

A COLONIAL DILEMMA: BRITISH POLICY
AND THE COLONIAL ECONOMY OF
TANGANYIKA 1918-1938

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I certify that this thesis is my own
work and that all sources used have
been acknowledged.

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ABBREVIATIONS

C.O.	Colonial Office
C.O.Lib.	Commonwealth Office Library, London
des.d.	despatch dated
E.A.	East Africa
K.A.R.	King's African Rifles
K.N.P.A.	Kilimanjaro Native Planter's Association
R.H.	Colonial Records Project, Rhodes House Oxford
tele.d.	telegram dated

A Note on Names and Sources

In regard to Tanzania's changes of name (from German East Africa to Tanganyika to Tanzania) I have employed whichever name was used during the time under discussion, i.e. up to 1920 German East Africa; between 1920-1964 Tanganyika and Tanzania from 1964 up to the present day.

The Colonial Office correspondence is identified sequentially by the series number, the volume number, the file number and the registry date or date of the most important despatch, e.g. C.O.691/117/28752/6/12/29.

INTRODUCTION

The following work is a study of the aims and nature of British colonial policy in Tanganyika between 1918 and 1939. The two decades between the World Wars mark the period of "colonial rule proper."¹ Colonial administrators looked forward to a long and untroubled future; the wars of conquest were largely over and colonial states were established within the African colonies. In the minds of officials Africans were backward and primitive and colonial rule appeared destined to last for a very long time. Administrators could proceed with colonial economic development - which meant turning the African colonies into a source of cheap raw materials for the benefit of European enterprise and the world market. The task of the colonial state was to guarantee that the extraction of raw materials by private enterprise would be both profitable and long-lasting. To attain these ends in Tanganyika, British administrators both in London and in Dar-es-Salaam worked on policies designed to create a permanent colonial economy within the Territory.

In his Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, Lord Lugard provided both an economic and a moral justification for colonial rule. Britain's "own industrial classes" and "civilisation" in general demanded raw materials from African colonies.² In return Africans would be provided with some of the benefits of Western civilisation and generally assisted in "their progress to a higher plane."³ Colonial rule would raise Africa out of barbarism by bringing Africans into contact with work, cash and Christianity. It was to be a mutually beneficial exercise. The idea of the Dual Mandate provided colonial administrators with powerful moral reasons for the imposition of a

1. M. Crowder; West Africa Under Colonial Rule (London 1969), p.19.

2. F.D. Lugard; The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London 1923), p.615.

3. ibid.

colonial economy. They were convinced colonial rule would eventually place the African on an upward path and any suffering or disadvantage was simply the price paid for an introduction to 'civilisation'. Ideally the African population would receive moral rather than material advantages from colonial rule, the material benefits from the production of raw materials being reserved for European enterprise. If economic benefits accrued to Africans, the extraction of raw materials would become more expensive and eventually lead to instability and change. Such developments were contrary to the general purposes of colonial rule.

The direction and application of colonial rule were determined by policies made by officials both in Britain and in Africa. A variety of interests and influences contributed to the content and shape of policy, but its long term aims remained essentially the same. Africans had to be made to produce raw materials for export, and this necessitated changes in their economic organisation. At the same time many of the consequences of such change were likely to prove harmful to the security of British enterprise and the permanence of colonial rule. The greater the extent of African participation in wage labour or cash crop production, the faster the formation of classes and groups considered by officials to be dangerous to the colonial state. As the main instrument of colonial rule, the colonial state was faced with the task of implementing conflicting and contradictory demands. The state had to induce change, yet avoid many of its consequences. Colonial policy was concerned to find a solution to such a dilemma. The ideal of colonial policy was to arrive at a balance between profits and permanence, to find a course of action that would not undermine the position. To achieve the ideal balance, officials formulating colonial policy had to take into account the full range of forces affecting the economy and society of a colony, both external demands and internal circumstances.

External demands were mediated through a section of the metropolitan state - the Colonial Office - and internal circumstances through the administration manning the colonial state. Long experience in empire had made British rulers realise that to have any chance of success, colonial policy had to be the product of an interaction between the metropolitan and colonial states.

Colonial policies endeavoured to create controlled economies devoted to the export of raw materials and containing few opportunities for sudden change. The African people were caught in a double bind. The colonial state could not leave them alone, owing to the demands by private enterprise for cheap raw materials, yet the same body would now allow private enterprise to exploit them to the full, for fear of disruptive social consequences.⁴ The interests of colonial policy were served by African societies being kept tribal and classless, producers of raw materials, buyers of manufactured goods but otherwise incapable of drastic change. The desires of private enterprise for increased productivity and greater exploitation would similarly have to be curtailed by the colonial state in the long term interests of British rule.

The colonial economies thus created were characterised by a limited rate of economic growth (except by European enterprise), low productivity and little internal development except in service of the export of raw materials. For a while the persistence of African impoverishment was ascribed not to the effects of colonial policy but to a lack of resources, to 'tribalism' and 'backwardness' by the inhabitants, or to an absence of the features of a 'modern' economy.⁵ However, within the last

4. This is the sense of Kay's remark: "capital created underdevelopment not because it exploited the underdeveloped world, but because it did not exploit it enough." G. Kay; Development and underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis (London 1975), p.x.

5. The problems of modernisation theory are evident in a Tanzanian example - P.R. Gould; "Tanzania 1920-1963: The Spatial Impress of the Modernisation Process",

decade the condition of the African economies has been described as 'underdeveloped'. According to the underdevelopment theorists, the world capitalist system had penetrated all African economies during the period of colonial rule, changing but not transforming them.⁶ African societies were no longer subsistence-based but made financially dependent on conditions in the world market. The African colonies were kept in a position of weakness and subservience by such dependence, to be manipulated by the demands of metropolitan capital. A colonial economy exported cheap raw materials and imported expensive manufactured goods. A pernicious economic structure had been created which retarded development on capitalist or on any other lines. African economies were distorted, a product neither of full European capitalism nor of internal class action but rather of a partial and incomplete combination of the two.

Underdevelopment theory has suffered from its frequent use at a general level to describe rather than explain the condition of African economies. However when examining a specific colonial situation, underdevelopment theory has the advantage of providing a clear interpretation of the aims, motives and effects of colonial policy without the confusion of official rhetoric.

F.n. 5 continued.

World Politics, Vol.22(2) 1970. The country was still poor though by Gould's calculations only a very few areas were without some form of 'modernization' by 1963.

6. There are large numbers of general works on the subject of African underdevelopment, out of which the contributions of Immanuel Wallerstein, Walter Rodney, Aghiri Emmanuel and Samir Amin are among the most prominent. Works applying underdevelopment to East Africa include E.A. Brett; Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa (London 1973), R.D. Wolff; The Economics of Colonialism: Britain and Kenya 1870-1930 (New Haven & London 1974) and C. Leys; Underdevelopment in Kenya (London 1975). The deficiencies of the theory are summarised in C. Leys; "Underdevelopment and Dependency: Critical Notes", Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol.7(1) 1977.

British officials would have admitted they were out to slow down economic development, but only in the interests of the African, to prevent him from being exploited by a ruthless capitalism. Public statements of British colonial policy in the inter-war years say a great deal about protecting African interests and there were many sincere officials who appeared genuinely concerned over the welfare of the native.⁷ While they were anxious to assist private enterprise in the 'steady economic development' of the colony, officials were equally concerned to preserve the African and his society from the worst effects of modern civilisation. Either way, whether one saw the African as a Noble Savage or as a primitive barbarian, British colonial rulers seemed to be undertaking something good and worthwhile by both assisting and controlling capitalism. British businesses could list the profits and officials and humanitarians could point to the benefits that cash, transport, health and education had brought to the 'Stone-Age' African. The paternalism of British rule concealed its aims and confused examinations of colonial policy. The methods of colonial rule were condemned but its ultimate intentions remained obscure.⁸

By indicating the persistent and damaging effects of colonial policies upon African economies, underdevelopment theory allows a deeper analysis of the period of colonial rule. Once the continual extraction of cheap raw

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7. In the past such statements have been accepted at face value as accurate guides to colonial intentions. Recent examples include R. Heussler; British Tanganyika An Essay and Documents on District Administration (Durham 1971) and H.A. Gailey; Sir Donald Cameron Colonial Governor (Stanford 1974).
 8. Sir Ralph Furse, chief recruiter for the Colonial Service, includes among the few mistakes of colonial rule insufficient knowledge of African opinions, and other failures of method. There is no questioning of the purposes of colonial rule. R. Furse; Aucuparius: Recollections of a Recruiting Officer (London 1962), pp.297-308.

materials is seen as the prime motive for colonial rule up to the end of the Second World War, it is possible to reconsider the role of British capital and the aims and motives of colonial policy. Recent studies of the capitalist state permit a better understanding of the role of the colonial state in the economy.⁹ Colonial economic policies contain the origins of African underdevelopment, and the inter-war years, the era of colonial rule *par excellence*, have become a period worthy of closer study.¹⁰

For a decade or so the study of colonial policy went through a period of relative neglect. In the early 1960s many historians rejected former preoccupations with the institutions of colonial rule in favour of a history centred on the activities of Africans.¹¹ The colonial period was reduced to a brief and unpleasant interlude between independence and the pre-colonial past. Colonial policy was deemed ineffective or irrelevant, a subject dealing in European illusions rather than in African reality. The application of underdevelopment theory has since re-emphasised the importance of colonial policy and colonial rule in the formation of African economies. However for one East African country, Tanzania, there is still no coherent explanation of the aims, motives and evolution of British colonial policy in the inter-war years. The colonial politics and economies of her neighbours, Kenya and Uganda, have been extensively studied, but there has been comparatively little done on the same period in Tanzania.

The reasons for such neglect are not hard to find. Britain formally held Tanganyika under a B-Class Mandate

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9. In particular J. Holloway and S. Picciotto (eds.); State and Capital: A Marxist Debate (London 1978).
 10. Aside from Brett's work already cited, other works have dealt with the peasant economies of Africa and the effect of colonial policies in the inter-war years. R. Palmer & N. Parsons (eds.); The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa (London 1977).
 11. Hence Hopkins' comment: "To be left in 1960 with a

of the League of Nations, and her colonial rulers made sure any pronouncements of policy would be in accord with the terms of the Mandate. As a result the colonial rhetoric surrounding Tanganyika is particularly turgid and idealistic, Britain apparently ruling the country entirely out of a moral duty to protect its inhabitants. In addition to a bland public record of "steady progress",¹² there were few dramatic incidents in the inter-war years to draw academic attention to Tanganyika. Compared to Kenya, African and settler politics seemed almost non-existent in Tanganyika. The emergence of African politics after the Second World War and the espousal of African socialism after independence made the inter-war years appear as "the mothball phase" in Tanzania's history, where nothing really happened. The worst that could be said of colonial policies was that they were "negative" and "neglectful" and the administration was characterised by a "benign paternalism."¹³ The political failings of Tanganyika's system of Native Administration had been clear by the end of the 1940s, and with Indirect Rule disposed of, there

F.n. 11 continued.

thesis entitled 'British Policy Towards ...' or even, one supposes, 'The United Africa Company's Policy Towards ...' was to be left stranded high and dry by the receding waters of imperial history without a paddle (still less a gunboat) ...". A.G. Hopkins; "Imperial Business in Africa Part One: Interpretations", Journal of African History, Vol.17(1) 1976.

12. This was obviously the impression intended by the yearly reports of the Tanganyika administration.

13. The "mothball phase" is the description of post-war Governor Sir Edward Twining quoted in H.W. Stephens; The Political Transformation of Tanganyika 1920-1967 (New York 1968), p.40. For descriptions of British policy in 'negative but benign' terms K. Ingham "Tanganyika: The Mandate and Cameron" in V. Harlow & E.M. Chilver (eds.); History of East Africa Vol.II (Oxford 1965), pp.551-2; C. Ehrlich; "The Poor Country: The Tanganyikan Economy from 1945 to Independence" in D.A. Low & A. Smith (eds.); History of East Africa Vol.III (Oxford 1976), p.90, B.T. Chidzero; Tanganyika and International Trusteeship (London 1961), p.48.

seemed little else to say.¹⁴

Tanzania's own 'Dar-es-Salaam school' of historians have placed great emphasis on African initiative and resistance, and they have found the inter-war period an awkward one to deal with. Many Africans in Tanganyika seemed more intent on collaboration rather than resistance to colonial rule.¹⁵ The tenets of underdevelopment theory hardly accord with an emphasis on African initiative and most histories of Tanzania reject the idea of colonial policy playing any decisive role.¹⁶ Although there are narrative accounts of British rule in Tanganyika there are few attempts to explain the aims and evolution of colonial policy. The most comprehensive account of economic policy is still Charlotte Leubuscher's study published during the Second World War.¹⁷ There have been almost no studies of sisal, the colony's most important export, and few investigations of the effects of colonial rule on local African economies.¹⁸ There are several works on tribal politics under the system of Indirect Rule but few deal directly with the economic policies of the British administration.¹⁹ The very diversity of climate, crops and social

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14. See R.E. Robinson; "Why 'Indirect Rule' has been replaced by 'Local Government' in the Nomenclature of British Native Administration", Journal of African Administration, Vol.2(3) 1950 and A.I. Richards (ed.); East African Chiefs (London 1960).
 15. John Iliffe describes the inter-war period as an "age of improvement" in I.N. Kimambo & A.J. Temu (eds.); A History of Tanzania (Nairobi 1969), Chapter 6, pp.123-124. African entrepreneurs are hardly suitable heroes for a country committed to African socialism.
 16. J. Iliffe; Agricultural Change in Modern Tanganyika: An Outline History (Nairobi 1971) and Kimambo & Temu; op. cit.
 17. C. Leubuscher; Tanganyika Territory: A Study of Economic Policy Under Mandate (London 1944).
 18. One study C.W. Guillebaud; An Economic Survey of the Sisal Industry of Tanganyika (Welwyn 1958) is written for the Tanganyika Sisal Growers Association and sisal remains the unknown industry of East Africa.
 19. For example R.G. Abrahams; The Political Organisation of Unyamwezi (Cambridge 1967), A. Shorter; Chiefship in Western Tanzania: A Political History of the Kimbu

structure within Tanzania make it difficult to generalise about territorial policy on the basis of local or regional studies.²⁰

Efforts to apply underdevelopment perspectives to Tanzania's history have not so far been particularly successful. The few works involved describe underdevelopment and its consequences but say very little about its origins within colonial policies.²¹ Even the recent study by E.A. Brett of British colonial policy in East Africa between 1918-1939 devotes very little space to Tanganyika and Brett sees policy within the Territory emerging from the personal preferences of individual governors.²² In addition the conscious efforts of the Tanzanian leadership to form a different type of economic organisation has meant that many features of the colonial economy have not demonstrated the persistence associated with underdevelopment.²³

Although the general aims of colonial rule were the

F.n. 19 continued.

(Oxford 1972), R.A. Austen; Northwest Tanzania Under German and British Rule (New Haven 1968) includes chapters on territorial policy but their political focus prevents adequate examination of economic policies.

20. For example J.G. Liebenow; Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania: the case of the Makonde (Evanston 1971) sums up colonial policy simply as "administrative caprice" (p.17), which is undoubtedly how the Makonde saw it but such a description is of little use to a student of colonial policy.

21. S.K. Sahu; "Tanzania: the Colonial Experience and Dependent Development/Underdevelopment", Africa Quarterly, Vol.17(3) 1978, simply labels features of the economy as 'underdeveloped'. J. Wayne; "Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Kigoma region, Tanzania: A social structural view", Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Vol.12(3) 1975, documents social disintegration as a consequence of colonial policy. G.W. Reeves: Tanzanian Underdevelopment and Dependence (La Trobe 1976) becomes bogged down in theory.

22. Brett; op. cit., pp.224-226.

23. Compared with 'neo-colonial' states as Kenya. Leys; Kenya.

same in Tanganyika as elsewhere, British policies acted through the colonial state to give an unusual shape to the colonial economy of Tanganyika. Unlike Kenya or Uganda where it was possible to identify settlers or cotton as major themes in economic and agricultural history, Tanganyika had no such focus. Her colonial economy appeared to mix settler, plantation and African cash crops. Her exports were shared between the sisal and coffee grown on European plantations and estates and a variety of African crops, principally cotton, coffee, grains and groundnuts. Elsewhere in East Africa such a combination had proved incompatible. In Kenya settlers had used the colonial state to limit African production of coffee and other cash crops. In Uganda the success of African coffee production had persuaded the colonial state to withdraw vital support from European plantations. Settlers were present in Tanganyika but they were unable to wield the power possessed by their compatriots in Kenya. Sisal was the single most important export crop, yet its plantations did not dominate the colonial economy. In terms of the price of raw materials, African cash crop production competed favourably with both settlers and plantations, but the existence of a strong African cash crop sector in Tanganyika did not lead to the elimination of European estates. The evolution of Tanganyika's colonial economy was hardly an accident but was due to changes in the policies directing the colonial state. Including the establishment of British rule in Tanganyika, there were four major changes in colonial policy, each change being initiated by a new Governor with a specific task to perform.²⁴ The division of the chapters reflects these changes. An examination of the evolution of British policies and their effect on the colonial economy should explain the unusual economic pattern that emerged in Tanganyika, and the reasons for its persistence up to the

24. Unfortunately there is little information available from official sources on the actual criteria employed in selecting governors.

start of the Second World War. It should also indicate why, although colonial rule impoverished and underdeveloped Tanganyika in the inter-war period, the colonial economy was so weakly entrenched that it failed to persist in the years after independence.

Colonial policy was the product of an interaction between the metropolitan and colonial states. Although separate, these two centres of colonial rule were inter-dependent and to stress one at the expense of the other provides an incomplete picture of the nature of colonial rule. A primary source which combines both metropolitan and colonial perspectives is the series of files of Colonial Office confidential correspondence. Two series have been used, one concerning East Africa in general and another dealing with Tanganyika in particular.²⁵ The files consist of a wide variety of communications to and from the Colonial Office, ranging from Governor's despatches and Treasury letters to schemes, pleas and demands from commercial interests and private individuals. The files and the minutes attached by the Colonial Office clerks responsible for Tanganyika, provide a detailed account of influences and changes in colonial policy. As confidential government documents they avoid the worst of colonial rhetoric and permit a broad appraisal of policy matters uncomplicated by the details of district administration. Although the files reveal some of the effects of colonial policy, by their very nature they cannot provide an accurate assessment of its impact upon African societies. Few colonial officials were in a position to make such an assessment, and even if correct, all information was subject to editing and interpretation by the colonial administration before being passed to the Colonial Office.²⁶

25. C.O.822 for East Africa and C.O.691 for Tanganyika.

26. In the words of one senior British politician, "though the C.O. get the truth they don't get the whole truth." Henn Papers (R.H.) W. Ormsby-Gore to Sir Sydney Henn (Chairman of the Joint East Africa Board) 27/9/24.

In the absence of African records, and to gain some idea of the effects of colonial policy from outside the official viewpoint, I have employed the personal papers of a number of officials and businessmen involved in Tanganyika. A long-term view of events from outside official circles is provided by the newspaper East Africa for the years 1925-1938.²⁷ Published weekly in London by F.S. Joelson, East Africa includes summaries of speeches, Parliamentary debates, commercial and social meetings of interest to residents of East Africa. With due allowance for the idiosyncracies of the editor, the commentary on events of the time is generally well-informed and accurate.²⁸ Because of its metropolitan base, East Africa provides a valuable and convenient record of the doings of businessmen and officialdom both in London and East Africa, without the parochial detail of the East African newspapers.


The main body of detailed work is prefaced by a chapter examining the influences on the formulation of colonial policy and the connection between the colonial and metropolitan states. Chapters 2 and 3 cover the evolution of the colonial economy of Tanganyika up to the beginning of the 1930s. These years saw the emergence of African cash crop production, the defeat of settler interests, and the rise of a powerful plantation sector. In the depression of the 1930s the administration of Tanganyika became bankrupt, and it should have been obvious to the dimmest official that there was something seriously wrong with the colonial economy. Chapters 3 and 4 explain why after such an experience the same economic structure persisted almost unchanged until the end of that decade. Collectively the chapters should provide a reply to Negley Farson's so far unanswered question: "Where and What is England's Tanganyika policy?"²⁹

27. After September 1936 East Africa changed its title to East Africa and Rhodesia.

28. Joelson was noted for his violent anti-German prejudices. Although he was a gadfly to the Colonial Office neither they nor any of East Africa's readers took him to task for inaccurate reporting.

29. N. Farson; Behind God's Back (London 1946), p.181.

Tanganyika Territory: Tribes, Towns and Railways
(1931)



Chapter 1

PROFITS VERSUS PERMANENCE: THE DILEMMAS
OF BRITISH POLICY AND COLONIAL RULE
IN TANGANYIKA

In 1918 the country which is now Tanzania came under the control of the armies of the British Empire. Through military conquest, Britain acquired another colony, though in this case her antagonists were not the indigenous population but the army of the colony's previous colonial rulers. Up to 1918 the country was known as German East Africa, the largest part of Germany's African empire. Despite the hopes of the German government, the colony was something of an economic disappointment. The country had few obvious natural resources. Its heart was a dry plateau noted for the infrequency and unreliability of its rainfall. Tsetse fly, malaria and a variety of other tropical diseases dominated large areas of territory. The four million African inhabitants concentrated themselves into the fertile areas along the fringes of the colony; along the coastal plain, around the edges of Lake Victoria and in the highlands of Kilimanjaro and the Usambaras. It was not a rich country and the indigenous economies demanded careful management to produce anything in the way of surplus. Since the 1880s such economic management had begun to break down under the combined impact of famine, new diseases such as smallpox and rinderpest, and the violent imposition of German colonial rule.¹ The German administration conquered the country in a series of wars during the 1890s, and in 1906 put down a major rebellion in the form of the Maji-Maji revolt. The experience of colonial conquest coupled

1. The ecological disaster in Tanganyika at the end of the nineteenth century is outlined in H. Kjekshus; Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History: The Case of Tanganyika 1850-1950 (London 1977), pp.126-160.

with ecological disaster left the indigenous economies weakened and vulnerable. Once their own economy was disrupted, the African inhabitants were in a position to become incorporated into the new German colonial economy, either as labourers or as producers of cash crops. However up to the outbreak of war, the colonial economy of German East Africa provided only a few raw materials for German industries and little return on government expenditure. African cash crop production was limited by the demands of white settlers, and up to 1914 they appeared ready to dominate the colonial economy. The African population was being reduced to a source of cheap labour on European estates producing sisal, coffee and rubber. German East Africa was rapidly evolving into a settler state.²

The embryonic development of the German colonial economy was shattered by the First World War. The British campaign against General Paul Von Lettow-Vorbeck and his guerilla army took three years in a slow advance through German East Africa. Both sides conscripted Africans from the villages to serve as porters, and they died in their unknown thousands from disease and neglect.³ The armies confiscated food and raw materials for their respective war efforts, while famine and new epidemics decimated the remaining African population.⁴ The colonial economy ceased to function. The German settlers, missionaries and officials were interned and deported and their farms and estates lay abandoned. Extensive sections of the Tanga and Central railways were blown up by the retreating

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2. On the extent of settler power in German East Africa see J. Iliffe; Tanganyika Under German Rule 1905-1912 (Cambridge 1969), pp.201-210.
 3. Of the 327,160 carriers officially serving with the British forces, 68,199 were dead or missing - a death rate of 20%. G.W.T. Hodges; "African Manpower Statistics for the British Forces in East Africa", Journal of African Studies, Vol.19(1) 1978. The Colonial Office unofficial estimate was up to 100,000 African dead. C.O.691/19/61252/18/12/18.
 4. The effects of the war are discussed in J. Iliffe; A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge 1979), pp. 269-272.

Germans, to be hastily repaired by the oncoming British. In Dar-es-Salaam the residence of the Governor was a pile of rubble courtesy of a British naval bombardment, and the harbour was choked with sunken or scuttled German shipping. The countryside between Tabora and the Congo was ravaged by the Belgian army, the Force Publique. Britain acquired control over German East Africa, but in the process the colony was thoroughly devastated.

Under British rule German East Africa would acquire a new name - Tanganyika Territory - and a reconstructed colonial economy. British and German colonial rule in Africa shared a similar aim: the profitable exploitation of raw materials. In Lord Lugard's words, British administration existed in tropical Africa "to create conditions under which individual enterprise may most advantageously develop the natural resources of the country" according to the dictates of "efficiency and economy."⁵ According to Lugard such development would benefit both Western 'civilisation' and the African inhabitants. In the inter-war years, economic development meant the extraction of cheap raw materials through the efforts of the African people, to the benefit of 'individual enterprise'. The African was viewed by officials as an economic asset to be put to work.⁶ Their indigenous economies had to be reorganised to produce raw materials for European enterprise and the world market.

The reorganisation of African economies and their incorporation into a colonial economy took varying forms according to a combination of internal circumstances and external demands. In Africa colonial economies were

5. Lugard; Dual Mandate, pp.95-96.

6. Education and health care were designed to preserve a valuable asset. For education policy in Tanganyika see W. Morris-Hale; British Administration in Tanganyika From 1920 to 1945 (Geneva 1969) and for health policy A. Beck; "Medicine and Society in Tanganyika 1890-1930: A Historical Inquiry", Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Vol.67(3) 1977.

organised around three types of production; white settlers, large scale mining and plantations and African cash crop production. The three types were not exclusive - all could exist within a single colony - but unless regulated by the colonial state all three types could undermine one another. White settlers demanded land, cheap labour and massive state assistance to maintain their precarious position as producers in Africa. Mines and plantations demanded less of the colonial state, but sought large amounts of cheap African labour. The development of African cash crop production threatened to destroy the reservoirs of native labour by providing Africans with an alternative source of cash income. All three types of production demanded a limited resource - African labour - and competition between them would make the extraction of raw materials an unprofitable business. Such competition was often limited by environment and economic circumstances. For example, West Africa was considered the 'white man's grave' and climate excluded the prospect of small settlers. In East and Central Africa all three types of production could co-exist in many colonies and there the regulation of competition was in the hands of the colonial state. State support was essential for one type of production to emerge prosperous and predominant. Settlers were dominant in Kenya so long as the administration restricted opportunities for the evolution of African cash crop production. African cash crop production predominated in Nigeria and Uganda as the colonial government limited the role of plantations. Such moves were deliberate policy decisions by a colonial administration.

However the form of a colonial economy was not simply dependent on decisions by a colonial government. A colonial economy was shaped by a complex interaction between external and internal forces. Such influences fall into four broad categories: the colonial state; the metropolitan state; circumstances within a colony; and circumstances outside both colony and state such as metropolitan businesses and conditions on the world market. The area where all four categories intersected was in the

connection between the metropolitan and colonial states, and here colonial policy was formulated as the expression of influences from all four categories. The location of colonial policy-making has been a matter of some debate. Colonial policy was said to derive from the pragmatism of the 'man-on-the-spot', whether district officer or colonial governor.⁷ Between the wars statements by British politicians on the subject of colonial policy were generally vague and appeared to bear little relation to the realities of colonial administration.⁸ Alternatively it has been argued that the Governor and his officials did not create policy but simply carried out decisions made by metropolitan interests.⁹ Depending on one's viewpoint the Colonial Office in London was either a powerful body of decision-makers or an ineffectual rubber stamp for decisions made by the colonial administration.¹⁰ In fact the formulation of colonial policy was done by both the Colonial Office and the colonial administration, a product of the relationship between them. Each was dependent on the other for guidance and information and each had a specific role to play in the formation of colonial policy

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7. For the British "genius for empiricism" and the pragmatic nature of colonial rule see W. Ormsby-Gore; "Address to the African Society Dinner", Journal of the African Society, Vol.28(112) 1929 and J.J. Tawney; Autobiographical Paper (R.H.).
 8. Between the wars official statements of British policy in East Africa were vague and open to a variety of interpretations. The classic example was the use of the term 'paramountcy' in the Devonshire White Paper Indians in Kenya Cmd.1922 1923.
 9. Works which stress metropolitan domination of colonial policy are Wolff; op. cit. and R. Howard; Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Ghana (London 1978).
 10. The majority of works make the Governor a supreme autocrat and source of colonial policy and limits the role of the Colonial Office. Unfortunately the motives behind colonial policy are then attributed to the personality of the individual Governor. In a recent article D.M.P. McCarthy describes the Colonial Office as having "a minimal impact on policy evolution" (p.581, n.7). Having reduced the Colonial Office to powerlessness (by confusing a lack of direct intervention with an inability to do so) MacCarthy attributes the motives of

and the maintenance of colonial rule.

The colonial state was a set of institutions implanted within a colony to carry out the main purposes of colonial rule. Its role was to guarantee conditions whereby European enterprise could 'advantageously' extract raw materials on a cheap and profitable basis. The colonial state had to "pave the way" for such economic activity by constructing transport systems, establishing legal relations, maintaining order and stability and undertaking the reorganisation of indigenous African economies.¹¹ In East Africa these activities were beyond the resources of private enterprise alone. The most important task was the reorganisation of African economies, to compel Africans to produce the raw materials demanded by European enterprise and the world market. The imposition of hut and poll taxes and the replacement of African manufactures by imported goods created the necessity for Africans to earn cash. They could do this by producing raw materials either directly on their own plots or for wages on European estates. Equally as important as the creation of a colonial economy was the maintenance of stability. To preserve law and order the colonial state possessed a monopoly of legal force and an extensive coercive apparatus of army, police, prisons and judiciary. However, long-term colonial rule - and future stability - depended not simply on the maintenance of law and order but on the colonial state gaining the acquiescence of the majority of the African population. Africans were made economically dependent upon imports and a cash economy and their traditional leaders were eventually incorporated

F.n. 10 continued.

colonial policy to the bureaucracy's obsessive need for order, stability and revenue. He is unable to explain why these goals should become obsessive except by reference to the bureaucratic personality. See D. M.P. McCarthy; "Organising Underdevelopment From the Inside: The Bureaucratic Economy of Tanganyika 1919-1940", International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol.10(4) 1977.

11. For an early assessment of the importance of the state in Africa S.H. Frankel; Capital Investment in Africa (London 1938), pp.257-258.

into the lower levels of the colonial state.¹² Such methods deprived Africans of leadership and made colonial rule cheap and effective, but they could not resolve the central dilemma of colonial rule.

Between the wars British colonial policy endeavoured to overcome the contradiction between the maximum production of raw materials for the benefit of European enterprise and the need to guarantee the long term stability of colonial rule. The impact of colonial rule upon African societies threatened to accelerate social change to a point beyond the control of the colonial state. The involvement of the African population in the production of cash crops would lead to the formation of classes of African farmers and merchants. Similarly, the evolution of a labour force dependent solely on wages could lead to the formation of a landless proletariat. Such developments might result in greater productivity, more raw materials and increased benefits for European enterprise, but they also threatened to create disaffected classes prepared to escape or defy tribal authority in order to satisfy their economic interests. During the 1920s British officials had before them the changes wrought in Europe by the First World War, the rise of the Labour Party and powerful trade unions in Britain and the spectre of revolution in Russia. Social change, the emergence of classes within African societies, could only increase the cost of extracting raw materials and prepare a fertile ground for agitators of the "Bolshevist" variety.¹³ Changes in African society were necessary to allow for the production of raw materials, yet it had alarming consequences of the stability of long-term colonial rule. The colonial state had to control changes in such a way as to allow European enterprise to play a profitable role, yet at the same time avoid the dangerous social and economic effects of imposing capitalist

12. This process was the essence of 'Indirect Rule' in Tanganyika. See Iliffe; Modern History, pp.318-334.

13. Sir Donald Cameron was the colonial official most articulate on the subject of preserving African society in order to resist destructive change and the

relations upon African societies. To this end the colonial state had to regulate both the development of the colonial economy and its social effects and the demands of private enterprise. In the interests of long term colonial rule African societies and European enterprise had to be brought under the control of the colonial state.

The need to control the activities of the indigenous population was an integral part of colonial rule, but the regulation of European enterprise was a relatively new development in colonial thinking. Before the war the economic failure of the great chartered companies, the days of 'Red Rubber' in the Congo, the activities of the Kenya settlers and continued African resistance revealed all the disadvantages of unrestrained European enterprise in Africa. Officials justified the regulation of private enterprise with a new ideology emphasising paternalism and trusteeship. Africans would be protected from the full effects of their incorporation into the colonial economy and the world market. The colonial administration would stand between the African and the full development of capitalist relations in the colonies. There were dangers in taking the African "too fast" along the "road to progress."¹⁴ Colonial officials believed they were protecting the African from exploitation by ruthless capitalists, and the knowledge gave them a strong moral and altruistic commitment towards the maintenance of colonial rule. European enterprise could not be allowed to break up African societies or, at least, their disintegration should be delayed for as long as possible. The African and European enterprise both had distinct roles to play; the African to produce raw materials and the European to sell them. Once under the control of the colonial state, the colonial economy operated with the

F.n. 13 continued.

impact of 'agitators'. See Sir D. Cameron; "Position and Prospects in Tanganyika" in Journal of the African Society, Vol.26(104) 1927 and Address to the Empire Parliamentary Association 25/3/31 (C.O.Lib).

14. Lugard; Dual Mandate, pp.198, 217.

full approval of officials.¹⁵ Work was essential to teach the African important and valuable habits and a regulated economy did not come under the idea of 'exploitation'. The 1926 Conference of East African Governors saw the basic problem of colonial policy as: "how to arrive at a just and far-seeing method of harmonising the best progress and welfare of the inhabitants with the maximum of production."¹⁶

Although the colonial state was a powerful agent within a colony, there were definite limits on its ability to control change. Colonial administration was designed to operate at minimal cost to the metropolitan power. In a country of the size and diversity of Tanganyika, there were limits to what 1,200 officials could accomplish, especially when the administration was often seriously short of finance and expertise. Many District Officers possessed only a limited understanding of changes in African societies in their charge. Similarly, officials usually had only a restricted knowledge of the activities of European enterprise. The administration's knowledge of the forces of change was distinctly limited. Hence officials both in the local administration and in London placed great reliance on caution, precedent and preventative action. A knowledge of the success (or otherwise) of past decisions provided officials with a guide to formulating colonial policy for the future. An acquaintance with the doings of private enterprise or a detailed knowledge of African society were not considered necessary.¹⁷

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15. One District Officer J.J. Tawney commented that though he was "imbued with the idea of the paramountcy of African interests" he had no doubts that the Europeans "had an unalterable right to the land they held by law and from which they contributed so greatly to the country's economy." The dual outlook "did not lead to logical political conclusions in my mind." J.J. Tawney; Autobiographical Paper (R.H.).
 16. Great Britain: Parliamentary Papers; Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa Cmd.2904 1927, p.4.
 17. None of Tanganyika's colonial Governors had any previous experience in the Territory. See A.H.M. Kirk-Greene; "The Progress of Pro-Consuls: Advancement and Migration among the Colonial Governors of British African Territories 1900-1965", Journal of Imperial

The role of the colonial state made it active in both enforcing and resisting change. The colonial state had to support yet control private enterprise, encourage labour or cash crop production among Africans yet avoid the social and economic consequences. In an endeavour to resolve this contradiction colonial policy was continually changing and re-adjusting to external demands and internal circumstances. Colonial administrations could not afford to be complacent or quiescent if they were to keep control over the colonial economy, and the Colonial Office could not afford to relax its supervision over colonial policy.

The Colonial Office in London was the main section of the British metropolitan state concerned with the administration of the Dependent Empire. The role of the metropolitan state was to guarantee the reproduction of capitalist social relations within Britain, and thereby acted in the general interest of British capital as the representative of the ruling classes.¹⁸ The main role of the Colonial Office, as a section of the metropolitan state, was to ensure nothing occurred within the colonies to damage the reproduction of capitalist relations within Britain and her Empire, to act where necessary to preserve metropolitan interest. Hence the Colonial Office acted as a supervisory body with the power to intervene in the administration of the colonies. Formally, this power was expressed in the right of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to review, modify and if necessary, to veto all legislation and proposals put forward by the colonial administration. In practice, because of the sheer size and diversity of the British Empire, and the multiple responsibilities and short tenure of the office of

F.n. 17 continued.

and Commonwealth History, Vol.7(2) 1979. Even a great Governor such as Cameron lacked any real knowledge of Africans. Sir P.E. Mitchell; African Afterthoughts (London 1954), p.105.

18. For the role of the capitalist state and its relations to capital see the essays in Holloway and Picciotto (eds.); op. cit. especially the contribution by Joachim Hirsch.

Secretary of State, his power effectively devolved onto the senior officials of the Colonial Office.¹⁹ Unlike Governors, who tended to be a heterogenous collection varying widely in education, experience and ability,²⁰ the permanent officials of the Colonial Office were of a uniformly high calibre as befitted the importance of their task.²¹ They were educated men rather than technical experts, who could be relied upon to take a broad and objective view, free from the parochialism and detail of territorial administration. The Colonial Service and the Colonial Office were separate hierarchies, and few Colonial Office clerks had any direct experience of the colonies under their supervision.²² However Colonial Office personnel were equally committed to the notions of paternalism and trusteeship. In the interests of long-term colonial rule, the Colonial Office would protect the African from the disruptive social and economic consequ-

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19. The Secretary of State was responsible for around 50 colonies and he had, on average, two years in office to learn something about them. In contrast to the 36 Secretaries of State between 1909-1945 there had been only 8 Permanent Under Secretaries. C. Parkinson; The Colonial Office from Within (London 1947), p.17.
 20. I.F. Nicolson and C.A. Hughes; "A Provenance of Proconsuls: British Colonial Governors 1900-1960", Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.4(1) 1975.
 21. The Oxford and Cambridge attainments of the senior clerks are listed in L.H. Gann and P. Duignan; The Rulers of British Africa (London 1978), p.378, n.2. Even their opponents admitted their intelligence. Sir Robert Coryndon, Governor of Uganda, described John Calder, the Colonial Office Secretary to the 1924 East Africa Commission, as "a narrow, dour, unforgiving, hostile, bitter man but with excellent brains." Henn Papers (R.H.), Coryndon to Henn 9/12/24.
 22. The division began to break down in 1925 when a former Governor Sir Samuel Wilson was appointed Permanent Under Secretary at the Colonial Office though not without some disapproval. One senior clerk commented to a Committee "How would you like to serve under a Permanent Secretary who can neither read nor spell." Furse; op. cit., p.146.

ences of capitalist relations and from the destructive greed of individual enterprises. Situations such as in Kenya, where a fraction of British capital - the small settlers - dominated the colonial state, demanded frequent intervention by the Colonial Office.²³

Direct intervention in East Africa was difficult and usually controversial and the Colonial Office preferred to persuade and suggest changes to policy rather than exercise the veto of the Secretary of State. There were limits on the power of the Colonial Office. Social groups within a colony, such as the Kenya settlers, could mobilise other sections of the metropolitan state against Colonial Office interference. Its officials were dependent on the despatches and reports of the colonial administration for information about a colony. The quality and accuracy of the information thus obtained could vary enormously, especially if a colonial administration adopted the attitude of "we tell them what we want them to know."²⁴ Although the telegraph could convey urgent messages, there was generally a three month delay between the transmission of a despatch and its arrival at the Colonial Office. The problems of time and distance involved in the running of a vast Empire made it impossible for colonial policy to be formulated solely in London. Instead the Colonial Office was concerned less with details than with principles and precedent, with long-term effects rather than immediate events. Decisions were made on the application of precedents found in the files and experience of the Colonial Office. According to one senior official Charles Jeffries, decisions about colonial policy were made on the basis not of what was "expedient, fashionable, convenient

23. See D. Wylie; "Confrontation Over Kenya: The Colonial Office and its Critics 1918-1940:", Journal of African History, Vol.18(3) 1977.

24. Such an attitude emerges very strongly from the diaries of Sir Phillip Mitchell when he was Secretary of Native Affairs and Chief Secretary in Tanganyika. See P. Mitchell; Diaries (R.H.) especially the entry of 23/5/32.

or economic" but on what was "right."²⁵ The Colonial Office knew what was right by remembering what had gone wrong before.²⁶ What had damaged metropolitan interests in the past was assumed to be likely to damage them in the future. Colonial policy grew out of precedent rather than from detailed local knowledge or technical expertise. The Colonial Office acted as a repository of colonial experience and as a source of guiding principle, to ensure continuity would be maintained in colonial policy despite changes in the senior staff of colonial administrations. The task of the Governor and his staff was to interpret and apply colonial policy according to circumstances within the colony. In the process a colonial administration could modify and adapt policy to meet the main purposes of colonial rule - which were firstly, to guarantee the profitable extraction of raw materials and second, to ensure the security and stability of colonial rule. Lessons learned in the implementation of colonial policy were passed back to the Colonial Office. To counter the social and economic pressures generated by colonial rule, British policy was the product of principles gleaned from past experiences combined with the circumstances within a colony as perceived by the colonial administration. Policy was not rigid or pre-ordained but could be adapted to try and resolve the contradictions of colonial rule.

Colonial policy was largely, but not uniquely, a product of the interaction between the colonial administration and the Colonial Office. Other sections of the metropolitan state could play important roles in the formulation of colonial policy, usually by making specific

25. C. Jefferies: The Colonial Office (London 1956), p.7.

26. In Lord Delamere's words: "The reason why the Colonial Office keep control in these countries is because not that they have any great experience in these countries, but because they have many precedents to work on ..."
Minutes of the Second Unofficial Conference
Livingstone Southern Rhodesia (R.H.) 12/9/26.

demands of the colonial administration. Their influence was normally mediated through the Colonial Office, though its officials strongly resented endeavours by other state departments to interfere in colonial administration.²⁷

In regard to East Africa the Treasury and the Foreign and India Offices were the departments most frequently involved in colonial affairs. The most formidable was the Treasury, and its financial orthodoxy and power to review colonial budgets appeared to the Colonial Office as a constant threat to the security of the colonial states. Many colonies obtained loans from the Imperial Exchequer, and the degree of Treasury control over their economic policies was an issue bitterly contested by the Colonial Office.²⁸

Other sections of the metropolitan state exercised a more intermittent influence. The African colonies made only infrequent appearances on Cabinet agenda and most Ministers appeared either indifferent to their existence or to regard them simply as a source of industrial orders for British factories.²⁹ Between the wars no Secretary of State possessed anything like the personal authority of Joseph Chamberlain in Cabinet, and the office became a junior ministry with little apparent influence.³⁰ The lack

27. The "pretensions" of the India Office to have any say in East African affairs were regarded as particularly "intolerable" by the Colonial Office. C.O.691/38/7975/13/2/30; 50/17812/13/4/21.

28. Senior Colonial Office personnel had no hesitation about publicly expressing their opinion of the Treasury. Parkinson described it as a labyrinth where the visitor felt he might meet the Minotaur "a foreboding that would not necessarily be dispelled when the caller came face to face with a Treasury official in his lair." Parkinson; op. cit., p.26. Permanent Under Secretary Sir George Fiddes considered progress in any colony depended on it being free from Treasury control. G. Fiddes; The Dominions and Colonial Offices (London 1926), p.121.

29. Brett; op. cit., pp.115-138.

30. Furse; op. cit., pp.145-146.

of interest in colonial affairs was equally apparent in Parliament. Supply Bills provided most of the opportunities for debate on colonial policy and they were frequently dominated by Kenya and its politics.³¹ The Colonial Office regarded questions in Parliament as a device designed to extract confidential information, and as a result Ministerial replies gave little away about colonial policy.³² Disagreements between the political parties were over the implementation of colonial policy, not about its general aims.³³ A change in government would produce little change in the purposes of colonial rule.

On the metropolitan level and outside the metropolitan state, there were other important influences contributing to the formulation of colonial policy. The nature of the links between the Colonial Office and private enterprise has been another area of debate. The Colonial Office is depicted as either the compliant tool of British business or else as a high-minded and idealistic body, contemptuous of the aims and methods of private enterprise.³⁴ Such descriptions are often simplifications of the complex attitude of the Colonial Office towards British capital. The Colonial Office endeavoured to act as an impartial regulator and protector of British business, to be a guardian of its general interest. The Colonial Office

31. The debates in the House of Commons are analysed by Brett; op. cit., pp.60-61.

32. The Colonial Office rule on Parliamentary Questions was "to confine the answer strictly to what is asked for and volunteer nothing on the assumption that the Hon. Member really wants something else." C.O.691/64/52947/1/11/23, Minute by Strachey 7/11.

33. See P.S. Gupta; Imperialism and the British Labour Movement 1914-1964 (London 1975) especially Chap.3-8.

34. For Colonial Office collusion with British business see Howard; op. cit., pp.147-148; for Colonial Office idealism Gann and Duignan; Rulers, p.53, and V. Ponko; "The Colonial Office and British Business Before World War I: A Case Study", Business History Review, Vol.43(1) 1969.

would limit competition, assist in the construction of a colonial economy and defend 'British interests' from incursions by capital of another nationality. By promoting and preserving colonial rule, the Colonial Office endeavoured to protect the interest of all British firms operating within the colonial economy. But because of the competitive nature of capitalism and the dilemmas involved in colonial rule, the Colonial Office could not maintain this impartial pose and frequently had to intervene either on behalf or against individual firms and sections of capital. It often justified such intervention as being done in the interest of the African population. The Colonial Office had nothing but contempt for speculators and other businesses who sought their own profits regardless of the consequences. Such firms put their own interest before the requirements of security and long-term colonial rule. The Colonial Office did not mind British firms making large profits, but it did object if in the process such firms threatened the stability of the colonial economy and the social and economic foundations of the colonial state.³⁵ 'Irresponsibility' was the worst crime, and colonial officials would decline to assist or would take positive steps against firms and sections of capital (such as small settlers) who resisted regulation. Such a distinction explains the ambivalent attitude of the Colonial Office towards monopolies and towards capital investment in the colonies.

Although in the Dual Mandate Lord Lugard condemned monopolies as inimical to the expansion of trade,³⁶ the Colonial Office was not opposed to the granting of monopolies in order to regulate competition and control the colonial economy. However officials were averse to granting certain types of monopoly - in particular large land

35. Mitchell summed up the attitude: "as much as we may dislike it the days of 'free trading' are over for good. The 19th Century individualist, captain of his soul, free to acquire wealth for himself alone & destroy society to suit himself is gone I hope for ever." Mitchell; Diaries (R.H.) 19/1/32.

36. Lugard; Dual Mandate, p.479.

concessions - to individual firms who might not act 'responsibly'.³⁷ Similarly the Colonial Office was in two minds over the desirability of capital investment in the colonies. Such investment might improve the extraction of raw materials yet officials were worried about individual businesses building up a concentration of commercial power which would allow them to resist regulation.³⁸

British enterprise needed the co-operation of the colonial and metropolitan states to guarantee the profitability of its operations in East Africa. Sections of capital within East Africa were frequently in conflict, and persistently sought specific assistance from the colonial and metropolitan states. The Colonial Office was usually unwilling to break precedent and provide special favours to single firms or sections of capital unless its officials could be convinced such moves would benefit the purposes of colonial rule. Large sections of metropolitan industry were far more likely to receive special assistance from the Colonial Office. Between the wars the cotton and the steel industries in Britain were in difficulties. As these two

37. The Colonial Office was badly bitten by land speculation in Kenya before the First World War. See M.P. K. Sorrenson; Origins of European Settlement in Kenya (Nairobi 1968), pp.142-150. On the need to regulate capital and compel it to behave responsibly see Mitchell; Diaries (R.H.) 1/5/30 and the writings of a senior Colonial Office clerk J.M.G. Green for the Labour Party in Gupta; op. cit., pp.82-83.

