (Chinese nationalism and European imperialism).

³²⁹ Rōyama M., *Nihon seiji dōkōron*, p.6-7.

³³⁰ Mitani T., *Taishō demokurashron*, p.237.

³³¹ *Ibid.*, p.256.

³³² Miwa Kimitada, *Nihon; 1945 nen no shiten* (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1986), pp.155-158.

³³³ Mitani T., *Taishō demokurashron*, pp.256-257.

Unlike Rōyama, Miki Kiyoshi (1897–1945) used race/culture as a key for an ideology for the New Order in East Asia.³³⁴ Much later than JCIPR members, Miki was recruited to *Showa Kenkyūkai* in 1938 to lead a cultural study group. The group was founded to construct a universal theory which would transcend capitalism, communism and totalitarianism.³³⁵

Miki's arguments for Japan to identify with the Orient [*Tōyō*] in opposition to the 'West' can be categorized as Asianist. This concept of the Orient and the Oriental Century [*Tōyō no seiki*] contrasted markedly with American invention of the Pacific and the Pacific Age, as a synthesis of 'East' and 'West'. Arguing the need to add historical meaning to a concept in order to make it work,³³⁶ he gave new meaning to the terms "Orient", "Japanism" [*Nihon shugi*] and "cooperative body"³³⁷ [*kyōdōtai*]. In this re-invention, historically specific intellectual trends, such as anti-imperialism and anti-materialism, also common in other countries, were re-defined as 'essentially Japanese'.³³⁸ While appropriating European scholars' arguments,³³⁹ in his work on New Japan [*shin Nihon*], he defined the current problems such as class conflict, disastrous capitalism and selfish liberalism, as created by Europeans. He emphasized the

³³⁴ Miki is more often described as a Marxist who died in prison, but he was also an architect of the new order in Eastern Asia. In the time when silence was the only means of resistance against the war involvement, he was 'contemptuous of those silent people'. By taking a 'positive' action, Miki was resisting against the war. Shimizu Ikutarō, 'Miki Kiyoshi to Showa kenkyūkai,' *Chūō kōron: Rekishi to jimbutsu* (April, 1974), p.63.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.59.

³³⁶ Miki Kiyoshi, 'Shin Nihon no shisō genri, Zokuhen,' in Miki Kiyoshi, *Miki Kiyoshi zenshū* Vol.17 (Iwanami shoten, 1968), pp.535–536.

³³⁷ Najita and Harootunian use the translation "cooperativism" for *kyōdō shugi*. T. Najita and H. D. Harootunian, 'Japanese Revolt against the West: Political and Cultural Criticism in the Twentieth Century,' in P. Duus ed., *The Cambridge History of Japan*, Vol.6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, first published in 1988), p.738. Because Miki's *kyōdōtai* was a synthesis of *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft*, I use the translation of "cooperative body" for *kyōdōtai*.

³³⁸ Shimizu I, 'Miki Kiyoshi to Showa kenkyūkai,' p.63. Similarly, intellectuals of the Kyoto school did not create the ideology to support military expansion and domestic fascist orientation, but they reflected the general public mental trend, see Takeuchi Y., 'Kindai no chōkoku,' p.412. A similar trend in making 'Japanese-ness' was seen in literature. *Ibid.*, pp.387, 409–411 and 421–422.

³³⁹ They included Ferdinand Toennies and Alfred Rocco.

superiority of the Orient over Europe,³⁴⁰ and argued the arrival of an "Oriental Century" in which the Orient should pursue a new order, transcending these problems.³⁴¹ The Orient should unite in order to achieve this new order,³⁴² and Japan had a special mission to lead the order.³⁴³

The new order was based on the 'Oriental' concept of "cooperativism" [*kyōdōshugi*]. In this argument, the contrast between the individual and the whole was sharply drawn. Miki condemned 'liberalism' which he interpreted as individualism and selfishness.³⁴⁴ But he argued that "cooperativism" did not deny individual freedom. The national polity was also seen as the basis of, rather than as an obstacle to, cooperativism. A sense of public benefit [*kōeki*] was the key to achieving the crucial balance between the whole [*zentai*] and individuals, and between the international community and nation.³⁴⁵ His cooperativism, in many senses, had much in common with New Liberalism.

Miki differed from JCIPR members at *Showa Kenkyūkai* in his strong identification with the Orient. While Miki's works were read by many JCIPR members,³⁴⁶ and the influence of Miki's concept of *kyōdōtai* [cooperative body] was evident in Rōyama's concept of a regional community, JCIPR members were ambiguous in their position towards the Orient. Their scope was more focused on a Euro-American audience. Symbolically Miki remained outside of the JCIPR.

Miki's Asianism, however, did not differ much from visions of international cooperationists in its failure to see the exploitive relationship between Japan and other countries in Asia. Miki argued that a cooperative body in the Orient could be achieved only by the realization of commonality of Japanese and Chinese culture, and that Japan should

340 Miki K., 'Shin Nihon no shisō genri,' in Miki K., *Miki Kiyoshi zenshū*, Vol.17 (Iwanami shoten, 1968), pp.514-516.

341 *Ibid.*, pp.512-513.

342 *Ibid.*, p.509.

343 *Ibid.* pp.528-529 and 530-533.

344 *Ibid.* p.524.

345 *Ibid.* p.520.

346 Miki K., 'Shina jihen no sekaishiteki igi,' dated August 1938, TYB, 87/43, ACTU.

not obstruct the Chinese movement to unite China.³⁴⁷ The point paid scant regard to reality. Miki must have known that China had not accepted Japanese leadership in the region and had been fighting against it. Like Konoe's thesis of 1918, Miki's Asianist argument was ambiguous about the nature of 'leadership'. By dismissing Chinese resistance and not questioning Japanese superiority, Miki ultimately provided a logic to support the imperialistic war.

vi) Continuity

Japan's withdrawal from the League did not change the nature of the activities of the international cooperationists. In 1933, the League of Nations Association was renamed as Japan International Association (JIA) [*Nihon kokusai kyōkai*]. In order to strengthen internationalist bodies as Iwanaga insisted, the JCIPR became a part of the JIA in 1935. The JIA continued cooperation with the international League of Nations Associations, and JCIPR members maintained their link with the IPR.

IPR conferences became increasingly important as stages for their publicity especially after Japan's withdrawal from the League. The duty of JCIPR members was to inform the world of the 'Japanese perspective' and 'correct' world understanding of the Japanese position and Japanese culture. They were involved with other international-oriented publicist associations, such as the International Culture Promotion Association [*Kokusai bunka shinkō kai*] and the Japan Institute [*Nihon bunka kaikan*]. The latter was founded at the Rockefeller Centre in New York in 1938 in order to deal with the worsening public opinion in the USA.³⁴⁸ Maeda Tamon became Director, and brought 20,000 books on Japan with him. He remained in New York until he was detained at Ellis Island in 1941. Mainly through IPR connections Maeda tried to cultivate Japanese studies with a focus on 'culture'. Public hostility against Japanese action,

³⁴⁷ Miki K., 'Shin Nihon no shisō genri,' pp.510 and 518.

³⁴⁸ Maeda recorded that the model of this institute was the British Council and its aim was to provide materials for serious Japanese studies, not for propagation. Horikiri Z. rep. ed., *Maeda Tamon*, p.47.

however, was strong.³⁴⁹ Reflecting this general hostility in the USA, the ISIPR also took a stronger stance advocating anti-Japanese intervention in China. The JCIPR withdrew from IPR's international activities in 1939,³⁵⁰ and did not return until the 1950s.

Although the nature of their activities did not change after 1933, their emphasis was increasingly on the region, not on the international community. At the time of the merge between the LNA and the JCIPR, Ishii Kikujirō, Chairman of the JIA, emphasized the importance of the Pacific region in international politics.³⁵¹ The emphasis of the JCIPR was apparent at IPR conferences. A reform of the League system based on an argument similar to Rōyama's was presented by the JCIPR members as a paper, 'A Security Pact for the Pacific Area', at the IPR conference at Banff in 1933.³⁵²

Although presenting the theoretical backbone of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, most JCIPR members remained uncomfortable with their identification with the Orient. Their focuses remained on Europe and the USA, and their publicist activities continued until 1942. Even in 1941, Takagi tried to bring about peace negotiations between Konoe and Roosevelt.³⁵³ Many pre-war members of the JCIPR cooperated with the war-time administration, and were purged from public office in 1947–1950 for their activities. Soon after the purge was lifted, they resumed their 'international' activities, working for the ILO, UNESCO and the United

³⁴⁹ Horikiri Z. rep. ed., *Maeda Tamon*, pp.47–49, Saitō M. et al. eds., *Amerika seishin o motomete*, pp.78–79, and W. Cohen, Hirai Atsuko trans., 'Ajia mondai to Amerika minkan dantai,' in Hosoya C. et al eds., *Nichibei kankei shi: Kaisen ni itaru jūnen*, Vol.3, pp.421–422.

³⁵⁰ See Chapter Six for the discussion of this incident.

³⁵¹ Ishii K., 'Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai tonō gappei ni tsuite,' *Kokusai chishiki*, Vol.15, No.12 (December, 1935), p.80.

³⁵² The draft was written by Takayanagi Kenzō. Takagi Yasaka and Yokota Kisaburō, 'A Security Pact for the Pacific Area', in Bruno Lasker and W. L. Holland eds., *Problems of the Pacific, 1933: Economic Conflict and Control* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), pp.441–450.

³⁵³ Takagi recorded that the plan failed because of the opposition of the State Department of the USA. Saitō M. et al ed., *Amerika seishin o motomete*, pp.82–83.

Nations,³⁵⁴ or they again contributed to promoting Japanese-American relations.³⁵⁵ While the JCIPR began to endorse Asian nationalism after WWII, most of these pre-war members had withdrawn from the JCIPR by that time.

³⁵⁴ Royama was purged in 1947-1950, and started to work for UNESCO in 1952. Maeda was also purged in 1946-1950, and then worked for the ILO from 1950 and UNESCO from 1952. Nasu Shiroshi (1886-1982) was purged in 1947-1950, but started to work for the ILO, UNESCO and the United Nations from 1951.

³⁵⁵ Matsumoto Shigeharu was purged until 1950. His contribution to promote Japanese-American relations was noted by his efforts to establish the International House in Tokyo and various other activities. Takagi contributed to Japanese American relations by promoting American studies. As part of these activities, he also wrote *Towards International Understanding* in 1953.

Chapter Four: Opening: The Experiment of the IPR in 1925–1927

While the previous two chapters focused on the National Councils of the IPR in the USA, Australia and Japan intellectually and institutionally, the next three chapters will examine the process of institutionalization of the IPR as the first International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO) in the Pacific. The theme of these chapters is to demonstrate the historicity of the main concepts of these organizations, 'international' and 'non-governmental'. The main questions in the following chapters, therefore, are: What was meant by 'international' and 'non-governmental' when those involved in the IPR used these terms?; and how did these ideas affect the institutionalization of the IPR?

The first half of this chapter focuses on the conferences as experimental 'laboratories', and the second half examines the process of the institutionalization of the IPR. The chapter demonstrates the new opportunities of the Pacific Age, and suggests the problems of its 'internationality' and 'non-governmentality' inherent in the IPR's original setting. The final two chapters will then focus on visions and policies of a few key figures of the International Secretariat of the IPR (ISIPR). Their interpretations of 'international', 'non-governmental' and the 'Pacific' were debated within the IPR, and these ideas ultimately shaped the Institute's prewar operations.

1) The Experiment of the First Two Conferences

i) Ideals

Around three o'clock on 30 June, 1925, the opening session of the first IPR conference started at a lecture theatre of the Punahou School in Honolulu. Frank Atherton addressed a crowd of over 100. The audience came from Australia, China, Canada, Korea, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines and the USA. Return travel by ship to Honolulu from Yokohama, Sydney or San Francisco took almost two weeks, and the conference itself lasted two

weeks. The audience was, therefore, drawn from the minority of the society who could afford time and money. Another distinct feature of the people at the Punahou School was that they were not official representatives from the governments. They were 'a small select group of people of influence in forming public opinion'.¹

To these people, Atherton stated his view of the 'international community':

There must be a growing consciousness of responsibility for the progress and *welfare* of all nations. Those living in a community have come to recognize that each man has his contribution to make to the *whole* Thus it seems logical to maintain that each nation has its contribution to make to the *family of nations* and each should take an active and constructive part in working out that plan which shall be for the *welfare of all*.² (emphasis added)

The emphasized words show Atherton's basic understanding of the world: the world as the family of nations; and duty of the component parts to contribute to the welfare of the world as a whole. Like Woodrow Wilson, Atherton extended the idea of the welfare of *society as a whole* beyond national boundaries, and promoted the welfare of the 'international community'. In his statement, almost no distinction was made between individual components and national components. Each man and each nation should contribute to the welfare of the whole.

Atherton emphasized particularly the *public* duty of individuals, and argued that it should not be confined to public servants or the government officials.

More and more we have come to recognize that public office is a public trust, and that service for the welfare of the city, state or nation is paramount to personal power or aggrandizement.³

¹ 'History and Organization,' in [The IPR ed.], *Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session, June 30-July 14, 1925* (Honolulu: the IPR, 1925), p.12.

² F. Atherton, 'The Purpose of the Institute of Pacific Relations,' in [The IPR ed.], *Institute of Pacific Relations, 1925*, p.55.

³ *Ibid.*

At the second IPR conference in 1927, a similar idea of public service for human welfare, not national welfare, was expressed by Ray Wilbur, President of Stanford University and Chairman of the Pacific Council:

I think it is fair to say that the ultimate aim of the American people, viewed as a whole, is not to accumulate mere wealth and power to exploit the world in the development of a great imperialistic design, but to offer some form of *world-service* as its contribution to human *welfare*.⁴

This was the backbone of the thinking of key figures at the IPR. While there was a diversity of the opinions among participants and members of the IPR from various countries, this idealism prevailed at the first two conferences. Wilson had voiced these ideas in the formation of the League of Nations. A majority of participants were, therefore, Wilsonians in the sense that they shared Wilson's principle of international moral codes, and supported the League of Nations, although some Americans had reservations about American membership in the League. Idealist thinking was also strong among the major American contributors to the IPR, such as the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, and various philanthropic business people.⁵

As Chapter One demonstrated, these Wilsonians were not immune to the old diplomacy or *Realpolitik*. What they saw in Honolulu in 1925 and 1927 was the possibility of *new ways* of operating international affairs, not a challenge to the existing system. They did not question the basic framework of colonialism or national sovereignty, but they felt the need for a new way of operation *within* it. They felt the need to reform the operation of foreign affairs, by *cultivating* public opinions. Their weakness, as well as strength, lay in the very nature of their reformist stance.

⁴ R. L. Wilbur, 'An Interpretation of America in Pacific Relations,' in J. B. Condliffe ed., *Problems of the Pacific: Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu, Hawaii, July 15 to 29, 1927* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1928), p.61.

⁵ Besides Atherton, Thomas Lamont of Morgan Bank, Bernard Baruch, who was the sole donator for the Institute of Politics at Williamstown, and other wealthy people contributed to the IPR.

ii) The Pacific Community

The first two IPR conferences promoted the ideas of the Pacific Age, the Pacific community and a Pacific-centred world-view. The map attached to the proceedings of the second conference embodied the new perspective: the Pacific-centred view of the world.⁶ The Pacific was surrounded by the rim countries, and Japan and China were located not in the 'Far East', but in the West. Europe was too far away to appear.

Herbert Croly, editor of *New Republic*, who had been involved with the foundation of the IPR, articulated the view in 1927. The Pacific-centred view was the result of the power shift from Europe to the USA.

The World War brought to an end the efficacy and the authority of European domination in the Atlantic It is profoundly significant that the Washington Conference of 1921, which, by dividing sea power between the British Empire and the United States, destroyed the physical basis of the traditional conception of the Atlantic Ocean as a liquid extension of Europe, looked in the direction also of a new conception of the Pacific.⁷

The Pacific, as a result of this power shift, emerged as a coherent unity of politics and economics.

The Washington Conference treated the Pacific, for the first time, as a somewhat independent political and economic area. It even outlined a sketch of a *Pacific regional community*, which, if it could be realized and developed, would neutralize the Pacific highway as an instrument of predatory politics The peoples of the Pacific are particularly protected in theory against any further aggression, and in this sense they are by way of forming a community of *political equals* which are obligated to consult one another about their common political and economic difficulties and policies.⁸ (emphasis added)

The distinctive feature of Croly's 'Pacific society of nations' is its strategic orientation. Economy was mentioned a few times, but the main concern

⁶ See Map I

⁷ H. Croly, 'The Human Potential in Pacific Politics,' in J. B. Condliffe ed., *Problems of the Pacific*, 1927, p.580-581.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p.582-583.

of Croly was political association. The notion of political equals rather than one central hegemonic power is noteworthy. While he meant, of course, political equals amongst the Pacific powers, excluding colonies, this possibility of consultation among 'equals' mirrors a similar argument in the literature in the post Cold War period.⁹ The imagined community of those gathered at the IPR conference was that of the Pacific powers of Japan, China, Russia and the USA, with the British Dominions on the periphery. And Croly argued that the IPR could transform this community from vision to reality:

[The IPR]'s object is to give reality to the vision of the Pacific as an area of positive political association among the inhabitants of its shores, and in this respect it is, as I have said, a political novelty. It is not only attempting to bring into existence a new political community bound together by an internationalized body of water [The Pacific], but it is forced by its own nature to invoke for its purposes a method exclusively of inquiry, study, consultation which heretofore has never been employed successfully in order to create a going political concern.¹⁰

Although expressing the excitement at the new era of the Pacific and stronger sense of independence, participants from the Dominions remained cautious. They had to make sure that participation in this conference did not mean that they sought a new affiliation with a new Pacific power, the USA.¹¹ They feared that the British government saw their activities as disloyal to the British Empire. The Dominions did not have discretion on foreign affairs, and Australians and New Zealanders, feeling that they could not comment on concrete policy issues independently, strongly proposed that British participation in the conference would be crucial.¹² Their definition of the Pacific community was also slightly different from that of political equals defined by Croly.

⁹ Works on 'middle power' in regional politics seem to reflect this paradigm of the post-hegemonic era. See, for example, Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott and Kim Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993).

¹⁰ H. Croly, 'The Human Potential in Pacific Politics,' p.583.

¹¹ J. B. Condliffe, 'New Zealand's Outlook,' in [The IPR ed.], *Institute of Pacific Relations*, 1925, p.91. F. Eggleston, 'The Viewpoint of Australia on Pacific Affairs,' in J. B. Condliffe ed., *Problems of the Pacific*, 1927, p.4.

¹² Duncan-Hall to Amery, 3 August, 1925, A981; Org 93, AA, and J. B. Condliffe, 'New Zealand's Outlook,' p.91.

While the latter focused on the Orient with power, the former was equally concerned with the Pacific islands, some of which were Australian mandated territory.¹³

Nevertheless, participants agreed on the need to establish regional diplomatic machinery, because the current system was inadequate. There were advantages in the region: distance from old politics of Europe. They argued that the existing system was inadequate because the League of Nations was not efficient due to the absence of two major Pacific powers, the USSR and the USA, and hostile attitudes in China; the Washington Treaty was limited in its application and function; the Dominions lacked discretion in foreign affairs;¹⁴ and the barrier of language and social organizations between 'East' and 'West' prevented better understanding.¹⁵ Regional diplomatic machinery which could provide occasions for continuing negotiation and discussion at intervals was desired, and many felt the IPR could play the role.

The majority felt, however, that the proposed machinery should be achieved within the framework of the international system, which was interpreted as the League of Nations. They argued that: 'There is no possibility of isolating the Pacific as a region for specific agreement out of relation to general international affairs'.¹⁶ The IPR sought the cooperation of the League, and the League also regarded the IPR positively and cooperated with it.¹⁷ Regional arrangements within the framework were, however, not a simple task. While focusing on the particularity of the region and the entity of the regional community, they had to be accommodated in the 'universal' codes of the wider framework of the international system.

¹³ F. Eggleston, 'The Viewpoint of Australia on Pacific Affairs,' p.8.

¹⁴ 'The Governmental Organization of Each of the Pacific Countries with Special Reference to Its Machinery for Handling International Affairs,' in [The IPR ed.], *Institute of Pacific Relations*, 1925, p.204.

¹⁵ On discussions concerning diplomatic machinery in the Pacific, see 'Co-operation among Pacific Countries,' in [The IPR ed.], *Institute of Pacific Relations*, 1925, pp.136-138, and 'Diplomatic Relations in the Pacific,' in J. B. Condliffe ed., *Problems of the Pacific*, 1927, pp.162-181.

¹⁶ 'Diplomatic Relations in the Pacific,' p.171.

¹⁷ Note by E. Drummond, 6 April, 1927, Paper of Huntington Gilchrist, Library of Congress. I owe this document to Mr Frank Moorhouse.

iii) The Orient

In the Pacific community, the Oriental powers, namely China and Japan, were seen as 'equal' partners. Probably, the IPR was one of the first attempts by the Americans to deal with the Orient on an equal footing. The term Orient was used with various meanings. In the IPR context, it meant either the race, region, or culture of East Asia. While Said argues that a certain discourse existed between Euro-Americans and the others for the domination of the former over the latter,¹⁸ this discourse assumes the hierarchy of strong 'West' and weak 'East'. The argument does not allow for different relations such as those between Euro-American powers and the others with great power, among Euro-Americans with and without power, or among the others with and without power. In the excitement of a new era, some sought new attitudes to Oriental powers, especially Japan. The IPR conferences became a laboratory for this experiment, and the documents show a much more complicated discourse than a simple rhetoric of Euro-American domination.

It was Americans, not Europeans, who were ahead in this experiment. They were, first of all, far ahead in their curiosity. Eggleston was impressed with American interest in the Orient, which he felt lacking in Australia:

The growing body of thought [in America] is directed to mutual understanding of their respective mentalities and problems This was fostered by heavy tourist traffic from America to Eastern ports. Every boat brought large parties of thinking American people genuinely interested in the East. There were also interchanges of educationalists, such as professors of economics and students of politics between the countries.¹⁹

The Japanese also saw an opportunity in the Pacific Age, which the IPR, they thought, embodied: an opportunity to solve the problems of racial

¹⁸ E. Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, first published in 1978), p.3.

¹⁹ F. Eggleston, 'Trade in the East,' *The [Melbourne] Age*, 12 December, 1929. I owe the copies of this series of newspaper articles to Dr Warren Osmond.

discrimination. Takagi Yasaka, a Professor of American Studies at Tokyo Imperial University, believed that the most important factor of the Pacific Age was the new trend of racial consciousness, and he saw a real possibility of a solution in the IPR. He wrote after the first conference with excitement:

The Institute might be a natural product of modern civilization called the Pacific Age We have to recognize the very fact of the awakening of *racial consciousness* all over the world. We have to deal with it with justice and wisdom. Some called the Institute one of the greatest adventures of humankind. For the success of the Institute, one needs ideals and courage I am one who believes that the aim of the Institute is that of the greatest enterprise at present, and that the Institute will make the most useful contribution to the human civilization at the most appropriate time.²⁰

What he had in mind was the Oriental race, especially the Japanese race, and what troubled him most was anti-Japanese immigration acts. When Merle Davis, first General Secretary of the IPR (1926–1930), was organizing the first conference in late 1924 and early 1925, amendment or even repeal of the immigration act of the USA of 1924 was seen as a possible goal for the conference.²¹ This political aspect was, however, totally abandoned at the conference. The objective of the conference was to 'bring together accurate information' on the conditions which would mould opinion and feeling toward other people, and to discuss them, so that it would 'point the way to right actions' leading to 'understanding and peace in the Pacific'.²² And research, not political activities, on the issues of race and culture was given priority.

Orientalist discourse was dominant among participants in the sense that they saw the world in terms of an 'East' vs 'West' dichotomy. At another level, however, the conferences provided one of a very few occasions where Euro-Americans met people from the Orient and vice versa. The participants had a chance to deconstruct pre-conceptions and stereotypes

²⁰ Takagi Yasaka, 'Taiheiyō kankei chōsakai no seiritsu nite,' *Gaikō jihō*, Vol 42, No. 501 (October, 1925), p.67.

²¹ See Chapter Two.

²² 'History and Organization,' p.14.

through the physical environment of the conference itself, not only through the knowledge they gained at discussions and lectures.

The laboratory of the personal contacts was the Punahou School, located at Manoa Valley, only five minutes by car from Waikiki Beach. The School had seventy acres of campus, and its equipment—dormitories, dining room, assembly halls, and sports facilities—was made available for the conference. Participants stayed in the dormitories during the two weeks of the conference. A participant recorded fondly that life at the School during the conference was like that of students. There was a bell around seven o'clock to get up, and they went to the dining room to eat breakfast around half past seven. They were encouraged to sit next to someone they had not yet met.²³ The quality of service, however, was rather more than students could expect. They received the service of messengers, automobiles, fresh flowers and daily newspapers in each room, and entertainments were generously provided.²⁴

They mixed and talked at discussions, meals or excursions around the island. These personal contacts with people from different countries excited participants. Japanese participants noted the encounters particularly with Australians and New Zealanders, because otherwise they never met them.²⁵ Although the mental paradigm of East vs West persisted, these contacts forced them to abandon old images and create new ones. Through the contacts, the image of Japanese was re-defined and re-constructed. Harada Tasuku, former president of Dōshisha University in Kyoto and Professor of Japanese History and Literature of the University of Hawaii,²⁶ participated at the first two conferences, and later described the atmosphere at the first conference.

²³ Hoshino Aiko, 'Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai ni shusseki shite,' *Fusen*, (October, 1927), p.6.

²⁴ J. M. Davis, 'An Inside Story of the Institute' [The report of the first IPR conference], Wilbur Papers, 40/5, HI.

²⁵ Hoshino A., 'Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai ni shussekishite,' p.7, Tsurumi Yūsuke, 'Taiheiyō kaigi chōkakan,' in Inoue Junnosuke ed., *Taiheiyō mondai* (Nihon hyōronsha, 1927), p.55. Zumoto M., 'Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai ni tsuite,' *Gaikō jihō*, Vol.51, No.594 (1 September, 1929), p.53.

²⁶ Dōshisha University had close contact with people involved at the IPR. The parents of Merle Davis were involved in the establishment of the university. Dōshisha also had a

An Australian at the conference told me later that he never had spoken to Japanese people frankly before the conference. He had thought that the Orientals had a totally different mentality from the Occidentals, but found after frank talks with them that there was not much difference and that they were the same human beings with the same mentality. There were some differences because they were Orientals, he said, but their kindness and courtesy was greater than that of Australians. From then, he had a totally different sentiment towards the Japanese.²⁷

Frederic Eggleston, leader of the Australian group at the second conference, recorded a similar experience with Japanese. Battling with chopsticks and being embarrassed with a hole in his sock at a Japanese restaurant, Eggleston had meals with them and developed a liking for them: 'They don't at all give one the impression of a conquering militant race Some of the nicest and most gentlemanly members of the conference are Japanese'.²⁸

At the conferences, participants constructed images of a *nation*, not of individuals. The liberal aspects of Japanese society and politics was emphasized by the Japanese participants. They argued that militarism was dying, and that liberalism and the democratic movement was the trend.

I have already referred to the growth of a strong, liberal tendency in the educational world of Japan. Such a tendency, however, is by no means confined to educational circles; it is observable in all

close contact with the "Mid-Pacific Institute", a private secondary school in Honolulu, which was founded by the Atherton family. The contact was through "Christian international friendship" activities, and Harada Tasuku (1863-1940), then President of Dōshisha, initially came to Honolulu through this connection. Harada was invited to become the first chair of the Department of Oriental Studies at the University of Hawaii in 1919. He moved to Honolulu in 1920. Like Atherton, he was involved with the Japanese American Relations Committee around 1923. Harada became active at the IPR in Honolulu. G. E. Allen, *Bridge Builders: The Story of Theodore and Mary Atherton Richards* (Honolulu: publisher unknown, 1970), pp.130 and 144-145. Harada Ken ed., *Harada Tasuku* (Ahoku insatsu, 1971), pp.498-499.

²⁷ Harada Tasuku, 'Taiheiyō kaigi no seishitsu,' *Ōsaka ginkō tsūshinroku*, No. 386 (October, 1929), pp.28-29. Harada does not specify the gender of this Australian, and in Japanese, gender is not obvious. The Australian members at the 1925 conference numbered six, including one female. Judging from the fact, he did not refer to gender, it seems right to assume that this person was male.

²⁸ Eggleston, *Diary*, 1927, MS 423/2, NLA.

fields of activity. In politics, for instance, universal manhood suffrage bill was passed finally this spring after twenty years of hard and constant fighting. As regards our foreign affairs, a new generation of diplomats with a fresh and broader outlook on the requirements of international life is rapidly coming to the front. On all hands, I notice unmistakable signs of the triumph of liberalism over the forces of reactionary conservatism.²⁹

It was effective image-making. An Australian was particularly impressed with the liberal trend in Japan.³⁰ However, some with intimate knowledge of the situation in Japan had a cautious attitude to this optimistic image. Merle Davis was born and brought up in Kyoto, and had spent much of his life in Japan before he became involved with the IPR. Davis warned the first Research Secretary of the IPR, John Condliffe, a New Zealand economist:

that there were other currents of Japanese thought that were hostile and unapproachable—the military and naval groups and the great mass of nationalists. We are dealing only with a small English-speaking group of scholars, merchants, bankers and officials, most of whom had been educated in England and America. They were for the time being in power but were aware of their precarious situation and anxious that we should not misunderstand it or press them too hard.³¹

Despite this awareness, a common image promoted at the IPR was of a liberal Japan, and of a very clear division between liberal and reactionary factions. Detailed analysis of Japanese internationalists in Chapter Three, Section Two showed that the reality was much more complicated, with grey areas between these two camps. While participants from other countries soon realized that these 'liberal' Japanese were not exactly representative of the dominant forces, these Japanese continued to play a role of mediator between Japan and Euro-American powers.

²⁹ Sawayanagi M., 'Japanese View of Pacific Relations,' in J. B. Condliffe ed., *Problems of the Pacific*, 1927, p.79.

³⁰ H. Duncan-Hall, 'The Changing East: Chinese Nationalism and Liberalism in Japan,' in H. Duncan-Hall and J. B. Condliffe, *What's of the Pacific?: A Searchlight on its Problems* (Honolulu, 1925), p.8, A981; Org93, AA.

³¹ J. B. Condliffe, *Reminiscences of the Institute of Pacific Relations* (Vancouver, B. C.: University of British Columbia, 1981), p.19.

National groups created a particular image of their nation as a whole. This national image making was practiced not only by the Japanese. Ray Wilbur presented an image of a USA confident in its national system:

There is a faith in the democratic ideal and a faith that the American form of government and general education will lead other countries to those advances which have meant so much in the life of America.³²

Those from the Dominions saw the opportunity to construct new images of nationhood at IPR conferences. Stephen Roberts, lecturer at the University of Melbourne in 1925, pronounced the emergence of the new Australia with a stronger sense of independence. Those who were attracted to the IPR and attended the conferences were more ready to see the importance of regional awareness than the rest of the society.³³

As well as constructing the images of the 'other', participants were defining the 'self'. Significantly, the key element in this identification was always the *nation*, not the individual. It is important, therefore, to examine what kind of people operated as mediators of this discourse. Various photos taken at the conferences show striking commonality among the participants regardless of gender, race or nationality. Their clothes indicated certain social classes. Men wore single breasted summer linen jackets and small neat collars, often accompanied by Panama hats. They probably brought dinner jackets in their trunks for formal receptions and dinners. While some Japanese women wore kimonos, others wore the similar low waisted summer dresses, popular in the 1920s, as did Americans and Australians. These photos seem to tell how much they had in common even before they left home.

The commonality in social background was also observed in 1927. Frederic Eggleston wrote of the *sophistication* of manners and styles of the Oriental participants.

³² R. L. Wilbur, 'An Interpretation of America in Pacific Relations,' pp.58 and 61.

³³ They admitted, however, that interest in the Pacific was not great in their countries. S. Roberts, 'Australian View of Pacific Relations,' in The IPR ed.), *Institute of Pacific Relations, 1925*, p.64-65, and J. Condliffe, 'New Zealand's Outlook upon Pacific Problems,' p.91.

They were, of course, well to do. Their behaviour was perfect and they looked very nice people ... they conversed with the visitors in quite a well bred way.³⁴

It was a genteel community. In the 1920s, the IPR was seen as a 'capitalist and imperialist organization'.³⁵ Business interests were well represented in the early stages. Traders, ship owners and bankers shared an enthusiasm to promote internationalism for economic purposes. The American steamship owner, Robert Dollar, told Davis that 'the Institute worked on the same principle as his company did,' such as promoting better understanding and peace in the region.³⁶ Jerome Greene, trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation, executive member of the American Council of the IPR, and a Wall Street banker, presented a paper on 'The Role of the Banker in International Relations' at the second conference.

the wide distribution of bonds representing legitimate investment in foreign countries tends to promote a better understanding between peoples, and ... a more liberal and sympathetic attitude toward each other's national characteristics and aspirations.³⁷

The IPR, however, did not exclude Labour interests. In selecting participants for the second conference, Edward Carter, Secretary of the American Council of the IPR, made it a clear policy to recruit participants with interests as diverse as possible, including 'capital and labor'.³⁸ When British participation was decided, Carter demanded that participants should include Labour Party sympathizers.³⁹ Accordingly, representatives

³⁴ Eggleston, Diary, 1927, MS 423/2, NLA.

³⁵ S. Carpenter, 'Honolulu Institute of Pacific Relations,' *The Pan-Pacific Worker*, 1 May, 1928, p.8, and 15 May, 1928, pp.6-8. Although the following Japanese article was not written particularly from a socialist standpoint, it described the IPR as social functions of 'leisured class'. Watabiki Misao, 'Taiheiyo kaigi yori dattaiseyo,' *Nihon oyobi Nihonjin*, No. 226 (June, 1931), pp.28-29.

³⁶ Davis to Atherton, 14 October, 1927, E-13/6, AUH.

³⁷ J. Greene, 'The Role of the Banker in International Relations,' in J. B. Condliffe ed., *Problems of the Pacific*, 1927, p.450.

