

A
fpDS546
.073

The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre

WORKING PAPER NO. 15

AGGRESSION AND ANNEXATION

Kampuchea's Condemnation of Vietnam

by

Milton Osborne



The Research School of Pacific Studies

University, Canberra

2307021



A.N.U. LIBRARY

WORKING PAPER NO. 15

AGGRESSION AND ANNEXATION
Kampuchea's Condemnation of Vietnam

by

Milton Osborne

A Summary of the Pol Pot Government's Livre Noir
(Black Book) with a Commentary and Annotations.

Canberra

1 August 1979.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page No.</u>
Introduction	1
Section 1. A Summary of the <u>Livre Noir</u> .	3
Section 2. Aspects of the First and Second Indochina Wars as Described by the <u>Livre Noir</u> .	17
Section 3 A Brief Assessment of the <u>Livre Noir</u> .	27
Appendix. Differences Between the <u>Livre Noir</u> and the <u>Black Paper</u> .	30
Footnotes.	32
Selected References	37
Map	39

INTRODUCTION

Less than four months before it was overthrown, the Pol Pot government issued a remarkable French-language document, a Livre Noir or Black Book. Released in September 1978 it dealt with the 'facts and proofs of Vietnamese acts of aggression and annexation against Kampuchea'.¹ There is also an English-language version with the title Black Paper, which bears the same publication date, and is largely, but not entirely, identical with the Livre Noir.² It omits certain passages found in the French version, which appears to account in part for its slightly shorter length - 94 as opposed to 112 pages. Neither the Livre Noir nor the Black Paper has had wide circulation.

It is not clear that any Kampuchean (Khmer) language versions of the Livre Noir preceded the document published in French, although some of the claims and allegations it contains formed part of earlier Pol Pot regime statements.³ Internal evidence suggests that this was a hastily prepared document, probably the work of a team of writers rather than of any single author. The French is often colloquial, sometimes bordering on student argot or slang. This is not surprising given the association with French student life of several leaders of the Pol Pot regime. The English-language Black Paper is an excruciatingly literal translation from the French, and as already noted it omits some passages that occur in the Livre Noir. A brief discussion of these omissions is included as an Appendix to the present paper.

The Livre Noir is of interest for various reasons. It is the longest compilation by the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) of the troubled history of their relations with the Vietnamese Communist leadership. As such, the Livre Noir not only appears to have been written to explain Kampuchean policy to the outside world but it may also be seen as providing the logical, if not necessarily rational, foundation for the policies followed by the Pol Pot regime when they confronted the vastly superior military forces of Vietnam. The Livre Noir

contains great detail concerning the complex and tense relations between the Kampuchean and Vietnamese Communists, and it is hoped that some of the flavour of this difficult relationship emerges in the summary of the document that forms Section 1 of this paper. In view of the detail provided in the Livre Noir, there is a clear need for reassessment of the part the Vietnamese Communists played in relation to the Communist movement in Kampuchea during both the First and Second Indochina Wars.

Such a major reassessment goes far beyond the limited narrative and analytic aims of the present paper. Its first aim is to provide a short summary of the document, since as already noted distribution of the Livre Noir has been very limited in any of its versions. The second aim is to draw from the information occurring in various parts of the document a summary of the information provided concerning the First and Second Indochina Wars. Although the information given in the Livre Noir concerning the First Indochina War as it involved Kampuchea does not depart radically from most general accounts of that period, the same cannot be said of the picture it gives of events during the Second Indochina conflict. Indeed, the account given by the Kampucheans in the Livre Noir diverges significantly both from accounts by Western scholars and from those given by the Vietnamese Communists. A summary of the information on the First and Second Indochinese Wars, as seen through the eyes of the Pol Pot government, with some commentary, forms Section 2 of the paper.

There is a brief assessment of the overall significance of the Livre Noir in Section 3, which is followed by an Appendix noting the nature of omissions from the Black Paper when compared with the Livre Noir. A selected list of bibliographic references is supplied.

SECTION 1

A SUMMARY OF THE LIVRE NOIR

This summary follows the chapter and section breakdown of the Livre Noir itself, and reflects the repetition that is a frequent feature of the original document. In order to achieve greater clarity the emphasis of the summary is on basic narrative, with relatively little attention given to details of the roles played by individuals - particularly by Vietnamese Communist leaders - in various episodes. In order to capture some of the tone of the original there is frequent direct quotation from the original document.

Introduction (Livre Noir pp. 1-3)

Democratic Kampuchea seeks to maintain goodwill with all nations.

But Vietnam which has always had the aim of annexing and swallowing Kampuchea and of exterminating the Kampuchean race by means of its sinister strategy for an 'Indochinese Federation' has carried out the most perfidious activities for dozens of years to gain its objective.

Vietnamese actions took place over various periods:

1930-45: through Ho Chi Minh's Indochinese Communist Party.

1945-54: under the flag of the battle against French colonialism.

1954-70: forced to withdraw from Kampuchea after the Geneva Accords, the Vietnamese continued to oppose the Communist Party of Kampuchea [CPK]'s political line and sought to destroy the Kampuchean revolution.

1970-75: the Kampuchean revolution saved the Vietnamese from defeat.

1975-78: with the connivance of the American imperialists the Vietnamese carried out subversion and mounted coups d'état against Kampuchea. At the end of 1977 they invaded and carried out aggression against Kampuchea.

'Vietnam never abandoned its nature of being an aggressor, annexationist, and a swallower of territory.'

Chapter 1 (Livre Noir pp. 5-19)

1. This chapter deals with the historical Vietnamese expansion in the Indochinese region. Attention is given to the Vietnamese conquest of Champa in the period from the late 15th to the late 17th centuries.

Vietnamese expansion into areas of modern southern Vietnam once ruled by the Kampuchean court (an area known as Kampuchea Krom or 'Lower Kampuchea') is described in detail for the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. Note is taken of the attachment of former Cambodian territory to southern Vietnam during the period of French colonial control (1863-1954).¹

Thus, whether it is during the time of the feudalists, of the French colonialists, of the American imperialists, or of Ho Chi Minh (that is to say in the contemporary period), the Vietnamese have not changed their true nature of being an aggressor, annexationist, and a swallower of the territory of other countries.

2. The Vietnamese have used various tactics to gain control of Kampuchean territory, including the 'sordid use of girls'.²

During the 1960s the Hanoi authorities and the Vietcong sought to introduce more and more Vietnamese settlers into Kampuchea to annex Kampuchean territory.

In the First Indochina War, between 1946 and 1954, the Vietnamese organised a party, an army, and a state power in Kampuchea. 'At this stage the Khmers (Kampuchians) who carried on the battle in Kampuchea did not have an independent position. They did not understand very well for whom or for what they were making a revolution.'

The Kampuchians have a vivid memory of past Vietnamese atrocities. Kampuchians speak of the Vietnamese as Yuon, meaning 'barbarians'.³

3. The Vietnamese have followed their policies of aggression and annexation because of three factors: (a) The Economic Factor: Vietnam is a poor country. (b) The Political Factor: the Vietnamese seek to dominate all of Southeast Asia. (c) The Military Factor: the Vietnamese want a strong military base in Indochina from which to dominate Southeast Asia.

After having seen these factors clearly one understands that the cause of the conflict between Kampuchea and Vietnam is not an ordinary frontier

problem. The root of the conflict is to be found in the policy of expansion and annexation carried out by the Vietnamese in a systematic fashion and by all means.

Chapter II (Livre Noir pp. 21-33)

This chapter deals with Vietnamese efforts to establish an Indochinese Federation between 1930 and 1970, and argues that this has been the constant aim of the Vietnamese Communist leadership. The following periods reflect important changes or developments:

1930-45: The Vietnamese were preoccupied by developments in their own country and they did not succeed in infiltrating Kampuchea.⁴

1945-54: The Vietnamese Communists were active in Kampuchea, recruiting Kampucheans and establishing their own political and military base in Stung Treng province, near Bokheo.⁵ They controlled a puppet Kampuchean Committee with Son Ngoc Minh as its chairman.⁶ Almost all the anti-French armed forces in Kampuchea were Vietnamese as late as May-June 1954. 'The Vietnamese concerned themselves with everything and controlled everything.'