38. One of the senior Colonial Office clerks, Sir Frederick Pedler, has commented that the size and power of British business in West Africa "tended to upset the colonial governments and led to strained relations for many years ... On the eastern side, where no such concentration existed, the attitude of the governments to commercial enterprise was more friendly." F. Pedler; "British Planning and Private Enterprise in Colonial Africa" in L.H. Gann and P. Duignan (eds.); Colonialism in Africa: Vol.4 The Economics of Colonialism (Cambridge 1975), p.98.

sections represented about two-thirds of British trade they clearly represented a large proportion of British capital and the Colonial Office had no qualms about promoting their interests at the expense of the colonies. Special assistance took the form of specific demands for cotton production and industrial orders from colonial administrations.

In contrast British enterprise in East Africa represented a much smaller proportion of British capital. Most businesses were of the merchant type - concentrating on imports and exports, buying and selling - and more interested in the price of commodities than becoming involved in their production.³⁹ Economic development in East Africa meant a cheap and continued supply of raw materials. The various sections of capital within East Africa disagreed over the form and organisation of the colonial economy, not over the aims of colonial rule. It was simply a question of whether settlers, plantations or African peasants could produce the raw materials more cheaply and efficiently without jeopardising the stability of colonial rule. Unlike West Africa, where businesses such as the United Africa Company embraced many different forms of commercial activity, companies in East Africa were generally smaller, more specialised and vertically integrated.⁴⁰ Certain firms concentrated almost exclusively on settler, plantation or African crops respectively, and they were very interested in changes of colonial policy which could limit or extend production of their specialities. A decision to favour a certain type of production could have immediate and drastic consequences for business in East Africa. Firms marketing African cash crops hardly welcomed the extension of settler influence and their insistence on limiting African production for the market.

39. The characteristics of merchant capital are discussed in Kay; op. cit., pp.98-107, 123-126.

40. On the characteristics of business in East Africa Hopkins; "Imperial Business", pp.277-278.

Although business in East Africa formed commercial organisations, the conflicting interests contained within them frequently divided their counsels and weakened their ability to influence colonial policy.

Such a process was clearly evident in the two main metropolitan commercial organisations, the Joint East Africa Board and the East African Section of the London Chamber of Commerce. Formed in 1926 the Joint East Africa Board contained a substantial representation from Kenya but the mixture of settler and commercial interests meant the Board could rarely agree on matters of colonial policy. The political organisation of the settlers made the Board a potentially formidable coalition, and the Colonial Office treated it with respect and gave its delegates regular hearings. However between the wars the Colonial Office had no desire to extend settler influence in East Africa unless absolutely forced to do so, and recommendations by the Board were treated with some caution.⁴¹ The Joint East Africa Board was a dangerous but divided body, more of a nuisance than a real influence on colonial policy.⁴² The East African Section of the London Chamber of Commerce was a different case. The Section represented metropolitan businesses rather than settlers and firms based in East Africa. In contrast to the Board, whose Chairmen were always Members of Parliament with neither the ability nor the inclination to unite conflicting interests, the Section was under a strong and long-serving chairman in the person

41. Meetings with the Joint East Africa Board were carefully prepared by the Colonial Office in order to provide no causes for complaint. The Board's advice was rarely followed and for the Colonial Office the meetings at least had the advantage of focussing "what would otherwise be a troublesome correspondence." C.O.822/38/26149/ Minute by Sir Cecil Bottomley 30/11/31.

42. Although Brett gives the Board the role of "a most pervasive and effective influence on economic policy" he was writing without access to Colonial Office files. Brett; op. cit., pp.viii, 63-65.

of Sir Humphrey Leggett.⁴³ Unlike the Board, the Section did not require formal consultations with the Colonial Office while Sir Humphrey Leggett was always willing and available to provide officials with the opinion of British business.⁴⁴ The Section disavowed political activity and was not involved in the constitutional controversies in East Africa between the wars. The deliberations of the East African Section of the London Chamber of Commerce provided a collective voice for British capital interested in East Africa. To judge by the infrequency of its criticism, the Section's members appeared to have remained generally pleased with the direction and results of colonial policy in East Africa.⁴⁵

The Colonial Office was not in direct and constant collusion with British firms. Except indirectly through the Crown Agents and through bodies such as the Joint East Africa Board the Colonial Office had no official links with individual firms in the City. Close connections would have cast doubts on the impartiality of officials and made the Colonial Office a battleground for competing business interests. The Colonial Office would still act in the interest of British capital for it was part of the metropolitan state and shared its function of guaranteeing the reproduction of capitalist social relations. Individual businesses or sections of capital only directly influenced

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43. Sir Humphrey Leggett was the founder and chairman of the British East Africa Corporation. Although the business ran into difficulties Leggett was "too clever to be left out of these committees" and he chaired the Section for the entire period between the wars. Henn Papers (R.H.) Henn to Archer 8/7/24 and "Chairman for Twenty Years", East Africa and Rhodesia 27/4/39, p.952.
44. In Henn's opinion Leggett's ability to produce a reasoned memorandum stating his views at short notice gave him a great influence with the Colonial Office. Henn Papers (R.H.) Henn to Archer 10/5/25.
45. A reading of the deliberations of the Section as reported in East Africa reveals protests over costs but very little criticism of colonial policy.

the formulation of colonial policy when they sought special assistance from the Colonial Office. The grant of such assistance was by no means automatic, for officials were anxious to preserve the autonomy of the Colonial Office and its image of impartiality.

Another influence on colonial policy at the metropolitan level was the general international economic and political situation. By the end of the First World War the pound no longer dominated the world money market and the price of commodities was often beyond British control. The East African colonies rarely produced sufficient raw materials to influence the world market. To colonial officials, market conditions were something beyond either prediction or control. State finances in East Africa were dependent on commodity prices and colonial budgets were framed with a mixture of fear and optimism. Slumps in prices culminating with the Depression of 1930-1932 demonstrated the vulnerability of a colonial economy. Particularly susceptible were important East African crops such as sisal and cotton whose price depended on the success of American and European wheat production and the size of the American cotton crop.

Of the East African colonies Tanganyika had the greatest involvement in international politics. Britain acquired formal control of Tanganyika through her acceptance of a B-Class Mandate over the Territory. The Mandates system was suggested by General Smuts as a means whereby Britain and her allies could keep the conquered German colonies without offending American susceptibilities. Colonial rule was the subject of American criticism and the idea of a Mandate would dispel suggestions that the war had been fought so Britain could annex more territory. In effect a Mandate was a promise to the League of Nations that the Mandatory power would hold the colony in trust for its inhabitants; would protect them from the abuses of firearms, liquor, slavery and forced labour; refrain from turning them into an army and would grant all members of the League of Nations free and equal economic access to the resources of the colony. Acceptance of such conditions, however irksome, was

regarded by the British government as a small price to pay for American assent to British acquisition of German East Africa, a large and strategically placed piece of territory. In theory, the Mandates were closely supervised from Geneva by the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. In practice, the Commission usually heard what colonial officials wanted it to hear. All detailed information about conditions within the Mandated Territory came from the colonial administration and all petitions from the inhabitants were first vetted by the Colonial Office. The Mandate contained few specific prohibitions and its provisions were mostly vague and full of the idea of trusteeship already familiar to British colonial officials.⁴⁶ Except for an occasional carelessness and indiscretion the Tanganyika administration and the Colonial Office had little difficulty in avoiding both deeper investigation and serious censure when reporting to the Mandates Commission.⁴⁷

Despite the weakness of its supervisory body, the Mandate over Tanganyika remained a source of international complications. The Colonial Office had no desire to be caught in blatant violation of the Mandate, whose provisions supposedly confirmed all the beneficial aspects of British colonial rule. The Mandate always had to be kept in mind when formulating colonial policy for Tanganyika, especially when officials frequently became confused by the Territory's ambiguous legal status.⁴⁸ Colonial Office

46. K. Robinson; The Dilemmas of Trusteeship (London 1965), p.21.

47. It was obvious that the Customs Union between the three East African territories operated to the disadvantage of Tanganyika and Charlotte Leubuscher was surprised that the Permanent Mandates Commission let the Tanganyika administration off so lightly. Leubuscher; op. cit., pp.113-120.

48. Tanganyika was in, but was not part of, the British Empire and references implying the contrary had to be deleted from official documents. For an example C.O.691/36/2674/18/1/21.

supervision was essential particularly as Germany retained a strong interest in her former colony. At the Peace Conference Germany was deprived of her colonies as a nation unfit to rule primitive races. British propaganda made the most of the 'brutalities' of German colonial rule and Germany added the 'colonial guilt lie' to her list of grievances arising out of the Versailles Treaty.⁴⁹ Former German officials in the colonial societies devoted to recovering the colonies were anxious to remove the aspersions cast on German administrations, and they were very interested in the activities of the British in Tanganyika. The possibility of international embarrassment arising out of the Mandate ensured that the administration of Tanganyika remained under close metropolitan supervision. The very thought that something like the Ainsworth Circulars on forced labour in Kenya could occur in Tanganyika was enough to make the blood of an Under-Secretary run cold.⁵⁰

The insistence in the Mandate on economic equality for all members of the League of Nations had a particular influence on colonial policy in the Territory. Although Tanganyika came under the Congo Basin Treaties which gave the imports of the European powers unrestricted access to certain colonies, the proviso in the Mandate opened Tanganyika to occupation by a diverse mixture of people. India was admitted to the League as a member in her own right and Indian capital, free from the restrictions imposed in Kenya, was very prominent in Tanganyika. The Territory's non-African population eventually comprised Britons, Indians, Germans, Greeks, Dutch, Swedes, Italians and numerous other nationalities. The colonial state in Tanganyika was established to provide for British interests, not to guarantee profits for the flotsam of other nations. The Colonial Office would listen to British petitions and

49. A good example of British propaganda is Bishop Frank Weston's "The Black Slaves of Prussia" in C.O.691/20/30520/21/6/18.

50. C.O.691/82/26303/10/6/25, Minute by Strachey 1/7/25.

to Indian protests if the latter were directed through the India Office, but dismissed all other nationalities. The diversity of the non-African population weakened its potential influence over colonial policy. In Tanganyika there would be nothing so formidable as the Kenya Congress of Associations to pressure the colonial administration.

The interaction of the internal circumstances of a colony with metropolitan demands was the central determinant of colonial policy. Normally within a colony the combination of geography, history and the presence of various social groups tended to lay down the lines of colonial policy and predetermine the evolution of the colonial economy. In Kenya, the Colonial Office inherited from the Foreign Office administration a policy of white settlement in the highlands and African reserves, and it was too late to go back. Thereafter as Wolff observes:

The process of development at every point was strongly influenced by policy decisions made earlier. The choice of settlement by Europeans powerfully influenced virtually every subsequent development decision ...⁵¹

In Uganda the incoming British administration encountered a numerous African population, many of whom were organised into strong African states. There was no room for a policy of extensive white settlement. By contrast, in Tanganyika in 1918 there were no strong forces to pre-determine colonial policy. The British administration did not arrive with a pre-ordained plan for the economic organisation of the colony. The place was devastated, the German colonial economy broken up and the African population hard hit by the effects of the campaign. The German settlers were deported and centres of African power were either destroyed by the Germans or scattered by the war. In the general dislocation of economic activity, commercial enterprises were small and few in number. Except for the survival of the economic structures of the German regime in the form of railways, farms and plantations, the British

51. Wolff; op. cit., p.145.

administration had almost a 'clean slate' on which to formulate colonial policy in Tanganyika.

Officials had a choice. The Territory could have easily been returned to white settlers. The existence of the German estates and the presence of highlands suitable for permanent European occupation rendered this the most likely possibility. Before the war the introduction of small settlers was accepted in both Kenya and Southern Rhodesia as the most suitable means of promoting rapid development of the colonial economy. There was nothing in the Mandate to preclude settler domination. Settlers and their supporters could argue that 'trusteeship' over the African could be exercised by white farmers employing him to work on their estates. The African would learn the habit of work, improved agricultural techniques and his health and welfare would be under the paternal eye of his settler employer.⁵² The Kenya settlers were anxious to extend their influence southwards to link up with the other 'white man's countries' south of the Zambesi. In 1918 there was no shortage of soldier settlers seeking the grant of farms in the East African territories.⁵³ All indications seemed to point to Tanganyika becoming a settler state.

Another possibility was the emergence of a plantation economy. Although plantations in German East Africa suffered a setback before the war when the price of ceara rubber collapsed in the face of Malay competition, extensive if dilapidated sisal plantations still covered the coastal plain. There were British firms interested in developing sisal and other fibres as major crops in East Africa, and part of the African population of German East Africa was

52. For an example of settler arguments see Lord Cranworth; Profit and Sport in British East Africa (London 1919).

53. Cranworth commented that it appeared almost the entire British army was desirous of settling in East Africa after the war. ibid.; p.vi.

already accustomed to migration for plantation work.⁵⁴ A third possibility, likely in view of the devastated state of the colony, was to turn Tanganyika into a labour reserve for surrounding territories. The colonial economy would be organised around the settlers, mines and plantations of other colonies. The Congo, Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Kenya all sought more African labour, and the export of labour was one way an impoverished colony could quickly place cash in African hands and so build up state revenues through taxation and customs duties. The final possibility was a policy of African cash crop production, along the lines of Uganda, the Gold Coast and Nigeria. Tanganyika had a large if unevenly distributed African population and many areas unsuitable for either plantations or white settlement. Africans had grown cash crops under the German regime, though the administration's efforts to enforce cotton cultivation brought the great Maji-Maji revolt. The colony did not possess any outstanding staple such as the oil palm or cocoa on the West Coast. Parts of the country were depopulated by the war and there was no apparent encouragement for a policy of African cash crop production. The presence of 'white highlands' and a dispersed African population made Tanganyika resemble Kenya more than it did Uganda or Nigeria.

However, between the wars Tanganyika's colonial economy evolved into an equal mixture of peasant and plantation agriculture, with the settlers playing only a minor role. The emergence of such a pattern can be made intelligible by an examination of aspects of British colonial policy as applied to the economy of Tanganyika. Colonial policies were designed to ensure the permanence of British rule and the profitability of private enterprise

54. The firm of Alfred Wigglesworth and Co. was particularly interested in expanding fibre production in East Africa. See I.D. Talbott; "The Kenya Flax Boom", Kenya Historical Review, Vol.2(1) 1974.

operating in East Africa. Colonial administrators endeavoured to balance the production of raw materials with the needs of social control, by regulating the activities of both European enterprise and the African population. Colonial policy aimed to create societies resistant to social and economic change. Little consideration was given to the interest of a colony as an independent unit. As T.K.Hopkins has pointed out, under colonial rule the African colonies were not viewed as separate societies but as economic adjuncts to the metropolitan state.⁵⁵ The purposes of colonial rule were fulfilled so long as the colony continued to provide cheap raw materials and act as a market for British goods. Ideally this state would be maintained by balancing profits and permanence, but regulating the colonial economy was a difficult and contradictory task. The following chapters intend to illustrate the fundamental dilemmas of colonial rule in Tanganyika and something of its consequences for her people.

55. T.K. Hopkins; "On Economic Planning in Tropical Africa" in R.T. Rhodes (ed.); Imperialism and Underdevelopment (New York 1970), p.157.

Chapter 2

SIR HORACE BYATT AND THE WEST COAST POLICY

Since 1916, when it appeared Britain might actually win the East African campaign and drive the Germans from their colony, there had been speculation in the British press over the future and the economic potential of German East Africa. Most writers condemned German rule as brutal, insisted that Britain had a moral duty to keep the colony and then went on to describe a prosperous future under British administration.¹ German East Africa appeared as a new and better Kenya; its highlands could properly be called "white man's country".² It was a colony in which all the hard work was already done, with railways, farms and plantations newly built and ready for British occupation. The sisal plantations were of particular interest to Alfred Wigglesworth, one of London's largest dealers in hard fibres. He described German East Africa as an "Eldorado capable of vast possibilities", needing only the hand of "willing and capable pioneers" to turn it into "a perennial source of valuable vegetable and mineral products for use in populous northern regions".³ Wigglesworth was very willing to take over the abandoned sisal plantations and stop them reverting to jungle. Apparently he and Secretary of State Lord Milner agreed it would be criminal to allow such resources to go to waste.⁴

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1. For example Rev. W.A. Crabtree; "Economic Resources of the German Colonies in Africa", Journal of the African Society, Vol.16(62) 1917. J.H. Briggs; "German East Africa during the War", ibid. F.R. Cana; "German East Africa and Its Future", Journal of the African Society, Vol.17(66) 1918.
 2. General Sir E. Northey; "The East African Campaign", Journal of the African Society, Vol.18(70) 1918.
 3. A. Wigglesworth; "Thirty Years of German Rule in East Africa", Contemporary Review, April 1916, p.484.
 4. Wigglesworth always claimed Lord Milner had encouraged him to restore the plantations. A. Wigglesworth;

The British government should provide money and press for the rapid economic development of her new colony. Visiting German East Africa in 1919 Journalist F.S. Joelson noted some signs of economic progress along the desired lines. Although there were unhealthy signs, such as the derelict rubber plantations and numerous shops run by the "grasping unscrupulous Indian", sisal was fetching four times its pre-war price and cases of whisky ("to many a white man the most important foodstuff sent from home") were again being unloaded at the Dar-es-Salaam docks.⁵ If the African was handled without too much "British sentimentality" the territory could become "a most important asset to the Empire and to civilisation".⁶

German East Africa's potential as a field for British capital would remain very limited until a British colonial state became firmly established within the colony. Despite the presence of a British army, the new British administration had been formally proclaimed to control the area north of the Central railway and to free the military for duties further south. The Administrator of Occupied Territory Sir Horace Byatt was a sound rather than brilliant official, and probably owed his position to his tenacity and ability to write clear and concise despatches.⁷ With most of the country still effectively under military control, Byatt was in an awkward position. There was no room in Dar-es-Salaam for himself and his

F.n. 4 continued.

"Signposts in Tropical Development", Journal of the Royal African Society, Vol.35(139) 1936, p.175. Milner was preoccupied with the Peace Conference while Secretary of State and made little comment on German East Africa until 1923. Lord Milner; Questions of the Hour (London 1923), p.148.

5. F.S. Joelson; The Tanganyika Territory (New York 1969), pp.15, 28.

6. ibid.; Foreword.

7. His Chief Secretary Alfred Hollis remarked on his ability but had little liking for him personally. A.C. Hollis; Autobiography (R.H.), Vol.5, pp.11-14. On Byatt's tenacity see his obituary in East Africa 13/4/33, p.735.

five-man Secretariat owing to military demands on the limited accommodation. Instead, the administration was established at Wilhelmstal (Lushoto) in the Usambaras, a position which was climatically pleasant but isolated from the rest of the country.⁸ A small and diverse collection of Political Officers had been recruited from the surrounding colonies to supervise affairs at the district level.

The embryonic British administration had two major tasks: to continue to supply the army with food and porters and to maintain the peace and economic structure of the colony. Unfortunately military demands for food and porters undermined the peace and stability of the whole country. The work of the Political Officers appeared confined to "sequestrations" of raw materials and forced recruitment for the Carrier Corps.⁹ Conditions of continual forced labour, combined with famines and epidemics of smallpox and influenza, placed an unprecedented strain on the African's acceptance of European rule. Byatt noted bitterly:

If the coming of the British had meant to relieve the native of a heavy yoke, that hope has hardly been realised and the new civil regime does not therefore start under the most happy auspices.¹⁰

Equally unprecedented, and adding to the precarious position of the administration, was the spectacle of war between two European powers in Africa. The former Governor of German East Africa, Heinrich Schnee, had argued the African colonies should remain neutral in the conflict,

8. Hollis; op. cit., pp.13-16.

9. Between March and December 1917 the area under civilian control had provided nearly 71,000 porters, 22,000 livestock and 125 tons of flour. C.O.691/12/11509/2/3/17. See also W.S.G. Barnes; Safari Diary (R.H.) for 1918.

10. C.O.691/4/18137/7/4/17 des.d. 22/2/17. Byatt reported the mental balance of the African was considerably disturbed by warfare and by "excessive and incessant demands".

to preserve the idea of a united and invincible white race among the African population. Instead, in battles at Tanga, Salaita Hill, Kibata and Mahiwa, Africans had seen or heard of British reverses, German defeats, white men killing white men and, worst of all in the eyes of the British administration, African askari killing white men. German administration had been characterised by shows of military strength and it was not known how the Africans would react to British civilian rule. The uncertainty made the new British administration very nervous. Conditions in German East Africa seemed conducive to African revolt. Early in 1917 the rumour of a Chagga rising to exterminate all Europeans led to the immediate deportation of 11 major Chagga chiefs and the deposition of several headmen.¹¹ The British administration was taking no chances.

At the district level conditions may not have appeared so alarming. One Political Officer noted in his diary that even the most surly and troublesome tribes had taken to heart "the beneficial demonstration of the power of the *mzungu* [white man] in the late war".¹² But, isolated in Wilhelmstal, the senior officials had only a vague idea of what went on in the rest of the country. Political Officers in the southern areas were effectively independent under the loose control of a Finance Officer.¹³ The military retained control of the railways, communications and the capital city. Byatt's health had been undermined by his previous African experiences, and after ten years in Malta and Gibraltar he was disinclined to start travelling around a tropical country investigating

11. ibid. A post-war inquiry revealed the conspiracy was a plot against the deposed chiefs by their political opponents on the mountain. C.O.691/23/50666/4/9/19.

12. Barnes; op. cit., 5/8/19.

13. Great Britain; Parliamentary Papers: Report on Tanganyika Territory Cmd.1428, p.42.

MAP II

Tanganyika Territory: Administrative Districts

1921



Source: L. Berry (ed.); Tanzania in Maps
(London 1971), p.109.

local conditions. With strict instructions from the Colonial Office not to undertake any large expenditure, there was little Byatt could do except wait until 'normal' colonial conditions resumed at the end of the war. In the meantime he began reading the translated records of the German administration.¹⁴

The history of German rule in East Africa would have made disquieting reading for any official. Germany had commenced a policy of rapid development by the introduction of small settlers and the enforced cultivation of cash crops by Africans. The attempt to make cotton cultivation compulsory reaped the Maji-Maji revolt, one of the largest rebellions in African colonial history. German reprisals had depopulated large areas in the southern parts of the colony.¹⁵ The German administration then adopted a policy of encouragement rather than enforcement to produce African cash crops, though such measures were limited by the active opposition of the settlers.¹⁶ The settlers crowded onto the highlands of Kilimanjaro created special problems. The Chagga and neighbouring tribes were faced with a shortage of land, and the settlers themselves were demanding more land and cheaper labour.¹⁷ After the rubber boom of 1911, the settlers improved their economic position and were able to dominate the administration.¹⁸ The Germans had aimed at rapid development but neither white settlement nor African cash crops had been outstanding successes. The colony had absorbed government loans but

14. H. Byatt; "Tanganyika", Journal of the African Society, Vol.24(93) 1924, p.1.

15. Iliffe; Modern History, pp.199-202.

16. J. Iliffe; Tanganyika Under German Rule (Cambridge 1969), p.82-117.

17. ibid.; p.206. German East Africa's 'shortage' of African labour seemed well known in Britain. Wigglesworth; op. cit., p.480. Cana: op. cit., p.131; and 'Africanus'; "A Central African Federation", Journal of the African Society, Vol.17 (58) 1918, p.298.

18. Iliffe; German Rule, pp.204-208.

produced few raw materials for Germany's economy. A policy of white settlement seemed to create, not economic development, but a series of difficult problems for a colonial administration. Although the German settlers were now interned or deported they had left one final problem for the British administration to solve: the question of the ultimate disposal of their farms and estates.

The fate of enemy property in East Africa had international complications. The War Office favoured immediate confiscation of all property to aid the war effort, though this action would have broken the Hague Convention limiting the disposal of private property in war-time.¹⁹ Although the Germans were supposed to have broken most of the Convention already, the Belgian government was concerned about possible German retaliation in the occupied parts of Europe.²⁰ The Belgians were reluctant participants in the East African campaign, and the British government was anxious to avoid upsetting them in the interests of Allied unity. The preservation of the German estates would score propaganda points for Britain, and avoid German accusations that Britain was returning East Africa to barbarism by the neglect of private property. Britain stood to inherit German East Africa as a 'going concern', and officials were reluctant to dismantle anything that resembled their conception of economic development. To prevent deterioration of the German estates, leases were offered on a yearly basis and clauses inserted insisting on replanting and repairs to avoid the attentions of speculators.²¹ Greek and Italian lessees received a total of £9,000 from Political Officers

19. C.O.691/1/49013/12/10/16.

20. ibid. and C.O.691/1/49925/18/10/16. On the latter Cecil Bottomley commented drily that the Belgian concern for private property looked very odd in the light of the Force Publique's plundering activities in the Tabora area.

21. C.O.691/5/40620/20/9/17; 5/36276/20/7/17; 5/62812/24/12/17.

in order to preserve the coffee farms on Kilimanjaro. The sisal plantations were threatened with complete breakdown, for unless the plant was constantly cultivated, it produced seeds and died and at least three years were required for replanting. Many of the light tramways used to take the spiky leaves to the processing decorticators had their rails requisitioned by the army. Leases on sisal estates represented a gamble only Indians and Greeks apparently had the nerve to take, for despite advertisements in the Nairobi press there were few British applications for leases.²² Although raw materials brought high prices in metropolitan markets, transport from East Africa was unreliable owing to the effects of the war and the shortage of shipping. Sisal was being developed in Kenya which had the advantages of lower wages and permanent status in the British Empire. British companies initially preferred to speculate in sisal, by buying up stocks cheaply in German East Africa and then gambling on the availability of shipping from Mombasa.²³

The efforts to preserve German property had been a pragmatic war-time measure rather than considered policy. The Colonial Office had made little comment, public or private, on the future of German East Africa other than a general affirmation that 'we expect to keep it' at the end of the war.²⁴ Although the country was conquered, the

22. C.O.691/5/40620; 18/37207/2/8/18.

23. Sir Humphrey Leggett's British East Africa Corporation had purchased 700 tons of sisal tow, railed it to Mombasa and persuaded the Imperial Shipping Committee to send a steamer to fetch it, much to the annoyance of the administration whose own stocks of requisitioned sisal were left on the docks at Tanga. C.O.691/14/5294/30/1/18; 14/7505/11/2/18; 14/8615/18/2/18. The Mombasa Loading Committee was persuaded to give preference to British grown products leaving Leggett "stewing in his own juice". C.O.691/19/14106/21/3/18 Minute by Bottomley 21/3.

24. C.O.691/7/17135/2/4/17. General Van Deventer was instructed to make it discreetly known the colony would never return to Germany. C.O.691/11/59043/3/12/17.

international implications of a takeover remained uncertain and the temper of the African population was still unknown. Ever helpful, the War Office suggested the colony be treated as conquered but hostile territory, and should be administered through the blockhouse, flying column and armoured train. The Colonial Office rejected the plan as disastrous to British prestige and dangerous to surrounding colonies.²⁵ German East Africa was to be placed under a light administration until a firm commitment was received on the colony's future. Nothing was to be done that might imply Britain had assumed full ownership. It was the task of the Allied Powers in conference to decide on a settlement and divide up the spoils. The British had no desire to encourage Belgian hopes that their occupation of western Tanganyika could be in any way permanent.²⁶

Although devastated, German East Africa was still the most desirable of Germany's African colonies. Strategically, the colony was placed almost astride the sea routes to India and Australia. The German armed raider *Konigsberg* had operated in the Indian Ocean from East African bases and had given British naval forces an unpleasant time early in the war. Permanent British occupation of German East Africa would guard the sea-lanes and a continuous line of British-controlled territories would stretch from Cairo to the Cape. Before the Imperial War Cabinet General Smuts had argued strongly for the retention of German East Africa as essential to lines of communication and to the future security of the Empire.²⁷ Although at one stage during the Peace Conference, the colony was offered as a mandate to the United States, there were few doubts that Britain would endeavour to hold German East Africa.²⁸

25. C.O.691/6/62655/21/13/17; 11/59901/6/12/17.

26. C.O.691/13/20014/19/4/17; and W.R. Louis; Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies 1914-1919 (Oxford 1967), pp.64-67, 149-151.

27. Louis; op. cit., pp.3-4, 9, 14-15, 71-72, 82-86 covers the role of Smuts and the emotive associations of the Cape to Cairo vision.

28. ibid.; pp.110-112, 124-125.

The issues in doubt were the conditions of formal control over the colony. Both Belgium and Portugal protested over their share of territory and there was some haggling over the terms and acceptance of the Mandate.²⁹ The Mandate itself was not issued until 20 July 1922. While negotiations proceeded, it was important to Britain that there were no incidents in German East Africa other than Africans welcoming British rule. The Colonial Office insisted Byatt produce evidence of African contentment which would rule out suggestions in the League of Nations that a plebiscite be held to decide the future of the colony.³⁰ Byatt reported some dissatisfaction over crop prices and increases in the cost of cotton cloth, but he was otherwise confident that Africans would find British rule most acceptable after a period of normal conditions.³¹ In the interim the Africans were to be left to recover from the effects of the war, while the colonial administration built up its authority. Various incidents were staged with the aim of impressing British prestige on the mind of the African. Lettow-Vorbeck's askari were told they had been defeated by the power of British arms, and Von Lettow himself was to make a formal surrender, to impress on any African present that Germany had really lost the war.³² A new and grandiose Government House was built to replace the ruined German building.³³ To impress the power and

29. On the delay in issuing Mandates A.J. Crozier; "The Establishment of the Mandates System 1919-1925", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.14(3) 1979.

30. C.O.691/14/7566/11/2/18; 16/9129/11/2/19. The collected evidence published as Great Britain; Parliamentary Papers; Correspondence Relating to the Wishes of the Natives of the German Colonies as to their Future Government Cmd.9210 1918 was far from convincing. See Q. Wright; Mandates Under the League of Nations (Chicago 1930), p.94.

31. C.O.691/14/7566/11/2/18; 15/38910/10/8/18; 16/60033/11/2/18.

32. Iliffe; Modern History, p.248, and C.O.691/19/54282/15/11/18.

33. Byatt ignored sarcastic comments and resided in the Museum until Government House was completed in 1922. Hollis; op. cit., p.28.

goodwill of the British upon the Wahehe, the Colonial Office launched the hunt for the skull of their great chief Mkwawa, stolen by the Germans after his defeat and death in 1898. Clause number 236 of the Treaty of Versailles insisted upon its return.³⁴ The Colonial Office believed the presence of any Germans in East Africa "might imply we had lost the war", and the deportation of German nationals continued even after the cessation of hostilities.³⁵

The Colonial Office provided propaganda support for the Tanganyika administration but otherwise considered that any definite policy for the Territory was out of the question until the international situation became clearer. Officials busied themselves thinking up a name for the colony and designing a flag and badge for the administration.³⁶ In Dar-es-Salaam Byatt became concerned that such a "policy of drift" would eventually return the country to its pre-war condition and consequently, to settler domination.³⁷ From his reading of German records the Governor believed such conditions would destroy the foundations of the new British colonial state. The occupation of German farms by British settlers would revive land shortages and demands for labour. Extensive recruitment by the German administration had been unable

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34. C.O.691/16/4135/20/1/19. Return of the skull would be "tangible proof German power was broken" (des.d. 14/11/19). This started a thirty-five year hunt for an African skull distinguished only by a bullet hole in the forehead - of which the Germans denied all knowledge. Governor Twining apparently secured the genuine article from a museum in Bremen in 1953 and returned the skull to the Wahehe. D. Bates; A Gust of Plumes (London 1972), pp.245-248.
35. C.O.691/16/52196/29/10/18. Removal of the German population would also simplify the disposal of their estates. Minute by Bottomley 1/11.
36. For names C.O.691/25/53688/12/9/19 and Iliffe; Modern History, p.247. For the debate over the colour of a giraffe for the Territory's badge C.O.691/29/43245/24/7/19.
37. C.O.691/16/4034/20/1/19 des.d.16/11/18.

to meet settler requirements for a greater and cheaper supply of African labour. As a measure of self-preservation, German officials had closed the Northern and Tanga areas to further settlement by prohibiting the alienation of any additional land. Since the war, the African labour force had been reduced by famine and epidemic and the loss of the heavily populated districts of Ruanda-Urundi to Belgium.³⁸ The British administration did not have the strong military style of the Germans to coerce Africans into the labour force.³⁹ As in Kenya, the settler demands would force the administration to adopt extreme measures to obtain labour⁴⁰. Many Tanganyika officials saw the interests of African and settler as in deep and fundamental conflict.⁴¹ The Governor wrote that if British administration was to achieve "any measure of grateful acceptance" it was essential the African population be given an extended period of "rest and recuperation".⁴² In the eyes of the Tanganyika government, the war had pushed the African to the brink of revolt, and a sudden influx of settlers would push him over the edge. The new colonial state was ill-equipped to cope with continual instability and possible rebellion, any of which could have embarrassing international repercussions. In the interests of permanent colonial rule, white settlement had to be limited, the Northern and Tanga districts kept closed and a prohibition placed on land alienations elsewhere in the Territory.

Byatt was well aware it was impossible to mark time in colonial administration. A colonial economy had to

38. Louis; op. cit., p.150.

39. C.O.691/16/4034/20/1/19 des.d. 16/11/18. General van Deventer considered any future administration should be military as the Africans were "accustomed to it and prefer it". C.O.691/62655/21/12/17, letter d. 16/12/17.

40. For the labour system in Kenya A. Clayton and D.C. Savage; Government and Labour in Kenya 1895-1963 (London 1974), Ch.1 & 2.

41. Hollis had opposed forced labour for settlers in Kenya;

emerge; it was simply a question of "how and under what conditions is the development of the natural resources of the country to be continued?"⁴³ In his despatch on the future of Tanganyika, the Governor explained that while certain industries such as sisal demanded European capital, there were other crops such as copra and rice, which should be recognised as "the legitimate field of native effort".⁴⁴ By a policy of African cash crop production, Uganda had moved from 'barbarism' in just thirty years, while on the West coast where Europeans acted solely as middlemen, the progress of the colonial economy had been rapid. Byatt's despatch must have been one of the first recognitions in East Africa of the implications of the so-called 'economic miracle' in British West Africa. In 18 years African cocoa production had quadrupled the revenues of the colonial government.⁴⁵ The prosperity of the West coast between 1891 and 1911 had weakened the idea that white settlement was the only way to set up a colonial economy.⁴⁶ By admitting "the claim of the natives to share directly in the prosperity of their country" the colonial state gained African commitment to the colonial economy.⁴⁷ African cash crop production promised prosperity for European enterprise, security for the colonial state and contentment for the African population. Although the rate of 'progress' in

F.n. 41 continued.

ibid.; pp.33-40. Similarly Dundas had "no faith in Kenya's policies". C. Dundas; African Crossroads (London 1955), p.115.

42. C.O.691/16/4034/20/1/19.

43. ibid.

44. ibid.

45. A. McPhee; The Economic Revolution in British West Africa (London 1926), Appendix A.

46. On this point D.A. Low; Lion Rampant; Essays in the Study of British Imperialism (London 1973), pp.66-67.

47. C.O.691/16/4034/20/1/19.

the colonial economy appeared slower, this was an acceptable price to pay for the absence of incessant settler demands for land and labour to maintain their precarious position in Africa. Byatt believed the British administration had a "clean slate" in Tanganyika. There would be few problems in adopting a West Coast policy and building a firm social foundation for the colonial economy and the colonial state.⁴⁸

Byatt's despatch was greeted with some scepticism by senior officials when it arrived at the Colonial Office in June 1919. They considered the Governor certainly did not have a 'clean slate' for a West Coast policy, owing to the presence of the German estates.⁴⁹ There were doubts over the East African native's desire to work without the motivation of trade gin, which in the opinion of the Colonial Office provided the incentive for cash crop production in West Africa. African production of cotton and flax was approved but only as an interim measure, to extend the "habits of industry" among the African population and accustom them to work in a colonial economy.⁵⁰ The Under-Secretary of State Leo Amery agreed to a freeze on further land alienation, but only as a means of ensuring the settler population of Tanganyika would become predominantly British. A delay over land alienation would circumvent the provisions in the Mandate opening Tanganyika to settlement by other nationalities. While waiting for British settlers and commercial interests to recover from the effects of the war, the Tanganyika administration was to prepare "the machinery of development" - Land and Survey Departments to prepare land for future alienation. Until such a time the Africans could be encouraged to "grow things for sale".⁵¹ It was hardly the approval of a West Coast policy that Byatt had sought,

48. ibid.

49. ibid. Minute by Bottomley 1/2/19. The Colonial Office was however anxious to avoid "premature" and uncontrolled settlement.

50. ibid.

51. ibid. Minute by Amery 6/8/19.

but at the time Amery was more interested in the unification of the East African colonies. He urged the Secretary of State Lord Milner to repeat his South African successes and create a Governor-General, complete with 'Kindergarten' to rule all East Africa.⁵² The unification of East Africa would make any policies on the economy of Tanganyika quite irrelevant for the future.

There were other sound reasons for delaying white settlement in Tanganyika. Although the owners of the German estates were not physically present to cause any embarrassment, the Colonial Office was wary of becoming involved in law suits through precipitate action. The disappearance of many German land records, the uncertainty of boundaries and the necessity of knowing the nationality of past owners made the disposal of enemy property a long and complex business. By the end of 1919 the Colonial Office was under a daily bombardment of letters and visits from companies and individuals requesting or demanding farms or concessions in Tanganyika. They ranged from soldier settlers claiming 5000 acres rent free in return for war service, to Lever Brothers inquiring about the establishment of oil palm plantations.⁵³ The standard Colonial Office reply, that nothing could be done until the Mandate was received, began to wear thin. The Mandate showed no sign of arriving and a wide range of European enterprise seemed firmly interested in Tanganyika. The value of the German estates was credited to the sum of Germany's reparations, and their sale would realise capital and reduce administrative costs. In March 1920 the Colonial Office instructed Byatt to proceed as

52. On Milner's 'kindergarten' and the Union of South Africa see W. Nimocks; Milner's Young Men: The 'Kindergarten' in Edwardian Imperial Affairs (Durham 1968).

53. For soldier settlers C.O.691/22/45494/5/8/19. For Lever brothers inquiry C.O.691/25/3657/17/1/19. For soldier settlers C.O.691/20/41106/23/8/18; 29/56444/1/10/19; 29/18125/24/3/19; 29/16984/18/3/19.

through the country were a British protectorate and to start selling the estates within 6 months.⁵⁴

The Tanganyika administration did not look forward to the sale of the estates and an influx of settlers. Already the lessees of sisal plantations and coffee estates were protesting over a shortage of labour and government restrictions on recruiting.⁵⁵ Inquiries from Union Miniere and the British South African Company about labour recruitment for Katanga and Southern Rhodesia were rebuffed by the administration.⁵⁶ A labour shortage seemed imminent and Tanganyika needed every last African for her own enterprises. Byatt did not wish to commence sales until all properties had been checked by the Government Surveyor - who would be finished in 1923.⁵⁷ The suggestion was quickly over-ruled by the Colonial Office, who pressed the Governor for an announcement of the commencement of sales.

Financial problems forced the hand of the administration and created an urgency within the Colonial Office to bring the former German estates back to full production. The difficulty was due to a shortage of cash in African hands. The two main sources of government revenue were the Native Hut and Poll Taxes and customs duties on imports. The most important goods in terms of revenue were cotton cloth for the African market, followed by machinery and other goods for European estates. Up to 1919 government expenditure remained low and the budget showed a surplus. On 1 February the administration acquired an annual liability of around £250,000 in the form of three battalions of the King's African Rifles. A month later the War Office also handed over control of the railway system and added another £250,000 to government

54. C.O.691/39/15604/25/3/20.

55. For complaints C.O.691/21/25043/25/4/19; 29/42394/21/1/19.

56. C.O.691/29/44750/1/18/19; 31/27652/5/6/20.

57. There were 1500 German properties, including town sites. For Byatt's caution C.O.691/33/33053/6/7/20 tele.d. 5/7. Colonial Office efforts to stir the Governor are in C.O.691/34/54259/2/9/20.

expenditure.⁵⁸ Imperial grants-in-aid would be necessary to cover extraordinary expenditure and restore the railways to full working order.⁵⁹ (See Table 1). The sale of the German estates would expand European enterprise in the Territory, increase imports, put cash in African hands and so enlarge government revenues. While the sale of African crops might have offset the shortage of cash, famines in 1918 and 1919 had limited the response of Africans to the few market opportunities.⁶⁰ In 1920 the price of agricultural commodities on the world market slumped sharply, and by the end of the year in Tanganyika, expenditure exceeded revenue by £1,500,000.⁶¹ The solution of higher taxes was dismissed by the administration as uncollectable and damaging to the temper of Africans. Wages were the fastest means of placing cash in African hands and the Kenya administration was granted permission to recruit labour in Tanganyika for government work.⁶² The Colonial Office insisted the "thing be well run" for heavy casualties would be "disastrous in E.A. and at home".⁶³ In view of recent disturbances in Parliament over forced labour in Kenya, the Colonial Office was averse to any similar behaviour being discovered in Tanganyika.⁶⁴

Sales of German estates commenced but they provided no way out of the administration's financial difficulties. The trade depression brought on a currency crisis in East Africa, with fluctuating rates of exchange between sterling and the local currency, the Indian rupee. Settlers repaying loans, receiving sterling for exported goods or bearing assets in sterling all suffered, when converting

58. Great Britain; Parliamentary Papers; Report on Tanganyika Territory Cmd.1428 1921, pp.42-43.

59. C.O.691/34/52314/25/10/20.

60. C.O.691/16/9115/11/2/19; 21/17969/22/3/19; Iliffe; Modern History, pp.269-270.

61. C.O.691/35/62443/22/12/20; 35/56862/13/11/20.

62. C.O.691/33/34334/13/7/20.

63. ibid.; Minute by Parkinson 16/7/20.

64. C.O.691/33/34334/13/7/20. Minute by Machtig 16/7; 36/2673/18/12/20. For the controversial labour

Table 1. Financial Position 1917-1925
(including railways)

Year	Revenue	Expenditure	Surplus/ Deficit	Customs Dues and Taxes as Percentage Total Revenue	
	£	£	£	Customs	Tax
1917-18	336,446	157,285	+179,161	34.7	58.4
1918-19	461,842	383,097	+ 78,745	25.8	62.9
1919-20	669,097	790,026	-120,929	21.0	46.2
1920-21	946,884	1,389,354	-442,470	19.9	46.7
1921-22	978,192	1,807,890	-829,698	21.5	42.8
1922-23	1,228,586	1,811,872	-583,286	21.8	38.7
1923-24	1,315,188	1,901,158	-585,970	24.8	38.5
1924-25	1,558,982	1,747,578	-188,596	27.4	34.1

Imperial Loans 1920-1925

	£	£
Grants-in-Aid	316,000 (1920-21)	408,109
	92,109 (1921-22)	

Loans (interest
and Sinking Fund
payments delayed) 2,185,219

Loans (Sinking Fund
payments delayed) 512,753

Loans (interest and
Sinking Fund payment
being made) 37,919 2,735,891

Annual debt repayment - £30,569 (2% revenue)

Source: Tanganyika Reports 1920-1925

to rupees while Indians and others receiving rupees from India generally benefited in the conversion to sterling.⁶⁵ It was not surprising that Indian capital was strongly represented at the land auctions, while settlers made a poor showing. So long as prices remained depressed, white settlement hardly promised financial salvation for the Tanganyika administration. Instead, the finance to reconstruct and build up the colonial economy came in the form of loans and grants-in-aid from the Imperial Treasury.

The financial crisis of 1920 was worsened rather than caused by the slump. Prevarication over policy by both the Colonial Office and the Tanganyika administration left settlers, plantation and African cash crop production all weakly established without creating a basis of revenue for the colonial state. Other forces appeared ready to dominate the economy of Tanganyika. Since 1916 the Indian Government, through the India Office, had pursued tenaciously a scheme for the settlement of Indian peasants in the humid lowlands of the Territory. Byatt opposed the scheme as competitive with African production and creating new demands on African labour, and he eventually persuaded the Indian Government's own representative that Indian settlement was not to be recommended.⁶⁶ If the colonial state was to become firmly established and be able to control the colonial economy, some clear policies were

F.n. 64 continued.

policies in Kenya Clayton and Savage; op. cit., pp. 112-117.

65. For the currency crisis R. Van Zwanenberg and A. King; An Economic History of Kenya and Uganda 1800-1970 (London 1975), pp.281-285. C.O.691/31/27651/5/6/20 reports increased trade with India as a result of the crisis.

66. The long history of the Indian settlement scheme is recorded on C.O.691/2/60277/13/12/16; 16/52341/30/10/18; 16/9129/11/2/19; 18/50001/17/10/18; 20/55180/18/11/18; 31/212147/28/4/20; 33/47140/23/9/20; 37/7975/13/2/20; 37/21293/28/4/20. For a view of Indian opinion see H. Luthy; "India and East Africa: Imperial Partnership at the End of the First World War", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.6(2), 1971.

required on land, labour and the encouragement of various types of European enterprise.

In August 1921 Charles Strachey, one of the senior clerks in the Colonial Office, drew up an important memorandum on land policy in Tanganyika. Strachey was an expert on West Africa, having actually visited the place before the war,⁶⁷ and he suggested Tanganyika's land laws should be drafted along West African and preferably Northern Nigerian lines. He pointed out how both countries shared similar latitudes north and south of the Equator, had large African populations and were equally unsuitable for extensive European settlement. Nigerian law recognised land as being in the legal possession of the African, but at the same time admitted plantation enterprise as compatible with native rights. As one of the injunctions of the Mandate was to take native rights into consideration when framing the land law, the Nigerian Ordinance would fit in with Tanganyika's status as a Mandate. The colonial economy would be based on African cash crop production and a plantation sector represented by the German estates. The Crown land system, which made all Africans tenants at will of the Crown and permitted large land alienations, was definitely excluded. Extensive settlement by either Indians or whites was thereby rejected. In Strachey's view, extensive European settlement, which relegated the African to the position of labourer for the white man, was "a policy of despair and unthinkable in West Africa".⁶⁸ Strachey intended such a policy should become equally unthinkable in Tanganyika, and he proposed a small committee comprising himself, Byatt, Colonel Wedgwood M.P. and William Ormsby-Gore should be formed to consider the

67. To the intense irritation of the Governor Frederick Lugard. M. Perham; Lugard: The Years of Authority 1898-1945 (London 1960), p.412. Strachey had links with British humanitarians who advocated peasant production in preference to rule by settlers. Gupta; op. cit., pp.33, 75.

68. The West African system was "much more satisfactory to the natives and also from the point of view of trade". C.O.691/52/39056/5/8/21, Memo by Strachey 5/8.

subject.⁶⁹ In arguing for a policy of African cash crop production Strachey neatly juxtaposed the peace and prosperity of the cocoa trade in West Africa with the problems of Kenya: the perpetual shortage of labour, the continual demands of settlers, and the unresolved question of Indian status. The most effective argument came last; Strachey included in his memorandum an extract from Byatt's despatch of 13 January 1921 which outlined Tanganyika's great possibilities as a producer of cotton.⁷⁰

Cotton textiles were one of Britain's great Imperial industries and few matched it for size in terms of export trade and workforce employed.⁷¹ In 1914 British exports of cotton goods had gone into "a steep and almost continuous decline".⁷² Asian competition was edging British cloth out of her traditional markets, and one of the ways to offset the decline in exports was to find a cheaper source of quality raw cotton. Even before the First World War the financial salvation of Lancashire was believed to lie in the dependent Empire. Since the turn of the century British mill-owners had been haunted by the idea that increasing American consumption and the manipulations of speculators could reduce the supply of raw cotton available to British mills. In 1902 the British

69. Colonel Wedgwood was an M.P. and another advocate of West African policies. Gupta; op. cit., pp.34-35. Ormsby-Gore was a Conservative M.P., Britain's representative at the League of Nations who was also interested in land policy. C.O.691/37/37058/27/7/20. Any land law produced by such a committee would be well defended in Parliament.