³⁸ Carter wrote: 'capital and labor, East and West, North and South, Jew and Gentile, Catholic and Protestant, Universities, large national organizations interested in international affairs, together with men and women who have expert knowledge with reference to cultural, trade, political and missionary interests in the different Pacific countries'. Carter to Curtis, 2 February, 1927, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 3, BLCU.

³⁹ Carter to Curtis, 11 May, 1927, CPR Box 108/Curtis 3, BLCU.

of labour organizations were invited to the conferences. Notable were Paul Scharrenberg, Secretary and Treasurer of the California State Federation of Labor, and Suzuki Bunji, President of the General Federation of Labor in Japan. They represented, however, not the socialist international movement, but the middle-of-the-road labour movement. The IPR inherited the line of the League of Nations, and its affiliated body, the International Labor Organization, which provided materials on immigration and labour issues, and sent observers to the conferences.

Although after WWII some suspected the IPR connection with the socialist international movement of the USSR, the IPR remained a patrician organization funded mainly by big business and philanthropic foundations. Interest in the USSR was, indeed, expressed enthusiastically at the IPR from the beginning, and key figures visited the USSR to negotiate its involvement with the IPR (Frank Atherton in 1927, Merle Davis at the end of 1927, and Edward Carter in 1934 and 1936). Although the Soviet experiment captured intellectual fascination in various countries including the USA in the 1920s, and many progressive liberals and some communists were involved with the IPR, the IPR never took a Co-mintern line. On the contrary, labour groups saw it as a plot of capitalism and imperialism. On a visit to Moscow in 1928, Davis recorded that: 'the labor group ... pointed out certain contradictions between the principles of the IPR and the Third International, while the Foreign Office [of the USSR] people ... seemed favourable to the idea of Russian participation in the IPR'.⁴⁰

Participants at IPR conferences regarded the USSR as a Pacific power, and did not doubt that it was important to have the USSR represented at conferences, so that they could discuss issues from various points of view with accurate information. The move to involve the USSR was pursued by Edward Carter, as will be discussed in the final chapter.

At the first two IPR conferences, the main aim of some labour leaders was to defend the interests of national labours against foreign ones.

⁴⁰ Davis to Gilchrist, 26 April, 1928, Paper of Huntington Gilchrist, Library of Congress.

Scharrenberg, for example, strongly defended the anti-Oriental immigration legislation. His mission was to protect Californian labour interests against foreign exploitation, rather than to promote labour interests beyond national boundaries.

Another distinct feature of the participants at the IPR conference was a relatively large representation of women. This was also inherited from the League, and differed from other foreign experts' organizations such as the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, or other international conferences on foreign affairs such as the Institute of Politics at Williamstown, which were more like gentlemen's clubs. Some women at the IPR conferences were wives, and played mainly social roles. Probably the custom of accompanying one's spouse was due to the character of the conference: half business, half holiday, and also the strength of the American economy.⁴¹ Australians who paid their own fees mostly did not bring their spouses. Three couples were included among the twenty Japanese participants at the first conference, and eighteen at the second.⁴² Their husbands' fees were paid by government, and they probably paid a certain amount for their spouses. It was a new custom to bring spouses to conferences, and these women had certain aptitudes and interests.

Women participants, whether attending as wives or on their own, were largely active in the female franchise movement and the peace movement.⁴³ The two movements often joined in each country. The IPR

⁴¹ For the second conference, Wilbur, Carter, Shotwell and Blakeslee, for example, brought their wives.

⁴² Those who came to the first conference with their spouses were Ibuka Kajinosuke, Chairman of the National Committee of the YMCA of Japan, Tsurumi, and Takayanagi Kenzō, Professor of Law at Tokyo Imperial University. For the second conference, Tsurumi, Takayanagi and Rōyama Masamichi, Professor of Politics at Tokyo Imperial University came with their spouses.

⁴³ Well known women activists were drawn to the second conference, especially from the USA. Among them were Grace Abbott, Chief of the Children's Bureau of United States Department of Labor, Carrie C. Catt, Chairman of Conference on the Cause and Cure of War (New York), Ada Comstock, president of Radcliffe College, Mabel Cratty, General Secretary of National Board of the YWCA, Mrs William G. Hibbard, Regional Director (Chicago) of National League of Women Voters, Marry E. Wooley, President of Mount Holyoke College (Mass).

in Australia, Japan and the USA received favourable and enthusiastic support from these women's organizations. IPR members often addressed these organizations, which promoted peace, democracy and social justice. Male participants in general sympathized with women's issues such as female franchise.⁴⁴ Saitō Sōichi, secretary of the Japanese Council of the IPR and of the national committee of the YMCA, commented on the importance of the IPR regarding women's issues.⁴⁵

This feminist element waned from the third conference, because the topics alienated women participants. Women participants at the first two conferences felt that the issues of women were not sufficiently discussed. There was no paper specifically focusing on women's issues. They felt it important that women's issues were discussed for better understanding and peace in the region. To achieve the goal, they organized the Pan-Pacific Women's Conference in 1928. The first few conferences were organized under the Pan-Pacific Union, and later they became independent. Relations with the IPR remained cordial. Merle Davis gave a warm opening statement at the first conference in Honolulu in 1928.⁴⁶ The importance of women's participation in international affairs was argued at the Pan-Pacific Women's Conference in 1930,⁴⁷ and this conference continues to the present day. While women members continued to participate in conferences and contribute to research and administrative works after 1928, the IPR largely lost its feminist element.

Did a distinct internationalism emerge from business, labour or female representation, linking the common interests of class or gender, and

⁴⁴ Tsurumi Y., 'Joshi kōminken fuyo nitsute,' *Toshi Mondai*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September, 1928), pp.11-16. His argument, however, was based more on the duty of service for the state rather than on basic individual rights.

⁴⁵ Saitō S., 'Taiheiyō kaigi to fujin,' *Fujin no tomo* (October, 1927), pp.6-9.

⁴⁶ M. Davis, 'The Opportunities, Limitations and Problems of the International Conference,' *Women of the Pacific* (Honolulu, 1928), pp.24-25.

⁴⁷ Georgina Sweet, 'Women and International Relations,' *Women of the Pacific*, 1930 (Honolulu: 1930), pp.335-342. Study on this Pan-Pacific Women's Conference would show an interesting dimension of the relations of race, gender, nation-state, region and international community. Currently the only work on this topic is P. Hooper, 'Feminism in the Pacific: The Pan-Pacific and Southeast Asia Women's Association,' *The Pacific Historian*, Vol.20, No.4 (Winter, 1976), pp.367-377. Australian official documents on Pan-Pacific Women's Conference in 1927-1937 are in the file of A981; Conf 232, AA.

overcoming nation-state boundaries or Orientalist discourse? Although the interests of the participants varied widely at the first two conferences, they tended to push a similar middle-of-the-road line, rather than developing distinct identity groups. This might have been the result of the selection method. Edward Carter, Secretary of the American Council of the IPR, argued that important criteria for the selection of participants were not their specific ideology or background, but their temperament and manner. Participants should be non-confrontational and able to carry on logical discussion.⁴⁸

Another element restricted the type of participants: language. In contrast to the eloquence of the Chinese, the poor English of the Japanese was noted.⁴⁹ This was also noticed at other international conferences such as the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Conference.⁵⁰ Probably Tsurumi was almost the only one who felt totally confident. Although his English was not particularly good,⁵¹ as an ex-member of the Debating Club at *Ichikō*, the most prestigious high school in Japan, he had the aptitude, confidence and the manner required for the occasion overseas.⁵² Others were more reserved, less confident or less comfortable in using English.

Those who could operate in a foreign language environment were very few in Japan, and they were much in demand.

[T]here are comparatively few men in Japan equipped to fill posts which have to do with [the] conduct of relations with foreign

⁴⁸ Carter was convinced that this conference method would work. He noted: 'The whole technique of the discussion cultivated the frank expression of varying points of view, induced an attitude of search and inquiry and a common pooling of all possible resources of fact and opinion'. Carter to Rockefeller, 26 August, 1926, LSRM/III-2-N/47/376, RA.

⁴⁹ Eggleston, Diary, 1927, MS 423/2, NLA. H. Duncan-Hall, 'The Changing East,' p.7.

⁵⁰ Matsuoka Yōsuke, a diplomat, was deeply disappointed by the poor language skills of the Japanese delegation at Paris Peace Conference. Miwa Kimitada, *Matsuoka Yōsuke* (Chūō kōronsha, 1971), p.56-57. Shibusawa Eiichi also regretted that there was no Japanese delegate at the Washington Conference, who could correspond to the counterparts of other countries with good English. Shibusawa Masahide, *Taiheiyō ni kakeru hashi: Shibusawa Eiichi no shōgai* (Yomiuri shimbunsha, 1970), p.388.

⁵¹ Matsumoto Shigeharu, *Shōwashi no ichishōgen* (Mainichi shinbunsha, 1986), p.24.

⁵² His record on the second conferences shows his confidence. Tsurumi Y., *Chūō o ayumu kokoro* (Shinshakai, 1927), pp.497-499.

countries. Naturally such men are required for various positions of importance and very high treatments are accorded to them (sic) either as government officials or as representatives of private corporations.⁵³

A Japanese participant at the second conference noted not only the disadvantage of those who were not eloquent in English at the conference, but also the type of people who operated in the medium of English.

The existence in China, roughly speaking, of these two sets of leaders, one communicating with Japanese leaders in the Chinese or Japanese language, and the other coming in contact with the rest of the powers through the medium of English is a plain fact; but this fact should not be overlooked, for it sometimes implies a great deal more than the simple difference in the medium of expression; it involves two sets of philosophies and perhaps two different lines of approach to their national problems.⁵⁴

The conference language was English, and this was a distinct feature of IPR conferences in comparison with other Pacific-oriented multinational conferences, such as the Pan-Pacific Science Congress (PPSC). At the PPSC, a debate existed whether French should also be considered as conference language.⁵⁵ The dominance of English at the IPR was probably because of the American initiative of the IPR, the influence of American missionaries among the participants from the region, and the initial lack of participation from continental European powers and their colonies. The League of Nations, located in the middle of Continental Europe, operated both in English and French and the priority of the latter was much greater than at the IPR. At any rate, in both conferences of a regional focus, not to mention the League, the use of other languages such as Chinese never came into consideration.

⁵³ Komatsu to Davis, 31 August, 1928, E-13/10, AUH.

⁵⁴ 'Diplomatic Relations in the Pacific,' p.167.

⁵⁵ A. P. Elkin, *Pacific Science Association: Its History and Role in International Cooperation* (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1961), p.30. It is interesting to note that an adamant supporter for making English a conference language was the Japanese, Sakurai Jōji, Vice-President of the National Research Council of Japan and a Member of the House of Peers. This was interpreted as his quest for the establishment of the dominance of Japanese scientists who were educated at British universities. Until then, German educated scientists were more dominant in universities and associations of sciences in Japan. James R. Bartholomew, *The Formation of Science in Japan* (London: Yale University Press, 1989), pp.254-263.

A Japanese participant felt that the dominance of English contributed to the Orientalist discourse.

The phenomena of China as seen by us are diverse. We are inclined to think that they are often unduly simplified by our Western friends to correspond with their preconceived ideas.⁵⁶

While the object of this statement was to justify Japanese intervention in China, it still shows that over-simplification, or in other words negative or exotic stereotypes, existed in the medium of English.

In the genteel community of men and women at the IPR conferences, commonality was not limited to manners or style, but extended to perceptions of the world and the methods employed to deal with the issues. As demonstrated already, the perception of a new Pacific Age dominated the first few conferences. Another dominant perception was the belief in scientific methods, and optimism about the solution of problems by scientific methods. Hessel Duncan-Hall, an Australian, reported this optimism in 1925:

[The] biggest contribution of the IPR is discovering that the most controversial questions of international relations in the Pacific can be discussed fruitfully by people of the most diverse races. They can unite together in scientific inquiry as to what the facts really were.⁵⁷

Participants expressed the importance of finding the *facts* and the *scientific* and *objective* analysis. On the one hand, belief in science strengthened the optimism and idealism of participants. On the other hand, it clashed with the religious tone of the first conference and the YMCA influence. The former force overwhelmed the latter, a situation which will be discussed later.

How did this commonality in manners, perspective and values affect discussions at the conferences, especially in terms of the Orientalist

⁵⁶ 'Diplomatic Relations in the Pacific,' pp.167-168.

⁵⁷ Duncan-Hall to Amery, 3 August, 1925, A981; Org 33, AA.

discourse? Conference documents reveal that the Orient vs Occident dichotomy was re-enforced, rather than challenged. There was no move to question the terminology of Far East, East, West, Occident or Orient. Certain values were attached to the West or Occident, which implied that these values were absent from the East or Orient. Anezaki Masaharu (1873–1949), Professor of Religion at Tokyo Imperial University, emphasized this point in 1925 in his paper, 'Eastern and Western Civilizations'.

In the present time the West represents the progressive side of humanity. The western people are active and aggressive. The chief banner of the West is "Progress" The Occidentals find expression in movement and take pleasure in making speed. The Orientals are changing many of their ways and adopting things from the West, but still their attitude toward life is one of contemplation.⁵⁸

Within this dichotomy, however, Anezaki did not see these values as ahistorical. He said the idea and word 'progress' only began to be used in the eighteenth century. He also did not see the difference between 'East' and 'West' as essential. He pointed out that 'the Buddhist attitude of renunciation, the Confucian morality and the Christian Way of the Cross were three ways of expressing the same thing,' and that 'in the last analysis the antagonism between the West and the East, between activity and passivity, is not fundamental'.⁵⁹

For another Japanese participant, Sawayanagi, the 'East' vs 'West' dichotomy was unquestionable, but Japanese civilization did not belong to one or the other: 'Modern Japan is a child whose grandfather was the Eastern civilization,' and 'whose father was the Western civilization'. Elaborating this position, he argued that Japan could:

create a richer and more balanced civilization by harmoniously combining the best of the two civilizations, spiritual and material.

⁵⁸ Anezaki Masaharu, 'Eastern and Western Civilizations,' in [The IPR ed.], *Institute of Pacific Relations*, 1925, pp.100–101.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p.102.

This is and must remain the real mission of Japan as a Pacific power, and herein lie Japan's cultural aspirations.⁶⁰

Through formal and informal talks with Japanese, Duncan-Hall felt that Japanese insisted on being perceived as Occidental, not Oriental.⁶¹ This was an assertion of the power of Japan. The ambiguity of Japan in the 'East' vs 'West' dichotomy reflected a dilemma between its past heritage, and its future quest as a modern power. An observation of the Japanese dilemma by an Australian, although the document was written after the third IPR conference in 1929, is quoted here:

East and West have met and profound changes are taking place Will change destroy [Eastern culture] ? Will the characteristic excellence of the East, its handicrafts, its philosophy, and culture mean anything in new era? The best place in which to study the impact of the mechanical civilization of the West on an Eastern race is Japan. Japan is the most changed and the most industrialized country in the East But the study of Western methods was made by Japanese students, and they were applied to Japan by Japanese statesmen, and the whole framework of Japan, however changed, remains Japanese I do not think that Japan is a mere copyist. But the question remains: Has she lost her essential culture—the wonderful sense of beauty, her craftsmanship, her decorative sense, her tradition?⁶²

This is a simplistic and lineal conceptualization of East, West, Occident, Orient, and the assumption of a *national* culture is striking. In these writings, however, there is not much nuance of imposition, condescension or contempt from the powerful to the powerless. More evident is sympathetic respect for the different, the other.

Related to this respect for the other and evident in the documents is an attitude of self-criticism towards the Western system, and of admiration towards the East's success in conquering its difficulties. While Eggleston detailed the beauty and courtesy of Oriental women, and was unimpressed by Oriental women's imitation of Western hair styles, he admired the way

⁶⁰ Sawayanagi M., 'The General Features of Pacific Relations as Viewed by Japan,' in J. B. Condliffe ed., *Problems of the Pacific*, 1927, p.31.

⁶¹ Duncan-Hall to Amery, 3 August, 1925, A981; Org 93, AA.

⁶² F. Eggleston, 'Australia and the Pacific,' *The [Melbourne] Herald*, 23 December, 1929.

the government and society in Japan tackled the difficulties of population and industrialization.⁶³ His respect for the other, within the Orientalist discourse, was strengthened by his visit to Japan and China for the third conference in 1929. Instead of blindly praising Western values and systems, he turned critical eye to them.

To hear the foreigner in Shanghai talking, one would think that there was no political incompetence in the West, no corruption in Chicago, no hold-ups in Melbourne. [T]he foreigner in Shanghai has only a limited interest in China. In most cases its culture has little meaning for him ...⁶⁴

After meeting Japanese and Chinese and experiencing their situations, Eggleston felt that the foreigners who talked about the reforms in China passionately had a very simplistic and one-dimensional understanding of a complex situation. His understanding of the complexity of the problems and appreciation of their efforts to combat the problems in China and Japan made him criticize Australians' ignorant attitudes to events in the region.

What has Australia to say to all this change [in the East] I have no suggestion to make as to any change in our White Australian Policy, or our policy of building up our industry But there is no excuse for our ignorance, and our lack of interest in a great world movement which is going so close to us, which has so many possibilities of danger to us, and so many possibility (sic) of benefit.⁶⁵

Eggleston's defence of the White Australian Policy suggests that danger rather than benefit was paramount in his mind. He was fearful as well as respectful of these new Oriental powers. The respect led him to emphasize the 'difference' between his own 'culture' and 'their culture', and this sense of 'difference' was the basis for his defence of the White Australian Policy. His experience in Japan and China, therefore, made him realize the need to reform certain aspects of the current system and to

⁶³ Eggleston, *Diary*, 1927, MS 423/2, NLA.

⁶⁴ F. Eggleston, 'Canton's Ideal of Ten Cents Daily,' *The [Melbourne] Herald*, 25 January, 1930.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

create a new and stronger Australia, but this new nation was one which did not accommodate Orientals or Aborigines.

Self-critical attitudes towards economic development were also in evidence. After stating the importance of the Orient as a market and raw materials supplier, Charles Batchelder, former US Trade Commissioner to India, did not propose the model of the Occident as an ideal one to the Orient. In fact, he thought it was important that the Orient must:

not make the mistakes of the Occident, and must avoid the sweat shop and the slum, long hours, and the exploitation of women and children, of the weak and the poor, underfeeding, bad housing and working conditions.⁶⁶

Instead of imagining an ideal model, he saw the faults of the existing system and suggested a modified capitalism as a better way of managing the economy of the Orient. After pointing out the deficiencies of the capitalistic system where workers have little power, he argued:

Cooperative production and distribution may be more successful in the Orient than Europe, and the satisfactory results of the cooperative associations ... in the United States may cause the thinkers of Asia to insist upon the substitution of similar methods for unmodified capitalism.⁶⁷

The attitude of non-imposition or non-self-righteousness represented by Anezaki, Eggleston and Batchelder reflected their doubts about the model of progress and capitalism which they saw in Britain and the USA. Anezaki did not praise Western values uncritically, and like Batchelder, he was cautious about the direction of this progress. Their reservations and doubts about current progress and capitalism allowed them to seek alternative paths.

Although he did not wish to impose a particular model for economic development, Batchelder was adamant about control of the economy.

⁶⁶ Charles Batchelder, 'The Far Reaching Effects of Industrialization,' in The IPR ed., *Institute of Pacific Relations*, 1925, p.123.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

If the processes of evolution [in the Orient] are not carried out properly and intelligently, there will be the sharpest kind of international competition, the unsettlement of our existing economic organization and wide-spread unemployment in many lands, which will be resented by the labouring classes and may lead not only to a serious economic crisis, but to political changes of the greatest importance.⁶⁸

The position of Batchelder summarizes that of American liberals at the first two conferences. Although within the intellectual paradigm of 'East' vs 'West' dichotomy, he did not impose the 'right' system, but accommodated different systems. He even saw alternative paths for economic development. What was needed most was not a single 'right' system, but a grand plan to coordinate and control the process toward the harmony of the whole.

At the conferences, two processes of myth deconstruction and myth re-enforcement occurred side by side. At one level, *scientific* researches, such as those carried out by the "Race Relations Survey", challenged the stereotype that Orientals did not assimilate the *democratic* system of Western values.⁶⁹ Although Sawayanagi argued that the basis of discriminatory immigration acts against Asiatics was a sense of racial superiority of the 'White' race,⁷⁰ arguments based on racial superiority was perceived 'incorrect' at the conferences. Instead, the arguments for anti-Asiatic immigration were defended on the grounds of living standards and 'traditional' *national* cultures. In the latter argument, the differences of value, culture, language and tradition implied the impossibility of assimilation: the very view which some research tried to discredit.

National culture making, in this context, was a tool to defend anti-Asian immigration policies in the Dominion countries, which had recently acquired a more independent status and needed 'national' identity. For this purpose, speakers from Australia, New Zealand and Canada spent

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ E. E. Robinson and P. C. Edwards eds., *The Memoirs of Ray Lyman Wilbur 1875-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp.316-317.

⁷⁰ Sawayanagi M., 'The General Features of Pacific Relations as Viewed by Japan,' p 33.

much time describing the history of their countries, and emphasizing their Anglo-European 'tradition'. While those from Australia and New Zealand concentrated on the threat of Oriental cheap labour to economic standards, those from Canada argued for maintenance of a *national* culture and tradition. They emphasized the importance of building a national character, which had not yet emerged, and pointed out that Oriental immigration threatened this process.

Canada is forced to proceed [in immigration] with caution because in addition to the *lack of a national background* of considerable age, her basic population is not homogeneous, and her *national type not standardized* The Canadian attitude is one of anxiety that the influx of Orientals shall never reach proportions that will endanger the *national type* which they are seeking to establish in the Dominion.⁷¹ (emphasis added)

This was stated by John Nelson in 1925, and Arthur Currie expressed the same concern in 1927.⁷² Here, the process not only of maintaining, but also of creating *national* culture is evident. The issue of the Orient was not merely an issue of *race* or *culture* as participants at the first conference thought. It was also an issue of nation-building and *national sovereignty*, and therefore, inevitably political.

iv) Nation-state

If the border between the Orient and Occident was relatively easy to transcend for the participants at the conferences because of their commonality of background and interests, the borders of nation-states were much harder to cross. The nation-state was the basis of the international order of the time. Nevertheless, some questioned the absoluteness of the order. Takayanagi Kenzō argued the historicity of the concept:

[I]f we conceive of sovereignty as absolute and unlimited, just as eighteenth and nineteenth century jurists thought of private

⁷¹ John Nelson, 'Canadian View of Pacific Relations,' in [The IPR ed.], *Institute of Pacific Relations*, 1925, pp.66-67.

⁷² Arthur Currie, 'Canada and Pacific Relations,' in J. B. Condliffe ed., *Problems of the Pacific*, 1927, p.14.

property as absolute and unlimited, international life would become unbearable and no sound international cooperation in the cause of world civilization would be possible.⁷³

Tsurumi Yūsuke also argued that absolute national sovereignty was at odds with the world trends, criticizing the speech given by Eggleston, which argued for discriminatory immigration and tariff policies as the basis of democracy in Australia. Tsurumi went on to point out that like domestic political and social transformation in France in the eighteenth century and in Britain in the nineteenth, the core of the new movement of the twentieth century was:

[T]o make the privileged positions monopolized with force by a minority of modern nations and races available for *common welfare of humankind as a whole*, and to establish the international principles for achieving this goal, based on the might of justice and reason, not force.⁷⁴ (emphasis added)

While Eggleston and other Dominion speakers emphasized the welfare of the nation-state as a whole, Tsurumi, who called himself a promoter of New Liberalism in Japan,⁷⁵ argued for the welfare of the world as a whole. Sawayanagi and Takayanagi also shared this priority, and argued that this welfare should be achieved even at the expense of national sovereignty

Did this approach appeal to the audience, who were supporters of Wilsonian principles and the League of Nations, and who passionately discussed the Pact to outlaw war? Even an ardent Wilsonian, Duncan-Hall, who was member of the League of Nations Union and later himself worked for the League, recorded that Takayanagi's point was *most interesting*, as if he would not have thought in the same way before.⁷⁶ To put the welfare of the world above that of a nation-state was not accepted among the participants who otherwise, as Frank Atherton did in the opening of the first conference, argued for the duty of 'nation' and individuals to serve the welfare of the world as a whole.

⁷³ Takayanagi Kenzō, 'A Suggestion for More Enlightened Immigration and Emigration Policies,' in [The IPR ed.], *Institute of Pacific Relations*, 1925, p.111.

⁷⁴ Tsurumi Y., *Chūō o ayumu kokoro*, p.443.

⁷⁵ See Chapter Three, Section Two.

⁷⁶ Duncan-Hall to Amery, 3 August, 1925, A 981; Org93, AA.

The debate was, however, not an academic debate over national sovereignty. While the ideas of Japanese participants might have contained the possibility of a new way of dealing with international affairs, these issues were put forward for the specific purpose of denouncing discriminatory immigration policies, namely the American immigration act of 1924.⁷⁷ They argued for the welfare of the international community at the expense of other countries without questioning Japan's own sovereignty. JCIPR members were not starry-eyed utopians, but aware that the rhetoric could be used for bargaining in the best interests of Japan.⁷⁸

Furthermore, the Japanese participants' claim did not apply to the Oriental races in general, but specifically to the Japanese, the Oriental race with power. The colonial assumption was so dominant that 'Orientals without power' were not allowed to come to the conferences. The exceptions were the Korean and Filipino groups, probably because of the strength of the YMCA movement in these countries. The Japanese group refused to accept the Korean group as an independent group,⁷⁹ so that it was banned from the third until the eighth conference in 1942.⁸⁰

With these limitations, how far could the concept of 'racial' equality and welfare of the world be implemented? Duncan-Hall recorded that the Japanese did not want to interfere with domestic policies, but insisted on

⁷⁷ Duncan-Hall recorded that Japanese and Chinese were only interested in American immigration policy. *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Saitō Makoto, a scholar of American studies and the US-Japan relations, interviewed and wrote by Takagi Yasaka. Saitō points out that although Takagi pursued his ideals, he was never naïve or ignorant about *Realpolitik*. Interview with Saitō M., Tokyo, 20 June 1994.

⁷⁹ Zumoto M., 'Kyoto kaigi no atoshimatsu,' *Gaikō jihō* Vol.53, No.602 (1 January, 1930), pp.293-296. Soejima Michimasa, 'Futatabi taiheiyo kaigi ni tsuite,' *Gaikō jihō*, Vol.52, No.599 (15 November, 1929), pp.86-87.

⁸⁰ As for the issue of Korean participation, see Nakami M., 'Taiheiyo mondai chōsakai to Nihon no chishikijin,' *Shisō*, No. 728 (February, 1985), pp.109-110, and Katagiri N., 'Taiheiyo mondai chōsakai to Chōsen daihyōken mondai: Chōsen gurūpu no dattai, 1925-1931,' *Hōgaku kenkyū* Vol.59, No.4 (April, 1986), pp.45-76.

the reform of the method of administration.⁸¹ Takayanagi accepted the framework of national sovereignty, but demanded an 'enlightened' administration of law so that 'the feelings and sensibilities of other nations or races would not be unduly injured by too vigorous assertion of the so-called "sovereign right"'.⁸² Japanese participants pushed the limits of national sovereignty, but operated within its framework.

In contrast to the Koreans, the Filipino group, another 'Orient without power', participated in all conferences except for the tenth at Stratford on Avon. This reflected different attitudes to the 'colonies' amongst Japanese and American participants. While Japanese members did not accept the independence of Korea, Americans tended to support self-government for the Philippines.⁸³ Jerome Greene, Chairman of the American Council of the IPR (ACIPR) in 1929-1932, explained rather awkwardly to Japanese members that Korean case and Filipino case were different: 'Korea was an integral part of the Japanese empire, and the Philippines were possessions of the USA, but the people did not hold its citizenship'.⁸⁴

Filipino participants at the IPR did not voice anti-colonialist views. A speech by a Filipino in 1925 was pro-independence, but also praised American institutions and heritage in the Philippines. In contrast, a speech of 1927 which was given by an American administrator in the Philippines, was bluntly anti-independence.⁸⁵ Filipino voices faded away in later conferences. While in 1929 and 1930, more emphasis was put on

⁸¹ H. Duncan-Hall, 'The Searchlight on Immigration Legislation,' in H. Duncan-Hall and J. B. Condliffe, *What's of the Pacific?*, p.9.

⁸² Takayanagi K., 'A Suggestion for more Enlightened Immigration and Emigration Policies,' p.111.

⁸³ Atherton, Davis and Charles Loomis from Honolulu IPR office met Henry Stimson, Secretary of State, and discussed the issue of the independent participation of the Filipino group at the IPR in Honolulu on 14 March, 1929. Stimson supported self-government, not independence, of the Philippines. He had no objection to its independent participation, and felt that it was a valuable thing. Stimson's opinion seems to have represented the general view among American members of the IPR. Notes on a conversation between Stimson, Atherton, Davis and Loomis, 14 March, 1929, Wilbur Papers, 40/5, HI.

⁸⁴ Greene to Nitobe, 24 January, 1931, E-17/17, AUH.

⁸⁵ Conrado Benitez, 'The View Point of the Philippines,' in [The IPR ed.], *Institute of Pacific Relations, 1925*, pp.82-87, and Fred C. Fisher, 'Present-day Problems of the Philippines,' in J. B. Condliffe ed., *Problems of the Pacific, 1927*, pp.44-54.

the indigenous heritage, rather than American institutions, of Filipino society, their speeches remained marginal. Probably the political irrelevance of the Philippines as well as the attitudes of American members enabled their participation to continue.

The Filipino case nonetheless influenced the content of the constitution to include non-independent countries. The constitution stated that the Institute included:

any sovereign or autonomous state lying within or bordering the Pacific Ocean or having dominions, colonies, dependencies, territories, mandated or otherwise, in the Pacific area, subject to *its being approved and admitted to membership*, by the Pacific Council With the approval of the Pacific Council, *independent Local Groups* may be organized in an eligible country which has not created a National Council.⁸⁶ (emphasis added)

And then there was Section Three of this article.

To encourage at Conferences of the Institute the fullest self-expression of distinct racial or territorial groups existing within an eligible country as defined in Section 2 of this Article, the Pacific Council and the Secretariat may, *with the assent of the National Council of such country*, enter into direct relations with such groups ...

This opened the door to participants to colonies. The practice to extend the membership not only to independent nation-states but also to colonies was unusual amongst INGOs in this period.⁸⁷ On the other hand, the same article made it possible for 'colonial' European powers to become the IPR members. Accordingly the British joined the IPR from 1927, followed by the French and Dutch from 1933.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Appendix III: 'Constitution of the IPR,' Article III, in J. B. Condliffe ed., *Problems of the Pacific*, 1927, p.607.

⁸⁷ The INGOs which followed this practice were only a few, such as 'Women's International League for Peace and Freedom'. L. C. White, *The Structure of Private International Organizations* (Philadelphia, Penn: George S. Ferguson Company, 1933), p.220.

⁸⁸ Greene argued for the participation both of a colonial power and a colony based on this constitution. Greene to Loomis, 7 July, 1930, E-17/5, AUH.

The discussion at the Yale Club and the intent of the first IPR conference emphasized the individual capacity of participants. Efforts were made to enhance this unofficial character at the first conference. Words such as 'delegates' were avoided because they implied 'national' representation.⁸⁹ The unofficial character was important in order to avoid defensive arguments for 'national' policies among participants, and to encourage individual discussion, as free as possible from official or national constraints. Key figures at the IPR represented this view strongly. Jerome Greene, Treasurer of the American Council of the IPR, who had been born and brought up in Japan, felt the Japanese members were under governmental pressure and did not want to discuss issues concerning national policies. Greene wrote to Carter that the third conference in Kyoto would be a great opportunity to show the government that discussions free from governmental pressures on important issues were not only harmless, but profitable.⁹⁰ Wilbur, Chairman of the Pacific Council, shared the view. Following his principles, Wilbur resigned as Chairman of the Pacific Council, when he was appointed Secretary of State in 1929.

The unofficial character of the Institute, however, was ambiguous from the beginning. Greene's point was to avoid, not discussion of official (national) policies, but discussions by official representatives. While participants were not governmental (official) representatives, they were seen as 'national' representatives. Differences of opinion about the nature of 'unofficial' national representative existed. Some JCIPR members thought that even 'unofficial' national representatives should not criticise national (governmental) policy at international conferences,⁹¹ while other JCIPR members argued that it would be suicidal for the IPR if participants only justified governmental policies uncritically.⁹² The latter position, a dominant position held by IPR founders, remained ambiguous because of

⁸⁹ Takagi Y., 'Taiheiyō kankei chōsakai,' p.62.

⁹⁰ Greene to Carter, 20 November, 1928, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU.

⁹¹ Soejima M., 'Taiheiyō kaigi ni tsuite Takagi kyōju ni kotau,' *Gaikō jihō*, Vol.53, No.603 (15 January, 1930), pp.169-170.

⁹² Takagi Y., 'Taiheiyō kaigi no seiseki no hihan,' *Gaikō jihō*, Vol.53, No.602 (1 January, 1930), p.272.

the strong assumption of the nation-state and the strong identification of participants with their nations.

The ambiguity of the terms 'official' and 'unofficial' was reinforced by the structure of the IPR. This structure was based on National Councils. The proximity between the National Council and the government differed from country to country, therefore it is difficult to generalize about the *official* character of National Councils. Nevertheless, the basic unit of organization was based on the nation-state, as was common among other INGOs at the time.⁹³ The constitution of the IPR, which was drafted at the second conference, makes this point clearly. Article III says:

1. Subject to the provisions hereof the Institute of Pacific Relations is constituted by the *national units* the name of whose representatives are appended to this Constitution ...

2. A national unit ... shall be a National Council organized for the purpose of the Institute, or organization of similar purposes Each constituent country shall have *one* National Council or equivalent organization ... ⁹⁴ (emphasis added)

There was, in fact, no emphasis on the unofficial nature in the constitution, although it was assumed. One had to be a 'representative' of a nation, and reside in the nation represented. This was not convenient for expatriates or those who mainly lived overseas.⁹⁵ While the British group insisted that the membership of a national group should be limited to its own nationality,⁹⁶ the IPR was relatively loose regarding nationality in national groups from 1925 to 1931. Chinese, Japanese and Koreans resident in Honolulu participated in the first conference as their country's members, and a few American missionaries resident in Japan as Japanese members.⁹⁷ Duncan-Hall participated as an Australian member in 1927 while he was at Syracuse University. Harada Tasuku (1863-1940), Professor of Oriental Studies at University of Hawaii from 1919, became an

⁹³ L. C. White, *Private International Organizations*, pp.31 and 34-36.

