

EMPIRE, DEVELOPMENT & COLONIALISM

The Past in the Present

Edited by

MARK DUFFIELD

Professor of Development Politics, Department of Politics, University of Bristol

VERNON HEWITT

Senior Lecturer, Department of Politics, University of Bristol

 JAMES CURREY

James Currey
an imprint of
Boydell & Brewer Ltd
PO Box 9
Woodbridge
Suffolk
IP12 3DF
www.boydell.co.uk
and of
Boydell & Brewer Inc.
668 Mt Hope Avenue
Rochester
NY 14620 USA
www.boydellandbrewer.com

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, or by electronic, or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without permission in writing from the publishers, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review.

Copyright © Contributors 2009
First published 2009

1 2 3 4 5 13 12 11 10 09

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Empire, development & colonialism : the past in the present.

1. Colonies—Administration—History—Congresses.
2. Humanitarian intervention—Decision making—Congresses.
3. International relations—History—Congresses.
I. Duffield, Mark. II. Hewitt, Vernon.
327.1'01—dc22

ISBN 978-1-84701-011-7 (James Currey hardback)

Typeset in 10/11 pt Photina
by Avocet Typeset, Chilton, Aylesbury, Bucks
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

Contents

Acknowledgements	ix
Notes on Contributors	xi

Introduction	1
MARK DUFFIELD & VERNON HEWITT	

1

The Exceptional Inclusion of 'Savages' & 'Barbarians' <i>The Colonial Liberal Bio-Politics of Mobility & Development</i>	16
MATTHEW MEREFIELD	

2

Empire, International Development & the Concept of Good Government	30
VERNON HEWITT	

3

Empire: A Question of Hearts? <i>The Social Turn in Colonial Government Bombay c.1905–1925</i>	45
HENRIK ASPENGREN	

4

'Conflict-Sensitive' Aid & Making Liberal Peace	59
SUTHAHARAN NADARAJAH	

5

- Development, Poverty & Famines 74
The Case of British Empire
RICHARD SHELDON

6

- Plain Tales from the Reconstruction Site 88
Spatial Continuities
in Contemporary Humanitarian Practice
LISA SMIRL

7

- The International Politics of Social Transformation 102
Trusteeship & Intervention in Historical Perspective
DAVID WILLIAMS & TOM YOUNG

8

- Liberal Interventionism & the Fragile State 116
Linked by Design?
MARK DUFFIELD

9

- Freedom, Fear & NGOs 130
Balancing Discourses of Violence & Humanity
in Securitising Times
PATRICIA NOXOLO

10

- Theorising Continuities between Empire
& Development 146
Toward a New Theory of History
APRIL R. BICCUM

11

- Spatial Practices & Imaginaries 161
*Experiences of Colonial Officers
& Development Professionals*
UMA KOTHARI

12

- Decolonising the Borders in Sudan 176
Ethnic Territories & National Development
DOUGLAS H. JOHNSON

13

- 'Individualism is, Indeed, Running Riot' 188
Components of the Social Democratic Model of Development
PAUL KELEMEN

10

Theorising Continuities between Empire & Development *Toward a New Theory of History*

APRIL R. BICCOM

Introduction

At the risk of adding to an already voluminous literature, this chapter begins with a question: how is it that the promises of the short¹ twentieth century have ended in the return of empire? Accompanying and prompted by the terror wars is an emerging spate of academic literature, translated into public and popular discourse, narrating this contemporary moment as a 'new' era of imperialism (Cooper 2002a and b; Harvey 2003; Cox 2003a and b; Saull 2004; Mann 2004; Ikenberry 2004; Wade 2004), for which it is largely apologetic, or a 'new' globalised Empire (Hardt and Negri 2001) which is distinct from the European state-led empires which precede it. The academic debate on the left has configured largely around Hardt and Negri's now seminal work (Balakrishnan 2003), and the debate on the right has made the case for a New American Century of intervention and state reconstruction (Mabee 2004; Ignatieff 2003). In the popular domain, Niall Ferguson's *Empire* has been televised, his *Colossus* much publicised, and the reconfiguring of imperialism as a history wrongfully maligned has appeared here and there in the popular press as it has in academic discourse. The history and historiography of empire is long and complex and, given the events of the twentieth century, part of my argument is that its vigorous resurgence at the dawn of the twenty-first century as a figure in discourse is significant. This chapter poses the question, what is at stake in the furore over empire? Why empire? Why now? What does this debate tell us about the configuration of capitalism, modernity, metropolitan self-conception and all of the multifarious political and economic implications this entails?

In addition to a resurgence of empire, and perhaps paradoxically, is a renewed fervor over global justice, manifesting itself as a complex and contradictory 'anti-globalisation movement' accompanied by a vast civil society mobilisation in the form of social forums and spectacular new campaigns, such as Make Poverty History and Live8. There has also been a shift in the global development apparatus away from structural adjustment and towards poverty eradication, as is witnessed by the Millennium Development Goals, governance partnerships and pro-poor policy promotion, themselves linked and intersecting in contradictory ways with civil society lobbying. Despite this emphasis on poverty reduction and global justice, in the mainstream discourse it is in fact a very old nineteenth-century idea of poverty-as-degeneracy (McClintock 1992) that has been utilised within the reconfiguration of development as a security strategy that suggests that there are very strong lines of

continuity between colonial and development discourse and policy (Biccum 2002 and 2005).