1954-70: 'After the Geneva Accords the Kampuchean revolutionaries launched a national campaign against the SEATO military pact and in favour of national independence and neutrality.' The Vietnamese in southern Vietnam were, by contrast, constantly on the defensive and came to take refuge in Kampuchea.

Facing annihilation in Vietnam the Vietnamese in 1960 began their armed struggle and established themselves along the Kampuchean border. They increasingly infiltrated Kampuchea. In 1965 there were 150,000 Vietnamese (Vietcong) in Kampuchea. This number rose to 200,000 in 1966. The Vietnamese 'no longer held territory of their own in South Vietnam' because of the success of the Strategic Hamlet Program. The population was 'completely under the control of the Americans and the Thieu clique.'⁷ By 1970 there were between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 Vietcong in Kampuchea with 80,000 in hospitals on Kampuchean territory.⁸

At the same time as they pursued their aims in Vietnam they continued to follow their strategy of 'swallowing' Kampuchea. To do this they (1) secretly organised the population (2) secretly created a state power (3) attacked and denigrated the CPK (4) sabotaged the Kampuchean economy.

Despite these Vietnamese actions the 'leaders of the Kampuchean revolution always recommended the development of solidarity and mutual assistance with the Vietcong'.

The Vietnamese Communists, however, pursued their policy of an Indochinese Federation. They criticised the CPK for being 'leftist' and 'adventurist'. They tried to take charge of the Kampuchean revolution.

The Vietnamese had no success in winning support among the population of northeastern Kampuchea but they did win over 'some elements among the population and the cadres' in the lowlands.

In 1970 there were 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 Vietnamese in Kampuchea with 200,000 to 300,000 in the northeast. In Kampuchea the Vietnamese had

- (a) sanctuaries from which to control the revolution in southern Vietnam
- (b) economic bases (c) communications routes for supplies.

Between 1954 and 1970 the Vietnamese had some success with their activities in Kampuchea but 'overall they failed in their efforts, since the Kampuchean revolution did not cease to reinforce its position of independence and sovereignty on the political, ideological, and organisational planes'.

Chapter III . (Livre Noir pp. 35-45)

This chapter deals with the conflict between Kampuchea and Vietnam over what political line should be followed during the 1954-70 period. The Kampuchean revolutionaries during the 1945-54 period were not independent.

1. From 1954-60 the Kampuchean revolutionaries did not have a clearly defined political line. As the result of experience gained in this period the Kampuchean revolutionaries adopted a political line of being 'independent, sovereign, and of relying on their own resources'. They subsequently organised

a congress to found the CPK on 30 September 1960.⁹

The Vietnamese launched systematic attacks against the CPK. They set up a secret rival revolutionary organisation and infiltrated cadres into the Pracheachon [People's Party, a pro-Communist front] group. The Vietnamese attacked the CPK's analysis of the existence of class divisions in Kampuchean society. They opposed the CPK's policy of independence and sovereignty and of pursuing the armed struggle and the political struggle at the same time.

2. 1961-70: As the Kampuchean movement developed vigourously from 1964, the Vietnamese accused it of being 'adventurist' and 'leftist'.

In 1965 the CPK sent a delegation abroad, led by Comrade Secretary Pol Pot,¹⁰ to have discussions in Hanoi. During lengthy discussions with a Vietnamese delegation led by Le Duan¹¹ there was a bitter debate over the CPK's political line. The Vietnamese attacked the Kampuchean position but the CPK did not bow to Vietnamese pressure.

From 1967 onwards the CPK continued its policy of combined armed and political struggle, without which it would have been destroyed. 'In 1969 the struggle between Kampuchea and Vietnam reached its culminating point. "Friendship" "Solidarity", were no more than worn-out formulas. On the Kampuchean side a permanent vigilance was compulsory. The CPK never told the Vietnamese where its leaders lived.'

From 1966 the CPK judged it could not have state-to-state and other governmental relations with Vietnam because there were fundamental contradictions between the Kampuchean and the Vietnamese revolutions. The Vietnamese wished to destroy the Kampuchean revolution so as to place it under their control.

3. Following the Second World War the Vietnamese 'kidnapped' Kampuchean to train them to become cadres to form the nucleus for their forces in Kampuchea. Between 1946 and 1954 these men were totally controlled by the Vietnamese. Following the Geneva Accords in 1954 they were incapable of directing the Kampuchean revolution.

But there were true revolutionaries in Kampuchea who resisted the repression that followed the elections of 1955. Some of the Vietnamese-trained cadres did

join the CPK in the maquis in 1963-64, and when the Vietnamese returned to Kampuchea in 1970 they were reintegrated into the Vietnamese network. The Vietnamese tried to use these renegades to destroy the CPK. They always failed.

With the great victory of 17 April 1975 the people of Kampuchea

saw clearly that this victory had been won by themselves and by their party...The CPK was born from an independent revolutionary movement and it is only in basing itself on its own independent revolutionary movement that it has been able to have its own experiences, whether correct or erroneous, bitter or comforting.

Chapter IV (Livre Noir pp. 47-82)

This chapter deals with Vietnamese attempts to destroy the CPK's independent political line between 1970-75.

1. The situation in Kampuchea in 1969 was very tense. The CPK knew the Americans and Lon Nol¹² were going to mount a coup against Prince Norodom Sihanouk.¹³ The CPK laid down a line for a National United Front. At the end of 1969 a CPK delegation led by Pol Pot left for Hanoi for discussions with a Vietnamese delegation.

The Vietnamese opposed the armed struggle being undertaken by the CPK. They wanted the CPK to lay down their arms, as they were afraid the Kampuchean would develop and consolidate their position. The Vietnamese were also frightened that the CPK's struggle would endanger their cooperation with Lon Nol.¹⁴ Le Duan, who led the Vietnamese delegation, said

According to the Vietnamese experience you must not undertake armed struggle. It would be better if the Kampuchean comrades wait until Vietnam wins victory. At that moment we will strike with a single blow and we will liberate Phnom Penh.

The Vietnamese wanted the field to themselves. They had forces in Kampuchea and forces outside - that is Son Ngoc Minh and his group.

The Vietnamese asked how the CPK could procure arms, munitions and other materials, how it would meet its medical needs, how it would find the necessary finance?

While the CPK delegation was in Hanoi Le Duan asked it to meet the Soviet

ambassador. The CPK delegation declined, as it did not wish to become involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute; moreover, it knew that the Soviet Union was critical of the CPK and had tried to create a rival Communist party in Kampuchea in 1964.

During the delegation's visit to Hanoi and while it was travelling in Vietnam, the Vietnamese could have destroyed it but 'the Vietnamese had an overwhelming need for the assistance of the CPK, which controlled immense areas of territory in Kampuchea'.

2. After the coup d'état against Sihanouk of 18 March 1970 and the American and Thieu clique's invasion of Kampuchea, even more Vietnamese took refuge in Kampuchea; the Central Committee of the Vietnamese party for southern Vietnam took refuge north of Stung Trang, in the Prek Prasap district of Kratie province.¹⁵

The CPK delegation went on from Hanoi to Peking and was in that city when the 18 March 1970 coup against Sihanouk took place; Prince Sihanouk arrived in Peking on 19 March 1970. Pham Van Dong¹⁶ arrived a few days later to have talks with Chou En-lai,¹⁷ Sihanouk, and the CPK delegation.

Pol Pot had it made known to Prince Sihanouk - who did not know Pol Pot was in Peking - that he must go on the offensive. The CPK revised Sihanouk's declarations to remove any reference to Communism or Socialism and stressed the need to work in a National United Front to rally the national forces.¹⁸

Pham Van Dong met Chou En-lai in Hanoi. 'His basic objective was to gain the agreement of the CPK to help defend the Vietnamese forces who were in difficulties.' With the attacks from the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies, and following the Lon Nol coup, the Vietnamese Communists had 'sustained a fundamental defeat'.