⁹⁴ Appendix III: 'Constitution of the IPR,' in J. B. Condliffe ed., *Problems of the Pacific*, 1927, p.607.

⁹⁵ Hinder to Eggleston, 8 January, 1931, MS 423/14, NLA.

⁹⁶ Macadam memo, 28 February, 1934, AIIA file, LCH.

⁹⁷ 'Membership,' in [The IPR ed.], *Institute of Pacific Relations*, 1925, pp.35-40.

unusual member of the Japanese Council of the IPR (JCIPR) who lived outside of Japan. He participated in the first two IPR conferences as a Japanese member, and the third as an American member, before he went back to Japan in 1932. Probably due to language skills, the JCIPR had conference secretaries with English names at the conferences of 1929 and 1931, while the Chinese seem to have managed themselves. After 1933, national groups consisted more of those with both nationality and residency than before.

The conferences and machinery of the IPR operated on the assumption of national units, assuming a *national* coherence. The conference of 1925 started with opening statements by the leaders of *national* groups, presenting, for example, an Australian view or a Canadian view. As seen earlier in this chapter, national culture was also assumed and re-constructed at conferences. This assumption, which existed from the beginning, contained a danger. Explaining the situation, and giving 'insider' knowledge of a nation did not have to be a justification of governmental policies, but because governmental policies were 'national' policies, there was a possibility that *national* representatives would voluntarily defend their governments' policies. Although scholars and contemporaries argued that the IPR shifted its orientation from culture to politics around 1929, the assumption of the national unit as the basis of the organization encouraged this reorientation.

Not only the administration, but also research programs and conference preparation, were based on national units, rather than on issues or fields. This was, however, not only because of political intentions or the intellectual context of that time, but also because of the practical necessities of carrying out institutional functions at a multinational level. The alternative method based on units of issues or fields was impractical for organizing the research program as well as the administration. I shall return to this issue in the next chapter.

The assumption of the nation-state was strengthened by the manner of personifying nation-states. It became common to deal with a nation-state as if it were a person. The expression 'Japan did, thought, or accepted' was

very common in papers and discussions. In this type of discourse, the complexity and diversity of a nation tended to be ignored or undermined. The name of a nation-state referred mostly to the national government, and the complexity of the composition and mechanisms of government tended to be ignored. *National* character, like personal character, was assumed in this practice, and individual or sectional differences were often overlooked.

The practice of personifying nation-states gave users of the term a sense of power. It gave them a sense of excitement and importance in discussing issues on a national level, which was the privilege only of a very few high officials. It enhanced the quasi-diplomatic atmosphere. Herbert Croly commented on the dangers inherent in this temptation.

[The IPR's] members will constantly be tempted to believe that it is capable of some salutary intervention in a critical dilemma Sooner or later it will probably yield to one of these temptations or solicitations and undertake to place its authority as a research institute behind some piece of practical political advice. But I hope not. If it does commit itself to particular policies it can hardly fail to become propagandist, and it will measurably disqualify itself for the more permanently important task which no other organized body is in a position to perform.⁹⁸

What he saw as significant in the IPR was its experimental nature in intellectual discourse. He thought that it would be of greater long-term benefit to the world than the activities of think tank type organizations. A Japanese participant agreed on this importance of 'unofficial' discussions at the IPR: 'It is like a *zadankai* [round table discussion] where one can discuss various issues without reservation and try to understand others' points of view'. It was useful, as he continued, only if this type of discussion was not carried out by professionals such as diplomats.⁹⁹ It was acknowledged that IPR discussions would contribute to psychological

⁹⁸ H. Croly, 'Human Potential in Pacific Politics,' p.588.

⁹⁹ Matsuoka Y., 'Taiheiyō chōsa kaigi no gyōseki,' *Gaikō jihō*, Vol.53, No.602 (1 January, 1930), pp.283-285.

disarmament, which might not influence policy-making immediately, but might do so in a long run.¹⁰⁰

Croly, however, sensed that the real danger for the IPR was the temptation for power. While some were more academically oriented, a majority of the participants were close to power, or aspired to be in power, either to implement their ideals or simply for self-promotion. This tendency was almost inevitable given the selection of participants for conferences. The IPR addressed the *influential* few, not the thinking majority. The trend towards a political orientation in the IPR was not caused by any *sudden* shift to focus on political issues. Rather it lay in the very nature of the people who gathered at the IPR conferences and its national councils, as well as in the assumptions of a structure based on the colonial system and national sovereignty.

v) Public Impact

The first two IPR conferences achieved success in the limited, but *influential* circles which the IPR targeted. The organization gained favourable support among the participants and press, and this was ultimately reported to officials. Reports on the IPR were not front page news, but were relatively widely covered by publications. From August to October 1925, more than 350 papers, magazines and journals carried articles relating to the Institute in the USA. These publications included those of labour unions, Chambers of Commerce, educational institutions, women's organizations, scientific societies, business associations and religious bodies. In the same period, 195 public addresses on the IPR, delivered by American participants, were reported to the headquarters of the IPR in Honolulu.¹⁰¹

Exhaustive examination of the newspapers which had particular interests in the IPR is hard to conduct. Newspaper articles collected at the Ministry

¹⁰⁰ Yasutomi M., 'Taiheiyō kaigi nyōze gakan,' *Gaikō jihō*, Vol.52, No.601 (15 December, 1929), pp.58-59.

¹⁰¹ This report was titled 'For information from Commissioner for Australia in the USA,' n. d. [in 1926], A981; Org 93, AA.

of Foreign Affairs of Japan, however, give a good indication of publicity in the USA. The number of the articles collected reflected the degree of official interest rather than absolute numbers in the press. For 1927, the file on the IPR included only a few major newspapers, such as the *San Francisco Chronicle* and *Los Angeles Times*. The file on the third conference at Kyoto was more encompassing, because the Tanaka government had a stake in the Manchurian issues, a major topic at the conference. The principal papers collected were the *New York Times*, *Herald Tribune*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Washington Post*, and local newspapers in Honolulu, Seattle, Oakland and Portland. Considering reports of the embassies in the USA on press coverage in 1927, it seems likely that the same newspapers maintained an interest in the IPR throughout the period from 1927 to 1929, rather than that they suddenly paid attention to it in 1929.

The prominence of press coverage was determined by the prominence of the participants at the conferences. Articles in the *San Francisco Chronicle* in 1927 were written by Chester Rowell, a distinguished Republican commentator from Berkeley. Rowell, heavily involved in the IPR, emphasized its importance. This positive image was reinforced by Wilbur, another Californian notable.¹⁰² The *Herald Tribune* reported in 1929 under the title, 'Pacific Institute in Japan Draws World Leaders', although the size of the article was modest.¹⁰³ These articles were detailed and supportive of the IPR. As reported by the *New York Sun* in 1927, the IPR was seen as a positive new type of organization.¹⁰⁴ After conferences, these positive images were promoted by participants through public lectures as well as articles in journals.

Publicity was carried in the same manner in Japan. Newspapers such as *Osaka Asahi*, *Osaka Mainichi* and *Tokyo Asahi* reported on IPR conferences. While American papers reported not only the issues, but also the functions and methods of the IPR, Japanese papers tended to focus

¹⁰² *San Francisco Chronicle*, 14 August, 1927.

¹⁰³ *Herald Tribune*, 25 October, 1929.

¹⁰⁴ *New York Sun*, 10 June, 1927.

only on issues.¹⁰⁵ The promotion of the IPR's functions and aims were left to participants and members of the JCIPR. Takagi Yasaka, Saitō Sōichi, and other participants wrote articles, and talked at public lectures. These articles appeared in journals for the Manufacturers' Club [*kōgyō kurabu*], diplomatic circles, academic circles and women's associations.¹⁰⁶ Members also gave public talks to these circles. In this way, they reached the audience they targeted, while most of society was left uninformed.

Press coverage in Australia was much less evident, and the penetration of the information seems less profound than in the USA. A few articles appeared in papers and the journal of the YMCA, but the space was unspectacular. Except for a series of reports by Eggleston from Japan and China with photos and illustrations in the [Melbourne] *Herald* and *Age* in 1929, articles did not capture great space. While a small number of experts discussed the IPR issues in the major cities in the 1920s, the functions and aims of the Institute, and the effects of the conferences were unknown to the broader society.

Governments and diplomats were better informed about the Institute because they received the reports from the USA. In Japan, diplomats reported on IPR conferences and emphasized the importance of the Institute.¹⁰⁷ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained close ties with

¹⁰⁵ For example, *Osaka Asahi*, 1 November, 1929, *Tokyo Asahi*, 9 November, 1929, and *Osaka Mainichi*, 8 November, 1929.

¹⁰⁶ Aoki S., 'Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai: Dainikai Honoruru taikai o miru,' *Kokusai chishiki*, Vol.7, No.9 (September, 1927), Saitō Sōichi, 'Taiheiyō jidai no tōrai to suno shomondai,' *Bōeki*, Vol. 28, No.7 (July, 1928), Saitō S., 'Taiheiyō kaigi to fujin,' *Fujin no tomo* (October, 1927), Saitō S., 'Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai no seiritsu to daisankai taikai no igi,' *Gaikō jihō*, Vol.51, No.2 (October, 1929), Takagi Y., "'Institute of Pacific Relations" ni tsuite,' *Kokka gakkai zasshi*, Vol.39, No.12 (December, 1925), Takagi Y., 'Kokusai shugi ni taisuru ichikōken: Taiheiyō kankei chōsakai no kansō,' *Ch ū kōron*, No.40 (December, 1925), Takagi Y., 'Taiheiyō kaigi no seiseki no hihan,' *Gaikō jihō*, Vol.53, No.2 (January, 1930), Takagi Y., 'Taiheiyō kankei chōsakai,' Takayanagi K., 'Konshū no taiheiyō kaigi,' *Ch ū kōron*, No.44 (October, 1929), Zumoto M., 'Kyoto kaigi no kōka ikan,' *Gaikō jihō*, Vol.52, No.601 (15 December, 1929) and Zumoto M., 'Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai ni tsuite,' *Gaikō jihō*, Vol.51, No.594 (1 September, 1929).

¹⁰⁷ Debuchi, Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Tanaka Cabinet, was posted as special envoy to Washington D. C. in October 1928. In Washington, he told

the headquarters of the JCIPR in Tokyo from the beginning. This included many meetings with government officials, social functions and discussions for the details of the activities and conferences. Furthermore substantial funds were donated by the Ministry.¹⁰⁸

In Australia, Duncan-Hall reported to the government that the IPR conference in 1925 was 'one of the most important incidents after the Washington Conference'.¹⁰⁹ The Prime Minister's Department was sceptical about the Pacific as a political entity and feared the IPR conferences' effect on immigration policies and imperial arrangements, therefore they maintained a policy of non-involvement with the IPR. Nevertheless, officials at the Department were not totally negative. They were informed about IPR activities by reports and a few interviews with key members, including John Condliffe, Research Secretary of the IPR.¹¹⁰ Probably the Department received more information about the IPR than any other individual or group in Australia, except for a few key members of the IPR in major cities.

How much did the IPR activities at conferences or at National Councils influence government policy making? This is hard to evaluate, because it depended on the situation in each country. Furthermore, even if the influence existed, it could have been in the domain of perception, and the impact was not necessarily immediate. As Chapter Three suggested, government involvement was stronger in the JCIPR than in its counterpart in Australia (the AIIA from 1932), but this does not necessarily mean the JCIPR had stronger influence on the government. The JCIPR reflected the government agenda and was more a national publicist body, while the AIIA before WWII initiated a new agenda for the government and society, although its influence was limited.

2) Institutionalizing the IPR: the first INGO in the Pacific

Davis that the Japanese government saw the importance of the IPR. Davis to Atherton, 21 November, 1928, E-13/12, AUH.

¹⁰⁸ See Chapter Three, Section Two.

¹⁰⁹ Duncan-Hall to Amery, 3 August, 1925, A981; Org 93, AA.

¹¹⁰ Note of Henderson, 29 May, 1929, A981; Org93, AA.

Various streams of internationalism operated at the first two conferences, such internationalism as based on Wilsonian idealism, Christian humanism and business interests. These streams were not totally independent, but inter-woven. Socialist and feminist interests were also represented, but the former did not promote its interest beyond nation-state boundaries, and the latter interest was inadequately addressed. As a result, class and gender did not materialize as alternative forms of identity transcending nation-state boundaries, and therefore did not promote alternative streams of internationalism at the IPR conferences.

Behind the optimistic excitement of the Pacific Age and the Pacific community was the making of the first INGO in the region. In 1925-1927, two major incidents highlighted the dominant elements in institutionalizing the IPR. The first was the withdrawal of the YMCA group from control of the IPR conference. The second was the entry of the British group. These incidents strengthened the move to make the IPR into an organization of regional affairs experts, rather than a philanthropic association to promote good will.

i) Withdrawal of the YMCA

Davis's organization of the first conference in late 1924 in New York had already led to a substantial reduction of the YMCA element in order to gain the support of 'influential' circles.¹¹¹ The first conference, however, illustrated the time lag between the central committee and each national group. National groups for the first conference were organized by national YMCA headquarters in each country, while National Councils were established mostly after the first conference. National YMCA headquarters had operated on materials which had been sent from the central committee several months earlier. As the result, two distinct camps existed in every national group at the first conference: one of members of the religious professions with YMCA connections; and another of experts on Asia and the Pacific islands, who were academics, businessmen or public servants.

¹¹¹ See Chapter Two.

Australian and New Zealand groups were selected by the respective national secretariats of the YMCA, and were therefore dominated by the YMCA camp. Expert members were few: John Condliffe among eleven New Zealanders, and H. Duncan-Hall and Stephen Roberts among six Australians. The dominance of the YMCA in these groups, which arrived first at Honolulu, led to the introduction of a prayer after breakfast at the Punahou School. The other national groups who arrived later had to follow this practice, which created scepticism among expert groups. The conflict was settled by creating a "Meditation Period" in which texts of different religions were read, followed by ten minutes of meditation. Davis noted: 'many found common ground for religious idealism and the inspiration of uniting in a recognition of the Deity as preparation for the work of the day'.¹¹² The practice was, however, abolished after the first conference.

Actual leadership of the discussion was given to the experts at the first conference. The YMCA camp resented this tendency as well as the general directions of the central committee. The trend was strengthened by the arrival of the American mainland group, which contained a substantial number of experts. Major figures in this group complained to Davis that the strong religious undertone was unexpected, and if they had known that this could be prevalent, they would not have come.¹¹³

Conflict between the two camps developed not only over religion, but also over the power to control the conference. Although the YMCA put much into the setting up of the first conference by making use of extensive organizational networks in Asia, it yielded to experts in organizing the proceedings.¹¹⁴ The program was re-organized by George Blakeslee, a 'Far East' expert at Clark University. Blakeslee had been a leading figure at annual summer meetings of the Institute of Politics at Williamstown for the preceding four years. In Honolulu, he established the pattern of the IPR conferences, following those of the Institute of Politics, and shaped the

¹¹² J. M. Davis, 'An Inside Story of the Institute,' pp.7-8, *Wilbur Papers*, 40/5, HI.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 8-9.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.10.

major structure of the conferences. The conferences consisted of forums for general discussion, a Round Table of a smaller number of experts on specific issues and public addresses.

Secularization of the institution as the result of the withdrawal of the YMCA groups was reflected in the content of the conference. At the first conference, religion accounted for 6 out of 27 discussion topics, among which the main themes were immigration, race and diplomatic relations.¹¹⁵ Although one topic on foreign missions survived at the second conference, religious issues were totally dropped from the third conference. This reflected the ideas of key figures who felt it important to overcome the image of a Christian organization and to portray the IPR as modern and scientific.¹¹⁶

This secularization, however, did not mean the decline of Christian faith among major figures of the IPR. While the number of participants with a YMCA background was substantially reduced at the second conference, the tradition of missionary families was still strong among the key figures in the USA. Christian faith was reflected in their sense of mission and social justice, which did not diminish much even in later years. Among participants from Asia, Christianity was also strongly represented, if one considers the percentage of Christians in the entire population. It was especially noticeable amongst the Chinese participants. Eggleston recorded in 1927 that all the delegates from China were Christian.¹¹⁷ To a lesser extent, this was the case among Japanese participants. It was probably because Christians in Japan and China were more exposed to foreigners, and their customs and language as well as their values and beliefs. Furthermore, they often studied in the USA or about the USA, and therefore their fluency in English was greater than that of the rest of the society. In these groups, a sense of social justice arising from Christian faith was strong, and did not conflict with the emphasis on science. What bothered key figures, who were themselves often Christians or from missionary families, was, however, the philanthropic generalist outlook,

¹¹⁵ See Appendix A.

¹¹⁶ Curtis to Carter, 23 January, 1928, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 2, BLCU.

¹¹⁷ Note of Conversation with Eggleston [in 1927], MS 2629/6, NLA.

which lacked the 'scientific' credibility to appeal to the 'influential', including major foundations.

ii) British Participation and Institutionalizing the IPR

At the first conference, British participation was strongly requested by participants from the Dominions, who found it hard to discuss diplomatic issues. As the request was accepted, the institutionalization of the IPR and the process of British involvement happened at the same time.

During the first conference, the structure of the Institute was discussed. A Committee on Permanent Organization was appointed during the first conference in order to create a Pacific Council (the executive body of the IPR), establish a headquarters, employ a secretariat, raise funds, and prepare for a second conference. This committee held three meetings, two at the end of the first conference and the third in San Francisco in October 1925, and the basic structure was shaped between the first two conferences.

Already by January 1926, British participation was accepted at the IPR without raising any concern or objection. At the same time other decisions were made to: 1) make Honolulu the headquarters for the next five year period; 2) appoint J. M. Davis General Secretary and Charles Loomis Associate General Secretary; 3) raise a budget of \$90,000 for 1926 in order to hold the second conference in Honolulu in 1927; 4) have the secretariat visit the participating countries for preparation; and 5) secure a research secretary as soon as feasible.¹¹⁸

Besides the decision on British participation, this document indicates a few distinct aspects of the IPR: the *temporary* status of Honolulu as headquarters; the emphasis on personal contacts in organizing national councils; and the emphasis on the research aspect of the Institute. The last point is important not only for the definition of the nature of the IPR, but also for the method of gaining funds and control over funds, to be discussed later.

¹¹⁸ J. M. Davis, 'Report of Committee on Permanent Organization,' in J. B. Condliffe ed., *Problems of the Pacific, 1927*, p.591.

The Pacific Council was established as an executive body, after the central committee was abolished. Its members were nominated, but were to be the representatives of National Councils once they were organized. R. L. Wilbur became Chairman of the Pacific Council, F. Atherton, Treasurer, Inoue Junnosuke of Japan, first Vice-Chairman, and David Yui of China, second Vice-Chairman. The other members were Mungo MacCallum, Australia, Robert Boden, Canada, and James Allen, New Zealand. Despite American dominance in staff, membership and funding, this multinational representation was a major reason why the IPR was seen as an INGO, not an American organization. While the American voice tended to be dominant, consultation with National Councils was not neglected. Meetings of the Pacific Council, held just before the biennial conferences,¹¹⁹ decided on the major issues of the IPR.

Administration was conducted by the ISIPR in Honolulu. The YMCA element was strong among the original nine staff. Davis and Loomis were YMCA men. Frank Atherton, Treasurer of the Pacific Council and the ISIPR, and his family had long been patrons of local YMCA activities. Administrative expenditure of the ISIPR was US\$ 24,500 in 1926 and stayed at a similar level until 1933, except for an expansion in 1929–1930 due to the enlargement of the staff in this period.¹²⁰

The responsibilities of the ISIPR were: to prepare and conduct the conferences; to promote research; to exchange information; and to liaise between National Councils.¹²¹ Communication and coordination, not policy-making for the IPR, were the main functions, and were carried out through letters, cables and visits. The IPR recognized the special importance of personal contacts in making this multinational operation work. Its whole operation, indeed, was based on the philosophy of

¹¹⁹ The IPR conferences between 1925 to 1933 took place every two years. Between 1933 and 1945, they were held every three years.

¹²⁰ 'Statement Showing the Receipts and Disbursements of the Institute of Pacific Relations for the Years 1925–1935, and the First Six Months of 1936, Compared with the Budget for 1936,' in the IPR, *Report of the International Secretariat to the Pacific Council, 1933–1936* ([New York]: the IPR, 1936), p.173.

¹²¹ J. M. Davis, 'Foreword,' in J. B. Condliffe ed., *Problems of the Pacific, 1927*, p.vi.

meeting and cultivating influential people of good will. This emphasis on visits was innovative then, and was enthusiastically supported by the staff, but required large amounts of money and time.

Davis, the first General Secretary (1926–1930), and Edward Carter the second (1933–1946), both visited National Councils after their appointments, and promoted the cause of the IPR. Davis spent almost half of the year out of Honolulu in each year of his term. In April to August 1926, he visited Japan, China, Australia and New Zealand, meeting prominent people, promoting the causes of the IPR, and reporting on the National Councils to the ISIPR.¹²² In late November 1927, he took off to Europe, visiting Paris, Geneva, Moscow, Germany, Holland and London, and in mid 1928 he was off to Tokyo and China for a few months to organize the conference. Between these overseas trips, he travelled constantly on the mainland of the USA and Canada. He had meetings in major cities by day, and travelled by train at night between New York and San Francisco.

The practice was followed by other staff. Having complained of the expense of Davis's trips,¹²³ Carter himself followed this practice after appointment as General Secretary. Other staff, such as the Assistant Secretary, Research Secretary and Treasurer, also took long trips for organizing and coordinating research and conferences. It was an expensive operation, but before jet planes or fax,¹²⁴ probably the only and most effective one.

The practice had a by-product. It constructed a life-style for what is now termed the 'international public servant': those who work for the United Nations and its affiliated bodies. While diplomats received salaries from their government, 'international public servants' are paid by the 'international' bodies. While the IPR was non-governmental and its salary scheme was not as well developed as that of the League of Nations,

¹²² Davis to Wilbur, 11 May, and 26 May, 1926, E-12b/29, and Davis to Atherton, 11 August, 1926, E-12b/32, AUH.

¹²³ Carter to Greene, 1 October, 1928, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU.

¹²⁴ The administration mainly used letters and telegrams for communicating National Councils, not telephones, in the inter-war period.

it made its officers accustomed to a certain life-style. It was hard for the families of these office-bearers. At times, they took their spouses for company or children as secretaries, and the IPR paid expenses of spouses on the occasions of major office-bearers' long trips.¹²⁵ Davis took his wife to Europe in 1927-1928. Carter also took his wife on a trip, but also used his children as secretaries. His son, William, learned shorthand, took a year off from Harvard, and attended the Kyoto Conference as a recorder.¹²⁶ These occasions were, however, rare and families were generally left behind while the officers were on long trips. Children were in some cases put into boarding schools. Carter's son did not remember much time together with his father. In some cases, it made children decide not to follow a similar career, but in others, it made them more prepared and attracted to the life-style and helped them to develop connection to similar social circles. For example, Carter's son took a job at UNESCO, and commented fondly of their life style: 'This reflects the times we live in; a family on the run'.¹²⁷

Key figures at the IPR felt the importance of these overseas visits. Davis and Carter both believed that one had to visit and experience countries in order to understand them, especially in the Orient.¹²⁸ Although the Pacific Council decided in 1929 that 'it was no longer desirable for senior secretaries to visit national units ... for the purpose of promotion,' it still recognized the necessity of these officers' keeping close touch with members in various countries.¹²⁹ Loomis, Condliffe and William Holland, Research Assistant at the ISIPR, went to Japan and China, not only for the coordination of conferences and research programs, but also to acquire a feel for the countries.¹³⁰ First hand experience and reports on the latest situation in the Orient were valued because of their scarcity. When very few had this information and experience, it was the biggest selling point of the IPR.

¹²⁵ Carter to Mrs Carter, 10 August, 1933, Carter Papers, Box 1, BLCU.

¹²⁶ William Carter, 'Some Memories of Edward C. Carter by His Son,' (unpublished), 17 April, 1986, pp.3-4. I owe this document to Carter's grandson, Paul Carter, and also Professor Mark Elvin for making this contact possible.

¹²⁷ W. Carter, 'Some memories,' pp.2 and 9.

¹²⁸ Carter to Greene, 15 December, 1928, CPR, Box 112/ J. Greene, BLCU.

¹²⁹ Pacific Council Minutes, 9 November, 1929, A-1/PC 1929, AUH.

¹³⁰ Davis to Atherton, 24 October 1927, E-13/6, AUH.

This practice of long trips was both a strength and a weakness of the IPR. It was possible because of the small number of staff and lack of bureaucratic complications at the ISIPR, but it increased the extent of fluidity. Less staff also may have meant that the IPR was vulnerable to the influence of a few office-bearers on policy matters.

British participation added a new dimension to this institutional context. The invitation of a British group to the second IPR conference was organized through Canadian members. This was a decision of the IPR.¹³¹ John Nelson, a journalist in Montreal, was selected to be in charge.¹³² At the first conference, he was nominated as a Canadian representative of a temporary executive committee, and therefore responsible for inviting the British group. Canadian members were not unanimous about the idea, but Nelson favoured it. Backed up by the IPR's committee, he sent an invitation to the Honorary Secretary of the British Institute of International Affairs (BIIA/RIIA) on 12 March 1926, stating that the British should have representatives at the next meeting.¹³³ The choice of the RIIA is not surprising given its publicity in IPR circles and its connection with similar foreign affairs experts' organizations in the USA such as the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, and the Institute of Politics in Williamstown. The move not only involved the dynamics from new British imperialism, but also strengthened the element of foreign affairs experts' organization within the IPR.

An interesting by-product of this process was the promotion of the formation of a Canadian *national* branch of the RIIA. As in Australia, membership of local branches of the RIIA and the IPR in Canada

¹³¹ J. M. Davis, 'Report of Committee on Permanent Organization,' p.591.

¹³² Before November 1925, Nelson published the *Daily World* in Vancouver where Oriental immigration was a big issue. It is most likely that he was involved in the public debate concerning the issue. Probably its reputation and also his active involvement in the YMCA movement brought him to the first IPR conference. P. Hooper ed., *Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations: The Memoirs of William Holland* (Ryūkei shosha, forthcoming in 1995), Part One, p.9. Page numbering is based on the semi draft version of the book. The draft is divided into two parts: Part One: pp.1-79, and Part Two: pp.1-87.

¹³³ Nelson to Cathorne-Hardy, 12 March, 1926, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 3, BLCU.

overlapped extensively and when they organized a *national* headquarters, the two were merged. Unlike the situation in Australia, suspicion against the IPR as a propaganda body of American hegemony was almost absent.

Major members of the IPR favoured British representation mainly in order to make higher level discussion possible. In a report sent to the RIIA, strong support for British participation among the key IPR members was confirmed.¹³⁴ Then Curtis, who showed great interest in the IPR enterprise, and who had been an ardent promoter of Anglo-American cooperation, wrote to Blakeslee privately, stating that the RIIA had taken a step to secure one or two participants for the second conference. At this stage, Curtis was still not sure about the position of the IPR. Curtis asked Blakeslee if it could send a final and definite invitation.¹³⁵

It is strange that the ISIPR left the matter to the Canadian members, and that formal correspondence between the RIIA and the ISIPR did not occur at this early stage. Curtis's private connection provided the channel between the IPR and the RIIA. Curtis contacted his old friend, Edward Carter, who was then secretary of the ACIPR in New York.

Carter's connection with Curtis went back to the time when he was a secretary of the YMCA in India in 1902-1908 and 1911-1917. When Carter was stationed as a YMCA officer in France during WWI and in London soon after WWI, they stayed in close touch. Their ties became stronger when Carter's secretary in France married Curtis. Around the time of the IPR organization in 1924 and 1925, however, Carter was not involved to any great extent in discussion on the matter with Curtis. Carter was more enthusiastic about his own project of the *Inquiry*, a YMCA related project.

As the National Council of the USA, the ACIPR always held a special position in the IPR. Especially when the existence of the Pacific Council and the ISIPR as an 'international' body was somewhat visionary, that of the ACIPR appeared more solid in the minds of some members. Often the

¹³⁴ Report of Wilson Harris, 24 May, 1926, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 3, BLCU, Note of Joseph Flavett, 18 May, 1926, Ms 2629/6, NLA.

¹³⁵ Curtis to Blakeslee, 16 July, 1926, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 3, BLCU.

IPR was identified with the ACIPR, not with the headquarters of the ISIPR in Honolulu. For example, the RIIA used the ACIPR in New York, not the ISIPR in Honolulu, as a channel to communicate with the imagined 'IPR'. This was probably due to the familiarity of Curtis with members of the ACIPR, such as Carter and Jerome Greene, and also due to the suspicious attitude of Curtis to the quality of the ISIPR.

As in other countries, however, the formation of a *national* council involved much imagination. While local branches of the IPR were formed in various places in the USA, the national council was in no position to control or coordinate all the activities at each branch. The ACIPR was more like a regional office in New York in this sense. But it was the region with power in terms of money, personnel, institutions and political influence. The documents on the formation of the ACIPR are not available, but fragments of letters suggest that the ACIPR was founded with the help of Davis and Wilbur after the first conference. In an effort to make it more *national* than regional, the executive board replaced three East Coast members with non East Coast members in mid-1926.¹³⁶

British participation was formalized after the second conference. The Pacific Council invited the RIIA to become a national unit for Britain which would send a representative to the Pacific Council. This process was delayed due to Curtis's discontent with the 'composition' of the ISIPR. Ironically this was because Curtis recognized the potential and promise of the experiment of the IPR.¹³⁷ He was one of the very few at the RIIA who had a great interest in the region. He felt it important for the RIIA to become a national unit of the IPR. He organized the Far Eastern Group in the RIIA, which dealt with IPR matters. Finally, in January 1928, Curtis sent a note to Carter, telling him that the RIIA had decided to ratify the Constitution.

[W]e might take our courage in our hand and join, and as full members exercise such influence from inside as belongs to a

¹³⁶ Edmund Gay, Grafton Wilson, and Blakeslee, as well as Carter and Loomis were involved in this re-organization. Carter to Greene, 20 June, 1926, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU.

¹³⁷ Curtis to Carter, 23 January, 1928, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 2, BLCU.

member in helping on the creation of a Secretariat with the qualifications and experience which in our view is needed for so delicate and responsible a task.¹³⁸

Ratification was completed soon afterwards, and Curtis became a member of the Pacific Council. Until he became preoccupied with the idea of Shanghai Municipal reform, he devoted his energy to re-organizing the ISIPR.

iii) Effects of British Participation

Did the British bring a different dynamic to the conference? Certainly, they brought with them not only their interests and perspectives, but also institutional characteristics of the RIIA. The interests of the British group (the 'Far Eastern group' in the RIIA), which were mainly focused on China, influenced the program. Planned programs were abandoned, and the China issue was put into the primary position beside food and population.¹³⁹

Beyond this, a Japanese participant, Tsurumi Yūsuke, felt that the British brought a political element into the conference.

What I felt, when the nature of the conference changed, was the political skill of British participants Only by adding the British, the nature of the conference changed. It is because although the USA is a great power, it still is relatively unused to international conferences, and tends to prefer academic discussion to politics. On the contrary, Britain is skilled in international negotiations, and its way of thinking is completely political. Britain selected participants only with political inclinations, and at the conference, their dealings are political and their interests in discussion were in politics. The international tradition of the Great British Empire gave them a superior position [at the conference].¹⁴⁰

The statement is coloured by Tsurumi's grand generalizations and grand words. It is, however, an interesting observation on the dynamism which

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ Tsurumi Yūsuke, 'Taiheiyo kaigi chōkakan,' Inoue Junnosuke ed., *Taiheiyo mondai* (Nihon hyōronsha, 1927), pp.43-44.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.44-45

the British brought to the conference. Rather than being alarmed, he was excited by the change. Lionel Curtis impressed Tsurumi, not only with his manner, but also with his reputation as an influential man in British foreign policy among American participants.¹⁴¹

In contrast, a critical observation was made by the Australian, Eggleston. He thought that while American participants mingled with those from Asian countries with ease, the British had no idea how to communicate with them, and did not even try to do so.

There is no doubt ... that the Americans have an art of getting it over with Eastern races that the British have not Americans have superior ability, [and are] socially miles ahead. [They are] witty and charming British make friends with nobody, Chinese, Japanese, New Zealanders, or Australians. They don't entertain them.¹⁴²

The crucial defect of the British, as Eggleston observed of them in Japan and China at the next conference two years later, was their lack of interest in the Orient.

The cardinal defect of the British psychology towards Eastern races is a lack of real interest in them. The days when the Westerner could come to the East, and rule it the better because he was indifferent to local quarrels and movements, are gone. At Hong Kong, the average Britisher is as ignorant of and indifferent to events in China as we are in Melbourne. All he wants to do is to make it a little bit of England. But the East is self-conscious, jealous, and moving with a premonition of vast power in the future. She demands attention and study.¹⁴³

Eggleston, who knew Curtis during WWI and at the Paris Conference, was also one of the original members of the RIIA when it was inaugurated in London in 1920. Curtis, however, did not put much effort in renewing old ties with Eggleston, or anyone from the Dominions in Honolulu.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹ Tsurumi Y., *Chūōo ayumu kokoro*, p.463.

¹⁴² Eggleston, Diary, 1927, MS 423/2, NLA.

¹⁴³ F. Eggleston, 'Australia and the Pacific,' *The [Melbourne] Herald*, 23 December, 1929.

¹⁴⁴ Eggleston Diary, 1927, MS 423/2, NLA.

Eggleston respected Curtis's determination and inspiration for a new form of imperial tie, but was critical of his Anglocentricity.