70. C.O.691/52/39056/5/8/21. Tanganyika was to be a "black man's country".

71. Cotton textiles comprised a third of British exports. Great Britain; Parliamentary Papers; Final Report of the Committee on Commercial and Industrial Policy After the War Cmd.9035 1918, p.16.

72. L.G. Sandberg; Lancashire in Decline (Columbus 1974), p.175.

Cotton Growing Association was formed to promote the production of cotton within the Empire. Other than in Uganda, where through the efforts of African farmers the crop had jumped from 4,000 to 40,000 bales between 1908-1914, the Association's efforts were not particularly successful.⁷³ During the war the Association went to the brink of financial ruin in its efforts to buy up the Uganda cotton crop and encourage Africans to continue planting. The shortage of shipping limited Lancashire's exports to Asia and encouraged the growth of cotton spinning in India and Japan. Their coarser but cheaper weaves began to displace the more expensive British product from the markets of Africa and Asia. Faced with a steady decline in exports it appeared by 1917 that the British cotton industry was poised on the brink of a major crisis.⁷⁴ Meetings and committees proliferated, and all stressed the need for new and better sources of supply of raw cotton. One Board of Trade Committee broke into capitals to emphasise the seriousness of the situation:

IT IS IN THE INTERESTS NOT ONLY OF THE LANCASHIRE COTTON INDUSTRY BUT ALSO THE EMPIRE AS A WHOLE THAT EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO RELIEVE THE SITUATION BY THE MORE EXTENDED GROWTH OF COTTON WITHIN THE EMPIRE.⁷⁵

In the eyes of the Board of Trade cotton growing was of mutual benefit to both growers and spinners. By earning more money growing cotton peasants could learn to

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73. J.A. Hutton; "The British Cotton Growing Association", Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, 28/1/16. In West Africa the Association had become too closely associated with shipping magnate Sir Alfred Jones. See K.D. Nworah; "The West African Operations of the British Cotton Growing Association", African Historical Studies, Vol.4(1), 1971.
74. Great Britain; Parliamentary Papers; Report of the Board of Trade Committee on Textile Trades After the War Cmd. 9070 1918; Sandberg; op. cit., pp.175-181.
75. Great Britain; Parliamentary Papers Cmd. 9070, p.8.

discriminate between the better if expensive British products and the cheap but inferior Asian weaves. Lancashire would be assured of increased exports and of a cheap, plentiful supply of high quality cotton.⁷⁶ In 1918 a committee was formed under the auspices of the Board of Trade to investigate and promote Empire cotton production. Profits were to be disregarded in favour of a scientific approach seeking to improve crop quality, transport and marketing facilities. The committee, which shortly became the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, began its philanthropic work by sending a circular to all colonial administrations in Africa and the West Indies seeking information on cotton growing as a matter of Imperial importance. Added to the list, almost as an afterthought, was Sir Horace Byatt, "Administrator, Ex-German East Africa".⁷⁷

The production of cotton was not one of German East Africa's outstanding successes. Governor Von Goetzen's compulsory cotton growing scheme was a major cause of the Maji-Maji revolt.⁷⁸ Despite government assistance the heavily capitalised European plantations had failed utterly between 1907-1911 in a period of buoyant cotton prices.⁷⁹ Although Africans had grown cotton in the Rufiji, Lindi and Shinyanga areas, the highest output in German times was 3,174 bales in 1913.⁸⁰ There had been some efforts during the war to save the Mwanza crop and encourage Africans to continue planting. Seed from Uganda had been distributed in Mwanza and Shinyanga, although Byatt, with memories of rebellion in German times, was anxious no administrative pressure should be brought to

76. The above reports make it very clear that to suit Lancashire the cotton supply had to be long-stapled, clean, white, inexpensive and reliable.

77. Great Britain; Parliamentary Papers; Report of the Board of Trade on the Empire Cotton Growing Committee Cmd. 523 1920, Appendix 4.

78. Iliffe; German Rule, pp.22-24.

79. ibid.; pp.99-100.

80. Iliffe; Agricultural Change, p.19.

compel planting.⁸¹ Cotton seemed the unpopular crop, and the Governor was concerned not to compromise the administration if growers became angry at a poor return for their efforts. Byatt cited the expert opinion of the Amani Institute to the effect that cotton would never succeed in German East Africa owing to the irregular and unreliable rainfall.⁸² However what had appeared as a dangerous and uncertain crop in 1918 emerged in the mid-1920s as the economic salvation of the Territory. Byatt telegraphed for the immediate despatch of a Director of Agriculture and instructors experienced in cotton, so an early start could be made with the planting. The African population was clamouring for cotton seed and the administration was very earnest about starting the industry on the 'right' lines.⁸³ Suddenly, regardless of climate, Tanganyika had been transformed into a country of great cotton growing potential.

Tanganyika's financial problems had transformed the attitude of the administration. An increase in government revenue was essential to repair war damage, reconstruct the railways and restore the colonial economy to conditions of commercial prosperity. Cotton prices had stayed relatively stable in 1919-1920,⁸⁴ and with the slow sale of the German estates, African labour was still plentiful.⁸⁵ The 'clamour for seed' by the African population was undoubtedly due to administrative pressure coupled with a need to obtain cash for tax and the purchase of goods. In the winter of 1919-1920, Byatt was on leave in Britain, and had talked and lunched with Sir James Currie, the Chairman-elect of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation. Like his colleague in Uganda Sir

81. C.O.691/20/20934/30/4/18.

82. ibid. des.d. 14/2/20.

83. C.O.691/33/43172/31/8/20.

84. For comparison with other commodities Great Britain; Parliamentary Papers; Report on Tanganyika Territory Cmd. 1428 1920, p.103.

85. For complaints as to the lack of employment Great Britain; Parliamentary Papers; Report on Tanganyika Territory Cmd. 1732 1921, p.5.

MAP III

Tanganyika Territory: Hasting Horne's Map of
Potential Cotton Growing Areas



Source: C.O.691/59/5242/2/2/22.

Robert Coryndon, Byatt returned to his colony a convert to cotton as a major Imperial requirement.⁸⁶ The crop was not dangerous if the industry was organised on the 'right' lines - which meant that production was controlled to produce the cheap, high quality, long-stapled cotton demanded by the Lancashire mills. The Governor was anxious to start the industry before European farms and plantations demanded all available African labour. The administration refused to assist Greeks and Indians planting cotton and confined the distribution of free seed to the Africans.⁸⁷ The cultivation of cotton by Africans would justify a West Coast policy in Tanganyika, and would benefit both metropolitan industry and the colonial state. Ordinances were drawn up to control the industry and Byatt was confident that Tanganyika's output of African cotton would soon surpass Uganda's famous crop.⁸⁸

In October 1920 the Empire Cotton Growing Committee (as it still was) appointed a Kenya district officer, Hastings Horne, to investigate Tanganyika's cotton growing potential.⁸⁹ Horne toured the coastal districts from Tanga to Lindi and the areas around Moshi, Tabora and Mwanza. Except for a few places in Bukoba and Tanga, he found the whole area to be, with the right efforts, admirably suited for cotton growing.⁹⁰ The report was too promising and perturbed the Tanganyika administration. Byatt and Kirby the Director of Agriculture doubted both Horne's qualifications and the ability of Tanganyika's small Department of Agriculture to conduct an extensive

86. On Byatt's contacts with the cotton industry see press clipping d.9/12/22 in C.O.691/58/1653/9/1/23. For Sir Robert Coryndon's contact and conversion C.P. Youe; "Peasants, Planters and Cotton Capitalists: The 'dual Economy' in Colonial Uganda", Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol.12(2), 1978, pp.180-181.

87. C.O.691/42/100542/2/3/21.

88. C.O.691/42/10054/2/3/21 des.d.13/1/21.

89. C.O.691/38/37491/29/7/20.

90. C.O.691/51/33775/7/7/21 letters from Horne.

cotton campaign without assistance.⁹¹ There were only four Agricultural Officers in the whole Territory.⁹² In spite of reservations the administration persisted, and in May 1921 Byatt reported the cotton crop would be 5,500 tons - two thirds at Lindi and the rest at Morogoro and Mwanza. There was one small hitch; except for the British Cotton Growing Association at Mwanza there were no local buyers.⁹³

The brief cotton boom of 1919-1920 had passed and Lancashire was no longer in any position to experiment with cotton production in Tanganyika. For the British mills "1921 was a complete disaster by any standards" as the amount of cotton cloth exported fell sharply.⁹⁴ Unless the Tanganyika crop could be purchased at a reasonable price to the grower, the cotton industry in the Territory would be strangled at birth because Africans would not plant an unprofitable crop. To safeguard the future of the industry, the Tanganyika administration was faced with the prospect of buying the whole crop itself, at an estimated cost of £102,000.⁹⁵ The Empire Cotton Growing Corporation was still awaiting parliamentary approval of a grant and was temporarily powerless to intervene. The Colonial Office began negotiations with the Corporation about future reimbursement of the Tanganyika government and sought the necessary approval from the Treasury. By June Byatt telegraphed the news that the natives, nervous about the future of the cotton crop and the absence of buyers, were allowing it to rot in the ground. The commercial future of the Territory was in dire jeopardy.⁹⁶ The Treasury decided Tanganyika did not have sufficient surplus balance

91. C.O.691/42/8599/22/1/21. Horne's cotton experience consisted of a single season at Kavirondo in Kenya.

92. A. Haarer; Memories as an Agricultural Officer 1921-1936 (R.H.).

93. C.O.691/44/24318/18/4/21.

94. Sandberg; op. cit., p.178.

95. C.O.691/44/24318/18/4/21; 45/29240/13/6/21; 45/35557/18/7/21.

96. C.O.691/45/35557/18/7/21.

to engage in a "flutter in cotton".⁹⁷ Any losses on the deal would have to come from the British taxpayer as another grant-in-aid. In July the Treasury ruled any purchase of cotton by the Tanganyika government to be out of the question. On receipt of this communication, Currie, Strachey and Deputy Under-Secretary Sir Herbert Read immediately adjourned personally to the Treasury and, after a good deal of pressure, obtained grudging approval.⁹⁸ Cotton was too important to be allowed to fall victim to Treasury parsimony or the selfishness of individual buyers. The Tanganyika government was saved from embarrassment when Indian buyers eventually bought a third of the crop.⁹⁹ The rest rotted in the fields and according to one Agricultural Officer, the story was used for years to make the point that the African only wanted enough money for his poll tax and a few small requirements. High prices were wasted on him.¹⁰⁰

Despite the appalling start, cotton still promised to provide a secure social and economic foundation for the colonial state. The attraction of a West Coast policy with a limited role for European production, was amply confirmed by the antics of British firms in the sisal industry. The two largest firms, Bird and Co. and Wigglesworth and Co. did not like the idea of bidding against Greeks and Indians for the best plantations. Both companies sought private sales as a means of 'saving' the estates from rapid deterioration. Although this move was unsuccessful, the companies obtained the largest and most desirable plantations at auction by coming to an arrangement with the Colonial Office. Payment was made through

97. C.O.691/44/24318/18/4/21.

98. C.O.691/51/33775/7/7/21. This was the only occasion when officials personally intervened to change Treasury policy. Their success may have been due to Currie's habit of carefully removing his false teeth before flying into a rage at government decisions. See Furse; op. cit., p.243.

99. C.O.691/45/35557/18/7/21; 46/46913/19/9/21.

100. Haarer; op. cit.

the issue of debentures, to be paid off over several years.¹⁰¹ The Colonial Office was anxious to encourage the two companies, who were among the few large British firms to take a close and active interest in the Territory. The plantation sector fitted in with the Nigerian framework suggested for the land law. Bird and Co. in particular had a formidable list of shareholders, "sound and substantial people" worthy of all possible encouragement.¹⁰² If the Colonial Office was expecting investment, co-operation and responsible behaviour it was in for a disappointment. Both firms began a seemingly endless series of appeals designed to gain more concessions, reduce the interest rate on repayments and extend the life of the debentures still further.¹⁰³ It hardly encouraged ideas that European plantations would make a sound and extensive contribution to the colonial economy, when the two largest companies in Tanganyika seemed primarily intent on getting something for nothing.

An experiment in labour recruitment demonstrated the dangers of Africans working for European employers. In this case the employer was the Kenya government seeking men to build the Uasin Gishu railway. Disappointment with cotton and the limited opportunities for employment on European estates sent Africans flocking to the Kenya recruitment centre at Tabora.¹⁰⁴ The Colonial Office had

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101. A private sale would probably have been unacceptable to the government of India, who were very keen to have Indian capital bid in the auctions. R.G. Gregory; Indians and East Africa (Oxford 1971), p.379.
102. C.O.691/52/48615/20/9/21, Minute by Read 7/10. Associated with Bird and Co. and its subsidiary the East African Development Corporation were Lord Inchcape, Lord Cable, Earl Grey, Sir Benjamin Robertson and Sir Trevyard Wynne. A check in Who's Who for the period confirms Read's opinion.
103. For the manoeuvres of the sisal companies C.O.691/45/34486/12/7/21; 51/5648/4/2/21; 63/41735/28/8/23; 64/54972/14/11/23.
104. C.O.691/55/25847/30/5/22. District Officers reported 500 men recruited in a single day at Tabora.

Table 2. The Major Products of the Colonial EconomyCotton Production 1920-1925

Year	Quantity (Centals of 100 lb.)	Value £	Percentage Yearly Exports (Value)
1920	21,683	164,565	9.6
1921	24,564	118,620	11.7
1922	34,593	140,750	9.8
1923	32,912	177,710	10.7
1924	56,927	373,753	14.3
1925	100,848	540,481	18.6

Groundnut Production 1920-1925

Year	Quantity (Tons)	Value £	Percentage Yearly Exports (Value)
1920	3,237	78,522	4.6
1921	8,488	141,475	13.9
1922	12,518	190,553	13.2
1923	16,508	264,129	15.2
1924	18,684	359,918	14.3
1925	9,055	178,685	6.2

Sisal Production 1920-1925

Year	Quantity (Tons)	Value £	Percentage Yearly Exports (Value)
1920	16,663	571,887	33.2
1921	7,923	238,171	23.5
1922	10,224	289,388	20.1
1923	12,845	367,228	21.2
1924	18,428	644,835	24.6
1925	18,276	688,451	23.7

Source: Tanganyika Reports 1920-1925

approved the scheme to alleviate unemployment, though Assistant Under-Secretary Sir Cecil Bottomley commented wistfully, "If all the unemployed men could grow cotton I should be well content".¹⁰⁵ On the high cold plateau the labourers from the plains of Tanganyika died from pneumonia at the rate of 60 per month, owing to poor conditions and a lack of government supervision. The death rate was "worse than the Rand mines" and the scheme was stopped.¹⁰⁶ The experiment only acted to confirm Colonial Office prejudice against a settler state. The Kenya government appeared willing to squander the valuable resource of African labour with no thought to the future.

Within Tanganyika the case of the Chagga indicated the problems of the native reserve. The tribe had been crowded onto the upper slopes of Kilimanjaro by land alienations in German times, and were thus formed into an unofficial but effective reserve by the European farms on the lower slopes. The Chagga proved unsuitable for plantation labour on the damp and humid plains and the tribe was short of land and under-employed by local settlers. They formed the threat of an "idle discontented population" poised above the areas of greatest European settlement. In the interest both of security and state revenues, the senior District Commissioner Charles Dundas encouraged the cultivation of arabic coffee by the Chagga as a means of binding the cultivator to the soil and providing an outlet for "legitimate aspirations".¹⁰⁷ Arabica coffee was a settler crop in East Africa and local settlers protested strongly to the administration and to the Colonial Office. The latter dismissed the settlers as "mostly Greeks".¹⁰⁸ The Tanganyika

105. ibid.; Minute by Bottomley 5/6/22.

106. C.O.691/56/33983/13/7/22.

107. C.O.691/62/26562/28/5/23. Report by C. Dundas. Local settlers employed 3,350 labourers out of a population of 121,000. Income from coffee was estimated at between 250-500 shillings per month.

108. ibid.; des.d. 18/4/23.

administration had little choice. Coffee was the only lucrative cash crop that could be grown on the limited areas in the mountains. Its cultivation was a sure means of involving the Chagga in the colonial economy and maintaining the authority of the colonial state. The quest for security took precedence over the protests of settlers.

The colonial administration was well aware that the confinement of large numbers of Africans to limited areas of land created special problems. Anything which might impose the system of natives reserves was opposed by the Colonial Office. Large land concessions, or schemes involving numbers of small settlers, were rejected out of hand, no matter how 'sound and substantial' were their backers.¹⁰⁹ "Otherwise", Strachey wrote, "we would fall into the same errors as the Germans in S.W. Africa", and Tanganyika would reap the consequences.¹¹⁰ In August 1922 when Strachey's committee met to consider the land ordinance, the reserve system was firmly repudiated. While native rights in land were recognised no separate areas were set aside for African occupation. Europeans could obtain a 'right of occupancy' over African land and a limit was placed of 5000 acres on the acreage so alienated.¹¹¹ Reserves were also supposed to interfere with the planned extension of cotton cultivation.

The Land Ordinance was designed to give the African peasant security of tenure and, by encouraging agricultural production, establish the West Coast policy in Tanganyika. Cotton would now play the same role in Tanganyika as cocoa on the Gold Coast and the oil palm in Nigeria.¹¹²

109. Close Brothers proposed to settle ex-servicemen "on some of the best cotton country in the Territory" and, despite substantial support (including ~~that of a former~~ Under Secretary in the Colonial Office) the scheme was rejected. C.O.691/52/8988/24/2/21.

110. C.O.691/53/38003/29/7/21, Minute by Strachey 30/7. He had in mind the Herero rebellion.

111. C.O.691/60/20525/1/5/22; 60/32190/4/7/22.

112. C.O.691/62/57443/21/11/22 des.d. 20/10/22. The

In July 1922 the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation provided a £5,000 grant and the services of a cotton specialist Cecil Wood, to advise the Tanganyika government on improving the quality of raw cotton.¹¹³ Spinning tests on fibres from the Rufiji experimental station proved very favourable, the cotton meeting all Lancashire's requirements for strength, colour and length of staple.¹¹⁴

Tanganyika's problem was now to grow sufficient cotton to attract the attention of Lancashire buyers. In 1922 an extended programme of seed distribution was carried out in Morogoro, Mwanza, Rufiji, Lindi, Bagamoyo, Kilwa and Moshi.¹¹⁵

The extension of cotton production would not simply benefit the British cotton industry, but would provide assistance in the form of orders for British manufactured goods to other sections of metropolitan capital. If the colonial economy was to be based on the cheap and plentiful supply of cotton to British mills, then its progress was, in the words of the Corporation, "entirely dependent on the provision of transport facilities".¹¹⁶ The expansion of the colonial economy was dependent on the construction of more railways.¹¹⁷ The experience of the Tanganyika administration with rail transport had so far been most

F.n. 112 continued.

Territory apparently required a cash crop of "large output and stable nature" and cotton supposedly filled these criteria.

113. C.O.691/59/5242/2/2/22.

114. For the spinning tests C.O.691/50/46973/20/9/21 and report in Empire Cotton Growing Review, Vol.(1) 1924, pp.42-43.

115. C.O.691/68/25641/23/5/23.

116. L.G. Killby; "Cotton Growing Within the British Empire", Empire Cotton Growing Review, Vol.1(3) 1925. The same attitude is very evident in the Board of Trade report Cmd.523 previously cited.

117. C.O.691/48/60225/3/12/31 tele.d.2/12. The Tanganyika administration was willing to spend enormous sums to restore the railways to full working order, even if there was nothing for them to carry. A total of £780,000 would be spent in England over three years and £100,000 locally.

unhappy. The administration had inherited from the War Office a rickety railway connecting the Tanga line with the Kenya-Uganda system. Traffic from Moshi flowed along it to Mombasa and the customs dues and railway rates provided a handy subsidy for the beleaguered Kenya-Uganda railways. As the line was profitless and costly to repair the Tanganyika administration, supported by Tanga merchants, desired its removal, but they were over-ruled by Kenyan interests. Railways were rare and costly things in East Africa and no Secretary of State would countenance their removal, especially when the act would stir up the Kenya settlers.¹¹⁸ The Central railway itself had almost involved the Territory in a crippling debt.¹¹⁹ However railways created orders for British steel and rolling stock, brought profits to industry and relieved unemployment at home. Although the Tanganyika administration would have been better off building roads and utilising the numerous army lorries left in the country after the war, roads absorbed funds locally rather than transferring them to Britain. In obedience to his instructions, Byatt had refrained from road building programmes in favour of schemes generating orders for British industry.¹²⁰

In the 1920s the construction of railways appeared as a means to fulfil all the purposes of colonial rule in Tanganyika. The extension of trunk lines into the

118. For the history of the Voi-Kahe railway see C. Gillman; "A Short History of the Tanganyika Railways", Tanganyika Notes and Records, Vol.13 June 1942. See also C.O.691/44/24495/15/5/21; 60/38023/3/8/22.

119. The Central railway was nominally a private concern and became the property of the Controller of Enemy Property rather than of the Tanganyika government. The Treasury offered a £1,000,000 loan to purchase the railway. C.O.691/59/59000/29/11/22. Eventually a court case settled the value at £34,000. Gillman; op. cit., pp.33-34.

120. C.O.691/48/60225/3/12/21 tele.d. 2/12. Hollis had bought 108 ex-army lorries for £1,000. Hollis; op. cit., p.28. This may explain Byatt's "known dislike of using motor transport". A. Smith; "The Sigi Tramway That Was: Tanganyika's railway development in the twenties", East Africa Journal April 1968, p.24.

major cotton growing areas would expand cotton cultivation and reduce the costs and time of marketing cotton. The African would benefit by growing a cash crop with which he could purchase his 'few desires' and meet his tax obligations to the state. Metropolitan industry would be supplied with raw cotton and orders for manufactured goods. The revenue of the colonial administration would benefit from improved railway traffic and a greater yield of taxes. The improved finances would allow the repayment of the Imperial loans necessary to construct the railways in the first place. Railways and cotton were an irresistible combination, and promised to be the backbone of the colonial economy in Tanganyika. The Colonial Office became particularly excited over the potential development of the Lindi tramway.

The Lindi tramway was another military railway, comprising 90 miles of narrow gauge lines running from outside Lindi and down the Lukedi valley towards Masasi. In 1914 this had been one of the most fertile areas in German East Africa for African production of grain and cotton. Such was its reputation that at the end of the war Sir Humphrey Leggett had been anxious to secure the line for his British East Africa Corporation as part of a cotton growing scheme.¹²¹ Byatt opposed the establishment of private railways as entailing large land concessions, Amery had agreed on the principle and the tramway had been forgotten.¹²² In 1923 the administration reported that the line, if developed, could tap what had been "the granary of German East Africa" and "one of the principal areas in the Territory where the cotton industry is expected to develop".¹²³ The £10,000 demanded by the War Office was considered a bargain as the district would grow very rich in a very short space of time. To reconstruct and extend the line an interest free loan of £50,000 was secured from the Treasury on the recommendation

121. C.O.691/32/26620/31/5/20; 30/15949/27/3/20.

122. C.O.691/41/29579/15/1/20.

123. C.O.691/62/24227/14/5/23 des.d. 11/4.

of the Cabinet Unemployment Committee.¹²⁴ In November 1923 the Tanganyika government suddenly changed its mind. Byatt reported the scheme was impractical and unprofitable, as Africans would rather carry their cotton to Lindi than pay railway rates. He proposed an alternative scheme of extensive reconstruction on the Central railway employing an £80,000 loan and spending nearly £35,000 in England.¹²⁵ The Governor's arguments were over-ruled by the Colonial Office. The Empire Cotton Growing Corporation attached great importance to the Lindi tramway and "in view of the serious situation of the cotton industry in this country any scheme for the extension of cotton growing within the Empire is bound to receive exceptional consideration".¹²⁶ The Governor was told to be more optimistic, to keep in mind the importance of cotton growing and not to expect profits on railway lines used for 'development'.¹²⁷

Unlike the Tanganyika administration, the Colonial Office did not have to find funds and balance budgets in the face of renewed Treasury pressure for financial self-sufficiency. Imperial funds had been essential to establish the colonial state and reconstruct the colonial economy in Tanganyika. The main concern of the Treasury was to ensure such funds were quickly refunded, and it insisted any loans be used to bring an immediate improvement in government revenue.¹²⁸ The Colonial Office argued that a "penny-wise, pound foolish" policy could lead to British administration being unfavourably compared with the German regime, and resisted Treasury pressure for

124. C.O.691/59/55568/9/11/22; 64/54144/9/11/23; 67/49682/11/10/23.

125. C.O.691/54144/9/11/23; 65/59810/10/12/23.

126. C.O.691/54144/9/11/23, draft reply 8/11.

127. The Colonial Office thought the General Manager of the railways was more concerned for his estimates than for economic development. C.O.691/65/263/2/1/24, Minute by Downie 9/1.

128. C.O.691/59/21969/9/5/22; 67/44246/6/9/23.

increased taxes and customs dues and reductions in government expenditure.¹²⁹ The appointment of Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer brought a new hard line to Treasury letters, with renewed demands for Tanganyika to cut expenditure and commence interest repayments on Imperial loans. Although by the beginning of 1924 the Territory's finances had begun to improve, £350,000 was still required from the Treasury. An extended effort by the administration to improve the yield of hut and poll taxes had brought in an additional £31,000 and left the African tax burden "as heavy as the public can reasonably bear".¹³⁰ In the midst of renewed Treasury pressure for financial self-sufficiency, the cotton programme ran into serious difficulty.

Despite the extended campaign of seed distribution and administrative pressure, the cotton crop for the 1922-23 season was down 14% on the previous year, with only Bagamoyo and Mwanza showing increases in tonnage.¹³¹ The Department of Agriculture blamed a mixture of heavy rain and dry weather over different parts of the Territory, but Wood, the Corporation's expert, blamed the Director of Agriculture and his Department. Insufficient administrative attention was being given to producing high quality cotton. According to Wood prices were too high, the native was receiving more than he deserved for his cotton and the industry required much greater control. In Morogoro first grade cotton brought 99 cents per kilo while the second grade, comprising the "variest rubbish", brought 50 cents. The industry needed better grading, greater selection of seed, the elimination of middlemen and the granting to ginneries of sole buying rights.¹³² To reduce prices and

129. C.O.691/47/63034/20/12/21; 66/20746/25/4/23 covers Colonial Office resistance to various Treasury demands.

130. C.O.691/65/2371/15/1/24 des.d. 20/12/23. On Churchill in the Treasury L.S. Amery; My Political Life, Vol.2 (London 1953), pp.299-300.

131. Tanganyika Territory; Report for 1923, pp.36-37. Cotton Production Report, Dar-es-Salaam Times 14/4/23 encl. in C.O.691/68/25641/23/5/23.

132. Wood's feelings are expressed in a series of reports

improve quality, cotton in Tanganyika required a Board of Control and the establishment of a department devoted to its cultivation. Kirby, the Director of Agriculture, was worried the "insistent claims of one crop" would result in his small Department neglecting other crops.¹³³ Cotton prices fluctuated wildly, and many peasants were switching to the more consistent groundnut as a cash crop.¹³⁴ The Corporation's expert believed the best way to produce high quality cotton was through a policy of concentration; intensive cultivation and sustained administrative effort in certain areas rather than spreading seed and advisers over the whole country. If intensive cultivation suited the demands of Lancashire mills, extensive cultivation suited the purposes of the colonial state. The Tanganyika administration was working to establish a sound social and economic base for the colonial economy. The more Africans involved in cash crop production the better, and the more Africans produced, the greater the tax yield for the administration. Many of the best cotton areas such as the Rufiji valley were under-populated and intensive cultivation would not improve taxation revenues.¹³⁵ Byatt rejected all measures of price control as detrimental to the rapid expansion of cotton cultivation. Tanganyika would obey the metropolitan demand for cotton, but it would be produced by the means most beneficial to the colonial state.

The difference in attitude became evident in the 1923-24 budget, when the Corporation's grant was excluded from the Department of Agriculture's estimates.¹³⁶ The

F.n. 132 continued.

encl. in C.O.691/57/57443/21/11/22; 58/4451/25/1/23; 69/10520/4/3/24; 70/23381/16/5/24.

133. C.O.69;/62/6292/5/2/23 encl. des.d. 10/1/23.

134. C.O.691/69/10520.

135. C.O.691/63/49425/10/10/23 des.d. 7/9. The Department of Agriculture refused to abandon work on cotton in Moshi and Tabora.

136. *ibid.* The Colonial Office was very puzzled by this move, and assumed it to be an oversight. Minute by Bottomley 12/10/23.

Corporation's directors were not pleased; the promising cotton field of Tanganyika seemed intent on producing large amounts of over-priced and erratically graded cotton. Further assistance was made conditional on a complete change of attitude by the Tanganyika government. Wood suggested what was required was a list of certain districts where cotton was to be pushed and a reminder to District Officers of the Imperial importance of cotton growing. The administration of Tanganyika remained unrepentant. In a last attempt the Corporation demanded Wood be given a say in the framing of agricultural budgets. The Tanganyika government indignantly refused to place the Department of Agriculture "under the domination of the Corporation" and stated if such conditions were insisted upon, then Tanganyika could do without the assistance of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation. The Corporation agreed and withdrew its men and money until there was a change in either the attitude or the personnel of the Tanganyika government.¹³⁷

The Tanganyika administration had refused to jeopardise the emerging colonial economy of Tanganyika simply to suit the convenience of Lancashire. By 1923 it had become evident to officials that Lancashire would not buy African cotton while American supplies were readily available.¹³⁸ The "beautifully balanced machine" of the cotton futures system was tied to the American crop and was not easily disturbed.¹³⁹ The agitation over Empire cotton had been directed towards the establishment of an available reserve, in case boll worm or speculators

137. Wood's suggestions are in C.O.691/72/5275/10/11/24. The response of the Tanganyika government is in C.O.691/78/2310/13/1/24. The withdrawal of the Corporation is covered in C.O.691/69/18696/21/4/24; 75/467/3/1/24.

138. If they had not learnt this by experience, officials and others could read it in Lugard; Dual Mandate, p.524, n.3.

139. A.B. Muir; "Liverpool Cotton 'Futures' Contract", Empire Cotton Growing Review, Vol.1(1) 1924, pp.198-199.

disrupted the American supply. However for the period 1920-1923 cotton had been an Imperial requirement and had justified the application of a West Coast policy to Tanganyika. Colonial policy in Tanganyika remained committed to African cash crop production. Feeder lines from the Central railway replaced the Lindi tramway as the key points in the development of the colonial economy. In an ambitious move the Colonial Office sought from the Unemployment Relief Committee an interest-free loan of £1,500,000 to build branch lines, improve the steamer service across Lake Tanganyika and generally improve the transport facilities of the Territory.¹⁴⁰ It was ambitious because the administration did not have £1,500,000 worth of schemes in mind, and hurriedly had to think up others to justify the sum. Treasury suspicion limited the scheme to loans to build a single line to Shinyanga and improvements to the harbour and steamer services.¹⁴¹ Strachey commented philosophically "the relief to unemployment is the same whether the money is provided by loan or otherwise" but loans added to the Territory's burden of debt.¹⁴²

Throughout 1924 there were signs that the policy of African cash crop production required modification and consolidation rather than further extension. Cotton required early planting and it competed with the production of foodstuffs.¹⁴³ The result was an increase in food prices and a shortage of food in some areas due, according to East Africa, to the too rapid development of the 'Manchester' policy stressing cotton at the expense of

140. C.O.691/69/10433/4/3/24; 69/15095/29/3/24.

141. C.O.691/74/32983/12/7/24, Treas. letter 14/7.

142. ibid., Memo by Strachey 26/4.

143. On the problems of cotton cultivation and food crops see T.J. Kennedy; "A Study of Economic Motivation Involved in Peasant Cultivation of Cotton", East African Economics Review December 1963.

basic food crops.¹⁴⁴ Boll worm appeared in the Tanganyika cotton,¹⁴⁵ and the Colonial Office began to have doubts about cotton as the staple export for the Territory.¹⁴⁶ Ormsby-Gore, in East Africa as part of a Commission of Inquiry, agreed cotton had been pushed too fast in Tanganyika but in a time of record prices Byatt had been right to insist on a policy of native production.¹⁴⁷ Ironically, the season after the departure of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation saw Tanganyika's cotton crop effectively doubled by another government campaign and by high cotton prices.¹⁴⁸ Cotton was now the Territory's second most valuable export. To the purists this was too little: the Governor of Uganda Sir Robert Coryndon wrote to Sir Sydney Henn "If you want cotton in Tanganyika you must push it and push it hard. You'll not do it the way Byatt has tinkered with it".¹⁴⁹ Coryndon believed that with sufficient men and money he could encourage and if necessary coerce the production of a great deal more cotton out of Tanganyika's 4 million potential growers.

But maximum production of cotton was no longer the basis of Tanganyika's economic policy. High commodity prices for other crops such as groundnuts pushed Tanganyika's exports beyond their pre-war levels and, if the railway deficit was left out of calculation, in 1923-24 Tanganyika finally achieved a surplus balance in the

144. "Economic Crops and Foodstuffs-History Repeats Itself in Tanganyika", East Africa 18/12/24, p.314, and C.O.691/68/25641/23/5/23 clipping from Dar-es-Salaam Times 4/4/23.

145. C.O.691/73/59224/18/13/24.

146. Bottomley enquired about the cotton policy to Sir Sydney Henn, to receive the cautious reply "by all means push cotton" but encourage other crops as cotton was a notoriously fickle market. Henn Papers (R.H.), Henn to Bottomley 23/11/24.

147. Henn Papers (R.H.), Ormsby-Gore to Henn 27/9/24.

148. Tanganyika Territory; Report for 1924, pp.42-46.

149. Henn Papers (R.H.), Coryndon to Henn 18/6/24.

finances of the administration. The time was judged appropriate to raise the poll tax from 6 to 10 shillings over most of the country.¹⁵⁰ The Colonial Office was anxious to deny any criticisms that Tanganyika was being run in an 'unbusinesslike manner'.¹⁵¹ Any objections to the West Coast policy in Tanganyika were judged to be sheer resentment that 'native interests' had been considered as elementary rather than exceptional.¹⁵² With record prices the African population was reported to be happy and prosperous.¹⁵³ British rule appeared to have been accepted and the colonial economy was making rapid progress. The Colonial Office decided it was now time to drop the restrictions on Germans entering the Territory. An Anglo-German commercial treaty was impending and in the interests of better relations the Germans were to be no longer excluded from Tanganyika. The Acting Governor's protests that the native mind would be unsettled and commercial progress gravely retarded were dismissed as no longer relevant.¹⁵⁴ The Colonial Office obviously saw 1924 as the year the colonial economy and the colonial state had become firmly established within Tanganyika. (See Table 2).

The West Coast policy had been employed to buy the loyalties of Africans and to avoid stresses upon the colonial state from settler demands for land and labour. In their anxiety to create the colonial economy and entrench colonial rule, both the Colonial Office and the Tanganyika administration had ruled out any attempts by European enterprise within the Territory to influence economic policy. The representations from both the Tanga

150. Tanganyika Territory; Report for 1924, p.54.

151. C.O.691/69/13963/24/3/24. The most prominent criticism had appeared in the 'Empire' issue of the Times 24/5/23.

152. ibid.

153. C.O.691/75/28/7/24, Minute by Strachey 28/7.

154. C.O.691/71/44991/22/9/24 des.d. 19/8; 71/39111/16/8/24; 73/3707/26/1/25.

and Dar-es-Salaam Chambers of Commerce had been dismissed as coming from men without "weight", a "ridiculous body" of small-time merchants.¹⁵⁵ The Colonial Office had formed the idea that the Kilimanjaro settlers were mostly Greek, and so their protests over African coffee or labour could be ignored without difficulty. The Greek settlers were poor and in no position to apply any pressure on the Colonial Office. The administration could do without the advice of a Legislative Council. The Tanganyika administration seemed intent on limiting the role of settlers and plantations in the economy of the Territory. As in Nigeria plantations had a part to play but they would not be allowed to dominate economic policy. Hence the existing European estates would be preserved, if only as a source of revenue. The extension of the Tanga railway towards Arusha was undertaken with this aim, and to generate further traffic for the railway.¹⁵⁶ The administration apparently had few qualms about promoting African cash crop production in Tabora and Shinyanga, which in the past had been one of the main areas supplying labour to European estates. Increased taxation, the usual means of forcing Africans into the labour force, was not applied to the other important labour areas. In 1924 the poll tax remained unchanged in Mahenge, Songea, Rungwe, Ufipa and Kigoma, all sources of migrants for the plantations on the coast.¹⁵⁷ Labour contracts were limited to 6 months, a measure designed to ensure labour was 'efficiently' employed on a daily rather than on the existing piece-work basis.¹⁵⁸ Otherwise Byatt and his administration seemed to ignore the existence of European farms and plantations.

Settlers were not used to being ignored by governments in East Africa. The economic survival of settler

155. C.O.691/31/27702/5/6/20 des.d. 26/4; 54/17255/11/2/22, Minute by Strachey 15/4.

156. C.O.691/55/33754/2/7/22.

157. C.O.691/77/35885/10/7/25.

158. C.O.691/62/20148/23/4/23; 65/4364/28/1/24.

Table 3. Land Alienation 1922-1925 (excluding enemy property)

Year	Amount	District (percentage of total alienations in brackets)
1922	Nil	-
1923	4,099	Morogoro Rufiji Moshi Dodoma Tukuyu
1924	16,625	Morogoro (75.5%) Rungwe (8.6%) Arusha (15.0%) Dodoma (0.6%) Tabora (0.3%)
1925	9,967	Dar-es-Salaam (31.8%) Morogoro (33.6%) Rungwe (13.2%) Moshi (10.0%) Arusha (3.8%) Kilwa (7.6%)

Source: Tanganyika Reports 1922-1925.

production was heavily dependent on co-operation by the colonial state in the provision of plentiful land, cheap labour, agricultural advice and subsidised transport. The settlers in Tanganyika were angered and alarmed by the indifference of the administration, and Byatt came in for a great deal of criticism as hostile to British enterprise.¹⁵⁹ The West Coast policy seemed to imply the eventual exclusion of European settlement from the Territory. Settlers around Moshi abandoned Tanganyika to African production and sought to have their area annexed by Kenya.¹⁶⁰ Up until 1924 the rage and hostility of the settlers and their supporters had been largely in vain. The firm establishment of colonial rule took precedence over the short term interests of European enterprise in the Territory. Many of the sisal and coffee estates were still recovering from the effects of the war or were still paying off the estates. The economic position of the settlers and planters was considerably strengthened in 1924 with the period of high prices for agricultural commodities. Sisal fetched £45 per ton and though its production had not substantially increased, its value had almost doubled to become Tanganyika's premier export crop.¹⁶¹ (See Table 2) The Governor reported 'big men' from Kenya were taking an interest in property around Arusha.¹⁶² The circumstances which had led to the policy

159. In the absence of a Legislative Council criticism of government policy came through the Dar-es-Salaam press. C.O.691/68/25641/23/5/23 encl. cuttings Dar-es-Salaam Times.

160. Coryndon commented "I wish Ormsby-Gore would not talk of developing on West African lines - its impossible and dangerously misleading". Henn Papers (R.H.), Coryndon to Henn 18/6/24. On the transfer of the Moshi region ibid.; Henn to Kenneth Archer (Chairman Kenya Convention of Associations) 15/6/24.

161. Tanganyika Territory; Report for 1924, p.42; East Africa 19/2/25.

162. C.O.691/68/25641/23/5/23.

of promoting African production in the Territory were now changing in favour of greater attention towards European plantation and estates. The basis of colonial rule had been secured and the administration was more willing to listen to the claims of European enterprise, especially in view of the greater economic importance of settler and plantation crops.

The changing circumstances in Tanganyika were reflected in the report of the 1924 East Africa Commission. The Commission was investigating the possibilities of a greater co-ordination between the three East African territories. While visiting Kenya the Commissioners had undergone a "Pauline conversion" in favour of settler production.¹⁶³ Their report recommended the application of a Dual Policy to East Africa; the simultaneous and equal development of colonial economies by both African and European production. The Dual Policy applied the declaration in the 1923 White Paper Indians in Kenya which stated that although native interests were paramount, at the same time they could not be allowed to obscure the rights of minorities in East Africa.¹⁶⁴ In theory African and settler production were supposed to be complementary and there was no question of promoting one at the expense of the other. In practice the Dual Policy was sufficiently flexible to be adapted to the different conditions within all three of the East African colonies. The Dual Policy brought no real change to Uganda or Kenya but demanded a reappraisal of the role of European production in Tanganyika.

The protests of settlers and planters could no longer be ignored by the colonial administration. Colonial policy would have to change and find a new role for European

163. Largely due to Lord Delamere E. Huxley; White man's Country: Lord Delamere and the Making of Kenya, Vol.2 (London 1953), pp.190-192.

164. Great Britain; Parliamentary Papers; Indians in Kenya Cmd. 1922, 1923.

production in the colonial economy of Tanganyika. Byatt went on leave and the Acting Governor, the Chief Secretary John Scott, was more sympathetic to the demands of the European community.¹⁶⁵ Sir Horace Byatt was not able to gain the co-operation of the settlers and planters demanded by the Dual Policy and his time as Governor of Tanganyika was over. The colonial economy and the colonial state were now established; the administration had "a firm grip on the country" and the Africans had been "taught ... to co-operate for the benefit of that country".¹⁶⁶ The Colonial Office looked forward to the consolidation of Byatt's work and the entrenchment of colonial rule. The first and most important step was a "sound tribal policy", the identification of "the natives with the machinery of government".¹⁶⁷ Scott had already commenced the process by commuting African payments of tribute to their chiefs into cash payments by the colonial state. The tasks awaiting the new Governor would be the extension of administrative control over the African population and the integration of European production into the emerging colonial economy. Under the Dual Policy a complementary role had to be found for European estates in Tanganyika.

After a period of political weakness settlers in East Africa looked forward to a resurgence in power under the Dual Policy. The Moshi settlers dropped their demands for annexation by Kenya.¹⁶⁸ In London, Leo Amery was the new Secretary of State for the Colonies and he had not

165. "Tanganyika's Excellent Year", East Africa 12/2/25, p.478.

166. For the administration's "good grip" C.O.691/75/35876/28/7/24, Minute by Strachey 28/7. For Byatt's success in teaching the natives to "co-operate" see Earl Buxton's discussion of Byatt's address 9/7/24, Journal of the African Society, Vol.24(93) 1924, p.51.

167. C.O.691/69/18679/19/4/24.

168. The settlers also realised annexation to Kenya would cut them off from labour in Tanganyika. "Tanganyika Letter", East Africa 25/9/24.

forgotten the dream of unity in East Africa. New Governors were to be appointed to all three East African colonies. Joelson ran the triumphant headline "East Africa Heralds a New Era."¹⁶⁹ The next five years would justify all Byatt's fears about the settler menace to the progress of the colonial economy and the security of the colonial state.


169. East Africa 8/1/25.

Chapter 3SIR DONALD CAMERON AND THE DUAL POLICY

The new Governor was Sir Donald Cameron, the former Chief Secretary of Nigeria. An appointment from West Africa was the most likely in view of the area's successful combination of African cash crops and European enterprise. The Colonial Office was very proud of Nigeria.¹ The colony seemed the epitome of the Dual Policy; the harmonious blend of African labour and European capital to their mutual prosperity. An experienced Nigerian official might achieve similar results in Tanganyika and placate Europeans outraged by Byatt's policies. The settlers and commercial community in Tanganyika had some reservations that a Governor from a purely 'native' state could confirm the West coast policy.² Any doubts were quickly dispelled. East Africa was full of Cameron's praises and noted the commercial community of Lagos had greeted his departure with general dismay.³ Cameron himself gave reassurances before his departure for Tanganyika. Without make any specific commitments he announced the guiding principle of policy would be a concern for the community as a whole, rather than the adoption of pro-official, pro-settler or pro-native viewpoints.⁴ The Governor's statement was taken from the East Africa Commission's description of the Dual Policy and it promised a new and greater role for European enterprise in Tanganyika.⁵ Henn wrote confidently to Kenneth Archer: "it is expected ...

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1. For example G. Fiddes; The Dominions and Colonial Offices (London 1926), p.147, where the author recalls there was no part of colonial administration looked back on with greater satisfaction than policy in Nigeria over the past 25 years.
 2. "Tanganyika Looks Forward", East Africa 12/2/25, p.478.
 3. "Economic Crops and Foodstuffs", East Africa 18/12/24, p.314; "Tanganyika's New Governor", East Africa 5/3/25, p.528.
 4. ibid.
 5. Great Britain; Parliamentary Papers; Report of the East Africa Commission Cmd.2387 1925, p.115.

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Cameron will be far more reasonable in his dealings with the white population."⁶

Cameron arrived in Dar-es-Salaam in April 1925 and he was not impressed with what he found. The state apparatus appeared to him to be poorly developed and the administration lacked direction.⁷ Shortly after his arrival the Governor wrote to J.H. Oldham: "I am not satisfied with the place, ... The economic development has been forced and little else has been thought of. The native is being de-tribalised and Europeanised and no thought at all had been given to the place which he is to fill in the political future of the country."⁸ Cameron's brilliance as a colonial administrator lay in his perception that colonial rule produced inevitable changes in African society. He was determined to eliminate or at least modify changes caused by the operation of the colonial economy and to avoid any disruptive social consequences of colonial rule. To control the colonial economy Cameron had to gain the co-operation and support of the European settlers, merchants and planters in Tanganyika.

The Governor first had to gain the support of his own officials. As far as the senior administrators of Tanganyika were concerned, Byatt had committed the Territory to a policy of unrestrained African cash crop production. During John Scott's interregnum, a conference of senior officials was held in Dar-es-Salaam, and proved unanimously hostile towards European production. The conference decided that European and African cash crop production were fundamentally irreconcilable, as one took labour away from the other. If African production were to

6. Henn Papers (R.H.), Henn to Archer 10/9/24.

7. In his memoirs Cameron sets out to give the impression that the administration was almost non-existent until his arrival. D. Cameron; My Tanganyika Service and Some Nigeria (London 1939), especially Ch.2.

8. Cameron to Oldham 1/6/25 quoted in R.A. Austen; "The Official Mind of Indirect Rule: British Policy in Tanganyika 1916-1939" in P. Louis & W.R. Gifford (eds.); Britain and Germany in Africa (New Haven 1967), p.587.

expand then the officials recommended further restrictions on land alienation. European farms ought to be limited to certain areas, and alienation of land outside of administrative guidelines should be made a criminal offence.⁹ The conference was willing to hear Mr. W. Ruggles-Brise address them on behalf of the sisal planters of the Territory. Ruggles-Brise supported the Dual Policy. He stressed the contribution of the sisal estates to the colonial economy and to the revenues of the state, and suggested African cash crop production be restrained in areas supplying labour to the estates. Otherwise Ruggles-Brise supported African production and he hoped some means would be found of making African and European production complementary.¹⁰

On his arrival Cameron approved some of the conference's suggestions, and it apparently became known within the administration of Tanganyika that the Governor was generally opposed to small settlers and extensive land alienation.¹¹ However Cameron was very willing to devise a complementary role for the sisal plantations. Under Byatt, planters had complained the six month contract period was far too short and that District Officers, concerned about tax payments, had discouraged Africans from migrating to the estates on the coast.¹² In response to what he described as "legitimate pressure from the Planter's Association", Cameron lost no time in producing

9. C.O.691/78/35885/10/7/25, Conference of Senior Administrative Officers 18/10/24.

10. ibid. Appendix 2.