This chapter suggests that these developments actually comprise a complex shift in vocabulary in the discourse of development, history and modernity that has also been accompanied by metropolitan attempts in popular and public discourses on the centre and right of the spectrum to normalise the 'new' imperialism, justify the (re)colonisation of the Middle East, pose neo-liberal capitalism as the only option for global governance. It is the contention of the chapter that what occurs via this shift in vocabulary is a narration of this contemporary moment as a rupture from its past through a repackaging of British colonial history in an apologetic frame. All of these intersecting discourses around development, modernity and empire are examples of what can be characterised as 'narratives of contemporaneity', competing narratives occurring across disciplines which implicitly or explicitly attempt to narrate this contemporary moment, and, in so doing, implicitly or explicitly corroborate a narrative of history. These are links which can be made with recourse to the very thorough excavation of colonial culture and discourse in the contribution of the multidisciplinary field of postcolonial theory. Thus, part of the argument here is that operative and enabling *rupture moments* have been constructed in the narratives of contemporaneity which could more effectively be theorised following Homi Bhabha, as *shifts in vocabulary* from within the discourses of authority. In so doing, it is also the contention that contemporaneity and history are in crisis. Thus, the chapter begins with the premise that these narratives are politically operational, that is, they engender political effects through their repetition in public discourse.

If the contemporary moment can be characterised by the logic of a crisis, a crisis for international security, a crisis for post-Cold War economics, a crisis in the national narrative, a crisis in the asylum system, a crisis of global migration, etc, the crisis in the narrative of contemporaneity is more profound. There is a crisis in the conventional narrative of twentieth-century history, the first inklings of which manifested themselves in Fukayama's now notorious book, Huntingdon's much debated civilisational theories, Hardt and Negri's new theory of Empire, Niall Ferguson's recasting of that narrative in an apologetic vein, and the proliferation of temporal markers in epistemic and disciplinary nomenclature² – post-development, post-positivist, post-industrial, neo-liberal, neo-colonial, etc (McClintock 1992; Shohat 1992; Dirlik 1997; Ahmad 1992). It seems that, in this particular historical moment, the narrativisation and signification of the 'now' in the context of its historical trajectory, what this moment means and how we got here, is entirely up for grabs.

This is what is intended by the idea of a crisis in the narrative(s) of contemporaneity, a crisis whose evidence is most notable and can be evidenced by the recurrent logic of an *historical rupture*. That is, by the positing of this historical moment as 'new', as broken from and/or entirely different from all which has come before. There is a rupture which occurs simultaneously with a writing out, distancing or recasting of the history leading up to what has been cast as a 'new' (rupture) moment. Taking a cue from a broad consensus in postcolonial theory, the contention here is that rupture moments in historical narratives are characterised/constituted by the discursive elision, or minimising, of a particular history, in this case, European colonial history. While on the left the debate has configured around the nature of social change for a new kind of global power, with a few critical voices asserting that echoes from the past remain (Mabee 2004; Arrighi 2003; Seth 2003; Amin 2004; Reno 2004), the connection does not seem to have been made within even the critical literature in

International Relations and in Development Studies, that the debate over the 'new' American imperialism has occurred virtually in tandem with a 'new' agenda in development *and* in social policy across Europe, comprising a multifaceted shift in vocabulary around poverty, modernity and contemporaneity from within the discourses of authority.

Narrative rupture moments are politically operative and enabling. Narrative rupture frames conceptions of the twentieth century as definitively ruptured from its colonial past. Both the disciplines of International Relations and Development Studies are broadly predicated upon the notion of a postcolonial or post-imperial state. If the twentieth century has been characterised in Development Studies by Truman's announcement of the end of the old imperialism, why has the figure of empire been so thoroughly resurrected? A 'New' American imperialism is being theorised and debated when the old European imperialism has been thoroughly written out and de-emphasised in the disciplines which construct the twentieth century, despite various critical interventions from 'migrant' intellectuals. Much of the literature attempts to distinguish between older European and British forms of empire and the 'new' American empire or new forms of globalised empire (Hardt and Negri 2000).

One of this chapter's aims is to suggest that there might be something larger at stake in the debate over empire *per se*, something that has more to do with how contemporary disciplines for the twentieth century (International Relations and Development Studies) have failed to incorporate the fact of empire into their narratives of history and contemporaneity. Witness the fact that empire as a political form and category of analysis is largely absent from political analysis which focuses almost exclusively on the state, sub-state and intra-state forms. One explanation may come from an examination of these narratives of contemporaneity through the theoretical framework of postcolonial theory. Central to the broad field of postcolonial studies is the question of history and temporality. The narrative for the twentieth century is perpetually framed as *history-as-development* that is constituted by a narrative rupture which writes out or de-emphasises the colonial moment. This sense of ruptured temporality frames the twentieth century and its key disciplines. This makes the furor over empire significant, it is politically operative. What is needed, therefore, is a new theory of history which is capable of theorising continuities pre and post World War II and the suggestion put forward here is that postcolonial theory is adequate to this task.

The first section of this chapter explores why and how. Firstly, it examines how postcolonial theory brings history and history writing to the forefront of the debate; it calls history and the practice of its production into question, including its problematic treatment in the theory of Marxism. Because postcolonial theory is sensitive to the ambivalences in classical Marx it is capable of bridging the impasse between post-structuralist critique and orthodox materialists. In addition, postcolonial theory has extensively theorised the culture of empire and has produced categories of analysis that can be applied to contemporary development discourses in ways which draw out the continuities. The second section of the chapter examines how postcolonial theory can assist in overcoming the stalemate of the contemporary left, and the third section examines how historical narratives function by the logic of a rupture by exploring what is at stake in narrative rupture through an examination of World Systems Theory and historians of the 'longue durée'. Finally, the chapter finishes by examining how the new discourses of empire function as narrative rupture.

Postcolonial Theory & the Question of History

Broadly speaking, postcolonial theory is what has happened, as the result of the post-war migration, when 'Third World' intellectuals entered metropolitan academies and began to alter traditional fields of study around literature and culture. What occurred was a simultaneous reconsideration of the subject matter, perspective and assumptions of conventional European and American disciplines in the study of literature and the human sciences, in tandem with the introduction of perspectives and literatures of the 'post'-colonial diaspora and South. A shift in the study of literature occurred, along with a whole host of studies looking at colonial history, discourse and culture, starting with Said's seminal text *Orientalism*, carefully analysing the assumptions and functions of a set of discursive apparatuses that made European colonialism possible, palatable and, for some, desirable.