The British group also brought the practices of the RIIA into the conference. Most important among them was the opposition to publicity. According to the RIIA constitution, the contents of talks and names of speakers at meetings were to be kept secret from the press, and the minutes recorded speakers anonymously. Curtis insisted on this practice and objected to publicity at the IPR conferences, while the American members argued for it. The dispute was fierce. Eggleston recorded: 'Evening was stormy as Curtis objected to publicity'.¹⁴⁵ As a result, the second conference had much stricter regulation on the press, and this tendency increased in the next conference in Kyoto. An American journalist complained about this closed nature of the IPR. He argued for the importance of cooperation between the IPR and 'truth seeking' reporters in order to make the conference successful. He blamed the British for this problem.

Americans want to deal openly, but British won't let them. At the 1929 Kyoto conference, British didn't care a damn whether the conference was reported or not. British were narrow and selfish The American press is still disposed to treat the Institute with interested sympathy [But] you must realize that after all the conferences of the Institute are not "must" news It is easy to alienate ... if reporters continue to undergo the experience of the last two conferences You must get along with us and treat us as friend, not enemy.¹⁴⁶

This elitist element of restricting all the information to selected experts and of scepticism towards the popular press was not peculiar to the RIIA, but had always been latent within the IPR. It aimed to be an elite organization. Along with research, two functions of the Institute—wide and impartial publicity, and education of the society through publicity—however, were given priority at the first conference.¹⁴⁷ The meeting at the second conference concluded that the IPR was a research organization,

¹⁴⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ Babb to Loomis, 19 November, 1930, MS 423/14, NLA

¹⁴⁷ For information from Commissioner for Australia in the USA, n. d. [in 1926], A981; Org 93, AA.

not an unofficial diplomatic organization or an educational organization.¹⁴⁸ While the emphasis on education was not totally abandoned, it seems fair to conclude that the elitist and secretive nature of the IPR conferences was accelerated by British participation.

Opposition to publicity was, however, not only the expression of elitist attitudes, but also that of relativist attitudes to *fact*. While a staff member of the ISIPR defined the two functions of the IPR as getting the facts, and presenting the facts to the people, a British participant argued:

What are the facts? This is the first question. In my view, it is essential that this Conference should concentrate on enabling us to get a better knowledge of the fact than we could have without it; but I also hold it is the function of this institute to deal with the *meaning* of the facts. The next question is whether this institute is going to take the function of saying "This is the *right meaning* of the facts, and it is up to us to get the people to believe this" If we try to insist that these are the *right* things we are headed for disaster We must be a body that includes every point of view. A body must be devoted to research or it must be devoted to propaganda.¹⁴⁹ (emphasis added)

Against this statement, an American participant argued the need for a great deal of propaganda to stimulate people's minds in relation to international affairs, especially in the USA where the general public were so far uninterested. This discussion resulted in a decision that the Institute would collect the facts, interpret them, but avoid offering solutions. In this way, the results of IPR conferences would not suggest concrete policies for the government.

The above statement by a British participant (probably Curtis) is significant in two respects. First, it was sceptical about the absoluteness of those 'facts' in which many participants believed. Second, it tried to clarify the boundary between publicity and propaganda in the material issued by the conference participants. Curtis was opposed to the IPR's defining the 'right' perspective and imposing it on the others.

148 Tsurumi Y., *Ch ūtō o ayumu kokoro*, pp. 192-193.

149 'The Future of the Institute,' in J. B. Condliffe ed., *Problems of the Pacific*, 1927, p. 201.

Curtis felt the need for an institution at which leaders of public opinion studied and analysed ever-changing foreign relations. This was his main idea when he founded the RIIA, and the idea had not changed in 1925:

The world is ... over-equipped with machinery for propagating views. [C]ooperate effort should now be concentrated on making it possible for those who mould public opinion to follow the ever shifting facts of international relations, and for thinking out together what those facts mean before they write and speak. In the last resort the public must judge ...¹⁵⁰

The clear distinction between publicity and propaganda, however, was blurred by the nature of the conference participants. They were not officials, but public men and women, who committed 'private' time and money to 'public' causes. Being 'public' figures, their lectures and writings had the potential to influence and 'educate' public opinion. If propaganda meant the imposition of what they believed to be 'good' and 'right', as Curtis claimed, their lectures and articles fulfilled this function.

Two alternative orientations of publicity (or propaganda) were possible. One direction was to become a pure academic research organization without much input to society. Another was to become a think tank type organization with exclusive input to the government, but not much to society. Curtis's idea was to produce materials on certain issues for policy makers and public through research and analysis, and was closer to a think tank type organization. The IPR after the second conference, increased its research emphasis, remaining ambivalent about its official or governmental orientation.

Certain new attitudes to the Orient were seen in the first two conferences. While the dichotomy of 'East' and 'West' was not questioned, a sense of geographical and moral centrality among participants was not evident. They dealt with the current pressing issues through a logic of difference rather than that of a hierarchy. In other words, the difference between 'East' and 'West' was not used by Europeans, Americans or Australians as

¹⁵⁰ Curtis to Babcock, 9 November, 1925, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 2, BLCU.

a means to dominate the 'East'. At the same time, the colonial framework and the nation-state framework were taken for granted. This approach, coupled with the participation of Britain, a European power outside the Pacific, meant that the future directions of the IPR were already becoming clear by the time of the second conference.

Chapter Five: From the Pacific to the Atlantic, 1927-1933

This chapter focuses on the ideas of 'internationality' held by key figures in the IPR. The first half of this chapter examines the re-organization plan of Lionel Curtis, which triggered the resignation of the first General Secretary, Davis. 'International' meant for Curtis a federation of nations on a world scale. The incident signified a clearer direction for the IPR, towards a foreign affairs experts' organization with an influence wider than the Pacific. The frameworks inherent in the original setting, the nation-state system and the colonial system, were strengthened by this incident. The last half of the chapter argues that the administration of Greene in 1930-1932 was transitional, and that the IPR was moving toward a world-wide oriented organization rather than a regional one. While acknowledging the importance of the 'unofficial' capacity of the IPR, key figures endeavoured to make the IPR a more governmental type of international organization modelled on the League of Nations, rather than an alternative non-governmental type.

1) Re-organization: Curtis' reform plan

British participation brought a new dynamic to the IPR, and caused some changes at the second conference. The biggest challenge from Lionel Curtis appeared, however, after the second conference. In brief, Curtis wanted to make the IPR an organization similar to the League of Nations. In other words, he wanted the IPR to be global-oriented, not confined to the region, and to be more official-oriented than it had been. His letter to Carter in January 1928 makes these points clear. He felt that the IPR had a world-wide potential, which was not realized by its present condition. This was because:

[The ISIPR] was dependent on YMCA staff which ... has not the exact kind of training which fits them for work which has more in

common with that of the Secretariat of the League of Nations than that to which the staff of the YMCA are accustomed.¹

He felt the need to get a 'world' class general secretary for the International Secretariat of the IPR (ISIPR), and believed that Davis fell short of this calibre.²

The following is a story of the shift of the IPR from the Pacific to the world as an organization and in terms of perceptions among the key figures. In this process, the regional dynamism, expressed in the term Pacific Age was lost, and an attempt to seek new attitudes to the Orient failed. Curtis did not manipulate this shift, but he at least triggered it.

Curtis's plan of re-organization was neither consistent nor persuasive, and was not adopted in the actual process of the institutionalizing of the IPR. His plan did, however, raise questions about the 'internationality' and 'non-governmentality' of the IPR. In contrast to Curtis's comment on the staff of the international YMCA as somewhat improperly trained or professionally inferior to those at the League of Nations, others evaluated the YMCA highly. White describes the World Alliance of YMCA as 'the first true international non-governmental organization to be established in the modern movement'.³ How, then, did key figures at the IPR respond to Curtis's re-organizing plan, especially to his interpretations of 'international' and 'non-governmental'?

i) The Meaning of Being 'International'

¹ Curtis to Carter, 23 January, 1928, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 2, BLCU.

² Curtis to Carter, 24 July, 1928, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 2, BLCU. Atherton to Davis, 9 August, 1927, E-13/4, AUH.

³ White continued as follows: 'From the date of its foundation in 1855, [it] was truly international with member associations from Belgium, England, France, Germany, Holland, Scotland, Switzerland, and the United States'. The World Alliance of YMCA originated in Europe, and was called 'truly international' by White. His lack of attention to non Euro-American organizations, or the lack of the existence of these organizations outside of Europe and North America is noteworthy. L. J. White, *International Non-Governmental organizations: Their Purpose, Methods, and Accomplishments* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1951), p.4.

Beside the issue of the 'improper' qualification of the staff at the ISIPR, Curtis questioned the 'international' quality of the IPR. In a letter of November 1928 to Jerome Greene, Treasurer of the American Council of the IPR (ACIPR), Curtis defined 'internationality' and the meaning of an international secretariat. He had three points, of which the first was funding. He argued that American dominance of funding for research meant American control over the projects, and would diminish the 'international' quality of research, and therefore that of the Institute. Second, the Institute should put its primary effort to set conferences on a permanent footing, not research programs. The latter should, he argued, be left to each National Council. Third, the size and expense of the ISIPR should be reduced. He proposed that rather than having a permanent location, the ISIPR should be shifted every two years to the location of the coming conference.⁴ In short, Curtis proposed his ideas of 'international' in terms of personnel, funds, place and function.

This plan also suggests a more government-oriented nature for the IPR. Curtis's idea of a new IPR was a conference-centred organization, where a small number of influential experts would meet and discuss issues. In this plan, data papers would be prepared by National Councils, not by an international research committee of the IPR. Curtis had, therefore, a blue print for more informal gatherings of diplomats.

Curtis's re-organization plan was known only to a few at the ACIPR in the early stages. General Secretary Davis only learned of it in early 1929. In hindsight, the ostracized Davis and J. Condliffe, the Research Secretary of the ISIPR, felt that there was a conspiracy between the British group and the ACIPR in New York, mainly Carter, against the ISIPR in Honolulu. As shown in the following, however, the documents do not support this. They not only demonstrate the role of the ACIPR as an independent body rather than an Anglophile follower of Curtis's idea, but also reveal a serious effort on the ACIPR's part to understand what it meant to be *truly international*.

⁴ Curtis to Greene, 7-13 November, 1928, A-1/PC 1929, AUH.

Greene, as Treasurer of the ACIPR and recipient of the letter from Curtis, took the initiative to respond. Curtis's letter on re-organization was written to Greene to communicate his impressions of the ACIPR meeting in New York, which Curtis had attended. The matter was mainly dealt with by Greene and Carter, and to a lesser extent Charles Howland and James Shotwell, both resident in New York and involved with the research committee of the IPR. Carter and Greene felt it important to deal with the matter in a small group, and only then to let Wilbur know.⁵ Greene was, however, uncomfortable at putting the ACIPR into a position of secretive negotiations. He wrote to Curtis:

[A]ny suggestions from London looking toward the alteration of the policies of the Institute and destined for consideration by the other groups would perhaps better be sent directly, either formally to Wilbur or informally to him and the various constituent groups, including ourselves, rather than to use us, another Anglo Saxon group, as a channel for getting your ideas before the others.⁶

The ISIPR does not appear in this statement as a headquarters of liaison. Instead, the Pacific Council was referred for this function. The Pacific Council, however, was an imagined committee, the members of which lived in different countries and only came together at the time of conference. Wilbur, Chairman of the Pacific Council, therefore often became the Pacific Council by himself. Probably the by-passing of the ISIPR was due to the topic of discussion (the ISIPR), and Greene's consideration of the delicate position of Davis. In any event, the ISIPR was left out from these proceedings.

Greene consulted only Carter, Shotwell and Howland. The response to Curtis's plan from them was not favourable. While seeing the letter as valuable for future consideration, Carter disagreed strongly with Curtis. He pointed out the mistakes in Curtis's understanding of the budget increase, and then moved on to his argument on 'internationality' in research.

⁵ Greene to Carter, 12 December, 1928, and Carter to Greene, 15 December, 1928, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU.

⁶ Greene to Curtis, 3 January, 1929, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU.

While we may not be able to achieve international mutuality in financing, I do believe that we may be able to achieve a high measure of international mutuality in the conduct of research if the American Council continues to be willing to place American funds fully at the disposal of the Institute for its international research program To [Curtis] the Carnegie Endowment's money is in the strict sense of the term *internationalized* I can see no difference at all between the degree of internationalisation of the Carnegie money and that of money raised in this country for the specific purposes of international peace in the Pacific which is raised by Americans and then handed over completely to the Pacific Council to spend.

Then Carter emphasized the 'international' character of the Pacific Council and the IPR as a whole.

The aims of the Pacific Council are clearly as international as those of the Carnegie Endowment, and the personnel of the Pacific Council and of the whole Institute is certainly far more international than the trustees of the Carnegie Endowment or the personality of the late Mr Carnegie, who appears to Curtis as an international figure rather than an American by reason of his Scotch (sic) ancestry.⁷

Greene was more concerned than Carter with the danger of American control. In the letter to Curtis, he wrote: 'Carter differs with you more or less radically' and 'my own position is sympathetic with yours in principle, and I am thinking chiefly of the practical question of the re-organization or re-direction of the activities involved'.⁸ After reading Curtis's plan many times, Greene wrote to him, and presented his idea of 'internationality', arguing that American interests were not dominant in the American foundations, and stressing the importance of having non-Americans, especially Orientals, among the staff of the ISIPR.

Greene proposed dividing the budget of the IPR into two independent categories; one for the administration of the ISIPR, and one for research. He pointed out the mistake of Curtis in seeing the major increase of the budget as the result of research requirements. It was not due to the

⁷ Carter to Greene, 10 December, 1928, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU.

⁸ Greene to Curtis, 13 December, 1928, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU.

research program, but to the administration of the ISIPR, including two new appointments of Associate Secretaries (a Japanese and a Chinese). The internationality of the secretariat, as Greene argued, could be attained not by alternating its locations between the Orient and Occident as Curtis suggested, but by recruiting people of diverse backgrounds at the secretariat. Greene thought that a real rather than a token addition of Orientals was necessary for the ISIPR. He argued that this addition would secure substantial contributions from these countries for the administration of the ISIPR.

Up to this time, [the staff at the ISIPR] has been wholly Anglo Saxon, and with the exception of Condliffe, wholly American. At best we have a heavy handicap of racial bias to overcome in the history of the inception of the Institute, its American leadership ... and in its financial support. The only feasible way to lessen this bias is to add Japanese and Chinese secretaries and to make that addition as a real one, not mere "scenery". The men selected must be of such calibre as to make them a real factor in the work of the Secretariat and to inspire the confidence of the oriental members of the Institute.⁹

Against Curtis's idea of the General Secretary living out of a suitcase, Greene argued for the importance of having a strong headquarters: 'The integrity of the Secretariat as an international instrument is the sine qua non of its usefulness'. In order to strengthen this integrity and retain its international character, Greene proposed to allocate a quota of the budget of the ISIPR to each National Council.

Unlike Curtis who emphasized conferences and a quasi-diplomatic function for the IPR, Greene felt strongly that the research on the 'Far East', which had been neglected, was valuable for international relations, and that it should be the priority. While Curtis worried about the dominance of American resources and control over the research program, Greene refuted the point. Like Carter, Greene argued that the funds of foundations such as the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial¹⁰ and the Social Science Research Council

⁹ Greene to Curtis, 3 January, 1929, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU.

¹⁰ As noted in Chapter Two, note 18, Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial became the Rockefeller Foundation in 1929, and the thesis is using the term the Rockefeller

(New York) were international because their purpose was to 'promote the well-being of mankind throughout the world'.¹¹ The Rockefeller Foundation recognized the IPR as:

an *international body* of a character and competence which make it an appropriate agency for undertaking research on certain important topics within the Pacific area.¹² (emphasis added)

Therefore, Greene concluded: 'it makes comparatively little difference where the money comes from'.¹³ For him the important thing was not to have each nation proportionally contributing to the research budget, but to have an efficient and competent Research Committee to supervise unprejudiced objectivity with useful results.

In contrast, Curtis's idea of 'internationality' was based on a strong sense of the nation-state. 'International' research had to be based on *national* institutions with funds coming from within the nation. In a letter to the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in 1925, Curtis stated:

My belief ... is that independent enquiry would lead your trustees to our own view that efforts to eradicate the causes of war will accomplish little unless they are based on continuous study conducted through research institutions which must be *national in character*, but with international relations with like institutions My own conviction is that if such institutes are really to be national, the bulk of their funds must also be *national*.¹⁴ (emphasis added)

Even the Carnegie Foundation money, as Curtis continued, would 'undermine the national character' of the RIIA. In his mind, each national unit should carry out independent research, and cooperate with others in other countries, rather than one international research institution having national branches as its sub-structure. This idea of *national* institutions for *national* research was based on his strong sense of

Foundation both for the Rockefeller Foundation and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial unless otherwise specified.

¹¹ Greene to Curtis, 3 January, 1929, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Curtis to Babcock, 9 November, 1925, CPR Box 108/Curtis 2, BLCU.

national security, the thinking which probably reflected the mentality in the Foreign Office:

Citizens of all views from one country can speak together with a frankness which becomes impossible if that gathering [is] open to people of all views from a number of other countries. The discussions of a cosmopolitan gathering become unreal.¹⁵

Curtis's stance against the international research scheme, his insistence on putting research strictly in the domain of each National Council, and his opposition to any enlargement of the ISIPR, implied not only the abolition of the international research program at the IPR, but also the dismissal of the International Research Secretary, Condliffe. Curtis's plan, therefore, put the method and organization of international research schemes under scrutiny.

Research had been a major function of the IPR from the beginning, based on the philosophy that the 'facts' would contribute to the solution of problems in the Pacific. Condliffe was recruited from New Zealand to organize the international research programs. Condliffe was Professor of Economics at Canterbury University College at Christchurch, New Zealand. His activities at the first conference impressed many participants, and he led the organization of the IPR in New Zealand after the conference. Davis offered him the job of Research Secretary in late 1926. Without knowing the prospects and against friends' worries, he accepted the offer, and arrived in Honolulu in February 1927.¹⁶

Organizing a multinational research program from scratch was no small task. His first duty was to go to the USA to report to Wilbur, and consult with scholars in the USA who were interested in the Pacific. It was his first trip to the mainland USA, starting in California where Davis had contacts through the "Race Relations Survey". The trip then continued to Oregon, Washington, Chicago and New York.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ He was thirty-four year-old, then. J. B. Condliffe, *Reminiscences of the Institute of Pacific Relations* (Vancouver, B. C.: Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, 1981), p.8.

Condliffe's perspective coming from a small country in the Pacific, contributed to a relatively impartial position regarding the research program. He felt that most American Far East specialists at the first conference were pro-China and sceptical of Japan and Britain, so he wanted to find others with different perspectives.¹⁷ However, this position, probably coupled with his rather arrogant attitudes, due to his youth, enthusiasm and his casual manner, created tension between him and Carter, Secretary of the ACIPR.¹⁸ They did not get on.

Condliffe thought Carter ambitious, eager, self-sacrificing and seldom relaxed enough to try the obvious simple course.¹⁹ Although Condliffe's evaluation of Carter seems to have been coloured by their personal clash and later bitter experience, it seems pertinent to point to the manipulative element in Carter's use of letters. Rather than stating incidents or asking opinions, Carter seems to have had strong opinions framed beforehand and to have tried to convince the others of his own views.

The clash was also over the control of research funds. Control over research funds virtually meant control over the IPR itself. The documents at the Rockefeller Archives reveal the importance of research programs for the IPR grant applications. More than any other functions, the Foundation valued the IPR's original contribution to research and to the creation of 'mutual-understanding' in the Pacific area in the inter-war period.²⁰ Reliance on this major source for the IPR funding not only determined the nature of the IPR activities, but also gave the one who controlled the grant application the power to control the IPR.

Major figures at the ACIPR were involved with the foundations as trustees or officers. Jerome Greene was a trustee of the Rockefeller

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.13.

¹⁸ J. B. Condliffe gave an arrogant impression to Wilbur, Shotwell, and Curtis as well as Carter. Atherton to Davis, 16 August, 1927, E-13/5, AUH.

¹⁹ J. B. Condliffe, *Reminiscences*, p.12.

²⁰ The Foundation had been the major source of the IPR from 1925, and its support remained in the inter-war period. In 1931, the Foundation described the IPR as follows: 'The value of the work of the Institute and its importance both as a research organization and as an instrument for promoting international good will cannot be questioned'. [Resolution], 22 May, 1931, RFnA/1.1/200/350/4171, RA.

Foundation in 1913-1917, and again in 1928-39, and James Shotwell was involved with the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and the Social Science Research Council. They socialized often at alumni clubs or social clubs which were concentrated in a small area of Manhattan. Communications were easy by telephone, mail, personal visits, or meals at clubs. These formal and informal ties were important for successful applications, and the ACIPR made efforts to maintain cordial relations with officers of these foundations.

Although Condliffe suspected that Carter wanted to give American scholars to control the research programs, as a result of the meetings with officers at the Rockefeller Foundation, Condliffe gained control of the research grant.²¹ He was, however, very aware of the power of those who had access to funds.

The almost unconscious assumption of superiority by so many in the United States who had access to funds was to be a constant problem in organizing a truly effective research program.²²

Lack of control over funds, Condliffe argued, was the weakness of Davis.²³ This was true, but the role of fund-raising from the beginning was very much left to the ACIPR in New York, not to the ISIPR. Davis did not include fund-raising as one of main functions of the ISIPR in 1927.²⁴ Atherton, a loyal supporter of Davis, did not realize the implications of this omission, and proposed to leave the fund-raising to Carter and Greene, while Davis could concentrate on other issues such as conferences.²⁵ Therefore, it was not only Carter's push, but also the original setting of the Institute itself that made Davis's position vulnerable. The location of the ISIPR did not help. Being in New York was crucial for fund raising at the foundations.

²¹ J. B. Condliffe, *Reminiscences*, p.11.

²² *Ibid.*, p.15.

²³ *Ibid.*, p.39.

²⁴ J. M. Davis, 'Foreword,' in J. B. Condliffe ed., *Problems of the Pacific, 1927*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), p.vi.

²⁵ Atherton to Davis, 5 October, 1927, E-13/6, AUH.

In Condliffe's organization of the international research program, American dominance was not evident in terms of agents, methods or agenda. Condliffe promoted the initiative of Japanese and Chinese members in research projects and data papers for the conference in 1929, and he did so in a consultative manner rather than imposing his ideas to them.

The organization of research projects and data papers in Japan was carried out through the Japanese Council of the IPR (JCIPR) in Tokyo. It was relatively easy because of its centralized nature. Almost all academics on the research committee were from Tokyo Imperial University. Condliffe found the prestige of the IPR high in Japan mainly because of the prominence of the people involved, and also the respect earned by Davis and Greene. He was lodged in the Imperial Hotel and invited to various functions.

His strategy of the research program was influenced by his experience in Japan. He recorded: 'I was also being educated in the values of Japanese society', and realized that he had to be sensitive to the delicate relationship between Japan and China.

Almost anxious in their courteous hospitality, sensitive and yet eager to display the beauty of land and the simplicity of their customs, they let it be known these graces were the mark of an old and tough civilization ... I grew not only to respect the Japanese character but to be a little afraid of what might come if it were not be understood abroad.²⁶

Not only JCIPR members, but also members of the Chinese Council influenced the research projects as well as the agenda of the conference in 1929. The members of the JCIPR told Condliffe that Manchuria should not be a topic at the next conference in Kyoto, and Condliffe should convey this message to Chinese counterparts. Against the wish of Japanese scholars, however, the Chinese thought that the only worthwhile subject at the Kyoto conference was Manchuria, and that it should be well-researched.

²⁶ J. B. Condliffe, *Reminiscences*, pp.19-20.

While being sensitive to the JCIPR and ruling out research on Korea because of the concerns of the JCIPR, Condliffe did not follow the requests of the JCIPR blindly. After coming back to Shanghai, Condliffe met Matsuoka Yōsuke, General Manager of the South Manchurian Railway, in Dairen in Manchuria, and told him that the Chinese group would prepare papers on political, legal and economic aspects of Manchuria for the coming IPR conference. Matsuoka responded positively that 'he could handle them'. Back in Japan, Condliffe sensed a much more negative reaction by JCIPR members, but the Chairman of the JCIPR, Inoue Junnosuke (1869-1932), took a similar confident attitude to Matsuoka. Condliffe recorded that:

Inoue listened to my report quietly and to the mingled relief and dismay of the professors decided to accept the challenge, but he asked me to work with the Japanese committee on a research program to outdo the Chinese. This I did and at the same time prepared a long report on my whole trip for Merle Davis.²⁷

This decision of the JCIPR to take on the Manchurian issue at the IPR conference reinforced the cooperation between the Japanese government and the JCIPR. From then, scholars such as Rōyama Masamichi (1895-1965), worked on the study on Manchuria with government cooperation. This study group became the core of the younger generation of the JCIPR. On the other hand, it was a brave decision of Inoue to agree to the proposal. Inoue, then General Director of the Bank of Japan, became Minister of Finance just before the Kyoto conference. To clarify the 'unofficial' status of the JCIPR, he resigned from the chairmanship of the JCIPR at the same time. He was assassinated in 1932, and with him, the JCIPR lost a figure, strong and influential enough to criticize governmental policies.

Condliffe's organization of research projects and data papers can be criticized. The research was heavily focused on Japan and China, and probably due to his background, economic topics prevailed. He provided, however, initiative and independence for Japanese and Chinese scholars.

²⁷ *ibid.*, pp.32-33.

As a result of his trip to Japan and China, various works were produced by Japanese and Chinese as well as American and British scholars. These works included Nasu Shiroshi's work on land use, Inoue Junnosuke's work on economy and finance in Japan,²⁸ and John Lossing Buck's *Chinese Farm Economy* (1930), and *Land Utilization in China* (1937). One of the major goals of the program was to initiate research on Japan and China. Condliffe did not claim exclusive credit for the research products, and often launched research projects in cooperation with other institutions. Various research works were initially promoted by a grant from the IPR allocated by Condliffe, and carried out in cooperation with various institutions.

Collaboration with other local institutions was particularly important in China. In contrast to the centralized JCIPR, the groups of the Chinese Council of the IPR were geographically far apart. They were mainly under the control of the YMCA, and many of the members were educated abroad. Through these YMCA contacts, Condliffe travelled extensively and organized research projects both by foreign-educated Chinese academics and foreign researchers resident in China. He, for example, travelled to Tientsin, and allocated some research funds to Nan'kai University, where young Chinese economists were engaged in primary studies on prices and industrialization.²⁹

Condliffe's approach showed that even if projects were funded by American money, this did not necessarily mean American dominance of their content. Condliffe proved, therefore, that Curtis's criticism of American domination and undermining the internationality of projects was not really valid.

Without knowing much about Condliffe's efforts in late 1927 and early 1928 in Japan and China, Curtis insisted on making all the research schemes the property of National Councils, and abolishing the international program, and therefore the Research Secretary at the ISIPR.

²⁸ This work is H. G. Moulton, *Japan: An Economic and Financial Appraisal* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1931).

²⁹ These economists were Franklin Ho, Li Choh-ming and H. D. Fong.

Curtis pursued this plan, backed by the RIIA, at the Kyoto Conference in late 1929. As Condliffe recorded: 'A few weeks before the conference, the RIIA submitted a proposal to reduce the [ISIPR] in view of the deficit (then about \$170,000) by eliminating practically all the staff, including the Research Secretary'.³⁰ Combined with the stock market crash in New York soon after the conference started, which made the raising of funds for the increased staff impossible, this plan caused the resignation of Davis.

2) The Resignation of Davis

Curtis's criticism of Davis, the ISIPR, and the IPR in general was based on his vision of an ideal 'international' organization. By 'international' Curtis also meant world class. He wanted the IPR to be a 'world-class' organization, and wanted 'world-class' men to head the IPR. For Curtis, world-class meant possessing a high reputation across the world, which was a euphemism for Europe. He expressed his discontent with the ISIPR first on the ship from Honolulu to San Francisco after the second conference. On board were Greene, Carter, Atherton and Wilbur. Atherton was upset by Curtis's insult to his close colleague, Davis. He later wrote to Davis:

[Curtis] takes IPR seriously What Curtis wants [is] a superman. We will look a long time before we find any such man You don't need to be disturbed.³¹

Davis contemplated resignation, but, encouraged by the words of Atherton and Wilbur, he decided to stay on for the next two years.³² After meeting people at the League in Geneva, Atherton was convinced that Curtis's judgement was often unsound. He felt strongly against Curtis's push to turn the Institute into a quasi-diplomatic body.

I do not think it would be right for us to allow the English influence, ... as some of the delegates clearly state they are

³⁰ J. B. Condliffe, *Reminiscences*, p.37.

³¹ Atherton to Davis, 9 August, 1927, E-13/4, AUH.

³² Davis to Atherton, 16 September, 1927, E-13/5, AUH.

primarily interested in the political aspect of the Institute I feel that much of the strength of the Institute is due to the fact that we have not emphasized the political side of many of our Pacific problems As I view the Institute from this distance [in Geneva], I feel personally more convinced that we have proceeded in the right way, and that because of the attitude and spirit shown by the secretariat ... we have won the respect and confidence of the various national groups I should be very loath to see any change along the lines that Mr Curtis recommends.³³

The criticism made Davis more conscious than ever of the implications of the IPR experiment. He realized:

perhaps for the first time, the wider out-reach and political implication and influence which the Institute possesses The Institute is proving to be a bigger enterprise with larger possibilities and influence than any of us probably realized at first.

A gathering of people of good will with a regional scope was being made into a serious political debating machine with a global scope. For this Davis was little prepared. However, like Atherton, Davis felt the need to maintain the original regional dynamism.

[I]t would not be the part of wisdom for us, at this early stage, to give up the point of view and philosophy of international relations that are really responsible for making the Institute the success it has become.³⁴

Until early 1929, Davis did not know about Curtis's plan and his correspondence with the ACIPR. From late 1927 to early 1929, he worked enthusiastically, pursuing what he thought right to do as General Secretary. He sailed to the USA, worked on promotion and organization of branches, published the proceedings through Chicago University Press, and worked on raising funding in New York. Then he crossed the Atlantic and visited Europe, mainly Geneva and London. In London, Curtis and the RIIA entertained him and his wife. Curtis told Carter that his impression of Davis improved a lot, but that Davis was still inadequate as General Secretary.³⁵

³³ Atherton to Davis, 5 October, 1927, E-13/6, AUH.

³⁴ Davis to Atherton, 24 October, 1927, E-13/6, AUH.

³⁵ Curtis to Carter, 23 January, 1928, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 2, BLCU.

Davis resented the fact that the proceedings of re-organization entirely ignored him as General Secretary. He did not think Curtis understood the philosophy of the IPR. He thought that Curtis was to re-organize the IPR completely, its conference techniques, research, information exchanges, publicity and emphasis. 'He was out to build a new kind of organization'.³⁶

Davis followed his idea of 'internationalization' of the ISIPR by recruiting two Associate Secretaries from Japan and China. The negotiation involved much energy and delicate care. Terminology was important to recruit a person of substance. Davis first used the term, Deputy Secretary, but this was replaced by Associate Secretary because he learned that in Chinese 'Deputy' meant inferior.³⁷ It was not an easy task. In Japan, the selection involved the JCIPR and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Finally an ex-ambassador, Yamasaki Keiichi, was selected. Davis worried about the official pressure behind the selection, but this suspicion was denied by the JCIPR.³⁸ Already before the Kyoto Conference, these associate secretaries had started work at the ISIPR.

The move to internationalize the ISIPR was supported by Greene and Wilbur.³⁹ Greene in particular felt that this recruitment was very important, and promised to raise the funds. He was then still hopeful, although he was also aware that the task was formidable. Carter did not oppose Davis's plan, either. Greene and Carter were determined to raise the funds required to employ the additional staff at the ISIPR, but did not predict the stock market crash.

The third conference opened in Kyoto on 23 October 1929. It was the most discussed issue on the Pacific Coast in the USA in the summer as John Tilley, British Ambassador to Japan, recorded when he attended a few

³⁶ Davis to Wilbur, 15 February, 1929, A-1/PC 1929, AUH.

³⁷ Davis to Loomis, 18 August, 1928, E-13/9, AUH.

³⁸ Saitō to Davis, 15 April, 1929, E-13/15, AUH.

³⁹ Davis to Atherton, 12 March, 1928, E-13/6, 12 October, 1928, E-13/11, and 17 October, 1928, E-13/11, AUH.

meetings in California.⁴⁰ Despite the anti-publicity policy of the IPR, newspapers in Japan, the USA and even Australia reported the details of the conference in favourable tones. Almost a week after the opening of this conference, however, on 29 October, the New York stock market crashed, and blew away all hopes for raising funds for new appointments. Having already recruited two associate secretaries from Japan and China, Davis lost face. He had to dismiss those in whose appointment he invested much energy.⁴¹ Humiliated, frustrated and feeling powerless, Davis submitted his resignation to the Pacific Council. On a motion by Curtis, seconded by Greene, it was voted that Davis would hold office until his successor be appointed, and that Greene and three others (one American and two Canadians) be appointed as a committee to seek candidates for the post of General Secretary.⁴²

3) Reaction and Meaning: Loss of the "Pacific Sense"

Davis's resignation symbolized the future direction of the IPR. The resignation was caused by the elements inherent in the original setting, but aggravated and strengthened not only by key figures at the IPR, but also by the events of the day. The IPR was now defined as a organization of foreign affairs experts. In the process, it became clear that the hope and possibility of the Pacific-centred perspective, and of establishing new attitudes towards the Orient, were lost. This sense of a loss of the original perspective and dynamism was recorded in the documents.

Just before his departure to take up a position at the League of Nations in Geneva in July 1930, Davis wrote to Greene, giving the reasons for his resignation. He listed three reasons: the change of the emphasis from cultural and economic topics to political ones, the lack of support from the Pacific Council, and the lack of the control over finances. Davis thought the original objectives of the IPR were in danger of failure.

⁴⁰ Tilley to Cushendun, 18 October, 1928, A981; Org 93, AA.

⁴¹ Davis to Greene, 18 July, 1930, E-17/6, AUH.

⁴² Minutes of Pacific Council, 7 November, 1929, A-1/PC 1929, AUH.

It may profitably be borne in mind that the cornerstone of this whole enterprise consists of neither speed nor technique nor money, ... but of mutual confidence and respect, and that these have been the most elusive of all the values which East and West have been building together in their contacts during the last hundred years.⁴³

Davis felt that these problems were brought in from outside the Pacific, implying British influence, and hoped that the IPR would not become 'an Atlantic Institute of Pacific Relations'.