When Pham Vang Dong met the CPK delegation in Peking he spoke very warmly to them and embraced Pol Pot. The Vietnamese could no longer make use of Sihanouk's army against the CPK; they could not use the cadres they had infiltrated into the CPK, and they could not use their external forces. After the coup d'état the Vietnamese could only 'turn to the CPK and beg help and

assistance from it'.

It was only after the coup d'état of 18 March that Pham Van Dong told the Chinese of the

serious difficulties encountered by the Vietnamese, and asked them to intervene with the CPK so it would agree to help them. The Chinese comrades were puzzled, as they had always heard that the Vietnamese were aiding the Kampuchians. The CPK delegation told the Chinese the true situation: the Vietnamese had no territory in their own country and took refuge in Kampuchea.

But even at this time the Vietnamese continued to think of swallowing Kampuchea.

3. With the aim of gaining control of Kampuchea the Vietnamese proposed to Pol Pot that (a) mixed Vietnamese-Kampuchean commands should be established (b) that the Vietnamese give the CPK 5,000 rifles (c) that the CPK help the Vietnamese by establishing sanctuaries in Kampuchea, by giving assistance in the use of communication routes to link Kampuchea with Laos, and through economic aid and food supplies (d) that there should be joint activity against American imperialism and its lackeys.

Pol Pot told the Vietnamese leaders that the CPK was ready to accept the 5,000 rifles if these could be provided. The CPK delegation could not make a decision about mixed commands without the advice of their Central Committee, but Pol Pot believed that such a proposal would lead to difficulties and show that the CPK was not truly independent.

If it had not been for the fact that the Vietnamese needed the help of the Kampuchean revolution they would not have hesitated to kill the members of the CPK delegation.

While the CPK delegation was away from Kampuchea the Vietnamese tried to set up mixed commands inside the country. In the northeastern zone Ieng Sary¹⁹ and Son Sen,²⁰ as the persons responsible for the region, rejected the Vietnamese suggestions that such commands be established.

The Vietnamese tried again to persuade Pol Pot to accept mixed commands while he was still travelling back to Kampuchea through Laos. He refused to

discuss the matter.

After the 18 March 1970 coup d'état the Vietnamese armed their nationals living in Kampuchea and used them as 'particularly ferocious instruments of oppression against the Kampuchean people'. The CPK suppressed these Vietnamese after a year.

At the same time the Vietnamese secretly organised state power [state apparatus], particularly in the northeast. Only at the beginning of 1971 did the CPK learn of this parallel state power and ask the Vietnamese to dissolve it.

The CPK did not receive a single one of the promised 5,000 rifles. The Vietnamese used these to arm a parallel army that they had formed secretly. The CPK learnt of this army and demanded that the Vietnamese hand it over. They did so but maintained another secret group for future use.

The Vietnamese secretly organised military and medical schools in Kampuchea. When the CPK learnt of these schools they required the Vietnamese to close them. The Vietnamese did so, but not before two classes had passed through military training and one through medical training.

5. In October 1970 the Central Committee of the CPK met in plenary session. It reaffirmed the policy of being independent and sovereign and of relying on its own resources. As for Vietnam, there was to be solidarity with vigilance.

Talks were held between the CPK and the Vietnamese in November 1970. The CPK knew the Vietnamese were untrustworthy, but they did not at this stage know of the Vietnamese plan to assassinate the CPK leadership, they only learnt of this in 1976. The Vietnamese raised the same issues as before and received the same CPK responses. During these November 1970 negotiations the Vietnamese tried to poison Pol Pot, but failed.

6. The Vietnamese carried out 'criminal and fascist acts' against the Kampuchean people.

The Kampuchean people nourished, sheltered, and looked after the Vietnamese who had penetrated into Kampuchean territory. But in return the Vietnamese cadres and fighters abused the hospitality of the Kampuchean people, behaving in the manner of a great power, as colonialists, as lords and masters in Kampuchea.

The Vietnamese showed scorn for Kampucheans and behaved in aggressive and brutal ways. On one occasion the Vietnamese burned Kampuchean villagers alive in Kampot province in July 1973. This incident led to a clash between Vietnamese and Kampuchean soldiers in which the Vietnamese lost 500 men and the Kampucheans 100. This particular conflict was resolved by the expulsion of two Vietnamese regiments from the region where the incident and fighting occurred.

Away from Kampuchea Pham Van Dong complained to the Chinese that the Kampucheans did not wish to work in solidarity with the Vietnamese. The Chinese reported these complaints to the CPK, while emphasising that the problem was Kampuchea's concern alone.

7. In 1973 the Vietnamese planned to overthrow the CPK and to put a new Communist Party in its place. They planned to do this with agents infiltrated into Kampuchea, and with agents living in Hanoi such as Son Ngoc Minh. The Vietnamese counted on the CPK being unable to survive the American aerial bombardment of Kampuchea, so they created a party called the 'Workers Party' and an army to take power. The plan failed because the American bombing did not cause heavy losses to the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army, and the Vietnamese did not have sufficient agents to form a party.

In 1975 the CPK determined to launch a final offensive. This undercut a Vietnamese plan that called for the liberation of Saigon in late 1976 and early 1977, after which they planned to place their Kampuchean agents in power in Phnom Penh.

In March 1975 the Vietnamese were still worried that there would be major American intervention if Vietnamese forces attempted to liberate Saigon. The CPK rejected this analysis and went on to liberate Phnom Penh on 17 April 1975.²¹ This angered the Vietnamese, since Kampuchea had won victory before Vietnam had, and Vietnam's plan to seize Kampuchea had failed.

From 1970 to 1975 the Vietnamese not only gave no help whatsoever to Kampuchea; instead they tried to sabotage and to destroy the Kampuchean revolution in a systematic fashion.

They [the Vietnamese] opposed everything that could have made the Kampuchean revolution independent. This was why on the battlefield there were often fights between the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea and the Vietnamese.

Chapter V (Livre Noir pp. 83 - 92)

This chapter deals with disagreements between the CPK and the Vietnamese over negotiations with the United States to end the Second Indochina War.

1. The Vietnamese tried to convince the CPK that Kampuchean Communist forces could not prevail against the Lon Nol regime. The CPK rejected this position since they controlled 70 to 80 per cent of the population in 1971.

In meetings with the CPK the Vietnamese said their position was not good. But the CPK discounted the importance of the intervention of external American-South Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea and judged that the 'Khmerisation' of the war through the use of Lon Nol's forces would fail.

2. In mid-1972 the Vietnamese urged the CPK to negotiate for an end to the war. In negotiations with the CPK Pham Hung²² told the Kampucheans that 'the Vietnamese could no longer continue the war, which had already lasted thirty years'. Kampuchea opposed this policy and refused to join the Vietnamese in the Paris negotiations.

The Vietnamese impudently offered to negotiate on Kampuchea's behalf.

Despite all the Vietnamese pressure the Kampucheans refused to join the Paris negotiations. When Pham Hung showed Pol Pot a copy of the draft agreement between the United States and Vietnam the Kampuchean leader said,

We will respect what the Vietnamese comrades have decided in relation to their own affairs. As for us, we will still not engage in a ceasefire. We will continue to fight and we are certain to gain victory.

The CPK still refused to negotiate despite threats from Kissinger relayed by the Vietnamese of massive American bombing.²³

The CPK refused to negotiate with the Lon Nol clique, since in 1973 it was already dying. To have negotiated might have enabled the Lon Nol clique to revive. In Kampuchea alone throughout the whole of Southeast Asia the

revolutionary situation was good.

Vietnam did not keep Kampuchea informed about the Paris negotiations and the Vietnamese told the Americans that it controlled Kampuchea. When Vietnam failed to make Kampuchea negotiate the Americans were very angry and sent B52s to bomb Hanoi in December 1972, which was why the Vietnamese begged them to stop and begin negotiations again.

Chapter VI (Livre Noir pp. 93-105)

This chapter deals with Vietnamese efforts to annex and swallow Kampuchea from 1975 to the present (late 1978).

