We'll Save Ourselves:

Student Activism in Contemporary Taiwan

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Declaration

Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is the result of original work carried out by the author.

Rowena Ebsworth

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Producing this thesis has been a laborious and complicated process. My life is fundamentally different now to when I began, as are those of many who have been involved. Its completion is a testament to the support I have received.

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Abstract

Between March 18 and April 10 2014, a group of student activists led thousands of protesters as they occupied the Legislative Yuan and surrounding streets in Taipei, Taiwan. The event, now known as the 318 Occupation or Sunflower Student Movement, has since been defined as turning point in Taiwan's democracy and dominates academic discussion. It has been celebrated as an expression of civil society's disillusion with the Kuomintang (KMT) government, growing ties with China, and economic inequality. The occupation has also been attributed with changing the balance of power in Taiwan, leading to the election of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to government in 2016 and the rise of minor parties.

This thesis seeks to understand the 318 Occupation and its significance in Taiwan by tracking the major student-led movements that proceeded it. Beginning with the Wild Strawberry Movement of 2008, this thesis asks how and why young activists became prominent in Taiwan's civil society and what this reveals about the socio-political structure.

To do so, I draw on eight months of fieldwork in Taiwan, including first-hand interviews, the observation of protests, social media and traditional media analysis. I adopt the concept of 'reflexivity' to capture young activists' deliberate and self-aware navigation of a contradictory and unstable political environment and divided civil society. Encountering fierce debates over geopolitics, national identity, party politics and the legacy of authoritarianism, I argue that the student protesters were able to establish political space only by compromising their ideals and political style. Their achievements – including halting legislation that concerned them, introducing new measures in line with their beliefs, and ousting the KMT in 2016 – led to a peak in their political disillusion. As such, I suggest that this process can be understood as an articulation of modernity as young activists pursued competing and irresolvable ideals.

A Note on Translations

A variety of romanisation systems are used in Taiwan. This thesis primarily includes names written in Wade-Giles accompanied by the Mandarin Chinese, but uses Pinyin and English, or a mix of systems, where they have occurred in the primary source material and where people have chosen to spell their names idiosyncratically, such as Ma Ying-jeou. Language and romanisation in Taiwan are politically fraught. Therefore, while the characters for certain places, people and groups are undisputed, exactly how that name should be romanised is complex – in some cases the name may be spoken using both Taiyu and Mandarin. Therefore, I have chosen not to give romanisations but only characters.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

In the lead up to the Republic of China 中華民國 (ROC or Taiwan)'s 2016 general and presidential elections, discussion in the media and amongst political parties was often focused on the role of young people. The youngest candidate for Taiwan's legislative branch of government, the Legislative Yuan 立法院, was only 24 and part of a new generation of prospective politicians (Ide 2016). The Democratic Progressive Party 民主進步黨 (DPP), in opposition at the time and the victor of the election, had specifically hired young people and graduate students to work on their campaign and allied themselves with youth-focused minor parties (Van der Horst 2016). The Chinese Nationalist Party 中國國民黨 (Kuomintang or KMT), later attributed their loss of the election to their inability to appeal to younger voters (Liang 2016).

Indeed, during the eight years of the Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九-led KMT presidency, from 2008 to 2016, young people had been at the forefront of civic opposition to the government. They had originally mobilised in November 2008 in a student movement against laws restricting freedom of protest and the KMT's instigation of closer ties with the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国 (PRC or China). Over the following years young activists had maintained pressure on the government, while also developing their protesting tactics and connections with other parts of civil society[1]. As evidenced in the presidential election results, by 2016 they had established themselves in a position to influence legislative politics.

[1]'Civil society' is a ubiquitous term in the study of Taiwanese politics. It is used in the sociological sense, as in David Held's understanding that "civil society retains a distinctive character to the extent that it is made up of areas of social life – the domestic world, the economic sphere, cultural activities and political interaction – which are organised by private or voluntary arrangements between

The trajectory of political action led to the March 2014 occupation of Taiwan's parliament, the Legislative Yuan, and the protests that followed (now referred to as the Sunflower Student Movement 太陽花學運 or 318 Occupation 318 佔領). On the night of 18 March 2014, hundreds of young activists forcefully entered and took over the site of the Legislative Yuan on Ketagalan Boulevard in central Taipei. They were opposed to the KMT's implementation of a trade deal with China focused on service industries with the potential to increase the economic interdependence between China and Taiwan and were unhappy with the broader dynamics of cross-strait relations. Thousands of citizens joined in occupying the surrounding streets the following day, where they remained until 10 April. The movement received widespread public support and successfully halted the passage of laws enhancing cross-strait trade. The young leaders of the occupation went on to form new political parties, work for the DPP, or run as candidates in the 2016 election.

The 318 Occupation has coincided with and facilitated a renewed interest in student movements in Taiwan and research on their role in politics. Immediately following the movement, the tone in books, films and academic production worked to legitimize the historical significance of 318 and write the youth-led protests in a positive and celebratory way into the history of Taiwan's democracy. There was a burst of research on the experience of participants during the 318 Occupation and in the subsequent years (Rowen 2015; Pan 2015; Hawang 2016; Beckershoff

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individuals and groups outside the direct control of the state" (Held 1987, 281). Within this definition, civil society emerged in Taiwan as part of the process of democratisation, as strict government controlled abated, and citizens were given the freedom to form groups, discuss, and directly participate in politics (Hsiao 1990, 177-179). In the context of Taiwan's contemporary democracy, civil society includes non-government organisations and groups that represent or embody the political interests of citizens, often expressed through protests, community building, or political campaigns.

2017; Chen and Yen 2017; Fell 2017a), as academics attempted to construct an account of how students had successfully occupied the Legislative Yuan. Their actions were interpreted as part of the consolidation of democracy in Taiwan and symbolic of a so-called 'democratic awakening' (Yan, Lo, Liang, and Jiang 2015; Cole 2015; Fell 2017b).

Yet the reaction to student movements has also been critical and contemplative. Even while the 318 Occupation was still unfolding, conflict arose over the strategy of protesters and the political style of student leaders (Laskai 2014). Academic research has identified the systemic issues student movements failed to address (Wang 2017) and the power imbalance inherent in the approach they adopted (Yan, Lo, Liang, and Jiang 2015). Participants also faced scrutiny in the legal system after being charged for their actions (Pan 2015; Tong 2017; Hioe 2017a). Participants themselves have been actively involved in criticising and reflecting on their protests. They have conducted projects examining what could have been done differently and systematically analysed the limits and failings of the protest actions (Zhang, Huang, and Yu 2015; Bao et al. 2018). Anger against the KMT government has also subsided amongst young activists and been replaced by disillusion with the DPP government that they helped elect (Ihara 2018). Within this context, the outcome and meaning of student movements remains unstable and subject to negotiation.

In line with much of the established research on the topic, this thesis argues that young activists have been critical in shaping civil society and Taiwanese politics since they became active as a coherent group through the 2008 Wild Strawberry Movement 野草莓運動. The year 2008 marked the election of President Ma Ying-jeou and a KMT government, who began pursuing an agenda student protesters perceived as a threat to the integrity of Taiwan's democratic system. Student-led protests, which peaked with the 318 Occupation of parliament but encompassed campaigns over media ownership laws, the process of urban development,

military conscription and political freedom, amongst a number of intersecting issues, helped to reframe legislative politics and introduce new discourses to the socio-political environment in the period of Ma Ying-jeou's presidency. The primary aim of my research was therefore to understand how and why young activists came to prominence in civil society during this period and to ask what this reveals about contemporary Taiwan. It draws on nine months of fieldwork which took place in 2014 and 2015, firsthand interviews, protest observation and social media and traditional media analysis. This thesis also hopes to fill a gap in the literature by considering the shifting meaning of student movements in Taiwan, and the role that young activists themselves have played in reflecting their significance. It seeks to reconcile the simultaneous celebration and criticism of student-led movements between 2008 and 2016 and the distinctive mode of self-awareness demonstrated by the actors who were involved.

To do so, this thesis draws on the concept of 'reflexivity', that is the interconnection and circular relationship between structure and agency, to capture young activists' distinct mode of political engagement during this period. I argue that between 2008 and the 318 Occupation young activists reflexively and self-consciously adapted their political ideas and style in order to navigate Taiwan's shifting socio-political environment. Their actions in turn shaped the nature of this period and the priorities of both civil society and legislative politics. They learned to balance their political ideals against the compromise needed for tangible results and they did so within a mode of reflection on their social identities as students and activists.

In this chapter, I detail how this argument unfolds throughout the thesis. After introducing the literature that has informed and been produced on student activism in Taiwan, the chapters are ordered chronologically. They examine the Wild Strawberry Movement of 2008, the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement 反媒體壟斷運動 that took place between 2012-2013, protests against forced evictions and the White Shirts Army Movement 白衫軍運動 of 2013, and the

318 Occupation itself. Firstly, however, I explore the ideas of 'reflexivity' and 'modernity' as part of the theoretical underpinning of this thesis.

Reflexivity

The term 'reflexivity' is multifaceted with diverging uses across disciplines. It has not previously been well defined in relation to established social movement theories but has been used to account for and explain social change, of which social movements are one aspect. For the purpose of this thesis, I adopt the concept of reflexivity as an explanatory device to account for the relationship between social actors and their environment. In doing so, I begin with a broad definition that traverses the uses of the term that have emerged in the fields of sociology, anthropology and cultural studies. When examined in combination, work from Michael Foucault (1970), Pierre Bourdieu (1990; 2004), Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant (1992), Margaret Archer (1988; 1995; 2007; 2010; 2012) Anthony Giddens (1984; 1990; 1991), and Ulrich Beck, Giddens and Scott Lash (1994), identifies reflexivity as the mediating instrument between structure and agency, cause and effect. Reflexivity describes how through their agency and awareness, social actors engage with and shape, but are also constrained by social structures, in an ongoing and self-referential process.

Starting from this definition, this thesis applies the concept of reflexivity in three notable ways, which are explored here and referenced for clarity in later chapters. The first of these is as a sociological device that enables researchers to identify the role of structure and agency in the process of social change. This use of reflexivity is central to this thesis as a device to explain the interrelationship between participants in social movements and their socio-political environment. According to this understanding, the circular nature of reflexivity – that is the ability of individuals to recognise social structures, monitor and adapt their behaviour in response, and vice versa – creates conditions of constant transformation. Debates over

reflexivity therefore often centre on how much agency to attribute to social actors. For example, with his emphasis on power, Michael Foucault depicted a limited reflexivity, where choice is ultimately defined by available discourses (Foucault 1970). So too, Beck, Giddens and Lash (1994) emphasised that actors have become reflexive, that is able to recognize their own subject positions within social structures and respond to structural changes. Beck, Giddens and Lash see the contemporary era as one of 'reflexive modernity' in which politics is now focused on the consequences that emerged as a result of progress and modernisation, including challenges such as climate change. The global and catastrophic nature of many of these developments has weakened previously established social bonds, political borders and identities. They have created conditions of instability and high risk "interconnection" (Giddens 1990), in which individuals are forced to constantly consider their position in relation to others and the world they live in.

However, Giddens has also spent time considering reflexivity from the perspective of social actors and what role they play in reproducing social structures. According to Giddens' theory of structuration "society only has form… in so far as structure is produced and reproduced in what people do" (Giddens and Pierson 1998, 77). Actors are motivated to act within societal expectations by their emotional commitment to what feels familiar and safe. At the same time, the unstable nature of contemporary society has meant that reflexivity is often expressed in the process of self-identification. In everyday life, social actors constantly reflect on and question their actions and how they contribute to who they are as a person. As a result, self-identity is not a "set of traits or observable characteristics" (Giddens 1991, 53) but an ongoing project. Consistency in the distinguishable characteristics of an individual is "only a product of the person's beliefs about their own biography" (Giddens 1991, 53).

Margaret Archer's definition of reflexivity – as "the regular exercise of the mental ability, shared by all normal people, to consider themselves in relation to their (social) contexts and

vice versa" (Archer 2007, 4) – is also focused on the agency of social actors. According to Archer, reflexivity is not visible, but takes place within an 'internal conversation'. Within this conversation actors consider systemic "constraints and enablements as they pursue reflexively defined 'projects'" (Archer 2010). Archer argues that in contemporary society reflexive practice has replaced routine and habit (Archer 2012, 1).

My use of reflexivity mirrors that of Giddens and Archer in its focus on the experience of social actors. Reflexivity is used to explore how young activists understood and navigated Taiwan's socio-political circumstances and political history between 2008 and 2016 and what impact this had on underlying social structures. As identified in criticisms of Archer (see Caetano 2015) this approach privileges the abilities of social actors. Unless stated otherwise, I assumed that protesters made decisions that were reasoned and deliberate. Thus, not every mistake or 'internal conversation' has been revealed nor factored into analysis. Reflexivity was often only visible through young activists' practices or in the consequences of their actions.

Within this context, I argue that through their reflexive engagement in social movements, young activists successfully carved out political space. Recognising the dynamics of Taiwan's socio-political structures, these protesters were adaptable and compromising, promoting a cohesive identity and accepting tangible results over their ideals. Through a process of experimentation, trial and error, young activists influenced the political discourse and policy priorities of parliament. They revealed their ability to identify and utilise sources of power and strategically mediate internal divisions from within Taiwan's political life and their own activist community.

This thesis also touches upon the concept of reflexivity as it pertains to the position of academia in relation to broader society and politics. More than a critique of academia's intervention in society and politics, this use of reflexivity is a practical response to the embeddedness of academic institutions in Taiwan's social movements, particularly where participants are also associated with academic institutions and familiar with the theories and debates that attempt to account for their activities. This particular use of reflexivity is mostly confined to Chapter 2, where I explore the intellectual context for the student movements that took place in Taiwan between 2008 and 2016. Rather than trying to explain tangible links between intellectual history, academic research and individual practices and behaviors adopted by activists, this use of reflexivity aims to provide a broad overview of the types of ideas that have informed protests in Taiwan and how they are positioned as a part of a tradition of political activism.

This understanding of reflexivity relates to that developed by Michael Foucault in the *Archeology of Knowledge* (1972), where the author identified that power is reproduced through systems of knowledge and discourses that dictate the possibilities of what can be conceived. Further, as a result of this interrelationship, intellectuals can be complicit in the reproduction of power when they "define these *objects* (with) reference to the *ground,* the *foundation of things*, (rather than) relating them to the body of rules that enable them to form as objects of a discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their historical appearance" (Foucault 1972, 47). That is to say that presenting research as a foundational 'truth' instead of part of a system of knowledge denies academia's privileged position and ability to shape how the world is understood. According to this view, academics can begin to overcome this position by exposing the discursive structures that underpin both the position of the researcher and their subjects.

With a large, dynamic field of research encompassing global power structures and online platforms, amongst other divergent and intangible sites of research, this thesis does not profess

to be a comprehensive overview exposing all the discursive structures that have informed my position and that of my subjects. Rather, I find Foucault's definition of reflexivity a useful tool to understand the porous boundary between academia and social movements in Taiwan, explored further in Chapter 2. Where in Foucault's initial understanding academics are primarily complicit in reproducing power structures, however, I suggest that in the study of social movements and Taiwan's democracy more broadly, research, including this thesis, often works to bolster protests as a form of legitimate resistance. This is particularly pertinent in the context of cross-strait relations, where highlighting the strengths of Taiwanese democracy inherently challenges the narrative put forward by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the illegitimacy of Taiwan's political system. Thus, whether researchers express their political position or not, the study of Taiwanese social movements is part of an already always politicised academic practice. While seeking to explore and expose underlying power structures, this thesis is also itself a political undertaking and very much a part of legitimising Taiwan's democracy.

This leads to the third element of reflexivity touched upon in this thesis, which encompasses reflexivity as an epistemological intervention in which there is an "on-going mutual shaping between researcher and research" (Attia and Edge 2017, 33). In this sense, reflexivity acknowledges the researcher's subjectivity, the possibility of bias and the way their interaction with the subject influences the outcome. This view therefore challenges the idea of objective observation and shifts focus to the context in which research is taking place. It seeks to break down the pretense of a distanced researcher, capturing the unstable boundary between researcher and subject and emphasising the temporality of academic production.

Acknowledging this relationship, Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant (1992) developed the concept of 'reflexive sociology' as a heuristic research practice. This methodology is based on Bourdieu's idea that social theory, the practice of research and academic institutions are

inextricable, in that "a correspondence exists between social structures and mental structures, between the objective divisions of the social world – particularly into dominant and dominated in various fields – and the principles of vision and division that agents apply to it". (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 12). In response, Bourdieu and Wacquant advocated a flexible and self-referential approach to research, which neither attempted to be objective nor restricted itself to the "false antinomy" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 128-140) of different fields in the humanities and social sciences. Reflexive sociology required a "unified political economy of practices" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 4), where research and analysis included a questioning of the researcher's role as a nominal 'knowing subject' and the systems in place that allow them to know what they do. Mariam Attia and Julian Edge built on this idea by laying out guidelines for conducting 'reflexive research'. According to this view, reflexive research can be 'prospective' when the researcher learns to acknowledge and understand their biases towards different social categories and groups (Attia and Edge 2017, 35). 'Retrospective reflexivity' involves reflection on the way the research has impacted the researcher and requires the researcher be open to personal development. Thus, research is not considered to be exhaustive but one step in the long-term acquisition of knowledge and the researchers' own intellectual journey (Attia and Edge 2017, 42-43).

As previously noted, the broad scope of this thesis and size of the research field has mostly prohibited my ability to undertake research using anthropological methods or an ongoing reflexive practice. Even so, the concept of reflexive research is a useful way to begin to account for my own positionality and to introduce the methodology used through the course of my fieldwork. While not expressly addressing my impact on the field nor its impact on me, the two methodological considerations listed here – my relationship to my subjects and the data sources used – touch on which aspects of my findings may be a product of my own subjective interpretation or research approach.

Methodological considerations

The primary source research for this thesis included interviews with around two dozen university students who had participated in Taiwanese social movements. For the most part, I was able to interview those I did through virtue of their being my peers. My university in Australia helped facilitate a visiting scholar position in Academia Sinica in Taipei, where I was introduced to students studying Taiwan's social movements or who had been participants in recent protests. This introduction was generally enough to convince activists to participate in an interview, with most eager to engage with a foreign researcher about Taiwanese politics. As all participants were university graduates, over half (around fifteen) in the humanities and social sciences, it was not difficult to explain the aims or context for my research and no one had concerns about the risks of participating. Even so, I emphasised that I would keep all participants as anonymous as possible in case their personal circumstances or political dynamics in Taiwan changed. There were notable challenges in terms of gender representation, with all participants I met through Academia Sinica being male. In response, I actively sought out women to interview, either through asking other participants for introductions or using social media to identify appropriate candidates. In the end, under one third of participants (eight) were women. I also tried to interview activists who had been involved in a variety of protests and on-campus activities. This approach was largely successful: all interviewees participated in the 318 Occupation, twenty had been involved in other major protests and twenty-two were involved in ongoing political activism.

The other challenge I faced in terms of my relationship to my participants, was that some had engaged in theoretical debates over the meaning of social movements in their own academic careers and during our discussions framed their participation in protests using sociological terms. This led me to reposition the focus of my research to ensure I was adding value to an already highly theorised subject and was taking participants' academic backgrounds into

account. In my experience, those working on Taiwanese social movement in Taiwan are either deeply engaged in a particular discipline and use Taiwanese social movements to test or develop social movement theories, or analyse Taiwanese social movements in order to improve their political practice and pursue systemic reform of Taiwan's democracy. In contrast, in using the concept of reflexivity I seek to understand the broader environment in which Taiwanese social movements developed between 2008 and 2016, including the role of academic production on the topic itself.

The second methodological aspect that has shaped this thesis is the data sources available and the time at which I undertook my research. Taiwan's social movements from 2008 to 2016 were extensively documented by participants and observers alike, in both real time and in the months following events. While I observed protests in person in late 2014 and throughout 2015, I therefore also used social and traditional media sources to research protests that occurred before I began my PhD in March 2014 or when I was not in Taiwan. As a result, by the time I conducted my interviews in 2015 I already had an understanding of the timeline of and context for protests. Rather than purely relying on my participants for information, I therefore used my interviews to delve into particular issues and discuss participants' subjective experiences. In the few instances where my interviews conflicted with other sources in terms of specific details, I sought out additional sources to confer. Although I had a loose set of questions, I also let participants guide the focus of interviews to avoid restricting discussions based on my preconceived ideas.

Overall, 'reflexivity' is a versatile idea that relates to different aspects of this thesis. The goal of being a 'reflexive researcher' has shaped how I understand my positionality and methodological approach, while theories that address the power dynamics of academic institutions have assisted me in perceiving the interrelationship between academia and social movements in Taiwan. My primary use of reflexivity, however, and that which continuously

arises in later chapters, relates to how participants in social movements in Taiwan have interacted with their socio-political environment in order to achieve change. In doing so, I also draw upon the concept of modernity.

Modernity

As already touched upon, reflexivity has been conceptually linked to ideas of modernity. Modernity itself is a contested concept and the subject of ongoing debates over how the world's history should be categorised and understood. Risto Heiskala depicts how in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, social theorists such as Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, Max Weber and Talcott Parsons developed the idea of modernity to make sense of the rapid social changes taking place (Heiskala 2010, 4-6). Technological advances, democracy, industrialisation, and urbanisation ruptured established social patterns, led to new forms of social differentiation and a distinct mode of individuation. Theorists of the time characterised modern societies through teleologies of progress as freer, more dynamic and egalitarian, as a result of individuals having the opportunity to reflect on themselves and their place in the world. Ideas of alienation and anxiety towards the future have also been associated with modernisation in literature that has engaged with modernity's discontents.

Anthony Giddens has described the relationship between the process of modernity and reflexivity in social actors. According to Giddens, traditional societies were bounded by time and space in a way that restricted choice and led to decisions being based on norms and customs (Giddens 1990, 17-29). In contrast, modern societies include forms of specialisation, differentiation and ways to communicate, leading to "transformations… more profound than most sorts of change, characteristic of prior periods" (Giddens 1990, 4). Reflexivity is a driver of this fluidity and a necessary response. Later theorists such as Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984) and Matei Calinescu (1987) also developed a critique of modernity that suggested that the idea

of ‘progress’ itself was an ideological construct. In particular, the Enlightenment and its attendant secularisation and scientism had developed into an epistemology of objectivity in which truths could be found independent of subjectivity. In this reading, the pursuit of such truths became the political project of modernity. For Lyotard, this understanding of modernity was not reflexive, but closed, stable and uncritical in its presentation of narratives as “truths” (Lyotard 1984). Instead, Lyotard contended that the ‘postmodern condition’, reached in the late twentieth-century, is defined by a plurality of arguments and the destabilisation of metanarratives.

As a counterpoint to theories of postmodernity, Beck, later alongside Giddens and Lash, introduced the idea of ‘reflexive modernity’ to describe the nature of the late twentieth century (Beck 1992; Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994). Within this context, ‘reflexive’ is used to express how this period involves a ‘reflex’ to prior modernization, the main focus having shifted from social development to the consequences of the social development that came before (Beck 1992). Specifically, Beck argued that the modernisation process and increase in wealth produced a “risk society” (Beck 1992) in which hazards, such as pollution, are ubiquitous and on a scale to have changed the nature of politics. Traditional institutions including the nation-state, along with established expertise, are ill-equipped or at least perceived as ill-equipped, to address new challenges. They are consequently being replaced by transnational forces (Beck 2006, 339), which demand new forms of knowledge and a focus on concepts like “sustainability” (Beck 2006, 343). Beck contended that the universal nature of risk has also influenced class structure, where access to information has become more important than wealth.

When exploring the social consequences of the ‘risk society’, Beck (1992), Giddens (1990), and Lash (1993), also called into question how modernity has previously been understood. Specifically, by arguing that an increase in risk has produced conditions of dislocation (Giddens 1990; Beck 1992), this perspective presented modernity as a period of social cohesion

and a strong sense of purpose. This view diverges from theories of 'postmodernity', however, by arguing that in the current era, social bonds have reformed around ideas of seeking collective security and mitigating risk (Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994). The concept of 'reflexive modernity' therefore reintroduces the idea of progress, with a new focus on future threats, the distribution of resources and power (Beck 1992).

This thesis maneuvers through these debates by treating the reflexivity of young activists as a form of being modern and a political act in itself. Protesters encountered an unstable and contradictory environment, where critical, global ideas coincided with tangible existential threats to Taiwan. Operating from a position of marginality, young activists strategically deployed narratives they themselves were skeptical of and which were irreconcilable with some of their ideals. Their approach was also cautious and compromising, often working within established expectations and avoiding more contentious encounters. Even so, young activists' practice of experimentation and self-criticism revealed a political culture open to change and introspection. Their activities underpinned a broader search for an inclusive form of democracy and the realisation of political space both for themselves and Taiwan.

Literature Review

Reflexivity first emerges in the thesis as a useful way to navigate the problematic nature of the literature on student movements in Taiwan. I argue that the study of student movements is inextricable from the practice of protest and the political campaigns in which activists are also engaged. This goes beyond the normal unavoidable encounter with identity politics and cross-strait relations when writing on Taiwan but is also a product of the lack of differentiation between protests, politics and academic institutions. As such, rather than conducting a traditional literature review, I explore how the topic has been understood in Taiwan, and the political role that academic knowledge plays in student movements.

The term, 'student movement' – '學生運動 *xuesheng yundong'* or '學運 *xueyun*' in Mandarin – is primarily defined as a political or protest movement representing the views of students or organised and participated in by students. I suggest that in Taiwan, however, the idea of the student movement goes beyond this definition and is freighted with specific cultural and historical significance. This chapter explores the three most prominent lineages to have informed how in the contemporary setting student movements have been conducted, researched and understood. These include the American tradition of student protest, that from the Sinophone world and the role of student activists in Taiwan's own political history.

In the Sinophone tradition of student movements or '*xueyun*', the concept has a particular cultural resonance and moral dimension. This is linked to the socio-political position of scholars in Dynastic times, who often played a role in opposing corruption and directing the course of the nation (Perry 2001; Wakeman 1985). According to Fabio Lanza, students first emerged as a recognisable political subjectivity during the 1919 May Fourth Movement in Beijing (Lanza 2010). At this time, students established themselves as independent of the state, as well as articulating a contemporary expression of the Confucian tradition of the moral value of remonstrance against injustice.

In early twentieth-century China, student movements were often nationalistic, and an intrinsic part of the political system. Their phrasemaking included the need to 'save the nation *jiuguo* 救國', from international aggression, and internal governmental inefficiency and corruption (Wasserstrom and Liu 1989, 5). After the founding of the People's Republic of China (1949) the subjectivity of the activist student was subsumed into the totalising politics of the CCP-led state in China. This became visible during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), when Mao Zedong mobilised students into the Red Guard factions and in the crisis of party-state rule that occurred, students found their actions validated as 'continuing the revolution' (Lanza 2010).

The 1989 Beijing Democracy Movement drew on the lineage of student movements and expressed the complex relationship between political practices in the PRC and in Taiwan that had developed by the late 1980s. Here, participants expressed political social grievances and sought to 'correct' the course of the government. Although in many ways the student protesters remained constrained by the political language and practices of Communist China, through their political practices and mobilising of China's modern political history, were able to challenge the discursive order and shape the narrative of their activism (Pieke 1996). The CCP's violent suppression of a movement defined student activism as a dangerous form of political participation that was no longer accepted by the state.

The 1989 Beijing Democracy Movement had a significant impact on Taiwan and the practice of student movements. Participants in the 1990 Wild Lily Movement 野百合學運 were inspired by and drew symbolism from students in Beijing the year before (Wright 2001), while the KMT under its new leader Lee Teng-hui used the CCP's crushing of student protesters to build their own legitimacy in the transition to democracy. In this sense, the legacy of righteous scholarly protests that references Confucian traditions and the May Fourth Movement, and effectively destroyed in the PRC, continues in contemporary Taiwanese student movements. Student activists in Taiwan have often reflexively evoked past protests and identified opportunities to elevate their political position.

Taiwan's student movements have also been informed by the experience of youth activism in the United States of America (US). In the American tradition, student protests have been interpreted as a rational response to structural changes, including socio-economic pressures on young people, the monetisation of the university system, and events like the Vietnam War (Lipset 1967; Lipset 1971; Keniston 1968; Keniston 1971; Flacks 1973). Student protests have also been seen as an extension of left-wing politics and the rise of the New Left in the 1960s and 1970s (Altbach 1997). In this way, American scholars have emphasised that student

movements are socially embedded rather than a form of deviant behaviour. The conclusions drawn by American academics on student movements, and their research more generally may have been impacted by their own subjectivity and political commitments. Many leading scholars were also members of political movements, and part of the same milieu as their subjects. In order to overcome this interrelationship, researchers adopted methodologies that present the observer as distinct from the observed and establish the legitimising archetypes of objectivity. This included conducting their research within the fields of psychology and political science, which valorised objectivity in their epistemological principles.

This approach is mirrored in the study of student protests and social movements more generally in Taiwan. Mostly trained in the US, including during periods of significant student unrest, leading scholars in Taiwan have used their work to analyse protests as an integral part of democratic systems. They have also joined civic groups and NGOS and advised political parties, using their status as 'public intellectuals' to promote progressive policies (Ho, Huang, and Juang 2018, 119). Even so, the influence from the US is also prevalent in the methodological approach used in Taiwan, and in the way scholars write as if they are distanced from their politics in their writing.

Student movements in Taiwan have also been shaped by the island's own history and the focus on ideas of nationalism and democratisation. The 1990 Wild Lily Movement was particularly important in the immediate period after the end of martial law to framing student movements as a part of political liberalisation and consolidating the interrelationship between the study and practice of protests. The six-day sit-in at Liberty Square 自由廣場 in Taipei led to constitutional reform that reorganised Taiwan's legislative system and the way the executive office was chosen. Many participants went on to become leading academics writing on Taiwan's political system, or to join the DPP.

I suggest that as result of this history, scholarship from Taiwan often deploys the concept of the student movements in an uncritical way in which it valorises one aspect or another of Taiwan's dominant politics. Student movements have been presented as advocating one form of Taiwanese nationalism (Academia Sinica Institute of Sociology, n.d.) or opposed to a particular political party. At the same time, other work has more clearly explored the unstable boundary between institutionalised scholarship and involvement in student movements. Scholars have both sought to develop understandings of student movements and also through that knowledge, offered guidance to young activists in the way they approach their protests (Ho 2001).

This type of deliberate academic intervention in politics through the study of student movements in Taiwan has also been seen in the contemporary setting. Directly after the 318 Occupation there was a proliferation of both academic and popular publications that continued for several years. Photographic collections and books of poems and essays were part of the memorialisation and legitimisation of the event in a political process of writing the 318 Occupation into the history of Taiwan's democracy even as the effects were still unfolding (H. Huang 2014; K. Huang 2014; Ye 2014; Liu 2014). Academic texts presented these events as part of an institutionalised legacy and suggested that their significance may be as substantial as those of the 1990 Wild Lily Movement (Ho 2015).

Young activists themselves became involved in producing texts that blurred the line between the study and practice of student movements. They published accounts of their experiences to fund future activities, along with manuals on how to stage a successful student movement. Therefore, in Taiwan there is a distinctive reflexive relationship between Taiwanese student movements and academic research, and indeed this thesis is itself entangled in that reflexivity. There are specific intellectual and political lineages surrounding student movements as a concept, and in this, the concept is opened to being analysed and politicised within Taiwan's

broader political scene. When recognising this interrelationship, academics have used their position to depict the dynamism and complexity of Taiwan's student movements, and in turn its democracy.

The Wild Strawberry Movement

The following section reviews the key movements of the 21st century in Taiwan to explicate how this reflexivity has impacted the practice of student protest. As elaborated in more detail in the following chapter, the Wild Strawberry Movement was a two-month student sit-in at Liberty Square in Taipei, which ran between November 2008 and January 2009. It opens my thesis, as it is the first protest since 1990 that was classified by students themselves and academics as a 'student movement' in the distinctively unstable way described above. In part of a reflection by young activists on political strategy that distinguished their action from other political protests in Taiwan, the movement itself therefore became a discourse through which participants negotiated their place within civil society and attempted to carve out political space. Their failure to achieve significant success led them to recognise the limitations of certain forms of civic action and shaped the way they approached future movements.

The Wild Strawberry Movement is therefore significant to this thesis as a discursive moment that illustrates how young activists' reflexive engagement with the history of student movements has been realised as praxis in contemporary settings. Participants deliberately drew from this tradition in order to bring legitimacy to their movement and distinguish themselves from other protest movements. When faced with obstacles, young activists responded by identifying weaknesses in their tactics and adopting new approaches and rhetoric. Through this reflexive recognition of the nature of Taiwan's socio-political environment, this group of young activists would eventually become a significant political force.

The Wild Strawberry Movement emerged amid heightened tensions over cross-strait relations, nationalism and the meaning of ideal democratic practice. These divisions had been propelled to the forefront of public debate in November 2008 by the KMT government's decision to police public action against the visit of Chen Yunlin 陳雲林, then president of the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) 海峽兩岸關係協會 (海協會). Part of a long-term strategy to enhance the interconnections between China and Taiwan, Chen's visit had sparked widespread protests by those who advocated Taiwanese independence or were broadly concerned about a close relationship to the PRC. Wanting to create their own voice within these debates, young activists mobilised a distinct youth-led action in response.

In doing so, participants defined themselves as a 'student' protest. With limited experience in social movements, this decision in part reflected activists' reliance on their connections and status within the university system. At the same time, participants also strategically shaped their action to fit within the tradition of 'student movements' in Taiwan. This strategy provided legitimacy to the protesters through the political and cultural capital the concept carried and allowed them to cohere into an identity as the 'Wild Strawberry Movement'.

The movement's primary goal was quickly formulated as the need to amend the Assembly and Parade Act 集會遊行法. The law was seen as overly restrictive, and its reform would help to safeguard civil society and improve Taiwan's democracy. An idealisation of democratic process was also evident in the movement's organisational and decision-making structures. The tactics and political style developed by participants reflected a desire to overcome partisanship and bring 'rationality' to politics that expressed a distinctive vision for a modern democratic Taiwan.

Throughout the course of the movement, however, participants found themselves entangled in divisive party politics. Despite mobilising widespread protests, the movement also struggled to

achieve tangible results. Hoping to enhance their efficiency, young activists began to pursue new connections outside the university system and adjust their original approach. In particular, they drew on tactics outside the student movement tradition, including 'place making' and forms of protest theatre.

Yet the end of the Wild Strawberry Movement was marked by feelings of disillusionment and failure amongst student participants. They had not managed to overcome or significantly alter their marginal position in civil society or maintain long-term support. Issues of partisanship, geopolitics, and notions of weakness and vulnerability associated with the student movement identity, had continuously undermined their ability to articulate their cause. The student participants retreated from politics for several years after finally abandoning their protest in Liberty Square on 6 January 2009.

As such, the Wild Strawberry Movement demonstrates how young activists could not rely on the student movement tradition for success or substantive political space. On the contrary, the identity became a source of uncertainty for young activists in the way it dictated the parameters of their protest and how their actions were ultimately understood. The realities of Taiwan's contentious political climate and tensions between protesters also forced participants to negotiate their political approach and commitment to democratic ideals. This sets the stage for later movements in which young activists more aptly engaged with these issues, and through trial, error, and compromise, created new sites of politics for young people in Taiwan.

The Wild Strawberry Movement and the way its meaning has changed is also a clear articulation of the impact of the 318 Occupation. Directly following its end, the movement was seen as an example of idealism interrupting pragmatic protesting techniques, and the systemic weakness young people faced in Taiwan's politics. Since students successfully occupied the Legislative Yuan in 2014, however, the movement has been rewritten into a more positive

narrative of Taiwan's democracy and generational change. Yet the difficulties faced by participants have not been erased by the movement's renewed meaning.

The Anti-Media Monopoly Movement

Between 2012 and 2013, a coalition of academics and students staged widespread protests against Want Want China Times Group's 旺旺中時集團 (Want Want) proposed takeover of China Network Systems 中嘉網路 (CNS) and several Next Media 壹傳媒 outlets. The acquisitions would give Want Want a clear position of dominance in Taiwan's media market and the disproportionate ability to publish their editorial line on sensitive issues. The Anti-Media Monopoly Movement, as these protests are now known, consequently became central in debates over the meaning of a 'free press' in Taiwan's democracy, and prompted a debate over the legislation then in place to protect media diversity. After achieving international recognition, the movement shifted public debate sufficiently to motivate the government media regulator to block both the Want Want mergers and led to the introduction of new media ownership legislation to parliament.

For the community of young activists at the centre of the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement, the movement represented a reflexive exploration of the issue of media freedom and a search for new sites of political power. Participants skilfully navigated Taiwan's divisive party environment in order to establish a presence in civil society. Young activists' political style and approach in the movement can also be understood as an articulation of a flexible and inclusive form of modernity, opposed to hardened partisan divisions. Their involvement was lively and experimental, shifting between the online and offline worlds, and international and local contexts.

The Anti-Media Monopoly Movement first arose as a specialised and highly legalistic debate over the meaning of a 'free press', identity politics, Taiwan's authoritarian past, and cross-strait

relations as encapsulated in Want Want's proposed takeover of CNS. Conflict largely took place between government institutions, lawmakers and media professionals, as they attempted to establish a role for the press in maintaining democratic standards.

After members of the community were targeted by Want Want media outlets, however, a group of students formed the Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 反媒體巨獸青年聯盟. Members were spread across Taiwan, and first came to prominence through their online presence and use of social media. The group was also distinct in their original lack of understanding of, or commitment to, the legalities of the issue of media ownership. Their participation was shaped by a process of development and learning about media ownership law and the history of a free press.

From mid-2012, the Youth Alliance became the driving force behind the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement. Their playful and lively use of new technologies, and mobilisation of a significant support base, dictated the nature of the movement and expanded its parameters. Finding the traditional media and legislative process closed to them or dominated by partisan politics, the group took to social media to deliver their message and appeal to other young people. They portrayed their cause as part of the lineage of protests for 'liberty of the press' and successfully staged an unprecedented media themed rally in July 2012.