Men of the Pacific area formed this Institute to put into practice their ideals and to solve their peculiar problems ... [I]f the Councils of the institute are dominated by the point of view of the old order they cannot succeed in meeting the needs of the new community of the Pacific.⁴⁴

Davis's view was shared by Eggleston, who wrote to Greene that there was a danger in shifting emphasis from culture to politics, and of control from New York.⁴⁵ Greene and Curtis dismissed the claim of Davis and Eggleston. For Greene, the shift from culture to politics was not deliberate nor avoidable.

[T]hey were both as wrong as they can be. Matters of political controversy endangering international relations are subjects for study and discussion par excellence. The whole point is that we are supposed to approach these subjects in a mood of scientific inquiry.⁴⁶

Curtis agreed:

What a silly letter [of Davis's] that was ... We British were not at the conference at Honolulu if the conference was meant to confine itself to cultural relations ...⁴⁷

⁴³ Davis to Greene, 18 July, 1930, E-17/6, AUH.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Eggleston to Greene, 18 September, 1930, MS 423/14, NLA.

⁴⁶ Greene to Curtis, 21 August, 1930, MS Curtis 3, BL.

⁴⁷ Curtis to Greene, 20 September, 1930, MS Curtis 3, BL.

In the initial organization process, Davis had reduced the influence of the YMCA and tried to present the IPR as something similar to the Institute of Politics at Williamstown. Although following the dominant opinion of that time, he was often unsure whether he was going in the right direction. Davis's vision of the IPR remained based on good-will and brotherhood, which was increasingly in conflict with the views that the IPR should become a more 'professional' organization of foreign affairs experts.

Davis's main weakness was his lack of control over funds. Carter's application for the grant from the Rockefeller Foundation was clearer in points which were significant for the foundation.⁴⁸ Davis's idea of financing the IPR was also problematic. He relied entirely on the wealthy. Greene was finding this method more and more limited.

It is proving to be extraordinarily difficult to paint the picture of the institute to the rich man in the [Wall] Street in such a way as to win anything better than his indulgent approval of what he regards as a well meant but somewhat visionary enterprise.⁴⁹

Despite these faults, Davis embodied the original dynamism of the Pacific-centred community in which the Oriental powers would have equal standing. Davis was not alone in this thinking. Eggleston also feared the loss of the regional sense which Davis embodied.

We go further to say that delegates from regions which do not border on the Pacific, should be particularly careful to understand the point of view of those who do. They may possess interests, but not understand. I have always ... [been] keen on preserving the character of the Institute ... well defined by Mr Davis.⁵⁰

Not only the regional sense, but the experimentation with new attitudes to the Orient was felt to be failing. As Ian Allen, a New Zealander, wrote:

⁴⁸ The style of Davis's application tended to be more descriptive, while that of Carter was more business like and more relevant to the requirements of the foundation. Compare, for example, Davis to Cuthwaite, 2 December, 1925, and Carter to Ruml, 11 June, 1926, LSRM/54/582/IPR 1925-1926, RA.

⁴⁹ Greene to Fosdick, 7 August, 1929, LSRM/54/582/IPR 1929, RA.

⁵⁰ Eggleston to Greene, 18 September, 1930, MS 423/14, NLA.

Is there any possible development by American and British members which would be likely to create feeling between East and West? Should this be so, I feel the main principle of the institute would be jeopardized.⁵¹

Allen thought one of the reasons for Davis's resignation was Davis's sympathy with the Japanese and Chinese which may not have been appreciated by some groups, such as the British. Like Allen, Eggleston worried about the danger of the emergence of undesirable blocs at the IPR.

[T]he Australian groups would deprecate any political or national grouping of the members such as British bloc or Anglo-Saxon bloc.⁵²

These observations show that the experiment of establishing the new discourse with the Orient was making progress at the conferences, but that it was impeded by the series of incidents which culminated in Davis's resignation. In the following years, the direction of the IPR was to become, not region-wide, but a more world-wide organization, which meant more European involvement. A few regional plans were submitted to the conferences against this direction, but never captured major support or even interest.

Eggleston enthusiastically proposed a regional disarmament plan at the Kyoto conference. He argued that it was easier to achieve disarmament in the Pacific because of its spaciousness and because there was less imperial competition here than in Europe. But he failed to attract much support.

This tendency to a regional consideration of Pacific problems was resisted by certain sections of the conference [in 1929]. The representatives from Great Britain in particular were very much afraid of it, and put their weight against any regional consideration, or regional conference. They operate in the Pacific ... but it is too far from the Far East to have any appreciable effect on the situation.⁵³

⁵¹ Allen to Greene, 10 April, 1930, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU.

⁵² Eggleston to Greene, 18 September, 1930, MS 423/14, NLA.

⁵³ F. Eggleston, 'Australia and the Pacific,' *The [Melbourne] Herald*, 30 December, 1929.

The lack of attention to or enthusiasm for his regional plan was not only due to the resistance of British participants. He pointed out that there had been no major debate on regional arrangements at the conference because of 'the disinclination of both British and American representatives'.⁵⁴ British reluctance can be explained easily. As Chapter Three, Section Two showed, seeing the Pacific as an independent entity was thought dangerous by the British and Australian governments because it implied the challenge to its imperial order. Probably, American reluctance was not so much because of the 'regional' aspect of the proposal, as because of the 'multilateral' nature of collective security. The IPR, born of regional dynamism, failed to achieve any kind of regional arrangement, or even to discuss seriously any regional proposals.

Probably only small powers in the Pacific, such as Australia, saw the Pacific from this regional perspective as opposed to a 'global' perspective. Such a regional perspective implied a certain challenge to the wider framework, and the perception and the institution which had been constructed by the great world power. Davis was well aware of the role of small regional powers at the IPR.

I hope that the Australian Branch of the IPR will continue to stand for the importance of Pacific leadership in the Enterprise Your group with NZ, held the balance of power in the Pacific Council on the important matters of policy.⁵⁵

In contrast to these reactions, Japanese members did not see profound implications in Davis's resignation. Japanese members did not take this incident as a major change in the nature or direction of the IPR. No letter from the JCIPR to either the ISIPR, the Pacific Council, or the ACIPR exists in the archives in regards to this incident. They did not perceive the failure of new attitudes to the Orient or the loss of the Pacific-centred perspective.

The JCIPR's perception of the IPR's role differed from those of the Europeans, Americans and Australians. The IPR was certainly seen as

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Davis to Eggleston, 30 July, 1930, MS 423/14, NLA.

having elements of a new regional experiment, but much stronger expectations lay in its publicist function as an informal means to achieve pro-Japanese attitudes in the major countries of the Pacific. The priority of the JCIPR was to cultivate new attitudes, not to the Orient in general, but to Japan. Even after they realized that nothing could be done to repeal the American immigration act of 1924, the IPR was still a useful stage on which to publicize the image of a liberal Japan. Davis's resignation and the subsequent direction of the IPR made little impression in JCIPR circles.

Eggleston, Davis, Allen and Atherton were Orientalists in a sense that they did not question the East vs West dichotomy, which was the dominant intellectual paradigm of the period. In many ways, they were more conscious of the difference of culture, and re-enforced this dichotomy strongly. This strong sense of 'difference' made some, such as Eggleston, respect the 'East'. Importantly, their Orientalist discourse was *not for domination*. Their attitudes were at times paternalistic, but hardly condescending or contemptuous. At another level, however, the same attitudes of 'difference' contributed to the defence of anti-Asian immigration policies of their countries.

Their dealings at IPR conferences demonstrate that Orientalist discourse was more complex than a simple imposition of views by a strong 'West' on a weak 'East'. By only focusing on this discourse's stereotypes and prejudices, which were constructed by power relationships at a given historical moment, the complexity of the discourse is lost. Actual discourse was never one-sided nor static, and was as diverse as were its operators. An attitude of accommodating difference without making judgement or being condescending existed in the first few IPR conferences, and this relativist approach was only possible when there was no strong sense of centre. This was soon to be lost when a stronger sense of centre appeared.

Eggleston summarized his position on the Orient and its implication in the Pacific:

Something is needed which gives Pacific nations the feeling that they are meeting and discussing their own problems and deciding them free from the *dominance of Western ideas and interests*. I know that I will be met by the parrot cry that these problems are world problems, and they cannot be settled on a regional basis. I will admit that they are world problems, but I will confidently predict that they will never be settled unless a regional approach is made to them. There is certainly a phase of centralization of all world problems. But every tendency to centralization must be balanced by decentralization.⁵⁶ (emphasis added)

While the majority at IPR conferences felt it important to fit the regional arrangement into the League of Nations order, the relations between the regional organization and the world organization were never clearly articulated at IPR conferences. The wider framework of the world system *did not exist 'out there'* as concrete institutions. The main concerns of the League were on European matters, and it was inadequate in dealing with issues arising in the Pacific. While asserting the particularity of the region in cultural, racial, economic and strategic terms, participants were torn between a hope of finding universal elements of the international community and the need to establish specific codes and institutions which were relatively independent from the League system. This problem of the relationship between 'region' and the international order became clearer after Japanese intervention in North China in 1931, an issue to be discussed in the final chapter.

4) Greene's Administration 1930-1932

i) Greene's Administration

After Davis announced his resignation in November 1929, actual administration fell to Greene. Davis's secretaryship continued in principle until November 1930, and Charles Loomis, who had been Associate General Secretary, became Acting General Secretary. But Greene, as Chairman of the Pacific Council, conducted major policy issues of the IPR: consulting with National Councils on future plans; taking

⁵⁶ F. Eggleston, 'Australia and the Pacific,' 30 December, 1929.

initiatives in selecting the successor of Davis; and organizing the fourth conference in China in 1931. Until he took up the Woodrow Wilson chair of International Relations at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, in September 1932, through Curtis's connection,⁵⁷ he conducted IPR matters mainly from his office of Lee and Higginson in Manhattan. He was a partner of this investment bank, which suffered substantially from the stock market crash of 1929. Greene, therefore, juggled two demanding jobs probably with little money from the IPR.

Greene's administration of 1929-1932 was transitional. The ISIPR and IPR conferences certainly lost their original enthusiasm for the region and the Orient, but they retained some legacies. The journal of the IPR, *Pacific Affairs*,⁵⁸ was still edited at the Honolulu office and did not lose the input of views from the 'East'. The researches in China and Japan initiated by Condliffe began to materialize, and Chinese and Japanese scholars kept up their contributions. Charles Loomis, as Acting General Secretary and conference secretary, spent much time in China organizing the fourth conference, which was first planned in Hangchow, but due to the political consideration, eventually was held in Shanghai. In these respects, the lines set in 1925 were still followed.

However, Greene also initiated changes. His approach was not autocratic, but involved consultation with the members of the Pacific Council in each country. None of these changes actually followed the lines of Curtis's reorganization plan. Condliffe's claim that Carter influenced the decision-making of the IPR greatly in this period is not evident in the documents.⁵⁹ Greene had his own convictions. He believed that contemporary urgent issues should be discussed at the next conference in China, despite the criticism of Eggleston and Davis that the IPR was becoming 'too political'. Greene's faith in the IPR activities and internationalism was strong, and

⁵⁷ Greene recorded how Curtis got Greene for the position in 1932. Greene to Curtis, 4 February, 1950, MS Curtis 60, BL.

⁵⁸ The previous journal of the IPR was monthly [IPR] *News Bulletin*, which started prior to the second conference in 1927. This was renamed *Pacific Affairs* in May 1928.

⁵⁹ J. B. Condliffe, *Reminiscences*, p.41.

he had supporters at the Rockefeller Foundation.⁶⁰ He poured much energy and money (an annual contribution of US \$ 5,000) into the IPR and the fourth conference, and the extent of his commitment and leadership was widely acknowledged.⁶¹ Charles Loomis, at the ISIPR in Honolulu, provided support in the practical arrangements of coordination and the conference.

Greene tackled two major issues: the conference and the financial problem. First, he wrote to members of the Pacific Council to ask their opinions on the last conference at Kyoto, for preparation of the fourth conference, and about the timing of the conference.⁶² The conference was prepared in this consultative manner throughout. A meeting of the Program Committee at New York on 29–30 November, 1930, was attended by representatives from Canada, China, Britain, Japan and Australia and the USA,⁶³ and the report was sent to the members of the Pacific Council or secretaries of National Councils.⁶⁴

Greene initiated changes in finance, as the ISIPR had a big deficit. The first target was the IPR journal *Pacific Affairs*. The journal evolved from a newsletter to its 1930 style in mid-1927, and subscriptions increased from 1,200 in 1927 to 2,000 in 1929. In 1930, the subscription fee was two US dollars, and publication costs did not justify its monthly style. Greene asked the members of the Pacific Council whether *Pacific Affairs* should be quarterly until they resolved financial problems.⁶⁵

Greene followed his own ideas in dividing the budget into two categories: one for research, and the other for administration of the ISIPR in

⁶⁰ Greene noted: '[T]he thing we are trying to accomplish is so vastly worth accomplishing that any money given to us from whatever source will be amply justified as a contribution to world peace'. Greene to Fosdick, 7 August, 1929. Fosdick agreed with Greene, Fosdick to Day, 10 August, 1929, LSRM/54/584/IPR 1929, RA.

⁶¹ Carter to Eggleston, 10 February, 1931, CPR, Box 110/Eggleston, BLCU, and Saitō Makoto et al eds., *Amerika seishin o motomete: Takagi Yasaka no shōgai* (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1985), p.68.

⁶² Greene to Eggleston, 30 January, 1930, MS 423/14, NLA.

⁶³ They included Carter, Shotwell, Howland, Loomis, Greene and Condliffe (New Zealander).

⁶⁴ Loomis to Eggleston, 6 December, 1930, MS 423/14, NLA.

⁶⁵ Greene to the members of the Pacific Council, 3 April, 1930 MS 423/14, NLA.

Honolulu. The research section was rather well-off due to the grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. The problem was the administration budget. Greene had already showed disapproval of the Honolulu office's method of using research funds to cover deficits in administration. He thought the cost should be covered by contributions from National Councils, and in this way the 'international' character of the IPR headquarters would be maintained.

The contributions, other than those from American sources, however, remained at a very low level as a proportion of the administrative costs. In 1929, against the American contribution (US\$ 55,275 from the mainland and US\$ 13,200 from Hawaii), the pledged quota for each country was US\$ 5,000 for Canada, US\$ 20,000 for Japan, £ 1,000 (US\$ 5,000) for Britain, £ 250 (US\$ 1,250) for Australia, and £ 100 (US\$ 500) for New Zealand.⁶⁶ The quota for Japan was big due to the cost of the conference in the year, but other quotas were extremely small. In 1932, the contribution from the USA was US\$ 27,525 (\$ 22,000 from the mainland and \$ 5,525 from Hawaii), and others were \$ 4,778 from Canada, \$ 3,550 from Britain, \$ 2,500 from Japan, \$ 1202 from China, \$ 500 from the Philippines, and \$ 42 from New Zealand.⁶⁷ Except for the doubled Chinese contribution in 1933, non-American contributions did not increase much. Later the situation got worse, and attempts to raise quotas from these countries failed.

Atherton, as Treasurer of the ISIPR and the Pacific Council, had to borrow from a bank in Honolulu US\$ 50,000 annually in 1929-1931 on his own account. It was the time of the depression. In reply to Atherton's claim, Eggleston had to explain Australian economic conditions and point out the difficulty of paying its quota of 1% of the entire budget. As the contributions from National Councils did not increase after a few years, Atherton started to wonder why they were so low, especially compared to that from Hawaii on its own, and he questioned whether it reflected the

⁶⁶ The method of how these amounts were decided is not known, but correspondence suggests that members of National Councils expressed the most likely amount of money they could expect from their councils, and the Pacific Council decided according to these suggestions.

⁶⁷ Appendix VI, in B. Lasker and W. Holland eds., *Problems of the Pacific*, 1933 (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), p.478.

appreciation and evaluation of the IPR activities.⁶⁸ By January 1931, before the fourth conference, the deficit had become US\$ 10,750.⁶⁹

In order to overcome this problem, four approaches were possible: to further cut staff at the ISIPR: to raise more funds in the USA: to ask National Councils to increase their contributions by increasing donations, by membership or by increasing membership fees and subscription fees. Greene did not pursue these alternatives, except for consulting members of the Pacific Council about possible changes to the journal, and the actual schemes for reconstruction were carried in Carter's period.

The only incident related to the reconstruction of the IPR in Greene's period was the resignation of the Research Secretary of the International Research Program, John Condliffe. This was a result of Condliffe's seeking a safer position, rather than Greene's instructions to cut staff. In his memoirs, Condliffe recorded that he felt his position was threatened by the Curtis's re-organization plan presented at the third conference. After the conference, in his travels to organize research programs in Europe and the USSR, he was invited to write the first World Economic Surveys for the League of Nations in the manner of Arnold Toynbee's annual *Survey of International Affairs*. Condliffe's mind was already made up then. Rather than fight for his position at the ISIPR, he decided to accept the position.⁷⁰ He made a transitional one year arrangement with the University of Michigan, spending one third of his time on IPR work.⁷¹ Greene regretted this decision, but he had to admit that the IPR did not have resources to keep Condliffe.⁷² Atherton, as much as Greene, also felt that there was no security as the Research Secretary's salary.⁷³ A year later, Condliffe and his family left Honolulu for Geneva.

The research programs of the IPR did not change immediately after Condliffe's departure. He was strongly against American domination of

⁶⁸ Atherton to Carter, 12 January, 1931, E-1b/33, and 4 December, 1935, E-2/20, AUH.

⁶⁹ Atherton to Eggleston, 14 January, 1931, MS 423/14, NLA.

⁷⁰ J. B. Condliffe, *Reminiscences*, p.47.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.43.

⁷² Greene to the members of the Pacific Council, 3 April, 1930, MS 423/14, NLA.

⁷³ Atherton to Eggleston, 31 January, 1931, MS 423/14, NLA.

the research programs, which, he thought, was Carter's intention. This stance of anti-American dominance did not vanish immediately. Programs initiated by him had a long-term scope, and were carried on independently by local researchers in China, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA. A new research assistant to Condliffe, William Holland, followed the agenda set by Condliffe without major changes. Holland was only twenty-one years old when he joined the ISIPR in 1928. Inspired by John Mott at Canterbury University College, Holland was interested in Asia and an enthusiastic member of the YMCA international student movement. He was one of the students of economics whom Condliffe taught at the college. Condliffe offered him an assistant's job at US\$ 35 a week, because he wanted someone with university training but with a wage of an ordinary secretary. Holland jumped at the job, and borrowed the money to pay for the steamer to go to Honolulu.⁷⁴ Holland states that Condliffe's opposition to American domination and promotion of initiatives by Asian scholars 'made deep impression on him ... and certainly influenced his own attitudes and actions after he himself became Research Secretary (1933-1943)'.⁷⁵

To summarize, Greene did not venture drastic changes, but carried the IPR in the direction he believed right. He tried to follow the two-budget policy for administration and research, sought to cut expenses on *Pacific Affairs*, put urgent political issues such as Manchuria on the agenda of the fourth conference, and pursued these objectives through consultation. Since he did not touch on the issue of staff and the location of the ISIPR, his vision for post-Davis organization is hard to discern. One issue, however, indicates the kind of organization Greene and other key figures had in mind: the list of candidates for the succeeding General Secretary of the IPR.

ii) The Hunt for a General Secretary

⁷⁴ P. Hooper ed., *Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations: The Memoirs of William Holland* (Ryūkei shosha, forthcoming in 1995), Part One, pp.1-2.

⁷⁵ W. Holland, 'Preface' in J. B. Condliffe, *Reminiscences*, pp.i-ii.

Candidates' names show the thinking of key figures of the IPR on the type of person suitable to head the IPR, and the type of organization they would lead. They were after a type similar to the Secretary General of the League of Nations. The lists of names appeared in correspondence in 1930–1933, until Carter was appointed at Banff in August 1933. They included names of ardent League supporters with established careers in Britain, Canada and the USA: Frederick Whyte (British former president of the National Indian Legislative Assembly), Arthur Salter, (British officer at the League, Director of the Economic and Finance Section, in 1919–1920 and 1922–1931), Dwight Morrow (American banker and diplomat), Henry Hodgkin (British educator with missionary experience in China), Vincent Massey (Canadian diplomat), Alanzo Tayler (American academic specializing in food and population at Stanford University), Robert Borden (Prime Minister of Canada in 1911–1920, and Chancellor of Queen's University in 1924–1930), Owen Lattimore (American business traveller and writer) and Jerome Greene. Although Greene looked for another career after the re-organization of his investment bank, he did not consider the post at the IPR. Instead, he took up an academic position in Wales. Carter's name only appeared in April 1933.

Female candidates were never suggested despite the active and enthusiastic support for the IPR activities of women's organizations in each country. As is clear in this list, expert knowledge on and experience in countries in Asia and the Pacific islands were considered, but was not thought essential.⁷⁶ Prestige and calibre were given greater weight. Also the type who could conduct good relations with governments was valued.⁷⁷

It is worth pointing out that, except for Maeda Tamon, there was no serious consideration of candidates from Japan, China, or even Hawaii, Australia or New Zealand. The names mentioned in the list were on the Atlantic side of Canada, the USA or Britain with a few exceptions such as Taylor at Stanford. This of course reflected the context of international

⁷⁶ Carter to Rockefeller 3rd, 1 September, 1932, RFmA/III-2-Q/9/62, RA.

⁷⁷ Greene to Curtis, 15 March, 1932, MS Curia 6, 7L.

politics at the time. Japan and China were in conflict, and Hawaii, Australia and New Zealand were seen as too far away by key figures such as Greene and Curtis. This loss of Pacific focus in the selection proceedings was only symbolic, but certainly reflected the thinking of key figures on the nature and direction of the IPR.

The selection proceedings were secretive and only known to a very few in London and New York. Most members of the ISIPR and National Councils were not informed. This was also true even for members of the Pacific Council. As a member of the Pacific Council, Eggleston thought that the election would take place among the members of the Pacific Council in mid 1930. He wrote to an old friend, Herbert Brooks, Australian Commissioner-General to the USA,⁷⁸ in case such an occasion should come up. He explained that the successful candidate should have expert knowledge of international affairs, organizing ability, and the capacity to appeal to the public. Selection, or even nomination, however, was not easy.

The secretiveness and difficulty of proceedings had reasons. First, negotiations for the appointment were very delicate because most of the candidates had well-established careers and current appointments, and did not want to make the negotiations public. The interviews had to be handled in a secretive and informal manner, especially in the beginning. Second, not only did key figures in the IPR find it difficult to nominate a suitable person, but also many approached had commitments, or were reluctant to take up the position. By mid-1930, when Eggleston expected an election meeting in New York, the selection committee was not yet able to line up candidates.

Why were those approached reluctant to become head of the IPR? The only suggestion in the documents is financial. Persons who were approached were already established and highly-paid. Eggleston thought

⁷⁸ Brooks was Commissioner-General to the USA and stationed in New York from 1929. His mission was to promote Australian musical, artistic, literary and economic achievements.

that a suitable man would not be obtained without an adequate salary.⁷⁹ Greene estimated that a candidate such as Arthur Salter would be impossible to get without a salary of US\$ 15,000 to 20,000.⁸⁰ Furthermore the substantial deficit of the IPR would have been a great concern to any candidate.

But was it only finance which deterred these prospective candidates? Probably other elements also played a role in their decisions: the structure and credibility of the IPR, and lack of interest in or commitment to the issues of the Pacific. The structure of the ISIPR had been fluid from the beginning. Although there was the ISIPR office in Honolulu, staff were few, and always travelling. Coupled with financial problems, the IPR lacked a solid structure, which made it flexible but also rather insecure.

Second, there was the issue of the credibility of the Institute. The Research output of the IPR was earning credibility, but only in limited circles of academics and specialists. Although the conference and data papers were highly regarded, the IPR was still developing its prestige. Last, interest in the region on which the IPR focused was still very limited. Studies suggest that interest in 'Far Eastern' issues, not to mention knowledge of the region, was very limited in Europe and North America.⁸¹ Those who were interested in foreign affairs were, to start with, very few, and among them those who were interested in contemporary Asia and the Pacific islands were in a minority in the USA and Europe. While Europe was advanced in certain areas of Oriental studies such as languages and history,⁸² Holland noted that there was very little interest in and

⁷⁹ Eggleston to Brooks, 15 April, 1930, MS 423/14, NLA.

⁸⁰ Greene to Curtis, 2 September, 1930, MS Curtis 3, BL.

⁸¹ Cohen argues that Asian affairs was only a secondary importance for the peace movement in the USA before WWII, and therefore only attracted attention of a minority. W. Cohen, Hirai Atsuko trans., 'Ajia mondai to Amerika minkan dantai,' in Hosoya C. et al eds., *Nichibei kankei shi: Kaisen ni itaru jūnen*, Vol.3 (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1971), pp.356. In the USA, there were very few academics specialized in 'Far Eastern' studies, and only inadequate academic organizations of the fields in the inter-war period. Paul Evans, *John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern China* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp.62-63.

⁸² H. Borton, Saitō M. trans., 'Nihon kenkyū no kaitakushatachi,' in Hosoya C. and Saitō M. eds., *Washington taisei to nichibei kankei*, (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1978), p.563.

knowledge of contemporary Asia at Cambridge University in 1934.⁸³ Curtis emphasized to RIIA members the importance of the IPR and Anglo-American cooperation, but he was in a minority.⁸⁴ Furthermore, the interest at the RIIA was exclusively focused on China. Many men who were approached by Curtis or Greene were Europe-oriented in their activities and interests. In this sense, accepting the headship of the IPR reflected general indifference to the region in this circle. Davis, Wilbur, Greene, Carter or Curtis were, no matter what their motivations or styles, not only interested in, but also committed to the issues in the region, and this sense of commitment was rare among most of those who were approached.

One minor, but symbolic episode supports the argument that the IPR was following the model of the League of Nations around the time of 1933. When Carter was appointed at a Pacific Council meeting at Banff in 1933, the Council wished him to use the term Secretary General, instead of General Secretary.⁸⁵ Whether or not they followed the custom of the League is not clear, but it is a suggestive episode.

The visions held by key figures in the IPR were contested, and in this process, the nature and structure of the IPR was negotiated and constructed. Davis's resignation symbolized the direction of the IPR. In 1929–1933 the following trends became clear: the failure to establish new attitudes towards the Orient; and the loss of the Pacific-centred perspective. The failure to establish new attitudes to the Orient was due to the uncritical acceptance of the nation-state and the colonial framework inherent in the original setting of the IPR. Based on this acceptance, the issue of principles of racial equality became concrete matters of *national* sovereignty and *national* culture. The nature of the membership—consisting of influential public men and women—enhanced the strong sense of nation-state among participants. Members were close to the governments mentally and institutionally. IPR conferences also failed in

⁸³ P. Hooper ed., *Remembering the IPR*, Part One, p.23.

⁸⁴ Even in 1933, there were very few who knew about the IPR, and many at the RIIA criticized contributing money to the IPR. Macadam to Rose, 6 January, 1933, 4/Rose, LCH.

⁸⁵ Carter to Mrs Carter, 10 August, 1933, Carter Papers, Box1, BLCU.

initiating agendas for regional arrangements. This was because of the anti-regional attitudes of British and, to a lesser extent, American groups. Increasingly, key figures attempted to use the IPR as a means to integrate the region into the imagined 'international order'.

Chapter Six: Co-option: American, and World, organization, 1933–1942

This chapter focuses on the International Secretariat of the IPR (the ISIPR). It argues that under Carter's administration,¹ the two existing trends within the IPR—the loss of the Pacific-centred perspective and the failure to establish new attitudes to the Orient—were intensified, and that these trends were further reinforced during WWII. The Sino-Japanese conflict of the 1930s clarified the problems of the international order and the assumptions on which the IPR was based. The IPR as a whole did not question the nature of the international order. As it had been from the beginning, the IPR functioned on the basis of the colonial and the nation-state system. While this base was strengthened at the IPR in the 1930s, it became the problem at the JCIPR because of Japan's position in the 'international order'.

Carter took the initiative in promoting the IPR as a 'think tank' for restoring international order in the Pacific. This move made the IPR more government-oriented. Although this official orientation was intensified by the Sino-Japanese conflict, it was also caused by a strong emphasis on the nation-state in the IPR's operations. The official orientation was furthered during WWII. IPR gatherings served as unofficial forums of the Allied countries, attended by officials and supported by the governments, and their discussions contributed to the reconstruction plans after the war, including the United Nations.

Carter aimed for a more world-oriented organization with a strong sense of centre on the East Coast of the USA. While he sought 'world-wide' prestige and reputation for the IPR as a regional affairs specialist organization, his 'world' meant Europe. Beside Britain, France and Holland joined the IPR, and participated in its conferences from 1933. Although at one level he made the IPR more 'world'-oriented, Carter also made the IPR more American at another level. He pursued the policy of

¹ Carter's administration was in 1933–1946, and the chapter mainly focuses on the period before WWII.

strengthening the National Councils, as opposed to the ISIPR. This enhanced the significance of the ACIPR (the American Council of the IPR), which became almost identical to the ISIPR in terms of location and function in the eyes of many. This 'nationalization' did not contradict the original function of the ISIPR, which was to coordinate and to provide a forum for *national* units. For Carter, the Americanization of the ISIPR was not at odds with the idea of making it a 'world' organization, either, because he was convinced that the USA had to lead the world, especially in the Pacific, and that the IPR should play a significant role in this leadership. As argued in the following, for Carter, New York was not only the centre of the USA or the region, but also of the world, and in this sense, he thought he was making a 'world' organization, not an American organization. The defacto headquarters of the IPR moved from the Pacific, and after 1936, conferences were held away from the Pacific Coast: at Virginia Beach in 1936, Mont Tremblant in 1939, and Stratford upon Avon in 1942.

The emergence of a strong centre outside the Pacific meant the loss of the Pacific perspective. This loss of Pacific centrality also meant that the Orient in the IPR failed to become equal partners. This remained the case until the end of WWII. The emergence of a sense of strong centre aggravated the failure to establish new attitudes to the Orient. The Orient became more and more an 'object' to be studied, rather than an equal partner in the enterprise. Although China and the Philippines remained in the IPR project and conferences after the Japanese withdrawal in 1939, their role in the Pacific at conferences became more that of 'outsiders' than 'insiders'. Only towards the end of WWII did representatives from countries such as China, India and Burma, start to assert the need to abolish the colonial framework at IPR forums, and become equal partners.

1) Carter's Appointment in 1933

By the time of the fifth conference at Banff in 1933, the only names not yet eliminated from the candidates' list for General Secretary of the IPR were those of Owen Lattimore and Carter. Unlike other established figures in

the list, Lattimore was only thirty-three years old with no definite job at reputable institutions. But his works on Mongolia, *Desert Road to Turkestan* (1929), *High Tartary* (1930) and *Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict* (1932), all of which were based on his first hand experience, demonstrated his unusual language skills and insights on the political and economic situation in significant, but unknown, regions. By 1933, these works had earned him good reputation in Britain, and greatly impressed Curtis.²

That his first success occurred in Britain, not in the USA, can be explained by his background. Although born to American parents in Washington D. C. in 1900, he was brought up in expatriate societies in China in 1901–1912, educated in England in 1914–1919, and worked for a British trading company in Tientsin in the 1920s.³ He had, therefore, closer connection with British circles than with Americans. Through these connections, his first book was published by a British publisher, which brought him to the notice of British literary circles.

Lattimore was looking for a job when he attended the Banff conference as an American member. Another participant at the conference, a British journalist resident in Shanghai, who knew Lattimore and thought highly of his works, recommended him, not as General Secretary, but as Editor of *Pacific Affairs*.⁴ Probably with the strong support of Curtis, Lattimore was appointed as Editor.

Carter's appointment seems to be explained, not by his power hunger, but by a simple reason: no suitable candidate had accepted the position by then. Carter's name first appeared only in April 1933, in a letter from Newton Baker.⁵ Baker, an influential Democrat whose political career suffered due to his support for American involvement with the League of

² Curtis to Wilbur, 18 November, 1932, MS Curtis 8, and Curtis to Greene, 18 May, 1933, MS Curtis 9, BL.

³ Owen Lattimore and Fujiko Isono, *China Memoirs: Chiang Kai-shek and the War against Japan* (University of Tokyo Press, 1990), pp.3–34, and Robert P. Newman, *Owen Lattimore and the "Loss" of China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp.3–21.

⁴ O. Lattimore and F. Isono, *China Memoirs*, p.34.

⁵ Baker to Atherton, 4 April, 1933, E-2/4, AUI.

Nations,⁶ was then Chairman of the ACIPR, and a strong backer of Carter. While Lattimore was regarded as a remarkable scholar, he was still young and his administrative skills were unknown. In contrast, as Secretary of the ACIPR in 1926–1933, Carter had proved to members of the IPR his excellence in administration, and the decision to appoint Carter was a popular one.⁷ His salary was fixed at US\$ 12,000, lower than the anticipated US\$ 15,000 to 20,000, and almost equivalent to the salary of the Deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations.⁸

In a letter to his wife after the appointment, Carter did not show surprise or enthusiasm. He said that he would see what his wife and Newton Baker thought before his decision.⁹ A British member of the RIIA, who attended the conference, thought that Carter showed 'considerable hesitation' in accepting the offer while the ISIPR was in the financial difficulties.¹⁰ Despite this lack of enthusiasm, however, Carter seems to have had a clear vision of the IPR, and was ready for the job.

2) Carter's Administration, 1933–1942

Carter's administration in the 1930s was a time of crisis both in domestic and external terms. The year, 1933, when he was appointed as Secretary General of the IPR was marked by significant incidents in international and domestic politics. Many countries were going through economic and political crises, and there was a general trend towards national-socialistic policies. The Depression continued, and the seeming success of the Soviet experiment made those who were deeply discontented with the status quo see socialist revolution as a possible alternative. In this climate, government officials felt that the state had to be strengthened, and that counter-socialist schemes were necessary to absorb this discontent. In

⁶ Douglas Craig, *After Wilson: The Structure for the Democratic Party, 1920–1934* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), p.233.