1. After the liberation of Kampuchea and South Vietnam the CPK asked the Vietnamese to withdraw their forces by the end of May 1975. The Vietnamese withdrew some forces but left others behind in Kratie, Mondulkiri, and Ratanakiri provinces.

Eventually the Vietnamese troops withdrew but Vietnamese forces continued to launch attacks into Kampuchea along the borders. The Vietnamese also occupied Kampuchean islands.

Despite these Vietnamese actions the CPK decided to negotiate with the Vietnamese. There were no results to these negotiations.

Vietnamese actions were designed to prevent the CPK consolidating its power; to enable Vietnam to take possession of Kampuchean territory; and to encourage the agents infiltrated by the Vietnamese into the ranks of the Kampuchean revolution. 'In 1975 the Vietnamese objective was not yet to take possession of Kampuchea from the outside.'

In July and September 1975 the Vietnamese attempted to assassinate the Kampuchean leadership and failed. In 1976 the CPK broke a Vietnamese network when it discovered that the Vietnamese intended to encourage subversion in Prey Veng province.

2. Because their various attempts at internal subversion failed, the Vietnamese from mid-1977 onwards embarked on large-scale attacks against Kampuchea. In December 1977 they launched attacks using 14 divisions, including 5 crack divisions

The Vietnamese used 3 to 4 divisions to attack the southwest of Kampuchea and 8 to 9 divisions to attack eastern Kampuchea. Soviet troops 'participated in the attacks as commanders of units and as members of tank crews'. In both the southwest and east the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army halted and defeated the Vietnamese forces.

3. In May 1978 the CPK foiled a Vietnamese attempt to stage a coup d'état. As on previous occasions this attempt took place in collaboration with the CIA.

4. Because of their successive defeats and the failure of their strategy of 'lightning attack-lightning victory' the Vietnamese have had to fall back on a strategy of protracted war. This adds to Vietnam's many domestic problems. The tens of thousands of Vietnamese who were being made ready to settle in Kampuchea must now remain in Vietnam.

Vietnam has had to reduce its forces along the Kampuchean border because of the threat posed by China in the north. The Vietnamese have bombed Kampuchean territory since July 1978 but their aircraft can play no strategic role.

Conclusion (Livre Noir pp. 107-12)

'In their combat against Vietnam's acts of aggression and annexation, the people and the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea have overcome all obstacles.' If they had not resisted Vietnam with its plans for an Indochinese Federation, what would have been the situation in Southeast Asia?

The great expansionist power and Vietnam, as an annexationist and swallower of territory, would have been even more arrogant and presumptuous and would have continued their expansion in Southeast Asia.

Kampuchea's struggle is not simply its own but a struggle against the great expansionist power in Southeast Asia. Vietnam faces great difficulties at home. In terms of its international relations it is not an independent state. The great expansionist power is its master.

Vietnam seeks to establish the impression among Southeast Asian states that it is not expansionist and does not have designs on Kampuchea. But the peoples

of Southeast Asia recognise Vietnam's true character.

Democratic Kampuchea does not set any conditions for solving its problems with Vietnam. Rather it is Vietnam, the aggressor, annexationist, and swallower of territory in the manner of Hitler, which sets conditions for Democratic Kampuchea.

If Vietnam ceased its aggression against Kampuchea the war would stop immediately. But Vietnam is determined to swallow up Kampuchea and then to extend its expansion into Southeast Asia. And the great expansionist power seeks to gain control of Southeast Asia as part of its global strategy. The great expansionist power uses Vietnam as its mercenary in Asia.

The Kampuchean people and army maintain their revolutionary vigilance. They have the situation well in hand.

Formerly the Kampuchean people began to fight with empty hands and they defeated the leader of the imperialists, that is to say the Americans and their lackeys. After liberation, in a situation where they had to confront a mass of difficult and serious problems, they successfully defended Democratic Kampuchea, totally preserved its independence and its territorial integrity. In the future they can defend it with even more success.

SECTION 2

ASPECTS OF THE FIRST AND SECOND INDOCHINA
WARS AS DESCRIBED BY THE LIVRE NOIR

Among the many interesting features of the Pol Pot regime's Livre Noir is the picture it presents of military developments during the First and Second Indochinese Wars. As Henry Kamm of the New York Times has observed, the Livre Noir provides retrospective support for former President Nixon's assertion that the American invasion of Cambodia in 1970 was to strike at 'the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam'.¹ Kamm goes on to record the fact that the invading United States forces and their Saigon allies did not find the headquarters in question, but according to the Livre Noir, this was because it had been relocated deeper inside Cambodian territory, on the west bank of the Mekong in the extreme southwestern section of Kratie province.²

Working from the English-language Black Paper versions of the document, Kamm suggests that 'Incomplete and tendentious as it is, the document, which experts view as generally plausible, has the kind of interest that made Nikita Krushchev's report on the crimes of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956 such a major source for historians'.³ This judgment is probably overdrawn. There is no doubt that the Livre Noir is tendentious, but there should be considerable doubts concerning the plausibility of sections of the document. In particular, this is so in relation to some of its assertions about military developments in Vietnam and Cambodia/Kampuchea during the Second Indochina War. Reference to the presence in early 1970 of between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea is a case in point.⁴ So too is the document's assertion that after 1965 the South Vietnamese (Saigon) regime controlled virtually the whole of the territory and population of South Vietnam.⁵

Other assertions made in the Livre Noir do appear less open to controversy, and provide either new insights into developments between 1946 and 1975 or

apparent confirmation of information that has previously been considered uncertain or speculative. The detail it provides on armed clashes between Vietnamese Communist armed forces and troops fighting on behalf of the CPK is interesting in this respect.⁶

Information relating to military developments during the First and Second Indochina Wars is scattered throughout the Livre Noir. This section of the paper attempts to present the most interesting of this scattered information in a coherent form. At the same time it offers some commentary on claims and assertions made in the Pol Pot regime's document.

The Livre Noir is frank in admitting that Communism had made no progress in Cambodia before 1945. While it alleges that the Vietnamese had planned to dominate the whole of French Indochina from the moment the Indochinese Communist Party was founded in 1930, the document notes that until 1945 the Vietnamese were preoccupied with developments in their own country. 'Besides, the people of Kampuchea knew nothing about Communism and despised the Vietnamese.'⁷

The First Indochina War

The extent to which Cambodians, as opposed to Vietnamese in Cambodia, participated as members of the Communist forces fighting against the French has long been a matter of discussion and controversy. Except for some left-wing commentators the general inclination has been to argue that only the most limited number of Cambodians did in fact fight with the Vietminh, and that those who did were firmly under the control of the Vietnamese.⁸ The Livre Noir gives support to this estimation. Describing the period 1946-54, the authors note that

At this stage the Khmers who carried on the battle in Kampuchea did not have an independent position. They relied completely on the Vietnamese. They did not understand for whom or for what they were making a revolution.⁹

According to the Livre Noir the Vietminh forces sought to advance their aims in Kampuchea during the First Indochina War by using Khmers (Kampuchians) whom they 'kidnapped'. One of the most interesting figures to be described as

having been recruited in this fashion was Son Ngoc Minh. Whether or not this person actually existed has been a matter for scholarly debate.¹⁰ There is certainly no doubt about his existence so far as the authors of the Livre Noir are concerned. Nor is there any doubt about his lack of independence from the Vietmanese Communists. He was withdrawn from Cambodia under Vietnamese orders at the end of 1951; the Livre Noir maintains that the Vietnamese simply used Son Ngoc Minh's name in an effort to disguise the fact that it was they who were making all decisions.¹¹ As for the Cambodian Peoples Revolutionary Party, created in 1951 following the dissolution of the Indochina Communist Party, the Livre Noir claims that it 'existed only in name'.¹²

Reviewing the information in the Livre Noir concerning the First Indochina War, it is also noteworthy that a grudging compliment is paid to the efficacy of French covert action in Cambodia during the 1945-54 period. According to the document French services succeeded in infiltrating 'intelligence agents, police, and soldiers into the ranks of the Vietminh' forces operating in Cambodia.¹³

One final point is of interest in relation to the period of the First Indochina War. The Livre Noir asserts repeatedly that at an unspecified period (c. 1950?) the Vietminh established its political and military base (presumably for southern Vietnam, although this is not made clear) in Ratanakiri province of Cambodia near the gem-mining town of Bokheo.¹⁴

In summary, the Livre Noir provides a picture of Communist activity in Kampuchea during the First Indochina War which is entirely under Vietnamese direction. Those Cambodians who were associated with Communist anti-French activity were men controlled by the Vietminh. As for the armed forces fighting in the Communist cause, as late as May-June 1954 'these were made up almost entirely of Vietnamese'.¹⁵

Post-Geneva until 1960

Two principal points emerge from the Livre Noir's account of the years

immediately following the Geneva Accords of July 1954. The first relates to the emergence of a Cambodian/Kampuchean Communist movement independent of Vietnamese control, despite the continued existence of such pro-Vietnamese Cambodian Communists as Son Ngoc Minh. The second concerns the fate of the Vietnamese Communist forces in the early years of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime.