Within this process, the Youth Alliance also began to redefine the political identities available for young people in Taiwan's civil society. Their participation touched on but was not determined by the history of student movements, instead engaging with a range of ideas and traditions, such as the politics of labour and of democratic institutions. They became increasingly involved in analysing the ideal role of the media in democracy and how it intersected with labour laws and industrial relations. While not fully realised at the time, these

concepts continue to inform the approach and policy priorities of young people in Taiwan's politics.

The course of the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement was also mediated by discordant nationalistic rhetoric and legislative gridlock at that time. Both the KMT and DPP, and the pan-blue and green media, sought to use the movement to attack the other side, and were unable to collectively address the issue of media ownership in parliament. In response young activists mobilised an online global support network and sought to reframe the movement outside the context of Taiwan's mainstream politics. They also began to adopt the embodied political practices of direct action, further deviating from the expectations of the tradition of student protest.

As a result of these dynamics, the conclusion to the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement incited mixed reactions amongst participants. By late 2013, a number of draft acts tightening legislation on media ownership had been introduced to parliament, including one written by members of the movement. The Want Want acquisitions of CNS and Next Media outlets also fell through. In response, Want Want Chairman Tsai Eng-meng 蔡衍明 complained that the movement had damaged the company's reputation and the validity of the deals.

Yet the movement had not significantly altered the discourse that had allowed for the threat of media monopolisation to first emerge in Taiwan. Capitalism and the 'free market' continue to be understood as solutions to the problem of media ownership consolidation, while bias in and the democratic responsibility of the press have never been resolved. Young activists in the movement had also struggled to articulate their position amidst international, geopolitically driven interpretations of their protests, and had been the victims of political posturing by those from whom they had sought support. These dynamics remain pertinent in Taiwan's politics and the experience of protesters.

The Anti-Media Monopoly Movement itself has since been framed by its role in facilitating the 318 Occupation. Its significance has been classified as representing a pivotal step in the rise of civil society and the process of empowering young people. The elements of the movement that go beyond this narrative, however, are still points of contention and debate. As such, the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement may yet be revived, or given a new meaning.

The Hung Chung-chiu Incident and Urban Development Protests

Between 2008 and 2014 a number of protests took place that were not classified as 'student movements' but were important to the emergence of the 318 Occupation and the individual experiences of many young activists. Through these movements, civil society began to emerge as a coherent force and developed a united position against the KMT government.

This includes the largest protests against forced evictions to take place during this period, specifically in Dapu Village 大埔 and Huaguang Community 華光社區, and the White Shirts Army Movement, sparked by the death of Hung Chung-chiu 洪仲丘, an army recruit who died in 2013 while serving time in military detention.

Although these movements did not utilise the student movement identity, students often made up the largest number of participants. As such, these protests help elucidate the meaning of the student movement identity by acting as a point of contrast.

These movements represented young protesters' reflexive engagement with a spectrum of Taiwan's civil society. Through their participation, protesters negotiated what it means to be a student activist and found new ways to frame their political practice. The variety of topics addressed in these movements also broadened their ability to petition on different issues. Their flexibility and connections they formed with disenfranchised groups became central to their pursuit of an ideal form of democracy.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The protests against land expropriation in Dapu and Huaguang are analysed concurrently and used as case studies to examine the politics of urban development in Taiwan.

This chapter tracks how both movements began as community-led initiatives focused on attaining adequate compensation for the victims of forced land seizure by the state. As the affected citizens struggled to achieve success, they also became representative of those who were disadvantaged by or sat outside the processes of modernisation and urban development.

The entry of student activists into these movements in 2012 and 2013, coincided with heightened tensions and in increase in the use of direct action by protesters. Students were at the forefront of attempts to hinder the demolition process, and in forging alliances between disparate parts of civil society.

Despite these movements, the houses in both Dapu and Huaguang were demolished in 2013. In response, protesters sought to redefine the meaning of their political action, and how society valued land and community. In doing so, young activists experimented with different ways of being 'political', their sense of belonging, and the meaning of Taiwan. They experienced civic action outside the 'student movement' tradition and learned to navigate and connect with unfamiliar parts of society.

The second half of this chapter examines the Hung Chung-chiu Incident 洪仲丘事件, also known as the White Shirts Army Movement, which ran for a number of months from mid-2013. The movement addressed Taiwan's military justice system, balancing the rights of citizens against Taiwan's defence requirements, and called into question the policy of conscription. It was orgnanised by an online, anonymous civic group – the Citizen 1985 Alliance 公民 1985 行動聯盟 - and unfolded as three tightly staged mass rallies. Citizen 1985 deliberately

separated themselves from other protest leaders by avoiding disturbances or disrupting underlying power structures.

As a result, the White Shirts Army Movement was problematic for student activists and their role within Taiwan's civil society. The approach adopted by Citizen 1985 not only contrasted with their own but was accompanied by a criticism of students' motivations and the moral implications of their political style. In addition, Citizen 1985 did not seem to share the students' goal of establishing an idealised version of democracy, through subverting restrictive social structures. In particular, young activists had based their political participation on challenging the same generational power dynamics and familial expectations from which Citizen 1985 drew legitimacy.

Even so, the students chose to support Citizen 1985's protests and tempered their tactics to do so. These mass rallies were some of the largest Taiwan has ever seen and helped make protesting accessible to a broader cross-section of society. In the following months, student activists and members of Citizen 1985 also worked cooperatively on other political issues, including in the 318 Occupation. Their collaboration and exchange of knowledge and ideas helped strengthen civil society during this period.

As such, this chapter demonstrates how young activists operated across political theatres and adjusted their approach accordingly. Their participation in these movements helped build the networks and complexity of political approaches and ideas fundamental to the 318 Occupation.

The Sunflower Movement

On 18 March 2014 hundreds of protesters led by Black Island Nation Youth Front 黑色島國青年陣線 occupied the Legislative Yuan in Taipei. The group were part of a broader movement opposed to a Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement 海峽兩岸服務貿易協議 (CSSTA), which

had been pushed through parliament by the KMT government on 17 March. The agreement would extend the 2010 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 兩岸經濟合作架構協議 (ECFA) which loosened trade restrictions between Taiwan and China. The CSSTA had been negotiated behind closed doors and the review process cut short. As a result, the agreement epitomized the students' fears of China's growing influence, economic inequality and the KMT's disrespect for legislative procedure. The following day, thousands more occupied the surrounding streets where they remained until 10 April. At this time, Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng 王金平, promised to introduce new legislation increasing the oversight mechanisms on trade agreements with China, before the CSSTA was reviewed again.

This event was originally labeled the Sunflower Student Movement but has since become more commonly referred to as the 318 Occupation. The earlier name makes reference to the box of sunflowers donated to protesters by a member of the public and adopted as the movement's motif; emphasises the youth of a significant proportion of the protesters and places the occupation within the tradition of student movements in Taiwan. The idea that the occupation had been 'student' led later became contentious, however, and embroiled in power struggles between participants. The movement has since been framed as representing a number of different social groups and ages, and reflective of the overall strength of civil society.

This chapter explores this interpretation, but with a focus on the community of young activists who led and spoke for the occupation. I find that this group emerged at the forefront of the movement through having reflexively pursued links with other parts of civil society, and the skills to mobilise large crowds in the years preceding. Within the occupation, the movement's young leaders deployed a range of discursive and tactical devices that allowed them to guide the protest and the way it was understood. The occupation became an embodiment of the ideas and values they had developed through participating in civil society since 2008.

The issues of geopolitics, national identity, democracy and economics were central to the movement, as they underpinned debates over the CSSTA. While the government's acceleration of the process to pass the latest cross-strait agreement had triggered the occupation, these issues have a long history in Taiwan and have often been the source of tension between the KMT and DPP. Leading up to the 18 March takeover of parliament, lawmakers had been unable to work cooperatively or effectively on resolving their differences. In this sense, protests against the CSSTA can be understood as an attempt to establish a new perspective on the issues embodied in the agreement, separate to those of the major parties.

Once inside the Legislative Yuan, the 318 Occupation also became an opportunity for protesters to explore their political beliefs, and experiment with idealised forms of democracy. The space of the parliament and the streets surrounding were divided into designated sites of debate and learning or used for creative working bees and discussion of strategy. Participants empowered and supported one another, forming new connections with those they may otherwise have never encountered. For many, the occupation had a celebratory and transcendental atmosphere, giving a sense of freedom and what was possible through civic action.

However, the occupation was also indicative of the challenging mechanics of staging a social movement, the compromise and risk inherent in protests. The use of social media for internal planning, in addition to media liaison and effectively communicating their message across the world, required a complex operation of secret chat rooms and documents, teams of translators, and hackathons. Protest leaders were also tasked with managing tensions from within the movement over strategy and policy priorities, a divisive political environment, and threats on their safety. Further, the government response to an attempt to occupy the Executive Yuan on 23 March revealed the limitations of tolerance for protests and introduced violence to the experience of many young activists.

The decision to end the occupation on 10 April 2014, therefore marked a recognition of the possibilities, but also limitations, of protests, and the need for broader institutional reform in Taiwan's political system. The movement's most direct tangible achievement, halting the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement, was incomplete and still dependent on the actions of the KMT government and Legislative Yuan. In response, participants refocused their attention on forming minor parties, helping the DPP to win the 2016 presidential election, and instituting progressive policies, such as legalising gay marriage and environmental protection. They have since addressed constitutional problems and the unresolved history of political violence, as ways to improve Taiwan's democracy.

The personal narrative of many young activists has coincided with the intensification and dissipation of social movements since 2008. After the 318 Occupation many student leaders began to retreat from protesting, and rechannelled their efforts into legislative politics, academic analysis of their activities, or finding ways to mentor and advise future participants. Through this, young activists continue to shape the meaning of the protests they staged, and the policy priorities of the Taiwanese government. Even so, they do not always position the occupation as a source of pride or achievement, but rather use the movement a way to reflect on their mistakes and further work towards improving civic action.

Thus, the reflexive attitude displayed by young activists goes beyond the strategic negotiation of Taiwan's socio-political environment to stage successful protests. It also reflects an underlying drive for self-analysis in the pursuit of progress and political equality. The 318 Occupation presented an opportunity to tangibly engage with the KMT government, while also empowering civil society and experiencing personal growth. Participants themselves have driven criticism of the movement as they seek to question the world around them and their place within it.

Conclusion

This thesis uses a chronological structure to tell the story of young activists in Taiwan emerging in civil society through student protests in 2008, before pursuing independent political space. Each social movement developed the idea that this trajectory had been reflexively driven, and an opportunity for young activists to advance their skills, networks and political opinions. Set against the backdrop of the KMT presidency, student protests culminated in the 318 Occupation, and propelled the DPP to victory in the 2016 presidential elections. The journey of young activists reached some form of conclusion when they realised the limits of civil society and transferred their attention to other areas of politics.

The narrativisation of student movements and focus on their role in the period of KMT government, has primarily been shaped by the events of March 2014. The 318 Occupation gave renewed meaning to the protests that had preceded it and allowed their otherwise tenuous conclusions to be replaced with a sense of resolution. It also emphasised young activists' agency within protests, as their adaptability and success justified the decisions that they made along the way. This reflexive awareness has further been evidenced in their self-analysis and critical assessment of whether their actions were ideologically consistent with their broader goals.

Relying solely on a chronological narrative to tell the story of young activists in contemporary Taiwan is therefore at odds with their own engagement with the world. It can be a useful tool to document protests and make sense of the shift they initiated in the socio-political position of young people. At the same time, this approach gestures towards teleology and has the potential to detract from the dynamics of individual movements. It takes ownership of the meaning of events and makes it difficult for alternative interpretations to arise.

Taking a cue from young activists in Taiwan, the conclusion of this thesis therefore considers some of the alternative ideas and forms of participation embedded in the social movements explored in this thesis. It takes the position that in many ways protests offered little resolution to the political issues they encountered and initiated as many questions as they answered. As a result, the significance of other youth-led movements has not entirely been dictated by the 318 Occupation. Rather, these movements and the ideas contained within them, may be reprised in other contexts, and continue to shape Taiwan's politics.

Other experiences, such as those of violence and trauma, may never find any closure at all. Although often used for political ends, encounters with death or police brutality during protests seemed to transcend their role within social movements. Even when positioned as noble sacrifices, these cases caused ongoing grief and emotional damage. They therefore reveal the high-stakes and tangible consequences of civic activism.

While possible to describe as a smooth and linear process, the experience of young activists in contemporary Taiwan has also been fractured and incomplete. It signals towards a form of modernity that traverses the reflexivity and cynicism of the postmodern condition in addition to pursing morals standards. Within this process, young activists seem to be driven by a search for an ideal form of democracy, as a cornerstone of what it means to be Taiwanese. Their questioning and self-analysis is not seen as adverse to this goal, but a way to further push for intellectual freedom and political progress.

Chapter 2: The Study of Student Movements in Taiwan

Introduction

The term 'student movement' refers to a distinctive category of political activity in both the Anglophone and Sinophone worlds. It captures foundational elements of notions of tradition, modernity and the nature of social change. Nominally, a student movement is a political or protest movement representing the views of students or organised and participated in by students, therefore denoting political action by a definable social grouping. From a sociological perspective (see Olson 1965; Blumer 1971; Offe and Wiesenthal 1980; Ostrom 1990), it follows that this group will have collective needs and goals. In neoliberal capitalist societies where student movements have predominantly been studied, 'students' have been defined in relation to the role of universities as a means of capitalist reproduction (Bowles and Gintis 1976; Weatherly, Barrow, and Burnham 2008; Robinson 2014). According to this view, students represent a stage whereby individuals are prepared to enter the economic system by obtaining a degree that is aligned with the jobs market. Their collective needs are thought to reflect this process, formed by the influence of broader socio-economic changes on the higher education system. As a consequence, student movements have often been interpreted as attempts to improve the university experience and the capitalistic benefits it provides (Lipset 1967; Flacks 1973; Altbach 1997; Mason 2012).

Even so, in Taiwan the concept of the student movement goes beyond this understanding to also include cultural and historical connotations. These elements inform how in the contemporary setting student movements have been conducted, researched, and understood. In this chapter I explore the three distinct but intersecting lineages that have dominated this

process. This includes the Chinese, or Sinophone tradition[2], that from the US, and Taiwan's own political history. In doing so, I find that the study of student movements is inextricable from both the practice of protest and the political campaigns in which activists are also engaged. This problem is not unique to student movements but is clearly expressed in the lack of differentiation between protesters and academic institutions. In response, I adopt the concept of 'reflexivity' to capture the distinctive qualities of Taiwanese student movements in which rather than merely inhabiting pre-given social categories participants are actively engaged with the socio-political category itself, creating a self-conscious critical political practice.

In an analytical sense, reflexivity can be understood as an epistemological intervention, in which there is an "on-going mutual shaping between researcher and research" (Attia and Edge 2017, 33). The 'reflexive researcher' in humanities and social sciences acknowledges that research can never be truly objective and that both the subject and object will be altered in the process (Attia and Edge 2017, 36). From this perspective, academic production is not considered 'complete', but one step in developing various forms of knowledge and the researchers' own intellectual journey (Attia and Edge 2017, 42-43). This idea is particularly applicable here in describing the embeddedness of research on student movements in Taiwan's

[2] The concepts of the 'Sinophone world' and 'Sinophone tradition' have developed as ways to discuss Chinese-speaking or Sinitic-language cultures without relying on the ambiguous and problematic category of 'China', and the power historically exerted over 'Chineseness' by both the contemporary CCP-led People's Republic of China, and Western scholars and their notion of the 'Orient'. As described by Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu: "The Sinophone is a counter-hegemonic formation against China-centrism and a deconstruction of essentializing notions of 'China' and 'Chineseness'" (Lu 2008). The use of the term 'Sinophone' therefore makes an implicit statement about the complexity and fluidity of the idea of 'China'. It is a way to discuss Taiwan's association with Chinese culture and language, outside the dynamics of cross-strait relations.

socio-political structure. It acknowledges that young activists themselves are involved in theorising and analysing the significance of their political actions. Within this context, rather than conducting a traditional literature review I explore how student movements have been studied in Taiwan, along with the political role played by academia. This ranges between the conscious narrativisation of student movements for political purposes and attempts to expand and bring complexity to this field of research.

The lineage of student movements in the Sinosphere

Student movements in Taiwan have been informed by the island's Sinophone heritage and shifting relationship to mainland China. Dating to imperial times, the lineage of student movements in China produced a moral dimension and unique relationship to the state, which continues to be associated with the identity of Taiwan today. Amid contrasting political developments and geopolitical tensions, however, the traditions diverged between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. As such, student movements have been incorporated into Taiwan's process of democratisation and become a point of differentiation from the mainland.

In the Sinophone tradition, the concept of the 'student movement' has particular moral undertones and a cultural resonance. This can in part be attributed to the perception that scholars by virtue of their having passed a merit-based civil service exam, were representative of the potential for social mobility and the power of society to restrain the emperor (Bai and Jia 2016, 678-682). While the actual meritocratic nature of system has been called into doubt (Elman 1991; Elman 2013), scholars were nonetheless revered for the high degree of education they undertook in order to pass the exams. The exams also helped unify a culturally and linguistically diverse kingdom, through setting a shared knowledge base on which candidates were tested (Cressey 1929, 257-262). The significance of Confucian scholars was further enhanced by their relationship to the doctrine of the 'Mandate of Heaven 天命 *tianming*'. This

doctrine underpinned the legitimacy of China's emperor and maintained an expectation of so-called 'righteous' rebellion in the face of corruption. As described by Elizabeth Perry, protest has been an accepted aspect of politics in China because the "Mandate of Heaven (*tianming*) bestowed instant legitimacy upon successful rebel leaders… so that one who managed to wrest the throne by force thereby gained Confucian sanction for his rule" (Perry 2001, 163-164). Scholars, intellectuals and students have historically played a significant role in criticising and 'correcting' the course of the government, when their actions were considered unpatriotic or against the national interest (Perry 2001, 163-164).

Amid a multitude of historical instances, in 1604 during the late Ming Dynasty 明朝, scholars were part of the campaign to restore Confucian values in the state under the Wanli Emperor 萬曆帝 in order to improve the quality of the bureaucracy. Driven by Gu Xiancheng 顧憲成, the movement led to the restoration of the Donglin Academy 東林書院 in Wuxi 无锡 and the increased influence of scholars in the Ming Court (Wakeman 1985). Similarly, in the late Qing Dynasty 清朝, scholars pursued wide-ranging imperial institutional reform in response to the Qing empire's military defeats and imposed extraterritoriality in what became known as the 1861-1895 Self-Strengthening Movement 自強運動. After losing the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) scholars in the Gongche Shangshu 公車上書 movement also opposed the Qing government's acceptance of the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which included, amongst other things, the loss of Taiwan.

Students became recognisable as a political group separate from other scholars during the 1919 May Fourth Movement 五四运动 in Beijing. As with earlier protests the May Fourth Movement was markedly patriotic, having been sparked by an upsurge of popular Chinese nationalism against the Treaty of Versailles. Students opposed what they perceived as the government's weak response to Article 156 of the treaty, which gave control of Shandong 山

东 to Japan. Rallies on 4 May led to a broader reflection on the role of Confucianism and the pursuit of new 'Chinese' ideas in the New Culture Movement 新文化運動 of the early Republican era (Perry 2001, 167). According to Fabio Lanza (2010), the May Fourth Movement redefined the meaning of 'students' as a category of political participation. At this time 'students' had traditionally been considered part of the state and future participants in the government. In 1919 however, they became independent social actors and "truly political" (Lanza 2010, 5)**,** in the sense described by Alan Badiou of "placing the state at a distance" (Lanza 2010, 5). The term 'student movement 學生運動' came into use but maintained the Confucian connotations of being a righteous rebellion by an elite class.

In Lanza's depiction, students were mobilised as a distinct group through the lived experience at Peking University 北京大学. Adopting Henri Lefebvre's concept of the "production of space" (Lefebvre 1974), Lanza describes how in the context of an already weakened government, spatial changes reconfigured the power relationship between students and the state. The relative openness of Peking University's campuses and dormitories made it difficult to define who should be included as students and for the university and government to consequently exert their control. Similarly, the radical reforms to the 'intellectual space' of the curriculum of Peking University meant that the state was no longer solely responsible for the definition of legitimate knowledge. Through the 'political space' of the 1919 off-campus demonstrations students also challenged the state on the parameters of their participation in politics and what it meant to be a student activist. In taking their politicisation to the 'social space' of the modernising urban environment of Beijing students actively influenced the order and meaning of urban spaces, including Tiananmen Square 天安門. Through this approach Lanza challenged the idea that 'students' are "already always established" (Lanza 2010, 5), as a category of political participation. In other studies, 'students' have been defined by their

enrolment in the school system (Lanza 2010, 4), and their mobilisation treated as an inherent part of this environment. Lanza argues that in doing so these studies frame students as a fixed category, which continuously re-emerges without context or agency (Lanza 2010, 5). For the purpose of this thesis, Lanza's description of May Fourth can therefore be understood as offering an example of the reflexive interaction between student protesters as an emergent socio-political category and the socio-political environment. Students were not inherently 'political' but became so, and recognised their own becoming, through identifying and engaging in structural opportunities.

Following the May Fourth Movement, student movements in China continued to be nationalistic and an intrinsic part of the political system. Jeffrey Wasserstrom and Xinyong Liu (1989) described five student movements in Shanghai alone between the 1919 May Fourth Movement and the relocation of the KMT-led Republic of China government to Taiwan in 1949. Continuing the intersection of Confucian scholarly righteousness with the national formations of the New China all were driven to "*jiuguo* [救國], or 'save the nation', from the twin threats posed by external aggression, on the one hand, and internal governmental ineffectiveness, corruption or lack of patriotism, on the other" (Wasserstrom and Liu 1989, 5). Within these movements, students also self-referentially evoked and found legitimacy in past protests, "at times quite self-consciously imitate[ing] the actions of their predecessors" (Wasserstrom and Liu 1989, 6). Even so, Wassterstrom and Liu emphasised the role of university life in enabling and shaping the emergence of student movements during this time where other types of rebellions or protests were less common. They note that the highly bounded, structured and organised nature of Shanghai's universities meant that formal and informal groupings laid the basis for movement mobilisation (Wasserstrom and Liu 1989, 7-8).

Despite this shared heritage, in the contemporary setting the student movement tradition has materialised differently in China than in Taiwan. In China, the interaction between young activists and the state created a form of protest that incorporated communist practices and ideas into student activism. For example, students formed an elite and legitimised political group in the Cultural Revolution 文化大革命 (1966-1976) and framed their actions in Maoist terms (Lanza 2010). Their patriotic protest became 'continuing the revolution' and promoting a Chinese nationalism based on the overarching legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as totalising authority. The 1989 Beijing Democracy Movement reflected this form of student movement and further distanced political practice in the PRC from that in Taiwan. According to Frank Pieke, the movement was a response to a "long-term crisis of the discursive underpinnings of Chinese society" (Pieke 1996, 57), and an attempt for citizens to bring meaning to their lives amongst "moral decay" (Pieke 1996, 57). During the movement, protesters consciously adopted political symbols, such as the student movement identity and hunger strikes, to express their grievances. Protests became a performance that was staged to appeal to their audience where actors drew from a repertoire of symbols defined as legitimate by the dominant social structure. Pieke also argued, however, that through a process of 'ritualization', which involved the "decontexualisation and recontexualisation" (Pieke 1996, 237), of discourses, students were able to challenge the discursive order and shape the narrative of their activism. Although the government's reaction to the 1989 Beijing protests ultimately destroyed the legacy of this process, Pieke's work demonstrated how close these protesters came to redefining China's civil society.

In contrast, Perry (2001) depicted the 1989 Beijing student movement as consistent with the tradition of protest as an aspect of the 'Mandate of Heaven'. Rather than challenging the legitimacy of the CCP the movement sought to correct the government, holding the "expectation of support from elements of the central leadership" (Perry 2001, 164). Activists

themselves have since determined that their actions did not reflect the democratic ideal they claimed to pursue and were unable to "constitute a genuine rupture with earlier modes of protest" (Perry 2001, 165). This perspective therefore emphasised the institutionalised nature of student movements within China's socio-political system during this time, no longer 'distanced from the state' as Lanza described.

To Lanza (2010), the 1989 protest in Beijing and the state's reaction to the students, effectively destroyed the legacy of the May Fourth Movement in the PRC. The CCP's violent suppression of a movement that clearly drew from this lineage made it a dangerous form of political participation that was no longer accepted by the government. Indeed, there has not been another movement in China that has utilised the student movement identity in the same way. As such, the events of 1989 made the "repertoire of student activism…practically and symbolically unavailable" (Lanza 2010, 184).

The 1989 Beijing Democracy Movement had a significant impact on Taiwan's civil society. Teresa Wright (2001) demonstrated how students in the 1990 Wild Lily Movement were inspired by and mirrored those in Beijing. In comparing the two, Wright identified that the behaviour of students in both settings was rational and shaped by their being in a repressive one-party state. To Wright, protesters utilised their student networks because there was a lack of trust with broader society. Their exclusion of those outside the university system was also a tactic used by the students to avoid repression, as other groups did not share their status as part of the intellectual elite. Finally, Wright argued that the difference between how the two movements ended reflected the dominance of liberal elements in each government. From this perspective, rather than the actions of students themselves, the 1990 Wild Lily Movement was more successful than that in Beijing because the KMT was willing to show leniency towards society's democratic demands.

Indeed, the 1989 movement and the CCP's reaction compelled the KMT government to tolerate student protesters. Since the PRC joined the United Nations (1971) and the United States switched recognition from the ROC to the PRC in 1979, the KMT had been under increasing pressure from both internal and external forces to end martial law as a way to maintain legitimacy (Chou and Nathan 1987, 279-282). In 1990 Lee Teng-hui displayed a willingness to placate the student protesters and institute the reforms they demanded, while taking steps to separate Taiwan from the Chinese heritage of the ROC (Jacobs and Liu 2007). As discussed below, the Wild Lily Movement has since become a foundational myth for in Taiwan's democracy and continues to provide legitimacy and degree of security for student protesters who draw from the 1990 movement. In Taiwan today, young activists are reflexively engaged with the student movement category as it was acted in the political crises of 1989-1990. They themselves consider the repression of the 1989 Beijing student protests to be central to the strength of the student movement identity in contemporary Taiwan. In their analysis, the KMT remains focused on differentiating themselves from the CCP through their support for democracy and the seemingly innocent student protesters. As described by one interviewee:

> "There is a particular political sense that if you try to define your protest as a student movement, then the government will have fewer reasons to repress such a movement. It's because of the legacy of events like the Tiananmen massacre, the KMT government is afraid of having a similar image to the Mainland government of the time. (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 27 March, 2015).

In this sense, the legacy of righteous scholarly protests – of which the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 are the last large-scale expression in China – is a tradition that contemporary Taiwanese student movements continue to reflexively reference and address in their political activities. Student activists in Taiwan explicitly evoke past protests and seek out opportunities to mobilise this legacy in Taiwan's contemporary partisan democratic politics. Their strength

has in part been derived from the connotations of virtue and the legitimisation conferred by a historical role as an elite group in state institutions. Through mobilising this legacy and strategically expressing their patriotism, students have played a significant role in shaping political culture and the democratic system.

The American tradition of student movements

Student movements in Taiwan have also engaged with the experience of student protests in the US. Taiwanese academics writing on the topic of student movements were predominantly trained in America and observed the role that scholars themselves played in this type of protest. The American influence is evident in the methodology used in Taiwan to research social movements. It has also shaped how academics position themselves in relation to participants and their understanding of the function of contentious politics in a democratic system.

The study of student movements in America emerged amid the upsurge of protests following World War II. In contrast to the historical connotations in China, students in the US were defined as a socio-economic category, linked together by their presence in the university system while they were trained to join the workforce. As such, scholars observing the phenomenon primarily asked why student movements occur and who is most likely to participate. Research focused on how the university environment might enable activism and the broader socio-political structures shaping student protests. For example, in discussing student activism in America during the 1960s, Seymour Martin Lipset (1967) – a proponent of the post-WWII positivist impetus in the social sciences – focused on the structural changes in the higher education system. Lipset identified that student protest coincided with fee increases and the dramatic upsurge of university enrolments since the 1950s (Lipset 1967). Both these factors were found to cause student discontent, as they created an increasingly competitive environment where young people were pressured to excel. In particular, Lipset identified that

financial debt as a result of university costs and the devaluing of degrees, were sources of student grievances (Lipset 1967). In 1971, Lipset added to these observations by contending that familial relationships and broader political issues also influenced student movements. Lipset found that the views of student activists were a progression of those of their parents over widely contentious political issues, such as the Vietnam War (Lipset 1971, 37). In this sense, the university itself did not shape the politics of student movements but "furnished (activists) with the means to build a movement" (Lipset 1971, 37). This suggests that the 'student' status of protesters did not have any particular cultural resonance at this time for the students themselves but was simply the social category they occupied in their daily life.

Kenneth Keniston (1968; 1971) similarly focused on the broader socio-political basis for student protesters' mobilisation. In his study of 'New Left' student activists who opposed America's involvement in the Vietnam War, Keniston psychologically analysed the source of this group's political beliefs and consequent protest activism. Challenging the idea that radicalism is a social aberration (addressing the conservative sense of social crisis in 1960s America), Keniston argued that the views of the New Left students logically emerged from their life experiences. Keniston found student activists to be driven by liberal values and the belief that the government was infringing on the rights of young people through the policy of conscription (Keniston 1968; Kenniston 1971).

Richard Flacks (1973) also connected socio-economic changes in America to the emergence of student protests. Rather than focusing on how students' political beliefs aligned with progressive parts of society as Lipset and Keniston had done, however, Flacks focused on the shift in young people's social experiences during the 1960s and 70s. According to Flacks, changes in the labour market facilitated an extended adolescence where young people were segregated from society for increasing periods of time in educational institutions or the military. The speed of this shift produced a "fundamental socio-cultural crisis… [and] cultural

incoherence" (Flacks 1973, 7), where young people felt disconnected from broader society and closer to others in the same age group. Issues that mainly affected young people further influenced their politicisation as a specific group. Flacks argued that the Vietnam War in particular created youth class-consciousness, as they were the primary victims of battle and the policy of conscription.

While not disputing the validity of studies that accounted for student movements through broad post-WWII structural changes, such as those by Flacks, Keniston and Lipset, Douglas McAdam (1988) added to the research by exploring why only some students protest. To do so, McAdam mapped the influence of socio-economic differences in students' lives over several decades, and how they affected their activism. McAdam tracked over 300 students who in 1964 had applied to be part of a civil rights organisation in Mississippi, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), during heightened racial tensions. As the candidates had similar views, McAdam was able to demonstrate that political opinions had little influence on the decision to become a student activist. Rather, McAdam found that biographical factors determined who did and did not participate as some were hindered by family, work or education commitments, their parents' opposition, gender (being female) or personal ties with those already involved. McAdam therefore demonstrated that student activism in America during this period was a privilege, only accessible to those from certain backgrounds. This challenged the idea that student movements represented a generational uprising or transcended underlying social structures.

Further, in 1997 Philip G Altbach argued – in a way that gestured towards the distinctive category of student politics in the Sinophone world – that student movements should not be understood as a product of the unique socio-political conditions of the time but a part of tradition in middle class politics. Altbach (1997) identified that throughout US history, student protesters have consistently demanded better conditions for themselves in university and

society more generally and expressed their opinions over America's role in the world. Altbach attributed this uniformity to the unique position of the middle class in America, whose level of education and dominance in the university system is not matched by their political power. Activism emerges in universities because the structured environment and liberty of ideas allows the middle class to organise, often during periods of poor economic management by the state. Overall, Altbach therefore emphasised the rationality of student movements and how they are a legitimate part of American democracy. Similar to that identified in China, this suggests that there is a lineage of student activism in the US, which can be reflexively drawn upon by different generations.

In this sense, those studying student movements in the US transitioned from trying to understand what they had believed was the extraordinary nature of this phenomenon to considering student movements as embedded in the socio-political structure. Their research accordingly shifted from focusing on the exceptionality of student movements to the links between this form of protest with other parts of society, political cultures, and groups. As researchers witnessed the diffusion and absorption of student activists' ideas and the trajectory of participants' careers the revolutionary potential of protests was called into question and their status as a normalised part of American political life became clear (Altbach and Cohen 1990, 32). This shift can also be connected to the researcher's own subjectivity and the ambiguous relationship between the study and practice of student movements. The interconnection between academics and student activists is unique in the field of contentious politics, as in the history of post-WWII American student activism the two groups were often acting together. As described above, in the American tradition scholars have not typically identified this reflexive relationship as such but have attempted to distance themselves from their subjects. That is not to argue that this factor discredits their research but that that they are often part of the same political movement as the protesters themselves.

For example, in Keniston's work the focus on 'rationality' is clearly linked to his own subjective beliefs and psychology. In order to build trust and conduct his interviews, Keniston observed and worked closely with student activists, while advocating against their demonisation in his research (Keniston and Lerner 1971). Richard Flacks was a notable anti-war activist who taught student protesters at the University of California in Santa Barbara. In his research, however, Flacks adopted a political science approach where his own beliefs were not discussed. In doing so, Flacks created a sense of distance between his academic work and political life, despite them both being directed towards criticising the impact of socio-political change on young people in America. In their research, Lipset and Altbach used participant observation (Lipset and Altbach 1969) and were both registered members of anti-war and left-wing groups during the period. While Lipset noted similarities between the political stance of academics and students, he also emphasised the separation between the two groups in protests. For example, Lipset argued that student protesters were wary towards their teachers because they represented authority and institutionalised power (Lipset 1971, 30-35). Due to the publishing requirements of professors there were also few opportunities for them to interact with and influence the politics of students (Lipset 1971, 30-35). Thus, American academics studying student movements were often involved in protests and driven by their own political commitments. Their research can consequently be understood as deliberately playing a role in legitimising student protests as a part of American politics.

The American academic tradition surrounding the study of student movements and social movements more broadly is reflected in that of Taiwan. Scholars researching social movements have also been politically engaged, while distancing themselves in their writing. This connection is not incidental but a product of the distinct relationship between the US and Taiwan. Taiwan's leading scholars writing on social movements were all trained in America,

including during periods of significant student movement activity and the US has had a significant cultural impact on Taiwan's academic institutions.

For example, as argued by Ming-sho Ho and Jane Hindley, throughout the 1960s and 70s Taiwanese students were exposed to New Left and anti-authoritarian ideas, and student movements, while studying post-graduate degrees in America (Ho and Hindley 2011, 31-34). This experience challenged the KMT's restrictive and highly ideological syllabus students had experienced in Taiwan and led students to push for the liberalisation of Taiwan's education system when they returned. It also produced a progressive view amongst these scholars of the role of protests in democratic systems (Ho and Hindley 2011, 31-34). It provided the training ground for activism, knowledge of tactics, and forms of organisation that could lead to success. Indeed, the four scholars whose work has been identified as the foundation of social movement research in Taiwan (Ho, Huang, and Juang 2018, 119), achieved postgraduate degrees during the 1970s at American universities. Michael Hsin-Huang Hsiao 蕭新煌, Cheng-kuang Hsu 徐正光, Bih-er Chou 周碧娥, and Mau-kuei Chang 張茂桂 subsequently joined civic groups and NGOS, becoming "public intellectuals for progressive and democratic change" (Ho, Huang, and Juang 2018, 119).

The influence from the US also continues to be prevalent in the methodologies used by social movement scholars in Taiwan. Throughout the past decade over 60 percent of publications have conducted participant-observation, single case studies of social movements, and asked questions that mirror American scholars writing in the 1960s and 70s (Ho, Huang, and Juang 2018, 125-126). Ming-sho Ho, Chun-hao Huang and Chun-ta Juan (2018) also in part measured the institutionalisation of this field of research in Taiwan by references to American scholars made in publications. They found that 30 percent of English articles on social movements in Taiwan alone mention at least two of Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, and Douglas McAdam (Ho,

Huang, and Juang 2018, 130-131). I would argue that in doing so, Taiwanese social movement scholars have positioned their research as a part of an 'objective', scientifically based field. They had demonstrated a positivist understanding of knowledge and favoured small-scale, data-heavy case studies, designed to limit bias and emotion.

As detailed in the following section, however, this approach is fundamentally at odds with the reality of Taiwan's dynamic political climate and the interrelationship between scholars and activists. This lack of separation is not the fault of Taiwanese scholars, but as has been emphasised here by examining the US, a reflection of the nature of the field itself. While, taking their cues from America, Taiwanese scholars have been dedicated to producing scientific, evidence-based research, as with their US counterparts, their studies inevitably intersect with vying political agendas.

The emergence of a distinctive Taiwanese form of student movements

In Taiwan the traditions of student movements from the Sinosphere and the US have been entangled in the island's own political history. As a result, they have predominantly been considered to be a part of the process of democratisation and incorporated into debates over identity. Within this, the boundaries between individual protest movements and the academic institutions that inform them, have been distinctively unstable. Scholars and movement participants are closely linked and at times interchangeable. The classical scientific assumptions of scholarly objectivity and authority are problematised in a socio-political setting in Taiwan in which politics and public institutions have been entangled through the experience of authoritarianism and its long legacy. Research on student movements can therefore be framed within this context; as a product of the reflexive relationship between the study and practice of student protests.

This relationship was clearly articulated at an exhibition on student movements staged by Academia Sinica's Institute of Sociology 社會學研究所 and Digital Culture Centre 數位文化中心, between 22 April and 14 August 2015. Titled *A Review of Student Movements in Postwar Taiwan* 學動運生: 台灣戰後學運回顧, it was designed to commemorate 70 years of student movements since the end of World War II in 1945. The first portion of the title '學動, 運生 *xue dong, yun sheng*' was a play on the four characters that make up the term for 'student movement 學生運動 *xuesheng yundong*'. It described students, represented by the character '學 *xue*', who through their actions '動 *dong*', have dictated the fate '命運 *mingxun*' of society and given rise '衍生 *yang sheng*' to new advances and desires (Academia Sinica Digital Culture Centre 2015). In this way, the exhibition portrayed student activists throughout Taiwan's history as a cohesive force with a consistent goal. According to the exhibition organisers, this goal was primarily nationalistic. For example, Tang Chih-chieh 湯志傑 described how the exhibition told the story of student movements as a vehicle for "a 'localised community' that centres on Taiwanese identity" (Tang and Chen 2015). Beginning with the violent clashes between students from Municipal Kaohsiung Senior High School 高雄市立高雄高級中學 and KMT military in 1947, this version of Taiwan was portrayed as having emerged in opposition to political repression and the Chinese presence on the island. The 2014 318 Occupation, with which it concluded, was characterised as a culmination of civil society's efforts to achieve a more liberal and democratic Taiwan for the Taiwanese.