11. By December 1925 one District Officer Anthony Sillery was writing to his family "H.E. [His Excellency the Governor] is very much opposed to the alienation of native land to the European ... Directly any land shows any signs of being healthy and fertile the planters say 'Oh much too good for the native. We must have that'. H.E. is going to put a stop to it." Anthony Sillery; Tanganyika Letters (R.H.) 12/12/25.

12. See the letter from "Our Tanganyika Correspondent" in East Africa 27/11/24, p.258.

a memorandum on labour policy in the Territory. The Governor decided that as Tanganyika only had a small African population relative to area, all African labour would have to be "efficiently" employed to avoid shortages. There should be no encouragement of cash crops in areas remote from "suitable transport." Such cultivation would not be economic and "can hardly be regarded as a profitable one from the point of view of the state." In this case African labour would be more usefully and efficiently employed on a plantation. In areas supplying labour, district officers should "exhort" the inhabitants to work and the chiefs were to be informed that "although the government makes no order as to the work which the natives shall do, it is the desire of the government that they should go out and labour in the manner indicated."¹³ It was the duty of the government to "conserve" capital invested in the country, and even in areas suitable for cash crops, there was to be no discouragement of natives working on plantations. The first duty of the Department of Agriculture was to promote food crops. District Officers were to remain "neutral" and leave propaganda for cash crops to the Agricultural Officers.¹⁴

The Colonial Office correctly saw Cameron's 'neutrality' as being heavily biased in favour of plantation work. To its officials, a division of the Territory into areas either capable or incapable of producing cash crops seemed reasonable enough, but Cameron's imposed system seemed arbitrary and designed solely to secure a labour supply for the convenience of local planters. The Colonial Office pointed to "a strong consensus of disinterested opinion that believes native welfare is better promoted by production on his own land"

13. Quotations from C.O.691/82/26303/10/6/25 des.d. 18/4.

14. Cameron's despatch echoed the remarks of Ormsby-Gore on the labour problem. See "The Future of East Africa. Mr. Ormsby-Gore on Railways, Labour and Federation", East Africa 27/11/24, p.255.

and to the serious effects migrant labour was having in Northern Rhodesia. If plantation work was "spreading syphilis, breaking up native marriages and depreciating local food supplies" the District Officer should intervene.¹⁵ The Governor's use of "exhortation" and the fine distinction between an order and the "desire" of the government reminded Strachey of the Ainsworth Circulars in Kenya.¹⁶ If the Governor's thin guise of 'neutrality' were ever seen through there could be a similar uproar over Tanganyika.

The Colonial Office asked Cameron to reconsider or at least re-word his memorandum, and received a despatch in reply announcing the contract period for African labour had been extended from 6 to 12 months, as desired by the planters. The Governor explained that he was aiming at complete administrative impartiality between the competing claims of European and African cash crop production. If the cultivation of cash crops were to be pressed on the African population regardless of the effects upon the labour supply, then he would have to announce the position of the Tanganyika government was not one of complete impartiality.¹⁷ The essence of the Dual Policy was supposed to be fair and equal competition between the two types of production,¹⁸ and such a declaration would imply the abandonment of the Dual Policy in Tanganyika. The disturbance raised by settlers and planters in East Africa would be as bad as anything stirred up by humanitarian groups objecting to plantation labour. Faced by a strong-willed Governor and by potential uproar on all sides the Colonial Office backed away and made no further objection.

15. C.O.691/82/26303/10/6/25, Minute by Green 12/6.


16. *ibid.*; Minute by Strachey 1/7/25.

17. C.O.691/78/35486/4/8/25 des.d. 14/7.

18. On "perfectly fair competition" between African cash crops and labour for the European see W.G.A. Ormsby-Gore; "The Work of the East Africa Commission", Journal of the African Society, Vol.24(95) 1925.

MAP V

Tanganyika Territory: Administrative Districts 1925-1930



Source: G.F. Sayers (ed.); The Handbook of Tanganyika Territory (London 1930), p.116.

It was not the only time Cameron was to blackmail London over what he saw as the long-term interests of British rule in Tanganyika. There were good reasons behind the Governor's support of the planters, as became evident from his second major memorandum, this time on the subject of Native Administration. Cameron likened the situation in Tanganyika to that of the early days in Southern Nigeria. Like Tanganyika, the administration of Southern Nigeria had been run on grants-in-aid and all government efforts had been devoted to encouraging trade and raising revenue. As a consequence native administration had been neglected and a great deal of damage had been done to the processes of colonial rule.¹⁹ Plainly Cameron disapproved of a policy of African cash crop production without a tribal policy to control its social effects. He immediately brought district administration under greater control by the replacement of the old German districts by provinces and the creation of Provincial Commissioners to supervise policy. Rather than simply being refunded their commutated tribute in cash, African chiefs received a stipend from the administration according to their position and responsibilities.²⁰ Until African societies were brought under much closer control than hitherto had been the case, the expansion of African cash crop cultivation would cease. This had been one of the main purposes behind the Governor's memorandum on labour. The application of Cameron's criterion of 'proximity to suitable transport' would condemn the outlying regions - Kigoma, Kasulu, Ifipa, Rungwe, Songea and Mahenge, to the status of permanent labour reserves. It was assumed by colonial administrators that migrant labour would always walk out of their districts, and there was no need to build roads. Using Cameron's criteria there would be no cash crops without roads, yet there would be no roads built without cash

19. C.O.691/78/39079/27/8/25 des.d. 31/7.

20. Cameron; Tanganyika Service, pp.23-25.

crops to justify their construction.

The other main purpose of the labour memorandum was to gain the co-operation of the settler and commercial communities. Cameron continued with his West African analogy and recalled that plantations and tin mines in the Cameroons and Nigeria had not conflicted with the principles of Indirect Rule.²¹ Similarly European settlement was judged as not necessarily contrary to a tribal policy provided it was kept under administrative control.²² Cameron would allow European settlement and permit alienation of large areas of land,²³ but he would not tolerate a large influx of small settlers or any attempt by them to dominate government policy.

Such distinctions were either unknown or not appreciated by the non-African communities in Tanganyika, many of whom were still impressed by Cameron's co-operative and conciliatory attitude.²⁴ Byatt's Profits Tax, a revenue measure that persistently irritated the Indian community, was jettisoned by Cameron as more trouble than it was worth.²⁵ He quickly established a Legislative Council on the Nigerian model to "assist the Governor with his responsibilities." Although it was only an advisory body, the Governor was careful not to give the impression that the Council was simply a rubber stamp by packing it with officials. The official majority was kept small and equal representation granted to planters, Indians

21. C.O.691/78/39079/27/8/25 des.d. 31/7, Memorandum on Native Administration.

22. ibid.

23. Up to 1926 41,169 acres of land had been alienated for agricultural purposes. In 1926 64,029 were alienated during that year. Tanganyika Territory; Report for 1926, p.51 and Table 3.

24. For example "Lord Delamere on East African Policy", East Africa 18/3/26, p.565.

25. To sighs of relief from the Colonial Office. C.O.691/77/30914/7/7/25, Minute by Strachey 11/7.

and merchants.²⁶ Henn wrote to Kenneth Archer with approval: "Cameron is taking local Englishmen into his confidence and endeavouring to help them."²⁷

The appointment of a new Governor revived the interest of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation in the cotton potential of the Territory. In April 1925 the Deputy Director of the Corporation, Colonel French, visited the Mwanza area and became very enthusiastic over a scheme of cotton production along the lines of the Sudan Plantations' operation at Gezira.²⁸ Under careful supervision and using ploughs provided by the Corporation, African tenants would produce the right sort of cotton. Ormsby-Gore, now Under-Secretary of State, eagerly looked forward to reports on this "very specially interesting area" and like Sir James Currie, he was confident Cameron's administrative ability would prevent any repetition of the errors of the past over quality and control.²⁹ Although the Corporation offered to supply another cotton adviser to the Tanganyika Government, the Colonial Office rejected the idea. The Corporation had become "unnecessarily huffy" last time and Sir James Currie and his friends were considered "a little too much inclined to dictate to us not only about cotton but agriculture generally."³⁰ Such a decision reflected the change in policy in Tanganyika initiated by Cameron. Under the Dual Policy the Territory could no longer be considered an area devoted to African cash crop production. The pressures from the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation and the demanding nature of cotton as a crop ensured that cotton production would have to be controlled if Tanganyika were to follow the Dual Policy.

Although the expansion of African cash crop cultivation had ceased, there was no obstacle under the

26. C.O.691/78/39087/27/8/25; 78/39095/27/8/25.

27. Henn Papers (R.H.) Henn to Archer 7/9/25.

28. C.O.691/77/18881/27/4/25.

29. C.O.691/82/50589/10/11/25, Minute by Ormsby-Gore 31/10; 82/45096/6/10/25.

30. C.O.691/82/45096/6/10/25, Minute by Green 12/10.

Dual Policy for administrative assistance to Africans already producing commodities for export. The administration regarded the Sukuma and Nyamwezi peasants in the Mwanza and Shinyanga areas as particularly industrious, and liable to produce large amounts of cotton and groundnuts.³¹ (See Table 4) To fully exploit such production the Tanganyika government proposed the extension of the Tabora-Shinyanga branch line all the way to Mwanza. The scheme had been highly recommended by the East Africa Commission in 1924 and the importance of the line was impressed on Cameron by Sir James Currie before the Governor left for Tanganyika.³² Its construction was strongly urged by cotton interests in the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, the Joint East Africa Board and the East African Section of the London Chamber of Commerce.³³ The Treasury opposed the scheme and argued that as expenditure ought to be tailored according to the funds available, road transport should be developed as a cheap and practical alternative.³⁴ The Territory's ability to repay Imperial loans came first in the Treasury's list of priorities. It insisted on financial orthodoxy in the face of powerful interests, and the Colonial Office saw an opportunity to inflict a major defeat and weaken Treasury control over Tanganyika. To be free from Treasury interference Tanganyika had to balance her budget, and this could be accomplished if branch lines were constructed and the Central railway made a profitable concern. With

31. C.O.691/82/50589/10/11/25, Minute by Ormsby-Gore 31/10.

32. C.O.691/18881/27/4/24, Minute by Bottomley 29/4; 77/29047/26/6/25, Draft to Treasury.

33. C.O.691/77/29047/26/6/25; 80/55886/14/12/25.

34. The battle with the Treasury is recorded on C.O.691/81/8460/23/2/25; 81/11923/16/3/25; 81/20706/7/5/25; 81/40333/4/9/25. In the latter Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer informed Amery that a free hand with development in Tanganyika was "impossible as long as it is I who have to find the money." Letter d. 1/9.

Table 4. The Major Products of the Colonial EconomySisal Production 1926-1931

Year	Quantity (tons)	Value £	Percentage Yearly Exports (Value)
1926	25,022	911,293	29.1
1927	33,012	1,160,735	31.6
1928	36,186	1,111,429	28.6
1929	45,728	1,485,593	39.9
1930	49,962	1,172,315	44.4
1931	55,939	707,177	42.9

Cotton Production 1926-1931

Year	Quantity (Centals)	Value £	Percentage Yearly Exports (Value)
1926	109,450	427,437	13.0
1927	88,272	361,916	11.0
1928	109,607	495,405	12.8
1929	110,821	487,863	13.1
1930	82,224	247,413	9.4
1931	54,349	119,752	7.2

Groundnut Production 1926-1931

Year	Quantity (tons)	Value £	Percentage Yearly Exports (Value)
1926	15,867	254,903	8.4
1927	14,147	238,082	7.2
1928	10,595	188,582	4.9
1929	7,765	120,448	3.2
1930	17,333	186,567	7.1
1931	3,070	20,706	1.8

Source: Tanganyika Reports 1926-1931 and Armitage-Smith Report.

the Territory restored to the full control of the Secretary of State the way would then be clear for a union of the East African colonies.³⁵ A Board of Trade Committee reported renewed demands by the cotton industry for raw cotton and by the engineering and steel industries for new orders. The Committee strongly supported railway construction in East Africa using the £10,000 Guaranteed Transport Loan suggested by the East Africa Commission.³⁶ The Treasury still maintained Tanganyika's additional revenue should go towards debt payments rather than to support new loans, but, outgunned, it then conceded defeat and approved construction of the Mwanza line.³⁷

The East Africa Commission had investigated the possibilities of federation and closer co-operation, and had ruled out federation until there was widespread local agreement in East Africa. Ironically, while the Colonial Office believed the Mwanza railway would clear the way for future federation, its construction shattered any chance of co-operation between the East African governments. The Kenyan administration feared the line would compete with the Kenya-Uganda system for the traffic of Lake Victoria. Even worse was the possibility that a competitive tariff would divert the lucrative Uganda cotton traffic through Mwanza to Dar-es-Salaam instead of through Mombasa. The loss of the cotton traffic would mean an end to the subsidised railway rates for Kenya settlers. One of the mechanisms for co-ordination recommended by the East Africa Commission was a conference of the East African Governors. The Governor of Kenya Sir Edward Grigg envisaged the Conference as a type of Cabinet for East

35. C.O.691/80/56265/30/12/25, Minute by Green 24/2.

36. Great Britain; Parliamentary Papers; Report of the East Africa Commission, p.182; Memorandum on Transport Development and Cotton Growing in East Africa Cmd.2463 1924-25.

37. C.O.691/80/56265/30/12/25.

Africa. At its first meeting in Nairobi early in 1926 Cameron found himself 'outvoted' on the subject of the Mwanza railway, with Grigg and the Governor of Uganda Sir William Gowers telegraphing strong protests over the line to the Secretary of State. An infuriated Cameron sent off his own protests to the Colonial Office and to Sir Sydney Henn and was met with reassurances that the Mwanza line would be built regardless of objections by Kenya and Uganda.³⁸ Instead competition between the Tanganyika and Kenya-Uganda railways would not be permitted and the Kenya-Uganda Marine branch would maintain a monopoly of services on the Lake.³⁹

The Mwanza incident left Cameron with a deep suspicion of Grigg and of the machinery of the Governor's Conference.⁴⁰ The government of Kenya seemed willing to meddle in Tanganyika's affairs and capable of placing the financial stability and future security of the Territory in jeopardy. The threat of interference from over the border made Cameron acutely aware of the need to conciliate Tanganyika's own European settlers. The extension of the Tanga railway to Arusha was approved on the grounds it would attract capital, expand cotton and coffee production by Europeans and eliminate the 'inefficient' use of porters along the Moshi-Arusha road. In justifying his decision Cameron noted it was politically unsound to deny to white settlers the advantages extended to similar settlers in a neighbouring colony.⁴¹ With a railway for

38. C.O.691/84/4515/26/5/26 des.d. 3/5 and Henn Papers (R.H.) Cameron to Henn 4/12/25, Henn to Cameron 12/1/26. For Cameron and Grigg's later justifications see Cameron; Tanganyika Service, pp.124-127; Lord Altrincham (Sir Edward Grigg); Kenya's Opportunity (London 1955), pp.192-195.

39. C.O.84/4971/12/6/26; 84/6382/16/8/26. Altrincham; op. cit., p.195.

40. Walker Papers (Colonel C. Walker Secretary East African Governor's Conference) (R.H.); Wilson to Walker (Sir Samuel Wilson Permanent Under-Secretary Colonial Office) 29/6/26; Walker to Hankey (Sir Maurice Hankey Imperial Defence Committee) 22/6/26.

41. C.O/691/80/55806/1/10/25.

settlers at Arusha and another for Africans at Mwanza, no-one could accuse the Tanganyika government of a lack of balance in its application of the Dual Policy.

There was a limit to how far the administration would go to meet the demands of settler interests. In reply to representations by Moshi settlers and by the Joint East Africa Board, the Governor explained he was unable to prohibit the Chagga coffee industry on Kilimanjaro. Eradication was impossible owing to the sheer number of trees and if attempted could cause a labour boycott of the European estates and possibly even insurrection. As the Board entertained the erroneous belief that without administrative encouragement Chagga coffee would quickly disappear, the Tanganyika government duly adopted 'discouragement' as official policy towards arabica coffee cultivation. Cameron promised to enact regulations which would prohibit the spread of coffee growing among the neighbouring Pare and Arusha tribes.⁴² Chagga coffee had gone beyond the stage where it was likely to be seriously affected by administrative attitudes short of total prohibition. (See Table 5) The administration was faced with a difficult problem in controlling the Chagga coffee industry, and the interests of the Dual Policy and general stability ensured the crop would remain limited to Kilimanjaro. The administration *could* use the power of the colonial state to control African cash crop production. The output of African crops produced for export had steadily declined since Cameron's arrival.⁴³

42. C.O.691/78/40022/2/9/25 J.E.A.B. memorandum 30/6/26. Henn wrote to Archer and told him he had received assurances from Cameron that coffee would be confined to Kilimanjaro "otherwise I told him I would publicly discourage the investment of any London money in the industry - and this he did not wish as he is bidding for capital to be put into T." Henn Papers (R.H.) Henn to Archer 27/4/26.

43. Austen; Official Mind, p.596.

Table 5. Coffee Production 1921-1931

Year	Quantity (tons)	Value £	Percentage Yearly Exports
1921	3,328	138,397	12.7
1922	4,271	203,784	15.6
1923	4,047	204,987	12.4
1924	5,261	352,529	13.5
1925	6,010	481,072	16.6
1926	6,540	495,199	16.4
1927	6,595	463,420	14.1
1928	10,431	739,657	19.1
1929	8,857	588,871	15.8
1930	11,547	397,040	15.1
1931	9,251	247,037	15.0

Production 1921-1931: African 68%
 European 32%

Source: Tanganyika Reports, Armitage-Smith Report

However control of European production was much more difficult. Unlike planters, who seemed content with a steady labour supply, small settlers needed to gain control of the colonial state if they were to prosper in East Africa. In 1926 the Kenya settlers launched a major campaign to establish a strong settler presence in Tanganyika and eventually, to commit the Territory to settler control.

Kenya's leading settler, Lord Delamere, had greeted the arrival of Sir Edward Grigg with a speech on the theme that "Kenya's safety as a civilised unit depends on the extension of our influence southwards."⁴⁴ Delamere looked forward to East African federation on Kenya's terms, which involved the grant of an unofficial majority in the Kenya Legislative Council. The price of settler agreement to a Closer Union would be effective self-government for the colony and a guarantee of ultimate settler control. Pressure for a union on Kenyan terms would be greatly strengthened by the existence of a numerous and sympathetic body of British settlers inside Tanganyika. Delamere's aim was to build up white settlement in the Southern Highlands of Tanganyika. To Imperial idealists in Britain and Kenya the Tanganyika highlands were the 'missing link' in a chain of white communities running from South Africa to Kenya. A closer union of all the East African territories would create a 'Great White State' devoted to white settlement and destined for Dominion status.⁴⁵ According to the various correspondents in East Africa the Southern Highlands constituted a white man's paradise: extremely fertile, elevated above the humidity and tropical diseases of the lowlands, underpopulated by African tribes and running for 200 miles between Tukuya and Iringa. The country south of Iringa

44. E. Huxley; White Man's Country (London 1953), pp.194-195.

45. The best summary of the ideas behind the 'new Dominion' may be found in J.C. Smuts; Africa and Some World Problems (Oxford 1930), pp.52-78.

was reported to be "healthy and roomy enough to carry the number of white planters and settlers required to open it up without in any way disturbing the agricultural development of the Native population."⁴⁶ The Wabena and Wahehe tribes were still expected to provide labour for the settlers, and they were described as industrious and a first class work force. The settlers could grow sisal, wheat, coffee, tea, sugar, flax, and tobacco, and rear livestock. The only problem was the isolation of the Southern Highlands, and to bring these crops to market a railway would have to be built by the Tanganyika government.

A line between the Central railway and northern Nyasaland had been recommended by the 1924 East Africa Commission, but in the interests of developing African cash crop production. The Commission suggested the railway be built from Ngeregere on the Central line through the cotton areas of the Kilombero Valley to Mande, a port on Lake Nyasa. A route through Tukuya, Mbeya and the parts of the Southern Highlands most favoured for white settlement was rejected on engineering and economic grounds.⁴⁷ The Kenya settlers were not deterred; political pressure could often triumph over technical difficulties and change the direction of the railway. Within a week of his arrival in Tanganyika, Cameron had been approached by a settler seeking land at Tukuyu. The Governor ordered a flying survey to define land "conspicuously suited" for European settlement. The Planter's Association was worried that white settlement might take African labour away from plantation work, but Cameron was confident that settlement was politically and economically desirable.⁴⁸ The African labour coming from the south-west would be made more "efficient" as less

46. East Africa 27/11/24, pp.254-255; "Tanganyika's Southern Hinterland", East Africa 6/8/25, p.923.

47. Great Britain; Parliamentary Papers; Report of the East Africa Commission, p.121; C.O.691/73/57675/9/12/24 des.d. 13/11/

48. C.O.691/78/35484/4/8/25.

time would be lost travelling to find work.⁴⁹ By making maximum use of the available workforce, the administration hoped to reduce the demand for African labour, and so harmonise the two parts of the Dual Policy. Cameron was anxious that settlement should be controlled. There were to be no large blocks of European farms as in the highlands of Kenya and there were to be no special concessions until the railway was actually built. A limited influx of settlers would satisfy demands for land alienation and take pressure off the over-crowded Northern Province.

The Colonial Office considered there were several sound reasons why settlement should be actively discouraged, at least until the railway was nearing completion. An application had already been received for a 40,000 acre concession to grow tea at Tukuyu, forwarded by a gentleman without apparent financial support or knowledge of tea cultivation. It looked to the Colonial Office like a land speculation, with the concession being quickly divided into small farms and sold to incoming settlers. The policy of encouraging small settlers, Strachey noted, "has everywhere led to trouble and we are to this day still suffering from its adoption by the Foreign Office in the early days in Kenya."⁵⁰ In addition the Colonial Office feared such settlement would take the form of German immigrants fleeing economic hardship in Europe. British officials knew from bitter experience that it was easier to limit the numbers of settlers than to resist their demands for labour once they had arrived.⁵¹

49. For the need to make African labour more 'efficient' see Tanganyika Territory; Report by Major G.St.J. Orde-Browne upon Labour in Tanganyika 1925; A. Wigglesworth; "Our Latest East African Possession", East Africa 23/7/25, pp.884-885.

50. C.O.691/82/32370/16/7/25, Minute by Strachey 15/7.

51. On this point see R.L. Buell; The Native Problem in Africa, Vol.1 (New York 1928), p.508.

Despite Colonial Office fears, settlement in Southern Tanganyika enjoyed a wave of publicity. In August 1925 the London Times reported that land was being surveyed in Southern Tanganyika with a view to its alienation on very favourable terms.⁵² In the same month the Colonial Office received an alarming letter from Lord Stamfordham, the King's Private Secretary. His Majesty had heard of new coffee lands being made available in Tanganyika on excellent terms, and he wondered if it might be politically and economically beneficial for one of the Princes to take up land in the Territory. The thought of a Royal Prince becoming a settler and acting as a mouthpiece for settler demands horrified the Colonial Office and the idea was promptly and tactfully discouraged.⁵³ The event seemed to presage a descent of settlers on Southern Tanganyika. In September Cameron went on safari to investigate the Southern Highlands. At Songea he encountered several chiefs sceptical of his existence (despite his full dress uniform) and at Iringa, Lord Delamere was waiting to discuss European settlement in Tanganyika.⁵⁴

In May 1925 Delamere had formed Colonists Limited, a company designed to act as a land agency promoting settlement in the Southern Highlands. Delamere seemed confident the area would prove a second Kenya, and his optimism brought about twenty applications for land around Iringa.⁵⁵ Cameron sought the approval of the Colonial Office to put the land up for immediate auction, arguing it was unfair to make settlers wait for the building of the railway. He gave assurances the amount of land alienated would be determined by the "interests of the natives" and that there would be no great influx of

52. C.O.691/82/35853/5/8/25, clipping from Times 24/7/25.

53. C.O.691/82/35853/5/8/25, letter from Stamfordham d. 27/7.

54. Cameron: Tanganyika Service, p.37.

55. Huxley; op. cit., pp.208-209.

German or any other settlers. Otherwise he would have to make a frank declaration that the government did not propose to alienate further land for the present. The threat of 'frank declarations' was a familiar tactic of Cameron's but this time the Colonial Office avoided the issue and counselled delay.⁵⁶

In October 1925 Delamere, with an astute eye to the future and the benefits of publicity, staged his first Unofficial Conference at a deserted mission station near Tukuya. In their long and tiring journeys settler delegates from Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Kenya and Tanganyika came to appreciate the isolation of the Southern Highlands, but having arrived they all agreed on the importance of white settlement in Southern Tanganyika.⁵⁷ The conference urged the construction of a railway to Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia and asked the Joint East Africa Board to admit a member representing the Iringa settlers. The only obstacle to further settlement was seen to be Colonial Office opposition, and a resolution was duly passed demanding less metropolitan interference in East Africa.⁵⁸ The resolution supporting increased settlement was formally and unanimously endorsed at the 1926 Governor's Conference. However despite such widespread support and the apparent goodwill of Cameron, settlers who applied for land received no response from the Tanganyika administration.⁵⁹ The Colonial Office still advocated delay. In London negotiations had begun with Baron Friedel de Ropp of the German Colonial Society over a scheme to establish large numbers of German settlers in southern Tanganyika.

56. C.O.691/79/47881/23/10/25; 79/48010/24/10/25 des.d. 1/10/25.

57. The horrors of the journey and details of the conference are in Huxley; op. cit., pp.201-204.

58. A summary of the proceedings is in East Africa 10/12/25, pp.244-245.

59. Huxley; op. cit., pp.44.

For the British government even to consider a deal with the Germans was an extraordinary reversal of attitude. One of the few things certain to unite the Colonial Office, the Tanganyika government, settlers, planters, merchants and metropolitan businesses was a general opposition to German advances into British spheres of influence. The Colonial Office kept a close and suspicious watch on the German connections of firms operating in Tanganyika.⁶⁰ The Tukuyu Conference condemned the arrival of German settlers as an obstacle to Closer Union and a danger to British rule.⁶¹ In their eyes rapid British settlement was the only way to avoid German domination in Tanganyika.

The anxiety was caused by the lifting of immigration restrictions upon Germans and the rehabilitation of Germany in the international sphere. At Locarno the Allies had retracted the accusations of German 'colonial guilt' and unfitness to rule subject peoples. The last Governor of German East Africa, Dr Schnee, had written the first of a number of books evoking Germany's right to colonies and the adverse effects of British rule.⁶² Articles supporting German colonial claims had appeared in the British press.⁶³ In 1925 Britain had relinquished the A-Class Mandate over Iraq and created doubts over the

60. For example C.O.691/81/13456/23/3/25, Crown Agents' report on the Mazlimba Sisal Company.

61. "The Return of Germans to Tanganyika-Views Expressed at the Tukuyu Conference", East Africa 17/12/25, p.264.

62. H. Schnee; German Colonisation Past and Future: The Truth about the German Colonies (London 1926).

63. The background to the German colonial claims is discussed in W.W. Schnokel; "The Hard Death of Colonialism: British and German Colonial Attitudes 1919-1939" in Gifford & Lewis (eds.); op. cit. and in A.E. Ekoko; "The British Attitude to Germany's Colonial Irrendtism in Africa in the Inter-War Years", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.14 (2) 1979.

permanency of any Mandate. Both Cameron and Amery made strong statements asserting Tanganyika was irrevocably part of the British Empire.⁶⁴ Baron de Ropp was President of the German Colonial Society, and he wanted 1,600,000 acres for a joint Anglo-German settlement scheme in Tanganyika. While Ormsby-Gore politely informed him large concessions for settlement were not encouraged in Tanganyika, the Baron pointed out certain mutual political advantages behind such a scheme. De Ropp maintained that unless bona fide German settlement was permitted in Tanganyika, a movement could easily grow up in Germany hostile to Britain and intent on making public protests to the League of Nations. One hundred settlers would reduce international friction and make the south-west railway immediately profitable. Such joint initiatives would demonstrate Anglo-German harmony and together they would oppose the spread of Bolshevism and its intentions of overthrowing the British Empire. Amery was sympathetic and while he stressed there was no question of returning any territory to Germany, he supported schemes for white settlement in Tanganyika providing the errors of Kenya were not repeated. The senior officials of the Colonial Office summed up de Ropp's scheme as:

... leasing to a German company disguised as British an area about the size of Devonshire with special privileges over mining in another large area - all incompatible with the policy so far followed and embodied in the laws.⁶⁵

They believed the scheme was a plot by the German government to gain control of Tanganyika and it was all based on the false premise that Tanganyika was dependent for its prosperity on European production. The Colonial Office claimed it was well known "the native could beat the white

64. Amery's speech is cited in Ekoko; op. cit., p.289. It was specially placed in the Tanganyika Government Gazette C.O.691/82/33408/22/7/25. For Cameron's comments in a speech to the Legislative Council see East Africa 7/7/27, p.85.

65. C.O.691/82/49234/2/11/24, Minute by Strachey 25/11. See also C.O.691/82/33697/24/7/25.

man out of the field except in the case of a few crops (such as sisal) and, of course in mining."⁶⁶ In Tanganyika white settlement should be the exception rather than the rule.

The de Ropp scheme threatened to become a matter for 'high policy' and then any objections by the Colonial Office would be over-ruled by calculations of international political advantage. The baron and his British sponsor Major Church lobbied vigorously in the City and a deputation of bankers urged Ormsby-Gore not to be too discouraging for fear of throwing de Ropp and the moderate Germans into the hands of the nationalists.⁶⁷ There were certain advantages to a joint Anglo-German settlement scheme in Tanganyika. German colonial propaganda would be choked off and a measure of control obtained over German immigration. German capital would come in to assist the colonial economy and relieve the necessity for future loans or grants-in-aid from the Imperial Exchequer. Cameron was told there was to be no general offer of land pending a decision on the route of the south-west railway and the formation of a new development company. Amery insisted the scheme be backed by adequate capital and include equal numbers of British and German settlers. Lord Delamere would help to choose the 'right type'. Native rights were to be respected and there were to be no continuous blocks of white settlement. In return, the government would waive the auction requirements and grant the land concession. Strachey judged the de Ropp proposals, if successful were "the most important event in the history of the Territory since we took it over."⁶⁸ Policy in Tanganyika would effectively be reversed and the Southern Highlands would become a 'white man's country'.

66. C.O.691/82/49234/2/11/24, Minute by Strachey 25/11.

67. C.O.691/82/49234/2/11/24, Minute by Ormsby-Gore 20/11. Amery, while attending a party given by General Page-Croft, found himself listening to de Ropp lecture on the menace of Bolshevism to the British Empire. C.O.691/82/33697/24/7/25, letter by Amery 4/5.

68. C.O.691/83/49234/2/11/24, Note by Strachey.

The only thing which prevented the de Ropp proposals from being carried out was the refusal of City financiers to back the Baron's scheme. As he could only promise an inadequate £100,000 capital, the British government was faced with the prospect of either financing settlement itself or renouncing its promises. Suddenly acceptance of the de Ropp proposals became contingent on the approval of the Governor of Tanganyika, and Ormsby-Gore suggested de Ropp and Major Church go and convince Cameron personally.⁶⁹

Although Cameron was not opposed to a degree of European settlement, extensive schemes such as de Ropp's had little chance of gaining his approval. At the 1926 Governor's Conference he had accepted the resolution committing East Africa to the Dual Policy. In the Governor's words, the choice for the Tanganyika administration was between European settlement "where ever the climate is suitable and adequate areas are available for settlement without depriving the native population of sufficient land for its own use" or declaring Tanganyika "an economic sanctuary reserved for native production alone."⁷⁰ Cameron believed the Tanganyika administration could not create such an 'economic sanctuary'. The policy was "publicly indefensible" and the forces advocating white settlement were too strong to be ignored or resisted.⁷¹ Settlers had to be controlled rather than excluded, and to this end the Governor insisted "the land laws as they stand are to be carried out in the most scrupulous manner."⁷² The Land Ordinance was a "native charter" designed to stop the creation of native reserves. Small settlers, who in Kenya and South Africa relied on cheap labour from such reserves, were deemed undesirable, far too reliant on the colonial state. The Tanganyika administration looked to the 'large settler' - self-reliant with plenty of capital - and to plantations

69. ibid.

70. C.O.691/83/2971/26/3/26 des.d. 25/2.

71. ibid. See also Cameron; Tanganyika Service, pp.37-41.

72. ibid.

Table 6. Land Alienation 1926-1931

Year	Acreage	District (percentage total alienation)
1926	64,029	Iringa (77.7%) Northern Prov. (12.2%) Eastern Prov. (6.8%) Kigoma (3.3%)
1927	166,201 (agricultural)	Northern Prov. (59.8%) Iringa (20.8%) Eastern Prov. (12.1%) Other (7.3%)
	56,300 (pastoral)	Iringa (91.1%) Mwanza (8.9%)
1928	154,828	Iringa (44.2%) Northern Prov. (25.9%) Eastern Prov. (16.0%) Other (13.9%)
1929	124,293	Northern (38.3%) Eastern (26.7%) Iringa (23.5%) Kigoma (6.6%) Other (4.9%)
1930	57,467	Eastern (27.8%) Northern (19.0%) Iringa (16.2%) Unspecified (37.0%)
1931	24,470	Unspecified

Source: Tanganyika Reports 1926-1931 and G.F. Sayers (ed.);
Handbook of Tanganyika (London 1930).

to carry out the European side of the Dual Policy. De Ropp's scheme was subsequently described by Cameron as not only in violation of the Mandate but also simply unnecessary. So long as small-holders were either excluded or made the sole responsibility of the company then the Germans could bid for land in the Southern Highlands once surveys were completed. Cameron pressed for the immediate allocation of funds for the construction of the south-west railway and for land alienations to commence along its route. The Governor favoured what was called the 'Delamere line' through Iringa, Mbeya and the country most favoured for white settlement.⁷³ The despatch was so favourable to white settlement that Cameron predicted it would make Strachey's hair stand on end when he read it at the Colonial Office. Strachey was not impressed: "It did nothing of the kind and I do not know where the Governor got the idea that we expected him to apply Nigerian ideas in a cast iron fashion."⁷⁴ The Governor would have obtained the idea from reading Colonial Office despatches sent to his predecessor. But the West Coast policy was in the past. Ormsby-Gore decided that the despatches sent in Churchill's time as Secretary of State (1921-22) had erred far too much on the native side. Tanganyika now followed a Dual Policy.⁷⁵ Cameron's distinction between the settler of the 'right type' - responsible, with plenty of capital - and the 'typical settler' - selfish, destructive and financially dependent - fitted in with the Dual Policy. The Colonial Office disapproved of the unrestrained pursuit of land and labour by small settlers, and it fully supported the Governor's distinction. Delamere backed up Cameron's despatch with a lengthy telegram advocating a Dual Policy of white settlement in

73. The line through the Southern Highlands christened by the Chief Engineer Clement Gillman. C. Gillman; Diaries (R.H.) 8/2/27.

74. C.O.691/83/2971/26/3/26 des.d. 25/2, Minute by Strachey 3/5.

75. ibid. Minute by Ormsby-Gore 3/5/26.

the highlands and African cotton production in the lowlands.⁷⁶ Ideally the Dual Policy admitted but did not capitulate to the strength and persistence of settler claims, while at the same time maintaining an equal but limited role for African cash crops. The mixture was fundamentally unstable, for while the power of the colonial state could contain African cash crop production, it was far more difficult to restrain settlers who had the political power to divert the influence of the colonial state. The weakness in Cameron's approach became evident in negotiations over construction of the south-west railway.

Colonel Maxwell, the General Manager of the Tanganyika railways, had been against the idea from the start. He saw the south-west line as running through regions populated by either "natives excessively stupid with palm wine" or by overly optimistic settlers.⁷⁷ Any agricultural development would take years and in the meantime the railway would run at a heavy loss. The Tanganyika railways lost valuable traffic to the Kenya-Uganda system through the Voi railway and on the Lake, and only made a profit on the through traffic in Katangan copper. The south-west line would ruin his already fragile estimates, and Maxwell suggested an alternative track to serve the 360,000 Africans around Itigi. The Colonial Office told him to be more enthusiastic and consider how traffic from the Rhodesias and Nyasaland would swell railway traffic and bring labour into the Territory.⁷⁸ What dampened enthusiasm for the south-west railway at the Colonial Office was the discovery that the 39 miles between Tukuyu and Mbeya represented a difference of 15,000 feet in altitude.⁷⁹ To the engineering problems were added doubts over the de Ropp scheme. Until the Germans came forth with some serious financial commitment,

76. C.O.691/82/46520/15/10/25, tele.d. 9/10.

77. C.O.691/79/44077/29/9/25, des.d. 2/9.

78. ibid.; Minute by Ormsby-Gore 7/10.

79. C.O. 691/79/47881/23/10/25, Minute by Ormsby-Gore 13/11.

Ormsby-Gore for one was not prepared to see millions being spent on a railway to allow German settlers to send raw materials to German markets.⁸⁰

The cost of the line caused other complications. In 1926 as part of the preparations for future union in East Africa, the Colonial Office had come to an agreement with the Treasury over Tanganyika's loan burden. The Treasury would relinquish close supervision over the finances of the Territory provided payment began of deferred interest charges on certain Imperial loans and the country ceased to require any Imperial grants-in-aid. Cameron protested in vain that freedom from Treasury control had been bought too dearly, and that the increased payments would retard the economic development of the country.⁸¹ Although funds to build the railway could have been obtained from the 1926 East African Guaranteed Loan, the Loan Act had not provided for an interest-free period and repayments automatically became the first charge on a colony's revenue.⁸² The construction of the south-west railway would make the Tanganyika government liable for between £5-6,000,000 in debt charges. Without an Imperial guarantee to cover the payment of interest charges, Tanganyika would face impoverishment.⁸³

A line which was so expensive to construct would have to become immediately profitable, and owing to the scattered African population, the south-west railway could only rely on extended white settlement. The situation bore an unpleasant resemblance to circumstances surrounding

80. C.O.691/83/49234/2/11/25, Minute by Strachey 28/11.

81. C.O.691/84/3636/20/3/26, tele.d. 19/4.

82. The problems of colonial loans are examined in D. Meredith; "The British Government and Colonial Economic Policy 1919-1939", Economic History Review, Vol.28(3) 1975.

83. Sir Donald Cameron; Speech before the Empire Parliamentary Association (C.O.Lib.) 7/7/27, p.9.

Table 7.Financial Position 1925-1931 (excluding railways)

Year	Revenue	Expenditure (Recurrent)	Surplus/ Deficit	Customs Dues and Taxes as Percentage Total Revenue	
	£	£		Customs	Taxes
1925-26	1,434,878	1,096,896	+337,982	35.8	42.0
1926-27	1,527,346	1,275,308	+252,038	37.1	41.4
1927-28	1,640,664	1,335,323	+305,341	38.8	39.0
1928-29	1,778,023	1,467,394	+310,629	39.5	37.6
1929-30	1,812,442	1,610,962	+201,480	41.0	36.6
1930-31	1,550,329	1,641,955	- 91,626	36.8	39.3

Capital Works Paid for From Surplus Balances

Year	Surplus	Capital Expenditure	Effect on Balance
1925-26	+337,982	-	+337,982
1926-27	+252,038	152,690	+ 99,348
1927-28	+305,341	186,806	+118,535
1928-29	+310,629	216,922	+ 93,707
1929-30	+201,480	296,605	- 95,125
1930-31	- 91,626	267,096	-358,722

Railways 1925-31

Year	Revenue (Recurrent)	Expenditure (Recurrent)	Surplus/ Deficit	Debt Charges as Percentage of Expenditure
	£	£		
1925-26	409,075	416,557	- 7,482	6.6
1926-27	500,488	484,559	+15,929	11.4
1927-28	617,810	555,890	+61,920	15.3
1928-29	736,296	652,516	+83,780	16.7
1929-30	803,550	777,175	+26,375	21.2
1930-31	884,277	796,144	+88,133	20.6

Source: Tanganyika Reports 1925-1937 and
Armitage-Smith Report.

the Kenya-Uganda railway before the war. The railway had been built first, and then settlement was encouraged in order to make the line pay. It was unanimously recognised in the Colonial Office that the policy had been a mistake and that small settlers made excessive demands both on the African population and on the colonial state. While statements of government policy could discriminate between small settlers and men with capital, it was not so easy to apply such distinctions in actual administration. The Tanganyika administration was faced with the dilemma of discouraging small settlers from the Southern Highlands while still providing favourable conditions to attract plantations and 'big' settlers with capital. The development of a community of small settlers and their importunate demands threatened to divert resources away from the re-organisation of native administration and the ultimate consolidation of the colonial state.

Cameron regarded native administration as his most essential work.⁸⁴ He was less interested in the economic organisation of African societies than in their political future as members of the colonial state. The creation and encouragement of Native Councils, Treasuries and Courts, the whole apparatus of Indirect Rule in Tanganyika, was designed in the Governor's words, to ensure "the political energies and ability of the people are directed towards the preservation and development of their own institutions."⁸⁵ By giving Africans a limited share in the administration, they would also acquire a stake in the preservation and maintenance of the colonial state. Thus would be formed a "bulwark against agitators."⁸⁶ By preserving and enlisting "on the side of law, order and

84. For the Governor's assessment of the importance of Native Administration see D. Cameron; "Position and Prospects in Tanganyika", Journal of the African Society, Vol.26(104) 1927.

85. Cameron; Tanganyika Service, p.95.

86. Cameron; Position and Prospects, p.321.

good government all responsible elements in native society" the administration would avert the "social chaos" arising out of the impact of the colonial economy.⁸⁷ Indirect Rule in Tanganyika was dedicated to control and to make it "possible for the other races occupying the Territory to pursue steadily and in security their lawful occupations, and to organise their industry in such a manner as to enable them to enlist that sufficiency of African labour without which their existence in this Territory would cease to be profitable."⁸⁸ Indirect Rule demanded responsibility and co-operation from European enterprise. The administration would not organise labour for settlers who could not 'organise their industry' in the manner approved by the government's policy. Cameron took a long term view of colonial rule and African societies and believed that by controlling change he could preserve what was 'best' for the Africans while eliminating what was worst for European enterprise. His zeal and depth of vision converted many of his officials to a "religious fervour" over Indirect Rule.⁸⁹ Cameron and his subordinates became convinced that the presence of small settlers would create another Kenya and break down the Governor's efforts to build a secure and stable future for the colonial state in Tanganyika.

After 1926 the policy of the Tanganyika administration began to change from the encouragement of limited white settlement to active opposition. The Kenya settlers were not interested in the future of Tanganyika or in peopling it with the 'right type'. Settlers, of any 'type' and as many as possible, would give Kenya and her supporters the loudest voice in deciding the form of any future federation. From the tone of a circular issued by Colonists Ltd., it

87. ibid., pp.321-322.

88. ibid.

89. For a 'converted' South African District Officer see M. Perham; East African Journey (London 1976), p.63; Sillery; op. cit. 12/12/25; C. Whybrow; Diaries (R.H.) 17/10/26 show the fervour of Tanganyika officials.

appeared Lord Delamere and his associates were not particularly worried about attracting men with capital to the Southern Highlands:

The development conditions are sound and easy of fulfilment by any *bona fide* settler. There is no doubt whatsoever but that the landowner of the Southern Highlands of Tanganyika can repeat the history of Kenya colony over again. With far less difficulties to face than had Kenya twenty-three years ago, profiting by her experience and avoiding her few mistakes she has made, the Southern Highlands of Tanganyika Territory should develop and progress within quite a short space of time.⁹⁰

The aim of British colonial policy was quite the reverse - the last thing the Colonial Office and the Tanganyika administration wanted to do was to imitate Kenya. Despite the interpretation of Sir Edward Grigg and the Kenya settlers, the Dual Policy was not intended to be simply another name for settler domination. After 1926 it appeared to the Tanganyika administration that the federation of the East African territories would entail the acceptance of the Kenya interpretation throughout East Africa.

Sir Edward Grigg had been sent to Kenya by Amery to prepare the way for federation in East Africa. In any form of Closer Union, Tanganyika appeared as the "junction state" of East Africa and the attitude of its administration would make or mar the federation.⁹¹ In January 1927 at the Mombasa Governor's Conference Grigg told Cameron exactly what form Closer Union would take. He explained that as the Dual Policy accepted white settlement as a permanent factor in East Africa, constitutional power would eventually pass from the Secretary of State to the European communities of Kenya and Tanganyika.⁹² Federation would create the 'Great White State' with a European

90. East Africa 7/7/27, p.85.

91. Walker Papers (R.H.) Grigg to Amery 11/6/26.

92. C.O.822/5/17126/ Imperial Policy in East Africa: Memorandum by Sir Edward Grigg 5/4/27.

population of half a million. In such circumstances Kenya was the model Tanganyika should follow and her African population would have to be placed in reserves.

Cameron was not opposed to Closer Union as such and indeed may have looked forward to an opportunity to spread his policy of Native Administration throughout East Africa.⁹³ But he was incensed by the Kenya conception of Closer Union and its implication that the Kenya settlers would dominate East Africa. The proposals seemed utterly detrimental to the future of Tanganyika. Cameron wrote angrily to the Colonial Office:

Tanganyika, like Uganda, was primarily a native country and land alienation went on in spite of that, not to further the dreams of the Kenya settlers ... Native policy as adopted in Tanganyika recently represents the first real effort which has been made in South or East Africa to deal, at the beginning of a country's British administration, with a problem which is now highly embarrassing in both owing to a lack of policy and political foresight.⁹⁴

The Territory ought to be left to work out her own salvation without interference from "weak administration in a neighbouring colony."⁹⁵ The Governor rejected even a loose federation and asserted that if a decisive statement were made by the British government safeguarding native interests and present policy in Tanganyika, the interest of Kenya in the Territory would quickly evaporate. The Colonial Office reflected that if Cameron's attitude was parochial and based solely on the viewpoint of Tanganyika, then Grigg's proposals with their emphasis on unofficial majorities and constitutional change simply mirrored political pressures in Nairobi. Constitutional changes would revive the question of

93. Whybrow reported a strong rumour in October 1926 that Cameron was to be made Governor of Kenya with Lieutenant Governors placed under him. Whybrow; op. cit. 17/10/26.

94. C.O.822/5/17126/ Memorandum by Sir Donald Cameron 1/5/27.

95. ibid.