⁷ Rose to Malcolm, 10 August, 1933, Rose to Malcolm, 23 August, 1933, and Macadam to Curtis, 4 September, 1933, RIIA file, LCH.

⁸ Egon F. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *The International Secretariat: A Great Experiment in International Administration* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945), p.295.

⁹ Carter to Mrs Carter, 10 August, 1933, Carter Papers, Box 1, BLCU.

¹⁰ Power to Curtis, 4 September, 1933, 4/Curt, LCH

1933, Hitler's National Socialist Party won the election in Germany. In the USA, Franklin Roosevelt won the election and started the New Deal scheme. In Britain, MacDonald already had formed a national coalition government. In Japan, the May 15 Incident, a military coup de'état in 1932, ended the political party system. The 'national-unity [*kyokoku icchi*] government' was created, under which the power of the bureaucracy and the military was extended and national mobilization proceeded.¹¹

The popular perception of this period is that the intellectual paradigm shifted from internationalism towards nationalism, culminating in WWII. From this perspective, the 1930s were a difficult time for the IPR and other internationalist organizations including the League of Nations, and they were forced to adjust to the situation. Indeed, the League was losing credibility as the emergency of domestic crises swept away the rhetoric of good-will and mutual understanding. What has been demonstrated in this thesis, however, was that inter-war internationalist organizations had always been based on the nation-state system. As the speeches of Wilbur, Chairman of the Pacific Council in 1926–1929, or Sawayanagi, leader of the JCPR in 1925 and 1927 at IPR conferences, showed, internationalists at the IPR firmly based their internationalism on the nation-state system.¹² Internationalists did not, therefore, oppose nationalism in general, but only the particular nationalisms which challenged the existing international order.¹³

Japanese military intervention in Manchuria in 1931 and its subsequent development was perceived as a challenge to the international status quo. Nish summarizes the difference of the perception between the challenger and the challenged. In Japan, it was seen as an *incident* which led to the establishment of Manchukuo in 1932, but in the 'West', it was perceived as

¹¹ Gordon M. Berger, 'Politics and Mobilization in Japan, 1931–1945,' in P. Duus ed., *The Cambridge History of Japan*, Vol.6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.107–118.

¹² See Chapter Four for Sawayanagi, and Chapter Five for Wilbur.

¹³ Thorne's work illuminates the criteria by which European and American internationalists judged conduct in pursuit of 'national' interests in international politics. C. Thorne, *The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931–33* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1973), pp.400–401.

a crisis of collective security of the League of Nations.¹⁴ Although Thorne uses the accepted term, "the Far Eastern Crisis", he is rather critical of the nature of the international order, by which the 'vital interests' of the dominant powers were secured, but Japanese action was condemned because Japanese 'vital interests' challenged the order.¹⁵

The problem of this imagined order put members of the JCIPR in a difficult position. While earlier JCIPR members accepted and supported the order, reform-oriented younger members increasingly questioned it, and began to support Japan's new order, a challenge to the existing order.¹⁶

Meanwhile, the ISIPR did not question the international order, but defended it. Carter wanted the IPR to be a think tank of regional affairs experts, which would contribute to restoring the international order in the Pacific. And Japanese action was a challenge to the order. Carter's push to conduct an investigative study, the "Inquiry", resulted in the JCIPR's withdrawal from not only the Inquiry but also the IPR conferences after 1936.

Carter did not fundamentally change the nature of the operation of the IPR, but reinforced the existing elements: strengthening the National Councils, the sense of the nation-state and official-orientation; and moving away from the Pacific to the Atlantic. The move signified his ambition to make the IPR more significant in the world, and WWII helped his ambition to materialize. In this process, the IPR became more politicized and Americanized, which led to its decline after the war. The following sections examine Carter's visions of internationalism and international organization, and his policies as Secretary General of the IPR in 1933-1942.

i) Carter's Visions and Policies

¹⁴ I. Nish, *Japan's Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China, and the League of Nations, 1931-1933* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1993), p.vii.

¹⁵ C. Thorne, *The Limits of Foreign Policy*, p.419.

¹⁶ See Chapter Three, Section Two.

Carter's policies can be summarized as follows: 1) emphasizing the focus of the IPR not only on the region, but also in relation to the world; 2) working to involve the USSR in the IPR activities; 3) moving the headquarters from Honolulu to New York; 4) strengthening the National Councils; 5) making the ACIPR a more democratic organization in terms of its program and membership; and 6) taking a stance against Japanese action in China.

A clear indication of his position was given in the preface of the proceedings of the Banff conference, probably written by Carter. It makes a point of the importance of a wider context. Focusing on the fact that the conference was the first held on the American continent, it argued:

disturbances of helpful international relations in the Pacific ... have their origin as much in the *western* as in the eastern hemisphere [T]he setting of the conference made yet another valuable contribution to a more *balanced* understanding of the Pacific problems: the peace and beauty of the immediate scene invited attention to *larger* perspectives ... and *larger* problems of human welfare.¹⁷ (emphasis added)

The preface contrasts the American Continent to Shanghai, therefore unlike many Americans who used 'western hemisphere' in contrast to European continent, it seems to be counterpoising 'western' to 'Far East'. The same new direction of widening perspectives is suggested for the new *Pacific Affairs*, which was to focus on the Pacific region, but '*in relation to world affairs*'.¹⁸

This reveals Carter's ambition for the IPR to have greater world-wide prestige as a regional affairs experts' organization. The format of the new *Pacific Affairs*, for example, suggests this direction. It resembled that of *Foreign Affairs*, an acclaimed journal among foreign affairs experts in many countries, published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in New York. The old style of a newsletter section in *Pacific Affairs*, which reported happenings in countries in the region was lost, as was the section

¹⁷ 'Preface' in B. Lasker and W. L. Holland eds., *Problems of the Pacific*, 1933 (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), p.v.

¹⁸ E. Carter, 'Institute Note,' *Pacific Affairs* (November-December, 1933), p.617.

of "Views from East". Despite the claim of the editorial that it would aim at a wider public, the new *Pacific Affairs* presented itself more like a journal for experts in foreign relations.

'World'-wide recognition and prestige as a regional affairs experts' organization was also sought by enlarging membership in Europe. The initial move to include more European involvement was proposed by Davis when he visited Europe in early 1928,¹⁹ but it did not materialize. The move was carried further by Condliffe in mid-1930, and he obtained a favourable reply from the French.²⁰ The preparation of other European groups was, therefore, in process before they actually participated in the IPR conference in 1933 and before Carter took over Secretary Generalship. Carter was, however, well known among European groups of foreign affairs experts,²¹ and he pushed the direction of European involvement enthusiastically. Additional European involvement from 1933 signifies the reinforcement of the colonial framework at the IPR, which was not challenged until the 1942 conference.

Carter's eagerness to involve the USSR was related more to this ambition for world-wide prestige of the IPR than to his attraction to Soviet-style internationalism. The attempt to draw the USSR into the IPR was not his initiative, either, but he pushed the move hard. The USSR was a major Pacific Power, and it was felt important to have its participation at IPR conferences. Merle Davis had visited Moscow in the end of 1927, and suggested the idea but without success. The USSR as well as labour organizations in various countries saw the IPR as an imperialistic capitalist organization. In 1930, Condliffe also tried to have the USSR participate in the IPR conference, and obtained a commitment.²² Carter was not much concerned with ideology. He believed that as long as participants discussed their different views in the right manner, they would reach some agreement, and the more diverse the opinions,

¹⁹ Davis recorded that the Dutch showed great interest in the IPR and participation in the conference, but the French did not show much interest. Davis to Atherton, 7 February, 1928, E-13/6, AUH.

²⁰ Condliffe to Greene, 21 June, 1930, E-17/4, AUH.

²¹ Loomis to Atherton, 2 September, 1928, Wilbur Papers, 40/5, HI.

²² J. B. Condliffe, *Reminiscences*, p.44-46.

therefore, the better the conference. Furthermore, Sino-Japanese conflicts made the strategic position of the USSR more significant.

Carter was determined to get the USSR involved in the IPR.²³ He went to Moscow in 1934 with this mission, and as a result of this trip, the Pacific Ocean Institute, a branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, became the Soviet unit for the IPR. It was a government bureau, but Carter was satisfied. The USSR remained sceptical to the IPR, and its contribution was minimal. It criticized the imperialistic nature of the Institute and *Pacific Affairs*, which, it argued, defended Japanese actions in China.²⁴ In 1935, the Soviet unit contributed an article to *Pacific Affairs*, which Lattimore, the Editor, described 'rank propaganda', although he felt that he was obliged to publish it to show the non-partisan nature of the journal.²⁵ In 1936, Carter visited the USSR again to push for its participation in the sixth IPR conference at Yosemite. As a result, the USSR sent two delegates to the conference, the first and only Soviet participation. After 1936, Soviet-involvement faded away. But Carter had at least extended the institutional base to the USSR, and therefore taken one further step to make the IPR 'world-wide'.

Was this shift from the Pacific to the 'world' related to British initiatives and Carter's connection with the British group, as some suspected at the time? Or did Carter want to get closer to the prestige of the CFR, a sister organization of the RIIA? As demonstrated in the following sections, the documents contradict the suggestion of a strong British influence, but not Carter's ambition for the IPR as a more globally recognized body of experts. It was his conviction that New York, not London, was the centre of the world, that directed his move. The nature of Carter's relations with the British group is examined below.

ii) Carter's Relations with the British Group

²³ O. Lattimore and Isono F., *China Memoirs*, p.37.

²⁴ R. Newman, *Owen Lattimore*, p.28.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.27.

Carter was born the son of a minister in Lawrence, Massachusetts in 1878. He went to Harvard College in 1900, where he was involved with YMCA student international activities. The activities led him to become a Secretary of the YMCA in India in 1902. Carter visited Oxford before he went to India, and through a professor at Trinity College, 'he met what was to become the famous Round Table group'.²⁶ The Round Table, founded in London in 1909, was a group of young men who discussed the new strategy of the British Empire. Major members included Lionel Curtis and Philipp Kerr, who also became the core of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (the RIIA). Carter had maintained close personal connections with Curtis since then.

Did this encounter with Round Table members influence the twenty-four year-old Edward Carter on the way to his first foreign mission in India? William Carter, Carter's son, thought so: 'E. C. C. [Edward Carter]'s discussions with this [Round Table] group had much influence on his later liberal approaches in India'.²⁷ 'Liberal' attitudes meant that Carter did not impose what he thought 'right' manners or customs on the Indians, but encouraged them to keep their own. Carter also, as William records, made efforts for Indians to be treated equally as British citizens. On one occasion, Edward Carter pleaded that Indian soldiers be awarded the King's Commission, not only the Viceroy's Commission, for their achievements during WWI. On another, Carter arranged for a Sikh member of the Royal Flying Corps to wear a turban during his service.²⁸ These episodes demonstrate that Carter adopted certain 'liberal' attitudes particular to the Round Table: an acceptance of differences in order to make colonial subjects serve the common good, the empire; and a willingness to grant self-rule in order to strengthen the empire. Curtis, impressed by Carter's achievement in India, suggested to Philipp Kerr, Lloyd George's Secretary, in 1919 that Carter be appointed Viceroy of India, as he had most appropriate qualifications for the proposed constitutional reforms to widen

²⁶ William Carter, 'Memories of Edward C. Carter by W. D. Carter: Addendum 1,' (unpublished manuscript) 8 May, 1986, p.3.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ W. Carter, 'Some Memories of Edward C. Carter by His Son,' (unpublished manuscript), 17 April, 1986, p.5.

self-rule in India.²⁹ Were these kinds of 'liberal' attitudes to non Euro-Americans significant in Carter's policies towards the Orient at the IPR?

Carter's attitudes to the Orient, however, seem to have been determined not only by the association with the Round Table, but also by his Christian belief. The latter was shown in his commitment to the project, the "Inquiry into the Christian Way of Life" (1922-1932). It was this project, and not the IPR, which paid Carter's salary during the time of his secretaryship of the ACIPR, and Carter put much work into it. Its aim was to seek ways of applying Christianity into the problems of modern life. A major focus of the project was race relations, and a method which the project promoted was the conference. By discussing different viewpoints, it was believed, a solution of problems would emerge.³⁰

While the project earned strong support from the Rockefeller Foundation, which evaluated it as innovative, fundamental and honest,³¹ its documents do not reveal much about Carter's attitudes to the Orient or Orientals. A few letters on IPR matters, however, indicate his position. In 1927, he wrote an enthusiastic letter to Greene on his attitudes towards Orientals:

[The American group] need imagination in finding new trails for experimentation and discovery in human relations. We need a new quality and new standards for our research program We need to learn how to enter into such a full relationship of mutuality with the Chinese and the Japanese ... in research, in resource, in imagination, and avoid the danger of America's dominating the Chinese and Japanese Group by the sheer force of money and personnel Throughout our membership, it is necessary for us to discover how we can get away from our feeling that we have superior wisdom to contribute to the Orient and instead induce a genuine recognition of the fact that we are in a great need of Chinese and Japanese help and that the deeper problems of the future can only be solved by joint study and effort.³²

²⁹ W. Carter, 'Memories of Edward Carter,' 8 May 1986, p.3. James Shotwell, *At the Paris Peace Conference* (New York: Macmillan, 1937), p.159.

³⁰ Fosdick to Rockefeller, 22 January, 1924, LSRA/III-2-N/47/376, RA.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Carter to Greene, 30 June, 1927, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU.

This seems to contradict Condliffe's criticism that Carter wanted Americans to dominate research money and projects and was reluctant for initiatives to be left to the Orientals. When the ACIPR discussed the inclusion of black members in the American group for the Kyoto conference, Carter argued strongly for it. It was, he thought, important in dealing with Orientals:

For several years, Chinese, Japanese, and Europeans have told me that they did not feel that Americans could adjust themselves to a full understanding of the American attitude to the Orient until they had a new attitude to the American Negro. Until we have, as a matter of course, a competent Negro entering into our American Council program and attending the biennial Conferences, I do not think that we are availing ourselves of the full data and experience that we need, if we wish to take a long time to look at the question of race implication and cultural conflict across the Pacific.³³

While his principles were shared by many, Carter's manner towards the older generations of Japanese and Chinese, however, was problematic. Younger Japanese, relatively fluent in English, such as Tsurumi Yūsuke, admired Carter's efficiency,³⁴ but Atherton heard many complaints from other Japanese and Chinese participants at conferences.

I feel that [Carter] does not fully comprehend or appreciate the psychology of the Orientals. The Japanese, particularly the older ones and those who have not mixed a great deal with Americans, think slowly and desire ample time to weigh matters carefully before reaching a decision. One has to have great patience and tact in dealing with them. Mr Carter is so eager to see things accomplished that I have found at times he does not recognize this trait of the Orientals and forces things through with the result that he hurts the feelings of many of them I know this personally from statements made to me directly in the past by several of my Oriental friends.³⁵

Carter's forcefulness, however, did not seem to be directed only to Chinese or Japanese, but to everyone. Some admired his selfless devotion, and

³³ Carter to Greene, 9 July, 1929, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU.

³⁴ Tsurumi Y., *Chūō o ayumu kokoro* (Shinshakai, 1927), pp.478-479.

³⁵ Atherton to Baker, 6 May 1933, E-2/4, AUH.

others were offended by his single-mindedness. Atherton himself had to fight this trait of Carter's over the location of the headquarters of the IPR.

Although Carter was conscientious and enlightened about the racial issue, it is also evident that he had a strong sense of fellowship with Anglo-Saxons. In the same letter to Greene in 1927, he urged American participants to mingle with the Orientals, rather than 'continuing to keep company with our own companies and our fellow Anglo-Saxons'.³⁶ This was very much the way Curtis looked at Americans, as comrades to constitute the British-American Commonwealth with common values and beliefs. Frederic Eggleston and Ian Allen warned that this division between the Anglo-Saxon group and the Oriental group was jeopardizing the vision of the original IPR.³⁷

This Anglophile sentiment also existed among other members of the ACIPR on the East Coast. Personal connections were fostered through education, especially the Rhodes Scholarship, family and business ties, and geographical closeness. The RIIA had official connections with the CFR to which some ACIPR members also belonged. Jerome Greene, also a member of the CFR, knew Curtis from the time when he was stationed in London as American secretary to the Allied Maritime Transport Council, during the time of WWI.³⁸ Among these members, terms such as 'this or that side' of the Atlantic were commonly used in their correspondence.

Although Carroll Quigley suggests the importance of this Anglo-American Establishment connection in the media and amongst policy-makers,³⁹ even the close connection between the CFR and the RIIA did not mean the absolute support of British initiatives from American organizations. A founder of the CFR, who was a Rhodes scholar and whose wife was a friend of Mrs Curtis as well as a secretary of the RIIA,

³⁶ Carter to Greene, 30 June, 1927, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU.

³⁷ See Chapter Five.

³⁸ Carroll Quigley, *The Anglo-American Establishment: From Rhodes to Cliveden* (New York: Books in Focus, 1981), pp.188-189.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.227-310.

was an enthusiastic supporter of Curtis's idea of world government, but even he harboured reservations about Anglo-American solidarity.⁴⁰

Sentimental Anglophile attachments did not play a big part in organizational issues at the ACIPR either. As already seen, Greene was cautious not to create a distinct Anglo-Saxon group in the IPR and asked Curtis not to use the ACIPR as the British group's channel. Carter did not support Curtis's reorganization plan, but criticized it, especially on financial issues.

Both you [Greene] and I, who have lived several years in London, know how faulty Lionel's conception in this matter [finance] is.⁴¹

Carter remained close to the British group, and against moves by the groups in Hawaii and San Francisco which wished to keep the ISIPR in the Pacific, the British group along with other Americans, Canadian and European groups supported Carter's move to the Atlantic.⁴² This did not mean, however, that Carter was manipulated by the British group to move the headquarters to Britain. Carter's supporters agreed that it was important for him to remain in New York for fund raising and research purposes. Carter shared a sense of a strong centre, both morally and geographically with Curtis. But his centre was located in New York, not on 'the other' side of the Atlantic.

1933 marked a significant, but often neglected, incident in relation to the influence of new British imperialism in the IPR, the foundation of the British Commonwealth Relations Conference (BCRC). The institutional base of the BCRC was the network of the RIIA and its Dominion branches. Lionel Curtis, a founder of the RIIA, perceived that the development of the RIIA in the Dominions symbolized that of the British Commonwealth.⁴³ The BCRC was, for him, an institutional embodiment of the British Commonwealth.

⁴⁰ Shepardson to Brandeis, 26 September, 1925, MS Eng Hist 872, BL.

⁴¹ Carter to Greene, 31 January, 1930, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU.

⁴² Anderson to Atherton, 21 August, 1936, E-3a/11, AUH.

⁴³ Curtis to Nelson, n. d. [late 1926 or early 1927], CPR, Box 108/Curtis 3, BLCU.

The BCRC was a by-product of the IPR conferences. It emerged through the network and methods which were developed at IPR conferences.⁴⁴ It took the same format as IPR conferences, that is an unofficial conference attended by 'leaders of public opinion'. Its main agenda was to survey and improve the system of the relations of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.⁴⁵ The first BCRC was held in Toronto soon after the Banff IPR conference, which almost the same members from the Commonwealth participated in.⁴⁶

Did this result in a reduction in enthusiasm for Pacific issues among Commonwealth countries? To some extent it probably did. The BCRC provided them with an alternative forum in a more familiar environment for similar discussions. Certainly the energy and focus of the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) was more concentrated on the BCRC than the IPR.⁴⁷ Research projects and personnel exchanges, however, were maintained between the AIIA and the ISIPR, and British Commonwealth countries continued to send delegates to IPR conferences.

More importantly, the establishment of the BCRC implied a decline in the influence of the new British imperialism at the IPR, and therefore consequently enhanced stronger American initiatives. One idea behind

⁴⁴ Eggleston recorded that during the IPR conferences in 1927 and 1929, informal meetings of participants from the British Commonwealth discussed the possibility of having conferences together. Eggleston Diary, 1927, MS 423/2, NLA, and F. Eggleston, 'Australia and the Pacific,' *The [Melbourne] Herald*, 19 December, 1929. Arnold Toynbee ed., *British Commonwealth Relations: Proceedings of the First Unofficial Conference at Toronto, 11-12 September 1933* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), pp.5-6.

⁴⁵ These countries included Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, South Africa and Britain. A. Toynbee ed., *British Commonwealth Relations*, pp.3-5.

⁴⁶ Confused by the similarity, the leader of the British group read the opening speech for the BCRC at the IPR conference, causing puzzlement for participants from other countries. The leader was Herbert Samuel, Leader of the British Liberal Party. P. Hooper ed., *Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations: The Memoirs of William Holland* (Ryūkei shosha, forthcoming in 1995), Part One, p.26.

⁴⁷ While the Round Table reported enthusiastically the IPR conferences in 1925-1933, there was no report on IPR conferences after 1933. For its positive reports, see anonymous articles of 'Honolulu', *The Round Table*, Vol.18 (December, 1927-September, 1928), pp.90-104, 'The Kyoto Conference', *The Round Table*, Vol.20 (December, 1929-September, 1930), especially pp.345-347, and 'Canada', *The Round Table*, Vol.24 (December, 1933-September, 1934), pp.183-202.

the new British imperialism was to achieve a British Commonwealth including the USA as the basis of the international community, and to use the IPR as a means to achieve that goal. Instead, through the BCRC, a stronger world-wide imperial bloc was discussed and pursued. The sense of a strong centre was again clear, and the Pacific and 'Orient' became an 'object' rather than a 'subject' participating in the imperial bloc. There were a few in Australia who argued the importance of the Orient as a 'subject', a trade partner,⁴⁸ and the Victorian branch of the AIIA started to publish the *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin* in 1936. However, a majority of Australians saw the region, especially Japan, as a threat, rather than an opportunity of partnership, and perceived the region as an object to study, to fear, and eventually to fight.⁴⁹

Carter did, however, adopt one of Curtis's ideas: the notion of a travelling Secretary General without central headquarters. Curtis suggested that his ideal organization would have a prestigious man as its head, who would travel between 'East' and 'West', and be stationed at the location of the next conference.⁵⁰ But Carter's choice of being a travelling head proved to be part of his tactics of moving the headquarters from Honolulu to New York.

iii) Location of the Headquarters

Carter gradually shifted the functions of the ISIPR from Honolulu to New York in 1933-1936. Two points are debatable about the shift. Was it Americanization or not? And was it centralization or decentralization? Probably there was an element both of Americanization and centralization. In 1933-1944, the ACIPR was almost identical to the ISIPR. The physical location of Secretary General and the ACIPR was the same, 129 East 52nd Street, New York. Instead of having no fixed central headquarters, Carter conducted his work as Secretary General from this office in New York. It was his office from 1922 when he started the YMCA

⁴⁸ J. G. Crawford, 'Australia as a Pacific Power,' in W. G. K. Duncan ed., *Australia's Foreign Policy* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1938), p.69-90.

⁴⁹ As for this strategic thinking, see Map II.

⁵⁰ Curtis to Greene, 7-13 November, 1928, A-1/PC 1929, AUH.

related project, and became the office of the ACIPR from 1926 during his secretaryship at the ACIPR (1926-1933). It remained a virtual office of the ISIPR and the ACIPR until 1945.

Holland, the Research Secretary in 1933-1943, argues in his memoirs that Carter made an effort to draw a clear line between the American and international IPR, but he also admits that in practice, there was a great deal of overlap in personnel and work.⁵¹ The phrase 'joint projects of the Pacific Council and the ACIPR' was used,⁵² but Carter dealt with the matters of the ACIPR and used the staff of the ACIPR for his ISIPR work, and vice versa.

Although Carter insisted on having no central headquarters and strengthening the National Councils,⁵³ the actual functions of the ISIPR were gradually taken from Honolulu and centralized at his New York office. Was this a strengthening of the National Councils without a central office, and therefore decentralization, or was it a virtual centralization by Carter or the American Council? Wilbur, a major figure on the Pacific Coast, certainly felt that centralization in New York was taking place, and he argued for the need for decentralization.⁵⁴

The shift of the headquarters contributed to the loss of a Pacific-centred perspective. For those, such as Davis, Atherton, Eggleston and Allen, who valued the original idea of 'promoting mutual understanding among people and countries bordering the Pacific' and establishing new attitudes to the Orient, Honolulu had more than a mere geographical importance. Having the headquarters there meant that they would keep the original spirit and principle. This argument was convincingly, but without success, presented by Frank Atherton and to a lesser extent Wallace Alexander. Atherton was Treasurer of the Pacific Council, and based in Honolulu. Alexander was head of the San Francisco Bay group of the ACIPR. Representing the sentiment of the Bay Region, he argued the

⁵¹ P. Hooper ed., *Remembering the IPR*, Part Two, pp.9-11.

⁵² Field to Atherton, 15 November, 1934, E-2/12, AUH.

⁵³ E. Carter, 'Tentative Note,' [August, 1933] Carter Papers, Box 1, BLCU

⁵⁴ E. E. Robinson and P. C. Edwards eds., *The Memoirs of Ray Lyman Wilbur 1875-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), p.608.

importance of keeping the headquarters on the Pacific Coast in order to retain its Pacific centrality.

Atherton and Alexander represented not only the Pacific perspective, but also a private element as opposed to the official element in the IPR. Most American companies which contributed to the IPR were in California in 1935.⁵⁵ Hawaii had also contributed substantial amounts of money from the beginning. The shift of the centre of the IPR from the Pacific Coast to New York increased the official character of the organization because of the loss of 'private' funding, and because of the physical proximity to the government. The shift against the opinion of these groups reduced the incentive for private contributors in California and Hawaii. New York was of course closer to Washington D. C. and physically it was easier to meet officials and exchange information with them.

Constitutionally, the location of the ISIPR was not decided. Honolulu was originally chosen due to its image of good racial relations, which was the main concern at the time of the foundation. It was a neutral meeting spot for people who travelled across the Pacific. In the documents, however, it was depicted as a temporary location,⁵⁶ and many, including Carter and Curtis, deplored the inadequacy of the place for the IPR's more 'professional' activities. Carter especially did not care for the claim of Honolulu to be the "Geneva of the Pacific": 'I doubt whether in our lifetime Honolulu will ever have the world news daily [T]he stimulus that comes through the almost daily visits of able minds from all over the world is something that will not be achieved in Honolulu in our lifetime'.⁵⁷

During Greene's administration, no attempt was made to change the location. Greene conducted IPR matters from his company in New York, but administrative work and conference arrangement was done through

⁵⁵ Field to Walker, 10 December, 1935, RFA/1.1/200/351/4174, RA.

⁵⁶ J. M. Davis, 'Report of Committee on Permanent Organization,' in J. B. Condliffe ed., *Problems of the Pacific*, 1927, p.591.

⁵⁷ Carter to Curtis, 16 March, 1928, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 2, BLCU. His attitude to Honolulu was seen by his use of the phrase such as 'that little small town'. Carter to Greene, 4 April, 1930, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU.

Charles Loomis, Acting General Secretary, in Honolulu. Loomis travelled extensively for conference organization, spending a few months in China. Meanwhile, the idea of locating the headquarters in Asia constantly came up, and Tokyo and Shanghai were suggested.⁵⁸

The Pacific Council meeting, which appointed Carter as Secretary General, decided that Honolulu would stay as the headquarters until the next conference. Most members of the Pacific Council assumed that Carter would move to Honolulu,⁵⁹ and they quoted his moving costs US\$ 1,500.⁶⁰ Carter, however, had no intention of moving to Honolulu. He wanted to be a travelling secretary and visit Honolulu occasionally. His intention was shown in a letter to his wife soon after the appointment was made. He told her that there was no need to move furniture to Honolulu. His idea was to visit National Councils, and stay in a furnished cottage in Honolulu between their trips.⁶¹ Although he said that he would consult each National Council during his travels about the location of the headquarters, this was little more than a diplomatic statement.

He seems to have carefully planned to minimize the importance of the Honolulu office. In the beginning he flattered Honolulu, using terms he disliked, such as Geneva of the Pacific,⁶² or put the term 'temporarily' before his office address in the letterhead.⁶³ At the same time, he pursued the plan to make Honolulu a 'local' office. In his resolution as new Secretary General, Carter proposed a scheme to help 'making Hawaii a model community of race relations', and placed Loomis in charge of the scheme. He argued later that the Honolulu office increased its local

⁵⁸ Curtis suggested Shanghai, Curtis to Greene, 18 May, 1933, MS Curtis 9, BL. At Carter's visit in Tokyo, Japanese discussed the possibility of Tokyo, 'Carter's Visit in Tokyo in 1934,' OC, B-7, LHU.

⁵⁹ E. Scott, 'General Report on the Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations held at Banff, Canada, August, 7-29, 1933,' p.3, Harrison Moore Paper, 11/3, AUM.

⁶⁰ Minutes of the Pacific Council meetings, 29 July, 1933, E-2/22, AUH.

⁶¹ Carter to Mrs Carter, 10 August, 1933, Carter Papers, Box 1, BLCU.

⁶² Carter to Atherton, 7 February, 1934, E-2/9, AUH.

⁶³ Carter to Atherton, 18 October, 1933, E-2/6, AUH.

emphasis from 1934, and that therefore it could not claim a budget as the headquarters as well as a salary for Charles Loomis as headquarters' staff.⁶⁴

Atherton resisted Carter's push. His criticism was twofold: the loss of the Pacific perspective, which had constituted the original spirit and principle of the IPR;⁶⁵ and a lack of the publicity to appeal to a wider audience, which resulted in the lack of interest and donations to the central budget.⁶⁶ The second point will be discussed later in relation to publicity and the democratic nature of the IPR.

The opposition to losing Pacific centrality was strongly voiced not only by the Honolulu group, but also by the West Coast groups, especially the San Francisco group. Already at the time of Davis's resignation, members in Australia, New Zealand and Hawaii expressed their concern about losing the original Pacific perspective with its potential for developing new attitudes to the Orient. Similar views were held by those in California.

These voices were not influential in the IPR despite the strong leadership on the Pacific Coast, which included such people as Wallace Alexander, Ray Wilbur and Chester Rowell. Leading figures on the Pacific Coast were not unorganized or unenthusiastic. Communication and trade across the Pacific were much denser on the Pacific Coast than the East Coast. Not only academics but also journalists and business people were interested in the IPR. Leading figures formed a regional centre in the Bay Region of San Francisco in 1928, of which the Chamber of Commerce in San Francisco was the core. They organized many meetings for IPR activities. Wilbur, Chairman of the Pacific Council in 1927-1929 and President of Stanford University, argued in 1929 that the headquarters should be on the Pacific Coast.⁶⁷

Despite all this, the weakness of the Pacific Coast can be explained by various factors: Carter's strategy of maintaining power in New York; the

⁶⁴ Carter to Atherton, 10 May 1935, E-2/15, AUH.

⁶⁵ Atherton to Baker, 27 January 1936, E-2/25, AUH.

⁶⁶ Atherton to Carter, 10 January, 1936, E-2/23, AUH.

⁶⁷ Wilbur to Greene, 30 January, 1929, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 2, BLCU.

lack of full time staff; and, probably most importantly, the lack of institutional strength including research centres, publishing companies and major social science foundations in contrast to the strength in these fields in New York.

The problem of IPR groups on the Pacific Coast seems to have been based in the geographical distance of the headquarters of the ACIPR under whose control they were located, rather than the reluctance of the ACIPR headquarters. This control hierarchy was clear from the beginning. The Honolulu group was keen to strengthen the Pacific Coast group. Davis thought, since he had good contacts with the institutions there, it would be easy to exercise his direct control from Hawaii. Wilbur, as Chairman of the Pacific Council, reorganized the council of the ACIPR in mid-1926 in order to balance power between the East Coast and the Pacific Coast.⁶⁸ He thought, however, that the Pacific Coast group should be under the ACIPR, not the ISIPR in Honolulu.⁶⁹ But New York was far away, and the staff were busy. The New York office decided further in 1928 that action to promote the IPR on the Pacific Coast should be postponed until 1929, the conference year, which would make fund raising easier.⁷⁰ Atherton criticized Carter for his lack of promotion of the IPR on the Pacific Coast still in 1933.⁷¹ Only in 1935, a serious fund raising campaign on the Pacific Coast was undertaken by Carter and Secretary of the ACIPR, Frederick Field.

The weakness of the Pacific Coast group was also due to lack of full time staff. Enthusiasm was strong, but they were all busy businessmen or journalists who had little time for fund raising or administration in their spare hours. In 1936, Charles Loomis was assigned the job of promoting the IPR in cities other than San Francisco on the Pacific Coast and of raising US\$ 15,000 before the sixth conference at Yosemite in the same year. Carter argued that Loomis's salary should be paid mostly by the Bay Region group, and this request was reluctantly accepted.⁷² Loomis

⁶⁸ Carter to Greene, 20 June, 1926, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU.

⁶⁹ Carter to Greene, 19 August, 1927, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU.

⁷⁰ Davis to Atherton, 20 January, 1930, E-1b/37, AUH.

⁷¹ Atherton to Baker, 6 May, 1933, E-2/4, AUH.

⁷² Alexander to Atherton, 17 January, 1936, E-2/24, AUH.

conducted fund raising successfully through prestigious social clubs, such as the Commonwealth Club and Bohemian Club, and Chambers of Commerce in Los Angeles, Portland and Seattle. The Bay Region Group consulted Atherton and agreed that Loomis would be needed for strengthening the IPR on the Pacific Coast. It decided to have him for a few months from 1937, again without financial support from the headquarters.⁷³

Although as Treasurer Atherton strongly resisted almost every proposal from Carter by not approving the budget of the Pacific Council, Carter removed almost all the functions of the headquarters from Honolulu. The final straw was the transfer of the research fund account from Honolulu. Atherton then tendered his resignation as Treasurer.⁷⁴

Carter's strategy to make Honolulu a 'local' office succeeded. At the sixth conference at Yosemite in 1936, the Pacific Council decided to have no headquarters, and Honolulu lost the claim.⁷⁵ This move was supported by British, Russian, French and Dutch members.⁷⁶ Although Loomis remained on the staff of the ISIPR, his salary was shared by the Honolulu and San Francisco groups. While they agreed to decide the location of the headquarters at the next conference on the Pacific Coast, this never materialized. Carter remained in New York and conducted business from the same office as that of the ACIPR.