In other contexts, Taiwan's student movements have been described as ideologically driven and influenced by shifts in the geopolitics of North East Asia. Yang Tu (1994) argued that in the first half of the twentieth-century, student activists in Taiwan were inspired by socialist ideas often encountered while studying abroad. In 1910, Taiwanese students in Japan founded *Taiwan Youth* 台灣青年, a magazine espousing modernisation and self-determination for the

Taiwanese using the language of early-twentieth century leftism. Many of these same students established the Taiwan Cultural Association 台灣文化協會 in 1921, which became the cornerstone of Taiwan-centred political and cultural activism under Japanese colonisation, before ideological splits between conservatives and leftists and the eventual suppression of the organisation by the colonial authorities.

During the period of martial law on Taiwan (1949-1987), when student protests were violently suppressed, there was notable tolerance for the Diaoyutai Islands Movement 保釣運動. In 1971, following protests in Hong Kong and the US, students from National Taiwan University 國立臺灣大學 (NTU) demonstrated against the US's support for the Japanese claim over the Diaoyutai Islands 釣魚台列嶼 (Harrison 2006, 118-20), and what they perceived as a weak response by the KMT in defending them. Drawing on the discourse of 'righteousness' protesters referenced the tradition of student movements from China previously discussed, attempting to correct the course of the government while acting patriotically. They, along with other students from Macau and Hong Kong displayed what can be understood as an alternative form of Chinese nationalism to that advocated by the KMT (Harrison 2006, 118), while mirroring the government's own frustration with Taiwan's place in geopolitics.

Student movements emerged in the way that they are now predominantly framed in Taiwan, as a part of political liberalisation, in the 1970s and 80s. As described by Teresa Wright, during this time students undertook activities to reduce the influence of the KMT on campus and expose the details of the 228 Massacre[3] (Wright 1999, 990-996). Students from NTU, including

[3]The 228 Incident, 228 Massacre, or February 28 Incident was an anti-government uprising against KMT corruption and incompetent rule, which took place in Taipei on 28 February 1947, before

some who would go on to become prominent social movement researchers, achieved democratic elections on campus. Even so, activities did not move off campus and few connections were made between participants and other parts of civil society. The 1990 Wild Lily Movement is pivotal to the interrelationship between the study and practice of student movements currently present in Taiwan. Occurring three years after the official end of martial law in 1987, student protesters in the six-day sit-in at Liberty Square demanded the popular election of the legislature and the executive office (Yun 2004; Ho 2010). At the time, the president was still chosen by members of the National Assembly (replaced by the Legislative Yuan in 2005) who had been transplanted from and represented provinces on Mainland China in accordance with the 1947 ROC constitution. As a result, the movement is now seen as a turning point in democratisation and the emergence of a Taiwanese identity (Yun 2004; Ho 2010). It initiated the political changes that led to the National Affairs Conference from which constitutional reform were enacted to enable truly democratic elections. More broadly, the student protesters were seen to embody the formation of a new civil society. In 1986, members of the 'Tangwai 黨外' (outside the party or *dangwei*) movement,[4] who had largely driven civic

spreading across the island. In response, the KMT government massacred thousands of Taiwanese and launched a period of political oppression known as the White Terror, which saw the death or imprisonment of tens of thousands more Taiwanese citizens. The KMT also declared martial law, which lasted on the island until 1987. During this time, the 228 Incident was banned from public discussion on threat of death or torture. The date is now a public holiday, known as Peace Memorial Day 和平紀念日, whilst the incident is memorialised in a peace park and museum in central Taipei. It has also become a foundational event in the lineage of protests against the KMT.

[4]The Tangwai movement was a political movement made up of the few members of Taiwan's Legislative Yuan who were not members of the 'party' – the KMT –in the final decades of martial

action during marital law, formed the DPP. According to Wright (2012) this group's transition to institutionalised politics left a vacuum in civil society, with no strong organisations to coordinate protests. The Wild Lily Movement, however, represented the emergence of new activists, political discourses and civic groups, who laid the foundation for social movements over the following years (Wright 2012). The Wild Lily Movement also shaped the academic and political landscape of contemporary Taiwan. It continues to provide legitimacy for several groups, and networks created through the movement still influence the relationship between civil society and political parties (Chen 2005, 606-607). Some participants went on to join NGOs or the DPP (Chen 2005, 606-607), who have utilised the Wild Lily symbol in their election campaigns and policies aimed at promoting 'Taiwan consciousness 台灣意識'. Other members became leading academics and public intellectuals, themselves involved in analysing the meaning of student movements in Taiwan's democracy.

Within this process, participants have used their research for conscious self-reflection, critical analysis, and to inform subsequent political movements. There have been several publications that problematise the Wild Lily Movement and the way it has been utilised as the author has attempted to come to terms with their own role within it. For example, Ho Rong-xing 何榮幸's 2001 book on the subject was designed to capture the complexity and dynamism of the group who have been dubbed the 'Wild Lily Generation'. Through detailing the life histories of

law. During the 1970s and 80s the KMT allowed a very small number of seats in the Legislative Yuan to be selected through contested elections but banned political parties. Tangwai members therefore ran as independents and were unable to gain control of the government but used their platform to debate the KMT. The movement was pro-democracy and pro-Taiwanese independence, and involved civic activists committed to these causes. Members of the Tangwai movement illegally formed the DPP on 28 September 1986. The DPP was legalised in 1991.

participants, it sought to humanise the movement and create meaning outside the criticism or glorification often surrounding the event (Ho 2001). Similarly, Chen Hsin-hsing published an article specifically intended as a "self-criticism" (Chen 2005), which detailed both the limitations of the approach used by participants and the legacy that they created. Chen was particularly critical of what he identified as the elitist and undemocratic practices used by some parts of the student activist community in order to better deliver their message (Chen 2005, 595-600).

As such, research on student movements in Taiwan can be interpreted as an academic intervention in and extension of politics. This relationship has at some points been clearly articulated, and at other times obscured by the formalities of objectivity provided by certain fields of study. The idea of the student movement has most prominently been framed as a part of the struggle for democracy and the creation of a political system that represents a Taiwanese identity. This meaning is not closed, however, and continues to be challenged and debated by student activists and scholars alike.

This understanding is also inseparable from the interaction between politics and the education system. In addition to academia, Taiwan's school curriculum has also been highly politicised and a proxy through which partisan tensions have played out. The young activists explored in this thesis were educated during the period in which this politicisation was acknowledged and publicly debated. In their experience the curriculum, as a representation of knowledge, was treated as a key site of power in the shaping of the nature of Taiwan. The politicisation of Taiwan's education system was pronounced during martial law, when it was used to underpin the KMT's claims over the mainland of China and diminish resistance to their rule. The syllabus was centred on China, suppressed mention of incidents like the 228 Massacre, along with local Taiwanese languages and history. During democratisation, the education system became a site of contestation between groups driven to define Taiwan's national identity. The

end of the KMT's authoritarian curriculum was marked by the introduction of the *Knowing Taiwan* 認識台湾 textbooks in 1997, which focused on Taiwan in place of China (Stolojan 2017, 102). The Chen Shui-bian 陳水扁-led DPP government sought to extend these changes from 2000, by making it compulsory for students to learn a local Taiwanese language (Klöter 2004, 1-2), and further emphasising Taiwan in the teaching of history and society. While less focused on national identity than previous reforms, the government came under fire for allegedly supporting a pro-independence stance through separating the teaching of Taiwan's history from that of China. During the remainder of the Chen Shui-bian government and the presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, fierce debate continued over the appropriate emphasis to place on Taiwan in the school syllabus and how much room to dedicate to China (Stolojan 2017, 106). Thus, the contemporary generation of student activists had been socialised into a period in Taiwan's history in which debates over the nature of education were a part of public life. Education was treated as something inseparable from identity, and the production of knowledge was intertwined with Taiwan's political institutions.

This reflexive relationship between study and practice became visible in contemporary student movements after the 2014 318 Occupation, when a proliferation of publications began to emerge within months of the occupation of the legislature ending. This collection of academic and commercial texts acted to legitimise the significance of the event, stitching it into the narrative of Taiwan's modern history even as the effects were still unfolding. They helped locate the movement as a 'pivotal moment', presenting a hopeful view of its role in strengthening civil society against authoritarian power. For example, journalists present during the occupation took on the role of memorialising the movement. Some publications, such as the photographic collections by Huang Kong-long 黃恐龍 (2014) and Huang Hsien-go 黃謙賢 (2014), presented the event as a spirited civic uprising with a varied participant base. This

was demonstrated through photos of the representational forms that the movement took on, its signs and symbols (K. Huang 2014), and also its embodied form, in the diverse range of people participating in the protest in different ways (H. Huang 2014).

Yan Shan-nong 晏山農, Lo Hui-wen 羅慧雯, Liang Qiu-hong 梁秋虹 and Jiang Bing-lun 江昺崙 (2015) also attempted to capture the complexity of the occupation, which they maintained was "not the Sunflower Student Movement 這不是太陽花學運" (Yan, La, Liang, and Jiang 2015). According to this description, the 318 Occupation had been misnamed the 'Sunflower Student Movement' because of the visibility of young people. The authors suggested, however, that the movement was driven by a diverse group of citizens with a desire to improve Taiwan's democratic system. They also recognised that as a result of the numerous perspectives on and involved in the occupation, its meaning will continue to shift and develop over time. Other publications focused on the role of young people in the occupation and sought about capturing the 'spirit' and political views of the contemporary generation of activists. This included books such as Ye Bai-xiang's 葉柏祥 (2014) analysis of the topics discussed amongst student protesters and Liu Ding-wang's 劉定綱 (2014) interviews with young participants about their dreams for Taiwan. Ho Rong-xing's (2014), sequel to his 2001 book, *Student Movement Generation* 學運世代 similarly gave weight to the students who had staged the occupation, by linking them to the Wild Lily Movement. Through a number of essays and interviews with activists from both generations, Ho explored the connections between the two, including how the long-term effects of the 318 Occupation may be similar to those produced by the 1990 sit-in.

In a distinct articulation of the interrelationship between the documentation and practice of protests, academics and activists were also involved in a number of non-scholarly publications, which blurred the line between the two. For example, *With Our Eyes We Saw the Island Sunrise*

從我們的眼睛看見島嶼天光 (2014), was a compilation of first-person accounts of the movement by, amongst others, authors, academics, young activists, film directors, and journalists. Designed to provide an accurate account of events and the political concerns of participants as part of a "dialogue" (Hsiao et al. 2014), with broader society, the book's proceeds went to funding the ongoing efforts of participating NGOs. Similarly, *Loser Spring* 魯蛇之春 (2014), written by a group of people who were both activists and post-graduate students, was a self-described "youth manual to engage in student movements" (Zhang, Huang, and Yu 2014). The book simultaneously acts as an account of the authors' own activities, self-analysis and as a guidebook for other students on how to coordinate a social movement.

Academic publications on contemporary student movements, specifically the 318 Occupation, have also been aligned with, or helped to legitimise, the significance of the movement. While from a range of fields and with varying connections to participants, in general the research positions the occupation not as a democratic outlier of disruptive protest, but as intrinsic to the democratic system and exemplifying rational and legitimate political practice. In some publications, the authors' sympathies with participants is clear and their research used as a way to legitimise not only the movement, but also Taiwan's claims to nationhood. This has been evident in studies that focus on, and therefore affirm the existence of, distinctively 'Taiwanese' political views and a national identity. Shiyin Rung Pan (2015) examined the occupation as an example of how in the context of Taiwan's problematic political status, civic participation is an expression of nationhood. As such, Pan argued that the large size and success of the movement reflected a "mature civil society (and) also a clear assertion (of) Taiwanese identity" (Pan 2015, 461). Fan-yu Chen and Wei-ting Yen (2017) used the movement to explore the different dimensions of Taiwanese nationalism and how they related to social consciousness. They found that participants' "anti-China…and pro-independence attitudes" (Chen and Yen 2017, 1194), were inextricable from "possible social outcomes brought about by intensifying

trade relations" (Chen and Yen 2017, 1195), which they distinguished from an aggressive or "chauvinistic nationalism" (Chen and Yen 2017). While outside Taiwan's academic institutions, Ian Rowen's (2015) participant observer account of the occupation was clearly positioned as supportive of participants. Rowen described how the movement signalled that the "Taiwanese appear to be saying goodbye ever more loudly to 'peaceful reunification'" (Rowen 2015, 18), while also facilitating "an increasingly vibrant, volatile, and re-networked region" (Rowen 2015, 19).

Research on the 318 Occupation from within the fields of political science and sociology has tended to examine the movement in positivist terms of power dynamics and underlying causes. These studies therefore treated the movement as a logical and explainable outcome of structural changes and consistent with the expectations of a democratic system. Applying Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam's theory of political opportunity structure, Ming-sho Ho (2015) argued that the movement's strength was derived from activists recognising and taking advantage of "disunity within the ruling party" (Ho 2015, 93). Ho found that these conditions allowed young activists to undertake a sustained occupation and frame their exit of the legislature as a success despite "low public tolerance for disruptive protest" (Ho 2015, 71). Brian Christopher Jones and Yen-tu Su (2015) depicted the movement and its opponents as engaged in a "confrontational contestation" (Jones and Su 2015, 194), over the nature of Taiwan's political system. According to this understanding, although participants challenged the state mandated use of the Legislative Yuan their actions were not "undemocratic" (Jones and Su 2015, 194-199). Rather, they claimed to be "defending democracy" (Jones and Su 2015, 199-202), from the KMT's abuse of procedure, the threat of China, and economic inequality brought about through free-trade agreements. The movement emerged from and was re-absorbed into Taiwan's democratic system rather than attempting to fundamentally challenge the political structure.

Other publications used the occupation to explore the personal experience of protest and the formation of political subjectivities. In doing so, these studies promoted the transformative potential of the movement in accordance with the broader, and contested, narrative of a modernising Taiwan. For example, focusing on the particular experience of housewives during the movement, Chia-Ling Yang (2017) emphasised how political participation empowered these women, giving them more confidence in their home and professional lives. Yang argued that as a result, civic activism can alter the dynamics of gender relations in Taiwanese society, redefining what it means to be a 'good woman' from a "Confucian ideal… [To] caring and acting for better politics and a better society" (Yang 2017, 668). Chih-ming Wang (2017) also identified how the 318 Occupation was motivated not only by political demands, but a broader challenge to underlying power structures. In particular, Wang argued that the participants desired an alternative temporality to that offered by neoliberalism in which the future is predetermined by the drive for progress (Wang 2017, 185-186). In Wang's interpretation, the movement was an intervention in the "neoliberal future that China embodies as a political and economic entity" (Wang 2017, 188), where Taiwan would inevitably be dominated by the financial capital that China represents. I would suggest that the self-awareness and critical engagement Wang attributes to his subjects, reflects the author's own attempts to expand the way Taiwan's prospects are defined.

Thus, student movements in Taiwan are multifaceted and complex, embodying a range of influences and shifting meanings, and the ways that have been understood and described equally so. Within the context of the island's history and socio-political environment, they have often been understood as part of the process of democratisation or the creation of a Taiwanese identity. Even so, they have also been shaped in relation to the history of student movements from China and the US. These lineages continue to influence the moral connotations of student movements in Taiwan and their legitimacy as a part of the democratic system. Within this

process, the practice of scholarly analysis is inseparable from the practice of protest, serving to create a reflexive field in which protest has been legitimised and opened to critique. When acknowledging this interaction, academics have often used their position to expose the dynamism, fluidity and agency of not only Taiwan's student movements but also the island itself.

Chapter 3: Between Tradition and Strategy – Student Activism in the 2008 Wild Strawberry Movement

Introduction

Between November 2008 and January 2009, around 400 student activists occupied Liberty Square in Taipei. Part of civic opposition to the government's treatment of protesters during a PRC official's visit to Taiwan, the Wild Strawberry Movement, as it is now known, sought to strengthen democratic rights through amending the Assembly and Parade Act. The movement received widespread support and became a unifying force for disillusioned groups in civil society. Participants staged large-scale rallies and transformed Liberty Square into a space for free political expression. Even so, the government refused to admit wrongdoing or significantly alter the Assembly and Parade Act. The students consequently ended the movement feeling that they had failed to achieve their goals.

In the context of this thesis, I argue that the Wild Strawberry Movement involved a clear articulation of young activists' reflexive engagement with Taiwan's socio-political environment. Reflexivity is understood as the mediating instrument between structure and agency, and the ability for individuals to conceive and respond to the dynamics of their socio-political context. Reflexivity materialised in the Wild Strawberry Movement through the students' political practice and self-analysis. As the first time that the post-martial law generation had protested as a distinct group, young activists adopted a 'student movement' identity to overcome their inexperience and lack of resources. Reflexivity has also been defined as part of social and political change in the sense that individuals continuously monitor and adapt their behavior based on the outcome. This in turn effects social structures and creates conditions of constant transformation. The Wild Strawberry Movement revealed how young activists were involved in this process through negotiating their political approach. When faced

with obstacles, participants debated and mediated their tactics and focus in a way that began to alter the possibilities of political participation for young people in Taiwan.

To explore these arguments further, this chapter tracks the major events of the Wild Strawberry Movement. It gives particular focus to the role of young activists and the interaction between their strategy, tactics, aims, and understanding of Taiwan's politics. The origins of the Wild Strawberry Movement lie in divisions over democratic practice and nationalism in Taiwan, along with the island's relationship with China. In 2008, these issues were heightened when the KMT government restricted civic demonstrations during a senior PRC official's visit. Feeling unrepresented by the mainstream political stance on these issues, young activists mobilised their own distinct protest, positioning the Wild Strawberry Movement as their attempt to establish adequate political representation. Within this process, the Wild Strawberry Movement used a 'student' identity to differentiate their movement. In part a result of protesters' university affiliation, this identity reflected the way in which young activists had previously been politically engaged. At the same time, participants strategically deployed practices that drew from the tradition of student movements in Taiwan, giving their action shape and legitimacy, and allowing them to maintain control. Even so, when the Wild Strawberry Movement struggled to gain tangible success young activists were forced to negotiate the political style and organisational structure they had originally adopted. Focused on remaining and appearing rational, and achieving an idealised form of democracy, these aspects had initially been used as a way to further separate the students from other parts of civil society. While eventually modified, when combined with the movement's place-making techniques, they also represented forms of political meaning for young activists outside the student movement tradition.

By the end of the Wild Strawberry Movement, however, participants were disillusioned with Taiwan's politics and their use of the student movement identity. Their efforts had been

continuously undermined by partisanship and their peripheral position in civil society. Geopolitics and the negative undertones of the student movement identity further destabilised their cause. After experimenting with direct action, young activists abandoned their protest. As such, through the Wild Strawberry Movement young activists recognised both the possibilities and limitations of the student movement identity in Taiwan. The movement represents the starting point from which the students would become a significant political force.

The Background to the Wild Strawberry Movement

The Wild Strawberry Movement emerged amid fierce debates over national identity, democratic practice, and cross-strait relations. In 2008, the change in government and associated power dynamics had accentuated the role of these issues in creating a divisive socio-political environment in Taiwan. Inextricable from the island's history of authoritarianism and resistance, they became key sites of animosity between the KMT and DPP. Disillusion with both major parties, however, meant that young people felt excluded from these debates.

Partisan divisions over cross-strait relations

The Wild Strawberry Movement began on 6 November 2008. At the time, it was one of several protests against the KMT's treatment of civil society and their approach to cross-strait relations. Two days earlier on 4 November, PRC official Chen Yunlin had begun touring Taiwan. Chen was the president of the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), and the first high level Chinese representative to visit the island. Founded in 1991 in response to Taiwan's formation of the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) 海峽交流基金會 (海基會), ARATS was the CCP body through which the PRC could conduct semi-official relations with Taiwan without either side revoking their claims to sovereignty. Since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) passed the Anti-Secession Law 反分裂國家法 in 2005, however, ARATS had been used to lay the groundwork for 'peaceful reunification' through increasing economic and

social connections (D. Chen 2014, 33-36). In line with this approach, Chen Yunlin's trip initiated the Three Links 三通 agreement to open postal services, transportation, and trade.

For President Ma Ying-jeou, Chen Yunlin's visit represented tangible success in his government's plans to create closer ties with China. Since having been elected in March that year, the KMT had introduced a number of policies to achieve this aim with the concurrent purpose of boosting Taiwan's economy. In July 2008, direct flights began between the mainland and Taipei, while restrictions on Chinese investment and immigration to Taiwan were loosened (Matusda 2015, 7-9). The 'Three Links' would consolidate this process, with the eventual goal of unifying the two sides of the strait. As such, activists and political figures quickly framed Chen Yunlin's visit as a threat to Taiwan's autonomy. In the lead up to the trip, a coalition of civic groups, the DPP and Taiwan Solidarity Union 台灣團結聯盟 (TSU), had staged large-scale protests against the KMT's pro-China policies, with one rally on 25 October drawing an estimated 600000 people. Over the first few days of the visit pro-Taiwanese independence groups had picketed Chen and President Ma at the various sites they attended, waiving the ROC flag and wearing headbands that read "Taiwan is my country". They had also thrown rocks and eggs at the two politicians, offering rewards for any successful strikes (Branigan 2008).

Chen Yunlin's visit therefore revealed divisions in Taiwan over national identity, cross-strait relations, and partisan politics. Taiwan's relationship with China had become a point of antagonism between the KMT and DPP, as tensions eased between the KMT and CCP. Since the early 1990s and so-called 1992 Consensus 九二共識, the KMT and CCP had stated that there was only one China but were deliberately ambiguous about what that entailed (Tan 2017). This had enabled pragmatic cooperation, while theoretically suspending the pursuit of unification or Taiwanese independence. In this political landscape, the KMT has become

associated with Taiwan's interconnectedness with China in a way that has often been conflated with a pro-unification stance. Since 2004, the party have formally opposed Taiwanese independence and framed cooperation with the Mainland as way to produce economic growth. In practice, however, high-ranking KMT officials have formed personal and business ties with the CCP and promoted a political identity that drew from the Chinese roots of the party (Hong 2005). In addition, as part of the pan-blue coalition the KMT worked with the People First Party 親民黨 (PFP), who are ardently anti-independence.

In contrast, the DPP's place in this political discourse has become synonymous with Taiwan's independence movement. In 1999, the 'Resolution on Taiwan's Future 台灣前途決議文' replaced the 1991 clause to push for an "autonomous Republic of Taiwan" (DeAeth 2018), in the DPP's charter, so that the party's official position is now that Taiwan is already a sovereign nation. The policies of the first DPP president, Chen Shui-bian, reflected this stance. For example, during this period names and imagery associated with the KMT were removed from official buildings and several streets, and the school curriculum was revised to centre on Taiwan. Since 2016, Tsai Ing-wen 蔡英文 has been more cautious in her approach but has refused to acknowledge the 1992 Consensus (Wong, Wu, and Wang 2016).

In this sense, protests against Chen Yunlin's visit highlighted the intense partisanship over Taiwan's national status, and cooperation with China. These issues had permeated Taiwan's politics and formed the central conflict around which other topics emerged. The hostility of this environment was further fueled where the government's response intersected with issues of the role of protests in democracies.

The legacy of the authoritarian era in Taiwan's democracy

As opposition to the KMT's policies towards China intensified at the beginning of the Ma period, the role of protests in Taiwan's political system were also brought into question. Here,

the KMT's reaction to the crowds was used by activists to highlight the party's problematic political history, incite divisions over democratic legitimacy, and offer reminders of Taiwan's authoritarian past.

Throughout the course of Chen Yunlin's visit, President Ma Ying-jeou had sought to not only diffuse the protests, but also disguise any suggestion of unhappiness or disrespect for the PRC. Over 7000 riot police had been deployed, who forcibly confiscated ROC flags and often clashed violently with protesters. By the end of the visit on 7 November it was reported that hundreds of police officers and protesters had been injured (Jennings 2008). Protest leaders during the Chen visit were identified by police and arrested under the Assembly and Parade Act. The Assembly and Parade Act was introduced in 1988, directly after the end of martial law in 1987. Along with the National Security Act 國家安全法 and the Civil Associations Act 人民團體法 introduced at the same time, it was part of three laws for national security designed to ease Taiwan's transition into a democracy (Hsiao 2016). Although Taiwan's constitution guarantees the right to protest, according to these laws any assembly must have prior approval and police can disperse crowds at their discretion. In this sense, the laws can be interpreted as a relic of the KMT's authoritarian rule. The government's use of the Assembly and Parade Act, in combination with the treatment of protesters by police during Chen's visit, was consequently framed as a threat to Taiwan's democracy. The DPP accused President Ma of having "[condoned] excessive force… not allowing the public to express their views on the streets…. [and returning] to dictatorial rule" (Mo and Chang 2008).

The KMT's relationship to democracy is complex, and, as evidenced in the ongoing process of transitional justice and constitutional reform (Morris 2018a), still being negotiated in Taiwan. The party's central ideological formula codified by its founder Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 as the Three Principles of the People 三民主義 includes the notion of 'Chinese' democracy. The

KMT also led Taiwan during its transition into democracy from 1987 and has been elected to the presidency three times. During the White Terror 白色恐怖 and period of martial law (1949-1987), however, the KMT was at the centre of an authoritarian party-state, and the issue of personal responsibility for acts committed during martial law are a defining feature of Taiwan's contemporary politics (Kawashima 2018). The KMT's conflicting positions in relation to democratisation can be contrasted with that of the DPP. Formed from the Tangwai movement, the DPP has been representative of anti-authoritarian resistance movements and maintained a close association with civil society throughout the 1990s (Ho 2010, 8-13). When elected to government in 2000, the party used these connections to fill its ministries and give weight to social justice issues in their policies. The DPP have also pushed for a continued 'deepening' of democracy in Taiwan through constitutional reform.

As such, accusations against the KMT government for their excessive use of police force in 2008 aligned with the historical roles fulfilled by the two political parties in Taiwan's democracy. The threat of authoritarianism was incorporated into divisive politics and became part of the DPP's rhetoric against the government. Even so, despite the dominance of these divisions, shifting power dynamics since 2000 had complicated Taiwan's politics. Protests against Chen Yunlin's visit took place at a time when disapproval of both major parties had led some sections of civil society to feel disenfranchised. This aspect can in part be attributed to the Chen Shui-bian presidency and the DPP's failure to provide an adequate option for those who did not support the KMT. Amid accusations of corruption and the inability to pass policies without a majority in the legislative assembly, by 2008 the DPP were subject to widespread opprobrium. Chen Shui-bian had less than a ten percent approval rating, including amongst previously supportive civic groups (*Taipei Times* 2006). In response, the DPP were decisively ousted from power in the 2008 presidential elections, in which the KMT won 58 percent of the vote (*The Economist* 2008). Frustration with the DPP materialised during protests against Chen

Yunlin's visit. At the time, the party were blamed for failing to amend the Assembly and Parade Act while they themselves were in power (Wang 2008) and were accused of having used the law to serve their own political aims. Indeed, in 2006 the government had threatened to arrest protesters critical of Chen Shui-bian with the law, such as the Red Tide 紅潮 anti-corruption protests led by Shih Ming-te 施明德 (Shih 2007, 92). As a result, the DPP had lost legitimacy with some parts of civil society.

In 2008, disillusion with both sides of politics was particularly prominent amongst young Taiwanese. For years, analysists had noted that young people in Taiwan were not swayed by divisive political issues (Rigger 2006a, 17-28), and had no deep commitment to either the KMT or DPP. This perception was reiterated in my interviews, where young activists expressed contempt for the policies and political style of the dominant parties. As one interviewee described in relation to the political climate around the time of Chen Yunlin's visit:

> "In 2008 I personally, and I know many young people [also did not] want to vote for the KMT or DPP… the KMT, and the DPP too, tend to be extremely culturally conservative and, [in terms of] their ability to motivate young people… they are just horrible at it. I think it's because they are not sophisticated and just rely on slogans… which I guess works with older generations or less educated people, but [not] talking to [this generation who] have more access to knowledge and experience with democracy… I was actually… in the front row of the [2008] presidential debate… I hated it [because] they talked like a late night commercial; just making impossible promises… [With] no substance, no logic. We are yet to see if this will really change [in 2015], but particularly in that year [2008], there was a lot of disillusion with democracy, or at least political parties" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 21 May, 2015).

This suggests that in November 2008 young people felt unrepresented within Taiwan's institutionalised politics. This issue was pronounced by conflict over cross-strait relations and the future of democracy, which had historically been debated along party lines. Although the DPP and their supporters actively opposed Chen Yunlin's visit and the KMT's response to protesters, their strength and legitimacy had been depleted. Within this context, the Wild Strawberry Movement can be understood as a search for representation in these debates, outside the party system.

Becoming 'Student' Activists in the Wild Strawberry Movement

The Wild Strawberry Movement began as a search for a new site of opposition to the KMT's policies on cross-strait relations and treatment of civil society. Within this process, identifying as a student action was central to the movement's distinction. Having become politically active in the university environment, this was in part a practical response to the networks on which students relied. At the same time, young activists self-reflexively deployed the student movement tradition in order to establish space and legitimacy in civil society.

Academics and campus activism in the start of the Wild Strawberry Movement

In 2008, young people in Taiwan were primarily politically engaged through their universities, having up to that point largely been absent from civil society. The Wild Strawberry Movement began within this context, facilitated by academics and the network of campus activist groups they had established. There had not been a significant student or youth-led action since 1990, and those born after 1987 had been labeled the 'strawberry generation' in response. According to this title, young people were sweet and nice to look at, but sensitive, easily bruised and apathetic (Rigger 2006b). When combined with their aversion to both major political parties, they were believed to lack the initiative to stage a protest. Despite this impression, there were several small campus activist groups operating across Taiwan. In previous years, they had

protested over specific educational issues such as student fees, environmental concerns, and the forced evictions of communities near their campuses. There had also been coordinated efforts in campaigns such as that to protect Losheng Sanatorium 樂生療養院 in Taipei, for which they had staged protests in 2006 (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 25 September, 2015). PTT, a bulletin board style social media forum, was central to communication between campus activist groups and organising these types of events.

The level of political activity amongst campus groups was often a reflection of the university out of which they were based. For example, one interviewee described how because National Chengchi University 國立政治大學 was closely linked to the KMT, there were few opportunities for advocacy when he was a student there (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 27 March, 2015). In contrast, protesters at NTU were particularly active and part of the university's distinct tradition of activism and rebellion (Wright 1999, 987-990). Academics from NTU's Department of Sociology 台灣大學社會學系 sometimes assisted this group and were generally encouraging of political questioning and critique (Anonymous. Interview with academic by author. 14 May, 2015). Within this approach, in January 2008, members of NTU's sociology department had staged a lecture by two Wild Lily participants and authors, Zhang Tie-zhi 張鐵志 and Ma Shi-fang 馬世芳. Titled 'Popular music, youthful resistance and Taiwan's political change', it was designed to "on the one hand, investigate the meaning of music (in politics), while at the same time show (this) current generation of young people how to find their own voice" (Claypatterns 2008). Several students who would become prominent activists attended the event and cite it as a source of inspiration (Ho 2014, 36). This suggests a conscious acknowledgement amongst young protesters of the influence of academics on their mobilisation.

My interviews revealed a similar recognition of young activists' embeddedness within the university structure. Their political engagement was dependent not only the resources available in their respective departments but had also been shaped by academics' social and political concerns. As one interviewee described in relation to why some universities had more politically involved students than others:

> "When I first entered NTU as a student in 2008, we did not have the opportunities… like we do now [to meet in] cafes and bookshops with a particular political focus… [In fact, after the Wild Strawberry Movement], a couple of us [decided that] those types of places [in which people could meet up to discuss politics] would be really useful… [Before that] we did not have money or resources to organise places to meet. [Our campus society] just had to use the [Department of] Sociology rooms. So actually, it is important in that context that you have professors who are willing to let you use rooms for that purpose" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 9 June, 2015).

Another recounted how they had initially been mobilised when their professor at National Taiwan University of Arts 國立臺灣藝術大學, took a group of students to visit Losheng Sanatorium. They said:

> "In my experience [I learnt about political] issues through my professors… [And] that's how I became active" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 25 September, 2015).

This interrelationship between student activists and their university experience, also accounts for the start of the Wild Strawberry Movement. On the evening of 5 November 2008 Lee Ming-tsung 李明璁, a young sociology professor at NTU, made a post on his PTT board about the treatment of demonstrators during Chen Yunlin's visit. Lee suggested that students and

academics stage their own protest against the government's actions, assembling the following day at the Executive Yuan. They would demand:

> "That President Ma [Ying-jeou] and Premier Liu [Chao-shiuan] should openly apologise for excessive police conduct [during the Chen Yunlin visit]…That the two ministers who head the police and security units involved [National Police Agency Director-General Wang Cho-chiun 王卓鈞 and National Security Bureau Director-General Tsai Chao-ming 蔡朝明] should take responsibility and step down. [And] that the Assembly and Parade Act should be revised to ensure the right of peaceful assembly and expression" (*The Right Thing* 2011).

To the organisers' surprise, on 6 November around 500 students and professors from various universities occupied the grounds of the Executive Yuan. Wearing black and makeshift yellow headbands they sat together chanting slogans and singing songs. By four pm on 7 November police began to disperse the crowd, corralling students onto buses and dropping them at different locations around Taipei. Having made an earlier plan, however they reassembled at Liberty Square that same evening, where they would remain for two months. The Wild Strawberry Movement therefore emerged as part of university based political activism in Taiwan. This environment shaped the mobilisation and mechanics of the students' protest and provided them with a preliminary political subjectivity. Even so, these assemblies were only identified as a 'student movement' when protesters deliberately cultivated this identity, exposing the boundaries and context-dependence of the student movement tradition.

Self-reflexive and strategic identification as a 'student movement'

The November 2008 protest became a widespread student action through young activists' engagement with the lineages of student movements in Taiwan. Here, the protesters' reflexivity and self-representation allowed them to maintain control over their protest and establish

legitimacy. As a result of this reflexivity there was often a lack of differentiation between my interviewees' discussion of their own experiences and analysis. They would cite different events in which students had acted righteously or been oppressed, not as a source of inspiration, but as a frame of reference which they could use to limit the government's response.

For example, one activist who was also a postgraduate student in History at NTU told me:

> "'*Xueyun*' is a term that's been used since the May Fourth protests. I guess student protests are so important in Taiwan because college and university students became part of the quasi-elite, the new bourgeoisie… [and] our protest leaders, are very clever in leveraging that… By calling yourself a student movement we obtain a level of respectability and legitimacy" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 21 May, 2015).

Another student from NTU's sociology department described how:

> "On the basis of Taiwanese [and] Chinese culture, scholars have traditionally been important in protests… [Their] social position has been different, higher than others… [Because] it is believed that education somehow makes you more virtuous. Traditionally in the Qing court, scholars would always give advice to the ruler. When it comes time to protest, because of the influence of this history, if we say we're a student movement then it implies we're a different type of people, that we're a more legitimate social class. For a while then, every time we went to protest, even if we were not enrolled in university at the time, we would still say that we're a student movement… [And] would we really achieve such a big exposure in the media if we didn't? Would the public and authorities be so lenient?... In the context of our society it's a bit of a strategy" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 9 June, 2015).

Yet another politics student said that:

> "There is a particular political sense that if you try to define your protest as a student movement, then the government will have fewer reasons to repress such a movement. It's because of the legacy of events like the Tiananmen massacre, the KMT government is afraid of having a similar image to the Mainland government of the time. They always try to emphasise that "we're not like that" [referring to the Taiwanese government's desire to distinguish themselves from the CCP]. So, the idea of the student movement became like a shield. Students are seen as innocent and pure and when they say something is wrong it must really be wrong, they don't have any other interests. It actually gives more space for young activists to make their point and explain to society what's going on. In that way, we're using the student movement as a vessel, like a Trojan horse to address all the issues that we want" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 27 March, 2015).

Young activists' engagement with the history of student movements in Taiwan can consequently be understood as a strategic utilisation of its historico-cultural connotations. More than an inherent result of their university enrollment, protesters took steps to propagate this identity in a way that was indicative of ongoing consideration for and attempts to write themselves into the narrative of Taiwan's politics. Although often expressed in strategic terms, this form of reflexivity also encompassed consideration for the moral value of young activists' actions and the possible ways they could be perceived. This revealed a distinctive understanding of the relationship between practice and meaning, and a self-conscious recognition of how they were situated in Taiwan's socio-political landscape.

Those involved in the November 2008 protests primarily used the student movement tradition to separate themselves from other parts of civil society. Over the first few days of the sit-in,

there was a concern that if too many members of the public or DPP joined the event then it could be co-opted. As shown in the documentary *The Right Thing* 廣場 (2011), participants argued about this issue on their first night in the square. One student is shown asking the crowd "if we invite everyone to attend, then who runs the activity? How do we vote on decisions?" (*The Right Thing* 2011), while another adds that "if the opposition party sends 1000 people then the movement is gone" (*The Right Thing* 2011). In response, young activists in the protest began to strategically reference the student movement tradition. Their tactics, political style and imagery were drawn from this lineage and deployed in a deliberate way. For example, the student movement tradition had informed their choice to 'sit-in' rather than staging a rally or a march as other groups would do. According to one of the movement's organisers:

> "In the very brief history of the student movement sit-in protest is the only recognised form of student activism. Taiwanese student activism is defined by the action of 'sitting in'. It seems like once a group of students sit together, it becomes very clear to people that it's a student movement. At this moment Taiwan hasn't had a large scale student movement for a long time, so the fastest way to get students involved is not to march on the streets and raise the banner for protest; having a sit-in is probably the easiest way" (*The Right Thing* 2011).