Indian rights in Kenya and seriously delay Closer Union, although the settlers had made it clear in the past that they would not participate in any union without such changes. The Colonial Office decided that Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia would have to be included in the federation, to prevent Kenya from dominating the smaller arrangement.⁹⁶

In an endeavour to obtain some measure of agreement, Amery summoned the Governors of all the colonies concerned to a Colonial Office conference in London in June 1927. The Secretary of State began with a concession to Cameron, by approving the building up of local administration by Africans in all the East African territories. Amery eventually secured a general concurrence from all present that some form of federation was desirable in the future. An attempt to go into further detail produced chaos. Amery and Grigg favoured the appointment of a High Commissioner over all the East African colonies as a prelude to Federation. Cameron absolutely refused to surrender either the Tanganyika railways or the customs revenue to a High Commissioner who was also the Governor of one of the territories. Ormsby-Gore opposed the grant of unofficial majorities in the Legislative Councils as compromising the position of a High Commissioner. Grigg protested that without unofficial majorities, too much power and responsibility would be vested in one individual. Strachey suggested that it was politically desirable to avoid any idea of Tanganyika - "a prosperous native state on the Nigerian model" - being forced to follow Kenya. Ormsby-Gore pointed out that the Kenya settlers would have to be favourably treated, otherwise Northern Rhodesia might be frightened off Federation. The Governor of Northern Rhodesia demanded the construction of the southwest railway to link the colonies as a prerequisite to Federation. The conference ended in

96. ibid.; Minute by Ormsby-Gore 16/5/27.

a complete impasse. Even Amery's suggestion to appoint a High Commissioner as an interim measure foundered on disagreements over the power, finances and location of the office.⁹⁷

As an effective counter to Grigg's ideal of the 'Great White State' Cameron seized on the obligations of the Mandate and the responsibility of the Tanganyika government to the League of Nations. Although when it suited him the Governor could claim he was "oblivious to the Mandate as nothing in it conflicted with the system of British colonial administration",⁹⁸ when his colonial policies came under threat he emphasised the sacred, inviolate and solemn duties imposed by the Mandate on the Tanganyika administration. Grigg and his allies had no doubts about Cameron's ability as an administrator and conceded that colonial policies followed within Tanganyika were largely correct for that Territory.⁹⁹ What puzzled them was Cameron's insistence that Tanganyika was "a peculiar and exceptional territory responsible in some way to authorities outside the Empire", and surrounded by "a sort of Chinese wall ... which he appears to think essential to the administrative progress on which his whole heart is set at the present time."¹⁰⁰ Cameron told Lugard he had threatened to resign if Closer Union went ahead over his objections.¹⁰¹ The Governor's connections

97. Minutes of the meeting are in C.O.822/5/17167/9/6/27.

98. Cameron; Address to the Empire Parliamentary Association 25/3/31 (C.O.Lib.) p.7.

99. Walker Papers (R.H.) Walker to Oldham 22/5/26; Grigg to Hankey 25/3/26. Oldham reported that Amery had "a good deal of personal confidence in Cameron which is quite compatible ... with a hearty belief in Grigg". Oldham to Walker 15/6/26.

100. Walker Papers (R.H.) Grigg to Amery 1/10/26, and also C.O.691/84/6382/16/8/26 des.d. 22/7 by Grigg.

101. Perham; Lugard, p.670.

with the Labour Party and with businessmen such as Sir Sydney Henn made it impossible to replace him with someone more compliant.¹⁰² The policy of Native Administrators, incorporating African rulers into the lower levels of the colonial state, was seen by Cameron as essential for the continued survival of British administration in a relatively new colony. European enterprises would not extract raw materials without the guarantees of security and profitability and this would limit the expansion of the colonial economy. Unlike the Kenya administration Cameron's regime endeavoured to provide such guarantees without the instability and disruption brought by settler production. His actions in Tanganyika received the full support of the Colonial Office, including the backing of the Secretary of State.¹⁰³ Although Closer Union might be considered desirable, its execution would always be severely hampered by the knowledge within the Colonial Office that, for the purposes of colonial rule, Cameron was right and the settlers were wrong.

While the Governor personally led the fight against Closer Union, the Tanganyika administration evolved strategies to limit the numbers of small settlers in the Territory. The first strategy was the adoption of the same criteria used to limit the expansion of African cash crop production. No land would be alienated unless it was within range of suitable transport.¹⁰⁴ White settlement would be confined to the few areas of the Southern Highlands possessing roads. The second policy was to encourage investment in Tanganyika by large capital enterprises. As the Governor observed, the African whether peasant producer or wage labourer was ultimately dependent on the application of capital from overseas to employ him or market his

102. *ibid.*; p.670, and Walker Papers (R.H.) Walker to Hankey 22/6/26.

103. Throughout the Colonial Office correspondence Amery gives no sign of disapproving of Cameron's policies in Tanganyika. See note 99.

104. C.O.822/5/17133/ Memorandum to East Africa Trade and Information Office 29/3/27.

produce.¹⁰⁵ In the opinion of officials big business could be trusted to co-operate with the colonial state and behave in a responsible manner towards African labour. Large companies could operate without massive assistance from state finance and the diversion of state resources, without the drastic impact of small white settlers. The sisal plantation fulfilled almost all these requirements. The production of sisal demanded capital, extensive acreage of low lying land and a large and regular supply of African labour. Owing to the existence of small plantations with a precarious financial base, the industry required some control by the colonial state to avoid the worst abuses of African labour. In return the sisal industry was to receive the full support of the Tanganyika administration. In 1925, after a report by Major Orde-Browne, a Labour Department was established in the Territory.¹⁰⁶ Its aim was to make labour more 'efficient' by supervision of contracts and working hours, and to regulate the labour force by prosecutions under the Master and Servants Ordinance. To ensure that migrant labour arrived at the plantations fit and ready for work after the walk from the hinterland, rest camps were set up at various stages along the route. The co-operation between the Labour Department and the sisal estates was so close as to prompt one observer to protest that labour in Tanganyika received no protection at all from the government of the Territory.¹⁰⁷

The period of Cameron's administration were the best years for the sisal plantations up to the Second World War. The labour supply remained steady, wages remained low and the price of sisal stayed high on the London market. Some firms made considerable profits and expanded production.¹⁰⁸

105. Tanganyika Territory; Report on Labour by Major Orde-Browne, pp.12-13, des.d. 24/2/26 by Cameron.

106. ibid.

107. Buell; op. cit., p.498.

108. East Africa 22/7/26, p.949 quotes estates making profits of £50,000 and £100,000 since the war.

The sisal plant was almost immune to the droughts and locusts which ravaged African cash crops in many parts of the Territory. The production of sisal came to dominate the colonial economy and provide the administration with a large percentage of revenue. (See Table 4). Sisal enabled Tanganyika's exports to surpass those of Kenya in value, and allowed Cameron to comment patronisingly: "it therefore causes us some little amusement but no apprehension when our delightful neighbours across the border threaten to swallow us at one small gulp."¹⁰⁹ It was important that the colonial economy of Tanganyika should show a profit without white settlement, and also without expanding African cash crops to a point where they might menace tribal stability. In an address to the Empire Parliamentary Association in July 1927 Cameron systematically dismissed settler crops such as coffee and tobacco as unprofitable failures and described African cotton production as unstable and unsuccessful. The Governor's praise was reserved for the sisal industry. While he could hold out no hope for white settlement there was any amount of opportunity for investment in sisal. Any attempt to attract large numbers of British settlers to the Territory would simply bring ten Germans to every Briton.¹¹⁰

Delamere's second Unofficial Conference met at Livingstone in Northern Rhodesia in September 1926. Although Cameron urbanely telegraphed his best wishes, the settler delegates were puzzled and annoyed by the attitude of the Tanganyika administration. As land alienation was declared to be dependent on transport, the settlers so far had little of either. Land alienation in Tanganyika was already a slow, time-consuming and potentially costly business involving a complex series of surveys, applications and auctions. The delegates demanded the construction of the south-west railway, and the intro-

109. D. Cameron; "The Economic Development of Tanganyika Territory", East Africa 27/5/26, p.11.

110. Cameron; Empire Parliamentary Association, p.18.

duction of a scheme for settling ex-soldiers. They decided responsibility for the slow start in Tanganyika rested entirely on the intrigues of the Colonial Office.¹¹¹ The settler leaders Lord Delamere and Lord Francis Scott were reported to be privately "most disappointed in Cameron, who had promised all sorts of things to help white settlement but is not just doing nothing but acting to prevent it."¹¹²

The encouragement of big business was another matter. The possibility that Tanganyika could become a mining country received active encouragement from the Tanganyika administration. British companies were interested in the Sekenke goldmines and Ufipa coalfields. An Oppenheimer Company was investigating the extension of the Katanga copper belt into south-west Tanganyika and South African companies were reported to be enquiring into gold on the Lupa river. To encourage exploration, the Tanganyika government revised the Mining Ordinance to permit the granting of exclusive mining rights over large areas of territory. The administration rejected criticism by the Imperial Institute that the new legislation discriminated against small prospectors.¹¹³ Men with little capital were not welcome in Tanganyika. To confirm the correctness of his policy Cameron only had to forward to the Colonial Office the protests of the Moshi settlers over African coffee. Settlers in the Northern Province were convinced the administration was able but unwilling to suppress arabica coffee cultivation among the Chagga. The administration could easily rebut such criticism and the settlers' wilder demands only confirmed the view of the Colonial Office that settler production was troublesome, inefficient and incompatible with successful African

111. Minutes of the Second Unofficial Conference Livingstone-Victoria Falls (R.H.) 3/9/26-12/9/26.

112. Walker Papers (R.H.) Walker to Hankey 22/6/26.

113. C.O.691/94/29008/13/1/27; 101/29293/ des.d. 30/11/28.

cultivation of cash crops.¹¹⁴

To attract large companies to Tanganyika, Cameron favoured the creation of controlled agencies, companies in which the government was included as an active partner. Controlled agencies permitted a degree of administrative supervision over company activities, provided certain guarantees for investors and circumvented the Mandate's injunction against the granting of monopolies to private companies. In England Cameron personally distributed a circular seeking wealthy syndicates to develop the cotton and rice areas of the Kilombero Valley along the lines of the Gezira scheme in the Sudan, the latter being the model controlled agency during the inter-war period.¹¹⁵ The Tanganyika government had no scruples over the Land Ordinance when it came to alienating large blocks of land. After a question by an irate Colonel Wedgwood in the House of Commons, it was revealed that Colonel Arthur Fawcus, a wealthy Kenya settler, had been granted a total of 50,000 acres near Iringa (in legal sections of 5,000 apiece) for pastoral purposes. The Colonial Office noted the deal was certainly in contravention of the spirit, if not the letter of the Land Ordinance.¹¹⁶

Even white settlement in Tanganyika would be permitted if undertaken by a large company. Cameron had suggested all land alienation be controlled by a Land Board staffed by the nominees of the Lord Chancellor, the Archbishop of Canterbury and other metropolitan dignitaries.¹¹⁷ After this proposal was turned down the

114. Cameron had no hesitation over expressing doubts about the future of European settlement to the Permanent Mandates Commission, much to the fury of the Moshi settlers. C.O.691/88/18168, Meeting of P.M.C. 23/6/27 and letter in East Africa 23/2/28, p.765 repudiating the Governor's views.

115. C.O.691/93/18517/11/10/27.

116. C.O.691/94/29041, Parliamentary Question 18/7/27; 102/X29386/ des.d. 15/4/30.

117. C.O.691/94/29041/ Memorandum d. 14/11/28. Cameron wanted the Land Board to divert attacks on government land policy. Ormsby-Gore did not like the idea at all. Minute 11/3/28.

Governor indicated he would accept a settlement company sponsoring and being entirely responsible for small settlers, along the lines of the 1820 Association in South Africa.¹¹⁸ A similar scheme had been presented to the Colonial Office by General Sir Hubert Gough in June 1927. The Colonial Office was cautious; Tanganyika was not asking for settlers, only for a few of the 'right type' with capital. The Territory sought investment and estate personnel for the sisal plantations but otherwise "we are some years off the small settler in T.T."¹¹⁹ Cameron was perhaps more aware of settler discontent over land alienation and he was more sympathetic to Gough's company, provided it had sufficient capital to take full financial responsibility for any settlers. When finance appeared to be lacking, Cameron finished the idea by pointing out a similar opportunity would, under the Mandate, have to be granted to a German company. The de Ropp proposals would revive and Germans would infiltrate the country.¹²⁰

The administration's distinction between big and small capital confused its opponents. Some believed the lack of support for white settlement was due to the stubborn attitudes of officials left over from Byatt's "Giraffe" administration.¹²¹ The Joint East Africa Board could not agree on a suitable settlement policy for Tanganyika, and its spokesmen thought the terms of the Mandate forced the Tanganyika government to oppose white settlement.¹²² The Permanent Under-Secretary at the

118. The 1820 Memorial Settlement Scheme was a land agency selecting and assisting approved settlers. See Round Table, Vol.12(1) 1922-23 for a description.

119. C.O.691/92/18479/ Minutes by Strachey 27/7/27, and Ormsby-Gore 27/7.

120. C.O.691/96/29060/ des.d. 6/7/28.

121. See a letter from Conrad Walsh in East Africa 21/4/27, p.965.

122. C.O.691/96/29060/ J.E.A.B. meeting 20/7/28.

MAP VI

Tanganyika Territory: Land Alienation 1930



Source: G.F. Sayers (ed.); The Handbook of Tanganyika Territory (London 1930), p.242.

Colonial Office, Sir Samuel Wilson, confided that "Cameron's sympathy with White Settlement is only limited by his desire to avoid the Labour problem and to prevent settlement outrunning transport."¹²³ Writing in East Africa Sir Alfred Sharpe attributed the slow rate of settlement in Tanganyika to the unfavourable conditions when compared to the Dominions. Tanganyika had no freehold land, land values were too high, the country was not even a proper colony and then there was "malaria, Native questions, tsetse fly, lions, leopards etc."¹²⁴ If the Tanganyika government treated the settler not as a troublesome intruder but as a valuable asset and provided him with land, transport and African labour, then men with only £2,000 capital could comfortably settle in the Tanganyika highlands.

Only other settlers and their supporters believed white settlers were a valuable asset in East Africa. In January 1928 the Tanganyika administration made its intentions more clear by a new policy on land alienation. Instead of potential settlers selecting their own land and then seeking administrative approval, the government would survey farms of a minimum 2,000 acres and put them up for auction. It would not permit "a number of what may be called small people with little capital to go down there [the Southern Highlands] and take up small farms, picking the eyes out of the country in anticipation of the time when railway facilities will be available."¹²⁵ Although a further 50,000 acres were released for alienation in the Mufundi and Mbozi areas, the decision to standardise farms at 2,000 acres was described as "practically the knock-out blow for all would-be settlers in the area."¹²⁶ The main settler crop in the Southern Highlands was coffee, and in Kenya the maximum size for a coffee estate was 500 acres.

123. Walker Papers (R.H.) Wilson to Walker 22/12/27.

124. The letter from Sir Alfred Sharpe is in East Africa 29/9/27, p.41.

125. Quoted in East Africa 5/4/28, p.985.

126. "Settlement in Southern Tanganyika", East Africa 26/4/28, p.985.

To plant, harvest and transport 2,000 acres of coffee and generally meet the development conditions demanded by the lease would require substantial capital. To attract this category of settlers, the Tanganyika government for the first time advertised land auctions in the British press.¹²⁷ Protests by the settlers made little headway against the approval of the Colonial Office.

In London an angry Lord Cranworth accused the Tanganyika representatives on the Joint East Africa Board of complacency and neglect towards the expansion of white settlement within the Territory.¹²⁸ The Tanganyika planters and their delegates on the Board were not convinced of the advantages of expanded white settlement. Adjacent to the Southern Highlands lay the Songea region, the home of Ngoni migrants highly valued on the sisal plantations. While plantation owners might support a form of Closer Union and the consolidation of European production in Tanganyika, greater settlement and closer association with Kenya could compete for the supply of African labour. The work force available to the sisal plantations was adequate and well-organised and planters had no wish to see it diverted to a flourishing settler community. Tanganyika had a large Indian commercial community and a European population of mixed nationalities. None of these were necessarily sympathetic to the aspirations of British settlers in Kenya.¹²⁹ The mixed and uncertain support of Closer Union by the non-African population of Tanganyika was the reason why the Kenya settlers had so assiduously sought to increase British settlement in Tanganyika.

While the administration limited the numbers of small settlers within Tanganyika, the threat of Closer

127. East Africa 27/9/28, p.39.

128. "Lord Cranworth Speaks Out", East Africa 15/11/28, editorial.

129. A conference of unofficial associations meeting at Dodoma had 21 hours of debate over government settlement policy, without coming to any conclusions. East Africa 27/12/28, p.458.

Union on Kenyan terms began to recede. After the failure of the 1927 Colonial Office conference, Amery appointed Sir Edward Hilton-Young to lead a Commission to East Africa and report on the means of accomplishing Closer Union. His colleagues - Sir George Schuster, Sir Reginald Mant and J.H. Oldham - were chosen to deal with any difficulties arising from the financial, Indian or missionary points of view. Instead the Commission was divided and, as Grigg complained, investigated not how to bring about Closer Union but whether it should be brought about at all.¹³⁰ The Commission agreed a single native policy was essential to Closer Union and then disagreed over which policy was preferable. The co-ordination of native policy was left to a High Commissioner but the rest of the Commission's report was vague and included a minority report from the Chairman.¹³¹ The idea of a High Commissioner with unspecified powers to co-ordinate policy created alarm throughout East Africa.¹³²

After the emphasis on native policy in the report of the Hilton-Young Commission, Cameron was able to attend the 1929 Colonial Office conference with far less apprehension over the outcome of Closer Union. The Kenya settlers would not accept federation without the constitutional changes to guarantee them supremacy. Neither Cameron nor Grigg would accept Amery's arguments over the economic benefits of Closer Union. On Cameron's enquiry Amery confirmed that present policy in Tanganyika was a success and should be continued.¹³³ Amery was hardly then in a position to reverse his decision and

130. Altrincham; op. cit., pp.214-218.

131. Great Britain: Parliamentary Papers; Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa Cmd.3234 1929.

132. Walker commented to Oldham that the thing about the Hilton-Young Commission report was that "it appears to be more disliked as time goes by." Walker Papers (R.H.) Walker to Oldham 11/10/29.

133. C.O.822/12/25201/6, Meeting on Closer Union 15/2/29.

push the Kenya interpretation through a reluctant Cabinet, much to the disgust of Sir Edward Grigg.¹³⁴

While in London Cameron received a standing ovation from a meeting of the East African Section of the London Chamber of Commerce. Introducing the Governor, the Chairman Sir Humphrey Leggett summarised Tanganyika's contribution to British trade since Sir Donald had taken over: imports had increased by 66%, exports by 125%, and 54% of this valuable trade was British. Cameron seemed taken aback by the applause and warmth of his welcome but proceeded to affirm his belief in the importance of attracting British capital to the Territory. He explained the reasons for his success: "in view of the network of Native administrations I can exercise a quite proper and extended influence in inducing the people to become producers."¹³⁵ The more Africans earned from the sale of their produce, the more they were encouraged to buy British goods. After passing on a warning of the threat to labour supplies from settlement in the Southern Highlands, the Governor departed amid assurances of full support and with the warm and enthusiastic thanks of the Section. Cameron replied "that nothing did him more good than to attend such gatherings and thus get in touch with the people whom he served."¹³⁶ A large section of British commercial interests in East Africa obviously approved of Cameron's policies and of the raw materials exported from Tanganyika. The Governor returned to Tanganyika with renewed confidence and ready to go on the offensive against settler production and Kenyan interference.

The policy of establishing Native Administrations and restraining both settler and African cash crop production had apparently balanced profits and security, though most of the profit went to the sisal plantations. The only

134. Grigg thought Amery should have threatened to resign unless Closer Union was approved. Altrincham; *op. cit.*, pp.211,214.

135. "Sir Donald Cameron Talks of Tanganyika", East Africa 28/2/29, pp.755-759.

136. ibid.

area of turmoil was the Kilimanjaro area where the Chagga and European settlers competed over coffee production. The spread of coffee on the mountain and the activities of the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association (K.N.P.A.) appeared to the district administration as a threat to tribal authority and the position of the Native Administration. Late in 1928 rumours that the administration would attempt to limit coffee production on Kilimanjaro and abolish the K.N.P.A. led to angry meetings among the Chagga. Charles Dundas was sent to investigate and the arrival of the man the settlers believed responsible for Chagga coffee in the first place brought mass meetings in Moshi hotels. The settlers petitioned the Colonial Office for Cameron's immediate recall. The Colonial Office dismissed the petition as "utter rubbish" and feared a clash between "the most highly developed and intelligent natives in the Territory and the least responsible and least educated Europeans."¹³⁷ Cameron analysed the settlers' submission with such brutal and public contempt that the Colonial Office warned him about inflaming the situation by being "too ready to secure debating triumphs and to prove his opponents fools or worse."¹³⁸ With the settlers so hostile Cameron was unwilling to limit African coffee production by interfering with K.N.P.A., though within a year the administration acted to weaken the power and finances of the Association and bring it under control of the Chagga Native Administration.¹³⁹

The so-called 'Moshi incident' with the settlers saw Cameron's policies triumph yet again. In 1930 Smuts gave his full support to the system of Native Administration in his Rhodes Lectures,¹⁴⁰ and Cameron was able to state

137. C.O.691/102/X29356/ des.d. 8/1/29, Minute by Machtig 24/7.

138. C.O.691/104/X29505/ des.d. 11/6/30, Minute by Seel 15/7.

139. For the early history of the K.N.P.A. S. Rogers; "The Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association: Administrative Responses to Chagga Initiatives in the 1920s" *Transafrican Journal of History* Vol 4. (1e2) 1974.

140. Smuts; op. cit., pp.78-87. Mitchell commented

confidently that his system was so firmly entrenched among the African population as to be ineradicable by subsequent administrations.¹⁴¹ The Governor took to baiting the settlers by appointing a committee to consider schemes of financial assistance for settlers and planters. Predictably the committee recommended an 1820 scheme, looser land laws and subsidies to assist European immigration and Cameron then sank it with the familiar arguments of finance and German infiltration. While the government was not opposed to settlement "in a cautious and prudent manner", settler crops had either failed or remained experimental, settlers around Iringa were in financial straits, sisal "the premier and most valuable industry in the country" would lose labour and German infiltration would be encouraged by concessions.¹⁴² It was all a very useful reminder to the Colonial Office of the evils of white settlement.

The confidence of the administration increased as it became apparent that the dream of Closer Union was fading. Amery's emissary Sir Samuel Wilson was sent to East Africa to try and salvage some agreement and a workable plan from the Hilton-Young Report. His departure was delayed until Amery gave assurances to Cabinet that any agreement would be subject to their approval regardless of any promises to the Kenya settlers.¹⁴³ Wilson's report returned decisions on native policy back to the Secretary of State and the respective Governors and his plan for Closer Union included only common economic services. By the time Wilson returned the government had changed and Sidney Webb - as Lord Passfield - had become Secretary

F.n. 140 continued.

that Smuts' lectures had led the settler leaders to support the government's native policy though this was not from "any intelligent & instructed thought on their part." Mitchell; Diaries (R.H.) 16/12/29.

141. Cameron; Tanganyika Service, pp.227-228.

142. C.O.691/107/296005/ des.d. 15/3/30.

143. R. Gregory; Sidney Webb and East Africa (Berkley 1962), p.76.

of State.¹⁴⁴ Cameron approved as he believed Amery had been far too inclined to be "led by the nose by Sir Edward Grigg."¹⁴⁵ His approval of Passfield quickly ebbed, with the publication of the 1930 White Papers on East Africa. In reviving the idea of a High Commissioner with control over native policy "Lord Passover", in Cameron's words, "had almost sold the fort to Sir Edward Grigg."¹⁴⁶ The second White Paper Memorandum on Native Policy supported Native Administration and the incorporation of the African as a member of the state, but its revival of the word 'paramountcy' without a mention of Europeans created a furore among the settlers in East Africa. The Dual Policy seemed abandoned in favour of a return to the West Coast ideas of the last decade.¹⁴⁷

Passfield had no intention of abandoning the Dual Policy - the omission of any mention of European enterprise from the White Paper had been a regrettable oversight.¹⁴⁸ His interpretation of the Dual Mandate essentially agreed with Cameron's in favouring large scale enterprise over the demands of the small settlers.¹⁴⁹ To resolve the question of Closer Union Passfield proposed to submit the problem to a Joint Select Committee of both Houses. Although the Secretary of State assured Grigg that Parliamentary authority would be essential to push Closer

144. Delamere was apparently disgusted that Cameron's "friends had got in." Henn Papers (R.H.) Cameron to Henn 29/6/29.

145. ibid.

146. M. Perham; Journey, p.45.

147. Great Britain: Parliamentary Papers; Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa Cmd.3573 1930.

148. C.O.822/45/27053/8/1/31.

149. In an address to the African Society Passfield described parts of Africa as being seen in a new light; as a plantation redeemed from barbarism by European enterprise and capital. Journal of the African Society, Vol.29(117), p.533.

Union through Cabinet,¹⁵⁰ its supporters saw the Joint Committee as a prelude to defeat. Hilton-Young wrote despairingly: "I do not see how Charles Buxton and Lord Cranworth are to meet in any common opinion."¹⁵¹ Grigg decided Closer Union would have to "mark time ... until a new Government of the Right comes into power."¹⁵²

Cameron looked forward to the meetings of the Joint Committee. The settlers would have to state publicly what they wanted and he could destroy any of their arguments. The Governor's evidence to the Committee fully confirmed his administration's alliance with plantation agriculture. Sisal was apparently the joint product of native and non-native effort, the epitome of the Dual Policy. As for the settlers, Cameron put forward a scheme to separate the settler from the African areas, grant the highlands self-government and allow the Tanganyika administration to take over the remaining areas of Kenya. The settlers could then be controlled by restrictions on labour and be made more responsible in their attitude towards the colonial economy. Already the Mwanza, Tabora, Bukoba, and Lindi areas in Tanganyika had been proclaimed homogenous native districts - though they were still open not for settlement but for development by businesses with capital.¹⁵³

Under the government's criterion of proximity to suitable transport, African cash crop production had become largely confined to areas either on the railway or close to the coast. Backed by the income from coffee and groundnut

150. Walker Papers (R.H.) Walker to Hilton-Young 30/8/29.

151. ibid.; Hilton-Young to Walker 7/2/31.

152. ibid.; Grigg to Walker 7/2/31.

153. C.O.691/107/29610/ Sub.File F. des.d. 15/3/30. For Cameron looking forward to the settlers stating "what they meant." Perham; Journey, p.44. The settlers appeared to have become understandably reticent about discussing native policy with the Governor.

production, districts such as Shinyanga and Bukoba possessed Native Administrations termed 'progressive' - anxious for medicine, schools, roads and improved agriculture. They were the showplaces of Indirect Rule.¹⁵⁴ In contrast the Native Administrations of labour areas such as Kasulu and Songea appeared to the government to be lacking in will-power and energy, and further justified administrative support for the 'progressive areas'.¹⁵⁵ Although coffee crops had been destroyed by government order in Kasulu, the administration was quite capable of encouraging cash crops in labour areas once a 'sound' Native Administration had become established.¹⁵⁶ In order to compete with settler production and withdraw labour from their estates, African production of tobacco and coffee was encouraged around the labour areas of Kasulu, Songea, Mbulu and Tukuyu in the late 1920s.¹⁵⁷ As long as a strong Native Administration was at hand to control the social effects of cash crop production, the administration would provide support, especially where such production could compete with settler agriculture. Cameron had always maintained he was puzzled by the priorities expressed in the Mandate that put material before social and political well-being.¹⁵⁸

154. Visits to Tabora and Mwanza were high on the itinerary of any visitors. Perham; Journey, pp.54-87; "Parliamentarians Report on Tanganyika", East Africa 13/12/28, pp.390-393; 20/12/28, pp.418-420; 27/12/28, pp.450-452; and J. Huxley; Africa View (New York 1968), p.106.


155. E.L. Leakey; Interview by J.J. Tawney (R.H.) 12/10/66 on conditions in Kasulu.

156. See for example Sturdey; Interview by J.J. Tawney (R.H.) 26/8/69 for efforts with coffee in Kasulu 1927-1929 and E.K. Lumley; Forgotten Mandate (London 1976), p.27 for coffee being destroyed at Kibondo.

157. Tanganyika Territory; Report for 1927, pp.82-83; Report for 1928, pp.72-73.

158. C.O.691/89/18168/ Meeting of P.M.C. 24/6/27, p.61.

Tanganyika Territory: Southwest Railways
Proposed by the 1930 Railway Commission



Source: "Sir Sydney Henn's Arresting Address",
East Africa 4/12/30, p.380.

The final economic blow to the prospects of white settlement had come with the 1930 Railway Commission, appointed by the Governor to decide how to use the newly available Colonial Development Fund for railway construction in Tanganyika. Cameron persuaded an old friend Sir Sdney Henn to chair the Commission. As a former Chairman of the Joint East Africa Board, Henn was most acceptable to the European settlers. He also had a financial interest in the development of the cotton areas of the Kilombero Valley along Gezira lines.¹⁵⁹ Not surprisingly, the Commission found "the most promising of all railway projects in Tanganyika" to be a branch line from Kilosa on the Central railway to the Kilombero Valley. The idea of an 'imperial link' with the railways of Nyasaland was rejected as it was unlikely the Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland governments would build a railway which permitted Tanganyika to compete for their copper traffic. In spite of the protests of Henn and Chitale the Indian member, the settler representatives on the Commission included a shortened version of the Delamere line as the third priority for future construction.¹⁶⁰ It was a final, desperate effort by the settlers to ensure a new Kenya in the Southern Highlands. Although Henn gave assurances that the government seriously considered settlement, Cameron had declared that the Iringa region and the Southern Highlands would be developed by road transport. Roads in Tanganyika were crude and vulnerable to the weather, and road transport an expensive means of evacuating settler produce. The government's final blow came in the publication of the Land Survey Report for the Iringa area in 1930. The Commissioner responsible F.J. Bagshawe had been chosen by the government for his cautious and pains-

159. Henn Papers (R.H.) Henn to Cameron 10/10/30; Cameron to Henn 14/11/30.

160. C.O.691/108/29619 Sub.File A des.d. 28/10/20; East Africa 4/12/30, pp.379-381.

taking qualities.¹⁶¹ In his report Bagshawe proclaimed that the soundest defence against unrest was a contented peasantry left with enough land for their future use. Of the 6,000 square miles in the district he recommended 78 for immediate alienation. The report brought bitter attacks from the Tanganyika press: the country needed thousands, not hundreds of farmers and it was ridiculous to leave some of the finest agricultural land in the world in the hands of some of "the most indolent, drunken and insolent tribes in Africa."¹⁶² It was all in vain. Appearing before the Joint Select Committee Cameron was confident that the settler would shortly disappear from the Iringa area. The settler leader Major William Lead tried to explain to the Committee that while there was no definite restriction or prohibition of alienation of land, there was a definite want of encouragement by the Tanganyika government and it was all very difficult to define.¹⁶³ Cameron's administration continued to receive the full support of the Colonial Office. While East Africa's readers were horrified by the Governor's comments,¹⁶⁴ the Under-Secretary of State Drummond Shiels commented: "It is fine to have a Governor like Sir Donald Cameron and I hope his successor will have the same backbone ..."¹⁶⁵

Cameron's remarks before the Joint Select Committee

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161. Margey Perham commented on Bagshawe: "I think I was right to suspect that Sir Donald chose him well as a wet blanket on extensive white settlement." Perham; Journey, p.99. Results of the Tanganyika Land Surveys are summarised in L.P. Mair; Native Policies in Africa (New York 1969), pp.142-143.
162. C.O.691/113/30002/ des.d. 9/12/30 and cuttings from Tanganyika Standard 25/9/30. See also East Africa 7/11/29, p.238.
163. Great Britain: Parliamentary Papers; Joint Parliamentary Committee on Closer Union in East Africa H.C. No.136 1931. Evidence of Major W.C. Lead and Major H. Bown, pp.268-269.
164. East Africa 2/4/31 Editorial.
165. C.O.691/113/3002/ Minute by Shiels 25/2/31.

were his last as Governor of Tanganyika. His regime had accomplished one of the most remarkable acts of political consolidation in colonial Africa. No matter how diverse, obscure or rudimentary, tribal authority in parts of Tanganyika had been assimilated into the colonial state. The Native Administrations thereby inherited many of the dilemmas of the colonial rule without the power to resolve them. Cameron did not intend his system to last for ever but only to act as a means of controlling change for a few generations. The Governor still saw it as essential work and he would not permit policies and resources to be diverted by extensive white settlement. The settlers had been defeated by the policy of the administration and by its alliance with big capital both in the Territory and in London. In Tanganyika the prosperity of the sisal industry had given the colonial economy economic security and the ability to resist claims that white settlement was the only sure way of developing the country. The extension of settlement had been opposed not only by planters but by the firms marketing African cash crops. Mercantile capital in London and in Dar-es-Salaam was not prepared to subsidise small settlers, and the East African Section of the London Chamber of Commerce fully supported Cameron's policies. Sir Humphrey Leggett's evidence before the Joint Select Committee contained such a scathing attack on white settlement that he later acquired the reputation of a humanitarian devoted to African interests.¹⁶⁶

Although the interaction between the Colonial Office and the Tanganyika administration was limited by Cameron's distrust of successive Secretaries of State, the Colonial Office had generally given the Governor its backing. The

166. Great Britain: Parliamentary Papers; Joint Committee Appendix 10: Memorandum by Sir Humphrey Leggett. Leggett's British East African Corporation was closely involved in African cotton. For his 'humanitarianism' Gregory; op. cit., p.97.

administration's policies of declaring labour reserves, limiting African cash crops and resisting white settlement had produced an apparent harmony between the two parts of the Dual Policy. Sisal plantation and African cash crops co-existed in the colonial economy of Tanganyika, to the benefit of a range of European enterprise.

However the Tanganyika government had failed in its efforts to attract the investment of large companies. The only large companies in the Territory were concentrated in the sisal industry. Although the Tanganyika government obtained a wide range of metropolitan and local support to defeat Closer Union and the dreams of the settlers, such support was a temporary combination of sections of British capital, unified by an opposition to settler domination. When the crisis came, the Tanganyika government would be betrayed by its dependence on sisal.

Chapter 4SIR STEWART SYMES AND THE POLICY OF SURVIVAL

The departure of Sir Donald Cameron was greatly mourned by many chiefs and most officials.¹ It must have seemed like the end of an era. The settler's dream of the 'Great White State' had been defeated. The meetings of the Joint Select Committee had shown the extent of the forces arrayed against Closer Union. The Committee indefinitely postponed Federation and left ultimate control over East Africa in the hands of the Imperial government.² In 1930 the East African economies began to feel the effects of the world-wide depression. Any large expenditure on Closer Union was impossible in a time of shrinking government revenues. Lord Passfield observed: "economy is now the watchword everywhere."³ Only Colonel Walker, the Secretary of the Governor's Conference, remained optimistic about Closer Union and he looked forward to the arrival of a new set of Governors in East Africa. He was particularly hopeful that the new Governor of Tanganyika, Sir Stewart Symes, would prove more amenable to the idea of federation. Walker noted: "Symes is apparently nicknamed 'Soapy' and has the reputation of doing what he is told."⁴

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1. For the chief's farewell see Cameron; Tanganyika Service, pp.281-82, 289-90. Mitchell mourned in his diary "We shall never see another like him & his loss will be a catastrophe but I believe he has lit a fuse in Tanganyika that will not easily be put out." Diaries (R.H.) 24/10/29.
 2. Great Britain: Parliamentary Papers; Joint Committee on East Africa Cmd.156 1931, Vol.1, Report pp.29-30.
 3. C.O.822/31/260001/30/4/31 Colonial Office meeting on Closer Union.
 4. Walker Papers (R.H.) Walker to Hilton-Young 6/3/31.

Contrary to the Colonel's belief, Sir George Stewart Symes had not been chosen as Governor of Tanganyika merely as a prelude to Closer Union. In some ways his appointment was a surprising choice for an East African governorship. Symes was a soldier and his experience of colonial administration was almost entirely confined to the Middle East. If Symes was something of a "dark horse" to many residents of East Africa, he in his turn knew almost nothing about Tanganyika.⁵ Symes confessed his total knowledge was confined to recollections that the Territory had been called German East Africa, came under a Mandate and was now governed by Sir Donald Cameron.⁶ The new Governor was chosen precisely for his lack of knowledge and complete detachment from East African affairs, and he was given a task that could not be entrusted to a defiant and strong-willed Governor such as Cameron. Symes would follow orders, and he was unlikely to be biased towards either European or African production. Similarly the new Governor would not have any sentimental regard for Cameron's precious system of Native Administration. Symes received clear orders from the Colonial Office before his departure for Tanganyika - to enforce drastic cuts in government expenditure. When the Acting Governor Douglas Jardine made a speech before the Legislative Council expressing hopes for a modest improvement in the Territory's economy, Symes, despite his purported lack of knowledge, had no hesitation in despatching a letter of admonishment. He informed Jardine that, on the contrary, Tanganyika was in the midst of a severe and prolonged economic depression and its administration was approaching a financial crisis of catastrophic proportions.⁷

5. Henn Papers (R.H.) Henn to Cameron 15/1/31; C. Whybrow; Diaries (R.H.) 25/1/31.

6. G.S. Symes; Tour of Duty (London 1946), p.161.

7. ibid. Symes was *not* briefed by Lord Passfield who was more concerned with the fate of any gorillas found in the Territory. ibid.; p.161.

Under Cameron's regime, the Tanganyika administration had reaped its share of rewards from the developing colonial economy. Since 1926 both revenue and expenditure steadily increased each year, although the size of the increase was obscured by a complex method of accounting which treated the railway budget as a completely separate item. (See Table 7). The Territory produced a variety of African cash crops and administrative revenues were cushioned against price falls in any individual crop. Sisal prices remained high and the copper traffic from the Belgian Congo allowed the railways to run at a minimal loss. Increases in customs duties and improvements in poll tax collection gave the Tanganyika administration a surplus balance of just over £1,000,000 by 1929. Revenue far exceeded expenditure as the cost of major capital works was taken from loan funds included in the surplus balance. As a Mandate, Tanganyika was precluded from freely borrowing on the money market like most other British colonies, and her sole source of loan money was the 1926 East African Guaranteed Loan. Despite the lack of an interest-free period, the Tanganyika government had borrowed a total of £5,000,000 to finance railway construction and improvements to transport generally. The debt charges, amounting to 12% of revenues in 1929, posed no problem so long as government revenue continued to expand, but if expenditure rose or revenues fell the Tanganyika administration would be left with fixed interest payments as a first charge on government expenditure.⁸ (See Table 8).

In 1930 Sir Donald Cameron remained confident that the economic recession would only prove temporary. His Native Administration system was secure throughout the

8. Tanganyika's complex loan history is contained in Great Britain: Parliamentary Papers; Report of the Committee Administering the East African Guaranteed Loan Cmd.3494 1929-30; Memorandum on Proposed Financial Resolution (Palestine and East African Loans) Cmd.3848 1930-31 and Report on the Finances of Tanganyika Territory by Sir Henry Armitage Smith Cmd. 4182 1931-32, pp.42-52.

Table 8. Imperial Loans 1925-1932

Loan	Amount £	Debt Charges (Annual) £	Percentage Revenue 1931-32
Imperial Exchequer	3,123,350	123,586	5.8
Guaranteed Loan (1928-68)	2,070,000	117,921	5.6
Guaranteed Loan (1931-71)	3,000,000	155,900	7.3
Guaranteed Loan (1932)	750,000	36,500	1.7
C.D.F.	39,900	5,279	0.3
	8,983,250	439,186	20.7

Source: Armitage-Smith Report

country and the colonial economy seemed set for a period of safe and rapid expansion. In his budgetary address to the Legislative Council for 1930-31 Cameron affirmed his belief that trade would continue to improve and revenues would continue to rise. The level of imports had risen despite damage done to the export trade by drought, locusts and poor markets. The Governor decided that as in the past the administration had persistently underestimated its revenue by as much as £146,000, the forthcoming budget should be cast on much more liberal lines. It was time to reduce the surplus balance and commence an expanded programme of public works and provision of social services. Cameron budgeted for an increase of £11,000 in revenue and £146,000 in recurrent expenditure over and above last year's figures.⁹

The sudden burst of administrative generosity was partly due to the passing of the Colonial Development Act in 1929. The Act was designed to give permanent assistance - "a real impetus" - to British industry by making extensive finance available for colonial development.¹⁰ Short-term measures such as the East African Guaranteed Loan had failed to alleviate unemployment, and the Colonial Development Fund aimed to increase trade permanently by improving the purchasing power of the inhabitants of the Empire and so create a greater market for British goods. The sums available were woefully inadequate for the Empire as a whole, but to the Tanganyika government the Colonial Development Fund must have appeared as a godsend. Financial assistance could be provided for a wide range of projects and provision had been made for grants to cover interest charges for a limited period. The administration lost no time in placing an extensive list of schemes before the Committee

9. C.O.691/116/30050/des.d. 30/1/31, Governor's Address to the Legislative Council 6/1/31.

10. C.O.822/19/25315/26/2/29, Memorandum for Cabinet Committee by the Secretary of State.

administering the Fund.¹¹ If the metropolitan government appeared confident about colonial development, then at least the Tanganyika government could follow suit and embark on an extended programme of improvements within the colony. The only note of gloom was provided by the Treasury. In a letter to the Colonial Office, Treasury officials noted that sisal prices had fallen 6% in three months and they urged officials to press a policy of caution on the Tanganyika government.¹² But so long as the colonial economy of Tanganyika remained prosperous, then the Treasury could not determine the financial policy of the Territory's administration. Sisal prices occasionally showed small annual falls and the Tanganyika government continued unconcerned, looking forward to large increases in the yields from customs and poll taxes. This was a mistake as for once the Treasury's warning was entirely correct.

The fatal error in the calculations of the Tanganyika government lay in the assumption of the continued prosperity of the sisal industry. While a number of African cash crops made up about half of Tanganyika's exports, a single crop, sisal, contributed the rest. In terms of imports, capital invested and wages paid, sisal was the most important crop in the colonial economy. Sisal exhausted the soil - observers spoke of it being mined rather than harvested - but the administration was always willing to grant more land on the coastal plain.¹³ Plantations made few demands on the colonial state and their owners had no pretensions to formal political control. Unlike the settlers, planters were interested in profits not politics and were willing to co-operate with the administration. The most important demand of the sisal industry was for a large

11. C.O.691/107/29610/ des.d. 15/3/30. Only the impoverished colony of British Guiana put in more applications for assistance than Tanganyika. Meredith; op. cit., p.490.

12. C.O.691/109/29650/ Treasury letter d. 22/4/30.

13. E.K. Lumley; op. cit., p.98.

and well-regulated labour force. Cutting the razor-sharp sisal leaves was unpleasant and painful work which was avoided by workers if they could possibly help it.¹⁴ As Africans from the adjoining highland areas were generally unsuitable for work on the humid coast, labour for the plantations came from districts 300-500 miles away in the west and south-west. For men to walk such a distance in order to undertake unpleasant work required a combination of incentive and administrative pressure. Cash crop opportunities were limited by the government's 'suitable transport' criterion and there were few other opportunities to earn money for tax in the labour areas. Unlike the small settlers, plantations could afford to pay higher wages to attract labour to the coast and to the unpleasant tasks on a sisal plantation. The flow of labour was supervised by the Labour Department and between 1926-1931 the whole system had operated smoothly. The settlers accused Cameron of everything *except* restricting the labour supply.¹⁵ The exclusion of small settlers and the 'efficient' organisation of the labour supply had averted the threatened labour shortages of Byatt's time. A few disgruntled individuals, such as Bird and Co.'s manager Major Conrad Walsh, complained of the government's attitude and maintained Indirect Rule was making the natives insolent and hard to handle, but otherwise the Tanganyika sisal planters seemed generally satisfied with the policies of the administration.¹⁶

14. On the difficulty in obtaining cutters see C.W. Guillebaud; An Economic Survey of the Sisal Industry of Tanganyika (Welwyn 1958), p.63, and K.M. Stahl; The Metropolitan Organisation of British Colonial Trade (London 1951), p.250.

15. For criticism of Cameron's policies see "Tanganyika's Native Policy", East Africa 10/10/29, pp.122-123; "Writing on the Wall - Indirect Rule in Tanganyika", ibid. 26/12/29, pp.476-478; "Points from Caledonian Speeches", ibid. 15/1/31, p.572; "Sir Donald Cameron's Governorship", ibid. 16/4/31, p.974.

16. Walsh's main grievance against the Tanganyika government was its handling of the Pangani Falls Electricity Scheme. There was some confusion over tenders for the scheme and a Bird subsidiary had lost out to a company

Sisal was unequalled as a source of revenue for the colonial state. The industry imported valuable machinery which attracted customs duties, it paid the wages and provided cash for taxes for 145,000 African labourers and purchased an unknown amount of locally-grown foodstuffs from African farmers. Sisal provided almost half the revenue of the Tanganyika administration. Sir Donald Cameron regarded the industry as the ideal combination between European enterprise and capital and African labour. Among its other advantages the sisal industry was a steady and reliable source of revenue. Throughout the 1920s the majority of African cash crops grown in Tanganyika had suffered from natural disasters or sudden falls in either output or market price. Cotton and groundnut prices showed considerable fluctuations in the years when they were not devastated by floods, drought or locusts in various parts of the Territory. In contrast sisal was almost indestructible and its price had remained buoyant on the world market.¹⁷ (See Table 4). Production had steadily expanded since the end of the war. Although prices had declined from the 1918 record of £99 per ton, sisal prices generally stayed within the range of £35-£50 per ton for No.1 fibre.¹⁸ With production costs varying between £20-£30 per ton according to the size of the estate some of the larger companies could make a substantial profit.¹⁹ Even after a 44% increase in shipping charges, Bird and Co. could announce an average annual profit of £17,331 between

F.n. 16 continued.

organised by Sir Montagu Barlow. C.O.691/98/29101/des.d. 4/9/28. Walsh' character is summarised in Henn Papers (R.H.) Henn to Cameron 22/3/28. In reply Cameron described Walsh as a "scurrilous dog". ibid. Cameron to Henn 31/4/28.

17. For administrative confidence in sisal and its recuperative qualities see Tanganyika Territory; Report for 1928, p.28; Report for 1929, pp.20,37,39.

18. "Thirty Years of Sisal Prices", East Africa, 29/1/31, p.656.

19. "Great Progress in Tanganyika", East Africa, 22/7/26, p.949; "East African Investment Co. Ltd. - Tanganyika Sisal", ibid. 29/9/27, p.58; "The Cost of Production of Sisal", ibid. 17/11/27, p.290.

1924-1927.²⁰ In April 1929 sisal planters were looking forward to price increases of up to £50 per ton.²¹

Eric Reid described Tanganyika in the late 1920s as a "fools paradise" where an overdraft was considered to be "the technical term for a bank balance."²² High prices and the general air of optimism apparently deluded both the planters and the Tanganyika government. Although Lord Cranworth had warned in 1919 that fibre was a "notoriously uncertain market", the sisal industry looked forward to a period of expansion and improved profits.²³ In fact sisal held a very precarious position on the world market. In the 1920s the main markets for sisal were the spinning mills of Europe and the United States where the fibre was turned into binder twine for use in agricultural machinery. Although East African sisal was sold on the London market, little was used by British industry and most stocks went to Belgium for distribution on the Continent. On the market sisal encountered competition from soft fibres such as manilla and other hard fibres, notably agave from the Dutch East Indies and henequen from Mexico. In 1930 as the Depression hit the American wheatfields, the Mexicans began to dump large quantities of henequen on the European market. Huge reserves were stockpiled and in the face of such a glut the price of East African sisal fell heavily. In six months between June 1930 and January 1931 sisal prices dropped from £28 to £16 per ton on the London market.

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20. "East African Investment Co.", East Africa 23/2/28, p.773; "East African Investment Company Report", ibid. 25/10/28, p.175. Cameron commented to Henn, "I read the Bird prospectus and if I were not forbidden to do so I should have a few hundred of the new capital." Henn Papers (R.H.) Cameron to Henn 26/3/28.
 21. "Sisal Growing in Tanganyika", East Africa 25/4/28, p.1033.
 22. E. Reid; Tanganyika Without Prejudice (London 1934), p.68.
 23. Lord Cranworth; Profit and Sport in British East Africa (London 1919), p.147.