Postcolonial theory began as a disciplinary critique in comparative literature in the 1980s and has since proliferated as a mode of critique across disciplinary fields into anthropology, sociology, cultural studies, women's studies, history and politics, but has remained largely on the margins of these disciplines. Postcolonial studies and theory have always been in conversation with Marxism and post-structuralism, and their progenitors have been engaged in various forms of historical, critical, literary and cultural engagement. Their seminal texts have included projects in literary criticism, such as Gayatri Spivak's translation of Mahasweta Devi in *Imaginary Maps: Three Stories* (1993), Edward Said's *Culture and Imperialism* (1994) and Homi Bhabha's *The Location of Culture* (1994), but also works in cultural criticism and critical theory which have been engaged in analysing colonial culture and discourse, such as Spivak's *In Other Worlds: Essays in cultural politics* (1987c), *The Postcolonial Critic: Interviews, strategies, dialogues* (1987a), Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978), and Anne McClintock's *Imperial Leather: Race, gender and sexuality in the colonial contest* (1992).

Postcolonial theory has also been renowned for a kind of historical revisionism that contests elite or mainstream historiography, by writing subaltern perspectives back into historical accounts, such as most notably, Ranajit Guha and the Subaltern Studies Group in *Selected Subaltern Studies* (1988). In addition, postcolonial theory has reached a point of prevalence in the academy where several anthologies and introductions have appeared in recent years, such as John McCleod's *Beginning Postcolonialism* (2000), Robert Young's *Postcolonialism: An historical introduction* (2001), Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman's *Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: A Reader* (1993), and Gregory Castle's *Postcolonial Discourses: An Anthology* (2001). And this list is by no means exhausted. Suffice it to say for now that postcolonial theory and studies is a recent subfield in cultural and literary criticism and critical theory that has had an impact across the disciplines in the humanities and social sciences.

Postcolonial theory can be broadly situated within a long trajectory of counter-critique in the twentieth century which has persistently been at pains to point out that the West's conception of itself is articulated by the logic of a rupture, that European self-construction is predicated upon an elision of the colonial relation which makes it both materially and epistemologically possible (Amin 1973, 1989; Cardoso 1979; Fanon 2001, 1961; Memmi 1965; Frank 1978; Hobsbawm 1968; James CLR, 1992; Cesaire 1955; Mudimbe 1988; Nkrumah 1965; Rodney 1981; Wallerstein 1984; Walvin 1993; Mariategui 1929; Eric Williams, 1994, among many others). Nevertheless, reading across the diverse field of interventions around the dominant

narrative of history (dependency, Third World nationalism and anti-colonial writing, postcolonial theory and post-development), one discerns a clear narrative recounting a growing consolidation of metropolitan capitalist power, one that relies on structural/systemic inequalities in trade, property, finance and sovereign power, as well as the institutionalisation of its hegemony through academic knowledge, technology, education, training and professionalisation and the dispersal of its narratives through the commodification and circulation of popular culture. The term 'metropolitan' is employed to describe contemporary capitalism in appreciation of the fact that Europe has not historically been the only coloniser or imperial power, that the term the 'West' has been duly problematised and that the increasing complexity of globalisation means that metropolitan spaces occur in the global North as well as in the global South, and that, among many other things, globalisation means the proliferation and spread of urban metropolitanism. Equally, it must be said that capitalism is a highly contentious term, with differing interpretations and definitions within the long tradition of Marxism.

Even as they might point to the precariousness of this power (particularly in the work of Bhabha), all of the 'interventionists' contribute to a theorisation of the historical consolidation of metropolitan power, the construction of the Western liberal democratic state as an onto-epistemic construct that is inseparable from empire. Thus, the broader project of postcolonial criticism and intervention is defined by Edward Said as a 'thinking together' of items which have been falsely separated in discourse for the preservation of the power of one over the other. For Said, it means linking culture together with the political; for Bhabha, it means noticing the aporia masked by binary couplets, such as coloniser/colonised, which are split and doubled in discourse; for Spivak, it warrants a close attention to how one is situated and inflected by the discourse which these theorists are trying to resist by *reading differently*. While for Samir Amin, Eric Williams, Eric Hobsbawm, Frantz Fanon, Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein, Kwame Nkrumah, Jose Mariategui and a whole host of others it means understanding metropolitan history, culture and context as intimately linked with and constituted by its colonial encounter.

This is also the preoccupation of postcolonial theory and criticism that links it with these other 'counter-narratives' coming from the global South, all of which in their varied and diverse endeavours have in common, at the very least, the interruption to or revision of conventional narratives of modernity, particularly, for some of these authors, as articulated in the discourse of development. For postcolonial theorists, this separation in discourse is not neutral or accidental, but rather is structural; it is operative and enabling, serving both an epistemic and ontological violence and warrants a rethinking of the practices of narrative production in the first place. In this way postcolonial theory is a departure from its lineage in Third World political and anti-colonial writing, both because it marks the presence of the Third World migrant in the Western academy as the result of waves of post-war migration to the global North, and because it takes up and combines postmodern and post-structuralist epistemologies with this long tradition of left-wing political writing from the global South.

The rise in popularity of postcolonial studies and theory in the metropolitan academy fomented a whole series of debates and discussions (Afzal-Khan and Sheshadri-Crooks 2000; Moore-Gilbert 1997) and schisms which, for convenience sake, can be characterised as a conventional split between those whose work would insist on a study of capital as foundational (Parry 1994; Dirlik 1997; Ahmad 1992), and those who under the influence of Derrida and post-structuralism bring the

foundational to the forefront as the inaugural question (Spivak and Guha 1988; Bhabha 1994). Very generally, those postcolonial theorists who utilise French philosophy have been accused of elitism, an apolitical focus on the cultural, discursive, ideological and linguistic, to the exclusion of questions of the material and questions of violence, and as themselves comprising a transnational capitalist class, cashing in on their diasporic status to further entrench their privilege (Ahmad, 1992; Afzal-Khan and Seshadri-Crooks, 2000). On the other hand, Robert Young (1990) argues that what is really at stake for Marx-inflected postcolonial critics is that the post-structuralists have placed the question of history, so problematic in Marx, at the very forefront of the discussion. Indeed, history is the central problematic implicit in any critical perspective on development, and it is the central problematic for many post-modern and post-structuralist theorists (Attridge *et. al.* 1987), including Foucault (1997), and also the central problematic in the mainstream discourse of development.