Indeed, students had previously 'sat-in' during significant protests in Taiwan. In the Wild Lily Movement of March 1990, around 22000 participants had also occupied Liberty Square for a period of six days. They themselves had adopted the practice from the student sit-in at Tiananmen during the Beijing Democracy Movement the previous year (Chen 2005, 591-608). Inspired by these major student actions, on 9 November participants also voted to maintain a picket-line perimeter around their protest. As had been done by the Wild Lilies in 1990 and in Tiananmen in 1989, through this tactic students literally represented their political subjectivity in the spatiality of the protest, using a policed boundary. In doing so, this tactic drew attention

to the class connotations of student activism. As described by several interviewees, the identity was powerful because of the suggestion that students were part of an 'elite class', somehow superior through their knowledge base and integrity. In the Wild Lily Movement, the line had been used to divide the 'pure' students from the 'complex' masses (Chen 2005, 593-594), with the underlying assumption that it would ensure their political virtue would not be corrupted. In the Wild Strawberry Movement, the problematic implications of this aspect were recognised, but pragmatically put aside. For instance, according to one participant:

> "Most of us were a little uncertain about excluding our supporters [as] we thought maybe it would seem too controlling or elitist… With everything happening so fast [however], we thought it was [the only way] to maintain the cohesion of the 'student movement'" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 2 August, 2015).

Further drawing from the repertoire of Taiwan's history of student movements, on 9 November participants voted to call themselves the 'Wild Strawberry Movement'. From one perspective, this name challenged the 'Strawberry Tribe' label previously applied to their generation. In going 'wild' students were rejecting the parameters of acceptable behaviour dictated to them by older generations and breaking out of the confines of the 'strawberry' stereotype. Their 'wildness' was not supposed to be destructive or senselessly rebellious, but in opposition to the belief that their generation were apolitical and lazy. At the same time, the name 'Wild Strawberry' made reference to the protester's determination and agency: in Taiwan the 'wild strawberry' is used as a metaphor for something that may look sweet but is tough, grows low to the ground, and has thorns to protect it from being easily eaten (*The Right Thing* 2011). In doing so, the name also invoked the tradition of the Wild Lily Movement. In the 1990 protest the Formosan Lily had also been chosen as symbol for its resonance in Taiwanese culture where it is used to represent purity and resilience.

These actions demonstrate that participants in the Wild Strawberry Movement deliberately shaped their protest to fit within the narrative of student movements in Taiwan, as this lineage was perceived as an accessible and politically salient form of engagement from which they could strategically benefit. While here, young activists' reflexivity was expressed in the form of a student protest, their self-reflection and careful orchestration of their political actions more broadly reveals a preoccupation with their role in shaping political reality. That is to say that this use of the student movement identity signalled a distinctive understanding of the interaction between history and contemporary politics. Young activists inserted themselves into this narrative with an acute awareness of the strategic value of the past, how their actions might unfold, and be interpreted in the future.

Signifying the strength of this approach, the student movement identity was initially a source of empowerment for young protesters. They received widespread support from a public who reinforced the sense that students were a special group, and representative of Taiwan's disenfranchised people. Throughout early November, other students and academics began to join the sit-in or show their solidarity. Between 7 and 12 November students in Kaohsiung, Tainan, Taichung, Changhua, Hsinchu, and Chiayi staged ancillary rallies, while on 14 November students in Hong Kong conducted their own sit-in that was video linked with Liberty Square. On 13 November hundreds of artists visited the square and presented a petition titled "Reject Silence and Defend Freedom of Expression" (Taiwan Wild Strawberries Movement Blog 2008). The American legal professor Richard Dworkin also attended the sit-in on 22 November, where he discussed jurisprudence and Taiwan's legal system. Despite being excluded from the sit-in, civic groups and members of the public praised and supported the Wild Strawberry Movement. They donated food, drinks, hats and money, while every night at 6pm over a dozen social activist groups held an hour-long silent vigil in the square to show their respect for the students. Busloads of representatives from workers and farmers unions,

church groups, aboriginal tribes and NGOs were transported into Taipei to support the sit-in. They would deliver speeches, play music and chant encouragements, such as: “Let’s go Taiwan, let’s go students” (*The Right Thing* 2011).

One speech delivered by an elderly member of the public encapsulated supporters’ understanding of the movement as an agent to unite and serve Taiwan. This impression drew from the connotations of the ‘student movement’ tradition previously discussed and afforded it an elevated place in civil society. For example, in describing the sit-in as “a new force… beyond parties and ideologies” (*The Right Thing* 2011), the speech suggested that the movement was driven by a ‘pure’ motive, outside partisan politics. In “healing and protecting this wounded island” (*The Right Thing* 2011), the students were also imbued with the power to overcome bitter divides and resolve historical traumas. I would suggest that the ability to represent the public was another element specific to the tradition of student activism in Taiwan. In other settings, the perception that students were part of an elite class not driven by self-interest allowed them to become a vessel for marginalised groups and transfer legitimacy to their cause (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 1 September, 2015). In the context of the Wild Strawberry Movement these undertones positioned the sit-in at the forefront of civil society. It became a uniting force not only against the Assembly and Parade Act, but the divisiveness, antagonism, and legacy of violence in Taiwan’s politics. The students took on this role with a sense of burden and empowerment, and a continued rumination on the variety of ways their actions might be interpreted within Taiwan’s political landscape. They became increasingly open to learning from groups outside the university community and engaged in revising the boundaries of student activism.

Navigating Taiwan's Divisive Politics and Complex Civil Society

Despite these shows of public support, the Wild Strawberry Movement faced an unsympathetic government and divided legislature and struggled to gain tangible achievements. Under pressure, tensions emerged within the community of student protesters and their increasingly frustrated supporters. Based around their democratic organisational structure, rational approach and focus on place-making, these issues highlighted and led young activists to negotiate their original ideals and tactics. In doing so, it demonstrated protesters' reflexive engagement with Taiwan's socio-political structure, along with their pursuit of political meaning separate to the tradition of student movements.

Differentiating student activism

By mid-November 2008, the government had delivered only a preliminary response to the protesters' demands. The movement's success was also hindered by setbacks in the legal and legislative processes. From the time it began, KMT officials had displayed a somewhat indifferent attitude towards the movement, simultaneously accepting and dismissing its significance. They tolerated and recognised the students' right to voice their opinion but refused to accede to their demands. When asked about whether he and President Ma would apologise for the treatment of protesters against Chen Yunlin's visit as the students requested, Premier Liu Chao-shiuan 劉兆玄 claimed that he did not have to because "these types of protests tend to dissipate quickly" (Chiu, Lin, and Hu 2008). President Ma directly addressed the movement on 13 November but told protesters that they were unreasonable to suggest that the heads of police and security step-down (Wang and Ko 2008).

The movement experienced similar immobility in the legislative process. After a public hearing on 13 November and an internal meeting of the KMT caucus on 17 November, on 19 November the Legislative Yuan Internal Affairs Committee 內政委員會 began revising the Assembly

and Parade Act. To the disappointment of the Wild Strawberry Movement, however, the version of the law presented for review had few significant changes. It still required three days prior notification to the police before a protest, restricted where demonstrations could take place, and reserved the right of the government and police to declare an assembly illegal and disband it accordingly. In a further obstacle to the movement, on 18 November the National Police Agency 警政署 completed its review of police conduct during Chen Yunlin's visit. It found that there was no abuse during the period and that the police force had "successfully completed its objectives" (Taiwan Wild Strawberries Movement Blog 2008). Thus, the Wild Strawberry Movement's connection with the tradition of student activism in Taiwan did not directly translate into enduring achievements. Instead, the movement's meaning and strength developed as young activists mediated and refined their political practice.

In addition to these mixed government reactions, young activists also encountered difficulty in defining the nature of their protest. The students had to navigate challenging encounters with other parts of civil society in order to establish an adequate and representative political style. From mid-November young activists were confronted with the issues of violence and emotion in protest. On 11 November, 80-year-old Liu Po-yan 劉柏煙, entered Liberty Square and set himself alight in an act that recalled the self-immolation of Cheng Nan-jung 鄭南榕 (Nylon Cheng). On 7 April 1989, Cheng, a prodemocracy and Taiwan independence activist wanted by the government for printing a constitution for an independent Republic of Taiwan, died by self-immolation in his office in Songshan District in Taipei. Cheng has since become an important symbol in Taiwan's search for democracy and free speech, with his office opening as a museum and shrine in 1999 and 7 April being declared 'Freedom of Expression Day 言論自由日' in 2016 (Nylon Cheng Liberty Foundation n.d.). In a note left in Liberty Square, Liu Po-Yan stated that his own actions opposed the KMT's suppression of protesters who were

demonstrating their nationalism, during Chen Yunlin's visit. Liu was an ex-KMT member and supported the anti-Chen protesters on the basis that they were carrying a ROC flag (Wang, Ko and Chang 2008). While the Wild Strawberry participants were sympathetic of Liu and aware of the lineage and significance of self-immolation in Taiwan (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 2 August, 2015), the act was at odds with how the students chose to participate in politics. Young activists set up a fundraising drive for Liu's medical bills but would not condone his actions.

Instead, throughout the course of the sit-in, maintaining order and avoiding 'disturbances' had been a priority for the students. When arguments broke out between older members of the public who came to either chastise or support the movement, they would quickly step in to break them up. This approach can be understood a deliberate response to how politics had been conducted in other public settings. With a lineage of struggle and against the backdrop of the 'China threat', post-martial law politics has often been mobilised by political emotions and affect (Hsiao 1990, 174-177). As described by one activist:

> "In the 2000s protesting didn't appeal to me because the people who ran them tended to be very old… [and] not necessarily well educated. There was a huge disconnect… Rather than explaining things rationally their message was couched in terms that I [didn't] really care about… [They would use] emotional one liners that weren't necessarily in language fit for polite company and would also get violent… they were very depressing and just don't look like guys who would actually win. [We] young protesters have been successful because we try to be rational" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 21 May, 2015).

In this sense, conducting protests 'rationally' was a way for young activists to distinguish themselves from other parts of civil society. While not always successful, it revealed their

inherent criticism of and strategic engagement with Taiwan's institutionalised politics; emotional displays were seen to be fueling divisiveness and a hindrance to productive political discussion. It was also suggestive of an ongoing self-reflection on the meaning of their political practices, how they were located in the narrative of Taiwan's politics, and the discursive devices that might be used to undermine them. Young activists were driven to position themselves as an alternative to the status quo, outside the partisan political environment and the repetitive debates that shaped it.

The Wild Strawberry Movement also demonstrated how protesters mediated their democratic ideals when confronted with political realities. Signaling young activists' strategy and values, the movement had originally mobilised in a decentralised and egalitarian way with strict rules over how to maintain organisational equality. This approach further differentiated the movement from other political actions, offering contrast to the hierarchical structure of other groups and a vision of an alternative type of democracy. Young activists were driven to conduct their protests as an expression of the way politics would ideally function in Taiwan, and the role they could have in achieving it. Gesturing towards radical forms of politics, such as anarchism, the movement had initially attempted to be 'leaderless', relying on nightly meetings where direct democracy was used to make decisions. This approach was in part a practical response to the ad hoc way in which the movement had emerged. For the first time in Taiwan, a protest had been mobilised via the internet rather than NGOs, political parties or unions (Hsiao 2017, 40-42). Participants were consequently unknown to each other and there was no clear leader. It was thought that making collective decisions would build trust, and avoid power struggles (Hsiao 2017, 40-42). Apart from this pragmatism, the lack of a leader in the Wild Strawberry Movement also mirrored the organisational preferences of the contemporary generation of protesters and their approach to democracy. They saw participants as equal and

institutionalised structure as unnecessarily bureaucratic and old fashioned. As described by one interviewee:

> "At first we really tried to be democratic. We said: "If you have an opinion about something then you ought to be heard". It doesn't matter if I was [there] first or had learnt all about the issue. In a student movement we are all students, so we are all equal. I think that's part of what is different between our generation and older people, because they use NGOs that are very institutionalized…we are more casual" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 1 September, 2015).

The Wild Strawberry Movement was therefore an opportunity for young people to articulate their ideal form of political practice. The students' loose organisational structure and egalitarianism separated their political style from other groups and represented a more flexible and inclusive vision for Taiwan's democracy. It also suggested that participants conducted their protests with consideration for how they might fit into and shape the broader political culture, and a belief that through enunciating their ideal it would be brought closer to realisation. Yet, the movement also brought into focus the limitations of the approach taken by young activists. In analysing the movement, the students themselves identified that direct democracy had inhibited their ability to make decisions or devise a clear strategy (Hsiao 2017, 49-50). Arguments within the young activist community were primarily based around how best to adapt to hostility in Taiwan's socio-political environment. Participants were consciously aware of their group's limitations but diverged in the tactics and values that informed how to resolve them.

For example, participants struggled to decide whether they should abandon their demand that the government apologise when they seemed unlikely to do so. The anti-KMT members of the community felt that the movement should hold the government to account, while others

believed their efforts would be better spent on reforming the Assembly and Parade Act. Divisions also emerged over how to consolidate a legacy for the movement and who would have the right to represent the 'Wild Strawberry' label in the future (*The Right Thing* 2011). This demonstrated an acknowledgement of and concern for the symbolic value of their action and a fear that they could lose control of its meaning. In response to these issues, in the years that followed students began to coordinate their movements through a combination of cross-campus activist coalitions and online communities (Hsiao 2017, 49-50). Social media technologies that allowed for dispersed and open discussion continued to underpin their actions, but each movement had representatives who were approved to speak to the media and a core decision-making body. This reduced the complexity in devising a strategy and enabled the students to develop and sustain a clear message.

As such, students' reflexivity also involved mediation and debate from within the community of activists itself. They balanced their ideal form of democratic participation against the perceived need for regimentation and consistency. Their actions revealed a pragmatic response to the realities of Taiwan's political environment and an ongoing contemplation of the meaning of their protest within it.

Place-making and redefining the space of Liberty Square

As the Wild Strawberry Movement struggled to maintain momentum, the students shifted their focus to strengthening emotional attachment amongst participants. Using creative and symbolic place-making techniques, they transformed Liberty Square into a space that reflected the values of their community. In contrast to the earlier focus on exclusion and differentiation, this approach promoted unity with groups outside academia and drew legitimacy from local cultural practices. In this way, it revealed a site of political meaning for young activists distinct from the student movement tradition.

By mid-November the number of protesters present in Liberty Square had dwindled, with nightly meetings now only attended by a few dozen people (*The Right Thing* 2011). In response, activists began several initiatives to reignite a sense of solidarity and purpose amongst participants in what can be understood as a form of place-making. In social movements place-making is the process whereby emotional attachment and unity are reinforced through the ritualised use of an occupied space (Della Porta, Fabbri, and Piazza 2013, 36). Place-making also seeks to challenge state power through reterritorialising the symbolic meaning of acts or spaces (Pieke 1996, 243; Della Porta, Fabbri, and Piazza 2013). Displaying this process, in the Wild Strawberry Movement young activists used artistic and performative practices to relocate their efforts as part of a general search for democratic freedoms. For example, at a rally on 15 November, which drew around 500 people, three students were voluntarily locked in a cage for 24 hours to symbolise social repression (*The Right Thing* 2011). Between 16 and 23 of November protesters constructed 'Wild Strawberry World' in the square, which consisted of a tower, newsroom, kitchen, cinema, and room for exhibitions. Replacing the earlier demarcation line, this initiative was designed to solidify the movement's presence in the square and create a clear boundary where 'free expression' could take place (*The Right Thing* 2011). Through this use of Liberty Square, young activists began to reposition the movement as representative of a universal struggle for democratic freedoms. Their practices encouraged cohesion amongst civil society against a largely unspecified 'political oppression', represented by the forces that threatened to undermine the space protesters were occupying. The simultaneous strict ordering of the occupied site and focus on freedom was indicative of an understanding of democratic politics that included a need for institutions and structure, and a move away from the students' previous experimentation with more radical forms of organisation. Beyond this symbolism, the process of shaping Liberty Square also enhanced the accessibility of the movement and understanding between participants and supporters. For instance, older labourers advised and

assisted the students in constructing ‘Wild Strawberry World’, thereby deepening respect between the two groups. As described by one interviewee:

> “The construction of the towers was important because it gave people something to do, a sense of purpose in what was otherwise a pretty boring way to pass time… It was [also an opportunity] for students and the working class to cooperate and for us to learn something from them” (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 2 August, 2015).

In this way, Wild Strawberry participants formed connections with groups who did not fit into the student movement tradition. The references they made to local rituals similarly added complexity to the earlier exclusivity of their self-identification, reflecting a broader interaction with how they were situated in Taiwan’s socio-political and cultural landscape. These political practices were also indicative of the temporality and situational relevance of the student movement tradition and young activists’ identification with other political identities. Where student protest was targeted at institutionalised politics, these practices intersected with quotidian life, cultural, and religious traditions. For example, one of the movement’s major rallies involved a mock funeral for human rights. This action articulated the importance young activists placed on democratic freedoms, while also drawing meaning from a highly localised discourse. Taking place between 19 and 23 November, the ‘funeral’ directly reproduced local Daoist religious practices. Participants first had an opportunity to ‘pray 做拜拜’ to a shrine adorned with funerary candles, incense and the words ‘human rights 人權’, before an overnight vigil was held on 22 November. At the main ‘memorial service’ protesters paid their respects to a casket laid with flowers, donated by a sympathetic funeral parlour, and gave ‘eulogies’ about the loss of political freedoms. Young activists’ equated democracy with basic human

needs and described the Assembly and Parade Act as a threat to their rights (*The Right Thing* 2011).

During the Wild Strawberry Movement, young activists therefore began to establish political meaning and attachments outside the student movement tradition. In part a response to their lack of success, this demonstrates the reflexive and multifaceted nature of the students' engagement with Taiwan's socio-political structure. So too, when faced with obstacles and internal tension the community had self-consciously debated their tactics and aims, reviewed the meaning of their political subjectivity, and role within the narrative of Taiwan's politics. The student movement identity was shown to be neither enduringly pertinent nor a guarantee of success.

The Wild Strawberry Movement's Ambiguous End

The Wild Strawberry Movement ended amidst political disillusion in the young activist community and frustration with the student movement identity. Even with the students' efforts their success had been limited by their reliance on the university system and partisanship in parliament. Having adopted direct tactics in response, including staging an illegal rally on 7 December, young activists resolved that their sit-in was futile. Even so, the catalyst to leave the square was based in geopolitics rather than a reaction to the students themselves.

The limits of the 'student movement' identity

While protecting protesters from overt suppression, young activists' student status and interconnection with the university system, proved problematic. With few resources, the movement could be undermined by the institutions upon which they relied. From late November the government used their influence in the education system to put pressure on the protesters. On 21 November, the Ministry of Justice released new guidelines requesting schools, amongst other organisations, recruit personnel responsible for implementing government ethics

protocol. Protesters were immediately concerned. They denounced the decision, arguing that the idea of an 'ethics protocol' had authoritarian undertones and could be used to punish protesters (Wang 2008). In addition, during martial law these types of personnel doubled as government spies (Wang 2008). Amid this climate of uncertainty, tolerance for the students began to diminish from within universities. On 24 November students at NTU were banned from using university equipment for protesting purposes. The following day the National Taiwan University of Science and Technology 國立臺灣科技大學 (NTUST) refused to loan campus space to movement participants to hold a seminar.

Divisive party politics also inhibited the movement's potential achievements in amending the Assembly and Parade Law. On 27 November, a public hearing on the law to which student protesters had been personally invited, ended with a deadlock between the KMT and DPP. The central dispute was over whether the law should designate areas where the public cannot demonstrate, give police the discretion to disband protests, and have penalties for those who break the law (Taiwan Wild Strawberries Movement Blog 2008).

Thus, even with the legitimising narrative of the student movement identity, the movement continued to act from a marginal position in Taiwan's civil society. Contrary to the assumption of the identity's strength, it set boundaries for and reflected the limitations inherent in the students' socio-political position; as young activists' political participation was defined by their student status and lack of resources, universities could easily derail their protests. The value of the elite status, moral superiority and pure motives associated with the tradition of student movements was thereby contingent on how the identity was deployed and mediated. The identity was neither static nor a guarantee of success, but something that imbued young activists' protests with meaning and which they in turn could shape. The students' intention to engage with institutionalised politics was also an obstacle to the efficacy of their actions. Their focus on legislative solutions meant that even if protesters successfully introduced new acts to

parliament, they would consequently lose influence over the outcome. Recognising the limitations to the approach they had adopted so far, students in the Wild Strawberry Movement now began to escalate their tactics. While remaining 'rational' and nonviolent, they were increasingly willing to use direct action in order to manifest their arguments.

This began with the purposeful and repeated breaking of the Assembly and Parade Law to illustrate its futility. The first time was in early December 2008 when the student sit-in reached the 633 hours permitted by police, but they still did not vacate the premises. When there was no police response, protesters also staged a rally on 7 December, for which they did not obtain a permit. In doing so, they hoped to demonstrate that the requirement of such was unnecessary. Indeed, the event drew over 5000 people, but avoided causing any public disturbances, violence or arrests (*The Right Thing* 2011). Following the traffic laws, the crowd marched from Liberty Square down Zhongshan South Road past the Legislative and Executive Yuan before circling back to the Presidential Palace. The parade featured chants, music, skits insulting President Ma, and another mock funeral. Hundreds of students had travelled from all over the country to attend the protest and formed relationships that would be drawn on in later protests (*The Right Thing* 2011). As a result, the march was positioned as an expression of the Assembly and Parade Law's irrelevance and a final show of the students' strength. It would prove to be the apex of the movement and had an important role in progressing the role of young activists in civil society.

From 7 December, the government tried to subtly undermine the movement without appearing repressive. For example, without a permit the sit-in was now illegal under the Assembly and Parade Act, but police did not arrest the students. Instead, they chose to regularly issue protesters with expensive traffic violations in the hope that they would be dissuaded from remaining in the square (*The Right Thing* 2011). This indicated that the movement had made an impact on and was a point of contention for Taiwan's government. Rather than a direct

response to the movement itself, however, the impetus to vacate the square came from a new protest action with a distinct set of issues around dissidence, religion, migration, and geopolitics. This protest reframed the Wild Strawberry Movement in ways that undermined its salience in the face of much harder political issues, and with consequences unmatched in the student movement tradition. Even so, the student protesters willingly intervened in these issues and allied themselves against Chinese and authoritarian power, signaling their recognition of and stance on the dynamics of Taiwan's broader political landscape.

On 11 December, around 100 Tibetan refugees assembled in a nearby corner of Liberty Square to plead with the government for asylum. Under Taiwan's Immigration Act the Tibetans were illegal immigrants, and they were also wanted by the PRC government. While the Immigration Act would be amended in 2009 and Tibetans thereafter given residency (Asia-Pacific Refugee Rights Network 2013), at the time the protest was a highly visible articulation of the KMT's problematic position in wanting to court the CCP and maintain their authority. In this context, only hours after the Tibetans had arrived, the police already planned to expel them from the site. The students went to support the new protesters, yelling words of encouragement and reminding the police of correct procedure. Shortly after the Tibetans were dragged from the square, police busses arrived for the students. They tried to peacefully resist, but were forcibly removed, while the structures that had taken them a month to build were destroyed (*The Right Thing* 2011). The following day, 12 December, both the students and Tibetans returned to the square. With the structures that had made the presence possible destroyed, however, the movement lost momentum.

Problematising the student movement identity through the Wild Strawberry Movement

The Wild Strawberry Movement officially ended on 6 January 2009, after the students announced to their supporters that they would not continue with their protest. In doing so, they

exposed their political vulnerability and the weaknesses associated with the student movement identity; as a legacy laden with expectation and a shifting significance, they felt unable to constrain the trajectory of their actions as a part of the tradition.

Young activists had felt despondent about the prospects of their protest from the time they had returned to the square. There was no celebration when amendments to the Assembly and Parade Act were passed on 24 December, abolishing the need to obtain a permit before demonstrating. Since the changes also granted police extra power when responding to protesters the students conversely considered their efforts to have been a failure (*The Right Thing* 2011). They believed that the sit-in was now hopeless, and they may have a better success establishing an office named 'Wild Strawberry House', out of which they could organise future actions. Before vacating, the students held a barbeque for their supporters in Liberty Square where they announced their decision. In what can be interpreted as a display of filial piety (孝), the students faced the group in a line and bowed, while apologising for failing Taiwan. Unhappy with this announcement, however, the crowd criticised the young activists using the same discourse they had earlier supported. The student movement identity now became site of conflict and the protest was discredited with the language of divisive politics. For example, one attendee loudly accused the students of having "been infiltrated by government agents" (*The Right Thing* 2011). Others demanded to know why they had refused to align with the DPP, suggesting that their vanity had wasted everyone's time. The class connotations of the student movement identity were also used to chastise participants. The older workers who had previously helped the students build their towers now called the protesters "pretentious" and "elitist". They accused them of having been "corrupt [for]…keeping the public out of [the decision making process] from the very beginning" (*The Right Thing* 2011), and for insisting that the movement be 'student' led.

Thus, young activists ended the Wild Strawberry Movement with a sense of failure and regret, ostensibly matched by the few supporters who remained. The historico-political connotations of their protest seemed to overwhelm the voice of participants and limit their agency in dictating how their actions were received. While here the student movement tradition had been criticised, the end of the occupation was more broadly indicative of young activists' ongoing negotiation of an unstable socio-political environment. The lineage of student protest was one site of politics encountered by young activists, amidst a number of intersecting narratives and political issues. Their activism would not be defined solely by their relationship to the student movement tradition, but their ability to navigate the dynamics of Taiwan's socio-political landscape.

Conclusion: The Wild Strawberry Movement's Delayed Legacy

In reflecting on the significance of the Wild Strawberry Movement there is a distinct gap between how it was conceptualised at the time, and the way it is understood in the wake of the 2014 318 Occupation. For participants, members of Taiwanese society and academics alike, the 318 Occupation redeemed the earlier movement, framing it as the first pivotal step towards the 2014 action and its political consequences (Fell 2017b). In 2008, however, there was a notable anger against the students for their decision to leave the square, and for having staged an exclusive protest (*The Right Thing* 2011). Young activists' themselves felt that they had failed and did not mobilise as a coherent group in public again until 2012. As described by one interviewee:

> "For a time after the Wild Strawberry Movement we did not really hold any protests… we were tired, but also we had missed two months of school. Some students needed to finish their masters or PhD theses… we also really had the sense that maybe the movement had been a little bit futile… looking back on it now, of course we know what

it would lead to, but at the time it just felt like we had failed. We were very disheartened" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 9 June, 2015).

Yet while the Wild Strawberry Movement is now celebrated, the student movement identity has been a source of frustration for those by whom it was adopted. In the years that followed, young activists largely abandoned the practices that had helped cultivate this identity. The 2008 sit-in had revealed its limitations and the negative aspects associated with its practice. While still providing legitimacy, young activists felt that protests defined as a student movement were often misinterpreted. For example, several interviewees complained that so-called student movements could be easily co-opted by political parties. The 'innocence' and 'purity' of student activists in particular, could be framed to suit their own political agendas.

One activist described how the identity allowed the KMT to dismiss the significance of young activists' arguments. They said:

> "Everyone has an idea about student activists in their head already and it doesn't necessarily match up to what we're trying to express. The KMT government can accuse us [of] having been 'influenced' by the opposition party. They say: *"*Those students who are protesting are failures and are being manipulated, but there's another group of students who can succeed. Just don't worry about the protesters" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 27 March, 2015).

So too, the DPP could hijack student movements to criticise the government. According to one interviewee:

> "When we're protesting the DPP don't actually listen to our argument. They just say: "It is inspiring how much these students hate the KMT*"*…it's really hard to get them to listen to what student movements actually want" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 1 September, 2015).

Another grew frustrated with the class associations of student movements. They said:

> "It's not like we young people go protesting and say, you have to listen to us because we study, because we are better than you. I personally don't feel that I am privileged and think I am more of a worker. Sometimes in protests we say: "Yes, we may be students, but we are also workers; our ideas are more aligned with the working class rather than the elite". But this really confuses people and they just continue to see us as students" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 9 June, 2015).

As such, while the Wild Strawberry Movement is now understood as having defined and introduced to civil society the community of activists who staged the Sunflower Movement, it was also an example of their marginal position in Taiwan's socio-political environment. It revealed young activists' reflexive engagement with the student movement identity as both a source of empowerment and a problematic political category, their distinctive interaction with history and sense of their location in the narrative of Taiwan's politics. The movements that followed can therefore be understood as a search for political space outside the student movement tradition through constant reflection on the meaning of their political subjectivity as part of a lineage of protest and as a force for shaping contemporary politics.

Chapter 4: *'Not Wanting Want'* – Student Activists in Taiwan's Anti-Media Monopoly Movement

Introduction

In Taiwan on 25 July 2012, the National Communications Commission 國家通訊傳播委員會 (NCC) prepared to announce their ruling on a NT$70 billion bid by Want Want China Broadband 旺中寬頻 to acquire the cable television operator CNS. The bid was the latest in a series of takeovers by the parent company of Want Want-China Broadband, Want Want Corporation 旺旺集團. Founded in Taiwan by Tsai A-shi 蔡阿仕, Want Want's fortune was originally made in the snack food and beverage industries in the 1960s and 70s, taking advantage of the modernising economy. Under the Chairmanship of A-shi's son, 'Taiwan's Richest Man' Tsai Eng-meng, Want Want launched a mainland Chinese subsidiary food company in 2007 as part of an aggressive expansion into China. In 2008, Tsai entered Taiwan's media industry by procuring China Times Group 中國時報集團, including the *China Times* 中國時報, one of Taiwan's four major daily newspapers. After the acquisition of the cable television broadcasters *China Television* 中視 (CTV), and *Chung Tien Television* 中天新聞台 (CtiTV) Want Want China Times Group 旺旺中時集團(formed as a result of the China Times Group takeover), also became a major player in the television industry.

With a market share of around 23 percent, CNS was one of Taiwan's largest multiple system operators. Its acquisition would ensure that Want Want owned media across cable television, newspapers, magazines and internet services, and control one third of Taiwan's media by market share (K. Chen 2013a). There was no indication that the company would show restraint

in making further purchases. At an NCC public hearing on 7 September 2011, Tsai claimed to be "pretty happy about the flattering comparison" (*China Post* 2011), that had been made to media mogul Rupert Murdoch. It was conceivable that as Murdoch had done in Australia and the United Kingdom, Tsai would elevate himself to a position of dominance in Taiwan's media market. As the independent statutory agency responsible for regulating and promoting competition in civil communications, it was up to the NCC to decide if the CNS merger would be allowed to proceed.

In response to the NCC's role as the state media regulator, a dozen or so academics and media professionals gathered outside the NCC building on the morning of 25 July to protest the Want Want China Times Group takeover deal (Shan 2012a). The group had spent the preceding months collecting signatures for a petition that called on the NCC to 'safeguard democracy' and 'protect press freedom' by rejecting the merger. Their presence signalled that a section of Taiwan's society was dissatisfied with the business deal and unconvinced by the state mechanisms in place to stop it. At the time, the protesters were a loose coalition of concerned citizens. Over the following months, however, this small event would evolve into the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement.

The Anti-Media Monopoly Movement was a protest led by a coalition of academics, journalists and students that took place in Taiwan between 2012 and 2013. After its initial opposition to Want Want's acquisition of CNS, the movement grew to address the meaning of a 'free press' in Taiwan's democracy, and the necessity of having appropriate legislation in place to protect it. Multidimensional in its practices, the movement ranged from street demonstrations to a global social media campaign, before introducing new regulatory proposals to the Legislative Yuan in May 2013.

This chapter details the trajectory of the movement, with a focus on young activists' reflexive exploration of the issue of media freedom and search for new sources of political power. Students only mobilised and formed the Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters (Youth Alliance), after members of their community were target by Want outlets. Even so, they became the driving force behind the movement, repositioning its identity, and introducing a flexible and accessible form of political practice. The Anti-Media Monopoly Movement was the first cohesive large-scale student movement since 2008 and successfully addressed many of the issues faced by Wild Strawberry Movement participants. Finding Taiwan's political system frustrating and hostile, the students adapted their protesting strategies to find legitimacy in other practices. Through the use of social media, the Youth Alliance created a global platform and developed their knowledge of the issue of media ownership from the perspective of a critique of neoliberal economics. This realigned their campaign to connect internationally with other sympathetic groups and created an online community of support.

The Anti-Media Monopoly Movement also revealed how young activists navigated the space between their political ideals and tangible success. When the movement intersected with divisive party politics, cross-strait relations and conflict over the appropriate role of young people in politics, protesters were forced to negotiate their original objectives. This approach allowed the movement to successfully introduce legislation to parliament but struggled to alter the discourse surrounding media ownership. Thus, the movement also highlights how global power dynamics and Taiwan's socio-political environment have restricted the possibilities of political discussion.

Origins of the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement

The Anti-Media Monopoly Movement grew out of debates about the relationship between politics and Taiwan's saturated and competitive media landscape. Encompassing disputes over

the meaning of a 'free press', identity politics, Taiwan's authoritarian past and cross-strait relations, the CNS deal became indicative of the complexity and prevalence of partisanship in Taiwan's socio-political environment. The first stage was driven by media professionals and experts as they attempted to institutionalise a role for the press in maintaining democratic standards. Conflict over the deal was therefore largely contained to the media itself, interspersed with small, sporadic demonstrations.

The 'free press': from Enlightenment ideal to component of capitalism

From the time the *Want-Want* takeover deal was first publicised, prominent journalists and academics used their platform in the media to give their opinion about its likely influence. Those concerned discussed its impact in relation to the need to maintain a 'free press' as a cornerstone of democracy. For example, on 18 April 2012 an opinion piece by the journalists Xu Yuli 徐毓莉, Chen Jiaen 陳嘉恩 and Su Shengyi 蘇聖怡 was published in the *Apple Daily* 蘋果日報 with the title: "Taiwan should not be left with only the one voice of Want Want 台灣不能只剩一種聲音 旺旺". The authors argued that the deal was seen a threat to a free and open media, which in turn would undermine Taiwan's democratic system, writing:

> "It is unbelievable that in 21st century Taiwanese society, if someone has sufficient capital, they can control the transmission of news and information without restraint, and heartlessly trample on the long struggled for democracy and freedom" (Xu, Chen, and Su 2012).

The recognition of an interaction between the media and democratic politics has a long history, linked to ideas of modernity in Europe. In John Keane's account, establishing a 'free press' was part of the struggle of the bourgeois against the governing class in the late eighteenth-century. In this era, Thomas Erskine (1750-1823) defended Thomas Paine (1737-1809) for

committing ‘sedition’ by arguing on the basis of theology that freedom of expression was a natural human and civil right granted by God (Keane 1991, 4-5). At the core of this argument was a belief that censorship undermines the God given ability of individual reasoning. On the other hand, utilitarian philosophy held that state censorship of public opinion would allow for despotism and that ‘truth’ could only be obtained through unrestricted public discussion (Keane 1991, 10-20). Market economics have been promoted as a way to maintain freedom of the press. In the pro-capitalist libertarian philosophy expressed by the economist Milton Friedman, *laissez-faire* economics enhance liberal democracy because the market is unbiased and produces an abundance of choice (Friedman 1982). John Keane demonstrates that in relation to the media it is similarly argued that “production and circulation of opinions [occur] through the process of commodity production and exchange” (Keane 1991, 43-46), and that balance is maintained by the objective processes of the market. Even so, market effects have the potential to undermine democratic principles. For example, an unrestrained media market could produce a ‘tyranny of the majority’ in which minority rights and perspectives are unrepresented, or as was feared with the Want Want China acquisitions, large media companies can have an undue influence (Keane 1991, 69-83).

This lineage of ideas reflects that the notion of ‘liberty of the press’ is idealised in liberalism, which by its very nature remains unrealised. The need for open, free and rational debate to fulfil a liberal society has been incorporated into the logic of capitalism, where it is now linked to the openness of the market. As such, the desired role of the media, as the proclaimed guardians of freedom and rationality, has been adverse to their capacity to address the issues of accountability and bias in commercialised media markets. This has fallen to media critics, analysts, and activists outside those institutions (Keane 1991, 43-36), and to government authorities like, in Taiwan, the National Communications Commission.

For those who opposed the CNS merger, the deal was therefore framed as a kind of market failure, where Want Want could dominate public opinion through its economic strength. The acquisition would signal that Taiwan's media were adversely placed to uphold their function as a check on institutionalised power. This threat was enhanced by the divisive nature of Taiwan's media environment.

Authoritarianism and the production of Taiwan's partisan media

The composition of Taiwan's media has been woven into this history of political oppression, transformation and partisanship. In tracking this history, Gary Rawnsley and Qian Gong (2012), identified the importance of the *Baojin* 報禁 policy, introduced in 1950 during the martial law era. This policy banned any new publications, limited the number of pages media publications could have, and controlled where each daily newspaper could be printed (Rawnsley and Gong 2012, 98-188). It was designed to restrict freedom of expression and the possibility of political opposition in less obvious ways than the crude censorship that also occurred. Privately-owned newspapers like *United Daily News* 聯合報 competed with the KMT's *Central Daily News* 中央日報, but all were tightly bound to Taiwan's authoritarian system. The KMT government's focus on controlling the press made it a key site of political resistance. From the 1970s, several dissident magazines emerged from the Tangwai movement including *Formosa Magazine* 美麗島雜誌 and *The Eighties* 八十年代. It was *Formosa Magazine* employees who, in 1979, staged a pro-democracy rally that became known as the Kaohsiung Incident. The ensuing trials and imprisonments of the events' leadership are a founding narrative for the DPP. Many key DPP figures, including one-time vice President Annette Lu 呂秀蓮 and Chen Shui-bian emerged from the Kaohsiung Incident to become synonymous with opposition to the KMT in the 1970s

and 1980s. The lifting of the *Baojin* in 1988 and the liberalisation of the Taiwanese press closely followed the end of martial law in 1987.