In a situation of low market demand the logical thing to do was to curtail production or withhold shipment until reserves were absorbed and the market improved. When the price of coffee slumped in 1930 African coffee growers at Bukoba held back their crop and waited until prices recovered. But the sisal plantations were incapable of cutting production. Sisal had to be continually harvested to prevent the plant from going to seed and many estates had contracts or mortgages that compelled them to continue production, even at uneconomic rates. East African planters were unwilling to abandon the market unless their competitors in Mexico and the East Indies took a similar step. The sisal industry was now faced with an extended period of extremely low prices. As imports declined the customs dues immediately fell by over £220,000. The Tanganyika administration was already heavily committed to extensive public works and a programme of improvements for the K.A.R. and it seemed likely the surplus balance of £750,000 would be steadily eroded by constant payments. The Colonial Office told Jardine not to panic and gave out calm assurances that the Tanganyika government could still function on a surplus balance as low as £364,000 if the worse came to the worst.²⁴

Cameron was understandably anxious that some assistance should be given to the failing industry. Early in 1931 he suggested the Imperial government should subsidise the sisal planters with a £300,000 loan. Interest would be paid by the Tanganyika government and the money would go to make up the difference between market price and cost of production, with a small profit thrown in. Firms who had paid large dividends over the past few years were to be excluded from the scheme on grounds of irresponsibility. Similar subsidies had been granted to maize farmers in Kenya and tobacco growers in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. While the Colonial Office was prepared, indeed, *had* to 'tide over' small settlers, it was not prepared to give financial assistance to companies with enough capital to look after

themselves. Other large firms would seek assistance from Imperial funds and subsidies would thus create an undesirable precedent. The Colonial Office saw the Depression as an exercise in a sort of 'social Darwinism'. The sisal industry would be much improved if the larger and more efficient estates could survive and absorb the less successful. When Major Lead, the representative of the small sisal planters, called at the Colonial Office with a scheme for a subsidy, he was informed only schemes dedicated to improving efficiency and reducing production costs had any chance of receiving favourable consideration.²⁵ The sisal industry knew how to cut production costs. Wages were halved to the point where it became difficult for Africans to earn enough to pay their taxes.²⁶

By the end of 1931 sisal was at a record low of £13 per ton and directors in London were foregoing their fees. The industry appeared past help. The Colonial Office calculated that if the industry folded up, Tanganyika would lose £70,000 from customs and tax and £18,000 from railway revenue. Such a loss would devastate the already weakened budget of the Tanganyika administration,²⁷ but the Colonial Office made no move to save the plantations. In spite of their importance to the colonial economy of Tanganyika, the sisal estates were left to save themselves.

The indifference of the Colonial Office towards East African sisal was due to the position and organisation of the crop on the London market. As prices began to fall, sisal was suddenly being described as an "important Imperial industry."²⁸ This was a sure sign of an industry in

25. C.O.691/114/30025A/des.d. 21/1/31, Minute by Green 9/4.

26. C.O.691/107/29606/ Minute by Shiels 14/3/31; "Troubles of the Sisal Industry", East Africa 21/8/30, p.1597; Iliffe; Modern History, pp.352-353.

27. C.O.691/114/30025A/ Minute by Bottomley 24/1/31.

28. "Meeting of the East African Section of the London Chamber of Commerce", East Africa 24/10/29, p.191.

trouble, but it was just wishful thinking on the part of those involved to elevate sisal to 'Imperial' status. Only a small fraction of British capital was deeply involved in the production and marketing of sisal. Only a small percentage of the crop was used by British spinners who generally preferred manilla as the material for rope. Very little binder twine was manufactured in Britain. The sisal industry had run campaigns to find new uses for sisal and to wean British ropemakers away from their preference for manilla. Patriotic appeals to use more Empire products had gone unheeded and the Empire Marketing Board's campaign for sisal was not a success.²⁹ The sisal industry of Tanganyika was not sufficiently important for the Colonial Office to create an undesirable precedent and provide assistance from Imperial funds.

The sisal industry was in no position to persuade the Colonial Office to think otherwise. The London sisal market was characterised by fierce competition and general disagreement between growers and brokers, largely due to a haphazard and uncoordinated system of grading. There was no agreement as to what constituted the higher-priced No.1 fibre. The industry was divided by suspicion between growers and brokers and disagreement between Kenyan and Tanganyikan interests. The two largest companies, Wigglesworth and Co. and Bird and Co., were bitter rivals and their respective chairmen, Alfred Wigglesworth and Major Conrad Walsh, fought a running battle through London's commercial organisations. Walsh suggested that only 'patriotic' British estates employing British machinery and British capital should qualify for classification as 'Empire' sisal. A register should be opened and firms

29. Empire Marketing Board; Empire Grown Sisal and its Importance to the Cordage Manufacturer, E.M.B. No.10 (London 1928). Major Walsh described the pamphlet as "puerile" and its accompanying poster "purporting to show a sisal estate in Uganda which pictured, as far as he could judge, two Zulus and two Madrassis in a sisal field (Laughter)". "Problems of the Sisal Trade", (Meeting of the Sisal Sub-Section of the London Chamber of Commerce) East Africa 27/9/28, p.39.

such as Wigglesworth and Co., heavily dependent on Swiss capital and German decorticators, would thereby be excluded.³⁰ Such actions did not endear Major Walsh to Alfred Wigglesworth, who chaired the Sisal Sub-Section of the London Chamber of Commerce. As a result of continual disagreement between Walsh and Wigglesworth and suspicion between growers and brokers the Sub-Section was almost entirely ineffective as a commercial pressure group.³¹ Walsh welcomed the Depression as a means of eliminating 'inefficient' estates and his opposition to any subsidy scheme had convinced the Colonial Office that the large plantations could survive without financial assistance. But within two years the price of sisal had fallen by 60% and common adversity made the sisal planters more co-operative. Agreement was reached to reduce African wages throughout the industry and in 1932 Walsh strived to form an international cartel to limit fibre production.³² To recompense for low prices sisal production in Tanganyika increased throughout the Depression though most estates hung on grimly and took heavy losses.

By the end of 1931 the prices of cotton, coffee and groundnuts, the major African cash crops had fallen by 30% and the surplus balance of the Tanganyika administration was £360,000 just below the Colonial Office estimate of the minimum necessary to continue administration.³³ The Europeans in Tanganyika had no doubts that the cause of the

30. "A Register of Patriotic Sisal Estates", East Africa 6/3/30, p.814; "Mr Wigglesworth and the Empire", ibid. 13/11/30, p.274.

31. The sisal planters regarded the Sub-Section as the voice of the brokers. "Blunt Criticism at Sisal Meeting", East Africa 18/9/30, p.26; "Is It the Sisal Section's Duty to Protect British Sisal Interests", ibid. 2/4/31, p.922.

32. C.O.691/114/30025A/ Letter from Walsh 15/9/31; "Sisal Growers Act at Last" and "World Sisal Growers Meet in London", East Africa 15/9/31, pp.344-345.

33. C.O.691/123/31090/des.d. 11/2/32; 127/5025/des.d. 11/2/33.

crisis was Cameron's investment of state finances in Native Administration. Jardine and Cameron himself were concerned that the system of Native Administrations would be dismantled by the cutbacks enforced by Sir Stewart Symes.³⁴ Jardine warned the Colonial Office that the natives were already anxious over the departure of Sir Donald Cameron and had been "notoriously unrestful" in the late war.³⁵

The Colonial Office was less worried about the possibility of African revolt than by the prospect of explaining Tanganyika's penury to the Permanent Mandates Commission. The Colonial Office was concerned that there had already been criticism by the Commission that "we were only providing services for a fraction of the population" and there could be further accusations that while other mandatories provided grants to develop their charges, Great Britain lent money with interest.³⁶ Repayments on Imperial loan now amounted to 20% of the current budget and such a sum would "stick right in the eye" of the Permanent Mandates Commission.³⁷ The Colonial Office sought Treasury assistance but the latter was unmoved. As Tanganyika would have difficulty in meeting her existing loan obligations, guarantees and further assistance were out of the question.³⁸ Throughout 1932 the situation grew steadily worse. So long as the copper continued to flow from the Belgian Congo the Tanganyika railways could resist the worst effects of the Depression. In 1932 a new railway was completed between Katanga and Lobito Bay in Angola and in the same year the copper market collapsed. The railway lost

34. Cameron wrote to Labour M.P. Charles Roden-Buxton expressing concern over the future of his Native Administrations. Roden-Buxton Papers (R.H.) Colonial Papers letter to W. Lunn 11/3/31.

35. C.O.691/116/30050/des.d. 15/8/31.

36. C.O.691/116/29650/ Minute by Green 11/6/31.

37. C.O.691/120/31020, Minute by Seel 4/3/32.

38. C.O.691/119/30250A/ Minute by Seel 16/10/31.

50% of its traffic and began to accumulate a massive deficit.³⁹ Tanganyika's surplus balance had fallen to £184,000, which was insufficient money for the administration to continue in operation. In 1932 the government of Tanganyika was effectively bankrupt. Drought ravaged the crops in Tanganyika and the Colonial Office finally admitted that in every respect "we are rapidly approaching a catastrophe."⁴⁰

The Colonial Office was faced with the distinct possibility of severely curtailing administrative control over Tanganyika and informing the Permanent Mandates Commission that the British government could no longer meet the obligations of the Mandate. The thought of such an admission was sufficient to extract another loan from the Treasury.⁴¹ The sum of £750,000 would be provided to repay the cost of capital works provided from the surplus balance and thus restore the Territory to solvency. The price of the concession was closer Treasury supervision over the budget of Tanganyika and an investigation by a Treasury official into the financial condition of the Territory. To obtain the sanction of Parliament, the Tanganyika loan was included on a bill extending similar assistance to another devastated colony. British Honduras had recently been hit by a hurricane.⁴²

The report of the Treasury official Sir Henry Armitage-Smith analysed the causes of the financial catastrophe in Tanganyika. He found the East African Customs agreements which permitted free entry of Kenyan sugar, bacon and butter in Tanganyika, to be costing more than £58,000 per year in lost revenue. The Customs

39. C.O.691/120/31021/des.d. 10/2/32; "Financial Problems of Tanganyika", East Africa 26/4/32, p.950.

40. C.O.691/127/5025/des.d. 11/2/33, Minute by Seel 29/6.

41. C.O.691/120/31020/ Treasury letter 2/3/32; 121/31048/ Treasury letter 26/1/32; 123/31090, Minute by Seel 7/11/31.

42. Great Britain: Parliamentary Debates; House of Commons Vol.263 14/3/32.

agreement provided a subsidy to Kenya settlers and to avoid criticism from the Permanent Mandates Commission, the Tanganyika government hurriedly imposed 'suspended' duties on the offending products. Armitage-Smith found the Territory's finances to be excessively burdened by a massive railway deficit, the payment of interest on Imperial loans and by a scale of social services providing administrative support for the Native Administrations. He concluded:

It was unwise in a new and untried territory relying for its economy on one or two main export crops and for its revenue on one or two large heads of taxation, to budget up to the hilt on the hypothesis of continued and unbroken prosperity ... We must cut our coat according to our cloth, and the cloth is black and scanty.⁴³

Sir Donald Cameron did not take kindly to criticism of his governorship and wrote angry letters to the Colonial Office. Bottomley consoled him with the thought that Armitage-Smith was more concerned for the financial exigencies of the present than with the political and social necessities of the past.⁴⁴ The Colonial Office understood that the consolidation of the colonial state through the establishment and support of Native Administrations had necessarily been an expensive business. The accumulation of a sizeable debt to the Imperial exchequer was unavoidable if the administration was to rebuild the structures of the colonial economy. It was not so much Cameron's extreme (if unwarranted) confidence and heavy expenditure which had undermined Tanganyika as the dependence of the Territory on a single major crop. Armitage-Smith commented:

For some few years in the past the revenue of the Territory profited greatly by the enterprise of those who invested capital in, and employed labour on, the sisal plantations; the sudden and sharp decline in the value of this one supremely important export product has profoundly affected

43. Armitage-Smith; op. cit., p.16.

44. C.O.691/121/31048/ Cameron to Bottomley d. 31/1/33.

the financial situation of the Territory.⁴⁵

The chances of sisal making a quick and substantial recovery seemed remote and Armitage-Smith decided that "apart from the yet uncertain possibilities of mineral development the economic basis of the administration is and seems likely to remain native African."⁴⁶ His report placed great emphasis on the expansion of African cash crops and the improvement of marketing facilities. Under Cameron's rule, the Tanganyika administration had pursued a complex and anomalous policy towards African cash crops. The Governor saw cash crop production as a menace to tribal authority and the system of Native Administration. Social and political order came before economic well-being in the administration's priorities and there had been no great 'push' to increase production. Administrative encouragement and support of African cash crops had been opportunistic rather than systematic.⁴⁷ Cotton, groundnuts, grains, hides and sesame were the products most favoured by the administration. By sale of such material Africans could obtain money for taxes and finance would flow into the Native Administration. At the same time African producers would not grow sufficiently wealthy on such crops to constitute a danger to tribal authority.⁴⁸ Cotton and

45. Armitage-Smith; op. cit., p.96.

46. ibid.

47. For example Donald Sturdey, the Agricultural Officer at Shinyanga, received an official letter instructing him to take energetic action to produce a good cotton crop, as following floods in America the price had risen by 2d on the London market. Sturdey commented, "If this 2d was passed back to the producer it would double last year's prices but of course there is no hope of that happening." D. Sturdey; Letters (R.H.) 10/6/27.

48. Sturdey wrote: "I do not think cotton is a dangerous native crop, the price varies to (sic) much last year they got 8 cents per lb, two years before that 32 cents per lb and this year double what they got last year and they look at it like this - When we are fed up with prices and grow only a little you pay us a big price, when we grow a lot you pay us nothing."
ibid. 14/8/27.

groundnut prices fluctuated violently and output was further limited by the frequent combination of drought and locusts. The only crop in Tanganyika which promised to become a consistently high-priced staple such as cocoa on the West Coast was arabica coffee.

Arabica coffee was however a 'dangerous' crop. African cultivation of high-grade coffee made settlers irate and threatened to create centres of wealth outside the Native Administration and beyond the control of the colonial state. The Chagga, confined on their mountain, were a special case and the administration had no intention of letting arabica cultivation spread throughout the high-land tribes. In 1929 new regulations had been imposed on the industry. Registration of estates was made compulsory and all coffee trees were to be treated regularly to prevent disease. The only organisation possessing sufficient funds and members to carry out the regulations was the Kilimanjaro Native Planter's Association and the rules acted to halt arabica cultivation among the neighbouring Pare and Arusha. By 1932 the K.N.P.A. had been brought under government control and turned into a co-operative to control coffee on Kilimanjaro.⁴⁹

At Bukoba the lower-priced robusta coffee had proved one of the great successes of the colonial economy. So long as the Buhaya chiefs benefited from robusta cultivation, coffee could only lend economic support to tribal authority. There was no need to extend coffee rules or co-operatives to Bukoba.⁵⁰ Except for a brief (and unsuccessful) attempt to introduce robusta cultivation to Songea and Kasulu, the Department of Agriculture had concentrated its efforts on improving cultivation in the 'show-places' of Indirect Rule rather than spreading cash crop production. The financial crisis made Cameron's policy redundant. The administration had relied on sisal

49. Rogers; "Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association". p.p. 102-III.

50. Tanganyika Territory; Report for 1929, pp.79-80 and Report for 1930, p.83.

for its revenues and was betrayed.⁵¹ If colonial rule was to survive in any effective form within Tanganyika, then the colonial economy required immediate and drastic re-organisation. The continuation and extensions of African cash crop production was now a matter of survival. In 1931 with a "Napoleonic disregard" for record low prices the Director of Agriculture Ernest Harrison launched a 'grow-more-crops' campaign in Tanganyika.⁵²

The general aim of the campaign was to induce Africans to produce more food and cash crops by any means and in defiance of economics. It seemed a curious response to a depression made worse by the over-supply of raw materials. Most observers saw the campaign as the product of the administration's desperate need to secure more revenue.⁵³ If Tanganyika's 800,000 defaulters could sell cash crops even at uneconomic prices, they could earn enough cash to pay off their tax on an instalment basis.⁵⁴ The African population would just have to do without 'luxuries' such as cloth, cooking ware and other imported goods.⁵⁵ However, the grow-more-crops campaign had a far more important purpose than bolstering the revenue. In Tanganyika the colonial economy threatened to break up and disappear. Barter and bark cloth had reappeared in some areas in the absence of the cash economy. Cash crops were no longer worth the effort of cultivation and African societies began to fall back to a subsistence level. The Governor commented that "if they did so, it might take years to induce them to resume their activities and the consequences to the new economic structure of the country

51. E.K. Lumley, a former District Officer, wrote bitterly: "The estates were the weak link which brought us near to bankruptcy." Lumley; Mandate, p.170.

52. Symes; op. cit., p.171.

53. See C. Gillman; Diaries (R.H.) 9/5/35 for a critical contemporary viewpoint. For a modern view McCarthy; "Underdevelopment", pp.592-93.

54. C.O.691/112/29816/ Minute by Seel 17/9/31 for the tax by instalment plan.

55. Tanganyika Territory; Report for 1930, pp.47-48.

would be disastrous."⁵⁶ The 'grow-more-crops' campaign was designed to keep the colonial economy in existence by a programme of compulsory cultivation. There were other alarming signs of the breakdown of the colonial economy. The Labour Department had been abolished as an economy measure and there was no one to supervise the migrants seeking work on the sisal plantations. Low prices forced more men to seek work on the coast where unemployment was already rife after the collapse in sisal prices. The unemployed, free from estate discipline and tribal control, were a menace to the security of the colonial state. Elsewhere there were grave dangers of food shortages as Africans sold grain in order to obtain cash. The Tanganyika administration was faced with social and economic disintegration.

The Director of Agriculture was a methodical man and not to be hurried into desperate measures. He viewed Tanganyika as an estate requiring management and development,⁵⁷ and the 'grow-more-crops' campaign was carefully structured. The first step was to secure the food supply by a programme of compulsory cultivation of crops such as yams and cassava. Unlike maize and millet, cassava required little cultivation and the attention of the African peasant could then be devoted to the second step; increased production of cash crops. Any food shortages caused by a 'push' on cash crop cultivation could thus be avoided by reliance on the hardy but less nutritious cassava. The campaign was enforced by what Symes called "benevolent coercion."⁵⁸ Native Administrations were instructed to issue orders compelling the planting of cassava, with fines for non-compliance.⁵⁹ In theory the

56. Symes; op. cit., pp.170-171.

57. Austen; Northwest Tanzania, p.206.

58. Symes; op. cit., p.204.

59. Flogging for non-compliance with planting orders was deemed illegal. See D.M.P. McCarthy; "Language Manipulation in Colonial Tanganyika 1919-1940". Journal of African Studies Vol.6(1) 1979, p.13, n.7. One District Officer F.D. Dowsett was unequivocal about the crops campaign among the Sukuma: "they are now

production of cash crops was not compulsory, but could be "encouraged" by District Officers through increased pressure for tax payments and selective recruitment for road work.⁶⁰

In the distant labour reserve areas of Songea, Rufiji, Mahenge, Tunduru and Kigoma, the administration made special efforts to establish rice, tobacco and groundnuts as cash crops. In such impoverished areas the barter system was most prevalent and the Native Administrations weak and penurious. To wipe out barter and to provide some incentive to plant cash crops the Tanganyika administration established a system of monopolies to control marketing in the labour areas. Companies would be granted an exclusive trading licence within a 'declared area' and in return they would pay growers a minimum price approved by the government. Technically the grant of monopolies was a violation of the Mandate and the Colonial Office was worried such moves might restrict the operations of private enterprise for the advantage of a single firm. The Secretary of State Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister warned that "the governing principle should be to adapt the machinery of administration to fit the actual conditions of trade and not to attempt to canalise trade so as to facilitate the task of administration."⁶¹

If the colonial economy of Tanganyika was to be re-organised around an increased level of African cash crop production, then trade had to be 'canalised' in order to allow greater administrative control over African economies. Private enterprise in East Africa did not regard state

F.n. 59 continued.

growing and if they dont want to they are forced to do so." F.D. Dowsett; Letters (R.H.) 3/12/31.

60. Lumley; Mandate, pp.67-68. African resistance to administrative pressure was based on a desire to retain control over their own economies. In Kasulu in 1927-1929 Donald Sturdey found the Ha most unwilling to sacrifice "a good balanced diet" in return for the effort and uncertainty of coffee cultivation. Sturdey; Interview (by J.J. Tawney) (R.H.) 26/8/69.

61. C.O.691/123/31088/ des.d. 22/2/32. Minute by Cunliffe-Lister 2/5/

interference in the economy as some sort of socialist heresy but as a necessity to profitable operation. The first instance of increased control over an African cash crop came in the cotton industry. Adverse rates of exchange made American cotton too expensive for British mills and the production of cotton in Tanganyika again became a temporary Imperial requirement. The Empire Cotton Growing Corporation reappeared to offer Tanganyika a £1,000 grant to further cotton production in the Territory.⁶² Behind the grant were British ginners, in particular the Liverpool Uganda Company who were concerned over the amount of cotton reaching their gins in Tanganyika. In a meeting with the Colonial Office the Company complained that the low prices given to African growers were entirely due to Indian middlemen who toured the country in trucks, buying up cotton for re-sale to the ginneries. The old system of preventing competition by separating ginneries by 10 mile intervals was rendered ineffective by motor transport. The Director of Agriculture discussed the problem with ginning interests in London and Tanganyika and the government then proceeded to set up a rigid zone system for the control of cotton. Ginneries were assigned exclusive rights of purchase within defined areas, and any movement of cotton outside such areas for purposes of sale was declared illegal. Businesses suspected of non co-operation were deprived of a zone altogether.⁶³ In theory the prices formerly paid to the middleman could now be passed on to the African growers, but in practice a monopoly had been created which paid a set minimum price regardless of market conditions.⁶⁴ The Colonial Office was not

62. C.O.691/127/5001/ Letter from Currie 8/5/33. Minutes by Stockdale 22/3, 23/12/33.

63. C.O.691/127/5001/ Minute by Seel 7/10/33; "Cotton Marketing in Tanganyika", East Africa 12/1/33, pp.420, 432.

64. It was not surprising Wabena peasants applied to District Officers for increases in the price of cotton. "Nothing will persuade the peasants that the price of these commodities is not fixed by the central government." A.T. and G.M. Culwick; "What the Wabena Think of Indirect Rule", Journal of the Royal African Society Vol.36(143) 1937, p.181.

Table 9.

The Major Products of the Colonial EconomySisal Production 1932-1938

Year	Quantity (Tons)	Value (£)	Percentage Total Exports (Value)
1932	60,554	698,202	31.9
1933	69,600	881,772	34.7
1934	72,510	847,562	32.0
1935	82,676	1,134,732	32.9
1936	80,559	1,873,312	41.5
1937	90,632	2,079,204	41.8
1938	101,400	1,452,125	39.2

Cotton Production 1932-1938

Year	Quantity (Cental)	Value (£)	Percentage Total Exports (Value)
1932	71,888	183,747	8.4
1933	113,677	276,864	10.9
1934	126,447	326,613	12.4
1935	223,547	569,547	16.5
1936	252,534	640,625	14.2
1937	258,039	603,594	12.1
1938	198,705	382,176	10.3

Groundnut Production 1932-38

Year	Quantity (Tons)	Value (£)	Percentage Total Exports (Value)
1932	15,873	182,010	8.3
1933	19,177	166,223	6.5
1934	8,036	60,145	2.2
1935	16,429	210,018	6.1
1936	22,786	277,226	6.1
1937	22,251	257,807	5.2
1938	3,579	40,340	1.1

Source: Tanganyika Reports 1932-1938

Table 9 Continued.

Coffee Production 1932-1938

Year	Quantity (Tons)	Value (£)	Percentage exports (Value)
1932	11,362	463,597	21.2
1933	12,718	429,523	16.9
1934	14,766	495,237	18.7
1935	18,588	486,842	14.1
1936	12,146	342,990	7.6
1937	13,612	429,501	8.6
1938	13,730	397,446	10.7

Source: Tanganyika Reports 1932-1938

impressed by congratulations over the new arrangements coming from the Joint East African Board: "as this was coming from the party in whose interests these arrangements have been made, this was hardly unexpected."⁶⁵

The other means of controlling African cash crop production was through government-sponsored co-operatives. The Colonial Office was very enthusiastic over the improvements in prices, quality and African purchasing power supposedly brought about by co-operative organisations. Once the colonial economy had become firmly established, Indian middlemen could be eliminated by cooperatives making direct contact with European firms. The Colonial Office believed co-operatives under British tutelage were more inclined to buy British goods than were Indian or Syrian traders. The organisation of co-operatives promised "a wide extension of Empire trade second only to that effected by extension of the means of transport."⁶⁶ Although the Tanganyika government obtained an expert C.F. Strickland to report and prepare legislation on native co-operative societies, such sophisticated measures of control would have to wait until prices recovered. In the interim, Symes relied on the Native Administrations backed by the coercive power of the colonial state to maintain administrative control over the 'grow-more-crops' campaign. Enforced cultivation could breed discontent, especially when market prices hardly warranted such efforts on the part of the African population. Tanganyika had the highest proportion of military expenditure of all the East African territories, but Symes rejected a suggestion by the Legislative Council that the K.A.R. be reduced by one battalion. Mitchell reported that Symes had a 'Near East' mind - "part policeman, part securityman."⁶⁷ The Governor informed the Colonial Office that he had an instinctive distrust of

65. C.O.691/138/21155/ Letter from J.E.A.B. 10/5/34. Minute by Seel 17/5/

66. C.O.822/21/25335/ Minute by Green 25/7/29.

67. Mitchell; Diaries (R.H.) 21/12/31.

"clear horizons" and even if there had been no trouble, he intended to stay prepared with the maximum of military force at his disposal.⁶⁸ Cutbacks and retrenchment had reduced the numbers and the scope of district administration and the Tanganyika government had little choice but to rely on the Native Administrations. The government had little hesitation about replacing recalcitrant or unco-operative chiefs, most of whom knew the consequences of failing to obey orders from the central government. As Cameron had predicted, the Native Administrations provided an effective vehicle for implementing the 'grow-more-crops' campaign. During the depression African taxes had not been reduced except in districts suffering from famine. Enforced cultivation preserved the colonial economy and, when prices began to recover, the administration was in a position to benefit immediately from increased yields of taxes. Symes seemed very pleased when he explained his policy to a London meeting of the Overseas Association:

We embarked on a double production campaign, led by Mr. Harrison our Director of Agriculture. It was a great success. We simply told the Natives that unless they produced enough to eat they would starve, and that unless they produced a cash crop they would have trouble with their wives. What is more important (loud laughter) - no, but very important - was that they would not be able to settle their obligations to Government and would not be able to keep going these schools and Local Government services which are a result of that admirable Indirect Rule - Local Native Government, as I prefer to call it - introduced by my predecessor. On those lines we got busy. Of course the District Officers did all the work. The result was that in twelve months we increased the total production by 33% (Applause). We transferred an adverse visible balance of several hundred thousands to a favourable visible balance of about £200,000 for last year ... The person of whom we speak affectionately as 'the old black' is satisfied that he has had a fair deal and quite prepared to continue to increase production to 50% in the present year, weather permitting.⁶⁹

68. C.O.691/118/30162/ Letter Symes to Bottomley -/7/31 des.d. 15/8/31.

69. "Sir Stewart Symes on Tanganyika", East Africa 25/5/33, p.862.

Table 10.Financial Position 1932-1938 (excluding railways)

Year	Revenue (Recurrent)	Expenditure (Recurrent)	Surplus/ Deficit	Customs Dues and Taxes as Percentage of Total Revenue	
	£	£	£	Customs	Tax
1932*	1,291,000	1,243,000	+ 48,000	24.4	37.4
1933	1,559,000	1,640,000	- 81,000	26.7	39.3
1934	1,720,000	1,659,000	+ 61,000	28.2	35.4
1935	1,974,000	1,709,000	+265,000	32.4	33.4
1936	2,150,000	1,973,000	+177,000	33.4	31.5
1937	2,233,000	2,069,000	+164,000	34.7	30.7
1938	2,100,000	2,109,000	- 9,000	34.1	32.4

* Nine months only - financial year changed to coincide with calendar year.

Source: C. Leubuscher; Tanganyika Territory Tables D.1 and D.2, pp.210-11.

Symes was not pushing cash crop production out of any sympathy for the African population. The Governor could not speak any Bantu language and his habit of touring the country by aircraft gave the Governor a good view of the wildlife but little understanding of the people.⁷⁰ Mitchell noted Symes' indifference: "I do not think he has any liking for the people he is governing or, indeed, that it occurs to him that they are human."⁷¹ The 'grow-more-crops' campaign had been a policy of survival. (See Tables 9 and 10).

The Depression had undermined the purpose of colonial rule and jeopardised the existence of the colonial state. Although the Dual Policy was not abandoned, there was a clear need to reassess the role of European production in Tanganyika. The administration considered a new role for white settlement in the colonial economy.⁷² Symes told the Colonial Office that the function of European settlement was to increase the wealth of the Territory and it was only to be encouraged to fulfil this end. The Governor desperately sought a crop sufficiently profitable to save the remaining settlers on the Southern Highlands from extinction. Turkish tobacco was considered but the scheme was refused assistance from the Colonial Development Fund.⁷³ Coffee was not successful in the Southern Highlands but tea seemed to be a promising crop. The Colonial Development Fund financed an investigation by a tea expert Dr. Harold Mann who reported at least 50,000 acres at Mufindi, Tukuyu and the Eastern Usambaras could be turned into tea estates. But tea planting was subject to international agreement and Tanganyika was awarded only 7,500 acres as its share of the

70. Symes; op. cit., p.197.

71. Mitchell; Diaries (R.H.) 21/12/31.

72. C.O.691/125/31230/des.d. 6/8/32; 128/5037, Minute by Green 7/2/33.

73. C.O.691/124/31165/des.d. 13/4/32.

world tea market.⁷⁴ In any case few settlers were in the financial position to experiment with new crops unless as a last resort. Symes had hopes that a coffee experimental station in the Northern Province would improve the productive capacity of coffee estates to the extent of permitting subdivision and a greater density of British settlement.⁷⁵ The Governor's desire to provide assistance for white settlement puzzled the senior officials of the Tanganyika administration. They saw the settlers and their organisations as irresponsible, uneconomic and often ridiculous and hardly worthy of support in the midst of a financial crisis.⁷⁶ Symes appeared as a "poor half-wit" full of extravagant and nonsensical schemes, and both Jardine and Mitchell were close to resignation. However, as Mitchell later realised, the Governor's schemes were attempts to discover a means of organising change in the

74. C.O.691/118/30227/des.d. 22/9/31; C.O.822/54/4035/Minute by Calder 15/12/33; "Tea Outlook in Tanganyika and Nyasaland", East Africa 17/10/32, p.152.

75. C.O.691/125/31230/des.d. 6/8/32.

76. Mitchell reported: "At the Convention of Associations yesterday Col. Abbage (?) caused a great sensation by a hush-hush revelation of a secret document he had been able to see at the Lands Office in which it was stated that the S of S had said there was to be no more White Settlement; sensation! Suspend standing orders & pass a resolution that the government should be compelled to reveal the author? origin? of this document. Denouement; the document is the report of the C.U. Committee & the printed despatches annexed to this! What incredible asses these poor things are; one of course has to remember that they were nearly all soldiers & make allowances accordingly for the military mind (mind is perhaps a little too strong) as a strange and unaccountable thing." Mitchell; Diaries (R.H.) 24/3/33. Another member of the administration described the settler in Tanganyika as possessing "the mentality of a rabbit even though he is an excellent chap." C. Whybrow; Diaries (R.H.) 9/10/32. According to Mitchell settlement was "predestined to failure." Mitchell; Diaries (R.H.) 19/9/32.

colonial economy.⁷⁷ The sisal collapse and the financial catastrophe that followed revealed the precarious position of Tanganyika's economy, a position which was detrimental to the stability and security of long-term colonial rule. For the rest of the decade the administration would seek an avenue of change, to reorganise the colonial economy on grounds more secure than sisal plantations. The experience of 1931 would not be repeated if the administration acted to diversify Tanganyika's exports and move away from dependence on sisal.

In the midst of the Depression came an opportunity to organise the colonial economy around a completely different basis than the production of agricultural commodities for export. Major Conrad Walsh of Bird and Co. had reached the end of his tether. He had worked hard with limited success to obtain Empire preference for Tanganyika sisal and to set up an international cartel of sisal producers. If British spinners and ropemakers would not use Tanganyika sisal in their products, then Bird and Co. would utilise the fibre itself and make its own ropes. Through a subsidiary Bird and Co. intended to set up factories in Tanganyika producing rope for export to the British and world markets. Heavy industry would come to Tanganyika.

Although by 1930 there were some 258 "local manufacturing establishments" operating in the Territory they were all classifiable as light industry. The majority processed raw materials into a convenient form prior to export or turned them into food for local consumption.⁷⁸ Products such as bricks, soap and furniture might go to the other East African territories but there was no manufacture specifically for export. For a variety of reasons, colonial policy did not encourage industrialisation. In 1928 Japanese firms had backed an attempt to set up a match

77. Mitchell; Diaries (R.H.) 17/1/32, 31/1/32, 29/1/32, 23/5/32, 3/10/32, 7/10/32. By the end of 1933 Mitchell's low opinion of Symes (see entries above) was completely changed. ibid.; 26/10/33.

78. Tanganyika Territory; Report for 1930, p.38.

factory in Tanga and take advantage of the duty imposed on imported matches. Cameron strongly objected to the proposal as the administration would lose £10,000 annually in customs duties. According to the Governor the enterprise did not intend to develop the resources of the Territory but simply aimed at making large profits. He threatened to impose an excise duty on any matches made in Tanganyika. The Colonial Office suggested it might be difficult to explain why such measures were only applied to Japanese interests, but the Governor was not deterred and imposed the penal duties. The factory was deprived of the protection resulting from high tariff barriers and the enterprise folded up.⁷⁹ East African tariff barriers were designed to secure revenue for the administration, not to provide a shield for local manufactures.

For its part, the Colonial Office had always been hesitant about restricting industrial development in the dependent Empire. In 1930 the Colonial Office received news of a scheme to establish cotton mills for the production of piece goods in Tanganyika. Cameron again objected as cotton piece goods were a major source of customs revenue and he promised to impose full excise duty on any cotton goods manufactured in the Territory. The Governor further criticised the scheme on social grounds, maintaining that "at the present stage of development" industrialisation was not at all to the native's advantage.⁸⁰ Factory workers did not fit into the Governor's system of Native Administration. The Colonial Office was tempted to approve the establishment of cotton mills, as the idea would certainly prove profitable to British firms owing to the low wages involved. Work in a mill was not so different from work in a mine or in the government railway workshops and the setting up of factories close to the source of supply seemed sound

79. C.O.691/99/29157/ Letter from Sir Humphrey Leggett 7/5/27. The latter alerted the Colonial Office to the danger of a Japanese match factory in Tanganyika. See also "A Match Factory in Tanganyika", East Africa 26/7/28, p.1496.

80. C.O.691/112/29803/ Minute by Lee 5/7/30.

economics. Cotton spinning in Tanganyika would hardly be popular with Lancashire mill-owners, yet the Colonial Office recognised that to declare such industrialisation to be contrary to the interests of British trade was politically undesirable in a Mandated Territory. The Colonial Office solved the dilemma by resorting to facile assumptions. The senior officials decided that although a mill in Tanganyika would probably compete with coarse textiles from Japan, "there is probably no type of work for which the tropical negro is less suited" and the factory could not compete even with high tariff protection. East African cotton was first class raw material and should be made into first class goods by skilled men, not wasted on a mill in Tanganyika manned by Africans. On such grounds the scheme was officially discouraged and refused all government assistance.⁸¹

Another scheme in 1932, to utilise redundant spindles from Lancashire mills to set up cotton spinning in Tanganyika, met a similar fate. The British cotton industry was passing through a period of 'rationalisation' and reduced production, and the Colonial Office decided the idea was to reduce the number of spindles, not transfer them to another country. British mills in Tanganyika could attract Japanese interests who would undermine the government's revenue and compete with British goods. One of the senior clerks noted that industrialisation would eventually come to Tanganyika but "the later the better. There is no reason at all why we should seek to accelerate the process."⁸² The Colonial Office would not permit the social effects of the Industrial Revolution to be duplicated in East Africa for the benefit of a small section of British capital.⁸³

81. C.O.691/112/29803/ Minute by Green 21/7/30 and Minute by Bottomley 22/7/30.

82. C.O.822/45/27056/ Minute by Vernon 16/4/32.

83. The backers of the cotton mills schemes comprised a *very* small section of British capital. Both were without financial backing and their proposals could be easily dismissed by the Colonial Office. *ibid.*; Minute by Bottomley 13/7/32.

Industry manufacturing goods for export might broaden the base of the colonial economy but it would have undesirable social and political consequences for colonial rule. Industrialisation would have to wait until it could be accommodated in colonial policy, and the Colonial Office could make it wait by imposing tariffs and refusing all state assistance.

A history of government opposition to industrialisation did not deter Major Walsh. He was a fighting Irishman and resembled one of the 'captains of industry' of the nineteenth century; volatile, entrepreneurial and entirely ruthless.⁸⁴ The crisis in the sisal industry had stung him into furious action as Bird and Co. ran into substantial losses. Walsh had a number of schemes before the Colonial Office designed to assist Tanganyika sisal.⁸⁵ In the course of one discussion with the Colonial Office, Walsh casually mentioned his company was inquiring into the local manufacture of binder twine, and gave assurances it "would have no effect on the industry in this country."⁸⁶ The scheme apparently already had the tacit approval of Sir Donald Cameron.⁸⁷ In October 1931 Walsh reported he had switched his scheme to the manufacture of sisal bags for local consumption in the shipping of coffee and maize. The Colonial Office approved of the idea as no loss to the revenue was involved and the struggling sisal industry

84. Walsh was prominent in the East African Section of the London Chamber of Commerce. Mitchell summed him up with some admiration as a "plausible rogue." Mitchell; Diaries (R.H.) 12/2/34.

85. Walsh proposed that if the Tanganyika government would transfer her coal contracts from South Africa to Britain, the returning ships could then carry sisal at a reduced rate. The idea was rejected on the grounds that it would not put the South Africans in "a forthcoming frame of mind" to give preferences at the impending Ottawa Conference. C.O.822/45/27072 Meeting with Walsh 10/5/32, Minute by Clauson 20/5/32.

86. C.O.691/114/30025A/ Minute by Bottomley 27/4/31.

87. Henn Papers (R.H.) Cameron to Henn 26/5/28.

would receive some assistance.⁸⁸

Although by 1932 the price of sisal improved from the record low of £12 per ton, changes in the British market made it imperative for East African sisal to secure a place in metropolitan industry. In February 1932 the sisal interests scored a rare victory over British spinners and ropemakers when the British government removed hemp from the new duty-free list.⁸⁹ While 'foreign' fibres such as manilla attracted duty, the Ottawa Conference saw Britain and India grant Imperial preference to Tanganyika sisal.⁹⁰ Other markets for sisal were shrinking with poor grain harvests affecting the demand for binder twine. In order for the sisal industry to take full advantage of Imperial preference, British spinners had to be encouraged to use more sisal, and if they refused, Bird and Co. were ready to go into open competition on the British market.

In October 1933 East Africa reported the formation of the Tanganyika Cordage Company, with £60,000 capital subscribed privately in London, for the purpose of manufacturing twine in Tanganyika.⁹¹ The next the Colonial Office heard of Major Walsh's factory was in September 1934 when an outraged British rope company sent an indignant letter complaining of competition from cordage manufactured in Tanganyika. The Secretary of State Sir Phillip Cunliffe-Lister was equally appalled; competition was bad enough

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88. C.O.691/114/30025C/ Minute by Preston 8/10/31. The Colonial Office carefully checked that there would be no competition with the products of mills in Belfast and Dundee and no loss to the Tanganyika revenue.
89. "Sisal Growers and the Tariffs Bill", East Africa 18/2/32, p.611; "Empire Preference for Sisal", ibid. 3/3/32, p.651.
90. "Sisal Producers Ask Ottawa", East Africa 7/7/32, p.1104; "Sisal Producers and Ottawa", ibid. 11/8/32; "East Africa and Empire Preferences", ibid. 26/1/33, p.478.
91. East Africa 5/10/33, p.79. The Colonial Office should have known something was in the air when Major Walsh waxed lyrical over the "romance" of Empire sisal in "Musings of a Business Man", East Africa 12/10/33, pp.87, 99.

coming from a colony but it was insufferable coming from a Mandated Territory that could not grant preference to British goods. The Colonial Office had no idea that Walsh planned to manufacture cordage for the British market and Bird and Co. had sufficient capital not to be dependent on state assistance. Shortly afterwards two representatives from the British Rope and Twine Federation arrived at the Colonial Office, "labouring under a powerful stress of emotion" and with unkind words to say about Major Walsh.⁹² Although only 500 tons of Tanganyika twine had arrived in Britain, the total British market was only 10,000 tons and the price of Walsh's product threatened to upset the whole business. The Secretary of State promised full satisfaction. Walsh's action had created a dangerous precedent. If even a minute section of British industry was swamped by Empire manufactures the way could be left open for further industrialisation in the colonies and competition with a wider range of British goods. In the face of such a threat the profits of Bird and Co., and the security of the colonial economy in Tanganyika, were rendered unimportant. Walsh refused to listen to any lectures and the Colonial Office lost no time in applying "the screw"; the threat of a penal tariff on Tanganyika twine imported in Britain.⁹³ Walsh refused to be intimidated, published all the correspondence with the Colonial Office and ran pamphlets with the heading "Empire products: PROHIBITION!"⁹⁴

92. Walsh had behaved "in a thoroughly low-down dirty way." He had inspected British mills as part of the Ottawa negotiations and used the knowledge to set up a rival company. C.O.691/135/25068/ Minute by Cunliffe-Lister 28/7/34. Minute by Clauson on meeting with the Rope Federation 31/7/34.

93. C.O.691/135/25068/ Minute by Lee 24/9/34.

94. "Secretary of State's Blunder. Threat to East African Sisal Manufacture", East Africa 25/10/34, pp.125-126. The Colonial Office attempted to quieten the controversy by drafting reports for the British press. C.O.691/135/25068/ Minute by Ridgway 21/10/34.

The British ropemakers threatened to boycott all Tanganyika sisal. In Parliament the Secretary of State faced a barrage of hostile questioning over the imposition of duties on Empire products.⁹⁵

Cunliffe-Lister explained that the policy of His Majesty's Government was to secure markets in Britain for the *primary* products of the Empire. There was no danger to the supply of raw materials to British industry. It was only in a comparatively few cases that a conflict of interest arose between British and Empire manufactures.⁹⁶ Parliament was reassured, and in the interim Major Walsh and the ropemakers came to an agreement. Details were vague, but it appeared that Tanganyika sisal would be allowed on the British market provided it conformed to existing prices. In return the Rope and Twine Federation probably agreed to use a greater proportion of sisal fibre in their own products. By the removal of competition the agreement effectively limited Tanganyika Cordage's share of the British market. The company was forced to look for other markets outside the Empire. (See Table 11). An attempt to enter the large American market in twine proved disastrous when American manufacturers combined to sell their twine at an uneconomic price in order to eliminate foreign competition. Without Imperial preference Tanganyika Cordage could not compete, and in January 1937 the company went into liquidation.⁹⁷

The East African Standard hoped the issue of tariffs on Empire manufactures would bring to the fore a question the British government had so far evaded, namely:

95. "The Threat to Sisal", East Africa 22/11/34, pp.214-215 reports the Parliamentary Questions.

96. ibid. Few conflicts arose because few cases of competitive manufacture escaped the notice of the Colonial Office.

97. C.O.691/135/25068/ Minute by Calder 31/10/34. For the export of twine Tanganyika Territory; Report for 1935, pp.59-63. For the company's collapse see East Africa and Rhodesia 14/1/37, p.586.

Table 11. Cordage Manufacture in Tanganyika 1933-1938

Year	Quantity (cwt.)	Value £	Percentage Total Exports	Destination (percentage total production)
1933	267	350	-	-
1934	15,252	19,098	0.7	-
1935	40,961	52,074	1.5	Britain (15.1%) U.S.A. (14.8%) S.Africa (30.1%) Other Empire (34.1%) Other (5.9%)
1936	46,493	75,942	1.7	Britain (10.0%) U.S.A. (75.6%) S.Africa (6.4%) Candada (4.7%) Other (3.3%)
1937	10,527	17,023	0.3	Britain (86.8%) S.Africa (13.2%)
1938	Nil	-	-	-

Source: Tanganyika Reports 1933-1938

... how far the vast resources of the Colonial Empire suitable for industrial manufacture on the spot are to be sacrificed in the interests of home manufacturers, who rarely trouble to try and encourage the greater consumption of Empire products.⁹⁸

The answer was that Empire manufacture would continue to be sacrificed until the British government decided it did not compete with British industry, injure the revenue of the colonial state and create conditions of social change in the colonies. The interests of British capital as a whole over-rode any benefits cheap labour and on-the-spot manufacture gave to individual capitalists. Although the rope industry was hardly a vital part of the British economy the Colonial Office had acted on principle to preserve the common interest. The role of the Empire was to remain as a source of cheap raw materials and as a market for British goods.

The Tanganyika administration had not gone out of its way to warn the Colonial Office about the plans of Major Walsh. A single factory did not pose a threat to Native Administration and the export of twine would strengthen the colonial economy, as part of the administration's policy to diversify exports. But the Colonial Office had insisted that industrialisation in Tanganyika should remain limited and local, and had closed off one avenue of possible change. The administration had to concentrate its efforts on enlarging the quantities (if not the price) of African cash crops through the 'grow-more-crops' campaign. By 1933 Symes could confidently report that the Territory was no longer dependent on sisal and instead produced a wide range of export crops.⁹⁹ While the administration was no longer so dependent on sisal, the 'wide range of export crops' in fact represented

98. Quotation from "Secretary of State's Blunder. Severely Criticised by the Press", East Africa 1/11/34, p.153.

99. C.O.691/127/5025/ Colonial Office Meeting 12/5/33.

increased production of all the old staples - cotton, coffee, groundnuts, copra and hides and skins.¹⁰⁰ The main concern was sheer output, to preserve the colonial economy and maintain the finances of the colonial state.

However, Tanganyika could not be wholly given over to African cash crop production. One of the consequences of colonial policy in the past was that the labour reserve areas lacked 'suitable transport' to move cash crops to markets. The days of the construction of railway branch lines were definitely over. Any surplus balance accrued by the Tanganyika administration would be devoted to establishing sinking funds, building up reserves and paying off existing loans. Road construction was similarly limited by a lack of finance and the administration had in any case strong doubts over the extension of lorry transport. Long distance haulage competed with the struggling railways for the carriage of the most valuable crops. An annual licence of £100 and numerous regulations prohibiting competition were some of the means employed by the administration to limit the expansion of road transport.¹⁰¹ Cash crop cultivation was restricted by the physical limit of the amount a man could carry on his head to the nearest market.¹⁰²

Changes in the organisation of colonial economy were limited further by the effects of financial constraints on the morale of District Officers. A number of technical staff had been retrenched and a 15% levy had been placed on official salaries.¹⁰³ All travelling allowances had been

100. Tanganyika Territory; Report for 1933, pp.49-50.

101. C.O.691/118/30229/ Minute by Seel 18/1/32; 138/25142/des.d. 4/5/34.

102. One District Officer A.T. Culwick cited the example of an African peasant who produced one ton of cotton. To transport it to market 5 miles away with a head load of 50 lb per journey required a total walk of 450 miles. A.T. Culwick; "The Labourer and His Hire", Tanganyika Notes and Records 17 June 1944.