This difference in emphasis between dialectical couplets which are spatial (the classical and outmoded account of base and superstructure), is also complicated by a theoretical schism coalescing around a temporal divide between narratives of the colonial past and the global capitalist present. Thus, those who place their emphasis on capital and material relations do so to the exclusion of both cultural power and identity and desire, and tend to discourage the possibility of theorising capitalism together with colonialism (Ellen Meiskins Wood, 2004, notwithstanding). And those who place their emphasis on the cultural mechanisms of power do so while often excluding violence and material/capital relations, and in so doing respect and reproduce the artificial rupture posited before and after World War II, thereby theorising colonial culture without theorising it rigorously with its material relations.³ While these divides are over-simplified here, it is nevertheless by way of redressing these schisms in part, that this chapter makes the case for the possibility of theorising continuities between development discourse and colonial discourse in a way which might help to reconfigure the rather anxious debate over contemporaneity and the new imperialism.

Briefly, the post-structuralist or postmodern turn in the study of International Relations (IR) has formed a counter-point around issues of temporality, subjectivity, knowledge and truth to the classical paradigm of realism in IR and its account of rational, autonomous state-actors in an anarchical and de-historicised state system. Criticisms of realism and neo-realism abound, but post-positivist approaches have failed, according to Arlene Tickner, to accommodate adequately 'Third World' perspectives. In her piece in *Millennium* titled 'Seeing IR differently: Notes from the Third World', Tickner has argued:

Calls for disciplinary opening have not been met by systematic efforts to explore IR from third world perspectives. The rejection of universal knowledge projects and absolute truths has not been matched by concrete actions to map out and incorporate multiple, competing know-hows that are scattered throughout the world. (Tickner 2003:296)

According to a strict Realist or Neo-Realist perspective, 'countries of the Global South are irrelevant to the study of international politics' (*ibid.*:301), as they are understood primarily in terms of statehood viability and are cast in terms of their 'failure' as states, their 'roguish' behaviour or 'weak' or contested status. Mainstream IR becomes both a theory for understanding its environment and an epistemology and set of practices for legitimating a particular set of relations (Tickner 2003). Development studies are precisely where the study of the territorially global South becomes

relevant to the discipline of IR. Conventional or mainstream Development Studies, just as in development policies and practice, is historically, and up to the contemporary moment, a professed practice of state-building or reconstruction according to the template of state presumed natural and inevitable by the discipline of IR. Development as a discipline picks up where IR leaves off.

Similarly, critical perspectives in development and the school of post-development have also been influenced by the same body of post-structuralist and postmodern scholarship and have made similar criticisms regarding development's unitary and teleological narrative, its Eurocentrism and its claims to a universality that is actually specific, and its function as an epistemology, or way of knowing the world, which in fact operates as a technology for structuring the world, in other words, the knowledge/power apparatus rendered legible in the scholarship of Michel Foucault (see Foucault 1972, 1993 and 1997). Critical perspectives in the study of development are also about theorising development as a discourse, mechanism and technology of power, but do so while respecting and reproducing a narrative rupture which facilitates the very apparatus of power they seek to critique. Critical development theorists need to be more explicit in their theorisation of history. The application of postcolonial theory to contemporary development can begin to bridge the 'tremendous paradox' that the global South poses for even post-positivist perspectives in IR, and, with its thorough treatment of colonial culture and discourse, begin to contextualise development beyond the narrow twentieth-century confines which critical perspectives in development have by and large reproduced.

A Stalemate on the Left

Thus far it has been suggested that there is a tradition of interruptions and alternatives to conventional narratives of history offered by the discourses of authority. This question of alternatives, *alterneity*, is one that grounds the historical debate between liberal, conservative or mainstream camps and their left-wing or radical counterparts which have pointed out all that is wrong in the dominant narrative of how the world is constituted (modern, free and developed vs. imperialist, exploitative and hegemonic) and how it has come to be that way (i.e. through a process of underdevelopment, colonisation or a process of inevitable enlightened progress). But where critics have possibly offered an alternative narrative for the past and the present, they always get caught out in prescribing a political programme for the future.

The fundamental problematic of offering alternatives that are *truly alternative* is what drives this consideration of historical counter-narratives when they attempt to fill in the positive content of *wie ist eigentlich gewesen* ('how it actually was'). If the Eurocentric recounting of history is fraught with gaps and silences (Bhabha 1994; Said 1994; Spivak and Guha 1988), and consolidates itself upon a constitutive lack, *wie ist eigentlich gewesen* becomes an aporia, as does any legitimate programme for how the world can be otherwise. What I mean by this is that the failure of various leftist projects in the twentieth century has led to the proliferation of anxiety over the loss of the agent of history as theorised by Marx. For critics of post-structuralism, this has amounted to a melancholia that is sceptical of over-arching narratives and firm political programmes and a refusal to make political commitments (Bartolovich, 2003). For some critics on the left in various fields (Cox 1996; Escobar 1995), the hope for emancipation has been transferred to the agents of New Social Movements in the global South. Critics of Post-Development, in particular, argue that this hope

amounts to a romantic reification of rural or indigenous actors who may or may not hold progressive ideals (Ziai 2004; Pieterse 2001; Storey 2000).