Among the points most forcefully made throughout the Livre Noir is the absolute need for the CPK to follow its own independent line. The negotiations that took place in Geneva in 1954 refused any place to a Communist Cambodian delegation and gave no recognition to the Cambodian Communist association with the anti-French struggle, even though that association was through 'puppets' such as Son Ngoc Minh, who were closely associated with the Vietnamese. Quite clearly, this refusal of negotiating status held a vital lesson for Pol Pot and his associates. According to the view presented here Vietnam abandoned its proteges, and in doing so made clear the extent to which any successful future Cambodian Communist movement would have to be self-reliant. Without Vietnamese support the 'provisional committee' formed by their proteges 'collapsed like a castle of cards'.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the Livre Noir claims, the Vietnamese continued to work for the future subjection of Cambodia by arranging for an unspecified number of pro-Communist Cambodians to travel to northern Vietnam.¹⁷

In Cambodia itself the period from 1954 to 1960 saw the emergence of those revolutionaries who were able to pursue their independent line. They were not yet ready for armed struggle, but their experience enabled them to found the Communist Party of Kampuchea on 30 September 1960.

The Vietnamese Communists meanwhile were, the Livre Noir states, in dire straits. The document argues that President Ngo Dinh Diem's repression directed against Vietnamese Communists in southern Vietnam was successful; according to the details the Livre Noir provides, 70 per cent of the members of the Vietnamese party and the revolutionaries fighting in southern Vietnam were killed in the 1957-58 period and the party committee was annihilated. Le Duan was among those

Vietnamese Communists who sought safety in Cambodia during this period, when the Vietnamese began to use Cambodia as a safe sanctuary from which to pursue political and military goals in their own country.¹⁸

The Second Indochina War to 1970

Because of the 'catastrophic situation' in which they found themselves in 1960 the Vietnamese decided to follow a policy of armed struggle once again.¹⁹ It is from this chronological point that the information supplied by the Livre Noir becomes increasingly open to serious question. The account of developments up to 1954 fits relatively comfortably with the generally accepted interpretation of developments, whatever particular qualifications need to be noted. The description of events between 1954 and 1960 may require some adjustment, but the suggestion that the Vietnamese Communists in southern Vietnam were under severe pressure during this period is widely accepted. Much of the detail for the period from 1960 onwards, however, must be treated with considerable reserve.

Vietnamese use of Cambodian territory on a major scale followed the 1960 decision to resume armed struggle. Infiltration began in 1961 and increased through 1962 and 1963. By 1965 there were 150,000 Vietnamese Communists, according to the Livre Noir, occupying a two to five kilometre band along Cambodia's frontier from Romeas Hek, in the northern part of Svay Rieng province, to the extreme northeastern part of the country in Ratanakiri province. This number increased to 200,000 in 1966 and reached 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 by early 1970.²⁰ These enormous figures far surpass any estimations made at the time of the escalating Second Indochina War.

Equally difficult to accept is the account of the military situation in southern Vietnam as described by the Livre Noir. The Vietnamese, the document states, were present in Kampuchea in such great numbers because of the success of the strategic hamlet program established under the direction of Sir Robert Thompson, a former Secretary of Defence in Malaya during the Emergency and

Head of the British Advisory Mission in South Vietnam. This program and the success of the Saigon regime's armed forces in the mid to late 1960s led to a situation in which

70 to 80 per cent of the young workers were enrolled in the enemy army. The 20 to 30 per cent remaining surrendered to the enemy and abandoned the struggle. There was no longer anyone to direct the struggle of the population that was completely under the control of the Americans and the Thieu clique.²¹

In terms of territory under the control of Saigon's forces, the Livre Noir asserts that by the period 1966-65 the Saigon 'defence perimeter' extended as far as the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. It was in these circumstances that the Vietnamese Communist forces were forced to enter Cambodia in such great numbers to take sanctuary and to find shelter for 'their armed forces, hospitals, artistic groups, transport, commissariats, and their entire command structure from the central committee down to the province and district committees'.²²

Although the CPK gave great assistance to the Vietnamese in the late 1960s, the contrary was not the case. Instead the Vietnamese opposed the CPK decision to pursue the policy of both armed and political struggle from 1967 onwards.²³ One of the reasons for this was the nature of the close cooperation between the Vietnamese and the Cambodian army; the latter played a vital role in ensuring that supplies reached the Vietnamese Communist troops. The Vietnamese feared that the CPK's policy of armed struggle would compromise this situation.²⁴

The Second Indochina War from 1970 to 1975

The Livre Noir presents the point of view that the 18 March 1970 coup d'état that toppled Sihanouk greatly aided the CPK's political and military position. In terms of the interests of the Vietnamese Communists, however, the combined American and South Vietnamese invasion that began at the end of April 1970, subsequent to the coup, posed major military problems. Retelling the story of developments during May and June 1970, the authors of the Livre Noir present a picture of Vietnamese Communist forces in Cambodia being disastrously caught

between the advancing American and Saigon forces and the troops of Lon Nol, who attacked them from the rear.²⁵

The combined invading forces are depicted as sweeping into Cambodia, far beyond the limits of advance that were announced at the time of these events or that were subsequently accepted. American and South Vietnamese forces are said in the Livre Noir to have advanced as far as the Mekong in Kompong Cham province and as far as Highway 4, linking Phnom Penh and Kompong Som (formerly Sihanoukville) in the southwest of the country. This advance was accompanied by 'murderous' aerial bombardment of frontier regions occupied by Vietnamese Communist forces. Apparently in an effort to underline the ferocity and technically advanced nature of the attack, the Livre Noir refers on more than one occasion to the use by the American forces during the invasion of 'prefabricated blockhouses'.²⁶ Somewhat in contradiction to earlier assertions concerning Vietnamese Communist numbers within southern Vietnam, the Livre Noir claims that the result of the American-Saigon regime invasion was the flight into Cambodia of a further 100,000 Communist troops.²⁷ One further point of military interest in relation to this 1970 period is the estimation provided by the Livre Noir of the casualty rate of North Vietnamese soldiers coming to fight in the south. By the time they reached Cambodia the document claims that only 20 per cent were fit to fight.²⁸

While the bulk of the Livre Noir dealing with the years between 1970 and 1975 is concerned with the various ways in which the CPK claims the Vietnamese Communists tried to destroy it and its military organisation, there are some further interesting, if often unverifiable, insights into the conduct of the Second Indochina War over this period.

One of these relates to conflicts between Cambodian and Vietnamese Communist troops. In addition to generalised accusations of Vietnamese abuse of Cambodian hospitality, disdainful behaviour, the rape of young women, and instances of indiscriminate killing, the Livre Noir provides some detail on a clash that took place in Kampot province. The event is recounted in the context of the conclusion

of the Paris Accords between the United States and the Vietnamese in early 1973. Following their conclusion, the United States stepped up its aerial bombardment of Cambodia, and it was in these circumstances that the Vietnamese are stated to have exacerbated relations with the CPK. In July 1973 Vietnamese forces in the Chhouk district of Kampot province arrested the 'chairman' of Sre Knong village. When the villagers protested the Vietnamese arrested Buddhist monks, ~~women~~ and children, and shut them up in a house to which they set fire. Six people were burnt to death.