Since the liberalisation in the 1990s and 2000s Taiwan's marketised media landscape has become vibrant and competitive. At the time of the CNS deal, Taiwan was home to around 2500 newspaper publications, 281 satellite television channels, and the highest density of satellite newsgathering in the world (Freedom House 2012). While the media is now nominally free from government control, dominant publications of the martial law era laid the basis for what became Taiwan's partisan politics. As described by Patricia Batto, publications like the *China Times* and *United Daily News* remain supportive of the KMT and pro-unification. In contrast, market segmentation meant that the Liberty Times Group 自由時報團體 positions itself as pro-Taiwanese independence and supportive of the DPP (Batto 2004, 6-7). Indeed, in discussions over the CNS deal and meaning of a 'free press' itself, coverage was divided along partisan lines. Pan-green and anti-KMT outlets published editorials criticising Want Want or warning against the merger (Tso 2011; *Liberty Times* 2012; *Apple Daily* 2012a; Jang 2011), while pan-blue and Want Want owned companies argued in favour (*China Post* 2011; *China Post* 2012; *China Times* 2012).

Thus, in the context of the press in Taiwan, the market has helped to solidify the enduring influence of the KMT's history of totalitarian rule and complicated the media's role in democracy. The Want Want takeover deal represented not only the consolidation of the media market as a threat to the 'free press', but a potential advantage for one side of politics. It revealed the entrenchment of partisanship in Taiwan's politics and the media as a fundamental division around which other issues circulate; the very idea of a liberal press was intertwined with opposition to the KMT's history of one-party rule. As a result, even as those who opposed the deal promoted media diversity, their campaign was divisive and targeted, positioned against

the KMT's authoritarian legacy. This division was further magnified by the ever-changing dynamics of cross-strait relations.

The CNS deal as identity politics

Opposition to Tsai Eng-meng's purchase of CNS in 2012 can also be understood a statement about national identity. The campaign against the deal equated the threat to media freedom with that to Taiwan's autonomy. As Professor Flora Chang 張錦華 of National Taiwan University complained, publications like the Want Want-owned *China Times* produced news in accordance with the CCP's strategy for annexing Taiwan. Chang argued that their news was:

> "All about how China's development is thriving… [and is] basically there to promote investment and to attract tourists…the sources cited are all from Chinese secretaries or provincial governors who are members of the Chinese Communist Party, and there are no other sources to balance the report… [The] orientation of Want Want can be linked to the basic principles of Chinese propaganda toward Taiwan — entering the country, entering the family, entering the mind and what is called the economic siege" (Flora Chang as quoted in Tso 2011).

Indeed, Tsai had actively positioned himself in favour of unification with China and openly used his business to push for this. At the time, the Want Want Group primarily operated from the mainland, with over 300 sales offices and a workforce of 50000, compared with just two offices and 6000 employees in Taiwan (Want Want China n.d.). In an interview with Andrew Higgins of the *Washington Post*, Tsai advocated unification, claiming that "whether you like it or not, unification is going to happen sooner or later… [And that he] really hopes…to see that" (Tsai Eng-meng, as quoted in Higgins 2012). In December 2008 Want Want's internal newsletter reported that Tsai had said the purchase of the China Times Group was "in order to use the power of the press to advance relations between China and Taiwan" (Enav 2012). After

Tsai's purchase of the China Times Group its publications increasingly portrayed China and Taiwan as a single political unit. The online version of the Want China Times publication has the tagline 'Knowing China through Taiwan' and is dominated by articles on the mainland and cross-strait relations. In November 2010 Control Yuan member Frank Wu 吳豐山 found that 69 of the over 300 reported incidents of Chinese authorities 'news buying' were in the *China Times*. The publication faced fines for presenting Chinese government paid advertisements as news, but nevertheless continued the practice (Tso 2011). For example, in 2012 the Chinese government paid for the extensive and positive coverage *China Times* gave to Fujian Province Governor Su Shulin's 蘇樹林 visit to Taiwan.

In the context of the political opposition to the CNS deal, maintaining a free press as a pillar of democracy was therefore tantamount to the issue of Taiwan's relationship with China. Experts and members of the media sought to simultaneously promote the press' role in Taiwan's democracy and stand against the growing influence of China on the island. They used the ideal of a 'free press' to capture anxiety around the economic strength of those who pushed for unification with the PRC and consequent ability to normalise the idea. Accordingly, these undertones of identity politics were also reflective of media personnel's conscious consideration for the interrelationship between ideas and reality in Taiwan's politics. The conflict over the CNS deal positioned the media and the language employed to discuss Taiwan as mechanisms for shaping the way Taiwan's national status was understood. Acknowledging this, the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement was also a campaign to produce a 'free' environment in which Taiwan's future could be openly discussed.

Partisan divisions over the meaning of a 'free press'

Yet, the principle of 'freedom' was also used to defend the deal, in a way that propelled the partisan split into divisions over the responsibilities of consumers and governments in neoliberal capitalist societies. For example, those in favour of the deal and members of the government argued that Taiwan had a relatively open media market. At an NCC public hearing in September 2011, academics like Professor Chuang Chuen-fa 莊春發 defended the merger, claiming that according to US antitrust law Want Want Group's media consolidation was low and no "cause for alarm" (*China Post* 2011). NCC Chairman Howard Shyr 石世豪 also supported the deal, citing revolutions in North Africa as evidence that a free internet meant media ownership was no longer an issue for society (Wang 2012). Supporters of the merger also suggested that citizens were responsible for the quality of the media. An editorial written for the pro-KMT English-language *China Post* argued that if there was bias in the media it adequately reflected public opinion. It also said that if readers "always look for excellent, complete, thorough, contextual news" (*China Post* 2013), then ownership of media outlets would be inconsequential.

The understanding of a 'free press' and how it should relate to government was central to the divided opinions on the Want China Times media acquisitions. In the context of this discourse, the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement was informed by a critique of economic neoliberalism and the domination of corporate power, appealing to the need for state regulation and democratic intervention in marketisation. In line with this perspective, opposition to the CNS deal also began to address the institutional failures of the regulatory processes for Taiwan's media. This approach would grow to become a general criticism of the KMT's attitude towards democratic procedure, and the need for legislative reform.

In September 2011, for example, Professor Jang Show-ling 鄭秀玲 argued that the NCC's public hearing on the deal was inadequate because interested parties like the Consumers' Foundation, National Security Bureau and the Consumer Protection Commission were absent. Additionally, she wrote:

> "The companies presented their complicated acquisition proposals for the first time at the hearing. Experts, academics and stakeholders had no chance to read the proposals beforehand, and consequently were not able to offer any kind of constructive, accurate assessment of the plans at the meeting" (Jang 2011).

By October 2011 three of the seven NCC review committee members had resigned from the case, after their pictures were published and integrity questioned in the *China Times*. Academic Shih Jun-ji 施俊吉 remarked that as a result the "committee is not competent to review this important case" (Lee 2011). The NCC continued with the review, however, and on 25 July announced an outcome they considered to be a compromise. They had concluded that the merger could go ahead, so long as the Want-China Times Group divested itself of CtiTV, CTV ceased to produce news and CTV established an independent editorial system. Even so, Academia Sinica research fellow, and later member of the Legislative Yuan, Huang Kuo-chang 黃國昌 led a small protest in response to the announcement. Not only were the conditions considered lenient, but there was also doubt the NCC would be stringent in upholding them. Later that day, a group of 200 university students appeared at the NCC to oppose the deal. From the day the results of the review were announced Tsai Eng-meng also refused to accept the decision, claiming that "the NCC cannot force rightful owners to sell their properties" (*China Post* 2012), and thus planned to complete the merger without fulfilling the NCC's conditions.

In this way, despite the complex entanglement of debates and ideas that underpinned conflict over the Want Want-CNS merger, opinion over the deal originally solidified along partisan divisions. The Anti-Media Monopoly Movement aligned itself against the forces of China's influence in Taiwan, including its economic strength. The early campaign against the deal was also largely contained to the media itself, as journalists and experts fought to establish the role of the press as a part of democracy. Against this backdrop, there was little indication that the movement would grow to be a mass-campaign and operate outside the dominant political trends in Taiwan.

Mobilising the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement

In the latter half of 2012 students became the driving force behind the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement. Their participation and modern political practice dramatically altered the identity, discourse and spatiality of the movement, as they laid the foundation for a globalised and provocative campaign. Having only initially mobilised in response to attacks on members of their community, however, they had no claim over a deep knowledge of the issues behind the CNS deal. This signalled how even as this group shaped civil society, their approach reflected a process of reaction, experimentation, and learning.

Repositioning the CNS deal as a part of 'student' politics

Following the NCC's decision, Tsai Eng-meng remained belligerent over his intensions to go ahead with the deal and began attacking the protesters who had criticised him. For example, between 26 and 29 July, the *China Times* and CtiTV produced several pieces which accused Huang Kuo-chang of having paid students who rallied outside the NCC on 25 July. The front-page of *Times Weekly* 時報周刊 read: "Huang Kuo-chang led anti-Want Want China Times protest and the demonstrators were paid. Who fronted the money?" (*Times Weekly* 2012). The

articles insinuated that Huang's impending trip to the US further proved his guilt.

At this time, Huang Kuo-chang was a legal scholar based at Academia Sinica. Huang was an expert in and advocate for judicial reform, believing that the legal system first used in the Republic of China in 1912, was out-dated and inadequate for contemporary Taiwan. This belief, along with Huang's anti-unification stance and criticism of the KMT's conduct, had inspired him to stage the protest outside the NCC on 25 July. As described by one interviewee:

> "Because of his legal expertise I think Huang Kuo-chang was particularly articulate on the issue, and so someone to be listened to... I did not attend that protest [on 25 July 2012]… but the thought that students would be paid to go is absurd. Students had already attended [other] protests" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 2 August, 2015).

Despite attempting to discredit Huang, the attacks conversely created an alliance amongst the civic groups, academics and student activists who defended him. On 27 July Huang held a press conference to establish that he was not connected to the student protestors. NTU law professor Jean Liu 劉靜怡 made a post on her Facebook page to clarify that Huang was accompanying her to America the following week "in the capacity of a Fulbright Senior Scholar, in order to do research" (J. Liu 2012). Online activists also got involved, uploading an image accusing *Times Weekly* deputy chief editor Lin Chao-xin 林朝鑫 of himself paying the student protests, which was published in the *Apple Daily* (*Apple Daily* 2012b). In response, on 30 July several Want Want owned media began attacking one of the users who had uploaded the image, National Tsing Hua University 國立清華大學 student Chen Wei-ting 陳為廷. Chen had been heavily involved in civil society since he had attended the Wild Strawberry Movement of 2008 as a high school student. After starting university, Chen became a member of the NTHU

Student Rights Team 國立清華大學學生議會 and promoted his causes online. Chen was the administrator of the community awareness Facebook page 'I live in Hsinchu City 我住新竹市', a moderator on the bulletin board system PTT, and regularly used his personal Facebook page, which had over 20000 followers, to campaign on a variety of civil liberty issues ranging from forced demolitions as part of urban development schemes to the pursuit of a 'nuclear free' Taiwan. In a CtiTV feature nearly twenty minutes long on 30 July, Lin Chao-xin argued that he only attended the protest because it was his job as a journalist and threatened to sue Chen Wei-ting as a way to "defend his reputation" (Chung T'ien Television 2012a). As part of the story, Chen explained that he was not the sole user to upload the image and was unaware of its origin. Yet the remainder of the report questioned Chen's integrity and proposed that he had falsified evidence.

Chen's response to these attacks, along with that of his peers, allowed students to become representatives of the campaign against media monopolies. When opposition to the CNS deal intersected with the 'student movement' tradition, the movement was repositioned as a righteous cause and demonstrative of the threat posed by Want Want media against innocent citizens. Young activists worked to solidify their role in the movement by creating a distinct student alliance. This can be understood both as a response to the status of youth in civil society and a way to frame and distinguish a previously informal network.

Specifically, over a number of days in early August, Chen Wei-ting staged a solitary protest outside the Ministry of Transportation and Communications 交通部, in central Taipei. Several media outlets interviewed Chen as he stood wearing a schoolbag, fuelling the depiction that he was defenceless and "merely a student 小小學生" (Chung T'ien Television 2012b). In his

statements to the press, however, Chen was firm in articulating that the behaviour of Want Want encapsulated the problem with Taiwan's media, saying:

> "The lawsuit [suing Chen for uploading the image] is not only against me, it's against all netizens, and Taiwanese civil society…What Lin and the media group have been doing these past few days just proves that our worries are not baseless" (Loa 2012a).

As such, Chen's plight was immediately connected to the tradition of 'student movements'. As previously described, this student identity was utilised for the first time by this generation of activists in the Wild Strawberry Movement, where it had provided legitimacy but only with limited success. Where in the earlier movement, young activists had built a campaign around the identity – directly replicating its lineage of practices, such as choosing to sit-in, introducing a demarcation line, and adopting it as an affective symbol – it was now partially referenced. For example, Chen's insistence that he was "merely a student" spoke to ideas of innocence and purity, while positioning his struggle as that of "Taiwanese civil society" alluded to the righteousness of student movements in their drive to improve the nation, rather than merely being seen as the chaotic result of individualistic desires. This gestures towards an awareness and engagement with the signifying meaning of the identity, without committing to mobilising the political practices of a 'student movement'.

Even so, students began to emerge as a coherent force in the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement by establishing their own civic group. This decision helped solidify the loose network of young protesters across Taiwan, while giving them a distinct voice within the campaign. Prior to the attacks on Chen, different campus groups had been following the CNS deal and its potential to create media monopolies. One interviewee described how it was the "one of the issues of [2012]… most likely because of Tsai Eng-meng's behaviour and stance on cross-strait relations" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 21 May, 2015). So far, and despite

growing momentum, few students had joined the groups leading opposition to the deal. This can in part be attributed to the previously described technical nature of the early stages of the campaign, as it unfolded within the media itself. At the same time as the preceding chapter revealed, this generation of young people had often felt disconnected from Taiwan's civil society and other groups' approaches to politics. They had consequently kept themselves separated in the Wild Strawberry Movement and were unlikely to join established NGOs. In discussing the problems with civil society, one interviewee described how young people had previously struggled to generate influence:

> "If you try to organise anything through, say a magazine or something, it is impossible…all those institutions, including the NGOs, are controlled by our seniors… [And you] can't have a say…if you try to organise something or you try to provide an idea, you are censored" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 4 January, 2015).

New forms of opposition to Want Want China

Within this context students now set about creating their own group to defend Chen Wei-ting and fight the CNS merger. To do so, they took advantage of the network that had emerged from the Wild Strawberry Movement and the resources provided by social media: after the 2008 protest had ended, students had sought to crystallise and develop their protesting experience by founding university-based campus activist groups. These groups, which spanned over 30 universities, had assisted each other on student advocacy, civil rights, and environmental issues. NTU graduate student Lin Fei-fan 林飛帆 was part of this community. He had been interested in coordinating a nation-wide youth alliance since he was an undergraduate student at National Cheng Kung University 國立成功大學 (NCKU), where he had helped found the 02 Activist Society 零貳社, before joining the Students Rights Team 學權小組 at NTU in 2010. As a close

friend of Chen's, Lin now drew on this network to form the Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters. It was organised via the Facebook page 'I am a student and I oppose Want Want China 我是學生，我反旺中' (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012a), and had the stated objective to "defend freedom of speech as a cornerstone of democracy, not exclusively for students, but a campaign for all the citizens of Taiwan" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012a).

As evident in the creation of the Youth Alliance, social media would be central to empowering the young activist community. A detailed account of the development of social media and its role in Taiwan's student politics is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is worth noting that key technologies and platforms that were nascent or not available in 2008 (at the time of the Wild Strawberry Movement) had achieved ubiquity by 2012. For example, since officially becoming available in Taiwan in 2009,[5] Facebook has become extremely popular, with over 90 percent of the population using the platform (Fulco 2017). During this period, smartphones also became common, with ownership in Taiwan increasing from around ten percent in 2009 to 50 percent in 2013 (E. Hsu 2014). While not inevitably leading to increased political mobilisation, these changes produced a new field for young activists to engage in. Since the 2008 Wild Strawberry Movement, students had primarily kept in contact and organised events through the bulletin board system PTT and Facebook. The Youth Alliance now used social media to strengthen and shape the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement. Here, the contours of social media, with their distinctive flow of individual and group interaction, use of text and images, and reconfiguration of geographic space, mobilised student activists in new ways. What might have previously been slogans or chants became 'memes' – inter-textual references in which the issues of the movement intersected with a wide range of political tropes, drawn

[5] Anecdotal evidence suggests Taiwanese university students were using Facebook as early as 2007, despite it only officially entering the Taiwanese market in 2009.

from different settings. This produced a fluid and impermanent form of politics, as activists developed their ideas and objectives, and created and experimented with new political subjectivities.

For example, early memes on the Youth Alliance Facebook page referenced George Orwell's *1984* and its phrase, 'Big Brother is Watching You 老大哥在看著你'. One included a picture of Tsai Eng-meng's face stencilled on a red background with the caption 'Yang-ming Tsai is WATCHING YOU' (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012b). Through this image, the students represented Tsai as the incarnation of an omnipresent system of oppression and the media as being inverted into a panopticon. What had once been the observed now became the observer. The media no longer existed as a tool for the benefit of society, but society existed to consume and benefit the media. A popular boycott would therefore not only send a message to Want Want, but also undermine the economic strength that made it threatening. To stage this boycott, the students drew upon local cultural practices and called on the public to 'Oppose Want Want China this 'Ghost Month 鬼月反旺中' – a Daoist festival in which offerings are made to the deceased – using the slogan when you "pray don't pay 拜拜不買" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012c). The meme quickly received over 900 'likes' as participants swore against buying Want Want products.

As such, the creation of the Youth Alliance revealed the reflexive and fluid approach taken by young activists in their engagement with civil society and the broader issue of media ownership. Their use of social media involved experimentation and a lively and evolving discussion, as their objectives unfolded, and they created community links that ran across the island. This shifting and adaptable form of politics can also be understood as an articulation of modernity against the hardened partisan divisions in earlier stages of the campaign and the way media

monopolies had previously been addressed. The Youth Alliance represented a flexible and unbounded approach to politics and engaged in a number of unstable discourses and political traditions. As the students aligned their efforts with journalists and academics, they helped shape the movement into a widespread campaign.

Forming a united movement

In the wake of the attacks on Huang Kuo-chang, opposition to Want Want grew within other circles. Motivations reflected a continued political commitment to a free press infused with moral imperatives. From this time, the Want Want leadership emerged as a clear adversary, and the need for regulatory reform pronounced. The movement mobilised in response, now a coherent effort supported by journalists, academics, civic groups, and the Youth Alliance.

On 28 July 2012 the Association of Taiwan Journalists became involved in the campaign, when they posted a statement on their Facebook page referring to the Huang incident. From their perspective: "Want Want *China Times*… [had] violated the profession and ethics of journalism by using skills in news manipulation to slander and discredit a scholar's character" (Association of Taiwan Journalists 2012). By 10 August, China Times Group employees also begun to turn against the company. Ho Rong-hsing 何榮幸, Chuang Pei-chang 莊佩璋, Yo Wan-chi 游婉琪, Yen Ji-yu 閻紀宇, Kao Yu-chih 高有智, and Huang Yi-ying 黃奕瀠, all *China Times* journalists or editors, had quit as a result of the incident. Three members of the CtiTV ethics committee Hu Yuanhui 胡元輝, Liu Yuli 劉幼俐 and Chi Hui-jung 紀惠容 felt they "failed to fulfil the responsibilities that were entrusted to them" (Shan 2012b), and closely followed in resigning. Yo, who had reported on the Huang incident, had been "shocked when the final version of the article came out… [because three paragraphs had been added that were] all

criticisms of Huang" (Loa 2012b). She left *China Times* because she could not "trust the management of the newspaper anymore" (Loa 2012b).

The first stage of the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement culminated in an official complaint against Want Want made to the NCC on 14 August. The petition, a 'Report against CtiTV for their violations of television broadcasting law' called upon the NCC to investigate whether CtiTV had violated media regulations by publishing accusations against Huang without evidence. The petition cited articles one, seventeen, nine and 29 of broadcasting law which included 'safeguarding public viewing rights and benefits', 'not impairing public order or good and honest social custom', and conditions that 'relate to running operations within guidelines' (L. Liu 2012). The group argued that the resignation of several members of the CtiTV ethics committee was evidence that the self-disciplinary mechanism in the institution had collapsed and indicative of the need for the NCC to intervene. Despite these factors, the NCC maintained that they could not start an investigation because no concrete evidence of wrongdoing had been provided (Shan 2012c).

Through drafting and presenting this petition, however, the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement became visible as a distinct campaign. Its mobilisation involved an incidental and responsive process from which point young activists in particular, developed their understanding of the central issues. The presence of the Youth Alliance also began to reposition the movement as it intersected with the student activist tradition, online engagement, and their attempts to distinguish themselves from other parts of civil society. These aspects would continue to drive the movement as it developed into a mass campaign.

Students at the Forefront of the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement

Throughout 2012 the Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters' reflexive political approach

expanded and shaped the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement. Finding traditional channels closed or dominated by partisan politics, they took to social media and drew on specific narratives to deliver their message and appeal to other youth. In comparison to the initial stage of the movement, this new approach mobilised a significant support base and led to the successful organisation of an unprecedented media themed rally. This reflected the ability of young activists to navigate Taiwan's socio-political environment in their search for political space.

Manoeuvring through divisive politics

Following the failure of the petition to the NCC, the newly formed coalition of groups sought to maintain momentum against Want Want. To do so, they resolved to hold a march on 1 September, leaving from the *China Times* headquarters in the district of Wanhua to the NCC on Ren'ai Road. The Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters took charge of organising the event through a Facebook page entitled 'You're very big but I'm not afraid – Anti-Media Monopoly 901 Demonstration你好大 我不怕 - 反媒體壟斷901大遊行', which had the Chinese Character for 'Big' replaced with the Want Want logo. It would call for "media professionalism, an apology from Want Want China, an NCC investigation and opposition to media monopolies" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012d). They would demand that the NCC be more stringent in their monitoring of the media and willing to penalise operators when regulations are breached, make transparent information and statistics on shareholder ownership of media, and "immediately draft a general law on media monopolies" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012d).

In the lead up to the 1 September rally, the editorial lines on the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement were clearly split between competing media outlets. Divisive identity politics

dominated coverage of the movement, distracting from the various discussions and complex criticisms associated with the deal. Publications that formed the pan-green side of Taiwan's media environment were supportive of the movement. For example, the Liberty Times Group published several articles that detailed the unfair treatment of individuals by the Want China Times media, several of which included a link to the 901 Facebook page (Hu, Huang, and Liu 2012). Others, in particular those of Next Media used the opportunity to gain an advantage over their competitors. Next Media is a Hong Kong based company, at the time owned and operated by Jimmy Lai 黎智英, and renowned for its publications' politically non-aligned, tabloid style journalism. In July 2012, Next Media's *Apple Daily* had published the photo accusing Lin Chao-xin of paying student protesters. Throughout August they had run articles detailing the weakness and bias in Want Want's reporting. For example, one article focused on how in response to 31 July student rally, CtiTV had dedicated an hour to "allowing *China Times* chief editor Zhang Jingwei to defend Want Want China" (*Apple Daily* 2012c), while four of the seven major news channels had not covered the incident at all. The participants in the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement considered this evidence of China Times Group's attempts to undermine their cause. Enmity increased when Want Want apologised to Professor Huang Kuo-chang on 29 August. In a small article on the *China Times* website Want Want admitted that: "Academia Sinica professor Huang Kuo-chang was not involved [in paying the students at the July 25 rally]" (China Times New Staff 2012). They also said, however, that in response to *Apple Daily's* insinuation that *Times Weekly* deputy chief editor Lin Chao-xin had been involved in paying the students, Want Want "expresse[d] the most grave protest and [would] continue to investigate" (China Times News Staff 2012). Next Media defended their coverage and argued that with the impending 1 September march, Want Want was trying to divert attention away from their company (NTV News 2012). *Apple Daily* was consequently accused of using the movement to damage the reputation of the China Times Group.

This level of mainstream media attention exposed the student protesters to the risk of becoming an instrument for media outlets to discredit one another. With limited resources, the Youth Alliance used social media to circumvent the mainstream media and articulate their own understanding of the movement's significance. As one participant, Charo Wu, expressed on Facebook on 17 August:

> "There are many people who say we students have been used by Next Media [to pursue media competition and divisive politics] … Yet the whole issue is not that you should choose a side, choose between Next Media and Want Want China, choose right or wrong, choose blue or green. Rather, regarding the issue of media monopolies, what do you think?" (Wu 2012).

The Youth Alliance's self-reflexive engagement with the broader questions of the purpose of the media in a democracy progressively propelled the movement towards a central concern of strengthening democracy in Taiwan and positioned themselves as part of a tradition of media protests that helped shape civil society. In doing so, young activists made direct references to past protests that were not only concerned with media freedom but also unaligned with either the KMT or DPP. This continued interaction with the traditions and discourse circulating in Taiwan's socio-political environment mirrored the group's use of the 'student movement' identity of the Wild Strawberry Movement. It allowed the young activists to engage with new political subjectivities and ways of inserting themselves into and shaping the narrative of Taiwan's democratisation. One banner on the 901 Facebook page included a picture from a protest that had occurred on 1 September 1994, for 'liberty of the press'. It was referred to on 17 August as an: "'Independent Event' from eighteen years ago [and] the last time we remember harmoniously calling upon all walks of life to take to the streets" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012e). The post emphasised that:

> "It would be satirical to suggest that there has been a market place of freedom of expression and freedom of the press in Taiwan in these 25 years since the lifting of martial law…we believe that if you don't have an independent news media, it's then hard to consolidate and strengthen democracy…it is our responsibility to supervise the authorities and prevent the abuse of power" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012e).

This approach revealed how the Youth Alliance engaged with the structures of partisan politics and the history of protests embedded in Taiwan, strategically utilising the narrative of rallies for 'freedom of the press' so as to subvert competing media outlets' co-option of the movement. Through this expression of reflexivity, young activists developed and articulated a vantage point from which to engage with the issue of media monopolies, as they would also do to appeal to other young people.

Overcoming political disengagement

At the time of the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement, few young people in Taiwan had achieved political results through their protest. The Wild Strawberry Movement of 2008 had been the first movement led by their generation and had ended with a sense of defeat amongst participants. They were also disconnected from the lineage of social movements for a 'free press', having been too young to participate in the last mass rally over the issue in 1994. In the lead up to the 901 march the Youth Alliance recognised and navigated this element in the way they sought to mobilise their peers. For example, one image posted on the Facebook page humorously acknowledged the inexperience of many young people in protesting. It read: "So how long since you've moved (campaigned)? 你多久沒運動了呢?", making a pun of the verb to 'move 運動 *yundong*' which is the same as in 'social movement 社會運動 *shehui yundong'*.

The post went on to sympathetically make light of the reasons people might be hesitant to join, such as: "(Having) sat in your office too long… [and] only [having] seen your classmates since starting school" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012f). It ended with what can be understood as a facetious promise to "fulfil all your hopes and desires… [when they took] to the streets in protest together on September 1st" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012f), while also offering solidarity.

This light-hearted intervention in the lack of civic participation by the young generation in Taiwan can therefore be understood as an attempt to create a political identity based around a common desire to get out of their comfort zones. Rather than detailing the issue of media monopolies itself, the post focused on "taking to the streets" as a personally transformative and fulfilling act able to overcome the drudgery of daily life. In framing protesting as a uniquely compelling shared experience, the post was also imbued with a sense of young peoples' inherent but unrealised political participation, as if to suggest that civic action was a duty of which they had to be reminded.

To complement this positioning, the Youth Alliance also began a campaign on their Facebook page to make protesting accessible, inviting people who had only recently become activists to send in photos supporting the movement. This included young journalists, media personalities like Chen Li-qi 陳力七, students and 'ordinary people' such as coffee shop owner Wu Lian-meng 吳連銘. As with the daily meme that featured a different character and the words "On 1 September come protest with me 9/1 陪我去遊行" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012g), these images sought to create solidarity amongst a group who were not experienced campaigners. They were suggestive of an inclusive and informal approach to politics and a point of contrast from the specialised and divisive aspects previously displayed in the Anti-

Media Monopoly Movement. Young activists had elsewhere criticised and sought to distinguish themselves from more established parts of civil society, who they did not feel represented their generation. As one interviewee described:

> "Our [activities] on Facebook were mostly a way to have fun… to show [young] people that protesting wasn't something just for 'deep green old independence activists' or KMT stooges. We tried to use language and symbols that we would use normally [in everyday life]… that would connect with young people" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 2 August, 2015).

At the same time, the political style adopted on social media was distinct from the problematic connotations of the 'student movement' identity encountered in the Wild Strawberry Movement. There, activists had been frustrated with the elitism embedded in the identity as it was inconsistent with the egalitarian views they had started to develop. Although appearing as part of the intellectual classes had given them legitimacy, the students now referenced this identity selectively. Their use of social media in the lead up to the 901 march reflected an explicit contrast to this tradition and attempt to redefine the role of young people in civil society.

In shaping their political style, the Youth Alliance also distanced themselves from the repetitive partisan conflicts and heightened emotion that has dominated parliamentary politics. On 30 August 2012 representatives from the movement visited KMT, DPP, TSU and the PFP politicians to confirm that anti-media monopoly legislation had universal approval. Political propaganda including banners and merchandise was also banned at the event to reiterate its neutrality. On the same basis, students also asserted their 'rational' and well-organised approach to political participation. This ideal had also informed their behaviour in the Wild Strawberry Movement but was elevated and formalised in the guidelines that they released for the rally. In the lead up to the march, posts were made advertising the itinerary, route map and

weather forecast, and included a checklist of useful items as a way to ensure that participants would be prepared and the action efficient. In addition, seven "901 Anti-Media Monopoly rally items of consideration 901 反媒體壟斷大遊行注意事項", were provided. Item one read:

> "This rally will fundamentally involve a peaceful gathering and a rational expression of opinion. March attendees please always follow the instructions of the leaders and inform a staff member if a spontaneous outburst of emotion seems to be occurring" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012h).

The political style young activists expressed in protests and marches would continue to be restrained and orderly. Aside from avoiding disturbances through the introduction of personnel responsible for crowd management and security, signs and matching headbands were often distributed in the campaign's colours that were notably never blue or green. I would argue that this use of distinct imagery served to instantly generate unity amongst group of relative strangers, creating a shared identity and image of a coherent action. As with the prevention of emotional displays, this symbolism and practice also placed students' efforts outside the normal parameters of Taiwan's socio-political structure and the dominance of the partisan divide.

In the case of the 1 September march, an estimated 9000 people assembled holding signs or wearing headbands with a yellow background emblazoned with the words 'You're Very Big, But I'm Not Afraid 你好大 我不怕' printed across. This crowd represented a record number of participants in the history of media themed demonstrations in Taiwan and was the largest ever politically unaligned rally to have taken place. Although it was too soon to determine the impact of the rally, Want Want China Times Group took notice. In response, they hung a banner on their headquarters and published a full-page advertisement in the *China Times* defending their actions. The headline read: "Who's big? Who's scary? 誰好大？誰可怕?" (*Apple Daily*

2012d). It argued that their "news reporting has always been professional and can be scrutinized" (*Apple Daily* 2012d) but went on to accuse *Apply Daily* of being the "media monster" for criticising *China Times*. To the students, the protest represented a successful display of their political voice. Not only had their engagement produced the slogans and style of practice adopted in the march but young people also made up over half of all attendees. Their efforts were celebrated in a post on 6 September that read:

> "The 4,500 who marched on the streets succeeded the Wild Lily Movement…and in doing so erased society's bad impression of young people often connected with the 'Strawberry Tribe' stereotype… [The Youth Alliance] participated with zeal, using the internet to display creativity and to discuss and formulate a movement with serious demands" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012i).

The 901 march therefore allowed young activists to establish themselves in civil society even as they continued to negotiate the meaning of student participation in politics. They demonstrated an ongoing self-reflexive relationship with the tradition of student movements, selectively making reference to the Wild Lily Movement but omitting the Wild Strawberry Movement. Their use of social media and political practice reflected the conscious pursuit of a form of politics distinct to that of older generations and the emotion and divisiveness of partisanship. Through these platforms and an effervescent self-awareness, they mobilised others and developed a stance on the issue of media monopolisation.

Restrictions and Obstacles for the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement

Following the 1 September protest the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement was given renewed urgency by another significant media take-over deal. With consequences for the conditions of workers, the proposed acquisition shifted the movement's focus to include concern for

industrial relations in the media business. This element was soon overshadowed, however, by partisanship and conflict over how students should conduct themselves in politics. In order to navigate this environment young activists had to balance direct action with their intention to engage in the legislative process.

New concerns and tactics in the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement

On 18 October, the owners of Next Media, including Jimmy Lai, announced that four of its outlets would be sold. At the time, Lai's sale to a consortium headed by Chinatrust Charity Foundation chairman Jeffrey Koo Jr 辜仲諒 was made with the guarantee that the "deal was not with Tsai Eng-meng" (*Apple Daily* 2012e). By early November, however, it became clear that Tsai was an invisible investor. Tsai began to attend meetings concerning the sale and claimed to be "the one who put up the most money" (Liu, Chen, and Pan 2012), for the deal. As *Apple Daily* commanded nearly 30 percent of Taiwan's market, the deal could result in Tsai having control of half of Taiwan's news media by market share. By 19 November labour unions covering the employees of Next Media publicly requested transparency over the sale because they were concerned by Tsai's reputation for editorial interference. They urged "prospective buyers to start negotiations with the unions immediately and sign agreements that ensure editorial freedom and independence" (Central News Agency 2012). When given no response, the Apple Daily Employee Union 蘋果日報工會 staged a sit in at the *Apple Daily* headquarters on the night of 26 November. Four Next Media labour unions issued public statements the following day that called interference in news reporting a 'disgrace to society'.

This encounter with the predicament of labour unions was an early indication that they would become a significant source of grievances in Taiwan's civil society. In early 2018, amid the introduction of new industrial relations laws, the issue of workers' rights dominated protests

(Hioe 2018a). However, having been banned under martial law and then emerging from ad-hoc company-based groups (Lee 2004, 72-80), labour unions have struggled to cooperate or form a united movement. Instead of representing workers from a left-wing basis as they do in the West, labour unions have therefore been interpreted as one aspect of democratisation (Ho 2006, 109). They have not typically been the main voice for their own cause, having been supported by minor parties, civic groups, and NGOs. This representation has in turn further undermined the emergence of a strong labour-based political position as the issue is often incorporated into other campaigns. Indeed, in the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement students became prominent advocates for the Next Media unions. The unions' demands fit comfortably with the critique of neoliberal economics already embedded in the campaign and helped legitimise the Youth Alliance's position against the greed of corporations and as advocates for exploited workers. Yet as the group's tactics began to escalate, the class connotations of their relationship with the unions was obscured by debates over the appropriate role of youth in politics.

Using direct action to undermine the government's authority

From mid-November 2012 the Youth Alliance used its Facebook pages to denounce the Next Media deal. Its criticisms reflected a lack of confidence in the authorities and the willingness of the NCC to uphold the law. In line with this perspective, the young activists' political style became more direct as they attempted to intervene in and undermine the power of government operations. This approach led to several clashes with police, arrests, and injuries.

As the signing of the Next Media deal approached, the Youth Alliance planned a sit in at the Executive Yuan on Zhongxiao East Road 忠孝東路 in Taipei. Conditions in the deal had been made public, which stipulated a guarantee that media equity shares not exceed twenty percent.

Now the students would make sure "the authorities did every final check" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012j), to uphold this promise. They also wrote a petition demanding that the government:

> "Immediately rigorously examine the [Next Media] acquisition case…enact anti-media monopoly legislation…declare their position on the 'China Issue'… [and] support the Next Media labour unions to protect news independence" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012j).

The students assembled outside the Executive Yuan on the afternoon of 26 November in order to present the document to Premier Sean Chen 陳冲. After "waiting in heavy rain for nearly three hours" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012k), however, Premier Chen failed to respond to their request. The students therefore invited everyone to join them outside the Executive Yuan for an "overnight vigil for Taiwan's democracy" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012k). Early on the morning of 27 November more posts were made reiterating that students continued to sit quietly in front of the Executive Yuan despite having been confronted by riot police three times. During the day, the government delivered its official response to the protesters. It argued that although they understood the students' demands any interference in the Next Media deal would be "a step backward for democracy" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012l). Becoming aggravated, a small group of students tried to occupy the Executive Yuan shortly after midday but failed to do so. After one student was arrested and another sent to hospital after they were "trampled by police" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012l), the protesters disbanded. The students resumed their protest on 28 November when the sale of Next Media was to be finalised. At this point, unless the Fair-Trade Commission stopped the deal, Tsai would take control of 32 percent of Next Media's print business. In response, the students organised an "11/29 Anti-Media Monster,

once more fight for fairness assembly" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012m), outside the Fair-Trade Commission. Protesters, who had come from all over the country, once again clashed with riot police.

Accordingly, the adoption of traditional physical or embodied forms of protest by young activists can be understood as a reaction to the government's lack of acknowledgement for their concerns. When contrasted with the earlier focus on rationality and order, however, it also suggested a diverging political style from within the community. At this time, the Youth Alliance strategically retreated from this more direct approach. As detailed in chapter 6, tensions over how best to conduct politics would later cause a split in the Sunflower Movement.

Discursive devices used to dismiss the movement

As the movement intensified young protesters were exposed to criticism. Government officials and pan-blue media increasingly portrayed students as disobedient children, attempting to exclude them from politics by exercising patriarchal authority. However, the primary effect of this technique was to increase animosity and solidify opposition to the government's actions. It also, however, highlighted the continued issue of self-representation for the Youth Alliance and tensions from within the movement over how politics should be conducted.