The problematic which post-structuralist inflected criticism is at pains to point out is the problem of ambivalence, or how to keep emancipatory projects from hardening into dogmatism, how to keep the despot from returning. This is a problematic currently playing itself out in the debates over the World Social Forum. This postmodern or post-structuralist problematic informs the reasoning behind the 'new culture of politics' professed by advocates at the World Social Forum, regional forums and various activist activity recently. It is the reason why the World Social Forum presents itself as an arena for the debate of alternatives, a unity in diversity, rather than a movement which articulates a succinct political programme. By and large, there has been a questioning of the old party-led, hierarchical, vanguard politics of the old left which the architects of the World Social Forum are attempting to replace with a postmodern, decentralised, networked, radical democracy which promulgates a multiplicity of alternatives instead of singular, monolithic political programmes.

The positivist premise that inaugurates the disciplines of history and the human sciences (including the study of politics and International Relations), that history and social life can be known and therefore efficiently disciplined and ordered, is also fundamentally tied up with the project of nineteenth-century nation-building (Appleby *et al.* 1994; Wallerstein 1984; Murphy 1994). While this problematic should be emphasised, it is also important within a post-structuralist framework to perpetually interrogate posited foundations, over-arching narratives, received political programmes, etc., but despite this, according to Spivak's reasoning, one is obliged to posit foundations and should do so *strategically*. Gayatri Spivak usefully articulates the paradox that one is obliged to inhabit that which one critiques (Spivak 1987a), or, worded differently, the idea that even the claim that there is no absolute truth is itself a claim for absolute truth. This is a tension that this chapter does not seek to resolve, but one which it attempts to work with productively, which is why it is highlighted here to situate the discussion ambivalently in between the materialist and post-structuralist perspectives.

This schism between an epistemological emphasis on the material and an emphasis on the discursive is significant for the narration of history and the positing of narrative ruptures. Theoretically, there are two issues to be addressed which reflect a wider debate that cuts across disciplines and fields of study on the academic left. Firstly, by using post-structuralist inflected postcolonial theory in a way that brings it directly to bear on contemporary political discourses, it can be (re)politicised. And secondly, by theorising continuities across a narrative rupture that is explicitly or inadvertently reproduced by epistemological schisms on the left, this chapter aims, in part, to begin to construct a bridge between critical development perspectives, postcolonial theory and critical IR.

Thus, the case can be made that development is at its heart a narrative of history. Moreover, development as an idea hinges on the idea of modernity as the 'wealth of nations,' which is persistently under threat from the continued existence of poverty, characterised within the discourse as a 'degeneracy'. Understood from a critical perspective that includes postcolonial theory, development as a discourse therefore has three narrative dimensions which bring it to bear directly on post-positivist or critical perspectives in IR: (i) it is a narrative of history and progress; (ii) more specifically it is a narrative of the history of nations, normatively positing the modern European nation state as a naturally and inevitably occurring historical process, rather than a historically specific matrix of intersecting institutions. Thus, history *per se*

becomes the history of the nation state (Appleby, Hunt & Jacob 1994), and the history dove-tailed by mainstream IR is paradoxically subsumed in the narrative of development. And (iii) it is a narrative of, and which defines and normalises, the *relationship* between empire and colony/dependency; first and third world; centre and periphery; developed and un(under)developed; rich and poor, etc. Postcolonial theory provides a set of analytical tools which seeks to theorise precisely this ambivalence that the relationship of development poses for an international system of Western liberal constitutional states. Its application to contemporary development discourses can begin to form a bridge between critical perspectives in development and post-positivist IR in a way that can potentially produce a more devastating critique, and reconfigures the debate over empire and contemporaneity informed by the logic of rupture.

By the Logic of a Rupture

The central argument of this chapter is that a rupture has been posited in the narration of contemporary history, a rupture with which alternative histories, historiographical interventions, postcolonial theory and post-development narratives have not adequately dealt. The rupture is posited pre- and post-World War II, and is a problem because it helps in part to mask the fact that the global political and economic organisation established in the nineteenth century is still largely intact, even if it has shifted its locus to new 'international' institutions (Amin 2004; Reno 2004). A growing volume of literature within International Relations and political history is making the case for the existence of continuities or similarities between nineteenth-century British imperialism and the not-so-new American imperialism, even if they are not making the concrete case for a purposeful theorisation of continuities by way of political praxis or intervention (Reno 2004; Mabee 2004; Pagden 2002; Armitage 2000; Cain and Hopkins 2002).

The case for theorising continuities has been made elsewhere in the literature recently. For instance, Samir Amin alludes to it in a piece titled 'For Struggles Global and National', an interview on the World Social Forum in which he explicitly states that globalisation and imperialism are not new because the nature of capitalism has always been imperialist global expansion (Amin 2004:7). The nature of this imperialist global expansion must be understood with recourse to European/metropolitan colonial history. William Reno (2004) argues in a piece titled 'Order and Commerce in Turbulent Areas: 19th Century Lessons, 21st Century Practice' in *Third World Quarterly* that contemporary foreign investment as a cost-effective indirect means of conducting relations and influencing events in stateless regions and conflict zones mirrors techniques used by Europe prior to its shift back to direct colonialism before 1885 (Reno 2004:608). Bryan Mabee in 'Discourses of Empire: The US "Empire", Globalisation and International Relations' reviews the current debate over the term 'empire' to describe, positively or negatively, US foreign policy, and argues that the US is not so different from its British predecessor and that the use of empire as a concept is helpful for IR to understand the motives and functioning of the US in the current international system (Mabee 2004:1364).