The Livre Noir notes here that this was not a region in which the CPK had 'significant armed forces'. Such an admission is a little surprising since, as the Livre Noir itself notes, Chhouk was an old revolutionary region, which has long offered important sanctuaries to the southwest. The Vietnamese, however, according to the account, had two regiments in this general area. Nonetheless, following the acts of the Vietnamese Communist troops the population joined with the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea to chase the Vietnamese from the region. In the armed clashes that took place 500 Vietnamese were killed while losses on the Kampuchean side were 100 men.²⁹

So far as the Paris negotiations between the United States and the Vietnamese Communists are concerned, the Livre Noir offers an account in which the frightened Vietnamese were ready to accept harsh American terms because of the disastrous state of their armed forces by the end of 1972. Considerable attention is given in the Livre Noir to the efforts by the Vietnamese Communists to persuade the CPK to join in the negotiations and to accept terms laid down by the United States. The extent to which the Vietnamese did exert this pressure is a matter of disagreement among academic observers.³⁰ Of interest in this present review of developments is the insistence that the Livre Noir places on the contrasting military evaluations made by the CPK and the Vietnamese Communist Leadership at this stage.

According to the Livre Noir the CPK leadership was supremely confident, believing that the Lon Nol regime would have to collapse as the bulk of the

population came under CPK control. Also contrary to the estimations of the Vietnamese, the CPK did not judge that American aerial bombardment would cause great losses to its forces since the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea was constantly on the move.³¹ The survival and success of the Kampuchean Communist movement greatly disturbed the Vietnamese Communists, the document claims, since it threatened the ultimate Vietnamese conquest of Kampuchea.

The Livre Noir argues that the Vietnamese had not planned to liberate Saigon before early 1977. Only because the CPK went ahead with its plan to liberate Phnom Penh in 1975, the argument runs, was it possible for the Vietnamese to mount their final assault against the south. In view of their later justifications for the forced evacuation of Phnom Penh, it is interesting to find the CPK arguing here that the Vietnamese feared that any attempt to liberate either Phnom Penh or Saigon would bring massive American retaliation. According to the Livre Noir, the CPK discounted such a possibility.³²

Epilogue - The Kampuchean-Vietnamese War

The Livre Noir was published before the final Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in support of its protege regime. In that context, its concluding passages on military events in Kampuchea following the liberation of Phnom Penh in April 1975 have a hollow ring. There is some validity in the document's contention that despite an initial reluctance on the part of the Vietnamese to withdraw their troops from Kampuchea, and Vietnamese action in occupying Pulau Way (Koh Way) for a period, the Vietnamese did not plan direct action against Kampuchea in the immediate post-victory period.³³ Only after the failure of their various attempts to overthrow the Kampuchean regime through subversion, the Livre Noir asserts, did the Vietnamese resort to direct attacks.³⁴

Although the Livre Noir ends with a brave claim for Kampuchean invulnerability, the document also makes a striking admission of the event of Vietnamese penetration of Kampuchean territory at the beginning of full-scale hostilities in December 1977. Vietnamese forces, the document admits, advanced

some 25 kilometres from the border along Highway 7, near to the provincial capital of Svay Rieng along Highway 1, and to points 20 kilometres inside the border in Takeo province. It claims that these attacks, which were driven back by the Kampuchians, took place with Soviet personnel participating on the Vietnamese side.³⁵

1

SECTION 3

A BRIEF ASSESSMENT OF THE LIVRE NOIR

Although there is much in the Livre Noir that cannot be verified, and even more that is open to serious doubt, the document should not be dismissed as being without significance. At the most fundamental level the Livre Noir provides an account of relations between the Kampuchean and Vietnamese Communist leaderships in the period from the mid-1950s to late 1978 that underlines the consistent and basic disagreements of these two groups.

It is not necessary to accept each and every allegation made by the Pol Pot regime concerning the perfidy of the Vietnamese Communists to recognise that the Livre Noir reflects very real, and not altogether unjustified fears by the Kampucheans that their independence was threatened by the Vietnamese. There is no need, for instance, to accept the Kampuchean allegation of a consistent and unswerving Vietnamese plan to establish an Indochina Federation to recognise that a Vietnamese determination to be the dominant power in Indochina must have been of the greatest concern to Pol Pot and his associates. This was particularly true in terms of the undoubted fact that the Livre Noir comes close to the truth in the picture it presents of Vietnamese domination of all Communist and pro-Communist activity against the French during the First Indochina War. Moreover, even if the Kampuchean Communist account is overdrawn at times, its general picture of the Vietnamese Communist leadership treating the 'fraternal' Kampuchean party as a very junior partner has the ring of truth. Given the long experience of the Vietnamese and their participation in revolutionary activity from the early 1930s - not to mention the genuine racial antipathy between the Kampucheans and Vietnamese, however much some commentators may seek to minimise this point - the relationship between the two Communist parties could never be an easy one.

As has been suggested earlier, there is much room for doubt in the account

the Livre Noir provides of military developments during the Second Indochinese war, interesting though some of the unverifiable assertions are. Leaving debate of the veracity of certain aspects of the Livre Noir's account aside, however, there is every reason to judge that the document accurately conveys the Communist Party of Kampuchea's assessment that its revolution was at least as important as Vietnam's; that it was a Kampuchean and not an Indochinese (Vietnamese) revolution; and that the Vietnamese Communists were as much the beneficiaries of the Kampuchean Communists as the reverse. Again, there is no need to accept the figures given by the Livre Noir for the number of Vietnamese Communist troops taking refuge in Kampuchean territory to see that, from the Kampuchean point of view, their assistance was vital to the survival and ultimate victory of the Vietnamese.

From a broader perspective, the Livre Noir may add some small additional insight into why the Kampuchean pursued such harsh internal policies following their victory over Lon Nol in April 1978. The conviction that Vietnam represented a consistently hostile and predatory neighbour can be seen as one further reason why the swiftest possible transformation of Kampuchean society was to be achieved. This observation is no defence of Kampuchean domestic policy; rather it is a recognition that within the terms of the situation as perceived by the Kampuchean leadership, to the extent this is reflected in the Livre Noir, consolidation of power and transformation was necessary at almost any cost before the Vietnamese began their 'inevitable' attempt to conquer Kampuchea.

Kampuchean perceptions of threat provided a reason for acting with brutal speed to transform the country's internal character; likewise the Livre Noir gives some suggestion of the thinking that lay behind the CPK's decision to confront the Vietnamese in such a direct and dangerous military fashion. Perhaps the Chinese, as some commentators argue, did give some form of assurance to the Kampuchean leaders that made them more ready to pursue the course they followed. Whether or not this was so it seems that for the Pol Pot regime a decision to fight rather than negotiate with their Vietnamese opponents was a logical, if not

neccessarily rational, course to follow in terms of their perceptions of Vietnam's long-term aims. Utterly convinced of the aggressive and annexationist nature of their neighbour, the Kampucheans seem to have believed that to negotiate would be to admit weakness, and so invite their ultimate destruction. As we now know there were limits to Vietnamese patience and China could not prevent the overthrow of its client regime in Phnom Penh. The Livre Noir is left as a document with an apparently proven central thesis. As of mid-1979 the Vietnamese are the masters of Kampuchea.

APPENDIXDifferences between the Livre Noir and the Black Paper

The difference in length between the Livre Noir and the Black Paper is explained, apart from a slightly different format, by the omission from the English text of some sections that appear in the French version. Some examples of the omissions are: final paragraph on p. 25 of the Livre Noir; final paragraph on p. 28 of the Livre Noir; paragraph 2 on p. 31 of the Livre Noir; section of paragraph 2 on p. 90 of the Livre Noir. This is not an exhaustive listing and it should be noted that in at least one case there is material in the Black Paper that is omitted from the Livre Noir (See Black Paper p. 30 footnotes 1 and 2).