The first signs that the activities of the Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters had gained the attention of government authorities emerged towards the end of November 2012. On 30 November, an email from Taiwan's Ministry for Education was leaked, claiming that the "head of the Ministry is worried about the health of the students" (Turton 2012*)*, who had been participating in demonstrations in bad weather. They called on: "Universities to increase understanding and concern for the students [and to] examine and add to a register the students who had participated in the Next Media activity" (Turton 2012*)*. The students responded with

frustration and anger. They interpreted the actions of the Minister as indicative of a lack of respect and tolerance for their political participation, and a return to authoritarian-style politics. The reference to being "deeply concerned 關切" by the state of their health was seen as "a warning against students participating in student movements" (Loa 2012c). School authorities had also attempted to inhibit Wild Strawberry Movement of 2008 and had used a similar discourse to quash student resistance against KMT authoritarian rule in the last years of martial law (Wright 1999, 1002). In response, young activists across the island spoke out in support of the Youth Alliance. Students such as Chang Fu-shun 張復舜 described how in their own experience "the term 'concern' is often associated with threats and attempts by schools to bar students from taking part in demonstrations" (Loa 2012d). To demonstrate their anger the Youth Alliance started a Facebook campaign called: "Tell the Minister we are very healthy, but the nation is sick" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012n). Students had the opportunity to confront the KMT directly when they were invited by DPP legislators to speak at the Legislative Yuan's Education and Culture Committee 立法院教育及文化委員會 on 3 December. At the meeting, the Minister for Education Chiang Wei-ling 蔣偉寧 argued that he did not have "the slightest intention of monitoring students… [and that] with empathy toward the students ... the ministry will review the methods of expressing concern" (Lee 2012). Unconvinced, Lin Fei-fan claimed that if the Minister was really 'concerned' he could have approached the students who were waiting in the pouring rain or contacted the Premier on their behalf. Chen Wei-ting called the Minister "a liar…hypocritical…unknowing of remorse… [and] unqualified" (Lee 2012).

Chen now came under attack for being 'rude' and demonstrating that political participation by young people was problematic. In the criticism that followed Chen's actions were used to

discredit the movement and blame its shortfalls on the DPP. The first reproach came from NTHU where Chen was a student. In the days following the committee meeting, the school released a statement criticising Chen for being disrespectful on the basis that: "Freedom does not represent and allow oneself to behave unscrupulously, especially when it is in relation to an opinion leader" (Lin 2012). Pan-blue publications like the *China Times* questioned Chen's "manners 禮貌" and claimed that his behaviour was "representative of the idea of the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement" (Lin 2012). The *United Daily News* devoted a front page article to calling the student 'ill-mannered 沒禮貌' and saying: "The college students who attended the committee meeting acted like 'DPP legislators' because the words and gestures they used were almost the same" (United Daily News 2012). The students seemed to be unable to "exercise freedom… [in that] the students' behaviour sacrificed their freedom as intellectuals and almost made them parrots" (United Daily News 2012).

In keeping with the KMT's own approach, the arguments against Chen's behaviour can be understood as a strategy to police appropriate behaviour and legitimate political conduct. As with the Wild Strawberry Movement, the government and its supporters attempted to dismiss the views of young protesters by suggesting that they did not have the right to hold them in the first place. This view was further emphasised by defining the movement as a part of divisive politics and equating young protesters with the DPP.

At the same time, the response by the government and their supporters strengthened solidarity amongst protesters, as several actions were taken to defend Chen. On 6 December NTHU professors launched a petition to criticise the university administration for apologising and their hypocrisy in not "showing concern" for the students when the riot police had been called (Hung and Huang 2012). Civil rights groups including Taiwan Democracy Watch 臺灣守護民主平

台 (TDW) and the Taiwan Association for Human Rights 台灣人權促進會 initiated a campaign called “Instead of Reprimanding Students, Let’s Protect Democracy” (Hung and Huang 2012). A rally at NTHU on 5 December was organised by students to “lament the death of the Tsing Hua University spirit” (Hung and Huang 2012), as a criticism against the school’s lack of support for social movements.

While advocating for Chen these types of demonstrations also reflected the continued struggle of young people in establishing a legitimate place in Taiwan’s political landscape. They suggested that in order to be heard, young people had to act within the parameters of prescribed behaviour or at least have older representatives speak on their behalf. Accordingly, this revealed that the power of political identities and traditions was not inherent but imbued with meaning through the way they were negotiated by the student activists.

Within this context, the Youth Alliance mediated their behaviour and conceded their right to define their political subjectivities. At a rally on 7 December under the guidance of the President of NTHU, Chen publicly apologised to Minister Chiang and called for focus to return to political issues. He apologised for his actions having caused offence and taken up attention, and called for everyone to: “stop arguing about the issue of attitude… [and focus on] media monopoly…Chinese intervention in our freedom of the press… [and] bottom line freedom of the media” (Loa 2012d).

Overall, this period demonstrated the difficulty faced by young activists in navigating Taiwan’s political climate and keeping focus on the issues they were campaigning over. Staging protests that were perceived as ‘polite’ had previously been used by young activists as a way to distinguish their community, but also proved necessary for them to avoid being invalidated. As such, these interactions revealed students’ reflexive awareness of and ability to adapt their

tactics to maintain political space. In the process, however, they tempered and obscured more radical practices and criticisms of the government, present within their community.

Repositioning the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement

The Anti-Media Monopoly Movement continued to unfold around young activists' reflexive search for support and the platforms on which they could express their ideas. Recognising the constraints upon them in Taiwan's domestic political landscape, the Youth Alliances strategically expanded their field to a global one, using the social media strategies they had already developed. At the same time, they invested in a grassroots, localised approach to promote the movement, focusing on communities outside the political centre of Taipei. In doing so, they created new opportunities for engagement and sites of meaning, reterritorialising the issue of media ownership.

Globalising the movement

Facing obstacles within Taiwan's politics, through the effective use of social media the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement was given an international dimension. From late November 2012 Ling Tzung-kuei 凌宗魁 began to use his *What's Next?* Facebook page to promote the cause. Originally developed as a site for discussing Taiwan's future, Ling suggested that overseas-based Taiwanese students upload a picture of themselves holding a sign that read: 'Oppose Media Monopoly, Reject the black hand of China, uphold freedom of the press, I protect Taiwan in ___ 反對媒體壟斷、拒絕中國黑手、捍衛新聞自由、我在___守護台灣' (Ling 2012), with a blank space left for the participant to add their location. Within a few days, several hundred images had been uploaded from places as diverse as Tiananmen Square, Dusseldorf, Cambridge (UK) and Texas (US). Over time, non-Taiwanese students and prominent figures also contributed. One group of students from Manchester declared that they "care about things

that are now happening in Taiwan!" (What's Next 2012). Controversial Beijing artist Ai Weiwei 艾未未, emeritus professor and long-time scholar of Taiwan Bruce Jacobs, and American public intellectual Noam Chomsky, also contributed in this protest practice over the first week in January 2013.

This use of a transnational cyber network in the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement is consistent with studies of digital technologies and social movements. Academics from within this field have argued that social media could create egalitarian and accessible sites of communication, where disconnected and underrepresented individuals find solidarity and community (Van de Donk et al., 2004; Keane 2009; Mason 2012; Shirky 2008). In the 2000s, at the time they were first studied, it was also theorised that new technologies could challenge the mainstream media's role as a primary sources of knowledge, theoretically opening and democratising control of the news (Van de Donk et al., 2004; Keane 2009; Mason 2012; Shirky 2008). As with the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement, through the use of social media disenfranchised groups in places such as Egypt and the Ukraine (Mason 2012) reached a new, global audience seemingly unrestricted by the same contentious confines as their local politics.

The Anti-Media Monopoly Movement also mirrored other contemporary social movements, including those mobilised through social media, in its critique of neoliberal capitalism. In line with Paul Mason's (2012) argument that failure in the global economic system is the ultimate cause of contemporary unrest, the Youth Alliance began to articulate their demands in terms of the negative influence of free market economics on the media. To do so, they explored ideas such as those of Harvard Political Philosophy Professor Michael Sandel, who had addressed the students at NTU on 13 December, adopting his claim that in a healthy democracy "there are some types of things and activities that ought not to be dominated by the logic of the marketplace, including education and the media" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters

2012o). The students increasingly formulated their actions using this rhetoric. For example, in the lead up to New Year they posted a statement that read:

> "If you only view the issue of media monopolisation through the logic of market distribution, you will never be able to break away from the powerful, who through capital monopolise and cast a shadow on public opinion" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012p).

In conjunction with these types of arguments, the students progressively used symbols that presented the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement as a global political action. From July 2012 the students had made use of the iconic Guy Fawkes mask taken from the original comic and its movie adaptation *V for Vendetta* (2005), which has been identified with protests against capitalism and corporate greed. The mask is the symbol of the anti-transnational corporation 'hacktivist' group, *Anonymous*, and featured prominently in the 'Occupy' initiatives, and other social movements identified by Mason (Mason 2012, 603-695). Throughout December the students promoted the international context of the movement by producing numerous memes that represented different 'anti-monopoly stories' from around the world. They also began the task of collaging the thousands of pictures of support that had been sent in.

In combination, these actions revealed how the students' ideas around the issue of press freedom developed in response to a contentious domestic political climate. Through a strategic interaction with trends in global politics, they positioned their campaign outside the normal parameters of Taiwan's partisan environment. Where in the past they had identified with Taiwan's lineage of protest, here they formed new, globally relevant and internationally networked political subjectivities. Their campaign and experience of politics were given virtual dimensions, theoretically unconfined by traditional political boundaries.

Further reflecting young activists' global engagement, the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement began to achieve international recognition at the end of 2012. Around this time Want China Times had made their final application for the purchase of CNS. The Tsai family had placed 75 percent of their CtiTV shares in the Industrial Bank of Taiwan 台灣工業銀行 so as to disassociate with the television station. The NCC was as yet to determine if placing shares in a third-party trust fund removed Want Want's control of CtiTV. Recognising that the CNS deal still hung in the balance, the Youth Alliance planned a 'party to oppose media monsters at Liberty Square' (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012p), over New Year's Eve. In line with their new outlook, the event sought to criticise President Ma's unwillingness to address market failure in Taiwan's media environment. The students called on the president to recognise that:

> "The marketplace should not interfere with the media's value in serving society… [and that] if you do not resolve the problem of capital monopolization of the media, then you create a [system] that benefits the powerful' (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2012p).

On the evening of 31 December, a crowd of nearly 1000 people, predominantly students, gathered in Liberty Square for the event. During the night, the protesters relocated outside the Presidential Office where they were met by lines of riot police. Powerful images of young activists sitting quietly in front of the well-armed police were immediately circulated around the internet and used to report on the movement. This included several prominent international publications, like the *New York Times' International Herald Tribune,* which praised students for their intelligence, innovation, and demonstrated commitment to their cause (Tatlow 2013). Coverage of the event also encapsulated the complex interaction between traditional and new media sites within the context of Taiwan's politics. For example, the indie-pop band

Sodagreen's 蘇打綠 lead singer Wu Ching-feng 吳青峰 promoted the event at a major New Year's Eve concert (Wang 2013a), televised on the free-to-air channel CTV. Footage of Wu's comments in support of the protest was removed from the broadcast, only to then go viral on social media (Wang 2013a). In this way, blatant censorship of the movement's defenders helped to justify its existence and fuelled anger against the government.

Reporting on the New Year's protest against media monopolisation therefore signalled that young activists had achieved international recognition, with the movement now operating outside the confines of Taiwan's domestic political environment. Within the context of this positioning, the government's efforts to suppress the campaign became opportunities for bolstering support, fuelling the narrative of the movement's righteousness and commitment to combatting media monopolies.

Searching for new locations of power in Taiwan's politics

The futures of the Want Want deals still uncertain, throughout early 2013 young activists continued to promote their cause. They complemented their use of social media with a search for domestic support outside the political centre of Taipei. To do so, they strategically drew on 'localised' political cultures, designed to enhance their legitimacy and make the movement more accessible. This was also indicative of their conscious engagement with a breadth of Taiwan's political traditions.

Over the course of the New Year demonstration the students had made a 'Pact to allow the blossoming of the movement to produce Anti-Media Monopoly reform' (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2013a), for which they toured the island between 19 January and 1 February. The 'Action to Travel Together to the Ends of the Earth in One Vehicle 一車走天涯串連行動' reflected a determination to expand the scope of their operation, both

geographically and in appeal to different parts of Taiwanese society. In a short film made about the tour the students were presented as using political practices that drew from the protest culture of rural and Southern Taiwan. For example, the students were shown sitting in open-aired trucks singing songs in Taiwanese 臺灣話 (also known as Tai-yu, Hokkien, and Taiwanese Min Nan 臺灣閩南語), which they also used to deliver speeches.

In addition to being dominant in the island's south the use of Taiwanese in place of Mandarin is highly symbolic in Taiwan's language politics. Taiwanese was restricted under both Japanese colonial rule and martial law (Hsiau 1997, 305-309), thereafter becoming a core signifier in the independence movement and representative of a distinctive Taiwanese identity (Shih 2003; Hsiau 1997, 309-312). The Youth Alliance's clear evocation of this lineage aligned their protest with political trends in Taiwan's south and gestured towards an understanding of the Taiwanese people as a victimised society. Their cause was not directly articulated as an issue of national independence but found meaning in the political cultures and communities that pursued this goal.

During their trip, members of the Youth Alliance also assembled in public spaces that constitute a significant part of quotidian life in rural areas, including night markets and Daoist temples. The students utilised the large crowds and tradition of soapboxing in these areas to engage an audience in the issue of press freedom and the threat of Want Want's consolidation of media outlets (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2013a). Similarly, activists used the opportunity to consult a variety of groups across the island and learn about their specific local concerns. This approach was reminiscent of presidential candidates, who are known to tour the island and employ varying levels of Taiwanese when appealing to rural communities (Wong 2004).

Although seemingly contradictory, the Youth Alliance's initiatives to simultaneously globalise and localise their campaign both acted to find new sources of support for the movement outside Taiwan's partisan system and their own uneasy connection to the student movement tradition. Their engagement with online platforms and local Taiwanese political traditions exposed the complexity of their political subjectivities and the dynamics of their reflexive engagement. On a practical level, the students' actions helped to expand the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement and develop the Youth Alliance's political legitimacy. They established and balanced globally relevant ideas and practices against finding local nuance and authenticity

Success and Compromise in the Conclusion of the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement

Throughout 2012 the issue of media monopolies had been propelled to the forefront of public discussion in Taiwan. Now moving within Taiwan's mainstream political sphere, the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement once again encountered vying agendas and the animosity of party politics. While marking increased visibility, protesters also struggled to keep their efforts from being reduced to an issue of bias in cross-strait relations. Thus, protests concluded with a sense that tangible achievements were only possible through negotiating the movement's original ideological underpinnings.

The dominance of geopolitics in political discussion

By early 2013, the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement had successfully increased awareness of its concerns over media ownership and had persuaded parliament to legislate on the issue. Now a compelling topic, however, the DPP began to channel the movement's demands into their own attempts to discredit the KMT and make a stance against China. Initially the movement appreciated the DPP's interest in the issue of media ownership when they proposed amendments to relevant laws with the intention of instituting clauses to avoid media monopolies. On 9 January 2013, the Transportation and Communications Committee began to

review the Cable Radio and Television Act 有線廣播電視法, the Radio and Television Act 廣播電視法, and the Satellite Broadcasting Act 衛星廣播電視法. The DPP also considered a proposal to ban companies that hold over ten percent of shares in a newspaper or terrestrial television station from also having the same stake in a cable television network. It seemed this clause had bipartisan support and that changes could be solidified as early as 11 January. Were the bill to pass, the Next Media deal would then officially become illegal. Amid scrutiny of the poor performance of Taiwan's economy, however, the KMT quickly withdrew their support for the bill. At the time, President Ma was experiencing record lows in popularity (eventually falling as low as nine percent), which analysts attributed to his failure to produce the economic prosperity he had promised (Lee and Hung 2013). Within this context, on 10 January Premier Sean Chen announced that the KMT had resolved not to support the bill. They believed that it might inhibit investment and if applied retroactively, have an unpredictable effect on the market.

Determined to see the "KMT stick to their word" over media monopolies, the Youth Alliance organised a sit in at the Legislative Yuan for 13 January (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2013b). The same day, however, the DPP deployed its well-practiced resources to stage a protest against President Ma. The 'Fury Mass Rally 火大', as it was called, diverted anger over the issue of media ownership into a criticism of the President's 'incompetence'. The 100000 participants demanded that the President institute a cabinet reshuffle, organise a national affairs conference, and reject the Next Media sale (Lee and Hung 2013). By incorporating the Want Want deals into their demands in this way, the DPP now became the dominant representatives against media monopolisation. This allowed them to frame the issue as a part of their broader political agenda of pushing for Taiwanese self-determination. For

example, DPP legislators announced that anti-media monopoly reform was needed because the movement was worried about "Chinese interference in Taiwanese media" (Lee and Hung 2013). DPP Legislator Yeh Yi-jin 葉宜津 stated that they "believe Tsai is a front man for the Chinese government and that it is reasonable to suspect that they (the Chinese Communist Party) are financing the purchase" (Tacon 2013). Some DPP politicians claimed that by making this stance they were leading a "resistance movement" (Tacon 2013), against Chinese oppression and the KMT.

By assuming the issue of media ownership as one of their core political concerns, the DPP therefore located its meaning within divisive party politics and cross-strait relations. Their resources and established support base practised in mobilising against the KMT allowed them to direct momentum over the issue into their own agenda. For the movement and young activists involved the DPP's actions signalled a continued struggle over the ability to define their own campaign. They faced the DPP's intrusion in addition to government institutions and the forces of decades of bipartisan neoliberal economic and social policies. As such, this incident was reminiscent of the issues of misrepresentation young activists had already encountered in the Wild Strawberry Movement over their use of the student movement identity. In both contexts the group revealed a conscious interaction with how they were perceived and located in the broader socio-political structure as they attempted to reframe their actions and achieve tangible results. This reflexive navigation of Taiwan's political environment made visible both the dynamics of power operating in Taiwan and the barriers to young activists' success.

Indeed, despite not actively supporting the DPP's actions, the movement was still characterised as being 'anti-China' and disingenuous. This depiction was further emphasised when the activities of the Youth Alliance intersected with the complex relationship between the Western

criticism of neoliberal economics, geopolitics, and Taiwan's media environment. Specifically, towards the end of January 2013, the student who had taken the Facebook campaign picture of Noam Chomsky holding the sign in support of the movement, Lin Ting-an 林庭安, became a target of the media outlets of Want-China Times Group. When Chomsky withdrew his support for the campaign, Lin was accused of not informing him of the movement's "true motive" (Lan 2013). In late 2012 Lin had spent a semester studying at UC Berkeley and had emailed Chomsky to draw his attention to the issue. Part of the email had read:

> "The Pro-China Want Want China Times Group chairman, Tsia Eng-meng, is going to buy the Taiwanese branch of Next Media (which is owned by Hong Kong mogul Jimmy Lai). If this purchase is approved, Mr. Tsai will control about 46 percent of Taiwan's newspaper market…There is now an activity which urges global supporters to photograph themselves, holding the slogan of "Oppose Media Monopoly, Reject the black hand of China, uphold freedom of the press, I protect Taiwan in ___", and upload it online" (Liu and Pan 2013).

Seeing the image circulating on the internet, Macau based media professor Liu Shih-diing 劉世鼎 had contacted Chomsky in the hope of discussing the nuances of geopolitics informing the movement. He emphasised how, as already discussed, the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement unavoidably intersects with the issue of cross-strait relations and national identity. Liu described how those concerned with media ownership in Taiwan:

> "Not only focus on the issue of media resources being monopolised by capitalists but also point toward an enemy. This enemy happens to be the one that the government of your country has been cautiously dealing with…Using the name of 'defending Taiwan' to refuse, oppose, and reject all people and matters relating to China and the Chinese

> government is not an isolated phenomenon, and it needs to be placed in the hegemonic structure led by the United States" (S. Liu 2013).

Unfamiliar with or unwilling to discuss the nuances of the issue, Chomsky issued a reply, which Liu uploaded to his Facebook page on 27 January. It read:

> "Thanks for the interesting comments, which go far beyond anything I know about. I also don't recall a placard referring to 'Chinese manipulation'. What I was shown, and held, didn't go beyond media monopoly and freedom of press. I hope that interpretations don't go beyond that" (S. Liu 2013).

Want-China Times Group publications reported on the issue the following day using an approach that was reminiscent of the attacks made against Professor Huang in July 2012. This demonstrated that the group was still willing to mobilise their resources to defame individuals and misrepresent the movement. The headlines over the following days in varying publications read: "Mislead to hold the sign, Chomsky: this is serious distortion 被誆舉牌 喬姆斯基：嚴重扭曲" (P. Liu 2013a); "Anti-Media Monopoly becomes Anti-China. Chomsky was set up 反媒變反中 喬姆斯基被設計" (Lan 2013); and "Chomsky: If I knew this was about opposing China, I wouldn't have held the sign 喬姆斯基：如知有反中絕不會舉牌" (P. Liu 2013b).

Quoting the email exchange and an interview that had subsequently been conducted, these articles reported that Chomsky would not have held the sign because he:

> "Absolutely doesn't understand that there was a problem with cross-strait relations… [That] there may have been an ulterior motive to exploit him in taking the photo... [and that] the deceptive technique used by the photographer, surreptitiously substituting one thing for another…. completely lacks political skill" (P. Liu 2013b).

These articles also claimed Liu had said the movement is "only against the 'China Factor'… [but that] Taiwan really enjoys freedom of the press, has never had propaganda disseminating from another country" (P. Liu 2013b). Hour long news reports on CtiTV over 29 and 30 January sought to allegedly prove that Lin Ting-an had deliberately mislead Chomsky to partake in an anti-China campaign (Chung T'ien Television 2013). Lin's own account was never included.

The reliability of the China Times Group reports was publicly contested. It became clear that Lin was unlikely to have 'deliberately mislead' Chomsky or that Chomsky held an informed opinion of cross-strait relations. In an interview for CtiTV, Chomsky clearly stated that he was 'misled' only by his lack of Chinese. In response Lin made the original email public and claimed she was "certain Chomsky had a good understanding of the students' campaign" (Liu and Pan 2013). Chomsky then admitted that:

> "She [Lin] may well have sent me an earlier email [clearly explaining the situation and the threat of Chinese influence in Taiwan's media environment] as she says. The deluge of email is so enormous I can barely remember yesterday" (Cole 2013a).

The pro-Green English language *Taipei Times* also published the questions that Chomsky had been asked by CtiTV. Chomsky had been told:

> "The photo has been posted online and is now part of a campaign in Taiwan by a few anti-China and pro-independence advocates against a prominent businessman [Tsai Eng-meng] who does a lot of business in China and who is the owner of several media outlets…The so-called 'Rejecting China's Black Hand' is actually a veiled allegation, without facts, that Chinese money goes into Taiwan through this Taiwan businessman to influence over, interfere in or otherwise manipulate the Taiwan press" (Cole 2013a).

In their deliberate misrepresentations, these exchanges revealed how geopolitics interferes with and shapes Taiwan's political environment and discussions of Taiwan, including in interactions

on a global level. They were indicative of how China's power, though invisible here, imbues discourse on Taiwan and creates a system of unease and threat for those who encounter it, Chomsky's claims of ignorance, a reminder of the difficulty for those in the West in articulating anything on Taiwan beyond what is stipulated by China. Deeply imbedded in ideological debates, a search for sensationalism or beholden to Chinese financial capital, the media in Taiwan have been willing to inflame this situation and distort news to support their narrative. Yet, the dynamism and intensity of debate in Taiwan's media is also reflective of the island's contemporary democratic reality. It can be understood as a point of contrast to, and by extension a site of resistance against, China's vision for Taiwan. Although the mistruths in these particular articles were eventually exposed, the movement itself had few avenues to do so. This illustrated how in the context of entrenched divisions over cross-strait relations, Taiwan's civil society has struggled to introduce other political discussions. Here, the voices of student activists, as represented by Lin Ting-an, were silenced by the contours of Chinese power in the international media environment.

Negotiating the Legislative Process

Despite these setbacks, a series of announcements throughout February 2013 revealed that the movement had been rightfully concerned with the actions of Want Want and that it had begun to achieve real outcomes in Taiwan's media regulation mechanisms. These successes, however, were not based around the strength of the ideologies originally underpinning the campaign and were only minimally celebrated by the Youth Alliance. The first tangible achievement for the movement was confirmed on 20 February, when Howard Shyr announced that the CNS acquisition would not go ahead. The NCC had found that according to the Trust Act 信託法 Want Want had not met the NCC's conditions as "Want Want's handing of the shares to a third

party does not change the nature of its ownership of CtiTV" (Li 2013). Want Want was welcome to reapply but not by placing their shares in a third party.

The NCC had also felt it necessary to draft an Act for the Prevention of Broadcasting and Television Monopoly and the Maintenance of Diversity 廣播電視壟斷防制與多元維護法草案. The legislation had 53 articles that in combination represented an attempt to regulate cross-media ownership, safeguard journalist independence, regulate the cable TV market by including Multiple System Operators (MSO) and Channel Distributors, and strengthen public service broadcasting (Rawnsley 2013). The bill posed a threat to the Next Media deal by prohibiting cross-media ownership of outlets that held more than fifteen percent of audience share. In light of this legislation, one official interviewed for the *New York Times* conceded that in regard to Want-China Times "whether or not a group is leaning too much towards China would affect the extent of the health of the market… We don't want to see the market overly dominated by a certain group" (Jim and Lee 2013). Public hearings would be held on 18 and 21 March to gather comments on the legislation before it was passed to the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan in June.

Although the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement had clearly played a role in forcing politicians and regulators to confront the issue of media ownership, celebration was subdued. In response to the announcement, the Youth Alliance made a post on Facebook attributing this quick decision by the NCC "to the spirited resistance of citizens" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2013c). Yet it added that:

> "If the court finds that the NCC's disciplinary action [against Want China] is invalid then the whole [outcome of the merger and acquisition] case [would] have to change…

and meanwhile Want China could find another way to 'cut CtiTV'… and reapply" (Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters 2013c).

As a result, the Youth Alliance encouraged protesters to continue to put pressure on the NCC. To do so, it made an appearance at both hearings in March. Observing the first quietly, they staged a sit-in at the Legislative Yuan on 21 March. Holding a banner that criticised the lack of transparency in the Next Media acquisition case, they demanded that the authorities take the issue of media monopolies seriously. The student campaigners were particularly concerned that adequate anti-media monopoly legislation be passed because the Next Media deal was to be finalised by 27 March. Then on 27 March it emerged that the movement had also been successful in undermining the Next Media deal. Want Want had decided to withdraw because "Tsai Eng-meng… [wanted] to pare the purchase back to avoid antitrust queries into his family's media ownership… [and] to make room for the acquisition of CNS" (L. Chen 2013). Tsai Eng-meng did not cede ideological defeat, however but complained that the movement had damaged the market value of the deal. Want Want claimed "Taiwan's regulatory authorities will set hurdles for the deal to proceed in response to public opposition… [and] may humiliate the company again by imposing more conditions" (*Want China Times* 2013). The company also maintained that the NCC was behaving illegally as a result of public pressure. Their media outlets reported that: "If administration does not approve, it is out of the question for someone to get anything even if it is legal" (*Want China Times* 2013).

Thus, although the movement had influenced the outcome of the deal, it had not altered the discourse that had been used to justify its initial approval, which included that on market capitalism and its role within the media. The issue continued to be discussed in terms of the tension between economic value and legality, with no deeper consideration for the normative function of the media in a democratic society. The movement had been framed as a personal attack on Want Want and an inconvenience to media businesses, rather than the progressive

campaign for democratic reform it endeavoured to be. It was shown to have had limited potency in challenging the discursive order of Taiwan's politics.

Recognising this limitation, the Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters began to reassess its approach and soften the idealistic aspects of their campaign. With the enduring uncertainty of Tsai Eng-meng's future actions, it switched focus to securing tangible change and institutionalising media ownership legislation. While in part a practical assurance against media monopolies, new laws could underpin a media environment where democracy was not beholden to the free market.

Yet, from May 2013, as several versions of anti-media monopoly legislation were introduced to and discussed in the Legislative Yuan, the parliamentary process produced new obstacles. Signalling the continued dominance of partisanship and identity politics in a broad spectrum of issues in Taiwan's politics, legislative deadlock over the draft acts quickly emerged. Even as this process began representatives of the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement expressed frustration with both sides of politics. Academia Sinica fellow Chiu Hei-yuan 瞿海源 publicly complained that: "despite many politicians across party lines promising that they would push for legislation against media monopolisation, they have been rather unenthusiastic about turning their words into action" (Loa and Wang 2013). The issue would be "pretty much decided by the attitude of the Chinese Nationalist Party caucus" (Loa and Wang 2013), and although the DPP had pledged to legislate on the issue the movement believed that they were not doing everything possible to fulfil this promise. So far, the DPP had presented one version of the legislation that sought to regulate market share rather than viewer ratings. The KMT would not support the bill because of this element but the DPP's revisions were delayed. In response, the movement drafted its own, simplified legislation. The group's proposal sought to

only control news outlets as focusing on entertainment or sports channels was seen as a waste of resources.

The draft acts finally made it to the review process of the Transportation and Communications Committee at the end of May 2013. Perturbed by the slow pace of discussion, the students occupied the Legislative Yuan on 29 May. Having illegally entered through a back gate, members of the group had time to demand the legislatures pass the bill by the end of the day before being escorted off the site by police. The bill received preliminary approval in June and moved onto the review process of the Legislative Yuan. Disagreement between legislators has again stalled the bill's passage, however, in 2019 it still remained unratified.

It was during this time, as the achievements of the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement were diluted by the inefficiency of the legislature, that activists proposed creating a new political party. Ling Ting-an explained the proposal in June 2013, describing how young activists and their teachers felt that the lack of cooperation in the parliament and contentious media environment had demonstrated the need for a new party (Lin, Ting-an. 2013. Interview with author. June). They hoped that a new party would reflect the complexity of Taiwan's politics, offering an alternative future to those presented by the partisan system.

As such, the trajectory of the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement had led young activists to identify the boundaries of civil society's power in Taiwan. Even where their actions were nominally successful – having undermined the Want Want deals, drawn attention to, and forced politicians to address the issue of media monopolies – the Youth Alliance continued to criticise the pace and type of change they had achieved, identifying systemic issues that worked against the salience of their protests. Their response was indicative of an understanding of political power as being located in formal government institutions, which civil society had a limited capacity to penetrate. It reflected tension between the students' respect for democratic process

and a defiant attitude in protesting, their desire for resolution to achieve their ideals surrounding the role of the media in democracy, and awareness of political limitations. This contradiction would continue to drive young activists in other movements as their campaigns, and political subjectivities, shifted to focus on broader democratic reform.

Conclusion: Understanding the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement

When young activists occupied the Legislative Yuan on 18 March 2014 in what is now known as the Sunflower Movement, a number of commentators identified that this monumental moment had been in part enabled by the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement of a few years earlier (Harrison 2014; Rowen 2015; Chen and Huang 2015; Ho 2015; Beckershoff 2017; Ho 2018a). As described in this chapter, the earlier event reinforced the island-wide network of activists and elevated the profile of student leaders such as Chen Wei-ting and Lin Fei-fan who were also at the helm of the 318 Occupation. Young activists had used the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement to experiment with and establish effective protesting tactics – including that of occupation – and a political identity separate from the restrictions of bipartisan politics. Through the movement, protesters had begun to recognise the limitations and need for reform in the legislative process. This shaped both the symbolism of occupying the parliament and the consequent formation of new political parties. The relationship between China's influence on Taiwan and its economic strength, one of the triggers for the 2014 occupation, had also arisen in the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement. As a result, by 2014, activists had become well adept at expressing the threat China posed through trade deals or company ownership. Considering this, one interviewee described how earlier protests like the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement were "practice for [the] 318 Occupation" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 21 April, 2015).

Yet the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement also demonstrated the complex trajectory that young activists faced in building momentum for the 318 Occupation and following initiatives. Rather than representing a smooth, linear process, it was only through students' reflexive awareness and strategic compromise that they had success. Having mobilised unexpectedly, the Youth Alliance drew from international campaigns to both established a stance on media ownership and position themselves outside Taiwan's divisive political environment. During the process, they developed their ideas within a critique of neoliberal economics and its impact on the media, while also touching on the politics surrounding labour unions. Both of these issues continue to influence Taiwan but were not fully pursued in this context. In negotiating the dynamics of cross-strait relations, partisanship and societal expectations of young people, the movement shifted its focus to legislative specifics rather than pursuing ideals. The actions of the Youth Alliance during the movement also revealed the diversity in the community and the possibility of a more radical form of politics. At the time, this approach was tempered so that the students would not themselves become the topic of political debate. It was not until the 318 Occupation itself when the full range of their political styles and beliefs emerged. It was therefore through the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement that young activists first practiced remaining unified in order to achieve political outcomes.

Even so, the significance and trajectory of the movement was not resolved by the 318 Occupation or the 2016 change in government. The debate over the ideal relationship between the media, democracy and market economic seems to have neither been settled, nor even simplified by the movement, with a variety of new concerns since being expressed. Recently, commentary on the issue focused on: whether media ownership laws were in fact too restrictive and dissuaded outside investors who can bring new skills and levels of professionalism to the market (Ferry and Shapiro 2017); the proliferation of independent publications in response to the continued bias of the major media companies and consequent difficulty in maintaining

ethical or quality standards (Rickards 2016); the impact of the 24 hour news cycle on the reduction of in-depth reporting (Rickards 2016); whether media consolidation may be positive for the overall quality of the media environment as competition would be less fierce and rely less on sensationalism (Rickards 2016); and whether strict laws against government shareholding stifle competition, fairness and growth in the media industry (Ferry and Shapiro 2017).

The role of China also continues to be a point of contention, with a renewed recognition of the complexity of identifying Chinese capital in media purchases. This aspect came to prominence in 2016, when US-based media company Dynamic Media Group (DMG) Entertainment tried to buy a 61 percent share of Taiwanese cable-television network Eastern Broadcasting Company 東森電視 (EBC) from the private equity company Carlyle Group, which is based out of Washington. This presented an issue as DMG had been founded in Beijing, with strong links to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). During restructuring in 2015 two separate entities based out of China and the US had been created but maintained a "strategic partnership" (Frater 2015). DMG eventually withdrew from the deal because of strict ownership regulations in Taiwan (Ferry and Shapiro 2017).

The relationship between Hong Kong, Taiwan and China in the media industry has also become progressively problematic. Increased Chinese repression in Hong Kong has consequences for Taiwan, with many dominant media companies operating across the two. In 2014 Next Media's Jimmy Lai was jailed for protesting against Chinese interference in Hong Kong democracy. Lai later stepped down as the head of the Next Media, but still owns 70 percent the company. Since this time, Lai has been threatened and physically harassed, while Next Media websites have been the target of several cyber-attacks (Rickards 2016). Most likely orchestrated by those

with ties to the CCP, these types of incidents represent an increased willingness by Chinese officials to target and attempt to influence Hong Kong based media companies.

From this perspective, media ownership can also be used to understand how the contours of global power continue to influence and be expressed in Taiwan. Even within this context, young activists remain committed to creating a more democratic media environment, including through starting their own companies (New Bloom n.d.). The ideal of a truly free and unbiased press remains elusive but is still a source of inspiration. Thus, the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement may yet provide a framework and legitimising narrative for future civic actions.

Chapter 5: Challenging the Parameters of 'Student Activism' – Youth Participation in Urban Development Protests and the Hung Chung-chiu Incident

Introduction

When the Sunflower Movement began on 18 March 2014, marked by the occupation of the Legislative Yuan, the media was quick to identify that 'students' were responsible. During the course of the movement, however, debate emerged over how the protest should be classified and what it meant for Taiwan's civil society (Yan, La, Liang, and Jiang 2015). Detailed accounts reveal a complex network of protesters and ideas, and the series of negotiations that took place to make the movement possible (Rowen 2015; Hsu 2017; Ho 2019). They posit that the occupation represented the unification of diverse groups under the banner of protecting democracy and opposing increased CCP presence on the island (Cole 2015). At the same time, the Sunflower Movement signalled the arrival of young activists as a distinct group in Taiwan's civil society. As explored in this thesis, in the time proceeding and that which followed, youth-led civic alliances expressed political views and styles previously unrepresented in Taiwan. While the 'student' label applied to the 318 Occupation may therefore have been an oversimplified way to describe a multifaceted event, it drew attention to the experience of young people in protests during this period. It can be used as a point of entry to understand how this group were shaped by and shaped Taiwan's socio-political environment.

This chapter seeks to reconcile the different ways that the Sunflower Movement and this period in Taiwan have been understood. It begins from the basis that the diversity in civil society and importance of political parties and other civic groups does not negate the significance of young activists. Students were not solely responsible for the Sunflower Movement but strategically and reflexively built their strength through cooperating with and learning from other groups.

They displayed the ability to bridge and benefit from civil society's complexity so as to achieve their aims.

To expand this further, this chapter explores protests not classified as 'student movements', but that were important to both the emergence of the 318 Occupation and the individual experiences of many young activists. This includes the protests against forced evictions in Dapu Village and Huaguang Community, and the White Shirts Army Movement, sparked by the death of Hung Chung-chiu (1989-2013).

The movements explored in this chapter were amongst several to take place outside the student movement tradition between 2008 and 2016. Other protests against forced evictions and urban development in particular were widespread and influential, involving attempts by students to mobilise and preserve the histories of affected communities and position their struggles against unchecked urban development. This included protests over Losheng Sanatorium in New Taipei City 新北市 and the Shaoxing Community 紹興 in Taipei's Zhongzheng District 中正區, among others. However, those in Dapu and Huaguang were amongst the largest and most contentious during this period and can be directly linked to the 318 Occupation; they are illustrative, rather than exhaustive, examples of the interaction between young activists and other civic groups. These movements were also significant as students often made up the largest number of participants but did not prominently utilise the student movement identity. The political subjectivities and practices the movements drew from accordingly act as a point of contrast to, and elucidate the meaning of, the student movement identity. With their own lineages of meaning, these aspects were also indicative of young activists' further engagement with a variety of political theatres, which then translated into the complexity of networks and approaches seen in the 318 Occupation.

The campaign against the forced acquisition of houses in Dapu Village first arose in June 2010 when the Miaoli government ordered the destruction of farmland to make way for the Jhunan Science Park 竹南科學園區. After local farmer Chu Feng-min 朱馮敏 committed suicide in protest in August that year the government made an official promise to halt the process. Then in July 2013, the Miaoli County Government 苗栗縣政府 delivered renewed demolition orders for the remaining houses in Dapu, arguing that they needed to widen a road for safety reasons. A campaign led by the Taiwan Rural Front 台灣農村陣線 mobilised in response, including students from the Protect Miaoli Youth Alliance 捍衛苗栗青年聯盟.