Furthermore, there are recent critical interventions into the study of development such as Monica Van Beusekom and Dorothy L. Hodgson's 'Lessons Learned? Development Experiences in the Late Colonial Period' and Hodgson's 'Taking Stock: State Control, Ethnic Identity and Pastoralist Development in Tanganyika', both in the *Journal of African History* (2000). Each makes the case, using empirical material, that

colonial policy has shifted its vocabulary into development policy, and that development policy functions as an apparatus for the material reorganisation of territorially defined spaces in the same way that colonial policies did. In fact, using a combination of Marxist and Foucaultian perspectives, Craig Murphy has shown the relationship between classical liberal philosophy in Kant and Smith, nineteenth-century functionalism in Comte and Bentham, and capitalism's need for international institutions to pave the way for economic expansion (Murphy 1994). Murphy's study traces the continuity between the Public International Unions that emerged in the mid-nineteenth century to lay the systems and infrastructure for capitalist expansion and the institutions for Global Governance that emerged with the Bretton Woods arrangement after World War II. Thus a lot of empirical work has been undertaken in the last 15 years which corroborates the case being made here.

Narrative rupture represents itself by the logic of a beginning, end or break in the narrative where what precedes and what follows are narrated as fundamentally *different* or *new*. Rupture moments in the narrative of history are the operative split and doubling (present/past) within the very narrative logic of history and are meant to distance and differentiate the past from the present in the same way the rational autonomous European subject has historically attempted such a distancing and differentiation from its projected/constructed other, that is, an idea of what has gone before constitutes, or makes possible, the contemporaneity of the present.

The problematic of historical rupture reveals precisely what is at stake in any given account of history. Put simply, how one frames the story of 'how it was' says just as much about how the historian imagines her identity and how historians would like others to think of themselves, each of which then inform the horizon of possibilities for things as they are and things to come. The problematic of historical rupture is precisely what is signalled by reading across anti-imperialist, critical development and postcolonial fields. The point of contention is that which should be narrated *otherwise*, stories which have not been told, myths which legitimate the absences, silences and violence. A good example of what is at stake in the *framing* of history can be garnered from the discussion which occurs between Gayatri Spivak, Ranajit Guha of the Subaltern Studies Group and Gyan Prakash, in which debates over the possibility/legitimacy of (re)reading/(re)writing history from the perspective of the subaltern are preoccupied more by questions of collective consciousness, agency, the nature of hegemony and power, the possibility of resistance, the role of writing and discourse as simultaneously a site of authority and resistance, modernity as a narrative of history and historiography as intimately tied up in the project of modernity, than they are about the subaltern as specific subject *per se* (Spivak and Guha 1988; Prakash 1992). All of the above may or may not necessarily be questions of concern for any given 'subaltern', but they are most definitely what is at stake in critical interventions in the *name of the subaltern* into mainstream historiographical accounts.

This particular feature of historiographical counter-narrative is also observable in the dependency and World Systems literature, where the neo-Marxist account functions on the logic of a revision, in the strictest sense a revisiting of dominant narratives, where the postcolonial account functions on the logic of (re)reading. A revision, in this sense, presupposes the possibility of an ontological past to be recovered, revised and reinserted into History, and a (re)reading presupposes or foregrounds the perspectival and/or ideological nature of *any* account of history. Each of the neo-Marxist revisions places its emphasis on the revising of specific historical events. For example, where Amin places his emphasis on reconfiguring the Renaissance, Frank places his

on the inauguration of European expansion and Wallerstein's is on the French and industrial revolutions.

Frank is redrawing the historical map of beginnings to assert that capitalism begins with colonialism, Amin is replanting the seeds of the Enlightenment on African soil and Wallerstein is pointing to the fallacy of a progress inaugurated by 'revolutions'. What each revision points to is the ideological link with the content of the narrative and its point of origin and rupture. The traditional interpretations of the French and industrial revolutions (which were not in fact, for Wallerstein, revolutions) are predicated upon the underlying narratives of progress, modernity and supremacy. Traditional interpretations of these 'revolutions' narrate them as ruptures, and what is more properly at stake, argues Wallerstein, in recounting the French Revolution as a break from the past is that it *produces* and makes possible a narrative of progress, modernity and the legitimation to reorder the world. The Renaissance is also not the rupture it claims to be, according to Amin, but rather is an attempt to *separate* European philosophy from its African origins and through such a differentiation posit a European supremacy which is deeply embedded in the tradition of liberal ideology. Likewise for Frank, capitalism does not *begin* with a historical break from colonialism but is always/already inseparable from its outward expansion, making capitalism not something that originates in Europe (which the logic of certain traditions in Marxism might maintain) but rather a process which is *founded upon and made possible by the relationship* between Europe and the regions of the world it colonised. Where Frank departs from the tradition of Marxism (and note, not Marx *per se*) is that capitalism's origins in Europe are a product of Europe's relationship with the territories with which it came into contact. Thus, empire is intimately connected to capital.

The obvious point of rehearsing the arguments of these somewhat out-of-fashion theorists is that how history is narrated has political implications and the positing of narrative ruptures within the dominant narrative of history is *operative* and *enabling* of particular ontic relations, that is, it is significant and requires closer scrutiny. Both postcolonial theory and critical studies in nationalism point to the logic of national narratives and how they are structured problematically with mythological notions of origin which function also as rupture (Anderson 1983; Bhabha 1994). Like Amin, Frank and Wallerstein, one must be attendant to what the narration of rupture means, how it functions in the overall discourse, what effects it produces and what it legitimates. Like Wallerstein's account of the narration of rupture posited by the French Revolution does to the idea of progress, the rupture posited by conventional narratives of the twentieth century around World War II attempts to erase the continuity around a free trade fundamentalism that persists from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries, whether in its embedded or neo-liberal form. Just as in Wallerstein's account of the French Revolution, the narration of rupture around World War II produces the world as new, progressive and distinct from the 'old imperialism' of Europe. Development as a post-war project inaugurated by Harry Truman's presidential address becomes distinct from colonialism as the sun sets on the British Empire and the process of decolonisation begins. The argument put forward here is that not only is development not distinct from colonialism, it bears significant threads of continuity which are masked by a complex shift in vocabulary and *the persistent narration of historical rupture*. Like Amin, Frank and Wallerstein, what is being pointed out is that there is something significant about this narration of rupture.