In general the differences between the two versions of the document are not significant. One possible exception to this observation, however, is the omission from the Black Paper of the references made in the Livre Noir to Son Ngoc Minh and to other Cambodians who were associated with the anti-French movement during the First Indochina War. It is difficult to know why reference to these persons, and particularly to Son Ngoc Minh, is omitted from the Black Paper. Examples of this omission include: Livre Noir pp. 23-4, 51, 56. It does not appear to be an effort on the part of the CPK to deny the existence of a division within the Kampuchean Communist movement, with some persons acting as agents of the Vietnamese. This division is made quite clear in the Black Paper. But the fact remains that Son Ngoc Minh and his associates become 'non-persons' in the Black Paper whereas in the Livre Noir Son Ngoc Minh, in particular, is depicted as continuing to play a role as a Vietnamese agent as late as 1970.

Possibly no other explanation is required than a recognition that the persons responsible for preparing the Black Paper sought to lessen its complexities by omitting the details of names that were not essential to the

basic content of the document. Such an explanation is not wholly satisfying, however, when note is taken of the points of detail included in relation to Son Ngoc Minh in the Livre Noir. Here, for example, is how he is depicted in Hanoi in 1970 (Livre Noir, p. 51-2), in a section that does not appear in the Black Paper:

Moreover, the CPK delegation [holding discussions with the Vietnamese in Hanoi in early 1970] was not very united and had to confront differences in its own ranks. Son Ngoc Minh, who had been living in Vietnam for a long time, was also a member of the delegation. During the discussions with the Vietnamese he dozed. But within the ranks of the CPK delegation he set about, at the instigation of the Vietnamese, asking questions such as, 'How can the CPK undertake armed struggle if it has neither arms, nor munitions, neither doctors nor medical supplies?' The delegation replied to him, 'How many rifles did Ho Chi Minh have when he began to fight? and Mao? and Lenin?'

FOOTNOTES

Introduction

¹Published by the Department of the Press and Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea, Phom Penh, 112 pages. I am indebted to Michael Richardson, Southeast Asia Correspondent of The Age, for providing me with a copy of the document. The quotations from the Livre Noir are my translation rather than the translation provided in the Black Paper (see footnote 2, below).

²That is, September 1978. I am indebted to Carlyle Thayer of the Faculty of Military Studies of the University of New South Wales for access to this version of the document. A further Indonesian-language version of the document exists with the title Buku Hitam (Black Book). This version was published by Suara Rakyat Indonesia. (The Voice of the Indonesian People), the name used for its publications by an Indonesian emigre group in Peking. A fairly cursory examination of the Buku Hitam seems to confirm that it is a direct translation of the Black Paper rather than of the Livre Noir.

³Particularly statements broadcast over Phnom Penhradio following the outbreak of open warfare between Kampuchea and Vietnam from the end of 1977. In addition to the Livre Noir the other major extant document dealing with the development of the CPK is the text of the speech made by Pol Pot to mark the seventeenth anniversary of the foundation of the party. This was delivered on 27 September 1977.

Section 1 - A Summary of the Livre Noir

¹The detail provided here relies on standard French-language sources, such as J. Moura, Le Royaume du Cambodge, 2 vols. Paris, 1883, and E. Aymonier, Le Cambodge, 3 vols. Paris, 1900-03.

²In this section of the Livre Noir the authors propose a folk etymological derivation for the word 'Cochinchina'. It derives, supposedly, from the Vietnamese words Cô (the word used to address a young woman), Xin (to ask or request), and Chin (a woman's name). 'Cochinchina' thus means 'Miss China requests' and this meaning is said to stem from the fact that the Vietnamese wife of a 17th century Cambodian king was instrumental in having her husband permit Vietnamese settlers to move into Cambodian territory.

The actual basis for the term 'Cochinchina' is discussed in detail in L. Arousseau, 'Sur le nom Cochinchine', Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient XXIV (1924), 564-79, where it is shown that the word in its modern form derives from Arabic.

The reference to the 'sordid use of girls' is never fully developed. The suggestion appears to be that, as with the 17th century Vietnamese wife of the Cambodian king, Vietnamese women traded on their sex to advance Vietnam's territorial aims.

³For some recent discussion of this term see David P. Chandler, 'The Roots of Strife', in Malcolm Salmon, ed., The Vietnam-Kampuchea-China Conflicts: Motivations, Background, Significance, Working Paper No. 1, Department of Political and Social Change, Australian National University, Canberra, 1979, p. 5.

⁴Contemporary evidence from the 1930s does, indeed, indicate that the Vietnamese leadership of the Indochina Communist Party thought in terms of an Indochinese revolution that would not have a place for a separate Cambodian revolution. See Archives Nationales de France, Section Outre-Mer, Nouveaux Fonds, Carton 323 Dossier 2625; Annexes a la note périodique No. 32 de la Direction de la Surêté Générale Indochinoise (3e trimestre 1934), Secret. Annexe 10.

⁵Sometimes spelt 'Bokeo' and now located in Ratanakiri province, following the division of Stung Treng. Given Bokheo's extremely isolated position the suggestion that it served as a Vietnamese Communist headquarters is striking.

⁶This and other references to Son Ngoc Minh are omitted from the Black Paper as opposed to the Livre Noir. Despite the references to Son Ngoc Minh in the document there is still considerable mystery concerning this man. Bernard Fall suggested in 1960 (Le Viet-Minh, Paris, p. 129) that he was an ethnic Khmer from Kampuchea Krom whose real name was Sieu Heng and who adopted the nom de guerre of Son Ngoc Minh to gain some reflected glory from the likeness of this name to that of another non-Communist and anti-French figure, Son Ngoc Thanh. Other commentators assert that Sieu Heng was a different individual. On Son Ngoc Minh and Son Ngoc Thanh see also M. Osborne, Politics and Power in Cambodia: The Sihanouk Years, Melbourne, 1973, pp. 48-9, and 54, notes 14 and 15.

⁷For a substantially different estimation of the effectiveness of the Strategic Hamlet Program see M. Osborne, Strategic Hamlets in South Viet-Nam: A Survey and a Comparison, Cornell Southeast Asia Program Data Paper No. 55, Ithaca, N.Y. 1965.

⁸The numbers noted here are dramatically different from the estimates generally held in Phnom Penh in early 1970. See Osborne, Politics and Power in Cambodia, p. 117 note 9 recording Prince Norodom Sihanouk's estimation that the number of Vietnamese on Cambodian territory was 40,000. Other estimates in Phnom Penh in February 1970 put the figure at 50,000 to 60,000. The present writer was in Cambodia during January and February 1970.

⁹This date for the foundation of the CPK was only revealed in September 1977.

¹⁰There is now general consensus that Pol Pot is the name assumed by Salot Sar. Born in 1928, he studied at a technical school of Phnom Penh before going to Paris in 1948. He failed to pass his examinations to qualify as a radio mechanic and in 1953 returned to Phnom Penh, where he worked as a teacher and was widely identified as a leftist. He went into the maquis (bush) in 1963.

¹¹Now Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

¹²Prime Minister at the time of Sihanouk's deposition.

¹³ Then Chief of State of Cambodia.

¹⁴ As noted elsewhere in the Livre Noir this cooperation involved Lon Nol and his associates facilitating the passage of supplies of all kinds to the Vietnamese Communists and, according to the CPK, Lon Nol's forces attacked the Kampuchean Communist movement to the benefit of the Vietnamese.

¹⁵ A region near the west bank of the Mekong, about 160 kilometres northeast of Phnom Penh.

¹⁶ Then, as now, Premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

¹⁷ At that time Premier of the People's Republic of China.

¹⁸ Sihanouk announced the formation of the Cambodian Front of National Union (known as its French initials by the acronym FUNK) on 23 April 1970. The formation of the Royal Government of National Union (GRUNK) took place between 3 and 5 May 1970.