Around this time, students from the Lost Wanderers of the Huaguang Community 華光社區：金磚上的遺民 also petitioned on behalf of the residents of Huaguang Community in Taipei. Huaguang was situated on Ministry of Justice 法務部 (MOJ) land that had been used to house ex-KMT soldiers. Since 2000 the government had been threatening to demolish the houses in order to build a financial district, the plans for which later changed to an area for nightclubs and high-end stores. Finding locals unwilling to move, in 2006 the MOJ took out lawsuits against occupants for 'illegally squatting'.

The movements to preserve Dapu and Huaguang were primarily positioned as a part of a broader campaign to resist political corruption, institute legal reform, and preserve human rights. Young activists worked with the affected communities and NGOs to amend the Land Expropriation Act 土地徵收條例, Rural Rejuvenation Act 農村再生條例, and Urban Renewal Act 都市更新條例, all which allow governments to seize and sell valuable land with few oversight mechanisms. Activists also filed lawsuits on behalf of residents threatened by forced eviction, often citing property ownership laws or the 'right to housing'. In doing so, these protests mirrored the focus on legislative and legal solutions seen in other movements in contemporary Taiwan, particularly those led by student activists.

Protests against forced evictions were also notable, however, in the spatial dimension they encompassed. Beyond concern for specific communities, these movements can be understood as a challenge to the state's territorialisation of Taiwan's urban environment in accordance with the demands of capital accumulation, and an attempt to demonstrate an alternative socio-economic vision. Student protesters consequently utilised discourse and tactics that reflected these aspects and contrasted with their previous emphasis on an idealised 'rationality'. They increasingly relied on embodied forms of dissent and engaged in direct action, including physically obstructing the demolition process. Student protesters also engaged with the traditions of rural protests and urban development politics, their place in broader debates over the meaning of 'Taiwan' and the benefits of neoliberalism. A clear goal or argument within these discourses was notably absent, however, which were instead infused with consideration for human rights and emotion. Similarly, the students' investment in building community links, a sense of place and belonging based around local cultures and quotidian practices, further expressed an abstract form of politics largely absent from other campaigns.

The White Shirts Army Movement – alternatively known as the Hung Chung-chiu Incident or Citizen 1985 protests – also shaped the role of young activists in Taiwan's politics during this time, without conforming to the 'student movement' narrative. These names are used to refer to three rallies held between July and October 2013 against misconduct in Taiwan's military. Sparked by the death of Hung Chung-chiu, a recruit who was serving time in military detention, the movement became a voice for civil society in the debates over conscription and the future of Taiwan's security. During its course, the movement drew attention to the lack of culpability in the military justice system and instigated new laws to promote fairer outcomes. Their demonstrations attracted record-breaking crowds, including significant numbers of first-time protesters who would continue to be active in civil society. The movement consequently played

a substantial role both in establishing tolerance and support for the 318 Occupation when it occurred the following year and in the activist trajectory of many protesters.

Even so, the White Shirts Army Movement was distinctive as one of the few mass protests between 2008 and 2016 in Taiwan to deliberately reject an association with student activists. The Citizen 1985 Alliance, who coordinated the protests, promoted themselves as less threatening and more representative than the student leaders of other movements in order to build legitimacy and forestall a negative political or law-enforcement response from the government. Despite tensions with movement leaders, student activists demonstrated their ability to adapt and compromise by working with Citizen 1985. They tempered their approach when participating in the White Shirts Army Movement and cooperated with members of the group in the pursuit of other political causes.

In combination, these protests therefore further demonstrate the situational and reflexive nature of the student movement identity, and where students worked outside this tradition to build the community, ideas and tactics that account for the 318 Occupation. They reveal how young activists navigated Taiwan's identity debates and legislative politics and an often-discordant civil society, with a distinctive reflexive engagement with their subjectivity as student activists.

Huaguang and Dapu: From Community Driven Initiatives to a Challenge to the Logic of Urban Development

The movements to protect houses in Dapu Village and Huaguang Community emerged in the 2000s, as resident-led protests against the government's plans for urban regeneration. As with other movements against forced evictions in Taiwan, in their early stages they used the legal system to challenge the state's decisions and sought reparations for the affected citizens. When they struggled to achieve success, however, these movements also began to question the way the government valued land, and came to represent the communities, lifestyles and cultures,

which were disadvantaged by or sat outside the processes of modernisation and urban development. Between 2012 and 2013 students became active in the movements to preserve Dapu and Huaguang and participated in debates over the broader issues with the urban development process. While still focused on aspects that aligned with their approach in other movements, such as due process and legislative fairness, they were also at the forefront of highly contentious clashes with police and the use of direct action. This shift in political style can be interpreted as a response to the human-centered connotations of forced evictions and the emotional toll of politics not previously encountered in their protests.

The origins of the movement to protect Dapu

The movement to protect houses in Dapu, a farming village in the central Taiwanese county of Miaoli 苗栗縣, dates to 9 June 2010. At this time, Miaoli County Magistrate Liu Cheng-Hung 劉政鴻 bypassed negotiations taking place between farmers and the Miaoli County Council 苗栗縣議會 to destroy 28 hectares of rice fields two months before it was due for harvest. The owners, a group of elderly farmers, were in the process of contesting the price they would be compensated for the fields. The land was being seized under the Land Expropriation Act, and the farmers claimed that they were only receiving 40 percent of market value in return (Taiwan Rural Front 2010).

Previously amended in 1986, the Land Expropriation Act allows the state to expropriate private land "where certain public undertakings so require" (Ministry of the Interior 2012). In 2008 the optoelectronics-company Innolux Corporation had applied to the Miaoli County Government to build a factory on the contested land and expand the Jhunan Science Park. Arguing that the factory would benefit the village through economic development (C. Yang 2013), the county government had accepted the proposal. By invoking the Urban Renewal Act,

however, the government also increased the area of appropriation to 156 hectares, which included farmland and houses.

This incident therefore brought into focus the relationship between citizens and the state in Taiwan's process of modernisation and urban development. In line with other neoliberal economies, since the 1980s both KMT and DPP governments had encouraged urban growth, as a way to raise revenue and increase an area's financial potential (Hsu and Hsu 2013, 686). The state's focus on urban development had been codified into law through the Land Expropriation Act, the 1998 Urban Renewal Act, and the 2008 Rural Rejuvenation Act. While focusing on different jurisdictions, in combination these laws effectively set the parameters for development projects (Council of Agriculture 2010). As seen in Dapu, this included where the state could appropriate privately owned land and what rights citizens had within this process. Within this context, after the rice fields were destroyed on 9 June, a coalition of farmers and NGOs began to protest against the government's actions. Led by the Dapu Self-Help Organization 大埔自救會 (formed by farmers when the Jhunan Science Park expansion was first announced) and Taiwan Rural Front (an NGO focused on the Rural Rejuvenation Act), their campaign encompassed legal, moral, and symbolic dimensions. For example, at a rally on 17 July outside the Presidential Office, protesters questioned the legality of the way the Land Expropriation Act had been utilised in Dapu and appealed for the policies surrounding land seizure be revised (Peng and Loa 2010). They demanded compensation for the crops that had been destroyed and protection for the remaining land and houses. At the same time, participants drew on the symbolism of Taiwan's rural lifestyle to demonstrate their frustration with the treatment of farmers. Wearing their distinctive conical hats, on the morning of 18 July participants planted Ketegalan Boulevard 凱達格蘭大道 with rice shoots in order to demonstrate the beauty of agriculture (Li, Yang, and Kuo 2010). In speeches, farmers described how they were angry both for the financial loss they had incurred, and the emotional suffering

endured through losing their homes (Li, Yang, and Kuo 2010). They criticised the government's focus on economic development and devaluing of rural culture.

Ignoring the more abstract aspects of the farmer's protest, however, the government responded by framing the issue as one of economics. On 22 July Premier Wu Den-yih 吳敦義 offered the 24 affected households similar sized plots of land in other towns and assistance with diversifying into organic farming. Disappointed that they would not be able to stay in their homes, the Dapu Self-Help Organisation refused the offer. Then on 3 August one of the farmers involved in the case, 73-year-old Chu Feng-min 朱馮敏 was found dead after drinking herbicide. According to her family, Chu had become depressed after she realised that she was powerless to stop the government from taking her land (Peng and Loa 2010). As a result, Chu's funeral on 22 August became another demonstration against the government, attended by over a thousand farmers and activists from across Taiwan. Following the eulogies and funerary rituals, six elderly farmers – Liu Hsin-mei 劉新梅, Hsu Chu 許珠, Chang Tsung-chin 張宗欽, Tsai Jung-chih 蔡榮治, Chu Ming-kun 朱明崑 and Chen Pang-nan 陳邦男 – threw ghost money at Liu Cheng-hung's residence, as a sign of ill will (Fu and Chung 2012).

In the immediate aftermath of Chu Feng-min's suicide the government remained hostile towards protesters. Wu Den-yih publicly stated that Chu had suffered from 'chronic diseases', which he blamed for her suicide (Chen 2017, 101). Liu Cheng-hung sued the six farmers who had thrown ghost money around his house, claiming that they had slandered and defamed him (Fu and Chung 2012). Liu demanded NT$2 million in compensation and that the culprits publish an apology in a newspaper.[6] Even so, on 17 August 2010 Premier Wu invited Dapu

[6] The Miaoli County District Court 苗栗地方法院 eventually ruled against Liu on 30 August 2012 (Fu and Chung 2012).

residents and their supporters to the Executive Yuan. After hours of negotiations, Wu promised that the farmers would not have to give up their land and that changes would be made to the Land Expropriation Act (Shih-jung Hsu 2013). Indeed, the Act was revised in early 2011 to include an increased percentage of compensation for farmers and the stipulation that the government could not seize prime farmland necessary for food security (Hsu 2011). With the impending 14 January 2012 presidential election, the amendments were pushed through the legislature in late 2011.

The movement to preserve houses in Dapu therefore began as a localised campaign led by farmers who were personally impacted with the support of NGOs. Protests encompassed the particularities of relevant legislation, the emotional connections to land, and the perceived value of Taiwan's rural culture. It can accordingly be understood as an attempt to intervene in the process of urban development and logic of capitalism, at the expense of certain industries and lifestyles. In its early stages, the movement achieved temporary success, but subsequent urban development issues show how it did not shift the broader socio-political discourse surrounding land seizure.

Legal, moral, and physical conflicts over the demolition of houses in Dapu

The movement against the forced appropriation of land in Dapu remerged in January 2012. Residents, sympathetic academics and lawyers, who focused on the legality of the way the Land Expropriation Act had been used, still primarily drove the movement. When this approach failed and the government argued that the demolition of the houses was morally justified, the destruction of the houses seemed inevitable. Around this time, protests escalated, and the tactics adopted by students became more sophisticated in response.

The demolition of houses in Dapu became a public issue on 6 January 2012, when political commentator Hsu Yung-ming 徐永明 and DPP candidate Ho Po-wen 何博文 were charged

with defamation, just days before the Presidential election. On 23 June 2010, Hsu and Ho had criticised the actions of Liu Cheng-hung in Dapu on a popular talk show. Now the Miaoli District Prosecutors' Office 苗栗地方法院檢察署 had decided to indict Hsu and Ho on the basis that they had defamed Liu with their comments. Widespread protests by farmers, academics, NGOs and students erupted in response. Then, in at a meeting of the Ministry of the Interior 中華民國內政部 (MOI) in July 2012, the Lee Hong-yuan 李鴻源 led ministry revised the government's previous decisions over the development of Dapu Village. As part of this review, they would demolish the houses of four of the farmers who had been promised they could keep their land in 2010 by now Vice President Wu Den-yih. With the assistance of lawyers from Taiwan Rural Front, the impacted residents – Peng Hsiu-chun 彭秀春, Chu Shu 朱樹, Ko Cheng-fu 柯成福 and Huang Fu-chi 黃福記 – took out an administrative lawsuit against the Miaoli County Government and the MOI in response. This process would determine if it was legal for these bodies to overturn previous orders given by the Executive Yuan (*Taipei Times* 2013). On 11 June 2013, despite the Taichung High Administrative Court 臺中高等行政法院 still not having ruled on the case, the Miaoli County government renewed the demolition orders for the disputed farmland. Magistrate Liu Cheng-hung gave the farmers until 5 July to voluntarily demolish their houses, after which time the bulldozers would be sent in to tear them down.

With the government's indifference to these legal proceedings, residents of Dapu heightened their activities between June and July 2013. Students became increasingly involved during this period and often drove the use of direct action and embodied forms of protest. The commitment these activists would show to protecting Dapu, however, was somewhat unpredictable in the context of their recent mobilisation over and lack of a deep familiarity with the issue of forced evictions. In contrast to the centrality of the student movement tradition in the emergence of

the Wild Strawberry Movement and the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement's original reactionary stance to Want Want's actions, youth involvement in Dapu represented a reinterpretation of their political subjectivity. While the group of young activists was still collectively identified as 'students', they were no longer separated from other parts of civil society or only valued for their 'elite' status. Rather, the students were positioned as a part of Taiwan's rural culture and as the future leaders of protests within this field. For example, Taiwan Rural Front was central in engaging students in the issues of forced demolitions and government land expropriation and framing these as indicative of both the dangers of unchecked neoliberal modernisation and as a threat to Taiwan's rural identity. In an interview with Brian Hioe, student and Dapu participant Zhang Kai-xiang described how Taiwan Rural Front organised a school for young activists where they could learn more about the subject of forced demolitions in the context of Taiwan's agricultural heritage (Zhang Kai-xiang as quoted in Hioe 2016a). From 2008, Taiwan Rural Front had also run activities through which students could experience farming culture and observe the struggles that rural communities faced firsthand (Chen n.d.).

This suggests that young activists in the Dapu campaign utilised their subjective identification and status as students to form connections with rural Taiwan and the issue of forced demolitions. They continued to self-organise or were invited to participate in student-based groups, and accordingly maintained association with the 'student movement' identity. Nonetheless, protests over Dapu also represented the opportunity for young activists to experience politics outside this tradition, in particular where the Dapu campaign contrasted with other movements in its focus on socially disadvantaged groups and aspects of Taiwanese society and culture unfamiliar to many young activists. Student participation in the campaign over Dapu also diverged from other youth-led movements in the political style adopted, notably in the use of emotive discourse and direct action. As revealed in my interviews, participants themselves

understood this change as a response to the urgency of the issue of land expropriation and how the government's actions reflected a broader disregard for citizens and the legal process. They said:

> "I really believe that the government had not given us any other choice [but to protest in the way we did]. Time and time again they made promises they did not keep, which seemed to me that they were deliberately lying… we could not trust them, [so] we could not trust the political process" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 4 September, 2015).

Another said:

> "These [types of movements against urban development] can go on for a long time… [but] then there are moments of urgency, where you think if you leave [a site threatened by demolition for urban development] you will miss the chance to protect it. There is really only one way to approach these types of situations, and that is just to be there" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 1 September, 2015).

This attitude was suggestive of a reflexive and adaptable approach to politics, where the students' tactics were shaped as much by their adversaries' actions and the type of issue with which they were engaged as by the participants' own values. This was in tension with their earlier pursuit of an idealised form of democracy in their protests and belief that their actions should reflect their moral standards. Yet, from another perspective, this approach can also be interpreted as an indication of the shifting views in the community and the understanding that civil disobedience and deliberate law breaking were ways to intervene in dominant political structures and disturb the status quo. These ideas are based in a long lineage of thought developed by theorists such as Karl Marx (1848), Hannah Arendt (1963), and Michael Foucault (1972), and with their own particular history in Taiwan associated with extreme forms of

opposition to the KMT's authoritarian rule, such as Cheng Nan-jun's self-immolation (see chapter 3 on the Wild Strawberry Movement). This tradition had already been expressed in the use of direct action by protesters in the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement, suggesting a self-identification with Taiwan's disadvantaged and politically unrepresented groups and a subjectivity based in political martyrdom. In the case of Dapu, an attitude of self-sacrifice materialised in a willingness to be injured or arrested, in order to halt the demolitions.

Students were a prominent part of a group, which along with Dapu Self-Help Organisation and Taiwan Rural Front staged a sit-in outside the Executive Yuan between 2 and 5 July 2012, where they pleaded with Premier Jiang Yi-huah to keep Wu's promise. Yet police began to forcibly remove protesters in the early hours of 5 July. During this process, exhaustion and stress caused one of the leaders of the Dapu Self-Help Organisation, 60-year-old Chang Sen-wen 張森文, to pass out (Loa 2013a). Along with his wife Peng Hsiu-chun 彭秀春, Chang Sen-Wen had owned a pharmacy in Dapu for over 30 years. At the time Chang's collapse in July 2012, the county government had already demolished most of the business. Claiming that they needed to widen a road for safety purposes, Liu Cheng-hung was threatening to destroy the rest (Loa 2013a). To the protesters' distress, Chang Sen-wen remained unconscious on the afternoon of 5 July. Over the following weeks, tensions between protesters and the government continued to rise. Although Wu Den-yih made a promise on 5 July that the demolition of houses in Dapu would be suspended, it was short-lived. On 8 July, the Miaoli County Government held a press conference attended by thousands of KMT supporters, where they announced that they would continue with the planned demolitions. They emphasised that it would be unfair to preserve the Chang Pharmacy, as it was in the interests of county residents to build a safe road. Similarly, on 11 July a half page advertisement appeared in Taiwan's four major Chinese language papers, addressing the Dapu case. These advertisements claimed if the Chang

Pharmacy was not demolished then large trucks attempting to enter the Jhunan Science Park would cause road accidents.

Conflict over the houses in Dapu therefore took on a moral dimension and spoke to fundamental philosophical themes of the rights of the many compared to those of individual citizens and to the nature of Taiwan's modernity. Mirroring the central logic of land seizure for urban development, the government framed the Dapu residents' plight as selfish and detrimental to the broader needs of the community, with the implication that the region was somehow backward and in need of state investment. The movement to preserve the houses in contrast emphasised the emotional toll the process was taking on landowners and the abuse of their rights as law-abiding citizens. The protesters celebrated agrarian life and small business owners, framing the Chang Pharmacy owners as dignified representatives of Taiwan's working and agricultural classes and the inherent value of traditional rural practices.

This approach was strengthened when on 10 July Chang Sen-wen was taken to hospital after suffering a mental breakdown, caused by his anxiety over the process. Shortly following, on 12 July, the Taichung High Administrative Court ruled against the farmers in their case against the government, effectively clearing the way for the demolitions to take place (C. Yang 2013). With the government's position clearly stated, the movement to protect Dapu continued to intervene in the demolition process through practices of direct action. Now concerned that the bulldozers could appear at any time, students and members of Taiwan Rural Front began patrols around Dapu, in the hope of defending the houses if the demolition order was given. Despite their efforts, however, the houses in Dapu were eventually demolished on 17 July. Taking advantage of the absence of the residents, who were in Taipei protesting, Liu Cheng-hung sent a demolition crew with over 100 police officers and firefighters for reinforcement. Protesters, including several students, had to be restrained by police while the houses were torn down. The process took less than two hours, before the owners had time to retrieve any belongings.

The movement against land expropriation in Dapu therefore failed to protect the houses from demolition. The government's actions had been condoned by the legal system and were framed as being morally justified for the benefit of broader society. In response, protesters had used direct action and attempted to obstruct the demolition process, leading to clashes with police, arrests, and significant physical and mental strain on some members. Student involvement during this period reflected the broadening of their protesting network and the way their political engagement was understood.

The emergence of the movement to protect the Huaguang Community

The Huaguang Community was an eleven-hectare jumble of houses and small stores, located on the border of the Zhongshan 中山區 and Da'an Districts in central Taipei. Just one street east of Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial Hall 中正紀念堂 between Xinyi Road 信義路, Jinhua Street 金華街, Hangzhou South Road 杭州南路 and Jinshan South Road 金山南路 the area is considered to be one of the city's prime locations, close to government buildings, major universities, and middle class neighbourhoods. In the early 1900s, during the period of Japanese Colonial Rule, the area was first established as a part of the Taihoku Penalty Institute 臺北縣臺北監獄署. Built from the stones of the Qing Dynasty Old Taipei City wall, the prison was used to house and execute political prisoners who opposed Japan's presence in Taiwan. After arriving in Taipei in 1945 the KMT took over operation of the prison, continuing its use as a place to silence political dissidents. Military officials and prison staff were housed in dormitories at the site. Lower ranking public servants in the ministry and KMT soldiers were not provided with accommodation but were permitted to build their own houses next to the prison. These houses became known as the Huaguang Community (Ho 2013). In 1963 the KMT government relocated the prison, now called the Agency of Corrections Taipei Prison 矯正署臺北監獄, to the Guishan District 龜山區 in Taoyuan 桃園. As a part of this move,

military personnel, prison staff and public servants in the MOJ were also transferred, with many abandoning their houses in Huaguang. The primarily poor KMT soldiers who remained sold or gave their houses as gifts to friends and family who were in need of accommodation. At this time, there had been no opposition from the government. As Taiwan's economy boomed in the 1970s, the nation rapidly urbanised and immigrants from the countryside flocked into Taipei in search of work. With its dark history, Huaguang was an economical place for them to buy. More shanty style houses were built as a result, most of which the government never approved. Regardless, from this time the residents of Huaguang paid for water and electricity, were provided with official street addresses, hukou 戶口 tenancy registration, and paid residential taxes.

As a result of this history, the Huaguang Community remained socio-economically disadvantaged and mostly comprised of ex-KMT soldiers and their families. With few other options, residents began to run businesses from their houses, taking advantage of the community's prime location. As with other Military Dependant Villages (Du 2010), the government tolerated Huaguang until the late 1990s. From this time, these communities increasingly became easy sources of government revenue, as the land was often in central locations and could be sold for urban development projects. In 2000, under the Chen Shui-bian led DPP government, the MOJ announced that it would be demolishing Huaguang. It argued that it had legal recourse to do so under the Urban Renewal Act, as it would benefit Taipei's economic development. While the process stalled, in 2006 the DPP government confirmed that as part of the Four Gold Bars Plan 四大金磚計畫, it intended to turn Huaguang into a financial district, that would be known as the "Wall Street of Taipei 台北華爾街" (Ho 2013). The plan was altered the following year, now intending to develop the area into the "Roppongi of Taipei 台北六本木" instead, referring to an area in Japan known for its upmarket shopping and

nightclubs. In 2007 the Ministry of Finance 財政部 (MOF), which handles all state-owned assets, was given control of Huaguang. This decision granted the government the power to sue occupants who refused to move under the Principles for the Disposal of Occupied National Public Use Real Estate Managed by Administrative Authorities 各機關經管國有公用被占用不動產處理原則 (Jou, Clark, and Chen 2016: 570). One hundred and 75 households in the 700 resident community were consequently designated as 'illegal occupants'. They could now face significant fines for their presence in Huaguang and would not receive assistance in relocating as was stipulated in the Urban Renewal Act. With the assistance of academics and lawyers, residents from the Huaguang Self-help Group 華光社區自救會 began a campaign against the government's decisions. Early opposition primarily involved legal challenges and small protests that emphasised the community's marginalisation in the process of urban regeneration. Citing ideas of morality, opponents to the demolitions focused on the residents' old age and the difficulty they would face in constructing a new life when they were relocated. The community themselves argued that as poor refugees, they had long been systematically disadvantaged, and that the seizure of their homes and legal fines would consolidate their margionalisation (Y. Wang 2014).

As such, the early stages of the movement to preserve Huaguang also highlighted the experience of 'mainlanders 外省人' in Taiwan and their relationship with the major political parties. Referring to those who fled China during the civil war (1927-1950), 'mainlanders' have typically been aligned with or members of the KMT and suspicious towards the 'Taiwanese 本省人' DPP (Y. Wang 2014). This divide has historically been a key social, political and economic distinction, and one in which the experience of the Huaguang Community was in some ways counter. For example, while Huaguang's citizens were disadvantaged, other members of the KMT formed Taiwan's political elite and benefited in areas such as education.

The DPP and the idea of a local ‘Taiwanese’ identity had developed in opposition to the KMT and generally perceived ‘mainlanders’ as “privileged outsiders” (Yang and Chang 2010, 110). As a result, the KMT were understood as representing ‘mainlanders’ and the DPP the ‘Taiwanese’. This perception was enhanced in Huaguang as DPP politicians had pursued the redevelopment of the community. In contrast, as Taipei Mayor in 2000 and the KMT Presidential candidate in 2008, Ma Ying-jeou had promised not to takeout lawsuits and to assist the community in finding new houses.

Even so, after reviewing the case in 2009, the KMT-led Taipei City Government resolved to proceed with the demolition. Then in May 2012, Vice President Wu Den-yih, announced that the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), a private capital partnership process for developing Huaguang should begin. Minister of Justice Tseng Yung-fu 曾勇夫 opened a public tender later that year, at which time residents were told they must vacate by 29 December (Y. Wang 2014). If unwilling, they would then face prosecution for having ‘illegally profited’ from public property.

Thus, the movement to save Huaguang emerged as a resident-led fight against the demolition of a unique community and a part of Taiwan’s urban history. With the assistance of NGOs and lawyers, from the early 2000s, inhabitants had framed their plight as representative of the ongoing difficulties faced by subaltern mainlander refugees, and the effects of urban development on the socially disadvantaged. Closely aligned with the KMT, members of the Huaguang community had also perceived their issue as a partisan one and blamed the DPP for the demolition orders. By late 2012, however, they had lost political support and faced imminent eviction.

The changing relationship between residents, the state, and civil society, in the movement to protect Huaguang

Throughout late 2012 and early 2013, the campaign to protect Huaguang followed a similar trajectory to that in Dapu. Conflict between residents and the state was positioned around the moral implications of forced evictions and what rights individual citizens had in comparison to those of broader society. When legal avenues failed and politicians remained unmoved, protesters escalated their tactics. Students became prominent participants during this time, establishing themselves as advocates for the disadvantaged 'mainlanders' and critically engaged with the implications of development politics on the urban environment.

Despite government announcements in May 2012 to demolish Huaguang, in late 2012 and early 2013 residents continued to personally appeal to KMT politicians. They positioned themselves as righteous citizens committed to the ROC, hoping that their deference would protect them. For example, on 28 December 2012, residents assembled outside Taipei City Hall to beg Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin 郝龍斌 to assist them. They reminded Hau that they had always been "good citizens 益民" (Mo 2012), and that demolishing their community would be a betrayal by the KMT. In a similar vein, on 11 February 2013, an elderly resident of Huaguang confronted President Ma while he was attending an ancestor worship event in Miaoli County (Stacy Hsu 2013). The woman dropped to her knees in front of Ma to plead with him to help the community, before presenting him with a petition.

The act of petitioning government officials, including through prostration, has its roots in dynastic times and became a common form of peaceful resistance in Qing China between 1740 and 1759 (H. Hung 2013, 135-167). According to historian Hung Ho-feng, petitioning is a form of protest condoned by the ruler's 'Mandate of Heaven 天命' and reflects a paternalistic understanding of the state embedded with an expectation of a positive government response to citizens' demands (H. Hung 2013, 135-167). The very act of prostration embodied a sense of acquiescence to the leader, leaving the petitioner vulnerable to their will, but was one of the

few opportunities for direct communication between citizens and the state. The Huaguang residents' use of this tactic was suggestive of an enduring faith in the KMT and a view of protest as a disciplined way to interact with the government. This can be contrasted with student activists' increasingly antagonistic approach and attempts to challenge the dynamics of the state-society relationship through the use of direct action.

Nonetheless, the government appeared unmoved by the Huaguang residents' pleas, and continued with the process of demolition. The date remained set for 24 February 2013, at which time the houses would be forcibly torn down. In response, a coalition of residents, NGOs and students began to physically intervene in the process of demolition. On the afternoon of 28 December, after residents had been protesting at Taipei City Hall, activists rushed at Hau Lung-bin, shouting for him to "Save Huaguang" (Mo 2012). Students, including prominent leader Hung Chung-yen 洪崇晏, were forcibly removed from the site, after which several faced arrest. Protesters also began to frame the KMT government's actions as callous and indicative of their authoritarian tendencies. This stance differed from the residents' own impulse to place blame on the DPP, instead framing the KMT as historically responsible for abuse against citizens. For example, on 11 December 2012, International Human Rights Day (11 December 2012), Huaguang movement participants ambushed President Ma during a visit to the Jing-Mei Human Rights Memorial and Cultural Park 景美人權文化園區 in Xindian District 新店區. Throwing objects at the president, protesters made reference to the significance of the event, by accusing the KMT of having "destroyed" (Loa, Shih, and Hsu 2012), human rights in Taiwan. In this way, the protesters demonstrated the capacity for protest movements to operate as a metaphor for wider historical and contemporary political issues in the context of Taiwan's authoritarian past and democratic transition. They reframed the relationship between the Huaguang community and the KMT by including the residents in the victims of the government's undemocratic actions, despite their historical role as party members.

Students had been at the forefront of protests to defend Huaguang from late 2012. Their participation in the movement was institutionalised, however, on 16 January 2013, through the formation of the Lost Wanderers of the Huaguang Community (Lost Wanderers of the Huaguang Community 2013a). While forming a distinct 'youth-led' group to represent their participation, students remained closely aligned with the tactics, discourse and members of the broader movement. As with Dapu, their presence did not reframe the protest as a 'student movement' but allowed young activists to learn from and connect with other parts of civil society. In particular, students in the Wild Strawberry Movement and Anti-Media Monopoly Movement had been supported by the 'pan-green' side of politics and found it difficult to stop their activities from being co-opted. In the case of Huaguang, however, they built attachments with 'deep-blue' members of Taiwanese society. As described by one student involved in the protests:

> "We students have always said that we do not support either side of politics, [we are neither] blue or green…I think this is best demonstrated in the Huaguang protests when we supported the families of KMT soldiers but were critical of the KMT government's tactics. [It really showed] that we have always been focused on political conduct and policies" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 2 August, 2015).

Students were part of the crowds who comforted residents when on 23 February 2013 the process of demolishing Huaguang finally began. Starting one day earlier than the community had previously been told, the owners of the seven houses that were demolished that day believed that they had not been sufficiently warned (Chang 2013a). As a further blow to the movement's goals, in March 2013, the court ruled in favour of the MOJ's case against the residents. In response, the government began freezing the bank accounts and seizing the wages and social benefits of the community members who had been found to be 'illegally profiting' from government land (Loa 2013b). On 14 March Premier Jiang Yi-huah also commented that

the right to housing did not extend to illegal dwellings. Although several politicians criticised Jiang for ignoring the KMT's role in generating the level of social disadvantage faced by members of the Huaguang community and the lack of opportunities residents had been given to legitimise ownership of their houses, this statement demonstrated that the government now perceived the community as enemies.

Huaguang and Dapu: expanding the parameters of protests against forced evictions in Taiwan

The movements to protect Huaguang Community and Dapu Village therefore emerged out of conflicts over state projects designed to contribute to Taiwan's urban development and economic growth. The movements did not originally dispute the validity of this process, but rather represented the rights of those who suffered as a result. Hence, they mirrored other community-based movements by individuals who have not typically protested until they are directly affected by government policies. They also, at times, framed their demands in terms of legal rights, reaching out for remuneration and the preservation of their landowner rights. As reflected in the research of scholars such as Chuang Ya-chung (2005) and Chang Chun-yen, Lee Po Yu and Yan Hao (2015), these types of mobilisations are not unusual in Taiwan. Rather, they often accompany significant state projects that require land seizure and legal judgments have not typically gone in favour of the citizens.

The protests over Huaguang and Dapu were distinctive, however, in the diverse constituency with which they engaged. With committed participants from outside the communities, the movements came to represent more than just the threatened houses; the destruction of Dapu was framed as a threat to Taiwan's rural culture and Huaguang as epitomising the disadvantage faced by 'mainlander communities'. As such, the movements can be understood as an intervention in the logic of urban development, a critique of Taiwan's path through modernisation, and as a metaphor for Taiwan's political history. Within these issues, protesters

sought to reposition the relationship between citizens and the state, reinserting their voice into the trajectory of Taiwan's future.

As demonstrated below, these movements were also notable in the escalation of protesting tactics shortly before both communities were demolished. Confrontations between the authorities and participants during this time were emotional and violent, expressing the distinctive urgency in these types of political issues. This dynamic in the protests against forced demolitions was at odds with how students had previously participated in politics. When staging a 'student movement' young activists had focused on remaining orderly to maintain legitimacy (see chapter 3 on the Wild Strawberry Movement and chapter 4 on the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement). I would suggest that the tactics used in Huaguang and Dapu reflected the nature of forced demolitions and the fact that they were engaged in a form of politics distinct from the student movement tradition. In these protests, young activists' mobilising their status as 'students' was secondary to the issues they were campaigning over. Similarly, during their early participation in the movements to protect Huaguang and Dapu, students moved away from their association with academic institutions. Their mobilisation came about through and enhanced their connections to other parts of civil society.

With the communities mostly demolished, from this time the campaigns over Huaguang and Dapu diverged from their instrumental approach. As explored in the following section, young activists continued to engage with forms of politics outside the student movement tradition, searching for new sites of meaning in the movements against forced evictions.

Academic, NGO and Student Participation beyond Dapu and Huaguang

Throughout late 2012 and 2013 tensions heightened over the houses that had been demolished in Dapu and Huaguang. Students became particularly active in using embodied forms of protest and direct action to express their anger and obstruct the further demolition of the condemned

buildings. During this period, young activists also drew political meaning from within the traditions of rural protest and human rights discourse, in a way that signaled the creation of new networks and collective identities.

Reshaping the nature of student protest through the movement to protect Dapu

With the houses in Dapu demolished and many legal avenues exhausted, the nature of the movement now changed. From this time, student protesters led by the Protect Miaoli Youth Alliance became the driving force behind activities. Using direct action and drawing on a rural identity derived from the daily life practices of the local community, their participation continued to contrast with the tradition of student movements seen in other contexts. Young activists demonstrated a reflexive and deliberate approach to developing new political discourses, practices and collective identities, while building links outside academia.

The Protect Miaoli Youth Alliance was formed by well-known activist Chen Wei-ting directly after the houses in Dapu were destroyed on 17 July. A native of Miaoli and student at National Tsing Hua University in nearby Hsinchu County 新竹縣, Chen had previously participated in the Wild Strawberry Movement and had experience leading protests in the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement of 2012. With its specific focus on Miaoli, the Youth Alliance was indicative of a conscious attempt to create a 'student' group that made sense within the context of Taiwan's rural culture. Aside from coordinating protests over the issue of Dapu, it was built on the premise that young people had moved away from their 'native roots' when working or studying in cities. The group consequently enabled young activists to reconnect with their "homeland 故鄉" (Protect Miaoli Youth Alliance 2013a), and the agricultural parts of Taiwanese society. They adopted a political approach that referenced the tradition of rural protests in Taiwan, while expressing anger at the government's actions in Dapu. In this way,

the group was mobilising complex vectors of identity into a self-reflexive critique of the patterns of Taiwan's modernisation and urbanisation.

In particular, the group were part of emotional and destructive protests throughout July 2013. On 18 July they attempted to occupy the Presidential Office, at which time several members were arrested for violating the Assembly and Parade Act. The following day Chen Wei-ting was arrested for trying to graffiti Liu Cheng-hung's house, while between 19 and 20 July dozens of students also protested outside the KMT national office, where they threw eggs at the building. On 23 July 2013 students and academics attempted to occupy the Office for Health Promotion of the Ministry of Health and Welfare 衛生福利部國民健康署 in the Datong District 大同區 of Taipei. Throughout the day, students flung themselves at police officers, attempting to storm the building and confront President Ma Ying-jeou and Premier Jiang Yi-huah, who were visiting the office. During one such interaction, NTU student Hung Chung-yen 洪崇晏 was knocked onto the pavement and later received three stitches, while under police escort (C. Hung 2013). Hung, along with student Lu Chih-hung 盧其宏 and Professor Hsu Shih-jung 徐世榮 was also arrested for violating the Public Safety Act 公共危險罪, the penalty for which includes jail time. Throughout these protests, young activists also expressed their anger with the KMT government through emotive and challenging slogans. The most prominent of these was 'You Teardown Dapu Today, Tomorrow We Teardown the Government 今天拆大埔, 明天拆政府', regularly shouted at rallies and printed on banners and placards.

In this sense, the political style used by student protesters over the issue of land expropriation remained distinct from that in other movement. Where in the Wild Strawberry Movement and Anti-Media Monopoly Movement they had attempted to remain 'rational', in the protests over Dapu their actions were notably confrontational and infused with a deep and inimical emotion

towards the KMT government. This further emphasised the contingency of their identification as part of a 'student movement' and the different political contexts in which they found meaning. It was an articulation of the groups' navigation through a variety of political theatres and modes, where the consequences and rationale behind protesting shifted between settings and they utilised whatever resources were available. Accordingly, they also framed their actions outside the student movement tradition and with a recognition of the different political discourses operating in Taiwan's civil society.

Indeed, students in the movement to protect Dapu framed their activities as being driven by their connection to rural Taiwan. They used imagery associated with agriculture and tradition in their protests such as conical hats, rice, cow dung and the Amazon Snail 福壽螺, known for destroying crops. Student protesters also called for the preservation of local culture and rural identity, which they claimed was under threat from the process of urban development (A. Yang 2013). They regularly appeared with farmers and Taiwan Rural Front, strongly associating themselves with these groups.

In doing so, the students also positioned their actions as part of the distinctive tradition of rural protests in Taiwan, one that exists in parallel to the 'student movement' tradition. A key event in this lineage in modern Taiwan dates to 20 May 1988, also known as 'Dark Friday', when a violent riot broke out between farmers and police in front of the Legislative Yuan. Led by the Yunlin Farmers Association 雲林農權會, protesters demanded more protection and tax cuts for rural industries in light of the increased importation of food produce and reduced exportation of rice. The riots came to represent a movement of 'native' Taiwanese fighting against US intervention and KMT oppression and became integral to the narrative of a 'Taiwanese Consciousness' practiced through civil society (Tu 1996, 1130).