The move to New York was not Carter's idea alone; many others supported it. Australian delegates felt that there was a strong consensus at the Council to fix the headquarters in New York. They thought it meant stronger influence for those outside the Pacific, such as Europeans, and therefore, opposed the move.⁷⁷ But for a majority of executive members of the IPR, there was no question that New York was important

⁷³ Atherton to Loomis, 1 June, 1937, E-3a/20, AUH.

⁷⁴ Atherton to Carter, 4 December, 1935, E-2/20, AUH.

⁷⁵ 'Appendix VI: Conference Organization and Administrative Decisions,' in W. Holland et al eds., *Problems of the Pacific, 1936* (London: Oxford university Press, 1937), p.459.

⁷⁶ Anderson to Atherton, 21 August, 1936, E-3a/11, AUH.

⁷⁷ '[Report of Australian delegate of the] Institute of Pacific Relations, Sixth Conference at Yosemite, August 15th-29th, 1936,' A981/1/Org 95.

for raising funds because the major foundations, Carnegie, Rockefeller and the Social Science Research Council, were based there. Funds from the Rockefeller Foundation for research and administration accounted for almost half of the revenues.⁷⁸ Carter mingled with its key officers through social clubs. Although the foundation was reluctant to be seen as an exclusive patron of the IPR, it had confidence in the work of the IPR. A sense almost of responsibility developed among certain officers at the foundation.⁷⁹ Against Atherton's claim that Carter should stay in Honolulu, the Chairmen of the American Council and the Pacific Council were adamant that Carter's location in New York was necessary.⁸⁰

Besides the importance of New York for Carter and others, this move could also be explained by financial factors. The deficit of the ISIPR was more than US\$ 10,000, and Carter had to cut expenses as well as raise more funds. Making the Honolulu and the Bay Region offices self-sufficient through the generous support of local funds was a practical way to cut expenses.

Carter's principle of financial self-sufficiency for each unit was seen in his policy towards the National Councils. In 1933 he proposed to strengthen the National Councils in both activities and finances. The aim was to achieve their self-sufficiency without assistance from the ISIPR budget, and to draw greater contributions from the National Councils to the ISIPR. Carter's visits to the National Councils, however, did not result in the increase of their donations to the ISIPR. In 1935, Britain contributed

⁷⁸ While it is hard to calculate the exact portion of the Foundation's contribution to the administrative cost for the ISIPR, the 1932-1933 financial report and the report of the Foundation in 1933 suggest this rough portion. 'Appendix VI: Summary of Revenues and Expenditures, 1932-3,' in B. Lasker and W. L. Holland eds., *Problems of the Pacific, 1933*, p.479.

⁷⁹ The good terms between the ACIPR and the Foundation were evident in the time of Greene's administration and Carter's administration. Sydnor Walker in particular had a high opinion of and commitment to the works of the IPR. She felt in 1940 that 'a good case should be made for the Institute's carrying on expanded research on problems of the Pacific,' and that 'unless the RF takes care of the Institute, it is not going to be taken care of'. Note of JMP [Packard], 7 November, 1940, RFnA/1.1/200/351/4177, RA. This support was carried during the time of WWII, and also in the difficult time of the 1950s. [Resolution], 23 June, 1950, RFnA/1.1/200/351/4179, RA.

⁸⁰ Baker to Atherton, 11 February, 1936, E-2/26, and Tarr to Atherton, 2 May, 1936, E-3a/4, AUH.

US\$ 3,000 (£600), Japan only US\$ 850 (¥3,000), and Australia only US\$ 600; a big contrast to the Hawaiian contribution of US\$ 10,000.⁸¹ Nor is there much evidence that Carter urged the National Councils to donate more.

How, then, should his argument for strengthening the National Councils be interpreted? Did this mean that he wanted to make them more autonomous and the headquarters of the IPR more American, dominated by American funds? This leads us further to question what kind of international organization Carter had in mind. Regarding research projects, his idea was similar to Curtis's preference for a federation of strong National Councils with each council conducting its own research from a *national* point of view. However, while Curtis was wary of American domination of funding, Carter did not see much problem in the issue. What was his idea of internationality?

iv) The 'Internationality' of the IPR under Carter

Strengthening the National Councils was one of Carter's major goals. In a report to the Pacific Council in 1936, Carter stated: 'there can be little permanent strength in an International Secretariat which represents weak National Councils. A principal task of the Secretariat has therefore been to aid in building up the *chain* of National Councils'.⁸² Here Carter's idea of internationality as an inter-national, rather than trans-national,⁸³ organization is evident, and the idea was very similar to that of Curtis. The domestic situations also supported the implementation of his policy to strengthen the National Councils. By 1933, most of the National Councils had established *national* headquarters,⁸⁴ and administrative correspondence was exchanged between national secretaries and the ISIPR.

⁸¹ The IPR, *Report of the International Secretariat to the Pacific Council, 1933-1936* ([New York]: the IPR, 1936), p.157.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p.8, (emphasis added).

⁸³ Transnational relations are defined as 'sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments'. See Introduction, note 22.

⁸⁴ The Australian Institute of International Affairs, an amalgamated body of national branches of the IPR and the RIIA, resolved to form the federal headquarters in late 1932.

What distinguished Carter's idea of the IPR as an international organization from that of Curtis was Carter's willingness to give more central power to the American Council. Carter maintained in 1936:

The American Council is the strongest of all the Councils formed for the regional study of the Pacific. It has served as a stimulus to most of the other Councils It is the only Council that has established the precedent of securing the service on its staff, for long periods, of scholars of other nationalities. If the Secretariat of the American Council develops along this line, it may be that in addition to being a national centre for the study of international affairs it will also become, in a modest way, an international centre of the study of international affairs.⁸⁵

Although this letter is not about the Secretariat, but research, Carter's positive attitudes to accept the American Council's 'international' character should be noted. The boundaries of the American Council and the ISIPR in a practical sense overlapped substantially under Carter's administration.

Carter saw locating major ISIPR staff in Asia as a part of the strengthening of the National Councils.⁸⁶ Probably this was a part of the strategy of countering the centrality of Honolulu office and building a strong centre in New York. On the other hand, officers who were posted to Asia had a strong regional perspective, and wanted to locate their posts in the region, not in New York. This was most evident in the case of new editor of *Pacific Affairs*, Owen Lattimore. On his appointment, Lattimore requested as a condition of acceptance that he could edit *Pacific Affairs* from Peking by correspondence, so that he could maintain field work and research. This was accepted and he did so until 1937.⁸⁷

William Holland, Research Secretary in Carter's administration, followed the line of Condliffe, who had insisted on the importance of local initiatives, rather than a strong centre in the USA. A new series of projects of the IPR in 1933-1936 was largely initiated by the Chairman and

⁸⁵ The IPR, *Report of the International Secretariat*, p.30.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p.49.

⁸⁷ O. Lattimore and F. Isono, *China Memoirs*, p.34.

Secretary of the Research Committee, and the list of the programs seems to be well-balanced, rather than dominated by American interests, in terms of geography, themes and scholars who carried out the research.⁸⁸

Like Condliffe, Holland valued local perspectives. He had travelled and been stationed in China, when he was Research Assistant in 1928–1932. When he was appointed as Research Secretary in 1933, he requested Carter to move the office to Tokyo. Holland thought it would 'strengthen East-West ties within the Institute' and that Tokyo had 'greater stability and better facilities for printing than Shanghai', a contested alternative.⁸⁹ The office opened in Spring 1934, and with the help of an American officer sent from New York, and the cooperation of the JCIPR members, Holland conducted his work as Research Secretary and Associate Editor of *Pacific Affairs* for almost a year. But then, he was asked by JCIPR members to leave: a request which he interpreted as resulting from government pressure.⁹⁰ Subsequently a publications office of the IPR was established in Shanghai in early 1937.⁹¹

After 1938, however, the office locations for these officers became more settled around New York. This was mainly a consequence of the difficulty of carrying out their duties in the war situation in China and Japan, rather than the result of Carter's instruction. Lattimore came back to the USA in 1938, and had a job at Johns Hopkins, where he continued his editorial work for *Pacific Affairs* until he became an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek in 1941. Holland also worked at the New York office, except for a year in Berkeley in 1940–1941.

A regional perspective was emphasized in the joint editorial of the first issue of the new *Pacific Affairs* in 1934, probably written by Lattimore:

[T]he Pacific ... is not a sufficiently well-integrated region to warrant exclusive regional consideration of its problems. Yet a large part of the world still thinks of East and West, of Orient and

⁸⁸ The IPR, *Report of the International Secretariat*, pp.115–129.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p.27.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.30.

⁹¹ P. Hooper ed., *Remembering the IPR*, Part One, p.33.

Occident, as natural antithesis, as if the world were in fact centred on the Atlantic, and as if the Pacific and the farther East were mere horizons of expansion. Such a view of the world has a *historic* validity of its own, but nevertheless it must be called eccentric, for an even larger part of the world posits the *continent* of Asia as the centre of the universe, with the West as mere external shell pushing down upon it. Such concepts, and such antithesis can be largely corrected by intensifying our consciousness of the Pacific as the *region from which both the common interests and the mutual antipathies of two major universes ... can best be understood.*⁹² (emphasis added)

Lattimore had not only been brought up and worked in China, but was also fluent in Mongol and Chinese. He insisted on travelling like the locals without servants, and he communicated with local people, gaining their trust and perspective as well as information. His background was reflected in the above quotation. Evident here is a serious challenge to the prevailing assumptions such as the East-West dichotomy and European centrality. The editorial goes on to argue the importance of regional-wide, as opposed to world-wide or national-wide, arrangements, and the role of the IPR in them.

International affairs can no longer be classified as concerning either the world as a whole or the restricted relations of definite national zones. They affect ... groups ... larger than the nations and smaller than the whole community of nations. The Institute of Pacific Relations is an outgrowth less of the instinct for creating international organs with arbitrary functions, than of the need for extra-national communication between national groups which have international interests. It is an organ for promoting information and understanding, not so much between nations as between groups or individuals within nations, and on a plane which is exactly international, but which transcends the national and does not attempt the universal.⁹³

This was almost a restatement of the original idea of the IPR, which seems to have been diluted by the direction of the ISIPR and conferences after 1933. It stated the regional perspective, the need for new attitudes to the Orient, and the individual, rather than official, capacity of the IPR, and

⁹² The Editors [O. Lattimore and et al], 'Comments and Opinion,' *Pacific Affairs* (March, 1934), pp.83-84.

⁹³ *Ibid*, p.84.

promoted the original line of being 'scientific'. Fact finding was the most important function and no political, social or economic doctrine should be expressed.

It did, however, reveal the contradiction contained in these principles. Although this editorial emphasized individual inter-action in the Pacific, it assumed a nation-state framework. It said: 'What is required is ... a feeling for the imponderables of *national* psychology'. This probably meant sensitivity in dealing with people with different backgrounds. Nevertheless, the assumption of national categories did lead articles to focus on *national* issues and *national* perspectives, rather than thematic perspective, and to discuss inter-national issues as inter-governmental ones.

This assumption of 'national' units was the very base of the IPR structure which Carter furthered. By 1936, it was clear that this structure had caused a serious problem for Lattimore in editing *Pacific Affairs*. He pointed out that the National Council could act 'intermittently as a censor instead of as a source of supply'.⁹⁴ He asked the question: 'Should the articles appearing in *Pacific Affairs* be regarded purely as individual expressions of opinion or should each article before final acceptance by the editor be endorsed by the approval of a national council or be subject to the veto of a national council?'⁹⁵ He warned that the structure based on the National Councils would lead *Pacific Affairs* to become a source of conflict, and he urged the Pacific Council to take a definite policy on editing.

From his point of view, the idea of *individual* articles was not compatible with the existence of the National Councils which functioned as sub-editors. The central editor should have independence to establish the journal as a free forum for opinions including criticism of the writers' own countries.⁹⁶ On the other hand, he knew that this policy would be very difficult because collecting articles and contacting authors was impossible without the help of the National Councils and because there

⁹⁴ The IPR, *Report of the International Secretariat*, p. 80.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.81.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.82.

was a natural tendency to self-restriction of criticism of their own countries.⁹⁷

The alternative to this policy was to continue the existing system of relying on the National Councils as the basic units. This would lead to an 'inevitable change in the whole character of *Pacific Affairs*', as Lattimore pointed out.

In spite of the wordings which define the Institute of Pacific Relations as an international association of national bodies, each of which is non-official in its own country and is designed to express as many as possible of the elements of public opinion in its own country, but not official government opinion, such an arrangement would convert *Pacific Affairs* into an organ for the expression of semi-official views.⁹⁸

Although Lattimore used the word 'convert', the original structure based on national units itself contained the danger which he pointed out here, and it was enhanced rather than decreased as time went on. As Lattimore warned, *Pacific Affairs* was involved in bitter conflicts over governmental policies. To prove its non-partisanship, he refrained from commenting on controversial articles and instead invited responses from readers.⁹⁹ While Carter did not give any specific instructions concerning the issues Lattimore raised in 1936, Carter's backing of Lattimore's conduct implies that he supported the direction of what Lattimore described as 'conversion'. Lattimore records: 'Carter was always my strong backer; and he also discreetly lobbied for me among the national delegates, and I stayed on with a renewed mandate'.¹⁰⁰

While Lattimore felt the need for a stronger central editorial board to make the journal 'unofficial' and 'individual' as opposed to 'national', Holland, as Research Secretary of the International Program, felt more need for attention to the interests of each National Council. Holland expressed the difficulty of strong central direction on two points. First,

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.83.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.82.

⁹⁹ R. Newman, *Owen Lattimore*, pp.27-28, 42 and 44-45.

¹⁰⁰ O. Lattimore and Isono F., *China Memoirs*, p.36.

there was within research programs, especially in cultural field, an assumption 'on the part of many Western national councils that Western civilization and economic organization were both desirable and inevitable for the East'.¹⁰¹ But more pressingly, it was difficult to get each National Council interested in a few common thematic issues initiated by the central committee and to persuade them of the implications of these issues beyond their national borders. 'Quite naturally investigators are often more concerned with local or national applications of their funding and are not anxious to distort studies to meet the needs of investigators in other countries', as Holland wrote.¹⁰² Perhaps 'distort' was not an appropriate word in this context, but this shows the sensitivity of 'international' research projects. He argued:

it is impossible to choose any one subject that will evoke the enthusiastic cooperation of all the groups An absolutely identical method of treatment is almost never possible without greatly impairing the local or national value of a given study.¹⁰³

Holland's opinion coincided with the general policy of Carter in strengthening the National Councils. Holland argued that the IPR should support the movement towards the National Councils' becoming the national centres of international affairs in each country. He also believed that the IPR should concentrate more on its international research work in the National Councils rather than other research bodies.¹⁰⁴

His sensitivity to the National Councils and questions about the direction taken by the Research Committee reflect his relativist approach. This attitude, however, was convenient for those who wanted to justify national policies. National centralization of research centres could also easily become a means of containing criticism of one's own national (governmental) policies. Up to 1936, research programs were mainly in relatively uncontroversial economic fields with a small expansion into studies of media and public opinion. But in 1937 Carter came up with the idea of a study of Sino-Japanese conflicts. This proposal exposed the

¹⁰¹ The IPR, *Report of the International Secretariat*, p.122.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p.121.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p.133.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p.137.

problem of the structure of the international research program, based on the National Councils presenting *national* perspectives, rather than on independent research institutions investigating certain issues. And it resulted in the withdrawal of the Japanese Council from the project, an issue to be discussed later.

At the ISIPR level, Carter's idea of 'internationality' was embodied in the scheme of staff interchange. He suggested this scheme in his initial plan to achieve 'truly international staff'.¹⁰⁵ Here again Carter used the rhetoric of strengthening the National Councils, because this scheme was carried out, not at the ISIPR office in Honolulu, but between the American Council in New York and other councils. On his visit to Tokyo in 1934, Carter arranged for a few members of the JCIPR to be stationed at the New York office, and three JCIPR members came to New York in 1935.¹⁰⁶ In a similar manner, young staff from other National Councils were sent to New York during Carter's period. The JCIPR continued this scheme at least until mid-1941, even after it had withdrawn from other IPR projects in 1939.¹⁰⁷

For Carter, this scheme contributed not only to the 'internationality' of the office, but also to its finances. He tended to employ young personnel, male and female, often soon after graduation. In this way, he provided not only a great opportunity for them, but also deployed enthusiastic talent at a relatively low cost. It was probably a necessary tactic for non-profit organizations such as the IPR. Condliffe had already used this method in 1928 to secure young talent at a low cost. Holland was first employed at US\$ 35 per week (\$ 1,900 per annum) when he was twenty-one; the salary which was raised to \$ 2,500 per annum in 1929.¹⁰⁸ Greene contributed a large sum to the Institute, rather than being paid for his Chairmanship of the Pacific Council and the ACIPR. In the 1930s, only a

¹⁰⁵ E. Carter, 'Tentative Note,' [August, 1933] Carter Papers, Box 1, BLCU.

¹⁰⁶ They were Takagi Yasaka, Uramatsu Samitarō and Matsukata Saburō. 'Carter's Visit to Japan, 1934,' OC, B-7, LHU.

¹⁰⁷ A Japanese staff member, Yasuo, was succeeded by others, Matsuo and Matsudaira, in September, 1940, and they probably worked until the break-out of the Pacific War in December in 1941. Carter to Cleeve, 25 September, 1940, CPR, Box 42/RIIA 1939, BLCU.

¹⁰⁸ P. Hooper ed., *Remembering the IPR*, Part One, pp.6-7.

few major positions such as Secretary General, at around US\$ 10,000 per year, the Editor of *Pacific Affairs*, at \$ 6,500 to 7,000 per year, and the Research Secretary, at around \$ 5,500 per year, were paid generously, but other clerical secretaries at the ISIPR were paid around \$ 1,500 per year.

This suggests the philanthropic rather than professional mentality of the Institute. The structure prevented bureaucratization, but the IPR remained a place of opportunity, rather than a place offering a secure career with a good income. The IPR still provided a great opportunity for quasi-diplomatic experience for aspiring young members both in the USA and other countries. The Rockefeller grants supported this scheme both directly and indirectly.¹⁰⁹

v) Education Schemes: Democratization and Americanization

Like many other Carter policies, the educational schemes of the IPR could also be explained by financial concerns, as one way to increase IPR funding was to appeal to wider audiences. This meant more sales of IPR publications and journals, and more donations. Also as a part of this widening audience, the membership and subscription fees were increased substantially. The original constitution of the ACIPR restricted the membership to 600, in order to preserve 'quality'. In 1936, the constitution was amended,¹¹⁰ and membership increased from 475 in 1935 to 1,300 in 1942.

At the same time, Carter was under criticism that the IPR was oriented only to a small circle of experts. Atherton accused the IPR of getting too academic and research-oriented and recommended that effort was required to make the results of IPR research serve a wider public.¹¹¹ What Atherton had in mind was influential people in business and public

¹⁰⁹ Jack Shepherd, the national secretary of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, arranged in 1938 to station himself at the ACIPR to do his research partially supported by the grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. Shepherd to Carter, 11 March 1938, CPR, Box 11/Australian Council, BLCU.

¹¹⁰ F. Field, 'Notice of Proposed Amendment to the Constitution of the American Council,' 17 November, 1936, RFnA/1.1/200/351/4175, RA.

¹¹¹ Atherton to Carter, 10 January, 1936, E-2/23, AUH.

office, as opposed to academics, and in this sense his vision was close to that of Curtis in 1929. While Carter emphasized research, as Greene did, this in no sense conflicted with the search for influential people as conference goers and supporters. Atherton and Carter, therefore, did not differ much on this issue.

Reaching a wider public was also achieved in Carter's period by promoting educational schemes. Significantly, this was exclusively an American project, carried out by the ACIPR. Adult and popular education was one of Carter's commitments before his involvement with the IPR, and one of his chief aims as Secretary General.¹¹² Carter, on his first visit to Britain, may have initially been influenced by the Workers' Educational Movement. A number of educational schemes were promoted. One was to educate teachers at tertiary and secondary level to enable the knowledge obtained through IPR research to reach the wider public.¹¹³ Other schemes included workshops on 'Far Eastern' problems at universities¹¹⁴ and language schools (Russian from 1933, and Chinese from 1937).¹¹⁵ The movement became more active as the war fear deepened in the 1940s.

In contrast to these efforts in the USA, public support for the IPR did not increase in other countries in the 1930s. Eggleston reported the failure of the Australian Council to get the public interested in IPR activities.¹¹⁶ The situation was similar in other countries. This was due to the nature of the organization. Membership was restricted to expert circles and steps to expand membership for subscription were not realized.¹¹⁷ International issues often remained too abstract and not immediate

¹¹² F. Field, *From Right to Left: An Autography* (Westport, Conn: Lawrence Hill, 1983), p.83. 'Interview of Walker and Stevens with Carter and Field, 4 October, 1934,' RFnA/1.1/200/350/4175, RA.

¹¹³ 'Report on Education, 1935,' included in the letter, Field to Mason, 12 November, 1935, RFnA/1.1/200/350/4174, RA.

¹¹⁴ One of these workshops took place at Mills College in San Francisco.

¹¹⁵ Annual meeting [of the ACIPR], 18 December, 1936, CPR, Box 1/ACIPR 1936, BLCU.

¹¹⁶ Eggleston to Carter, 15 July, 1935, CPR, Box 120/Australian Council, BLCU.

¹¹⁷ In order to increase the revenue for administration of the NSW branch of the Australian IIA, two alternatives were considered: increase of subscription fee of members; and expansion of membership. The Council decided to take the former choice. Minutes of the council meeting, 28 October, 1938, and 10 November, 1938, AIIA Papers, GC.

enough to divert attention from domestic political and economic crises. Furthermore, international links in the 1930s were often seen as suspect associations with socialists and communists, and the loyalties of members of organizations with international connections were questioned.

Publicity was another method of outreaching to the wider public. This applied not so much to the activities of the National Councils, but rather to those of IPR conferences. The publicity of the conference as a whole was widened in 1936. The conference was broadcast through the NBC. Major news agencies, such as UP and AP, and papers from the USA, Japan and China reported the conference extensively.¹¹⁸

At another level, however, there was a more closed atmosphere. Round Table sessions were closed from the conference in 1927, and previous chapters showed that this created disputes among participants as well as journalists. Carter followed this practice at Yosemite in 1936, and the press was not allowed to attend Round Table sessions.¹¹⁹ A journalist from Honolulu noticed more governmental influence in the conference. Because of the prominence of national groups, he thought, the conference mainly conducted diplomatic discussions. Despite the wide coverage of the conference over all, the majority of internal politicking of the IPR occurred in the closed sessions.¹²⁰

The loss of publicity and the increasing official element went hand in hand at IPR conferences. The conference of 1936 was the last one open to publicity before WWII. The next conference in 1939 focused on strategic policies of various countries over Sino-Japanese conflicts, and the press was shut out. During WWII, the practice of secrecy and official-orientation became stronger.

vi) The "Inquiry" and the Japanese Withdrawal

¹¹⁸ Loomis to Atherton, 21 August, 1936, E-3a/12, AUH.

¹¹⁹ 'Appendix VI: Conference Organization and Administrative Decisions,' in W. L. Holland et al eds., *Problems of the Pacific, 1936*, p.458.

¹²⁰ Riley Allen to Atherton, 1 September, 1936, E-3a/12, AUH.

The Sino-Japanese conflicts did not change, but intensified the existing nature of the IPR. Already at the time of the third conference at Kyoto in 1929, tension between Japan and China over Manchuria was high following the assassination of Chang Tso-lin, a powerful warlord, by the Japanese Kwantung army. The conference became a battle between Japanese and Chinese groups over the incident. Matsuoka Yōsuke, then Deputy President of the South Manchurian Railway Company, rejected the Chinese claim that Chang Tso-lin was assassinated by the Japanese army.¹²¹ Participants defended or justified their national policies, whether or not they were involved in actual foreign policy-making or military command. The practice was not new at IPR conferences, but only intensified as Sino-Japanese conflicts grew. Just before the fourth conference at Hangchow in 1931, Japan started military intervention in Manchuria, which was the beginning of the long lasting war leading to WWII.

The conflicts did not change the nature or function of internationalists at the JCIPR, but did affect the external status quo of the Japanese government. From the time of the Hara Cabinet (1918–1921) at least until the Wakatsuki cabinet (April to December 1931) the Japanese government supported the status quo of the League of Nations and the Washington Treaty. But after the conflict of 1931, the government was less committed to the international order. What the Japanese called the “Manchurian Incident” led to the creation of a puppet regime, Manchukuo, and the Japanese government rejected the intervention of a third party, the League of Nations, and decided to withdraw from the League.¹²² For other countries, that was a challenge to the status quo of the international order. JCIPR members did not criticize the government’s acceptance of the incident, but instead they sought a way to combine two seemingly incompatible arguments: to justify Japanese policies in China, and yet to fit into the existing order. Although some have argued that Japanese internationalists ‘converted’ from internationalism to nationalism during

¹²¹ Eggleston among other participants believed Matsuoka’s claim. F. Eggleston, ‘Australia and the Pacific,’ *The [Melbourne] Herald*, 27 December, 1929.

¹²² For a role played by members of the JCIPR, see I. Nish, *Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1993), pp.181–182.

the "Manchurian Incident",¹²³ the example of Rōyama, a member of the JCIPR, shown in Chapter Three, suggests that Japanese internationalists did not give up the attempt to fit into the existing order. In the new context, they sought a new explanation of their dual loyalty/identity to the international community and their own nation. And this duality did not appear suddenly around 1933, but existed right from the beginning of the internationalist movement in Japan.

JCIPR members did not give up their activities at the IPR. In fact, after the Japanese withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, IPR conferences became more important because they were one of the very few international forums in which the Japanese government could attempt to 'correct' misunderstandings of Japanese policies. After 1933, the Japanese government sought an alternative international order in the Pacific, and JCIPR members presented proposals for an alternative regional diplomatic machinery independent from the League at IPR conferences in 1933.¹²⁴ Governmental involvement in this plan was criticized by other participants, and failed to win their support.¹²⁵

The Sino-Japanese conflict highlighted the problems inherent in the international order and the original structure of the IPR based on that order. As suggested in Chapter Four, relations between the League of Nations and the regional arrangements remained ambivalent in the discussions of the IPR conferences of the 1920s. This problem was clarified by the Sino-Japanese conflicts and the subsequent action of the JCIPR.

While the JCIPR emphasized regional independence from the League system, Carter wanted the IPR to play an important role in integrating the Pacific into the 'world' system. He maintained that the Sino-Japanese conflict had global implications, and proposed an investigative study, the

¹²³ This was a popular interpretation by contemporaries as well as scholars. Mitani T.

Taishō demokurashiron: Yoshino Sakuzō no jidai to sonogo (Chūō kōronsha, 1984), p.236.

¹²⁴ Takagi Yasaka and Yokota Kisaburō, 'A Security Pact for the Pacific Area,' in Bruno Lasker and W. L. Holland eds., *Problems of the Pacific, 1933*, pp.441-450.

¹²⁵ Saitō Makoto et al eds., *Amerika sei o motomete: Takagi Yasaka no shōgai* (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1985), p.71.

"Inquiry". It was a study to examine the Sino-Japanese conflict from various points of view in order to prepare for a future peace conference. Carter was probably trying to do for the Pacific region what Colonel House had done in creating the "Inquiry" group for the Paris Peace Conference. As the Japanese government opposed the League's intervention, the JCIPR opposed Carter's Inquiry. Negotiations were carried on between Carter and the JCIPR in 1938 and 1939, but failed to reach agreement.¹²⁶ The JCIPR decided to withdraw from the Inquiry project, and to carry out an independent study series on the issue. The JCIPR did not, however, cut affiliation with the IPR. In fact, they felt that withdrawal from the project was the only way to continue that affiliation.¹²⁷

Although the JCIPR suspected an anti-Japanese bias at the ISIPR,¹²⁸ it is difficult to say that it was based on individual 'prejudice' of certain officers. The anti-Japan stance of the ISIPR reflected not only Carter's position but the sentiment of members of the ACIPR and the general public in the USA. The IPR was founded in order to solve the anti-Japanese immigration issue, therefore it contained pro-Japan people, including Davis and Greene. At the same time, it included many missionary members whose commitment and attachment to China was stronger than their sympathy towards Japan. Although it did not have missionary experience in China, Carter's attachment to China was great. He enthusiastically helped the mass education movement in China from 1928. Compassion for China among ACIPR members grew as Japanese military actions intensified. Especially after reports of the Nanjing Massacre, even strong Japan-supporters, such as Thomas Lamont and Jerome Greene, changed their attitudes.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ Jessup to Carter, 24 August, 1939, CPR, Box 151/Japanese Council 2, BLCU.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, and Ushiba to Carter, n. d. [late 1939], TYB, 94/39, ACTU.

¹²⁸ Saionji to Carter, 5 April, 1938, OC, A-4/Pacific Council, 1938-39, LHU, and 'Takayanagi Yasuho ryōshi yorino ri kaidan narabini sono torikime nikansuru shōsai hōkoku,' [Detailed report by Takayanagi and Yasuho on Lee conference and its resolutions], 23 August, 1938, TYB, 91/4, ACTU.

¹²⁹ Ron Chernow, *The House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of Modern Finance* (New York: Touchstone, 1990), pp. 343-345. W. F. Kuehl ed., *Biographical Dictionary of Internationalist* (London: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 299. Even already in 1933, G. Wickersham, who organized the movement against Japanese discrimination in 1924, was disheartened by the activities of the Japanese military in China: 'Japan had thrown away the good will which she built up among our people'.

If there was a fault on Carter's part, it was his autocratic manner of pursuing the 'Inquiry' project. By mid-1937, Carter already had the idea of the Inquiry project.¹³⁰ However, in April 1938, a staff member at the JCIPR claimed that there had so far been no consultation with the JCIPR.¹³¹ On Carter's instructions, Holland actually travelled to Japan to notify the JCIPR of the project in late 1937. But Carter gave Holland only a general and sketchy account, and entrusted him with the difficult task of notifying the JCIPR in a way which would not 'alarm them or give too many details'.¹³² This created a frustration and mistrust on the part of the JCIPR which Holland could not help. JCIPR members also discovered that Carter had told the RIIA, which was cautious about the proposed project, that he had already received a favourable response from the JCIPR.¹³³ A JCIPR delegate recorded in 1939 that he felt a lack of honesty on Carter's part in negotiations on the details.¹³⁴

The JCIPR argued against the project on the grounds that it betrayed 'traditions' of IPR research. By 'traditions', it meant three main points: unofficial studies for IPR conferences; the allocation of the study of individual countries to the relevant National Councils; and control of the Pacific Council over the project.¹³⁵ The JCIPR's criticism claimed that the project was an 'official' study in preparation for a governmental conference, and that the ISIPR, which was by then almost identical to the ACIPR, held the power of policy-making, not the executive body of national representatives. Although emphasizing the importance of the private capacity of the study, Carter argued that the study was important

Wickersham to Carter, 16 January, 1933, CPR, Box 115/Wickersham, BLCU.

Wickersham was not involved in the IPR (see Chapter Two), but the change of his attitude to Japan reflected the atmosphere among his colleagues in New York at that time.

¹³⁰ Carter to Ruth and Orrick, 16 August, 1937, Carter Papers, Box 5, BLCU.

¹³¹ Saionji to Carter, 5 April, 1938, OC, A-4/Pacific Council, 1938-39, LHU.

¹³² P. Hooper ed., *Remembering the IPR*, Part One, pp.36-37.

¹³³ 'Kàtā shi to chatamu hausu no secchū ni tsuite, 23 August, 1938,' [On negotiation between Carter and Chatham House], TYB, 91/2, ACTU.

¹³⁴ Takagi to Carter, 2 February, 1939, CPR, Box 33/Takagi, BLCU.

¹³⁵ Takagi Y., 'Re the International Secretariat Inquiry, December, 1938,' TYB, 95-2/13, ACTU.

for the government's use.¹³⁶ Unlike Colonel House, who was given the instructions from President Wilson to form the 'expert' group outside the government for the Paris Conference, Carter took an initiative to promote the IPR to the same status without any instructions from Roosevelt.

3) The War and the IPR

WWII enhanced, rather than changed, the existing trends within the IPR, which were caused by its original setting and intensified in the 1930s. It became even more national-oriented, government-oriented, secretive and Americanized.

The ACIPR put greater emphasis on external issues concerned with American 'national interests' rather than those 'promoting mutual understanding between the countries'. Frederick Field, Secretary of the ACIPR in 1934-1940, stated in 1938:

The American Council is intimately concerned with one of the major areas of conflict, an area toward which American people have a particular interest and responsibility [T]he existence in the United States of an organization like an American Council, able continuously to interpret current events ..., makes it possible for the leading writers, educators, businessmen and officials to keep far better informed than would otherwise be possible.¹³⁷

From the beginning, the ACIPR always dealt with applications for grants both for the American Council and the Pacific Council. The above quotation was from an application for the former, and therefore its 'national' emphasis is understandable. But previous applications had put greater emphasis on international activities, while after 1938 the rhetoric of national interests became much more distinct.

The ISIPR and ACIPR became more indistinguishable, and the centrality of the USA in IPR conferences became more evident. Carter was involved with several forums on "American policies in the Far East", organized by

¹³⁶ Carter to Dulles, 6 December, 1937, Carter Papers, Box 5, BLCU.

¹³⁷ Field to Walker, 21 November, 1938, RFnA/1.1/200/351/4176, RA.

various branches of the American Council, and these forums became the basis for IPR gatherings in the early 1940s.

For Carter, the most significant incident was not Pearl Harbour, but the Berlin Pact of 1936. He thought that the pact proved his long-held thesis: the importance of the work of the IPR for the rest of the world. Carter argued that this pact made one realize 'the neglect of the Far East and the Pacific in the schools, universities, the press and research institutions' and it became 'plain that the two wars [in Europe and Asia] were inextricably linked'.

This ignorance was the result of 'the tradition of looking at the Far Eastern problems through European glasses':

Under these circumstances the Institute's work seems more essential to the American public today than ever before. The American Council's close affiliation with a group of national councils ... constitutes an added obligation to press forward with its essential task.¹³⁸

Here, the centrality of the American Council, and of American interests and responsibility is strikingly demonstrated. In 1946, the IPR changed its name to the American Institute of Pacific Relations; symbolizing the virtual merger between the ISIPR and the ACIPR which had been in defacto existence from the mid 1930s.