¹⁹ Born in southern Vietnam in 1930 and said to have originally been named Kim Trang. He studied in Paris in the early 1950s but did not complete a university degree. After a period of teaching in Phnom Penh he went into the maquis in 1963.

²⁰ Born in southern Vietnam in 1930. He studied in France in the early 1950s before returning to Phnom Penh in 1955, after losing his scholarship for political activity. Like Ieng Sary and Pol Pot he was a teacher and he similarly went into the maquis in 1963.

²¹ Later, in an ex post facto justification for the forced evacuation of Phnom Penh, however, Ieng Sary speaking on behalf of the Pol Pot regime did argue that there was a threat of indirect American military intervention. Ieng Sary's interview with James Pringle on 4 September 1975, quoted from GRUNK Bulletin No. 220b/75 in F. Ponchaud, Cambodia Year Zero, London, 1977.

²² A military leader in southern Vietnam during both the First and Second Indochina Wars, Pham Hung is a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

²³ For contrasting views on whether or not the Vietnamese Communist leadership exerted pressure on the CPK to enter into negotiations with the United States, see, G. Porter, A Peace Denied, Bloomington, 1975, p. 153, and S.R.Heder, 'Origins of the Conflict', Southeast Asia Chronicle, No. 64 (September-October 1978), p. 17.

FOOTNOTESSection 2

- ¹Henry Kamm, despatch to the New York Times as printed in the International Herald Tribune, 19 March 1979.
- ²Ibid. See also Livre Noir, p. 53.
- ³International Herald Tribune, 19 March 1979.
- ⁴Livre Noir, p. 31.
- ⁵Ibid, p. 28.
- ⁶Ibid, p. 74 et seq.
- ⁷Ibid, p. 22
- ⁸For a brief review of the issue see M. Osborne, Politics and Power in Cambodia, pp. 48-9 and p. 54 note 14.
- ⁹Livre Noir, p. 14.
- ¹⁰See footnote 6 in Footnotes to Section 1 of this paper.
- ¹¹Livre Noir, p. 14.
- ¹²Ibid. p. 29 note 1.
- ¹³Ibid, p. 24.
- ¹⁴Ibid.
- ¹⁵Ibid, p. 25.
- ¹⁶For a discussion of the issue of Cambodian representation at the Geneva Conference see R.M.Smith 'Cambodia', in G. McT. Kahan, ed., Government and Politics of Southeast Asia, 2nd edn., Ithaca, N.Y., 1964, p. 616.
- ¹⁷Livre Noir, pp. 49, 56-7, 69 and passim. The document at no stage gives precise figures on the number of Cambodians who went to northern Vietnam at the end of the First Indochina War. Estimates by various commentators range from 1,000 to 5,000.
- ¹⁸Livre Noir, p. 26.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid, pp. 27-8, 31.

²¹Ibid, p. 27-8.

²²Ibid, p. 28.

²³Ibid, pp. 39-40.

²⁴Ibid, p. 32. In an interesting quantification the Livre Noir claims that one month's supplies transferred from Kompong Som (Sihanoukville) to Vietnamese Communist forces represented the equivalent of three years' supplies shipped down the Laotian (Ho Chi Minh) trails. See also pp. 56-7, note 1 and the account of the Vietnamese view of Lon Nol.

²⁵Livre Noir, pp. 52-55.

²⁶Ibid, p. 55. The prefabricated blockhouses to which reference is made probably were the shipping containers that United States Army units in Vietnam equipped as command posts to be lifted into combat regions by helicopter.

²⁷Livre Noir, p. 52.

²⁸Ibid, p. 55.

²⁹Ibid, pp. 74-6. See also p. 81.

³⁰Contrast G. Porter, A Peace Denied, p. 153 and S.R.Heder, 'Origins of the Conflict', p. 17.

³¹Livre Noir, pp. 78, 83, 90.

³²Ibid, pp. 79-80.

³³Ibid, p. 97.

³⁴Ibid, p. 99.

³⁵Ibid, p. 100.

SELECTED REFERENCES

There is a slowly developing literature on the Kampuchean-Vietnamese conflict. The following selection of references is not intended to be exhaustive. Instead the intention is to provide a brief guide to the more important and readily available writing on the subject and to some related issues linked to the emergence of a Communist Kampuchean state in 1975.

- Carney, T.M., Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and Discussion, Cornell Southeast Asia Program Data Paper No. 106, Ithaca, N.Y., 1977.
- Chandler, D.P., 'The Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea: The Semantics of Revolutionary Change', Pacific Affairs, 49, 3 (Fall 1976), pp. 506-15.
- Courrier de Vietnam, comp., Dossier Kampuchea I, Hanoi, 1978.*
- _____ Dossier Kampuchea II, Hanoi, 1978.*
- Gallois, J.P., 'Inside the Silent City', New Statesman, 13 April 1979.
- Heder, S.R., 'Origins of the Conflict', Southeast Asia Chronicle, No. 64 (September-October 1978), pp. 3-18.
- Kiernan, B., The Samlaut Rebellion and its Aftermath: The Origin of Cambodia's Liberation Movement, Monash University, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Working Papers Nos. 4 and 5, 1975.
- Osborne, M., 'Kampuchea and Vietnam; A Historical Perspective', Pacific Community, 9, 3 (April 1978), pp. 249-63.
- Paringaux, R.P., 'China and Vietnam: The Indochinese power seesaw', The Guardian Weekly, 28 October 1979 (a translation of articles originally appearing in Le Monde, 14 and 15-16 October 1978).*
- Porter, G., 'The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict in Southeast Asia', Current History, 75, 442 (December 1978), 195-96, 226, 230.
- Salmon, M. ed., The Vietnam-Kampuchea-China Conflicts: Motivations, Background, Significance, Working Paper No. 1, Department of Political and Social Change, Australian National University, 1979 (the articles by David Chandler, Ben Keirnan, David Marr, and Carlyle Thayer are of particular relevance).
- Shawcross, W., Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia, London, 1979.


Simon, S.W., 'New Conflict in Indochina', Problems of Communism, XXVII, 5 (September-October 1978), pp. 20-36.

Thayer, C.A., 'Dilemmas of Development in Vietnam', Current History, 75, 442 (December 1978), pp. 221-25.

Van der Krouf, J.M., 'Political Ideology in Democratic Kampuchea', Orbis, 22, 4 (Winter 1979), pp. 1007-30.

Zasloff, J.J. and McA. Brown, 'The Passion of Kampuchea', Problems of Communism XXVIII, 1 (January-February 1979), pp. 21-44.

* The items marked with an asterisk are of interest as expressing the point of view of the Vietnamese Government: directly in the case of the two Dossiers published by the Courrier du Vietnam, and indirectly in the case of the views put to the Le Monde reporter, M. R.-P. Pallingauz, by a senior Vietnamese official.



SDSC WORKING PAPERS

Working Paper No.	Title	Author
1	The Defence of Continental Australia	R.J.O'Neill
2	Manpower Alternatives for the Defence of Forces	J.O.Langtry
3	Structural Changes for a More Self- Reliant National Defence	R.J.O'Neill
4	Australia and Nuclear Non-Proliferation	D.J.Ball
5	American Bases: Some Implications for Australian Security	D.J.Ball
6	The Political Military Relationship in Australia	T.B.Millar
7	The Two Faces of Political Islam: Pakistan and Iran Compared	Md. Ayoob
8	Cost-effectiveness and Alternatives to the B-I Strategic Bomber	R. Huisken
9	Limiting the Use of Conventional Weapons: Prospects for the 1979 UN Conference	P.A.Towle
10	The Structure of Australia's Defence Force (Superseding Working Paper No. 1)	R.J.O'Neill
11	Australia as a Regional Seapower: an External View	McMccGwire
12	The Indian Ocean Littoral: Projections for the 1980s	D.J.Ball
13	The Australian Tactical Fighter Force: Prologue and Prospects	D.J.Ball
14	Non-aligned Criticisms of Western Security Policies	P.A.Towle
15	Aggression and Annexation: Kampuchea's Condemnation of Vietnam	M. Osborne