103. Whybrow commented: "Before long instead of the Govt owing me money I will receive no salary and still owe £5." Whybrow; Diaries (R.H.) 23/2/33.

withdrawn and rather than go on expensive tours of inspection District Officers placed greater reliance on "reliable chiefs" to carry out the government's instructions.¹⁰⁴ The men inspired by an 'apostolic zeal' for Indirect Rule now saw the government as interested solely in revenue and in the production of crops for "London businessmen."¹⁰⁵ The District Officers, the men responsible for the supervision of the colonial economy at a local level, began to doubt that what they were doing was in fact beneficial to the African and to the general interest of the Territory. One enthusiastic convert to Indirect Rule now wrote to his parents about the "heart breaking insincerity of Govt. Service":

If you could read the P.C. [Provincial Commissioner] reports - "steady progress - hope for the future - ready acquiescence in British rule - loyalty of chiefs - honesty of chiefs" - 20 lies in every page. We who live among them know what a sham it all is. Hicks up from Secretariat told men that Headquarters live on the eyewash that is put up to them. It seems to be the way to get promotion for what that may be worth. There seems to be no single purpose merely double shuffling and petty subterfuge to placate some anonymous individual in Whitehall. However it is my bread and butter, till I win a sweep, I shall continue to tell everybody that there is slow and steady progress during the year.¹⁰⁶

Low prices and compulsory cultivation hardly made cash crops popular in the labour reserve areas. For tribes such as the Makonde in the south the depression was the period of "the white man's madness", a period of arbitrary and conflicting government demands.¹⁰⁷ The areas providing labour for the European estates would retain that role despite the weakness and bankruptcy of many plantations and

104. ibid.; 20/12/21; Lumley; Mandate, p.11; Iliffe; Modern History, pp.356-357.

105. C. Whybrow; Diaries (R.H.) 13/4/33 and Lumley; My African Journey (Diary R.H.) 28/10/37.

106. A. Sillery; Letters (R.H.) 6/5/33.

107. J.G. Liebnow; Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania: the case of the Makonde (Evanston 1971), pp.125-143.

the low level of wages offered. Kilimanjaro, Shinyanga, Bukoba and other 'favoured' areas would produce more cash crops at lower prices but the shape of the colonial economy in Tanganyika would otherwise remained unaltered, with little potential for either growth or change.

The final factor militating against change in the colonial economy was the new-found unity among the sisal planters. The Depression had revealed the weak position of sisal on the world market and the inability of the industry to secure assistance from the British government. The sisal planters were determined to improve their situation by combining together and strengthening their position over the African workforce. By agreement wages in the industry were held at the reduced 1930 level and competition between estates for labour was to be limited in the future. The wages and conditions of the African workers underwent a rapid deterioration. The administration decided to assist the sisal industry by ignoring the condition of the estates and refusing to press for improved food, housing and medical care.¹⁰⁸ The sisal plantations may have been battered by the Depression but their owners had no intention of surrendering their economic position in Tanganyika.

The Tanganyika administration could not afford to dispense with the sisal plantations. African cash crop production in Tanganyika did not provide a stable revenue base owing to the effects of environment and price fluctuation. Only enforced cultivation allowed the Tanganyika economy to survive the Depression. Tanganyika was still dependent on Imperial loans and the railways had incurred a large deficit. Changes in the colonial economy were necessary if the administration were to recover its financial position. Industrialisation was ruled out by metropolitan policy. Production of new cash crops such as

108. Lumley reported that District Officers were ordered not to be too severe on the plantations as the industry was barely going. Lumley; Mandate, p.100.

tobacco and tea did not fit in with world market demands. The fickle market had shown that the combination of African cash crop and plantation agriculture, while promising political stability, did not guarantee economic prosperity. The Colonial Office fell back on another combination. They decided that the only way to revitalise the colonial economy of Tanganyika was through the development of a mining industry. Gold was the only product to maintain its price during the Depression and Tanganyika had numerous untried mineral deposits. Capital would flow into the Territory and the existence of gold mines would create an internal market for a wide variety of produce. White settlement would be given a new lease of life. The colonial economy of Tanganyika could evolve along Rhodesian lines.

Symes' work in Tanganyika was finished. He had carried out his orders and enforced both cash crop cultivation and drastic cutbacks in government expenditure.¹⁰⁹ The colonial economy and the colonial state had been preserved and Symes went to his reward; the prize post of Governor-General of the Sudan. The remaining officials could only look forward to a future of impoverishment and slow growth combined with an acute sense of financial caution. The bold spending of Cameron's day that had turned Tanganyika into the most prosperous of the East African colonial economies was replaced by a fear that the Depression could happen again. The administration looked like following Nyasaland by becoming devoted solely to the repayment of interest charges on Imperial loans.¹¹⁰

109. According to Mitchell Symes showed no knowledge of financial matters. Mitchell; Diaries (R.H.) 21/1/32. This may have been an advantage as the Governor was able to insist on reductions in expenditure "without fear or favour." Symes; op. cit., p.164.

110. For Nyasaland's impoverishment in the inter-war years see L. Vail; "The Making of an Imperial Slum: Nyasaland and its Railways", Journal of African History Vol.16(1) 1975. On the British finance market such colonial loans were "gilt-edged" and were quickly subscribed, hence the over-riding importance placed on their repayment. See Lord Altrincham (Sir Edward Grigg); Kenya's Opportunity (London 1955), p.195.

Only the development of a mining industry could pull the colonial economy out of its slump.

Impoverished colonies such as Nyasaland could be accepted by the Colonial Office. An impoverished Mandated Territory was a more dangerous matter. Private enterprise was not really interested in poor colonies where the administration was financially weak and unable to provide much in the way of guarantees and assistance. Government penury was a barrier to exploitation. The Depression had revealed that the colonial economy of Tanganyika was of marginal interest to British capital and in a crisis, it was even dispensable. One day in 1932, over golf, Symes confided to Mitchell "that he could not see that any imperial interests would be affected if the Germans got this country back."¹¹¹ Symes was right, and from 1933 onwards there was an excellent chance that Germany might well regain control of Tanganyika. The National Socialists were in power in Germany and had given a new emphasis to Germany's colonial claims. The German population of Tanganyika evinced a new interest in European politics. The British government was willing to discuss the future of Tanganyika as part of German colonial claims, but it was not willing to lose the Territory to a Nazi putsch. A new Governor was appointed, one more sensitive than Symes to changes in the mood of the Territory's African and European populations. Sir Harold MacMichael was formerly Chief Secretary of the Sudan and his transfer to Tanganyika was part of a plan to spread the talents of that elite group throughout the Colonial Service.¹¹² MacMichael and the Colonial Office were faced with a dilemma. If Britain were to keep Tanganyika then economic development using the mining/settler combination should be pressed ahead, but if the Territory were to return to Germany then all such development should be

111. Mitchell; Diaries (R.H.) 23/12/32.

112. Lord Swinton (Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister); I Remember (London 1946), p.92.

postponed. In the meantime it was necessary to exercise strong government control over possible subversive activities by the German community. To mark the change of emphasis in economic policy many of the 'old hands' from the Cameron era were transferred to other colonies.¹¹³ British settlers would have a new role; as political allies the administration could use to counter a new external threat to colonial rule. For the rest of the 1930s political security would be paramount over economic policy in Tanganyika.

113. Tanganyika Territory; Report for 1935, p.24.

Chapter 5SIR HAROLD MacMICHAEL AND THEPOLICY OF SECURITY

Sir Harold MacMichael took up his appointment as Governor of Tanganyika in February 1934. He was supremely confident in the future of the Territory and in the prospects for the rapid development of the colonial economy. In his letters MacMichael reported that the settlers in Tanganyika were of "an excellent type", generally co-operative, the officials were "a fine body of men" and even the miners were another "good type", orderly, industrious and treating the native well.¹ Relations between the European and African populations were excellent and while the Territory was "essentially a native country", it showed "infinite variety and promise."²

The Governor was writing to the King's Private Secretary and he was plainly putting on a brave face. In 1934 Tanganyika was still recovering from the effects of the Depression. Drought and locusts forced the administration to reduce taxes in some areas, and the Hut and Poll tax figures were some £90,000 down on the 1930 figure. A small surplus balance was only achieved when the Treasury agreed to a temporary remission of £100,000 in interest payments on Imperial loans.³ There appeared to be no clear policy or any chance of fruitful change.⁴ Within a month of his arrival MacMichael had commented to

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1. MacMichael Papers (R.H.) MacMichael to Wigram 16/5/34.
 2. ibid.
 3. C.O.691/139/25183/ des.d. 31/5/34. Treasury letter 20/12.
 4. Even one of the clerks Frederick Pedler thought the Colonial Office was failing in the early 1930s by "having no idea of policy & being made to give a lead to anyone." Mitchell; Diaries (R.H.) 31/8/34.

Mitchell that the Colonial Service in Tanganyika seemed "old and tired."⁵ Imperial loans and the railway deficit dragged on the budget. No more taxes could be squeezed out of the African population and the Europeans would not accept an income tax.⁶ Tanganyika appeared destined for a long period of stagnation.

MacMichael was determined to revive the colonial economy and stage a financial recovery through "a vigorous policy of development."⁷ If the purchasing power of the African population could be increased by only 5/- per head annually, retail sales would rise by £1,250,000 and the administration could collect an additional £125,000 in customs revenue. If "potentially valuable areas" could be opened up to cash crop production government revenue would increase in a very short space of time.⁸ Money not yet committed from Imperial loans would be used to build feeder roads for the railways and to spread cash crop production. More land would be reclaimed for export crops by active counter measures against soil erosion and investigation into irrigating the river valleys. The 'grow-more-crops' campaign would continue with renewed administrative effort. New cash crops - cashews and castor seed at Morogoro and coffee and tobacco at Biharamulo and Songea - would be controlled by the exclusive licence system and by an increase in the number of co-operative societies.⁹

5. ibid.; 19/3/34. Mitchell maintained officers were "keen and zealous."

6. For the complex issue of income tax in East Africa see C.O.822/46/27090 discussion in C.O. 5/7/32.

7. C.O.691/141/25257/ des.d. 13/11/34.

8. ibid.

9. The Governor believed native co-operatives would increase "the prosperity of all whose living is derived, directly or indirectly, from agriculture." A co-operative formed "the most valuable - and I believe the only practicable - force in knitting together native communities whose social organisation cannot be expected indefinitely to resist the impact of Western civilisation and economics." C.O.691/139/25183/ Governor's Speech to Legislative Council 30/10/34. Co-operatives were clearly envisaged as another means of controlling change.

During 1935 Tanganyika was completely free from either drought or locusts. Improved commodity prices brought many Africans back to producing cash crops on their own accord. The improvement in world market prices revived the colonial economy. Cotton and groundnut production increased by 116% and 134% respectively over the 1934 figure. The price of sisal showed its first substantial rise since 1931. Railway earnings increased by nearly £60,000 and general revenues improved by £236,000 over the estimate for the year. Tanganyika was producing more crops and exporting more raw materials than at any other time in its history. (See Table 9). It was a great year for the colonial economy and for the colonial state. Imperial loan charges could be paid, African tax rates restored and the levy on official salaries could be lifted.¹⁰ The Colonial Office was duly relieved; "Tanganyika has such a varied assortment of productive industries, both European and Native, that its economic future seems assured."¹¹ The nightmare of the Depression was in the past. MacMichael spoke confidently to the Overseas League:

There are three essentials to success: first, vision to foresee the potentialities of the future and to realise opportunities when they present themselves; secondly, vigour to grasp the opportunities when they present themselves and press forward to prosperity; and thirdly, confidence in ourselves as a nation and in the future of Tanganyika.

Why should that confidence be lacking? If there is a lack of confidence it can arise only from the existence of one or two or of both of two fears - first that our days as a ruling race are a thing of the past and I see no evidence of that as I look at the map of the world: or secondly that our statesmen are poor, blind, faithless, slippered pantaloons. That they are not. We may have confidence in the future, believing our

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10. C.O.691/139/25183/ Minute by Lee 18/11/35; 141/25247/des.d. 23/2/35; 146/42154/ tele.d. 5/11/35 outline the Territory's recovery. See also "Governor of Tanganyika", *East Africa* 4/7/35, p.941; "Progress on Tanganyika", *ibid.* 28/11/35, p.256.
 11. C.O.691/139/25183/ Minute by Calder 2/8/35.

work is righteous and that it shall endure.
(Loud applause).¹²

It was in many ways a blind confidence and not shared by observers outside official circles. It was true that except for the short slump of 1938, the Tanganyika administration faced no more financial crises, and the colonial economy appeared secure until the end of the 1930s. Yet as early as 1940 Lord Hailey viewed that decade in the history of Tanganyika as a period of stagnation.¹³ Frankel noted in 1938 that even for a colonial economy Tanganyika seemed "poorly developed."¹⁴ Later writers agreed that the 1930s marked the decline of colonial rule in Tanganyika.¹⁵

The impression of failure and stagnation was given by the colonial economy's inability to change. In spite of Colonial Office comments about Tanganyika's 'varied assortment of productive industries', the shape of the colonial economy remained unaltered. MacMichael's 'vigorous policy of development' had added a few roads and some minor crops but had otherwise only increased production of all the old staples. The collapse of commodity prices taught the Tanganyika administration that increases in production were temporary unless maintained by government coercion. The colonial economy in its existing form promised only brief stability to the administration and despite its bravado the Tanganyika government was well aware of the need for change. Gold mining

12. "Governor of Tanganyika on Permanence of British Rule", East Africa 4/5/35, p.941.

13. Lord Hailey; Report on Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa (London 1942), p.252.

14. S.H. Frankel; Capital Investment in Africa (London 1938), p.280.

15. For example Austen; Northwest Tanzania Ch.12; Iliffe; Modern History Ch.11.

promised secure and profitable change, rapid development and government revenues immune from shifts in the world market. Gold had not collapsed in the Depression and promised to provide a stable base around which to organise the colonial economy. The Colonial Office and the government of Tanganyika decided on a policy of 'vigorous development' through gold mining, and they would go to extraordinary lengths to achieve this aim.

The mining industry in Tanganyika possessed a very dubious history. During the war, mica for munitions was mined at Uluguru but was discontinued owing to Byatt's worries about the effects of forced labour on the African workers.¹⁶ There had been no thorough mineralogical survey, and the Mining Ordinance had been subject to considerable delay while the Colonial Office deleted all terms (such as 'British subject') known to be contrary to the Mandate.¹⁷ Up to 1930 there were discoveries of coal at Ufipa, tin at Bukoba and gold and diamonds at Mwanza but they had brought no large scale exploitation.¹⁸ The Colonial Office was willing to assist large companies but refused to grant demands for exclusive mining rights over two-thirds of Tanganyika.¹⁹ The most promising mineral area in Tanganyika was the south-west which contained the Territory's richest and most notorious goldfield on the Lupa River. The field was romantically discovered in 1922 when a trader Bill Cummings detected specks of gold under the carcass of a freshly-killed buffalo. The Lupa was an alluvial field and attracted diggers from all over Africa. East Africa published glowing reports of the potential of

16. C.O.691/19/56982/27/11/18.

17. C.O.691/33/38214/3/8/20; 46/46506/16/9/21.

18. For minerals in the Territory see C.O.691/48/3744/24/1/22; 85/1655/15/2/26; 95/29027/ des.d. 28/12/27; "The Lupa Goldfields", The African World 3/10/25 and "An East African Goldfield", The Times 7/8/25 enclosed in C.O.691/81/36159/7/8/25.

19. C.O.691/52/48615/20/9/21. Development Corporation of East Africa letter 27/9/21.

the diggings; food was plentiful, African labour was cheap and of the essential supplies only alcohol proved expensive. Tanganyika promised to be one of the richest colonies in Africa for "in a territory possessing 373,000 square miles of gold bearing country and with a population of 4,000,000, the possibilities are enormous."²⁰ Despite such optimism few fortunes were made on the Lupa, which like alluvial fields elsewhere was rough, tough and often brutal. The district was remote from administrative supervision and gangs of vigilantes kept 'order' among the African labourers.²¹ Cameron visited the field in 1925, commented "Good Heavens ... what a bloodsome place!" and came away most unimpressed.²² The Governor reported to the Colonial Office that the Lupa held out no great promise of prosperity and the 120 Europeans on the field would quickly decline in number within a year.²³ Cameron's new Mining Ordinance gave little encouragement to the small prospector and favoured instead mineral development by large companies.²⁴ Although gold reefs were discovered at the Lupa in 1924, few large mining companies took any interest in the field. The district was remote and easily isolated by heavy rains. Sir Sydney Henn's Railway Commission decided that mineral developments in the south-west did not warrant the construction of a railway in that direction.²⁵ During the Depression unemployed and destitute Europeans flocked to the Lupa, effectively doubling the population of the gold field. Symes was far more sympathetic towards the diggers and was willing to listen to their demands for greater government control over

20. "The Lupa Goldfields", The African World 3/10/25 enclosed in C.O.691/81/36159 7/8/25.

21. Reid; op. cit., p.166.

22. ibid.; p.164.


23. C.O.691/79/46633/15/10/25 des.d. 21/9/25.

24. C.O.691/101/29293/ des.d. 30/11/28; 112/29855/ des.d. 13/8/30.

25. "Sir Sydney Henn's Arresting Address", East Africa 4/12/30, p.381.

MAP VIII

Tanganyika Territory: Mineral Occurrences 1935



Source: "Gold Mining in Tanganyika",
East Africa 24/11/35, p.146.

the conditions of mining. The Lupa was brought under greater government supervision and regulations were enacted controlling labour and competition for leases.²⁶ The Chairman of the Lupa Diggers Association, Colonel Llewellyn, was full of praise for the "new era" of: "hearty co-operation between officials and diggers ... The Natives used to be almost intolerable; they were continually threatening and showed no respect for their masters. Now conditions are vastly improved."²⁷

In the eyes of the Colonial Office small prospectors promised little in the way of rapid development. Only the involvement of large mining companies would create stability, increase government revenues and attract capital into Tanganyika. The increase in the population of the Lupa expanded knowledge of the reefs and local holders of mining rights were attempting to sell their leases to British and German mining companies. In mid 1932 Colonel Arthur and Captain Harry Grenfell called at the Colonial Office to announce that their Trans-European Company had taken over a number of promising mining rights at the Lupa. They had commenced negotiations with the Tanganyika Mines Department for a major concession and the Tanganyika government was building an access road from Mbeya to encourage such development. This was what the Colonial Office and the Tanganyika government were waiting for: a chance to interest large firms in reef mining in the Territory. There was only one small cloud. The Grenfells had formed a new company - East African Gold-Fields - to develop the Lupa and there was a problem in securing sufficient capital. The elder Grenfell had a reputation in the City which hardly encouraged confidence.

26. The prize system, whereby African workers were paid a bonus for nuggets discovered, was stabilised to prevent competition, the pegging of leases was similarly controlled and all government departments concerned with mining were amalgamated into a single body. See "The Lupa Goldfield: Colonel Llewellyn Addresses E.A. Group", East Africa 22/11/34, pp.215-216.

27. ibid.

He was known as a notorious speculator who had been bankrupt three times. Grenfell had considerable difficulty in securing a 'reputable' businessman to head the Board of Directors of his new company. In spite of the Colonel's dubious past, opinion in the City suddenly changed when sterling was fixed to the price of gold at the rate of 100-120 shillings per ounce. The exploitation of low-grade gold fields such as the Lupa became a profitable proposition and companies were launched to develop similar fields in Canada and South Africa. East African Goldfields benefited from the gold boom and Grenfell was able to present the Colonial Office with a list of suitably 'reputable' shareholders from the City. The Colonial Office was duly impressed; the Crown Agent's own stockbrokers had subscribed capital and so had many other stock exchange firms of first class standing.²⁸ Grenfell stated the company would have at least £50,000 capital and held leases on a 70 mile reef containing 400,000 tons of ore. East African Goldfields intended to extract 360,000 ounces of gold per year with an annual value of £2,500,000. (See Table 12 for past production). After profits at least £1,000,000 would be spent in Tanganyika, with a portion going towards the wages of an estimated 10,000 African workers. The senior officials at the Colonial Office were excited at the prospect "that yet another valuable goldfield would be added to the many the Empire already possesses. If so, the former German owners of the Mandated Territory would be green with envy."²⁹

The Grenfells' proposals placed before the eyes of the Colonial Office an irresistible image of colonial development. The colonial economy of Tanganyika would take on a new form and prosper accordingly. The traffic in Lupa gold if diverted along Lake Nyasa to Beira could make the Zambesi bridge a profitable concern.³⁰ Gold mining would

28. C.O.691/124/31116/ Minute by Greenhill 24/9/32; 129/5080/ Minute by Clauson 18/12/33; "East African Gold-Fields", East Africa 7/6/34, p.792.

29. C.O.691/129/5080/ Minute by Clauson 18/12/34.

30. C.O.691/136/25080/ Minute by Calder 17/3/34.

Table 12. Gold Production in Tanganyika 1922-1938

Year	Amount (oz.)	Value (£)	Percentage Total Exports
1922	249	850	0.7
1923	1,320	5,937	0.4
1924	7,577	30,349	1.2
1925	10,614	42,506	1.5
1926	8,049	31,290	1.0
1927	9,548	36,203	1.1
1928	14,918	56,942	1.5
1929	10,462	39,184	1.0
1930	12,971	46,585	1.6
1931	15,200	60,183	3.7
1932	31,030	157,726	7.2
1933	38,704	195,369	7.7
1934	54,541	295,690	11.2
1935	64,134	369,742	10.7
1936	85,950	489,796	10.8
1937	93,083	526,277	10.6
1938	112,267	589,135	15.9

Source: Tanganyika Reports 1922-1938 and
Armitage-Smith Report 1933

revolutionise the economies of East Africa. Even so, there was still some scepticism in the Colonial Office over the ability of East African Goldfields to carry out such development. The Colonial Office normally investigated companies by asking the Crown Agents to enquire through their brokers, Scrimgeours and Co., but that firm had subscribed to East African Goldfields. The Grenfells' company was still a private concern with share trading carried out on an unofficial basis, and was not obliged to issue any prospectus for public or official scrutiny. The Colonial Office had only the company's word and the company's figures that it had the capital and the intention of developing the Lupa reefs.³¹

Within months the Grenfells reported further expenditure would be required to prove the existence of substantial ore bodies at depth. The reefs sloped at an angle of 70°, and East African Goldfields would need more capital and substantial assistance from the Tanganyika government. The company already possessed an exclusive prospecting licence over 92,000 square miles of south-west Tanganyika and now asked for an exclusive right to take out leases in that area, for a monopoly over water and timber and for the payment of royalties to be fixed for a 10 year period. The Tanganyika government was prepared to be generous *provided* the Colonial Office was satisfied the company intended to carry out genuine large scale development. The Grenfells gave assurances that a mill with a capacity of 500 tons per day would be established crushing ore from the Lupa reefs within 18 months.³²

Given the Grenfells' commercial background and the absence of corroborative evidence the Colonial Office was cautious enough to insist that the establishment of a crushing mill would be a condition of government assistance and that no public issue of shares should take place until

31. C.O.691/136/25080/ Minute by Bottomley 17/3/34.

32. ibid.

the mill was working. There was still a chance East African Goldfields was a sophisticated share speculation. The Colonial Office had no way of checking. A highly technical report forwarded by the company's mining engineers was quite incomprehensible to the senior officials and gave no clue to the value or extent of the reefs. As Bottomley pointed out, an announcement of government assistance would not only permit East African Goldfields to attract more capital, but it would also double the value of shares already issued.³³ The majority of the shares were either held by the Directors of East African Goldfields or had been used to pay the original owners of the mining leases. Sir John Campbell, the financial adviser to the Secretary of State, deprecated too much suspicion of East African Goldfields. He believed the company had the capital, intended to develop the leases and in any case "to start reef mining in Tanganyika is a very desirable development: we are justified in foregoing something to secure it."³⁴ What the Colonial Office was prepared to forego was the certainty that East African Goldfields was not just a front for some share manipulation on the London stock exchange.

East African Goldfields sought further subscriptions of capital and announced the Tanganyika government was prepared to grant extensive concessions to assist the company. It amounted to an expression of government confidence in the Grenfells and the company's shares, originally issued at 5 shillings, more than tripled their value.³⁵ The backers of East African Goldfields had made a profit before an ounce of gold had been mined and the company was now ready to freely spend other people's money, but with little result. In April 1935 Colonel Grenfell told the Colonial Office that his company had spent over £100,000 but was still unable to prove the existence of

33. ibid.

34. ibid.; Minute by Campbell 10/5/34.

35. For the company's advertising and share increases "East African Goldfields", East Africa 7/6/34, p.792.

workable ore at any depth. A smaller mill would have to be installed and the company would need more capital. The Colonial Office began to worry that East African Goldfields would simply dispose of the mining rights at terms most advantageous to itself without worrying about development.³⁶

Both the Colonial Office and the Tanganyika government were now in an awkward position. Tanganyika had obtained a loan from the Colonial Development Fund to build an all-weather road from Tabora to the Lupa for the transport of heavy mining machinery. Once committed the Colonial Office and the Tanganyika government could not pull back without ruining the confidence of investors and any chance of developing large scale gold mining in the Territory.³⁷ In September 1935 the administration's Mining Consultant Dr. Edmund Teale visited London obviously on a mission to encourage investment and improve business confidence in the gold mining industry of Tanganyika. Dr. Teale began a series of slide shows and lectures in which he expressed full confidence in the diamond drilling campaign of East African Goldfields and in the future of Tanganyika as a large gold producer.³⁸

There was another large company interested in gold mining in Tanganyika. Tanganyika Concessions was involved in mining throughout Africa, from Union Miniere in Katanga to the Kakamega gold mines in Kenya. The company owned Kentan gold areas and the Geita mine near Mwanza. Geita was supposedly the most promising mine north of the Rand,³⁹

36. C.O.691/145/42110A/ des.d. 20/11/35. Minute by Lee 30/11.

37. For Grenfell's complaints over the road and its adverse effects on investors "Tanganyika Gold Prospects", East Africa and Rhodesia 25/2/37, p.780.

38. "'Tanganyika Will Become Important Gold Producer'. Government Mining Consultant's Great Confidence in the Territory", East Africa 19/9/35, p.39; "Gold Mining in Tanganyika", ibid. 24/10/35, pp.146-147.

39. C.O.691/147/42022/2/ Letter from Kentan 1/5/36. Minute by Pedler 22/4/36; M. Perham; Colonial Sequence 1930-1949 (London 1967), p.164.

but Tanganyika Concessions had run into financial difficulties in the early 1930s over the operation of the Benguela railway.⁴⁰ It had little capital to spare to allow its subsidiary to develop the Geita mine. The Mwanza mines were scattered and it was difficult to imagine a new Rand arising in the midst of the dense African population of the Lake district. It was clear from Teale's speeches that the main hope of the Tanganyika government lay in the Lupa and in the diamond drill of East African Goldfields.

Political developments had given the promotion of gold mining in Tanganyika a certain urgency. With the Nazis in power in Germany, the Tanganyika administration was faced with outbreaks of intense German nationalism within the Territory. More alarming was the possibility of Germans gaining surreptitious control over the colonial economy. There were rumours that the German government and the Deutsche Bank were providing subsidies to permit German companies to buy up destitute sisal plantations. German mills refused to purchase East African sisal unless the fibre came from a German-owned estate. The German plantations favoured insurance companies and shipping lines run by their compatriots, and it appeared British interests might be ousted from the sisal industry. The Colonial Office would not break precedent and provide financial assistance for British sisal planters, but there was patently a need to attract more British capital into Tanganyika as a counter-weight against German influence.⁴¹

Ever since 1919 the Colonial Office was aware that

40. For the financial problems of Tanganyika Concessions 1933-36 see S.E. Katzenellenbogen; Railways and the Copper Mines of Katanga (Oxford 1973), p.131. In any case the Chairman Sir Robert Williams was determined that the East African Mines should operate "without sacrificing the interests of the original shareholders." "Life and Work of Sir Robert Williams", East Africa and Rhodesia 28/4/38, pp.992-993.

41. C.O.691/135/25068/ Letter from Major W. Lead on German schemes 13/2/34. For the unsuccessful British scheme to buy up defunct sisal estates C.O.691/136/25068/2 des.d. 14/8/34.

subsidised German immigration might be employed in an attempt to return the Territory to German domination.⁴² British anxiety to control German immigration without breaking the Mandate was one of the reasons why the de Ropp scheme had received such favourable consideration.⁴³ Although the Tanganyika government had expressed confidence that German immigrants could be kept under close surveillance in a small European population, groups of German settlers had escaped the administrative gaze to squat on farms around Mbulu in the Northern Province and in the Southern Highlands.⁴⁴ The Colonial Office hoped that Cameron's system of Native Administration would strengthen the administration against a German 'push'.⁴⁵ The German colonial societies had become extremely agitated over the question of Closer Union which appeared to them as the complete incorporation of Tanganyika into the British Empire.⁴⁶ The 'German menace' was never far from the attention of the Colonial Office. In 1930 a minor diplomatic incident had occurred when seamen from the German cruiser *Karlsruhe* staged a parade through Tanga and were addressed by the German consul. The British government made a formal protest and British sailors staged a counter-march a few days later. Africans at Korogwe feared a recurrence of the last war and sensibly fled to the bush.⁴⁷

Such activity was comparatively mild compared to the flood of German propaganda under the Nazis. In Tanganyika Nazi and Stahl Helm organisations proliferated and their displays of flags and banners profoundly irritated many

42. C.O.691/23/65096/13/11/19.

43. C.O.691/73/3707/26/1/25.

44. C.O.691/75/35876/28/7/24.

45. C.O/691/83/1099/30/1/26. Minute by Strachey 8/2/26.

46. For Colonial Office comment on the German agitation over Closer Union see C.O.691/96/29061 Minute by Machtig 25/2/28.

47. C.O.691/112/29834/ Minute by Seel 15/9/30.

Table 13.

Land Holdings in Tanganyika by Nationality 1930 and 1938

Nationality	No. of Holdings	1930		
		Acres per Holding	Percentage of Total	
			Holdings	Acreage
British	520	1,454	30.2	39.3
German	575	1,039	21.8	20.1
Indian	358	914	20.8	17.0
Greek	247	963	14.3	13.4
S. African	44	1,508	2.6	3.4
Swiss	5	1,323	0.3	0.3
Others	<u>172</u>	<u>764</u>	<u>10.0</u>	<u>6.5</u>
Total	1,721	1,116	100.0	100.0

Nationality	No. of Holdings	1938		
		Acres per Holding	Percentage of Total	
			Holdings	Acreage
British	440	1,791	26.0	38.8
German	554	860	32.8	23.5
Indian	278	994	16.4	13.6
Greek	223	865	13.2	9.5
S. African	51	1,116	3.2	2.8
Swiss	15	3,993	0.9	3.0
Others	<u>129</u>	<u>1,374</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>8.8</u>
Total	1,690	1,120	100.0	100.0

Source: C. Leubuscher; Tanganyika Territory
Table A.2, p.203

British settlers. Prominent Germans - ex-colonial officials, members of the former Royal family, personal emissaries from 'Herr Hitler' - came to Tanganyika in a steady stream for discussions with the German community.⁴⁸ In 1933 Sir John Sandeman Allen, the Chairman of the Joint East Africa Board, was debarred from discussing Closer Union with the Moshi Chamber of Commerce on the vote of the German members. Understandably irate, Sandeman Allen went on to make a speech at Arusha where he claimed the Mandate over Tanganyika was irremovably British, and called for capital to come and develop the Territory.⁴⁹ In November 1933 East Africa reported the formation of a British Union (open to all residents with British sympathies) in Tanganyika. Its chairman General Boyd-Moss maintained the Union was not anti-German, just pro-British, and sought to promote Closer Union, more British settlement, greater investment by British capital and increased purchase of British goods. The Colonial Office did not welcome the news; 'what with the German settler organisations, the new Nazi movement and now a pro-British Union (including the Portugese, the Argentines and the Greeks) there seems to be the making of a first class row.'⁵⁰

In 1933 an anonymous letter warned the Colonial Office that the Germans in Tanganyika were plotting to seize the Governor and overthrow the British administration. Symes had remained unconcerned, placing his faith in the Territory's strong K.A.R. Garrison and the effect of a few select deportations.⁵¹ The Colonial Office remained uncertain about what exactly could be done to discourage German activities. In regard to increasing British settlement the Colonial Office decided there was little it could do "unless some English concerns were prepared to make

48. For details of German visits see N. Macauley; Mandates: Reasons, Results, Remedies (London 1937), pp.62-67.

49. C.O.691/130/5089/ des.d. 1/9/33 semi-official letter from Symes 14/9/33.

50. C.O.691/130/5089/ Minute by Seel 24/11/33; East Africa 16/11/33.

51. C.O.691/130/5089/ des.d. 1/9/33.

speculative investments in financing settlers as the Usagara Company seems to be doing."⁵² Restrictions on German immigration could be construed as an unfriendly act by the German government. The Tanganyika government could not detect any subversive aims behind the German settler organisations. Local Nazis taught African workers to give the Nazi salute and say 'heil Hitler' on paydays but otherwise the government saw no need to proscribe the Nazi Party as was done in South-West Africa.⁵³ Early in 1935 the Tanganyika Nazis split over the issue of white solidarity in Africa and their activities became more subdued on orders from Berlin.⁵⁴ The Tanganyika Nazis were noisy but not dangerous and the Colonial Office became aware that "the real struggle over the Colony Question will come not in Tanganyika but in Europe."⁵⁵

All the same the Colonial Office believed it was necessary for the Tanganyika administration to do something to consolidate British interests in the Territory. MacMichael suggested the main long range measure should be support for British enterprise, in particular for East African Goldfields. The other possible measure was an increase in British settlement, though the Governor was very doubtful about its chances of success. He described the British settlers of Tanganyika as comprising two types; "the rolling stone and the professional failure."⁵⁶ They blamed the government for everything, grumbled continually about "old forgotten far-off things" and always asked for administrative assistance over matters the German

52. C.O.691/136/25089/ Minute by Seel 9/6/33.

53. C.O.691/136/25089/ des.d. 6/11/39. With hindsight some of the Nazi activities in Tanganyika appear redolent of musical comedy. In 1938 the German consul died and insisted in his will on being buried facing his beloved Fuhrer, thus providing Dar-es-Salaam cemetery with one grave at right angles to the rest. Mrs. A.C. Mason; Reminiscences 1930-1945 (R.H.).

54. C.O.691/141/42022/ Minute by Lee 31/12/35.

55. ibid.

56. C.O.691/136/25089/ semi-official letter from MacMichael 16/7/34.

settlers were willing to do for themselves. If a better type of man could be obtained, then the Governor was willing to modify the Land Ordinance and dispense with the auction requirement at the discretion of the administration. The government could then favour British settlement by the grant of large land concessions, regardless of the terms of the Mandate. MacMichael put more faith in a policy of "vigorous economic development" to strengthen British interests and to counter any suggestion that the Territory had become impoverished under British mandate.⁵⁷

The Tanganyika government formed a committee to report on the prospects of extended settlement in the Southern Highlands. It came to the usual *recommendations*: £3,000,000 annual assistance from His Majesty's Government, low rent and the grant of large land concessions.⁵⁸ Further Imperial loans on such a scale were out of the question. Tanganyika's loans came to nearly £9,000,000 and the Territory paid £434,000 annually in interest charges. The Colonial Office did not see how settlers in the Southern Highlands could market the suggested crops of coffee, grain and dairy produce. Coffee prices were still depressed as the Brazilians began to unload their surplus stocks on the London market. The settlers would have to compete with Africans in the production of cereals and the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia had recently told the Colonial Office that settlers could not prosper unless definite restrictions were placed on the development of native agriculture to prevent competition.⁵⁹ The Colonial Office would not restrict African cash crops in Tanganyika as German settlers would also benefit. The Tanganyika government was unwilling to subsidise small settlers and insisted that any settlement scheme should possess sufficient capital to provide educational, medical

57. C.O.691/136/25089/ des.d. 6/11/34.

58. C.O.691/143/42042/ des.d. 29/1/35.

59. C.O.691/143/42042/ des.d. 29/1/35. Minute by Bottomley 8/3/35.

and transport facilities. The government's insistence on capital had halted discussion in the Colonial Office over whether Jewish, Assyrian and other refugees could be placed as settlers in Tanganyika.⁶⁰

There was only one major scheme supporting British settlement before the Colonial Office. Over the years the senior officials had seen many schemes for the settlement of the Southern Highlands, and by all standards Lord Chesham's plan to settle the Southern Highlands was distinctly "half-baked."⁶¹ Chesham hoped to obtain 60,000 acres at low rent near Mufundi and to attract as settlers officers retiring on half-pay from the Indian army. He had already started circulating a pamphlet comparing the Southern Highlands of Tanganyika to the Sussex downs.⁶² Settlers would be able to breed polo ponies and undertake mixed farming and tobacco growing. Lord Chesham's pamphlet made no mention of markets or of the fact that the farms were 500 miles by road to the nearest port. He told the Colonial Office that great reliance would be placed on the successful development of the Lupa goldfield as a market for settler produce. Chesham was not a land speculator and genuinely sought British settlement in Southern Tanganyika but his scheme was extremely vague and its capital backing was very doubtful. In the past the Colonial Office had dismissed similar plans as dangerous, leading to numbers of small settlers becoming utterly dependent on the local administration. However if British settlement was to be strengthened in Tanganyika, then Lord Chesham's was the only scheme available and the Colonial Office had little choice but to provide encouragement.⁶³

60.. C.O.691/143/42042/ Minute by Lee 16/7/35.

61. C.O.691/143/42042/ Minute by Maffey 11/9/35.

62. C.O.691/148/42042/ letter from Chesham 2/1/36; "Settlement in Southern Tanganyika", East Africa and Rhodesia 6/1/38, pp.510-511.

63. In regard to the Chesham scheme the Colonial Office was faced with the same dilemma as had occurred with East African Goldfields - a doubtful company, but the only one ready and available. British capital was only slightly interested in Tanganyika. This was

The absence of even lunatic schemes for settlement in Tanganyika was not due to a clear perception of conditions in the Southern Highlands or to previous discouragement by the Colonial Office. It was ironic that when the Tanganyika administration desired to increase the number of British settlers there was a general lack of applicants. The shortage of settlers was due to the public attitude of the British government towards German colonial claims over Tanganyika. In March 1935 during discussions over the Anglo-German naval treaty, the German government officially raised the question of the return of her former colonies. The future of Tanganyika became a matter of 'high policy' at Cabinet level. The British government hoped that access to colonial raw materials would satisfy the German demand for colonies and avoid any transfer of territory.⁶⁴ Hence the Colonial Office had not taken firm action against German firms or German immigration into Tanganyika. While the question of German colonial claims remained unsettled government spokesmen refused to make firm commitments about the future of Tanganyika in the British Empire. Both the Joint East African Board and the East African Section of the London Chamber of Commerce made public statements calling for a firm stand against German colonial claims in East Africa.⁶⁵ The best the Colonial Office could do was to circulate copies of Amery's old speeches affirming the

F.n. 63 continued.

partly due to the sisal collapse and to financiers losing a good deal of money on the slump in East African coffee. Stahl; op. cit., p.232.

64. British attitudes towards the German colonial question are discussed in W.W. Schmokel; "The Hard Death of Imperialism: British and German Colonial Attitudes 1919-1939" in P. Gifford and W.R. Louis (eds.); Britain and Germany in Africa (New Haven 1967) and A.E. Ekoko; "The British Attitude to Germany's Colonial Irredentism in Africa in the Inter-War Years", Journal of Contemporary History Vol.14(2) 1979.

65. The Mandate in Tanganyika is discussed by the East African Section of the London Chamber of Commerce in East Africa 23/4/36, p.691, and ibid. 7/5/36, p.730; by the Joint East Africa Board, ibid. 14/5/36, p.756; by the Empire Industries Association, ibid. 7/5/36, p.730 and by the East African Group of the Overseas League, ibid. 25/6/36, p.872. All were opposed to any transfer.

permanency of the Mandate. The unusual unanimity of East African opinion was due to a realisation that the transfer of the Mandate could seriously affect the economic stability of Kenya and Uganda.⁶⁶ Settlers, traders, Indians, missionaries, merchants and officials all appeared united in opposition to German claims.⁶⁷

The issue would be decided not in East Africa but in Europe. A large section of the British press favoured the grant of colonies to Germany as part of a general settlement of Hitler's claims in Europe. Tanganyika was worth sacrificing to avoid a European war. There were disquieting signs that the British government might be prepared to sever Tanganyika from the British Empire. In 1934 the Secretary of State toured East Africa but he did not visit Tanganyika.⁶⁸ In October 1935 the new Secretary of State Malcolm MacDonald firmly rejected the idea of Closer Union, in spite of settler claims that a federation would halt all German aspirations in East Africa.⁶⁹ Most unsettling of all was the continued inability of the British government to give a clear statement of policy towards German colonial claims.⁷⁰ After the invasion of the Rhineland in March

66. A point made by Sir Humphrey Leggett in East Africa 23/4/36, p.691.

67. "Tanganyika's Own Appeal", East Africa 9/7/36, pp.909-910. The Colonial Office did not seek African opinion as it was by no means certain that they did prefer British rule. Some appeared to look back nostalgically to German times as a period of less pressure and lower taxes. See M. Perham; Journey, p.219.

68. The Secretary of State had an infected throat. Macauley; op. cit., pp.46-47.

69. For the rejection of Closer Union C.O.822/67/46523/Minute by Calder 9/9/35; 73/46523/Minute by Flood 12/6/36; East Africa 31/10/35, p.162.

70. For examples of government prevarication in Parliament see the reports in East Africa 30/4/36, pp.710-711; ibid. 30/7/36, p.969; ibid. 6/8/36, pp.995-996; ibid. 13/8/36, pp.1013-1014; Schmokel; op. cit., pp.318-320. For the response of the British press East Africa and Rhodesia 14/1/37, pp.570-571 and Schmokel; op. cit., pp.311, 319.

1936 a special Cabinet committee was appointed to examine the colonial question. The committee found strong, almost overwhelming arguments against the transfer of the Mandate but still concluded:

We realise that there are wider considerations of which we have not full knowledge and that these may render a transfer necessary, despite the grave objections. If so, for instance, it appeared Germany set so great a price upon getting back her former colonies that the return of one or more of them would tip the scale between peace and war, then we should hesitate to say that such action should not be contemplated.⁷¹

The problem for the British government was to find out what would appease Hitler. Although in May 1935 the Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon told Hitler the question of colonial transfers was "not discussable", the Germans were well aware the question *was* discussable so long as the British government was committed to appeasement.⁷² Hitler would not make his intentions clear and, while this was the case, the British government would not give assurances about the future of Tanganyika.

Not surprisingly MacMichael reported a growing uneasiness among the business community in Tanganyika. The Germans were quiet and there was no substance to reports of arms smuggling or other subversive activity. In spite of rumours to the contrary, the Lutheran missions were not teaching that Herr Hitler was identical with the Messiah.⁷³ In August 1937 MacMichael gave his own reassurances to the business community with a speech at Arusha on the topic 'The Empire of which we are and shall always be a part'. The Colonial Office felt it was improper for a Colonial Governor to make public comment on matters of 'high policy'

71. Report 23 of the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Transfer of Mandates to Germany quoted in Ekoko; op. cit., p.303.

72. "Germany Pressing Her Colonial Claims", East Africa and Rhodesia 20/10/38, pp.174-175.

73. C.O.691/147/42022/ des.d. 25/5/36.

and MacMichael was duly warned for his presumption.⁷⁴

The Governor had to do something as the uncertainty over the Mandate was ruining his policy of 'vigorous development'. Lord Chesham's schemes for greater British settlement began to take a concrete form. Although the Colonial Office was still sceptical of its chances, the Tanganyika government thought the scheme was worthy of every encouragement. MacMichael informed the Colonial Office that he expected the Lupa field to have a population of 5,000 Europeans and 25,000 African labourers within 5 years. They would consume 30,000 tons of mixed produce annually and would be supplied by Lord Chesham's settlers. Chesham started a company with £25,000 capital to build factories for processing raw materials and to construct suitable facilities for the settlers. 1,000 settlers would come each with £2,000 capital and they would produce wheat, flour, bacon, cheese and butter and make Tanganyika self-sufficient in those items. Vigorous economic development would commence and British settlement would be strengthened in Tanganyika. To forward such aims the Tanganyika government was prepared to grant 110,000 acres to Lord Chesham at the rent of 1 cent per acre. The auction requirement was waived and the company was required to bring 20,000 acres under immediate development.⁷⁵ The legal advisers at the Colonial Office described the agreement between Lord Chesham and the Tanganyika government as illegal, but the senior officials hoped the irregularities would go undetected provided there was no publicity.⁷⁶ After all the Tanganyika government was very enthusiastic about the prospects of "this new experiment in white settlement."⁷⁷

74. C.O.691/147/42022/4 Extract from the Times 6/8/36 and Minute by Bottomley 10/8/36.

75. C.O.691/148/42042/ Letter from Chesham 22/6/36.

76. C.O.691/148/42042/ Minute by Lee 23/3/36 and Minute by Roberts-Wray 25/7.

77. C.O.691/148/42042/ des.d. 7/3/36; "Sir Harold MacMichael Interviewed", East Africa and Rhodesia 22/7/37, p.1430.

Chesham commenced the construction of a country club on the Mufundi road, complete with polo ground, aerodrome, tennis courts and golf course. These improvements provided attractive pictures for his publicity pamphlets. But Chesham's scheme for the development of the Southern Highlands was all based on a dream. Mitchell thought Chesham was far too reliant on attracting "half-pay polo-playing majors" and had too little capital for the size of the scheme.⁷⁸ The land selected was of very uneven quality and too much money was spent on advertising and building luxury facilities.⁷⁹ Although Chesham reduced the amount of capital required by potential settlers, there were no applicants. After the Mandate scare, few people whether on half-pay or not, were willing to invest their small capital in an uncertain life on the Southern Highlands of Tanganyika. Settlement was confined to Lord Chesham and his partner.⁸⁰ In 1940 the country club was still standing but there were no settler farms around it.⁸¹ It was a pathetic end to the dreams of Smuts and Delamere, of a Great White State with strong settler communities established throughout the highlands of East Africa.

The uncertainty over the Mandate threatened the last great hope of the Tanganyika government - the development of gold mining. German demands and procrastination by the British government caused alarming tremors in the price of shares of gold mining companies involved in Tanganyika. Both Kentan Gold Areas and East African Goldfields sought assurances from the Colonial Office on the future of the Tanganyika Mandate. Grenfell maintained that £150,000 in capital subscriptions had been withdrawn from his company by stockbrokers in the City, and they were all advising

78. MacMichael Papers (R.H.) Mitchell to MacMichael 19/6/35.

79. Cattle were brought in before dipping facilities were built and the herd was decimated by tick fever. C.O.691/154/42042/ Minute by Lee 20/11/37.

80. ibid.