The 'New' Imperialism as Narrative Rupture

The central problematic therefore is a problem in the popular and elite institutional narration of history, and attention needs to be drawn to the discursive functioning of rupture in narratives of contemporaneity. Debates over Empire and globalisation and the apologetic literature on the nature of imperialism function likewise largely upon the narration of rupture in which the violence and exploitation of empire are written out, underplayed or characterised as wholly different. Or, when not written out, underplaying or differentiated, the apologetic literature on imperialism uses Britain's imperial experience as a source of lessons for America's imperial project, characterised as a benevolent project of modernisation that can bring a host of 'goods' to the world system such as order and prosperity (Ignatieff 2003; Ferguson 2004). An acceptable version of 'empire' is currently being constructed by ignoring the literature that narrates empire's violence and in so doing reverses the twentieth-century normative platitude that empire contravenes that universally accepted social good of 'sovereignty', as freedom from fascism, despotism and arbitrary governance, as a state of political existence that characterises modernity itself. An alternative version of globalisation as a new form of empire is being narrated which overlooks and/or fails to problematise the narrative rupture posited around World War II and does not theorise the relationship between capitalism and colonialism. The contention here is that this is a symptom of the 'sanctioned ignorance' (Spivak 1987a) around the figure and history of empire which persists in the study of politics and the field of International Relations.

The argument being put forward, therefore, is that two ruptures work instrumentally in the narrative of contemporaneity in a way which enables and facilitates the furtherance of global liberal power, apologetic versions of European colonial history, and a re-emergence of the figure of empire. The first posits World War II as the quintessential watershed, and while it would be foolish to argue against its significance, the argument is that empirical work which demonstrates lines of continuity, particularly in the development apparatus and the staggered nature of decolonisation, points more to a complex shift in vocabulary and material relations than a complete break with history with which it has become mythologised. The second rupture is posited around the phenomenon of globalisation, a significantly new feature of capitalism which returns us to policies experimented with in nineteenth-century empires. A response to these ruptures and the debates which they have engendered for contemporaneity, is offered here by way of a *theorisation of continuities* from colonialism and empire to development and globalisation. The continuities which find their axis between colonial discourse and development discourse should be understood, following Homi Bhabha, as a *shift in vocabulary from within the discourses of authority*, rather than a break in temporality, or even a renewal or reinvention of anachronistic power relations. In so doing, this chapter makes its own contribution to the debate over contemporaneity, and argues that this historical moment must be understood as a direct continuation, in spite of shifts and fissures, with nineteenth-century British colonial hegemony. I offer, therefore, a narrative of contemporaneity which has implications for the signification of 'history' and the urgency of resistance.

Bibliography

- Afzal-Khan, F. and Seshadri-Crooks, K. (2000) *The Pre-Occupation of Postcolonial Studies*. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press.
- Ahmad, A. (1992) *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures*. London: Verso Press.
- Amin, S. (1973) *Neo-colonialism in West Africa*. New York and London: Monthly Review Press.
- Amin, S. (1989) *Eurocentrism*. London: Zed Books.
- Amin, S. (2004) 'For Struggles Global and National'. In Sen, J., Anand, A., Escobar, A. and Waterman, P. (eds) *World Social Forum: Challenging Empires*. New Delhi: The Viveka Foundation.
- Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso Press.
- Appleby, J., Hunt, L. and Jacob, M. (1994) *Telling the Truth about History*. New York and London: W.W. Norton.
- Armitage, D. (2000) *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Arrighi, G. (2003) 'Lineages of Empire'. In Balakrishnan, G. (ed.) *Debating Empire*. London: Verso Press.
- Attridge, D., Bennington, G. and Young, R. (eds) (1987) *Post-Structuralism and the Question of History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Balakrishnan, G. (ed.) (2003) *Debating Empire*. London: Verso Press.
- Bartolovich, C. and Lazarus, N. (eds) (2002) *Marxism, Modernity and Postcolonial Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Beusekom, M.M. and Hodgson, D.L. (2000) 'Lessons Learned? Development Experiences in the Late Colonial Period'. *The Journal of African History* 41(1): 29–33.
- Bhabha, H. (1994) 'How Newness enters the World: Postmodern Space, Postcolonial Times and the Trials of Cultural Translation.' In *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge.
- Biccum, A.R. (2002) 'Interrupting the Discourse of Development: On a Collision Course with Postcolonial Theory'. *Culture, Theory & Critique* 43: 33–50.
- Biccum, A.R. (2005) 'Development and the "New" Imperialism: a Reinvention of Colonial Discourse in DFID Promotional Literature'. *Third World Quarterly* 26: 1005–20.
- Cain, P.J. and Hopkins, A.G. (2002) *British Imperialism 1628–2000*. Harlow: Pearson.
- Cardoso, F.H. (1979) *Dependency and Development in Latin America*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Castle, G. (ed.) (2001) *Postcolonial Discourses: An Anthology*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Cesaire, A. (1955) *Discourse on Colonialism*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Cooper, R. (2002a) 'Why We Still Need Empires'. *The Observer*, 7 April, <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/print/0,4388915-110490,00.html>.
- Cooper, R. (2002b) 'The New Liberal Imperialism'. *The Observer*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/apr/07/1>.
- Cooper, R. (2003) *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century*. London: Atlantic Books.
- Cox, M. (2003a) 'The Empire's Back in Town: Or America's Imperial Temptation'. *Millennium* 32: 1–29.
- Cox, M. (2003b) 'Empire by Denial? Debating U.S. Power'. *Security Dialogue* 35: 228–36.
- Cox, R. (1996) *Approaches to World Order*. New York: Cambridge.
- Devi, M. (1993) *Imaginary Maps: Three Stories*. G.C. Spivak (Trans.). Calcutta: Theme.
- Dirlik, A. (1997) *The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Escobar, A. (1995) *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Fanon, F. (1961) *The Wretched of the Earth*. London: Macgibbon & Gee.
- Fanon, F. (2001) 'Spontaneity: its Strengths and Weaknesses'. In Castle, G. (ed.) *Postcolonial Discourses: An Anthology*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 3–25.
- Ferguson, N. (2004) *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire*. London: Allen Lane.
- Ferguson, N. (2004) *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World*. London: Penguin.
- Foucault, M. (1997) *Society Must be Defended*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Foucault, M. (1993) 'Space, Power and Knowledge'. In During, S. (ed.) *The Cultural Studies Reader*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Foucault, M. (1972) *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. London: Tavistock.
- Frank, A. G. (1978) *Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment*. London: MacMillan Press.
- Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2001) *Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Harvey, D. (2003) 'The "New" Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession'. In Panitch, L. and Leys, C. (eds)