National interests always held priority over any other cause at the IPR, and in war time, this priority became much clearer than before. Just like JCIPR members, IPR members in other countries were also nationalist in this crisis. Immediately after the Japanese attack on the Pearl Harbour, Ray Wilbur, Chairman of the American Council again, announced:

[T]he American Councils of the Institute of Pacific Relations must define the course ... in the emergency [T]he war situation, far from negating the purpose of the Council, lends new and crucial importance to its program of study and widespread discussion of the issues at stake The immediate job of the American people is

¹³⁸ Carter to Fosdick, 20 November, 1940, RFnA/1.1/200/351/4177, RA.

the prosecution of war against the military imperialism of Japan and the other Axis powers In support of this aim the American Council pledges its full resources. It is making available to all agencies, public and private, its libraries, its publications, and the service of its staff in meeting the unprecedented need for reliable information and analysis.¹³⁹

The War boosted the status of the IPR tremendously particularly in the USA, and to a lesser extent in other countries. Recognition of and demand for IPR works increased substantially.¹⁴⁰ Governments and the public realized the importance of its work on little known, but important areas, and made the existence of the IPR indispensable. At the same time, because of its significance, it was mobilized for official duties. Although some staff resisted the shift of the entire office to Washington D. C.,¹⁴¹ the IPR founded a branch office there in 1940. Many staff and members of the ISIIPR and the ACIPR worked for the government, and it became very official in its functions and personnel.¹⁴²

The situation was similar in other countries. Some members of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, the merged body of the Australian branches of the RIIA and the IPR, worked in intelligence agencies for the government.¹⁴³ In Britain, the headquarters of the RIIA was moved to Oxford for intelligence work with other government departments,¹⁴⁴ and a government grant was given to the RIIA.¹⁴⁵

¹³⁹ R. L. Wilbur, 'The American Council and the War,' 17 December, 1941, RFnA/1.1/200/351/4178, RA.

¹⁴⁰ The Rockefeller Foundation recorded at the end of 1942: 'The events of today re-emphasize the value of the IPR'. Sales of the ACIPR's publications have increased 140 percent in 1942. The IPR was seen a sole 'competent agency' to provide 'information and a comprehensive analysis of the problems of the Pacific'. [Resolution], 2 December, 1942, RFnA/1.1/200/351/4179, RA.

¹⁴¹ F. Field, *From Right to Left*, p.125.

¹⁴² The IPR has 'responded to heavy demands from Washington for advice and assistance,' and the office in Washington was for 'maintaining a close liaison with government agencies'. [Resolution], 2 December, 1942, RFnA/1.1/200/351/4179, RA. The Office of War Information recruited staff of the ISIIPR, such as W. Holland and O. Lattimore.

¹⁴³ William Forsyth, 'The Pre-war Melbourne Group of the Australian Institute of International Affairs: Some Personal Recollections,' *Australian Outlook*, Vol.28, No.1 (April, 1978), p.44.

¹⁴⁴ Cleeve to Carter, 30 March, 1940, and 22 April, 1940, CPR, Box 42/RIIA 1939, BLCU.

¹⁴⁵ Carter to Cleeve, 6 May, 1940, CPR, Box 42/RIIA 1939, BLCU.

Members of the JCIPR also worked as administrators at public posts, assisting the war effort.

IPR conferences between 1939 to 1945 became unofficial forums for the Allied countries.¹⁴⁶ The IPR conference in 1936 was the last at which the agenda focussed mainly on economic issues, in which Japanese members participated, which was held on the Pacific Coast, and which maintained the rhetoric of the 'unofficial' status of participants. Hitler's attack on Poland in September 1939 made the ISIPR's contact with the ICIPR difficult, as Japan had signed the Axis Treaty with Germany. Coupled with the disagreements over the Inquiry series, the JCIPR did not attend the 'conference' at Virginia Beach in 1939. Due to this unusual situation, the gathering was called a 'study meeting'. The JCIPR still held a veto power over the decision of the Pacific Council meeting according to the Constitution, therefore it was decided that no formal meeting should take place in 1939. The veto power of the JCIPR was eliminated at the next conference in 1942.¹⁴⁷ All these elements enabled the IPR forums to serve the interests of the Allied countries.

The conferences in 1939-1945 were distinct in the following ways: they were all held away from the Pacific coast; they mainly discussed strategic issues; and they were attended by officials.¹⁴⁸ The 1939 'meeting' was much more heavily focused on European developments due to the circumstances of the day.¹⁴⁹ The official element was already strong in 1939, and the 1942 conference was explicitly a meeting of government officials.¹⁵⁰ In 1942 and 1945, the issues of post-war reconstruction in the

¹⁴⁶ On the discussion topics, see Appendix A.

¹⁴⁷ P. Hooper ed., *Remembering the IPR*, Part One, pp.40-41.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.46 and 66. See the list of attendants. 'Part VI: Conference Membership,' in [The IPR ed.], *War and Peace in the Pacific* (New York: The ISIPR, 1943), pp.154-152, and 'Appendix III: Conference Membership,' in [The IPR ed.], *Security in the Pacific* (New York: The ISIPR, 1945), pp.149-161.

¹⁴⁹ P. Hooper ed., *Remembering the IPR*, Part One, p.41.

¹⁵⁰ It did cause concern about 'official nature' of the conferences in this period. But it became an accepted practice. In 1943, the NSW branch of the Australian IIA noted: 'it sees no reason to stress unduly the need for complete independence from reasonable government assistance in the case of future delegations. All the other delegations at the conference were frankly sponsored by the governments'. 'Report of the Council of the NSW Branch to the 14th Annual Meeting for the Year Ending June 30th 1943,' 26, July, 1943, AIIA Papers, GC.

'Far East' and the United Nations were discussed, and the IPR network was thought important by diplomats in influencing decisions on these issues in Washington D. C.¹⁵¹ Furthermore, the conference documents were now secret and prepared for the government, and were not generally available to the public.¹⁵² This meant increased power for the IPR and its forums, but ironically led to its decline after the war.

Outside of these conferences, however, the war propaganda by the ACIPR was oriented to the wider public in the USA, and adult education took this form. The ACIPR provided many booklets on countries in the region, which were read by members of military forces and in schools. As many as 200,000 war-time pamphlets were distributed to the army.¹⁵³ Not only seeking to propagate 'correct' knowledge of Asia, the ACIPR also aimed to cultivate strategic, economic and social relations with other Allied countries such as Australia and New Zealand. The latter line was pursued by a pamphlet called "Meet the ANZAC".

While determining the nature of the post-war internationalism of various organizations, the IPR forums in this period saw the beginning of anti-colonialism in Asia. In order to achieve victory for the Allied Forces, the support of countries in Asia was crucial. Reflecting that thinking, one official forum organized by the IPR in 1942 included members from China, India, Netherlands Eastern Indies, and the Philippines, who voiced the importance of abolishing white supremacy in Asia.¹⁵⁴ This was an assertion of opposition to European colonial rule, the very base of the international order in the inter-war period. American members joined the attack on European colonialism at the conferences of 1942 and 1945, annoying and often angering members from Britain, France and

151 Watt noted 'the increasingly official character' of the IPR: 'By far the greatest value of these meetings ... is in the contacts I make. The IPR in this country is now in close contact with all relevant Embassies and Legations, which regard the IPR's work of sufficient importance to make it desirable that some official representative should attend its meetings'. Watt to Hodgson, 1 December, 1943, M1942; 6, AA.

152 Watt to Sluck, 28 December, 1943, M1942, 2, AA.

153 'The IPR in War Time,' 11 August, 1942, RFnA/1.1/200/350/4179, RA.

154 The forum was called Princeton Conference which took place in 28 February to 1 March, 1942, and was attended by fifty-eight government officials. JBK to JHW, 3 March, 1942, RFnA/1.1/200/350/4179, RA.

Holland.¹⁵⁵ They considered withdrawal from the IPR, and Holland suspects that the resignation of Carter from Secretary General was caused by the pressure from these groups.¹⁵⁶ Thus, during WWII the existing trends within the IPR intensified. At the same time, however, WWII provided the opportunity for challenging the colonial framework, one of the features of the international order which had been uncritically accepted at the IPR. Another feature, the nation-state, however, remained unchallenged.

¹⁵⁵ P. Hooper ed., *Remembering the IPR*, Part One, pp. 45-46 and 66.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.67.

Conclusion

What has emerged from this thesis is a shift of perspective within the IPR from 'regionalism' to 'globalism'. Although the IPR pioneered the creation of a region-oriented and relativist organization, as the period progressed, key administrative figures in the USA tried to make the IPR a world-oriented and more universalist organization. The move reflected their strong sense of a centre outside the Pacific, namely on the East Coast of the USA, a perception which became dominant in the discourse of international politics after WWII.

The IPR was born in a context where the sense of centre was ambiguous because of the perception of the decline of Europe and the rise of the USA and Japan. These elements contributed to creating the dynamism and potential symbolized by the term the "Pacific Age". The initiative of defining this new age was taken by Americans. Their proposal for new attitudes to the 'Orient' and the foundation of the IPR were born of this dynamism. Overlooking the colonial framework, the terminology the "Pacific community" suggested equal partnership in the region. With this paradigm, the IPR achieved certain success at the first few conferences.

The key to this success was the lack of a sense of strong centre among participants. A crucial characteristic was their scepticism towards modernity, industrialization, materialism and individualism, which reflected a general awareness of political and economic crises in their own societies. They were conscious of an East-West dichotomy, and in this sense, they were Orientalist. But their Orientalism was based on a sense of 'difference' which did not necessarily imply the moral superiority of the 'West'. As a result, at the first few conferences participants of Euro-American background did not attempt to impose certain values and systems on the 'others'. At the same time, however, this sense of 'difference' enhanced a strong sense of self. This kind of Orientalism, based on 'difference', therefore, was not exercised for purposes of domination in external politics, but contributed to the strengthening monolithic definitions of 'national' character in domestic politics.

This limited success was soon undermined by an inability to challenge the assumptions of the colonial and the nation-state framework, and by the emergence of a strong centre in New York. A clear distinction existed between the Orient with and without power, and the imagined Pacific community was a community of powers. This power structure meant that the issues concerning the Orient were not dealt with as a matter of the general principle of racial equality, but as a matter of specific inter-governmental policies.

At the same time, the IPR lost its sense of regional-centrality. Despite the excitement in the first two conferences, the IPR did not contribute to the institutionalization of, or even initiate an agenda for, a Pacific community. Proposals for regional arrangements, such as a regional disarmament plan by an Australian member or a regional diplomatic arrangement suggested as an alternative to the League of Nations by Japanese members, did not gain much support or attention either at conferences or at the International Secretariat of the IPR (ISIPR). Symbolically the ISIPR was moved to New York against the aspirations of those who wished to keep it in the Pacific. Physically sharing an office with the American Council of the IPR, the ISIPR strengthened its American-centrality. This American centrality was intensified at IPR conferences in the 1930s and during WWII, and was apparent in the discussions of strategic issues over 'Far Eastern' conflicts and post-war reconstructions in the 'Far East'. American centrality became dominant in the discourse of international politics after WWII.

'Globalists' in the IPR, the more world-oriented members and strong Wilsonians, did not question the nature of the 'international order'. While E. H. Carr argued in 1939 that the international order meant the preservation of the status quo set by the dominant powers, a majority of IPR members accepted that the order 'existed out there', and saw their role as being to defend that order and the League of Nations. As the thesis has demonstrated, however, the power structure of the international order was problematized at the Japanese Council of the IPR (JCIPR). For those who supported the dominant power structure, only certain kinds of

'nationalism' were a challenge to the structure. While the result of the Tokyo Tribunal after WWII determined the guilty image of Japanese 'nationalists', they were 'guilty' not only for Japanese military aggression in Asia, but more importantly for challenging the 'existing' international order. In the 1930s, JCIPR members did not 'convert' to 'nationalism' from 'internationalism'. From the beginning of internationalist movements in Japan, the duty of internationalists was to make Euro-American powers understand Japanese policies: what they called the 'Japanese perspective'. The IPR was an important tool for them to achieve that goal, and its significance increased, especially after the Japanese withdrawal from the League of Nations. Some JCIPR members, however, started to question the rationale of preserving the international order. The more reform-oriented JCIPR members were, the more sceptical they became of the status quo domestically and externally. And this led them to support the new order in East Asia, which Euro-American powers saw as a challenge to the 'existing' international order.

While the strong nation-state assumption posed a 'problem' for the JCIPR, the whole IPR assumed the existence of the nation-state system, and incorporated this system into its institution. The second Secretary General pursued this incorporation with particular enthusiasm, but it was also evident from the very start. The institution was based on national units, National Councils. Conferences and research programs were organized through National Councils. Although research programs posed common themes, they did not create transnational alliances concerning common interests. Instead, research was carried out independently by national groups, and a 'national perspective' was not only expected, but emphasized and valued.

To support this nation-state basis further, national unity was assumed in the discourse at the IPR. The nation was personified in discussions, and monolithic 'national' cultures were constructed and reinforced. The complexity of domestic politics was often underestimated as a result. A sense of 'national' representation was strong among participants, and this was related to the concepts of intellectual elite of the time, and to their sense of 'public' duty. Being members of the elite, participants believed in

their public service to the community, and the ultimate object of this service was their nation-state. While presenting a 'national' view did not necessarily mean presenting a governmental view, the former was often perceived as identical to the latter. Rather than being free individuals representing their own views, they represented *national interests*, and more precisely their government. This made the 'discussion' at IPR conferences and in *Pacific Affairs* an exercise of justification or criticism of governmental policies. Some did this voluntarily, and others, such as JCIPR members, were under closer supervision from the government. It was difficult to express 'free individual' opinion, not only because of governmental control, but also because of the assumptions of the nation-state in the operation at the IPR.

While 'globalist' trends became increasingly dominant within the IPR, the thesis has also suggested the significance of the role of the IPR in pioneering 'regionalist' perspectives in the inter-war period. This dimension of the IPR attracted thinkers whose visions were ahead of the times in their respective countries. For example, some Australian members of the IPR voiced the need for closer relations with the region, especially for trade relations with Japan, which was far-sighted, and was eventuated only in the 1950s. The IPR pioneered 'contemporary' Asian studies in the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, France and Holland, as it did American studies in Japan and probably in China. It was a time when not many knew about 'contemporary' Asia, and few were interested in the subject. Some of the regional specialists read the native languages and understood the political, economic and social contexts of these countries through native sources. To see things in the local context, not from some centre far away from the region, was something to which the IPR, unlike many other institutions at the time, contributed. While the IPR reflected and contributed to the dominant assumption-making in international politics, at the same time, it also prepared the ground to question 'Western' domination, and inevitably the colonial framework.

Furthermore, the thesis has illuminated the implications of the IPR experiment as a 'non-governmental foreign affairs experts organization'. The IPR aimed to influence public opinion, which IPR members believed

to play a greater role in foreign policy making after WWI. It did not, therefore, aim to be a part of policy-making at the government. Nor did it aim to be a part of social movements. It concentrated on a small number of leading public figures, and provided 'scientific data' in a hope that this would create a 'correct' understanding of foreign affairs among the public. In this sense, the IPR fulfilled its objectives, but at the same time, its influence was limited as a result of these objectives.

Was there a place for thinkers in public affairs, as a Wilsonian, Zimmern, had argued in 1930? Did the IPR enhance the position of non-official thinkers in public affairs? The thesis has shown that the IPR promoted the position of thinkers by making them closer intellectually and institutionally to officials. Beside those who were interested in the region, the IPR attracted the type of thinkers who were ambitious for influence over policy-making. But power meant proximity to the government, and the IPR encouraged this proximity by focusing on strategic issues relevant to government policy. The "Inquiry" of Colonel House for the Paris Peace Conference marked the beginning of the promotion of non-official thinkers into policy-making in the USA. The "Inquiry" by the IPR intended to do the same, but while this effort to influence 'American' foreign policy-making enhanced the power of the organization, it was also a cause of its decline after WWII.

The move to 'professionalize' the IPR as an organization of non-governmental foreign affairs experts was clear in every step it took. Like other new professional organizations, the IPR emphasized scientific methods and objectivity. In the process, however, it abandoned the possibilities of promoting an issue-oriented structure, which could have led to transnational alliances. Women, religious groups, natural scientists, labour movement leaders and business people re-directed their activities into other organizations, and the IPR became more and more dominated by a type of male foreign affairs expert who often pursued a career as a high official. This enhanced the nation-oriented, as opposed to issue-oriented, structure of the IPR. This may have been due not only to IPR policies, but also to the national mobilization process in the context of the political and economic crisis of the 1930s. Issues concerning working

classes, women, religion and business were often suppressed under 'national' interests, not only at international conferences, but also in domestic contexts.

The National Councils of the IPR had achieved status as authoritative commentators on regional affairs by the late 1930s, although the degree of this authority differed from one country to another. In order to utilize their expertise outside of the universities, these non-official regional experts at the IPR had to wait for the Pacific War. The strength of non-official specialists and their organizations depended on the nature of the national official bureaucracy and the magnitude of the crisis. Some JCIPR members were recruited in the 1930s to what is now called a 'think tank', and played a crucial role in policy-making until the end of 1940. This was a response both to the strong initiative of political leaders and to the perception of crisis. In other countries, the urgent sense of crisis only emerged at the time of the break out of WWII. In the USA, the official bureaucracy was relatively open to non-official specialists, which led to the controversial influence of the IPR in the war time. Australian members of the IPR exercised influence both as non-official public figures and government bureaucrats. Outside of the universities, the expertise of IPR members was utilized almost exclusively by the government, not by private enterprises.

Zimmern argued that there was greater need to create opportunities for thinkers to participate in public affairs in international organizations than in domestic ones, because in the nation-state, established organizations already existed. The problem of the bureaucracy of the United Nations suggests that the days when outside expert thinkers had much influence over a small bureaucracy have gone. The thesis has suggested, however, that the IPR contributed to training not only national public servants, but also international public servants who went to the League of Nations, and later the United Nations and various IGOs and INGOs. The IPR constructed an intellectual and institutional paradigm for these people, as well as establishing the pattern of their life styles. The thesis has not only demonstrated the historicity of the dominant assumptions in the discourse of international politics, but has also illustrated this

construction of the intellectual and institutional paradigm of non-governmental multinational organizations in the inter-war period, and the problems created by this paradigm.

The arguments of this thesis were based on the documents of three countries only, and may not be applicable beyond these three countries. A study of the Chinese Council of the IPR has yet to be carried out, and will be fascinating because of the contrast with Japan as another Oriental power, and because of China's position in relation to the League of Nations and the international order, its relations with the USA and its domestic political, economic and social conflicts.

Further studies are also needed to examine the historical and contemporary contexts of foreign affairs experts in Asia; their social and intellectual background, their positions in society and government, the degree of national mobilization, their attitudes to and perception of the 'international community' and their relations to multinational organizations. Analysis of such domestic historical, political, economic and social contexts are vital for evaluating the implications of various regional and global arrangements in the region.

Wilsonian dilemma largely remains intact. The nation-state system still presents the significant problem to current International Governmental Organizations and INGOs. No such organization can be free from domestic political constraints. The system is still problematic in terms of the role of non-official thinkers in international affairs. These thinkers need proximity to power in order to exert influence, and 'power' in most cases means the government. This proximity to the government often decreases their ability to criticize and initiate agendas in opposition to it.

A possible solution to this dilemma may lie in the deconstruction of the assumption of the monolithic nature of the nation-state. In the inter-war period, the nation-state was perceived as absolute, and even after WWII this assumption was not challenged. In this framework, people were assumed to identify themselves ultimately with the nation-state. This attitude was strengthened in times of crisis. But nationality is not the only

form of identity. At any one time any individual belongs to several identity categories, such as gender, class, age or religion. One's identity can, therefore, be multi-layered. Alternatives to nation-based identification are not only possible, but also could be a crucial starting point for creating issue-oriented multinational projects and organizations. This would help free participants of multinational projects from representing coherent 'national' interests. IGOs and INGOs could then become more issue-oriented, rather than nation-oriented, and they would be better able to address a variety of needs and interests rather than only 'national' interests.

While practicality is important in such reforms of the status quo, the rethinking of certain assumptions which are seen as absolutes in the status quo is the essential first step. Although it might create other boundaries, this would push people beyond existing intellectual and physical frontiers.

Appendix A

IPR Conferences

The First Conference 1925, 30 June–14 July Honolulu (USA)

Main agenda: Immigration and inter-racial problems

Round Table Discussions¹: Immigration, Inter-racial relations,
The role of religion and missionaries in
inter-racial and international relations,
Industrialization in the Far East, Custom, tariff
and foreign loans, National economic policies
throughout the Pacific, The government
diplomatic organizations in the Pacific
countries

The Second 1927, 15–29, July Honolulu (USA)

Main agenda: China's foreign relations, Food and population

Round Table Discussions: Tariff autonomy in China, Extra-territoriality in
China, Foreign Concessions and settlements in
China, Foreign missions and Pacific relations,
Population and food supply, Industrialization
and foreign investment, Immigration and
emigration in the Pacific, Diplomatic relations in
the Pacific, International education and
communication, The Pacific mandates,
The future of the Institute

The Third 1929, 23 October–9 November

Kyoto (Japan)

Main agenda: China's foreign relations and the Manchurian issue

Round Table Discussions: The machine age and traditional culture, Food
and population in the Pacific, Industrialization
in the Pacific countries, China's foreign relations,
The financial reconstruction of China,
The problems of Manchuria,
Diplomatic relations in the Pacific

¹ Because the topics of the Round Tables and Forums for the first conferences account for twenty seven, this list is a summary of these topics. From the second conference, the topics are listed as they are in the proceedings unless specified.

The Fourth

1931, 21 October–2 November

Hangchow and Shanghai
(China)Main agenda: Economic relations in the Pacific
China's economic developmentRound Table Discussions: Economic relations in the Pacific, China's economic
development, Political relations in the Pacific, China's
international relations, Cultural relations in the Pacific**The Fifth**

1933, 14–26 August Banff (Canada)

Main agenda: Economic conflict and control in the Pacific

Round Table Discussions: Economic conflict and control, Shipping in the Pacific,
Instability of currency, Differences of standards of living,
Differences in labour standards, Japanese expansion, the
United States recovery program, China's reconstruction
program, Ottawa: A cooperative attempt at recovery,
Economic conflict and public opinion**The Sixth**

1936, 15–29, August Yosemite (USA)

Main agenda: Aims and results of social and economic policies in Pacific countries

Round Table Discussions²: Trade and trade rivalry between the USA and Japan,
Factors affecting the recent industrial development of
Japan, The resources and economic development of
the Soviet Far East, The reconstruction movement
in China, The working of diplomatic machinery
in the Pacific**The Seventh**

1939, 18 November–2 December

(Study meeting for the proposed Inquiry series Virginia Beach (USA)

Main agenda: The Far Eastern conflict

Round Table Discussions: The position of Japan and China,
Third parties in the Far Eastern conflict,
Possibilities of adjustment in the Far East

² Because the proceeding of 1933 conference was summarized under the categories of, not issues, but countries, the main papers' titles are listed here to indicate the contents of the Round Table discussions.

The Eighth 1942, 4-14 December Mont Tremblant (Canada)
 Main agenda: Wartime and post-war cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East
 Round Table Discussions: United Nations Cooperation in the Pacific
 Political military problems, Military-political problems,
 Economic problems, Social and demographic problems,
 (mainly focused on China, Japan, Southeast Asia,
 and India)

=====

The Ninth 1945, 6-17, January Hot Springs (USA)
 Main agenda: Security in the Pacific
 Round Table Discussions: The future of Japan, Economic recovery and progress in Pacific countries, Cultural and race relations,
 The future of dependent areas, Collective security

The Tenth 1947, 5-20, September Stratford-on-Avon (Britain)
 Main agenda: Problems of economic reconstruction in the Far East
 Round Table Discussions: Japan and Korea, China, Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, Agricultural improvement, Industrial development, International economic problems, Education and technology

The Eleventh³ 1950, 3-15, October Lachnow (India)
 Main agenda: Nationalism in the Far East

The Twelfth 1954 September-8 October Kyoto (Japan)
 Main agenda: problems of the development of living standard in the Far East

The Thirteenth 1958, 3-12 February Lahore (Pakistan)
 Main agenda: Problems of foreign relations in South Asia and East Asia

³ Details of the following conferences are based on the information in Yamaoka Michio, 'Daisankai Taiheiyō kaigi (1929 nen) to Nihon no taiō,' *Kenkyū shirizu*, Vol.28 (May, 1991), p.193.

Appendix B

Participant Countries for the IPR Conferences

Year/No. of participants¹ (No. of women²/No. of women in secretariat³)

1925/140 (14) Australia 6 (1), Canada 7 (2), China 14 (3), Hawaii 29 (7), Japan 20 (4), Korea 8, New Zealand 11 (1), Philippine 3, USA 39 (6)
2 from YMCA in England and Geneva, and 1 from England

1927/136 (25) Australia 5 (1), Britain 14 (4), Canada 15 (2), China 14 (3), Hawaii 15 (2), Japan 18 (4), Korea 3 (1), New Zealand 5, Philippine 3, USA 44 (8)

Observer League of Nations (LN), International Labour Organization (ILO)

1929/212 (35/4*)

Australia 11 (4), Britain 17 (2), Canada 34 (4/1*), China 31 (6), Japan 56 (4/2*), New Zealand 7 (3), Philippine 8 (3), USA 48 (9/1*)

Observer LN, ILO, France, Netherlands, USSR, Mexico

1931/156 (26/8*)

Australia 9 (5), Britain 31 (4), Canada 14 (2/1*), China 37 (5/2*), Japan 21 (1/1*), New Zealand 6 (1), Philippine 6 (1/1*), USA 32 (7/3*)

Observer LN, ILO, Netherlands

1933/176 (35/21*)

Australia 4 (2), Britain 24 (4/3*), Canada 43 (3/1*), China 19 (5/2*), France 2, Japan 23 (3/3*), Netherlands-Netherlands Indies 4 (1/1*), New Zealand 6 (1), Philippine 7(1/1*), USA 44 (15/10*)

Observer LN, ILO, International Studies Conference of LN

¹ This figure excludes the International Secretariat of the IPR and observers

² This is based on the lists of the conference participants. Since not all first names were identified in the lists, the number is the minimum and can be bigger.

³ In 1925 and 1927, there was no category of secretaries in the participants lists. Also, even after 1929, some groups did not have secretaries.

1936/177 (28/16*) Australia 9 (2), Britain 22 (3/1*), Canada 27 (3/1*),
China 21 (2/2*), France 5, Japan 22 (2/2*), Netherlands-
Netherlands Indies 6, New Zealand 5 (1),
Philippine 3 (1/1*), USA 54 (13/8*), USSR 3 (1/1*)
Observer LN, ILO, International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation

1939/48 (5/4*) Australia 4, Canada 11 (1/1*), China 13 (1/1*),
New Zealand 1, Philippine 4 (1/1*), USA 15 (2/1*)
Observer LN, ILO, Rockefeller Foundation, Geneva Research Centre,
France, India

1942/131 (16/14*)
Australia 4 (1), Britain 20 (4/3*), Canada 18 (1/1*),
China 18 (3/3*), (Fighting) France 4, India 10 (1/1*),
Korea 1, Netherlands-Netherlands Indies 13 (1/1*),
New Zealand 3 (1/1*), Philippines 4, Thailand 2,
USA 34 (4/4*)
Observer LN, ILO, Carnegie Corporation, Rockefeller Foundation

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1945/157 (20/20*)
Australia 7, Britain 22 (2/2*), Canada 15 (1/1*),
China 25 (4/4*), France 13, India 5, Korea 3, Netherlands-
Netherlands Indies 14 (1/1*), New Zealand 2,
Philippines 4, Thailand 3, USA 44 (12/12*)
Observer LN, ILO, Rockefeller Foundation, United Nations Relief
and Rehabilitation Administration

1947/73 (7/4*) Australia 4, Britain 22 (2), Canada 11 (1/1*), China 8,
France 3, New Zealand 3, USA 22 (4/3*)
Observer United Nations, Rockefeller Foundation, Burma, India,
Korea, Netherlands-Netherlands Indies, Siam

Appendix C

Office Holders

(I) The International Secretariat of the IPR (the ISIPK)¹

1925

Executive Secretary

Merle Davis (US, H)²
Charles Loomis (US, H)

1926-1929

General Secretary
Associate General Secretary
Research Secretary
Research Assistant

M. Davis (1926-1930)
C. Loomis (1926-1929)
John Condliffe (NZ) (1927-1931)
William Holland (NZ) (1929-1931)

1930-1933

Acting General Secretary
Acting Research Secretary
Editor, *Pacific Affairs*

C. Loomis (1929-1933)
William Holland (1931-1933)
Elizabeth Green (US, H) (1927-1933)³

1933-1946

Secretary General
Research Secretary
Editor, *Pacific Affairs*
Conference Secretary
Assistant Treasurer

Edward Carter (US, E)⁴ (1933-1946)
W. Holland (1933-1943)
Owen Lattimore (US, E) (1933-1941)
C. Loomis (1933)
Hilda Austern (US, E)

1946-1961

Secretary-General
Publication Secretary

W. Holland (1946-1961)
Mary Healy

¹ Lists here are based on the information in the proceedings of the conferences and correspondences, and therefore the precise times of changes of positions are at times unidentifiable.

² The USA, Honolulu based.

³ In May 1928, *News Bulletin* [of the IPR] was renamed as *Pacific Affairs*.

⁴ The USA, East Coast based.

(II) The Pacific Council⁵

1925-1927

Chairman

Treasurer

Other members

Ray Wilbur (US, W)⁶

Frank Atherton (US, H)

Inoue Junnosuke (Japan)

David Yui (China)

Mungo McCallum (Australia)

Robert Borden (Canada)

James Allen (NZ)

1927-1933

Chairman

Treasurer

Other members

Jerome Greene (US, E) (until 1932)

F. Atherton

Nitobe Inazō (Japan)

Newton Rowell (Canada)

Frederic Eggleston (Australia)

Lionel Curtis (Britain)

D. Yui

J. Allen

1933-[1935]⁷

Chairman

Treasurer

Members

Newton Baker (US) (from 1932)

F. Atherton

F. Eggleston

Nitobe I. (until 1933)

J. Allen

N. Rowell

Hu Shih (China)

Archibold Rose (Britain)

L.P. Le C. De Bussy (Netherlands-
Netherlands Indies)

Manuel Camus (Philippines)

F. N. Petroff (USSR)

⁵ Lists here are also based on the information in the proceedings of the conferences and correspondences, and therefore, this list should be taken as a guidance, rather than the fact.

⁶ The USA, West Coast based.

⁷ The exact year is unidentifiable.

[1935]–1936

Chairman

Other members

N. Baker

F. Eggleston

J.W. Dafoe (Canada)

H. Shih

A. Sarraut (France)

Takayanagi Kenzō (Japan)

H. Belshaw (NZ)

C. Benitez (Philippines)

A.V. Alexander (Britain)

V.E. Motylev (USSR)

G.A. Dunlop (Netherlands-NI)

R.B. Anderson (Advisory Committee in
Honolulu)**1936–1939**

Chairman

Treasurer

Honorary Vice-Chairman

Other members

J.W. Dafoe (Canada) (1936–1938)

N. Baker

F. Atherton

F. Eggleston

N. Rowell (1939)

H. Shih

R.L. Wilbur

Ishii Kikujirō (Japan)

1939–1942

Chairman

Other members

Philip Jessup (US, E)

Jack Shepherd (Australia)

Edgar Tarr (Canada)

W.W. Yen (China)

J. Condliffe (NZ)

C. Osias (Philippines)

Frederick Field (US, E)

1942–1945

Chairman

Other members

E. Tarr

unknown

1945-1947

Chairman

Vice-Chairman

Percy Corbett (Canada)

R.J.F. Boyer (Australia)

Chiang Mon-lin (China)

Paul Pelliot (France)

Francis Visman (Netherlands-NI)

Other members

I. Clunies Ross (Australia)

R.G. Gavell (Canada)

Paul Emile Naggjar (France)

Jaime Hernandez (Philippines)

E. Zhukov (USSR)

Andrew McFadyean (Britain)

Robert Sproul (US)

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M1942; 6

Pacific Branch:
A1; 1919/8756

Pan-Pacific Science Congress:
A981; Conf 256 and Conf 262

Pan-Pacific Women's Conference:
A981; Conf 232

Pan-pacific Trade Union Conference:
A981; Conf 258

b. Institutional and Private Papers

Joseph Cutherrus: MSS 1638, Mitchell Library, Sydney (ML)

Frederic Eggleston: MS 423, National Library of Australia, Canberra (NLA)

Hessel Duncan-Hall: MS 5547, NLA

John Latham: MS 1009, NLA

Harrison Moore: Harrison Moore Papers, Group 11, Archives of University of Melbourne (AUM)

Keith Officer: MS 2629, NLA

E. L. Piesset: MS 882, NLA

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The League of Nations Union: MS 2198, NLA

Oriental History, University of Sydney: Papers of Chair of Oriental History, FLUS

2. Britain

Lionel Curtis: MS Curtis, Bodleian Library, Oxford (BL)

Charles Kingsley Webster: Webster Papers, Library of London School of Economics and Politics, London (LSEP)

English Speaking Union: English Speaking Union Papers, Library of English Speaking Union, London (LESU)

The Round Table: MS Eng Hist, BL

The RIIA: The RIIA Papers, Library of Chatham House, London (LCH)

3. Japan

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Takagi Yasaka: Takagi Yasaka Bunko (TYB), American Centre of Tokyo University at Komaba (ACTU)

4. The USA

Edward Carter: Carter Papers, Butler Library of Columbia University, New York (BLCU)

Ray L. Wilbur: Wilbur Papers, Hoover Institute Archives, Palo Alto, Cal (HI)

Woodrow Wilson: Wilson Papers, Library of Congress, Washington D. C.

The IPR:

IPR Papers, Archives of University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu (

Institute of Pacific Relations Collection (PRC), BLCU

Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial (LSRM)/54/582-584,

Rockefeller Archives, North Tarrytown, NY (RA)

Rockefeller Family Archives/III-2-Q/9/62-63, and 10/68, RA

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