81. N. Farson; Behind God's Back (London 1940), pp.133-134.

their clients to have nothing to do with Tanganyika.⁸²

The difficulties faced by the gold mining companies in Tanganyika were not entirely due to the Mandate scare. East African Goldfields was unable to meet the development conditions on the mining leases and the Tanganyika government had stopped building all-weather roads to carry the company's machinery. The Grenfells decided to limit the development and concentrate on the most promising site, the Sanza mine. A subsidiary company would be formed with £500,000 capital though half this sum would go towards purchase of the lease from East African Goldfields. In July 1936 the company reported its finances were almost exhausted but if the Tanganyika government would modify the development conditions and allow installation of a smaller crushing mill, East African Goldfields could survive on the issue of debentures.⁸³

By this stage the Colonial Office welcomed even a small start on the development of the Lupa reefs and agreed to further concessions to East African Goldfields. The company proceeded to issue the debentures - to the German firm of Siemens-Schuckert as credit on the purchase of mining machinery. The Colonial Office was now faced with the possibility of eventual German control over the most promising reefs on the Lupa. Financial assistance to the company from government sources was ruled out, and it became apparent even in the Colonial Office that all the money so far subscribed had been lost and any shareholders taking up additional debentures would lose more

82. C.O.691/147/42022/2/ Letter from East African Goldfields 6/4/36, Letter from Kentan Gold Areas 1/5/36. For share movements see report of a shareholders' meeting for Kentan Gold East Africa and Rhodesia 24/12/36, p.495.

83. The complex history of East African Goldfields is recorded in C.O.691/145/42110A/ Letters from Grenfell 15/5/35, 8/7/35; 150/42110A/ Minute by Calder 7/10/36.

money.⁸⁴ In October 1937 a source in the City revealed the condition of East African Goldfields was "financially as bad as can be."⁸⁵ The Grenfells could not raise 6d on their reputation in the City and the company would have to find a purchaser, appoint a receiver or allow control to pass to German interests. To avert the last possibility the Colonial Office asked the big South African companies if they were willing to take over the mines. Ernest Oppenheimer of Consolidated Goldfields and Dougal Malcolm of the British South Africa Company indicated they would be willing to take over the leases as a "public-spirited" gesture. They would do the Colonial Office a favour and expect it to be reciprocated. But neither company was willing to invest in and commence production of gold in Tanganyika.⁸⁶ They would simply keep the leases from German control. The colonial economy of Tanganyika needed the leases to be developed, not held under a 'dead hand' and the inquiry went no further.⁸⁷ In January 1938, after an unsuccessful issue of debentures, East African Goldfields collapsed. A further £60,000 was required to set up a crushing mill and start production but the company's capital was now reduced to £3.7.6. Eventually the official receiver managed to sell the company to an obscure American group but by then it was clear there would be no extensive development of the gold reefs of Tanganyika.⁸⁸

Many of the company's problems were due to uncertainty over the Mandate. Even Kentan Gold Areas, backed by

84. C.O.691/156/42110A/ Minute by Lee 25/5/37.

85. C.O.691/156/42110A/ Minute by Lee 20/10/37.

86. C.O.691/156/42110A/ Minute by Boyd 20/10/37.

87. Approaches were made to merchant bankers such as Jardine Matheson, but they were unwilling to help the company while the Colonial Office refused further assistance. C.O.691/156/42110A/ Minute by Clauson 10/11/37, Minute by Campbell 18/11/37.

88. C.O.691/164/42110A/ Letter from Sir H. Howitt (official receiver) 12/1/38.

a large and reputable company, experienced difficulty in attracting capital and was forced to issue debentures at a high rate of interest in order to develop the Geita mine.⁸⁹ East African Goldfields was launched in the midst of the mining boom of 1933-34 when the price of gold rose by 70% within two years.⁹⁰ The initial interest of major stock exchange firms in the exploitation of low grade gold fields camouflaged the speculative nature of the Grenfells' company. East African Goldfields was a venture intent on securing profits from share-markups and eventual sale of the leases to larger companies. The last part of the scheme broke down when the company was unable to prove the existence of sufficient ore to interest other buyers. The Colonial Office and the Tanganyika government believed that East African Goldfields would lead the way in the development of the gold industry in Tanganyika. But while the Lupa reefs were in the hands of a company more intent on speculation than on development, other British companies would not become involved. In addition it was not in the interest of the great mining companies to divert capital to the marginal gold fields of Tanganyika. The mining industry in South Africa was enjoying the greatest boom in its history and Oppenheimer and his colleagues were not inclined to invest in Tanganyika.⁹¹ A rapid expansion of the gold supply from discoveries and mining in Tanganyika could only damage the price of gold and therefore the gold industry in the Territory was deprived of capital.⁹² The

89. C.O.691/150/42110/5/ Minute by Lee 10/12/37.

90. For the gold boom, especially in South Africa, see G. Lanning and M. Mueller; Africa Undermined (Harmondsworth 1979), pp.137-139.

91. ibid.; p.138.

92. The Treasury was worried that the administration's scheme of loans for small miners might affect world supplies and reduce prices, and it seems likely the large mining companies would be of similar opinion. C.O.691/156/42110/7/ Letter from Treasury 9/7/37.

brief rise and prolonged fall of East African Goldfields shattered official hopes that the colonial economy of Tanganyika could be revived through gold mining. The last avenue of change was effectively closed.

The Tanganyika government endeavoured to reconstruct something from the shambles and switched its attention to development of mining through small prospectors. Almost all the £750,000 of gold from the Lupa had come from alluvial claims. The Tanganyika government apparently hoped the Lupa field would follow the Southern Rhodesian pattern and comprise a few large mines interspersed with alluvial diggings and small companies crushing the reef ore. The problem with small prospectors as agents of rapid economic development was the inability of most miners to make anything in the way of profit.⁹³ Simple machinery to separate gold from dirt was introduced into the field and by such means the output of gold slowly expanded. In 1937 the Tanganyika government decided to use £40,000 of surplus balance to finance loans for small diggers. The Colonial Office distrusted the scheme on the grounds of undesirable precedent but as there was little chance of development by large scale mining the loans were approved. Officials hoped that the provision of funds would go some way to solving the crisis over the conditions of African labour in Tanganyika.⁹⁴

The labour crisis in the Territory was due to the inability of the colonial economy to change combined with the administration's policies of 'vigorous development'. The administration continued to rely on the 'grow-more-crops' campaign to produce revenue. Compulsory planting, improved commodity prices and extension of the exclusive trading licence system combined to set record tonnages for

93. Of the 1,128 licenced diggers on the Lupa, 24 made 45% of the total profit of the field. "Tanganyika Mining Prospects", East Africa and Rhodesia 12/11/36, p.299.

94. C.O.691/156/42110/7/ des.d. 31/5/37.

the export of raw materials.⁹⁵ Mitchell explained that the main problem of the administration was:

... to make as many people as possible consumers; and, when they consume, they are avaricious consumers. We want people who are thirsting for umbrellas or gramophones to be able to buy them, for if the population could produce another £1 per head per annum we should be out of the wood.⁹⁶

The African population apparently preferred to hold onto their cash rather than spend it on metropolitan goods. Although exports expanded in each year there was no corresponding rise in the level of imports.⁹⁷ The administration believed one reason for the fall was the conquest of the East African market by cheap Japanese imports of clothing and textiles. During the Depression Japanese manufactures were welcomed by the government as their very cheapness encouraged African purchase and provided incentive to grow more crops. However, the administration suspected that Africans, unimpressed by the number and quality of the goods on offer in the local Indian *dukas*, were actually hoarding cash earnings. The Chief Secretary H.R. Mackenzie-Kennedy complained:

He had an offer to sell scented soap to the Sukuma and he had no doubt the offer would be taken advantage of, but the fact remained that in one of the Sukuma districts over £70,000 remained in the hands of the people when all their tax obligations had been met but that only 26 bicycles were available for sale in the whole district.⁹⁸

Cash accumulation by Africans was regarded as plainly

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- 95. C.O.691/151/42167/ Reports on Native Agriculture 26/9/36 and "Trade Report", East Africa and Rhodesia 18/3/37, p.880.
 - 96. "In Tanganyika Today" (address to the East African Section of the London Chamber of Commerce), East Africa 28/2/35, p.546.
 - 97. Tanganyika Territory; Report for 1937, pp.27-28.
 - 98. "Tanganyika's Problems and Policies" (speech to Tanganyika Sisal Growers Association), East Africa and Rhodesia 29/7/37, p.1459.

undesirable by the administration. It threatened to remove the incentive to work and the existence of wealthy Africans hardly promised to benefit the colonial economy. The Tanganyika government decided that here was a great opportunity for British enterprise if British traders could supply a better class of goods for African consumption. The Governor seemed to have in mind something along the lines of a travelling Woolworths.⁹⁹ The administration considered the issue sufficiently important to over-ride protests by the Tanganyika Chambers of Commerce about Africans engaging in trade. In the interests of extending the colonial economy African shops could be set up without the payment of licences or fees.¹⁰⁰ The Belgian delegate to the Permanent Mandates Commission drily suggested that the reason for Tanganyika's surplus of exports over imports was due to the white residents of the Territory "accumulating favourable balances in London and elsewhere, and could therefore export more than they imported."¹⁰¹

The late 1930s were undoubtedly a profitable time for European merchants in Tanganyika and for some Africans in some parts of the Territory. For others, particularly Africans in the labour reserves, it was a time of decline in health, wages and conditions. The colonial economy had not been changed by the Depression. The finances of the administration were still dependent on an equal combination of African cash crops and sisal plantations. In a desperate attempt to stay solvent the sisal planters had increased their output during the Depression and in 1935 sisal prices commenced a steady recovery. The planters were concerned that the administration's 'grow-more-crops' campaign and

99. "Sir Harold MacMichael Interviewed", East Africa and Rhodesia 22/7/37, p.1430; "New Openings for British Trade", ibid. 5/8/37, p.1488.

100. Tanganyika Territory; Report for 1937, pp.72-73.

101. "Lord De La Warr Rebuts Criticisms Made by the Permanent Mandates Commission", East Africa and Rhodesia 16/9/37, p.34. Lord de la Warr simply denied Rappard's remarks.

the expansion of the mining industry could deprive them of African labour. The Department of Agriculture explained that as women did most of the work on African farms and *they* were never employed cutting sisal, there was no danger to the labour supply. To make sure the 'grow-more-crops' campaign was diverted away from areas containing "normal labour sources."¹⁰²

The sisal industry was incapable of attracting labour without the active co-operation of the administration. Wages were so low that even the sisal planters agreed they could not be reduced further.¹⁰³ Although Mackenzie-Kennedy described the conditions for labour on the Lupa as "disgusting", the higher wages attracted many African migrants in the south-west away from the plantations to the gold fields.¹⁰⁴ From 1936 onwards the sisal industry launched a period of expansion to coincide with prices reaching £30 per ton. The dislocation in fresh planting caused by the Depression was being felt on world markets and the shortage was intensified by good grain crops on the American wheatfields and a corresponding demand for binder twine. In spite of all the scares over the Mandate in 1936 over £1,500,000 of British capital was invested in the Tanganyika sisal industry.¹⁰⁵ Sisal was profitable at £30 per ton because the operating costs of the industry had been reduced to a bare minimum. This extended not only to wages but to the conditions of the African workforce. Plantations adopted a policy of deliberate neglect towards the health, housing and food of their labourers. District Officers were instructed to ignore the conditions on the estates while the sisal industry was in financial difficulties. To man their estates, sisal planters were

102. "Tanganyika Plans Prosperity" (report of Tanganyika Department of Agriculture), East Africa 3/9/36, p.1075.

103. "Sisal Industry's Views" (address by Major W. Lead to Tanganyika Sisal Growers Association), East Africa and Rhodesia 15/12/38, p.438.

104. C.O.691/152/42191/4/ Minute by Lee 28/5/36.

105. "A Survey of the Sisal Position", East Africa and Rhodesia 19/8/37, pp.1544-1545.

forced to recruit 45,000 labourers annually from the labour reserves of Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, Mozambique and the Congo. Such recruitment was an expensive business and the sisal planters were anxious that "undesirable and uneconomic competition" for labour should be avoided.¹⁰⁶

In March 1936 the government appointed a commission to inquire into the numbers and organisation of labour in Tanganyika. The commission decided that the labour supply was quite adequate provided efficiency was improved and wastage was eliminated. The commission fell back on Cameron's measures of managing the African workforce by Labour Inspectors (preferably experts from Southern Rhodesia), the setting up of labour camps and the introduction of regulations to set minimum wages and control cut-throat competition between employers.¹⁰⁷ Scurvy and poor rations on the Lupa and dysentery and bad housing on the sisal plantations were regarded by the commission as both wasteful and inefficient and would have to be improved. In June 1937 two parties of workers returning from the Morogoro plantations arrived at Mwanza in such a debilitated condition that the administration was forced to send District Officers to inquire into plantation conditions.¹⁰⁸ Poor housing and inadequate rations were the main contributors to a high death rate among sisal especially as sick men on some estates automatically went on half rations.¹⁰⁹ Observers who saw the Tanganyika sisal plantations in the 1930s had no doubt that they were "one of the uglier forms of exploitation of a subject race."¹¹⁰

106. "Tanganyika's Problems and Policies", East Africa and Rhodesia 29/7/37, p.1459.

107. C.O.691/158/42191/5/ des.d. 9/9/37; "Fundamental Problems of Native Labour", East Africa and Rhodesia 17/3/38, p.824.

108. C.O.691/167/42191/9/ des.d. 27/10/37.

109. J.V. Lewis; Papers on Labour (R.H.) Estate Inspections 20/7/37, 28-30/7/37.

110. Lumley; Mandate, p.99.

The administration made little effort to improve conditions even in the interests of efficiency. In 1938 the labour crisis was solved by a sharp slump in world commodity prices. The decline in sisal prices reduced the demand for plantation labour while similar falls in African cash crops forced more men into working for wage labour.¹¹¹ The slump caused an immediate shortfall of £170,000 in administrative revenues. The consequences were far less drastic this time as a large part of revenues went towards the establishment of a reserve fund. The Colonial Office considered the Tanganyika economy to be far too vulnerable to movements in market price and joined the Treasury in insisting that expenditure should only be undertaken if it would lead to immediate improvements in government revenue.¹¹² The administration at least knew from bitter experience how to survive a slump in commodity prices. With the proviso that the balance between plantation and African agriculture should be maintained, the Governor decided on an intensified campaign to grow more crops. Enforced cultivation would ensure that "the individual himself may be benefited, that his obligation to the State may be honoured, that the tonnage carried by the railways may be maintained and that, at a time of low price levels, the purchasing power of the community may be raised to as high a figure as possible"¹¹³ A government circular issued in October 1938 informed District Officers that the Territory could not afford a recurrent series of deficits on the scale of £200,000 per annum without resorting to the serious economies of the early 1930s. More cash crops ensured continued tax payments and steady customs revenue through African purchase of manufactured

111. Tanganyika Territory; Report for 1938, pp.85-92. For the fall in sisal prices East Africa and Rhodesia 27/1/38, p.618.

112. C.O.691/161/42025/ Minute by Bottomley 14/6/38; 163/42081/ Letter from Treasury 8/1/38.

113. C.O.691/166/42154/ des.d. 4/1/39 enclosed Government Circular No.16 d. 27/10/38.

goods. To avoid food shortages and famines from another 'push' on cash crops the administration reinforced the compulsory planting of cassava, for "whatever may happen to markets for exports, the basis of the existence of the native population is assured once this requirement is satisfied."¹¹⁴ As a measure of economic and social stability the administration repeatedly took steps to preserve the subsistence basis of African economies. By the compulsory planting of cassava, the Tanganyika government could expand cash crop production in the colonial economy without risking drastic change.

The Tanganyika administration claimed the setback in the Territory's finances was at least partly due to the continued uncertainty over the future of the Mandate. Throughout 1938 the British settler and commercial groups in Tanganyika remained apprehensive over a German takeover. There were rumours of arms smuggling by German missionaries, with crates of machine guns entering the Territory under the label of 'church furniture'.¹¹⁵ The settlers formed the Tanganyika Defence League and spoke of fighting to the last cartridge against any attempt to transfer the Territory to Germany. Vivid images appeared in the press of German submarines prowling the Indian Ocean from East African bases and of Salisbury and Johannesburg in flames from German air attack.¹¹⁶ In the absence of any firm commitment from the Cabinet, the Colonial Office remained at a loss about what it could do to control German activities in Tanganyika. It was too late to restrict land alienation and subsidies to British firms were considered a "slippery path" leading to undesirable

114. C.O.691/151/42167/ Minute by Tempny 12/10/36.

115. "The Swastika in Tanganyika", East Africa and Rhodesia 6/10/38, p.115. The writer commented "I shall believe that only when I am faced with a bearded bishop glaring at me from the less dangerous end of a sub-machine gun."

116. C.E. Lane; "The Future of the Tanganyika Mandate", The African Observer Vol.5 5 June 1936 (C.O.Lib).

precedents.¹¹⁷ While the British government was still attempting to conciliate Hitler more positive measures such as restrictions of further German immigration were inapplicable. The German settlers were harder working, better subsidised and more effectively organised than their British counter-parts and with German interests in gold mining they threatened to emerge as the strongest economic unit in Tanganyika. (See Table 13). An ingenious credit system increased German control within the sisal industry and subsidies from German companies permitted their settlers to buy out British farms.¹¹⁸ Although East Africa had proclaimed the Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to be a friend of the settlers, he was apparently willing to rearrange the boundaries of East and West Africa to allow formal German participation in colonial rule.¹¹⁹ Tanganyika was still a dispensable colony and the Territory was fortunate Hitler did not demand a transfer during the Munich Conference.¹²⁰ With Hitler apparently conciliated at Munich and no longer interested in the colonial question, the agitation against the transfer of Tanganyika quickly died away.¹²¹

The Colonial Office was left with the problem of guaranteeing security in the Territory. Intelligence reports suggested that in a conflict about 40% of the African population might back the Germans.¹²² The

117. C.O.691/160/42022/ des.d. 22/1/38.

118. ibid.; for the German aski-mark credit system East Africa and Rhodesia 16/2/39, pp.676-677.

119. Schmokel; op. cit., pp.323-24; Ekoko; op. cit., p.304.

120. Chamberlain wrote: "I don't believe myself that we could purchase peace and a lasting settlement by handing over Tanganyika to the Germans, but if I did, I would not hesitate for a moment." Iliffe; Modern History, p.302. For praise of Chamberlain "Prime Minister and White Settlement", East Africa and Rhodesia 10/6/37, p.1250.

121. Schmokel; op. cit., pp.320-321.

122. C.O.691/160/42022/ des.d. 11/11/38.

Colonial Office decided to pursue a policy of the rapid development of African cash crop production. Encouragement of European settlement appeared to play into the hands of the more efficient Germans while a policy of African cash crop production would allow British companies to hold their own. Tanganyika would become a 'native country' with room for some work by companies.¹²³

Essentially the new policy went back to buying the loyalty of Africans with a few economic benefits and repudiated MacMichael's policy of 'vigorous development' by mining and increased British settlement.

The Governor's endeavours to revive and reorganise the colonial economy had failed. There was still no stable financial base to colonial rule as was demonstrated in the short slump of 1938. Under Sir Harold MacMichael the Tanganyika administration sought economic and political security for colonial rule in Tanganyika. A great deal of faith was placed in the gold mining industry to provide economic stability immune from drastic slumps in the world market. When large scale gold mining proved unsuccessful the Colonial Office and the Tanganyika administration were at a loss over what to do. The Territory continued to be dependent on sisal and a variety of African cash crops. At least the prospect of a European war gave officials some certainty about the future.

The policy of a balance between sisal and African cash crops was abandoned in favour of Tanganyika becoming a 'native state', probably along the lines of Nigeria. To administer the new policy came a new Governor, Sir Mark Young. MacMichael was sent to Palestine as High Commissioner. Sir Mark Young was formerly the Governor of Barbados and the experience of the West Indian islands in combining plantations, indigenous agriculture and general impoverishment may have recommended him as Governor of Tanganyika. In many ways the situation in Tanganyika resembled that

123. C.O.691/160/42022/ Colonial Office meeting 19/9/38.

of 1918. A form of West Coast policy had been decided upon to purchase the loyalty of the African inhabitants. The finances of the administration were again dependent on Imperial assistance. The new Governor forecast that owing to economic dislocation caused by the impending war, Tanganyika would incur a £600,000 deficit. An application was made to the Treasury for £250,000 in Imperial assistance to help the Territory survive the war.¹²⁴ Internment camps were again built in Tanganyika, and the administration prepared to fill them with the German settlers.¹²⁵

In 1939 the Colonial Office and the Tanganyika administration began to take stock of British policy and colonial progress over the last two decades. In the late 1930s there appeared to be something wrong with Britain's colonial Empire. The Secretary of State, Ormsby-Gore, spoke of the need to promote colonial development, to secure financial assistance for the colonies and the necessity of closer liaison between Whitehall, British capital and the African territories.¹²⁶ The Joint East Africa Board criticised the failure of the Colonial Office to appreciate the need for pure economic development within the dependent Empire.¹²⁷ The Board urged for more active policies to promote economic development and greater participation by private enterprise. The colonies had not been exploited enough. The Colonial Office ridiculed the Board and its suggestions and defended past

124. C.O.691/176/42154/1/ tele.d. 22/9/39.

125. C.O.691/176/42330/ des.d. 22/4/39. Minute by Boyd 26/4/39.

126. "Problems of the Colonial Empire" (address to the Corona Club Dinner), East Africa and Rhodesia 17/11/38, p.298; "Lord Harlech Broadcasts", East Africa and Rhodesia 10/8/39, p.1330. Ormsby-Gore succeeded to the title Lord Harlech in 1938.

127. C.O.822/68/46553/ J.E.A.B. memorandum 6/1/36; 83/46601/ Letter from J.E.A.B. 26/4/37; 89/46601/ Letter from J.E.A.B. 18/2/38; "Colonial Planning Needed: Joint Board Supports the Proposal", East Africa 10/10/35, p.96.

policies. Monopolies as recommended by the Board might increase private profit but according to the Colonial Office they would also encourage inefficiency and limit the expansion of trade.¹²⁸ One of the senior clerks J.M. Clauson explained that colonial policy in the past in Africa had differentiated between plantations, minerals and African crops. The small settler did not rate a mention. According to Clauson, mines and plantations were allowed to proceed through "the natural development of private enterprise."¹²⁹ The African was encouraged to produce more crops but "we have also been careful to keep the ring from him and prevent him being turned into a wage earner."¹³⁰ The Colonial Office (to judge from the reception of Clauson's minute) seemed satisfied that policy in the past had prevented undesirable social and economic change. The officials appeared bereft of great visions of colonial economic development such as had inspired the 'push' on cotton in the 1920s or the encouragement of gold mining in Tanganyika in the mid 1930s. Policy for the future would be limited and cautious. Bottomley commented:

all I would aim at at the moment is improved agriculture with its reward in improved quality and improved marketing both locally and here.¹³¹

The Colonial Office had lost confidence. Parts of the Empire - the West Indies, Nyasaland and Tanganyika in particular - were either impoverished or stagnating. There

128. C.O.822/83/46601/ Minute by Flood 27/4/37, Minute by Clauson 17/5/37. Flood described the J.E.A.B. as composed of either interested parties "or people whose own affairs are in such an unprosperous condition that they can afford the time to devote to other people's." Deprived of its Kenya settlers (after disagreement over income tax) the Board was of little use to the Colonial Office. C.O.822/68/46553/ Minute by Flood 14/1/36.

129. C.O.822/83/46601/ Minute by Clauson 17/5/37.

130. ibid.

131. C.O.822/89/46601/ Minute by Bottomley 14/3/38.

were signs that colonial policy had not halted social change. Within Tanganyika there were riots over restrictions on coffee growing among the Buhaya and Chagga, strikes among sisal workers and in 1939 a major dock strike and rioting in Tanga.¹³² Sir Mark Young realised that past policies were no longer effective guarantees of permanent colonial rule. In a despatch of 18 August 1939 the Governor pointed out that the production of wealth from agriculture at present prices demanded a degree of development expenditure which could not be met from purely local revenue. He put forward a plan of development costing £1,400,000 over the next ten years for urgent improvements in communications, health, education, agriculture and veterinary services.¹³³ The Governor explained that Tanganyika is "one of those colonies in which the doctrine of self-sufficiency had unduly hampered development in the past and will, if maintained, hamper it even more in the future."¹³⁴ Metropolitan demands that the colonial economy alone should provide government revenue had so limited the administration "that the most insistent demands for general services fall far short of being satisfied and the benefits which Western civilisation could and should bring are indefinitely postponed."¹³⁵ Unless Imperial assistance could improve the lives of the inhabitants of Tanganyika, the Governor concluded that "we are failing in our duty."¹³⁶ Young's despatch clearly recognised that colonial rule was not automatically beneficial to the African population and that the administration would never be secure while application of

132. For the Chagga coffee riots Iliffe; Modern History, pp.279-281; for the Haya coffee riots Austen; Northwest Tanzania, pp.224-229; for sisal strikes Tanganyika Territory; Report for 1938, p.105; for the Tanga strike and riot C.O.691/174/42191/3/tele.d.10/8/39 and Iliffe; Modern History, pp.309-311.

133. C.O.691/175/42303/ des.d. 18/8/39.

134. ibid.

135. ibid.

136. ibid.

"benefits of Western civilisation" was entirely dependent on the success of the colonial economy in selling export crops.

Although Sir Mark Young's viewpoint was eventually confirmed by the passing of the 1940 Colonial Development Act,¹³⁷ the Colonial Office saw the Governor's ideas as costly and impracticable. The senior officials doubted if Tanganyika could ever afford a "first class government organisation."¹³⁸ The Territory was the "classic case" of a dependency which would have to be financed generously from Imperial funds for a number of years and at the end there was still no guarantee the colony would ever develop an export trade to repay such investment.¹³⁹ Clauson suggested the way out of the impasse was to invest money in Tanganyika with the purpose of developing a higher standard of internal prosperity.

By organising an interchange of goods and services within the Territory everyone ought to be put in a position of having enough to eat and decent houses to live in and indeed quite an elaborate apparatus of purely native social services.¹⁴⁰

More government revenue would go on expenditure within Tanganyika and not be spent on overseas staff or expensive imports "which can ultimately only be financed by the export trade."¹⁴¹ The war provided an opportunity to train African staff to fill administrative positions and to place new emphasis on the production of food crops, with cash crops for export taking second place. Clauson's minute proposed that Tanganyika should no longer be viewed simply as a supplier of raw materials for metropolitan industries and world markets. His idea was perfectly feasible as the Territory's export crops were not Imperial requirements and the country not essential to the British

137. Great Britain: Parliamentary Papers; Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare Cmd.6175, 1940.

138. C.O.691/175/42303/ Minute by Clauson 9/10/39.

139. ibid.

140. ibid.

141. ibid.

economy. The British government had been willing to trade it to Hitler in return for promises of peace. Such a step would be in obedience to the Mandate in placing the interests of the inhabitants of the colony before the marginal interests of European enterprise.

The idea was beyond the imagination or the comprehension of other officials within the Colonial Office. The whole point of a colonial economy was the supply of raw materials to world markets. Money was supposed to flow out of the Territory in the form of the profits of private enterprise, not flow into the country to set up an economy operating for the benefit of Africans. The Financial Adviser to the Secretary of State interpreted Clauson's suggestion to mean Africans should increase food production, and, when prices improved, they should combine this with cultivation of cash crops for export. It would be necessary to make "the African cultivator work harder and more effectively."¹⁴² The Agricultural Adviser Sir Frank Stockdale commented that in Tanganyika, with its problems of uneven population, poor land and tsetse fly, only a modest standard of living was possible. The Territory was really "only groundnut country" and the administration should not be led astray by "dreams of El Dorado."¹⁴³

By 1939 the British colonial policy towards Tanganyika had reached a complete impasse. Administrative efforts to change the shape of the colonial economy in the 1930s were not successful. The Territory was still balanced between plantations and African cash crops. The Depression had shown that the sisal industry was a poor basis for the colonial economy but while the industry demanded labour, the Territory could not be given over entirely to African cash crop production. The 'grow-more-crops' campaigns could cushion the administration against the worst effects

142. C.O.691/175/42303/ Minute by Tempany 11/13/39.

143. C.O.691/175/42303/ Minute by Stockdale 18/12/39.

of the slumps but they were not a basis for change in the colonial economy. Both manufacturing and extensive mining were excluded as a means of reorganising the economy. Tanganyika would stay vulnerable and impoverished.

The Colonial Office had given up the role of initiating change in colonial policies. It could only defend past achievements rather than promote change. The absence of initiative within colonial policy was due to the general lack of interest shown by British capital in the evolution of the colonial economy of Tanganyika after 1930. Although the Territory was marginal to the interests of British capital, the Colonial Office would not abandon the purposes of colonial rule in placing the interests of the inhabitants before those of private enterprise. After the Second World War the Territory promised to be able to produce raw materials of strategic importance to Britain. The great Groundnut Scheme gave officials new confidence in the economic future of Tanganyika.¹⁴⁴ But the Groundnut Scheme simply involved a series of expensive plantations. Despite the money poured into it, the scheme did not provide a basis for the reorganisation of the colonial economy. One man in the Colonial Office had suggested that Tanganyika could not prosper while it was dependent on an export economy rather than on internal markets. The advice was ignored. Whatever the Mandate might say, the interests of the Territory and its inhabitants always came a poor third behind those of British capital and the colonial state.

144. For the great Groundnut Scheme A. Wood; The Groundnut Affair (London 1950).

ConclusionBRITISH POLICY IN THE COLONIAL ECONOMYOF TANGANYIKA

Between the wars British policy attempted to create an ideal colonial society in Tanganyika, a situation in which the colonial economy could profitably operate without inducing drastic social change within African societies. To achieve such an aim colonial officials had to establish a colonial state within the Territory and then construct a colonial economy devoted to the production of raw materials for export. The imposition of taxes and the demand that they be paid in cash were the means used to compel Africans to produce raw materials for the benefit of private enterprise.¹ Once this process had started, African societies would be drawn into economic dependence on the colonial economy. A variety of coercive and collaborative measures allowed the colonial state to maintain social control and guarantee law and order over the colony. By the end of the First World War colonial officials were beginning to realise that it was not enough simply to control African societies and allow private enterprise a free hand in their exploitation. In Kenya before the First World War, the demands of the settlers for land and labour threatened the reproduction of the African workforce and, therefore, the continued existence of the colonial state.² Officials became aware that the unrestrained operation of capital within the colonial economy could change the social structure of African society and render the task of social control extremely difficult. The imposition of capitalist relations in Africa could lead to the formation of

1. One writer noted in 1935 that the advantages of money taxation were obvious: "it renders the native more dependent on the European than any application of force." R.C. Thurnwald; Black and White in East Africa (London 1935), p.83.

2. See B.J. Berman and J.M. Lonsdale: "Coping With the Contradictions: The Development of the Colonial State in Kenya 1895-1914", Journal of African History Vol.14 (1) 1980.

dangerous and disaffected classes and undermine the structures of colonial rule. However, a certain amount of social change within African societies was essential to permit the production of raw materials and the operation of the colonial economy. Colonial administrators were faced with a dilemma: the problem of controlling change. They attempted to devise policies which would balance the profits of private enterprise with the permanence of colonial rule.

British administrators such as Sir Donald Cameron believed that the stability of colonial rule could be maintained provided social change could be slowed down and in the process pruned of its more undesirable effects.³ It was necessary to increase administrative control over African societies. Similarly it was necessary for the colonial state to attempt to regulate the activities of capital and so prevent dangerous social change. In East Africa European enterprise was dependent on the co-operation of the colonial state to secure their profits from the colonial economy. British administrators demanded equal co-operation from European enterprise in the interests of continued and stable colonial rule. In East Africa, as far as many officials were concerned, the days of the plundering 'captains of industry' and the avaricious small settler, who did what they liked without regard for the future, were definitely over.

In regard to Tanganyika both the Colonial Office and the Territory's administration were determined not to repeat the mistakes of Kenya and to keep control of the colonial economy. In 1918 Sir Horace Byatt was faced with a

3. Cameron recognised change was inevitable but believed it was not necessarily harmful to British rule if properly controlled. See Cameron; Tanganyika Service Chap. 6. He had little sympathy for the educated African who attempted to accelerate the process. See "Sir Donald Cameron Addresses League of Coloured People", East Africa and Rhodesia 1/7/37, pp.1342,1350 for Cameron's encounter with George Padmore and Johnstone Kenyatta.

situation which made administrative control an absolute imperative. The Governor believed the East African campaign had pushed the African population close to the brink of revolt. In such a climate, an influx of small settlers would make demands for land and labour that the administration would find impossible to resist but extremely dangerous to implement. The new British colonial state was faced with the prospect of an early disintegration. To avoid this possibility, the Tanganyika administration embraced a policy of African cash crop production. African production had been successful in West Africa in providing a profitable basis for the colonial economy and it would do away with the need for economic development by white settlers. The Colonial Office saw a policy of African cash crops as a way of meeting metropolitan demands for new supplies of raw cotton. Tanganyika would become a new Nigeria, with cotton as the staple crop. The former German estates would play a secondary role in the colonial economy, similar to that of plantations on the West Coast. The policy would provide a means of purchasing the loyalty of the African population while avoiding the pressures imposed by white settlement. The Colonial Office fully supported the West Coast policy as providing a stable foundation for the colonial state, as well as benefiting an ailing but important metropolitan industry. The requirements of stability and security were so important as to allow the Tanganyika administration to over-ride the specialised demands of the British cotton industry and foil its efforts to shape cash crop production according to metropolitan demands. Despite the size and importance of the British cotton industry its demands did not automatically take precedence over the need for secure and stable colonial rule.

Limited European settlement and the emergence of a strong sector of African cash crop production were the products of deliberate administrative policy. Had the government set out to establish a colonial economy through the medium of white settlement, then the history of

Tanganyika would have been very different.⁴ However the West Coast policy was not a success. It alienated a large section of European enterprise, for so long as the administration chose to ignore the demands of settlers and planters, co-operation between private enterprise and the Tanganyika government was effectively undermined. In addition cotton cultivation did not provide a stable basis for the colonial economy. Many areas of Tanganyika were not suitable for cash crops and variations in tonnage produced and fluctuations in world prices threatened the finances of the colonial state. The establishment of a colonial economy was an expensive business as the administration had to provide for the construction of transport and marketing facilities out of its revenues. In order to meet the costs of constructing the colonial economy the Tanganyika government was forced to rely on a wider range of crops, both African and European. In particular the economic well-being of the sisal plantations and coffee estates strengthened their claims for greater recognition and support from the Tanganyika government. The West Coast policy appeared incapable of producing either the prosperity or the Nigerian air of harmony between African production and European enterprise.

In 1924 the East Africa Commission jettisoned the West Coast policy in favour of a Dual Policy for the whole of East Africa. The Dual Policy gave equal emphasis to both African and European production, which were now officially viewed as complementary rather than antagonistic. A new Governor, Sir Donald Cameron, was sent to Tanganyika to implement the Dual Policy and to determine the role of European production within the colonial economy. Cameron quickly realised that Byatt's policy of encouraging the spread of African cash crop production could also produce

4. The existence of a settler state in Tanganyika would have turned Closer Union into a reality. The German settlers for their part appeared puzzled why Britain "had missed a tremendous settlement opportunity after the war." Farson; op. cit., p.136.

dangerous social changes and break down the tribal structure of African society. African cash crop production could develop after greater administrative control was imposed on African society. Cameron's system of Native Administrations was designed to reinforce the tribal structures by incorporating traditional authority into the lower levels of the colonial state. In return for a share of the benefits of colonial rule, African elites co-operated in extending administrative control over their societies.

The Governor regarded the system of Native Administrations as an important means of controlling change and essential for the continuation of colonial rule. The systems' existence was menaced from two directions - by the uncontrolled spread of African cash crop production and by the possibility of settler control. The spread of African cash crops ceased until Native Administrations became firmly established.⁵ The settlers were more difficult to deal with. The highlands of Tanganyika were an essential part of the Kenya settlers' dream of a Great White State, a new Dominion, in East Africa. They sought to realise this dream through the Closer Union of the East African territories on Kenyan terms. The Tanganyika government was well aware that the imposition of settler control from Kenya would destroy the Native Administrations by diverting the resources of the administration and by greatly restricting African cash crop production. In the struggle the Tanganyika administration sought allies in the shape of the sisal plantations. Cameron regarded 'large' capital, as represented by the plantations, as having few of the disruptive effects of 'small' settler capital. Plantations made fewer demands for government resources and the sisal companies were willing to co-operate with government policies provided their demand for African labour was

5. The encouragement of African cash crops seemed to be largely limited to areas possessing strong hierarchical tribal organisations and co-operative chiefs such as around Bukoba, Mwanza and Shinyanga.

satisfied. The administration protected the labour supplies of the plantations by declaring certain areas to be labour reserves, where African cash crop production could not exist owing to the lack of 'suitable transport'. By careful control over African labour Cameron's administration was able to simultaneously support European plantations and African cash crops. His policies gained the support of a wide section of British capital. Sisal went through a period of prosperity and with African cash crops encountering poor seasons, changing prices and administrative interference, the plantations became the mainstay of the colonial economy. Although Cameron was willing to alienate land to men with capital, any great influx of small settlers was precluded by government policies. The Southern Highlands, the focal point of the settler's dreams, were left without adequate transport. The Governor would alienate land to small settlers but only to prove that white settlement was a failure in Tanganyika.

By 1930 the colonial economy of the Territory appeared to have achieved the ideal balance between African and European production and to have fulfilled the Dual Policy in a most profitable form. Between 1921 and 1930 exports rose from £1,000,000 to £4,000,000 and the revenues of the state expanded proportionally. Sisal was the single most important crop but its contribution to the colonial economy was balanced by a number of African cash crops, principally cotton, coffee and groundnuts. The combination of the West Coast policy between 1920 and 1924 and the Dual Policy from 1925 onwards shaped the colonial economy to the approval of a large section of European enterprise. Tanganyika was a success story and the combination of Native Administrations and the Dual Policy appeared to guarantee administrative control over both European capital and African societies. Social change was under control and the Territory was apparently set for a long period of stable and profitable colonial rule.

Tanganyika's prosperity between 1926 and 1930 and the large number of African cash crops in the colonial economy disguised the administration's dependence on the sisal

plantations for a large part of government revenue. In 1931 the Depression intervened, commodity prices fell heavily and the whole colonial economy of Tanganyika almost collapsed. In order to build the transport and other facilities demanded by an export economy, the Tanganyika government had borrowed heavily from Imperial funds. The heavy fall in sisal prices cut administrative revenue in half and, burdened by inflexible debt charges, government finances were unable to withstand drastic price fluctuations on the world market. Falls in the prices of African cash crops brought the Tanganyika government to bankruptcy. Ironically, if the colonial economy had been organised completely around African cash crops, the revenue would have suffered less owing to a proportionally smaller decline in prices. Similarly, if Tanganyika had become dependent on small settlers, the Territory would have attracted assistance from Imperial funds. As it was, the sisal plantations did not command sufficient influence as a fraction of British capital to warrant the Colonial Office breaking precedent by providing the companies with government subsidies. There was no metropolitan pressure on the Colonial Office to assist Tanganyika because the Territory's exports were not an important part of the British economy. The combination of plantations and African cash crops was revealed as particularly vulnerable to price fluctuations on the world market and to be an unstable source of government revenue.

Sir Stewart Symes was sent as Governor to save the Tanganyika administration from financial ruin. His task was to enforce cutbacks in government expenditure without fear or favour. Reductions in expenditure were not enough to resolve the economic crisis in Tanganyika. The Depression threatened to damage the colonial economy permanently if Africans returned to subsistence agriculture, refused to grow cash crops and obtained their wants by barter instead of cash. The administration's 'grow-more-crops' campaign involved compulsory cultivation of cash crops regardless of their market price, to ensure Africans

remained part of the colonial economy. It was a matter of survival for the colonial state. As Tanganyika was the only East African colony to approach bankruptcy, there was an obvious need for some changes in the organisation of the colonial economy if stability were to be achieved and such crises avoided in the future. The 'grow-more-crops' campaign was employed to enlarge the proportion of African cash crops in the colonial economy, reduce dependence on sisal and to provide additional revenue for the administration.

The next Governor Sir Harold MacMichael was sent to revive the colonial economy and he decided on a policy of 'vigorous production' by every possible means to restore profitability and the interest of European capital in the Territory. One possibility for change in the colonial economy was the manufacture of cotton piece goods and sisal rope within the Territory. However the Colonial Office opposed colonial industrialisation if it was at all likely to compete with the products of British industry either at home or on the world market. In such cases the interests of the colony and the profits of individual firms were disregarded and the Colonial Office refused to sanction manufacturing in Tanganyika as a matter of principle. Another possibility which promised prosperity for the colonial economy was the development of gold mining on a large scale. However Tanganyika gained little from the mining boom of the mid-1930s because by that time large companies had lost interest in the Territory. The collapse of sisal, the bankruptcy of the administration and the unresolved question of German colonial claims all helped to deter British capital from becoming extensively involved in the colonial economy of Tanganyika. The Colonial Office had to rely on a dubious company with speculative aims to develop the gold reefs, and its eventual and predictable collapse further weakened any chances of substantial change in the colonial economy.

Confronted with the possibility of German economic domination MacMichael returned to a policy of promoting

the development of the colonial economy through a policy of white settlement. The term 'settler' became respectable but by the late 1930s there were few applicants. The economy of Tanganyika remained the same vulnerable combination of sisal and African cash crops. Its weakness was demonstrated again in the short slump of 1938 when sisal prices again fell and the finances of the administration suffered another severe setback. Once again the government fell back on a 'grow-more-crops' campaign to preserve the structures of colonial rule. So long as the sisal plantations formed the mainstay of the economy and continued to demand African labour, then the Territory could not be given over completely to African cash crop production. Instead of expanding cash crop cultivation by providing government assistance and extending transport into the labour reserves, the administration sought to increase the productivity of Africans already involved in cash crop production. The increase in exports necessary to provide the administration with a measure of financial stability was impossible without a degree of technological improvement and greater commercialisation of African agriculture. But such processes would have created classes of rich farmers and landless labourers dangerous to the preservation of colonial rule, and the Tanganyika administration insisted on subsistence cultivation as essential in maintaining the structure of African society. Colonial policy was based on the concept of the peasant who, by labour or cash crops, produced a surplus for the benefit of European enterprise and who remained tied to his land.⁶ In Tanganyika a limited number of peasant farmers could only accomplish so much, and in times of low prices the colonial economy became dependent for its operation on administrative coercion. The final eclipse of any possibility of large scale gold mining left the colonial economy without any avenues of change. Colonial policy had reached a complete impasse. Tanganyika was without a

6. Culwick pointed out the whole social and political structure of colonial rule in Tanganyika was built on the system of peasant farming. Culwick; "Labourer", p.31.

stable and flourishing economy and was still dependent on the 'notoriously fickle' market in sisal. The Colonial Office had run out of ideas and direction and throughout the 1930s the attitude of officials in Tanganyika was one of resignation and defeat.⁷

The aim of colonial policy was to create a society incapable of rapid change, characterised by "a reasonable hut tax, the preservation of tribal customs, young men respectful to their elders, proper care of native agriculture",⁸ where the ultimate role of the African was to become "a good intelligent peasant farmer."⁹ The structures of African society were preserved but at the same time its people were made dependent on the colonial economy. In the late 1930s one District Officer commented of the Wabena peasant "how fantastic that his standard of living and his power to purchase his few requirements should be determined by what goes on far away on the highly mechanised farms of Europe and America."¹⁰ When colonial officials sought 'economic development' they envisaged an economy based on the export of raw materials and the import of manufactured goods, not a self-sufficient economy developing along capitalist lines. In its endeavour to balance profits and permanence, British colonial policy produced the economic conditions which approximate to and are described today as under-development. If the latter term is used in Kay's sense of the limited and distorted development of capitalist relations within a colony, then Tanganyika was definitely underdeveloped during the inter-war years. Colonial officials saw the process in the light of protection and paternalism but its consequences remained the same: slow

7. This feeling is strongly evident in both the Colonial Office correspondence and the memoirs of Tanganyika officials at Rhodes House.

8. Furse; op. cit., pp.297-298.

9. Culwick; "Labourer", p.27.

10. ibid.; pp.29-30.

economic growth, impoverishment, uneven development and a limited capacity for change. Tanganyika remained a poorly integrated country, its industries and transport entirely orientated towards the export of raw materials. Within the country the application of colonial policy created a high degree of regional differentiation.¹¹ The most devastating effects of the colonial economy were found in the labour reserves with their high rates of malnutrition, social disintegration and general economic depression.¹²

Tanganyika shared such characteristics with the other colonial economies of Africa. However since independence the government of Tanzania has endeavoured to escape from the legacies of colonial rule and the structures of the colonial economy. Although the sisal plantations were very much strengthened by the commodities boom of the 1950s, after independence the Tanzanian government had little difficulty in sharply curtailing their role in the country's economy. One of the reasons why the colonial economy did not persist was the weakness of sisal on the world market. Sisal was always expendable to everyone except the sisal planters and the colonial administration of Tanganyika. The crop was of marginal importance to British capital, a source of quick profits rather than permanent investment. Plantations in Tanganyika were unable to become deeply entrenched in the colonial economy: a lesson all too visible in the Territory where abandoned rubber plantations lined the Central railway.

After 1931 European enterprise saw Tanganyika as a poor example of a colonial economy. The potential of the 1920s was destroyed by the Depression and British capital no longer took any great interest in the impoverished

11. See the survey in L. Cliffe; "Rural Class Formation in East Africa", Journal of Peasant Studies Vol.4(2) 1977.

12. For the social and economic effects of migration in Tanganyika see P.H. Gulliver; Labour Migration in a Rural Economy (Kampala 1955); J.R.K. Robson; "Malnutrition in Tanganyika", Tanganyika Notes and Records March-Sept. 1962; Wayne; op. cit.

Territory. Tanganyika provided only a small market for British goods and limited chances for the involvement of British capital. German and Indian capital poured into the breach but the British administration was not running the colony to allow foreign and minor interests to benefit from colonial rule. In 1940 Negley Farson commented bitterly that the "mandates" could have paid if British financiers wanted them to."¹³ British financiers did *not* want to, particularly after 1930 when Tanganyika ceased to be a reliable source of 'gilt-edged' government guaranteed loans. Tanganyika joined Somaliland, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia in an 'impoverished' department at the Colonial Office.

It must have appeared to colonial officials that Tanganyika's colonial economy operated to little purpose after 1930. British enterprise received some benefits but Tanganyika patently did not receive any at all. "What", asked one observer in 1939, "has Britain done on the practical side except regard the country as a trust for the natives and as the source of some raw materials needed by British factories ... If Britain had only expressed as much interest in Tanganyika as Hitler!"¹⁴ Tanganyika was not a rich country and twenty years of British administration left it poorer, weaker and of marginal interest to British capital.

The study of colonial policy provides a context within which to assess African response to the imposition of colonial rule. The actions of the African population and the intentions and activities of their colonial rulers are inextricable. When framing policy colonial officials rarely saw Africans as individuals but as a social force both potentially profitable and potentially dangerous.¹⁵ But the African population were not a mindless mass to be

13. Farson; op. cit., p.131.

14. B. Bennett; Hitler Over Africa (London 1939), pp.137-138.

15. Hence the sources of this study give little reflection of African opinion and I have not endeavoured to elicit it from the material available.

manipulated by colonial policy. By 1937 even the conservative Wabena peasants were convinced that "they are the victims of a colossal ramp which has its centre far away in England in the seat of Government."¹⁶ The Wabena correctly perceived the nature of colonial rule and made their District Officer worry about the future of British administration and the need for change. In attempting to balance profits and permanence British colonial policy in Tanganyika effectively undermined both. Officials laboured to create a lasting colonial economy but in the end it brought relatively small benefits to British enterprise. What colonial policy did achieve was to produce the conditions of underdevelopment in Tanganyika.

16. Culwick; "Wabena", p.182.

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