- Socialist Register: The New Imperial Challenge*. London: Merlin, pp. 63–87.
- Hobsbawm, E.J. (1968) *Industry and Empire: From 1750 to the Present Day*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Hodgson, D.L. (2000) 'Taking Stock: State Control, Ethnic Identity and Pastoralist Development in Tanganyika, 1948–1958'. *Journal of African History* 41(1): 55–78.
- Ignatieff, M. (2003) *Empire Lite: Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan*. London: Vintage.
- Ikenberry, J. (2004) 'Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age'. *Review of International Studies* 30: 615–37.
- James, C.L.R. (2001) *The Black Jacobins*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Mabee, B. (2004) 'Discourses of Empire: The U.S. "Empire", Globalisation and International Relations'. *Third World Quarterly* 25: 1359–78.
- Mann, M. (2004) 'The First Failed Empire of the 21st Century'. *Review of International Studies* 30: 631–53.
- Mariategui, J. C. (1929) 'The Anti-Imperialist Perspective'. *New Left Review* 7: 67–72.
- McClintock, A. (1992) *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest*. New York: Routledge.
- McCleod, J. (2000) *Beginning Postcolonialism*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Memmi, A. (1965) *The Coloniser and the Colonised*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Moore-Gilbert, B. (1997) *Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics*. London: Verso Press.
- Mudimbe, V.Y. (1988) *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Murphy, C. (1994) *International Organisation and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Nkrumah, K. (1965) *Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*. London: Nelson.
- Pagden, A. (2002) *People and Empires*. London: Phoenix Press.
- Parry, B. (1994) 'Signs of Our Times: Discussion of Homi Bhabha's *The Location of Culture*'. *Third Text* vol. 8 (28): 5–24.
- Pieterse, J.N. (2001) 'After Post-Development'. *Third World Quarterly* 21: 175–191.
- Prakash, G. (1992) 'Postcolonial Criticism and Indian Historiography'. *Social Text* 31(32): 8–20.
- Reno, W. (2004) 'Order and Commerce in Turbulent Areas: 19th Century Lessons, 21st Century Practice'. *Third World Quarterly* 25: 607–25.
- Rodney, W. (1981) *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Washington, DC: Howard University Press.
- Said, E. (1984) 'Permission to Narrate'. *Journal of Palestinian Studies* 13: 27–48.
- Said, E. (1989) 'Representing the Colonised: Anthropology's Interlocutors'. *Critical Inquiry* 15: 205–25.
- Said, E. (1994) *Culture and Imperialism*. London: Vintage.
- Said, E. (1997) *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*. London: Vintage.
- Saull, R. (2004) 'On the "New" American Empire'. *Security Dialogue* 35 (2): 251–3.
- Seth, S. (2003) 'Back to the Future?' In Balakrishnan, G. (ed.) *Debating Empire*. London: Verso Press, pp. 43–51.
- Shohat, E. (1992) 'Notes on the "Post-Colonial"'. *Social Text* 32 (32): 99–114.
- Spivak, G. C. (1987a) *The Postcolonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues*. New York: Routledge.
- Spivak, G.C. (1987b) 'Scattered Speculations on the Question of Value'. In Atteridge, D., Bennington, G., and Young, R. (eds) *Poststructuralism and the Question of History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Spivak, G.C. (1987c) *In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics*. New York: London: Routledge.
- Spivak, G.C. (1993) *Outside in the Teaching Machine.*, New York and London: Routledge.
- Spivak, G.C. and GUHA, R. (eds) (1988) *Selected Subaltern Studies*. London and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Spivak, G.C., Landry, D. and Maclean, G. (1996) *The Spivak Reader: Selected Works of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Storey, A. (2000) 'Post-Development Theory: Romanticism and Pontius Pilate Politics'. *Development (SID)* 43: 40–46.
- Tickner, A. (2003) 'Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World'. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 32(2):295–324.
- Wade, R.H. (2004) 'Bringing the Economics Back In'. *Security Dialogue* 35: 243–9.
- Wallerstein, I. (1984) *The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations Essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme.
- Walvin, J. (1993) *Black Ivory: A History of British Slavery*. London: Harper Collins.
- Williams, E. (1994) *British Historians and the West Indies*. New York: A & B Books Publishers.
- Williams, P. and Childs, P. (1997) *An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory*. Harlow: Pearson.
- Williams, P. and Chrisman, L. (eds) (1993) *Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: A Reader*. Hemel Hemp-

- stead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Wood, E.M. (2004) 'Infinite War'. *Historical Materialism* 10 (1): 7–27.
- Young, R. (1990) *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West*. London: Routledge.
- Young, R. (2001) *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Ziai, A. (2004) 'The Ambivalence of Post-Development: Between Reactionary Populism and Radical Democracy'. *Third World Quarterly* 25: 1045–60.

Notes

- 1 I use 'short' advisedly and not to disagree too much with Arrighi's account of the 'long Twentieth Century,' I am referring to the way the twentieth century is often conceptualised as beginning after World War I.
- 2 For an overview of this debate see Afzal-Khan and Sheshadri-Crooks (2000).
- 3 For an account of the Marxist strand of postcolonial criticism and theory, see Bartolovich and Lazarus (2003).