The Protect Miaoli Youth Alliance also strengthened their connection to rural Taiwan through a number of initiatives outside protests. These activities deliberately consolidated their links to farmers and regionally based NGOs, while exploring new forms of political engagement and ways of belonging. For example, in order to 'reconnect youth with the land' the Miaoli Youth Alliance opened Café de lam 竹南咖啡 in the township of Zhunan 竹南鎮, Miaoli County (Protect Miaoli Youth Alliance 2013b). This café sourced regional produce, served local dishes and acted as a space for seminars and meetings between young activists, NGOs, and local farmers. With the assistance of Taiwan Rural Front, the Miaoli Youth Alliance also facilitated "'down-to-earth workshops' to defend Miaoli 腳踏實地，捍衛苗栗" (Protect Miaoli Youth Alliance 2013c). During these activities young people visited local farms and small businesses to "listen to the voice of the land and the people … [and] cultivate a deeper understanding of and reflect on" (Protect Miaoli Youth Alliance 2013c), the issues in the region. Here the phrase 'plant our feet firmly on the ground/down-to-earth 腳踏實地' had a double meaning, referring both to the humbling effect of learning about the struggles of common people and the need to expose young people to the 'real 實' identity of the region (Protect Miaoli Youth Alliance 2013c). It suggests that participants would find the experience both politically and personally enlightening, enhancing their empathy for local farmers and feelings of attachment to Taiwan. Activists themselves reflected on how their participation in the Protect Miaoli Youth Alliance had been driven not only by political ideals, but also a search for a sense of belonging. The group was consequently seen as a source of emotional fulfilment, providing a place-based identity and kinship. For example, in a Facebook post made on 8 December 2014, Chen Wei-ting described how the Youth Alliance had made him realise that "one's homeland is like a mother 故鄉如同母親" (W. Chen 2014). As Chen's own mother, a local of Miaoli, had passed away when he was young, Chen's statement described how participating in the regional

community not only let him feel close to her, but provided him with the familial warmth that she had.

Thus, in the movement to protect Dapu young activists practiced politics in a way that diverged from other settings. This was evident in the use of direct action and affective discourse, which had previously been tempered and controlled. Student activities were also distinct, however, in the intangible quality they encompassed. Their focus on belonging and identity reflected a form of political meaning, not driven by a clear aim. Young activists' reflexive engagement with civil society during this time therefore had strategic and emotional elements. They pursued political goals and personal fulfilment, while redefining the possibilities for young people in Taiwan's civil society.

Life, death, and belonging in the Dapu protests

The spate of intense confrontations between protesters and the authorities continued throughout 2013. This included on the streets in protests and rallies and in the legal system, where each side attempted to discredit the other. During this time, conflict between the movement and the government also shifted to address the value and meaning of Taiwan's rural culture and the significance of 'home' in people's lives. Within this context, the movement found new purpose outside the political system, attempting to memorialise the houses and make sense of their destruction.

Continuing with the use of direct action, on 24 July hundreds of protesters assembled outside the Presidential Office. There, they called for an official apology and for the government to return the land to the farmers, before several participants were injured or arrested in confrontations with police. Members of the movement were also arrested in Dapu on 28 July for 'disturbing the peace' after they attempted to hold a film screening and vigil on the site where the Chang Pharmacy previously stood (Cole 2013b). In early August, Hsu Shih-jung and

Hung Chung-Yen filed lawsuits against the National Security Bureau 國家安全局 (NSB) and the Datong District Police 警察局大同分局, based in Taipei. They accused these agencies of having engaged in arbitrary arrest, injury and defamation, amongst other abuses of power while dealing with Dapu protesters. Around this time, hundreds of lawyers also began to speak out against police treatment of demonstrators, which they saw as extreme. On 15 August, student activists posed as Chinese tourists in order to gain access to the Executive Yuan. Once inside, they threw eggs and paint at the building and were promptly arrested. The following day, in what was one of the largest protests in Miaoli's history, over 1000 participants assembled outside the Miaoli County Government where they called for Magistrate Liu Cheng-hung to step down. The County Government had previously attempted to stop the protest by turning down the application for the rally on 12 August. At the time they had argued that it would "block the way for people going in and out of the county government's offices on official business" (Loa 2013c), despite it starting in the evening once the office was closed. While the crowd was tolerated at this time, government labeled the protesters as 'violent' for throwing things at government buildings. At this point, KMT legislators from Miaoli staged a press conference in defence of the Miaoli County Government. Continuing with their moralistic tone, they framed the owners of the demolished houses as necessary victims in the pursuit of a 'public good'. Arguing that the majority of the County's citizens were supportive of the Jhunan Science Park, the legislators emphasised that the region's development had necessitated the forced evictions (K. Chen 2013b). They also sought to discredit the activists who had mobilised on behalf of the famers, referring to them as 'outsiders'.

This approach by the County Government further reflects the role of rural identity in the case of Dapu. The struggle between state institutions and protesters to represent the meaning of this identity and to whom it legitimately applied became a key discursive conflict. The protesters argued that rural culture, which they linked to the historical role of farmers as a representation

of a unique Taiwanese identity, was under threat from urban development, and that by extension the very essence of the island was vulnerable to the process of modernisation. In contrast, the government presented the issue as one of economic growth and Taiwan's rural communities as in need of 'development'. They deliberately ignored the secondary consequences of this process, in a way that suggested Dapu's value related to its financial status and the resources it could contribute to Taiwan's central government.

This fundamental conflict between economic development and less tangible ideas, over how rural life and populations are valued in the process of modernisation, continues in Taiwan and across the world. In the past few decades, it has regularly driven contentious politics, often leading to disenfranchised groups of citizens mobilising against the governments and corporations who represent the forces of neoliberal economics and who have created the conditions under which citizens find themselves suffering (see for example Chomsky 1999; Dean 2009; Weidner 2009; Mason 2012; Harvey 2012; Brenner, Marcuse, and Mayer 2012; Della Porta 2015; Chen 2017). While often starting as self-interested campaigns to recover financial or personal loss, the presence of transnational networks or groups like the Youth Alliance have given them this broader meaning in the context of underlying socio-political structures. In Taiwan's case, these debates have additional implications in the conflict over Taiwan's national status; the movements against unchecked urbanisation have aligned with attempts to preserve a national identity and revealed an intrinsic divergence over how concepts like 'modernisation' should be understood. Within this discourse the campaign to preserve Dapu also represented an alternative future to that put forward by the KMT.

This debate was reflected in a protest on 18 August, when tens of thousands of people marched from the Presidential Office to the Executive Yuan. The crowd demanded an apology from the government and a revision of the laws that allow for forced land seizures. The 'Rice Bomber' Yang Ru-men 楊儒門, who had set off seventeen harmless rice bombs across Taipei in 2003

in opposition to the importation of rice at the expense of local farmers, was a prominent attendee. The crowd also deployed agricultural symbols in a ritualised and reverential way. In Dapu, tensions heightened when on the morning of 18 September, Chang Sen-wen was found deceased, having never fully recovered from his collapse at the protest on 5 July. Although the cause of death was yet unknown when Liu Cheng-hung attempted to pay his respects later that day, protesters assembled outside the Chang home and called him a 'killer'. Throughout the day, several protesters were arrested after brawls with police outside the Executive Yuan and the Presidential Office. In what would become a common act over the next few months,[7] Chen Wei-ting threw a shoe at Liu Cheng-hung, for which he was charged on 2 October. Chen stated on Facebook that "the shoe had an appropriate death" (W. Chen 2013) and refused to attend his court proceedings. He maintained that he had done nothing wrong and that Liu was responsible for having shoes thrown at him.

After Chang Sen-wen's death the importance of 'home' in people's lives also came into focus. From this time, the houses in Dapu were framed not only as the causalities of urban development, but a place on which residents were dependent for "living and survival" (Loa and Mo 2013). At Chang Sen-wen's funeral, the Miaoli County Government was labelled a 'murderer' for having destroyed Chang's house. A small model of his pharmacy accompanied

[7] The act of throwing shoes at politicians as a demonstration of disapproval was first recorded in Taiwan on 8 September 2013, when a group of protesters threw shoes at President Ma Ying-jeou at an anti-KMT rally outside the Presidential Palace (Yang 2014). Over the following months, protesters so regularly threw their shoes at members of Ma's cabinet that a number of police departments across Taiwan purchased anti-shoe netting. The act has been connected to other incidents around the world of protesters throwing shoes at politicians, including, most prominently, when at a press conference in Baghdad on 14 December 2008, Iraqi journalist Muntadhar al-Zaidi threw his shoes at US President George W. Bush.

the coffin, further symbolising its importance to his life and, in the context of Taiwanese Daoism, representing Chang's desire for his pharmacy in the afterlife. In addition, vigils continued to be held at the sites of the demolished Dapu houses years after they were torn down. This signified the spiritual connection associated with these homes and their importance as spaces for mourners and activists to assemble.

Protests over Dapu only began to abate in early 2014. On 3 January 2014, the Taichung Administrative High Court ruled that the Miaoli County Government had unlawfully destroyed the four houses in Dapu. The judge argued that the MOI had failed to conduct an adequate review of the Jhunan Science Park project submitted by the county government. On 6 February the MOI confirmed that they would not appeal the decision but would continue to press charges against protesters. Although these charges were eventually dropped, it was not until 16 May 2017, a year after the DPP took office, that Minister for the Interior Yeh Jiunn-rong 葉俊榮 agreed to return the land to the farmers and rebuild the Chang Pharmacy. The case was officially closed in early August 2017 after the families whose homes had been destroyed dropped their lawsuit against the central government and a settlement was reached.

Thus, the movement to protect houses in Dapu traversed a number of political, legal, moral and emotional aspects of Taiwan's socio-political environment. While it achieved few tangible gains, it strengthened and drew attention to values and ideas that have been undermined by the process of urban development.

Young activists search for new political meaning in the movement to protect Huaguang

After the process of demolishing the Huaguang Community began in February 2013, protests intensified. From this time, students from the Lost Wanderers of the Huaguang Community displayed a fervent commitment to the cause, regularly subjecting themselves to injury and arrest through their use of direct action. When legal challenges to the demolitions failed, the

movement attempted to broaden its appeal by drawing on the concept of human rights. This period was also shaped by the student activists pursuing new sites of meaning and belonging in the 'mainlander' experience and unique aspects of the Huaguang community.

On 15 March, around 100 residents and student supporters assembled outside the Executive Yuan to demand the KMT abandon the fines and protect the remaining houses. Angered by the lack of government sympathy, the crowds clashed with police and several students were arrested. On 19 March two further houses were demolished without warning. In response, protests broke out at the MOJ on 21 March, where students lay on the ground wearing white t-shirts with fake blood stains to signify that the government had violated human rights. Police disbanded the demonstrators and Ministry official Yang Ho-chin 楊合進 denied the government's responsibility, claiming that they were now legally obliged to continue with the demolitions. Further escalating their tactics, on 27 March students chained themselves to houses in the community to try and obstruct the process of demolition. Police were brought in to remove them from the roofs and walls where they had attached themselves, while the demolition crews tore apart several houses. Violently forced off the site alongside student protests and residents, journalists at the scene later accused the police of brutality **(**Loa 2013d**)**. After video footage of the incident in which several protesters were injured was released, Minister of the Interior 內政部部長 Lee Hong-yuan 李鴻源 promised to investigate the accusations on 28 March. In an attempt to deflate tensions, the Taipei City Government announced that it would provide public housing units to help relocate the Huaguang residents. However, protesters were concerned that the eligibility criteria would not apply to the whole community.

With legal avenues to stop the demolitions appearing ineffective, the movement sought to affirm the human rights discourse they had previously used to criticise the government. Where

the focus on the inequality produced by urban development had been undermined, they now positioned the residents' claims to their homes as a proviso of the 'right to adequate housing' stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although not a member of the United Nations (UN), Taiwan has ratified two of the UN Human Rights Council's covenants on human rights. They became legally binding through the Law Governing Execution of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 公民與政治權利國際公約及經濟社會文化權利國際公約施行法 in 2009 (Zeldin 2009). Indeed, in April 2013, a review of Taiwan's human rights concluded that the government should "provide a formal consultation with Huaguang residents and… [develop] a settlement plan for the community members" (Pavese 2013). They also recommended that until then "the MOJ should halt forced evictions and demolition plans in the area" (Pavese 2013). This focus on human rights helped to universalise the preservation of Huaguang and position residents' plight as a broader search for political fairness. On an international level, this framed the issue in familiar terms, outside Taiwan's particular political history, leading to a global online petition (Danthong 2013), and support from the Asian branch of Amnesty International. In Taiwan, the focus on human rights challenged partisan interpretations of the issue, made possible by the community's KMT 'mainlander' heritage. By emphasising the 'human' and 'righteous' aspects of the case the movement was reinterpreted to appeal to a broader opposition to authoritarianism, and as an issue of the state's neglect of the socially disadvantaged. For the young activists involved, the Huaguang Community also became representative of political and cultural meaning outside the logic of economic development. Their participation reflected a desire to promote alternative ways of valuing the land, such as its history and the sense of place it provided. One participant expressed this stance to me in an interview about the larger problems with the policy of urban regeneration. They described how:

> "I was definitely concerned about the Huaguang Community [because the] citizens were disadvantaged… [and] not being taken care of by the government, but the issue is also much bigger than that…If the government [wanted it could just] wait until this generation is gone and maybe the issue [over who inhabits the area] will go away. Maybe future generations will not care. So, then I think [our concern] should really be about getting people to care about these types of things as a whole…to change, or I guess reconsider, how we are as a society, how we live in the everyday… [If places like Huaguang are] demolished then that shows that we don't value these things [referring to the things that the community represents]. Our society only cares about profit.... And that's what I want to change" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 1 September, 2015).

This commitment to intangible ideals was present in Dapu but distinct from the approach used by young activists in other movements. For example, in the Wild Strawberry and Anti-Media Monopoly Movements protesters were driven by clear political goals, such as amending legislation. In the movement to protect Huaguang, however, the students focused on drawing out the markers of the community's distinction and the value of quotidian practices. They formed connections with the community on a human, rather than purely political level, and sought to translate these insights to the broader population. For example, student activists organised events that emphasised the quotidian practices and place-based identity of Huaguang. In doing so, participants not only became familiar with residents' lives but also legitimised the existence of the community as a part of Taiwanese society. Residents themselves had described how their experience as refugees, financial disadvantage and inability to fully integrate into Taiwanese society, meant that they were reliant on the community for a sense of place. Through maintaining certain practices in the community linked to the lives they had left in China, such

as cooking or speaking in dialect, the neighborhood had become a substitute for the residents' homeland. As described by Wang Yu-chi:

> "For poor and petty "mainlander" families like mine, Huaguang was the only place that gave us a sense of belonging. Even though there is nothing left there now but an empty lot with cold metal fences, and even though our homes and businesses were considered illegal constructions, Huaguang offered us comfort and warmth for the past 50 odd years" (Y. Wang 2014).

To highlight the importance of the space of the community and the life it facilitated for the residents, on 18 January 2013 Lost Wanderers of the Huaguang Community staged an event titled 'Traverse the Community, Half Day Tour of Huaguang 走跳社區，看見華光半日行'. Participants were invited to "explore the meandering alleys, meet the local grandmas … [and] hear the sounds of everyday life" (Lost Wanderers of the Huaguang Community 2013b). The event included speeches and a "pilgrimage of the community… [including its] culinary delicacies" (Lost Wanderers of the Huaguang Community 2013b), for which the area was famous. This allowed participants to "get to understand Huaguang" (Lost Wanderers of the Huaguang Community 2013b), through experiencing life there.

Through these types of initiatives, student activists therefore helped to reshape the movement to protect the Huaguang Community, bringing a level of human understanding to an issue that has been highly politicised in Taiwan's socio-political environment. Their approach reflected a conscious attempt to promote the abstract values of Huaguang and redefine the way the community, and their own participation, were understood, as they became advocates for the value of 'mainlander' culture as a part of the tapestry of Taiwanese society. This consequently diverged from the student's own preoccupation with 'rational' protest and legislative politics,

signalling the formation of new collective identities and political subjectivities in a number of ongoing debates.

The failure of protesters in the Huaguang case to challenge the process of urban development

Throughout early 2013 the government continued to ignore the pleas of the movement to protect Huaguang. Neither their activities nor a review by the Ministry of Culture 文化部 stopped the demolition process. Students became increasingly theatrical and combative in their actions, attempting to halt the destruction of houses by force. Despite widespread criticism of the authorities, however, the government's approach was ultimately condoned, and the houses were demolished.

The next wave of demolitions began on 22 April 2013. This time police assembled barricades to ensure protesters could not obstruct the process and checked the identification cards of anyone within the vicinity. Even so, students held a small festival outside the community perimeter that night. It was intended as a celebration of the community and included food stands, live music, and speeches from residents reflecting on their life in Huaguang. After police stopped a resident on her way home from work, however, the event descended into riotous protests. Throughout the night and into the next morning activists clashed with police, leading to over 50 arrests including fourteen students. The protest only subsided on the morning of 23 April, when the houses were torn down. Students ended their participation by throwing ghost money around the site, intended for the 'corrupt' businessmen and politicians (K. Chen 2013c).

Residents of Huaguang were offered temporary reprieve on 10 May when the MOJ announced that it would suspend the last round of demolitions. Under advice, they had directed the Cultural Assets Committee to assess the historical value of the site. During this time, protesters continued to call on the Taipei City Government and Executive Yuan to help resettle residents and revoke the fines. As part of this process, students held a mock wedding on 23 March

between Premier Jiang Yi-huah and big land developers and construction companies. The theatrics included a comical representation of Jiang offering an effigy of the Huaguang Community as dowry to his new wife. The day's activities ended in violent confrontations with the authorities, leading to accusations that the police had struck protesters and journalists with riot shields. Police Commissioner Huang Sheng-yung 黃昇勇 defended his force, however, claiming that officers were only protecting themselves. In addition, the Cultural Assets Review Committee released its findings in late June, which in the end would not help residents. Instead, they recommended that only the southern wall of Taipei Prison 台北監獄, the residence of the Director of the Prison 典獄長宿舍, the public bathing house 公共浴場 and twenty Japanese-style houses, be preserved. With no further obstacles to the government, on 27 June more houses in the community were demolished. Activists and residents attended the event but stood in silence rather than protesting. At this time, the MOJ organised public housing for Huaguang residents on the outskirts of Taipei. Most struggled to pay even the small amount of rent, however, as they faced fines, could no longer earn a wage, and had had their assets frozen. Within this context, protests continued to be held throughout August despite most of the houses having been demolished. On 27 August around 200 participants marched from the community to the Executive Yuan, where they pled with the government for reprieve. During the march, students dragged the remains of the houses "to show the government that what they are relentlessly tearing down are people's homes" (Lee 2013). The government was unmoved, and the remaining houses in Huaguang were town down a few days later.

The issue of the Huaguang Community lingered in Taiwan's politics over the following years. Despite having pushed for the community's destruction, by late 2013 the KMT government remained unsure of how they wanted to use the land. Earlier that year they had proceeded to

transform a former air-force building on Renai Rd 仁愛路 into Taipei's Reppongi instead. Ironically, in 2015 they resolved to build public housing where Huaguang had once stood.

Young activists also continued to be impacted by the protests over the Huaguang Community. Even with a change of government, on 15 June 2016, five students - Lin Ching-hao 林靖豪, Kuo Kuang-chun 郭冠均, Chang Chih-lu 張志綸, Pan Cheng-ji 潘承佑 and Ku Cheng-hui 古振輝 – had their convictions for their actions in the community upheld by the High Court (Pan 2016). The five had been particularly active in trying to stop the demolition of houses in Huaguang and had been charged on 23 April 2013 for obstructing the police. The conviction included 50 days in jail or a NT$50,000 fine.

The movement to preserve Huaguang failed to alter the relationship between the state and citizens in the process of forced evictions. Protests to protect the houses had been fierce, with students leading attempts to obstruct the demolition process and hold the government to account for their actions. The KMT's decisions were justified by the legal system, however, and continued under the DPP government. These types of movements would therefore struggle to achieve success in the future unless the logic of urban development is altered.

Understanding the movements to protect Dapu and Huaguang

The protests to protect Dapu and Huaguang were part of a broader movement against forced evictions in Taiwan. From the early 2000s, students had also mobilised to protect houses in Losheng Sanatorium in New Taipei, the Shaoxing Community in Da'an District, houses in Shilin District 士林區, and the Nankang Bottle Cap Factory 南港瓶蓋工廠. Within this process, activists had saved few houses or achieved what they believed were adequate reparations for citizens. At the time, protesters often framed this outcome as an issue with the KMT government, but land expropriation had been pursued by both major parties (Hioe 2016b).

Thus, the movements to protect Dapu and Huaguang demonstrated the difficulty for citizens in challenging the state in the process of urban development. In most cases, the governments' actions were legally endorsed and could be morally justified by the idea that forced demolitions were necessary for economic growth.

Activists recognised this aspect and attempted to promote alternative values to capitalism through the movements. Protests over the houses in Dapu drew on rural culture and agricultural life, which they emphasised were markers of an 'authentic' Taiwanese identity. In Huaguang, activists framed the demolition process as threatening the particular history of the area, the community as representative of the 'mainlander' experience in Taiwan, and universal human rights. When these movements failed, it suggested that these discourses had not successfully challenged the logic of urban regeneration.

Even so, as explored further in the conclusion of this chapter, the protests against forced evictions were given renewed meaning with the outbreak of the 2014 318 Occupation. At this time, their focus on the rights of citizens against authoritarian forms of government and recognition of systemic problems, were incorporated into a broader critique of Taiwan's socio-political environment. Members of the movements to protect Dapu and Huaguang and their ideas became part of the 'Third Force' in Taiwan's politics, which from 2016 has successfully challenged the bipartisan system (van der Horst 2016). This suggests that despite the outcome of the two movements their message resonated with parts of Taiwanese society. The movements to protect Huaguang and Dapu were also significant to young activists in the opportunity they provided to expand the parameters of their political participation. Students strategically created new networks outside academia and participated in protests that were not framed as part of 'student movement' tradition. They reflexively adopted political tactics, discourses and collective identities, which contrasted with their earlier focus on rationality and the pursuit of clear political goals. In doing so, they revealed their ability to connect with

various groups in civil society and the growing complexity of their understanding of political discourses and processes.

Student Activists and the 2013 Hung Chung-chiu Incident

From mid-2013 the death of a young man in military detention drew the focus of civil society away from urban development politics. The Hung Chung-chiu Incident, as it is now known, propelled the issue of military conscription and the treatment of recruits to the forefront of public discussion. Consisting of three mass rallies, the White Shirts Army Movement that followed helped reshape the nature of civil society in Taiwan. The tightly controlled events were organised by the Citizen 1985 Alliance, an internet based, largely anonymous activist group. They mobilised first time protesters, received support from both sides of politics, and significant concessions from the government.

Within this process, student activists played a complicated role. Citizen 1985 deliberately separated themselves from the more direct and contentious political style that had been used by young activist groups in the months prior, portraying themselves as a 'higher-class' of protester. At the same time, students participated in and supported the movement. They also cooperated with members of Citizen 1985 on a number of other political issues, including in the 2014 Sunflower Movement. As such, the White Shirts Army Movement further demonstrated the complexity and conflict within Taiwan's protesting community during this period. It revealed how young activists adapted their approach and pragmatically cooperated with those they did not always agree with, in order to achieve political results.

Hung Chung-chiu's death in the context of Taiwan's military conscription

The White Shirts Army Movement began in July 2013, in response to the death of Hung Chung-chiu. On 4 July, 24-year-old Hung had died of internal bleeding and multiple organ failure caused by heatstroke and exhaustion, while in military detention. A corporal in the 542nd

Armoured Brigade 陸軍裝甲第五四二旅 in Hsinchu County, Hung was due to finish his compulsory military service and start a master's degree at NCKU in Tainan, on 6 July. On 28 June Hung had been caught bringing a mobile phone onto the base, which he was reportedly going to use to document abuse occurring in the unit. As punishment, Hung was committed to the brig where he shared a cramped and poorly ventilated cell, was denied food and water, and was forced to do strenuous physical exercise in hot and humid conditions. Hung collapsed on 3 July and was rushed to hospital, but it was too late to save his life.

The government response to the death was initially apologetic and punitive against those who had made decisions over Hung Chung-chiu's punishment. On 15 July, Colonel Ho Chiang-chung 何江忠 deputy commander of Hung's brigade was detained for allegedly ordering Hung to be punished and bypassing the normal disciplinary channels. Thirty-seven additional officers involved in the incident faced other repercussions, including court martial. Minister for Defence Kao Hua-chu 高華柱 personally apologised for the death, and unsuccessfully tried to submit his resignation. President Ma Ying-jeou also apologised to the Hung family and offered NT$100 million in compensation, but the money was rejected.

Hung's death was particularly critical for the KMT because it was in the middle of transferring Taiwan's military force from being one of conscripts to volunteers. In March 2009, then Minister for Defence Chen Chao-min 陳肇敏 had announced that the government would end conscription in the military by 1 January 2015 (Chung 2009). Part of a campaign promise by President Ma to cut military spending, the government planned to reduce Taiwan's armed forces from around 300000 to 200000. President Ma argued that spending over NT$315 billion per annum as previous governments had done would be unnecessary if he was successful in improving the relationship between Taiwan and the PRC.

Indeed, conscription had been introduced in 1947 under the Act for the Enforcement of Military Service 兵役法施行法 when Taiwan was still actively fighting the PRC. It had subsequently been required that men aged above twenty do a year of military service. Yet at the time of Hung's death, the Ministry of Defence was already struggling to attract the number of volunteer officers required. In 2011 only half of the 4000 volunteers hoped for had signed up, only 11000 of the 15000 needed in 2012 and at the time of Hung's death in July 2013 just under 2000 new volunteers had joined the armed forces, while the target for the year was 17500 (Cole 2013c). As a result, it was necessary that the government be seen as addressing the treatment of recruits and corruption in the military if its campaign to end conscription was to be successful.

The DPP, in opposition at the time, had also developed their stance on conscription in the context of Taiwan's shifting geopolitics. Originally the DPP had been anti-conscription, citing democratic and human rights reasons. After China became more aggressive in preventing Taiwanese independence by military force, including through passing the 2005 Anti-Secession Law, the DPP revised their policy (Duchâtel 2006, 5). At the time of Hung Chung-chiu's death, they opposed the KMT's plans to end conscription and cut military spending, believing that Taiwan should be protected from the PRC (*The Economist* 2013).

Thus, the Hung Chung-chiu incident intersected with partisan divides over cross-strait relations and Taiwan's defence strategy. Both sides of politics had formulated their policy on conscription in response to their view of the PRC, but Hung's death reframed the debate as one of citizens' rights. In doing so, it drew attention to how geopolitics can overshadow and stifle other issues in Taiwan's politics. It also initiated the formation of new civic groups and a political force in civil society.

The formation of Citizen 1985 as a unique group in Taiwan's civil society

The White Shirts Army Movement was led by Citizen 1985, a group of strangers who mobilised on the internet in response to Hung Chung-chiu's death. New to protesting, the group found legitimacy in Confucian principle of 'righteousness 義', and the idea that they were not driven by personal reward. Citizen 1985 was also distinct from the other civic groups explored in this thesis in their relationship to authority and the government. They avoided the more contentious aspects of protesting and directing their anger at the KMT. In doing so, Citizen 1985 was able to position their movement as acceptable to most parts of society. They navigated the partisan divide in such a way that they were neither dismissed nor co-opted by either side of politics.

Throughout June 2013, much of Taiwan's public took to social media to discuss Hung's death and the subsequent inquiry that was taking place. In one chat room dedicated to the topic, a group of 39 strangers met and decided to publicly express their concern. They called themselves the Citizen 1985 Alliance in reference both the George Orwell's *1984*, and a hotline to the Ministry of Defence. The line was used for making complaints against the military, but the service did not allow the caller to remain anonymous, which the group felt was not in the best interests of the public.

In seeking to become established in civil society, Citizen 1985 drew on Confucian ideals of political participation. As described by Weiming Tu, in the sinophone tradition protest is often conducted with a sense of 'righteousness', which includes the "the right of the people to rebel" (Tu 1993, 8), in order to maintain the leader's 'virtue 德', and the health of society. In line with this practice, Citizen 1985 emphasised that they were compelled to protest by a sense of morality and duty, rather than being self-interested in a political career (Li 2013). Members of the group consequently chose to remain anonymous but maintained that they were

representative of a broad cross-section of society, including "white-collar workers, students, housewives, doctors, teachers, lawyers, designers and former legislative assistants" (Li 2013).

Once formed, Citizen 1985 began campaigning to introduce a third party to review the case over Hung Chung-chiu's death. Video evidence potentially crucial to the case had disappeared, and several families had come forward who had also lost sons in mysterious circumstances during their military training. In an interview with EBC published on 15 July, Hung's friend Liu Hsuan-yang 劉烜揚 revealed that the punishment had been part of a personal grudge against Hung for not respecting the military (Eastern Broadcasting Company 2013). Liu also claimed that First Sergeant Chen Yi-jen 陳以人 and Staff Sergeant Fan Tso-hsien 范佐憲 resented Hung for being allowed to leave the base as part of his job fixing military vehicles and had specifically asked Colonel Ho Chiang-chung to have Hung punished with time in the brig.

In light of these revelations, Citizen 1985 organised an event referred to as the Civic Call 公民教召 for 20 July, outside the Ministry for National Defence 國防部 in the Zhongshan District of Taipei. Their main objective was to ensure a third party would have the opportunity to investigate the case and that witnesses and key evidence would be protected. These demands were listed in a petition that would be presented to Deputy Minister for Defence Andrew Yang 楊念祖. Citizen 1985 invited the public to attend and requested they wear white as a sign of mourning, giving the protest the name of the White Shirts Army Movement.

On 20 July, around 30000 people attended the event. They sang military songs and held a minute's silence in memory of Hung before Andrew Yang received the petition. In addressing the crowd, Yang apologised on behalf of the ministry and stated that the government: "Now ask that the public give the ministry a chance to rectify our errors" (Hou and Lee 2013). The protest received coverage in the international press (*ABC News* 2013; *BBC News* 2013; *Fox*

News 2013), and support from media outlets that were sympathetic to both the blue and green sides of politics.

The initial response to the White Shirts Army Movement was therefore distinct from that received by other social movements described in this thesis. For example, media coverage of the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement and the 318 Occupation was noticeably split along ideological lines and used by both sides of politics to criticise the other. Government representatives were also typically hesitant to engage with protesters, the frustration from which sparked several attempts at the occupation of official buildings. Through this action, student activists in these other movements had developed a contentious relationship with the authorities, having been arrested and injured by police on multiple occasions.

The positive reaction to the White Shirts Army Movement was accompanied by tangible concessions to their demands. On 31 July it was announced that the Ministry of Defence's investigation into Hung's death had concluded with the indictment of eighteen officers. The most serious of the cases was against Chen Yi-hsun 陳毅勳, Staff Sergeant of the 269th Brigade 第二六九旅. Chen had overseen Hung's punishment and was charged with 'abusing a subordinate to death'. The seventeen remaining officers faced charges such as 'death caused by professional negligence' and 'abuse of authority to impinge on personal freedom' (Chang 2014a). If found guilty, the eighteen officers faced jail time, which in the case of Chen Yi-hsun could potentially be a life sentence.

Even so, the public were disappointed with the verdict. Hung's family accused the Ministry of targeting those who had carried out the order, rather than the senior military personnel who had authorised Hung's punishment. On 1 August, amid new evidence of corruption in the investigation, Hung's family made a statement to the press saying that they had "lost all hope in the military prosecutors' ability or willingness to do their jobs" (Cole 2013c). Continuing

with the government's conciliatory stance, in response Kao Hua-chu again tended his resignation as Minister for Defence and was succeeded by Andrew Yang in early August.

The White Shirts Army Movement in essence began as a widespread movement against the treatment of recruits in Taiwan's military and its justice system. Led by an anonymous group of 'selfless' participants in Citizen 1985, it was positioned as non-threatening and outside the normal parameters of civil society. The KMT government responded with tolerance and understanding, actively attempting to fulfil the movement's demands. While this was unique during the Ma Ying-jeou presidency, protesters were dissatisfied with the outcome.

The ambiguous role of students in the White Shirts Army Movement

The White Shirts Army Movement continued to grow throughout 2013, with the staging of two further mass rallies. As with other movements during this period, young people made up the majority of participants. This included first time protesters who found Citizen 1985's political style accessible, and established student activists. While the latter adjusted their approach to fit within that specified by the movement's leaders, Citizen 1985 developed their legitimacy through distancing themselves from, and criticising the tactics of student-led movements.

After the success of the 20 July protest, Citizen 1985 planned another mass rally for 3 August 2013, to keep pressure on authorities. Held on the evening before Hung Chung-chiu's funeral, as many as 200000 people assembled on Ketegalan Boulevard outside the Presidential Palace in Taipei, setting a new record in Taiwan. The crowd was largely made up of young people and first-time protesters who did not have any political affiliations (Dou 2013). They made generalised demands for things such as "truth 真相" and "human rights 人權" (Chang 2013b), before calling on the government to allow the Special Investigation Division 特別偵查組 to investigate Hung's death and similar cases, and to reform the court martial system.

The event was tightly run and polished, even compared to strictly planned student protests, such as those in the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement. The crowds were again wearing white and held professional quality signs that read 'Big Citizen is Watching You' in English, beneath the image of a bleeding eye. They were designed to reference George Orwell's idea that 'Big Brother is Watching You' and remind politicians that they were responsible to the citizens. Participants also sung a version of 'Do You Hear the People Sing?' from *Les Miserables* that had been translated into Taiwanese by Professor Wu Yi-cheng 吳易澄 and uploaded to Youtube a few days prior (Su 2013), for attendees to learn.

Citizen 1985's control over the event, extended to strict seating rules, a designated press area and personnel responsible for avoiding disruptions. They were critical of the events run by student protesters, who they told the crowd were "not like them", but violent, irrational and low class. This tactic worked to attract participants who were unprepared for more direct political engagement (Cole 2013d). It also seemed to reassure the authorities and law enforcement, whose presence was minimal.

Indeed, several interviewees argued that the Citizen 1985 demonstrations made protesting accessible for people who were not involved in politics. As described by one participant for whom these protests were their first experience of activism:

> "Not until [the] event [organised by Citizen 1985] did everyone in Taiwan realise that they can go out on the street and be safe. They can protest and be safe. Because before that event, everyone saw protests to be very violent, and very dangerous… Your family would tell you: "Oh those people, they're wrong and they're very violent people who would go out on the street". But for many people this event changed all that. And it was only because of this [event] that I, and I think many other people, went to join [events]

like the Sunflower Movement, or anti-nuclear protests" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 21 April, 2015).

Another interviewee described how:

> "With the [protests over the death of] Hung [Chung-chiu], there was not the police response or impression of risk that you normally see with protests in Taiwan. It was different in this way, and I think made this type of thing acceptable to people who had disapproved before" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 21 May, 2015)

I would suggest that Citizen 1985 was also less threatening than student activists in their relationship to prescribed generational roles. Although not always articulated as such, young activists had often faced difficulty when their behavior was seen as disrespectful to their elders or a challenge to filial piety. For example, Chen Wei-ting was widely and publicly criticised when he was seen to be behaving 'rudely' during the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement, and government officials used their paternalistic concern for the health and safety of 'children', to stop them from protesting. Participants in the 318 Occupation were so concerned by their parents' disapproval of their activities, that they produced a book to address them (Hsiao, et. al. 2014) and explain that they were not deliberately disobeying their parents or society's expectations. In the 2015 Anti-Curriculum Changes Movement 反高中課綱微調運動 (反課綱) this issue became highly visible when the parents of one participant, Chou Tien-kuan 周天觀, attempted to physically remove him from a protest, and received sympathy for having to endure their son's rebellion (*Apple Daily* 2015).

In contrast, the White Shirts Army Movement became advocates for and representatives of families and parents in the process of Taiwan's military conscription. Their discourse often took on a caring and parternalistic stance towards young men, when protesters and the tearful

families of deceased soldiers demanded justice for and the protection of their sons (*BBC News* 2013). Where in other movements student activists had challenged the parameters of young people's role in society, the White Shirts Army Movement therefore reiterated the vulnerability of children. In combination with Citizen 1985's criticism of student-led protests, it indicated that the group did not seek to challenge underlying power structures in Taiwan in same way as young protesters documented in other movements.

Despite these differences, established student activists attended the rallies in response to Hung Chung-Chiu's death. Many were personally affected by military conscription and saw the issue as part of a broader need to reform Taiwan's political and justice systems (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 21 April, 2015). Members of Citizen 1985 and student activist coalitions also cooperated in other movements (Hioe 2017b). For example, members of Citizen 1985 became experts on the CSSTA, and the group were responsible for organising the space around the Legislative Yuan during the 318 Occupation in 2014 (Lin Zuyi as quoted in Hioe 2017c).

This suggests that although tension and even direct conflict emerged between young activists and Citizen 1985, they were able to cooperate pragmatically, and solidify the growing strength of Taiwan's civil society in opposition to both the blue and green sides of politics' reticence to adequately reform the military justice system. The divergence in their approaches reflected the differing positionalities of each group, their relationship to the state and institutionalised power, and their understanding of the function of protest. Within this process, student activists displayed an ongoing recognition of the requirements of different political settings, and their role as one source of support for disadvantaged groups in Taiwan's politics.

The success and diffusion of the White Shirts Army Movement

Despite their successes, Citizen 1985's impact on Taiwan's politics throughout 2013 and 2014 would prove to be inconsistent. They staged one final large-scale rally as a coherent force in 2013, as they began to campaign on different issues. Protesting alongside other groups, it was clear that they remained one of the most tolerated and visible civic organisations. Yet, by 2014 they struggled to maintain relevance, and were absorbed into other parts of civil society.

Still taking a placatory approach, throughout early August 2013 the government made a series of announcements in response to the White Shirts Army Movement's demands. On 5 August, the Taoyuan District Prosecutor's Office 桃園地方法院檢察署 – the authority responsible for the area in which the military prison Hung had been kept is located – announced that there had not been any tampering with the surveillance tapes.

More significantly, Premier Jiang Yi-huah publicly committed to establishing a group comprised of officials and representatives from civic groups to investigate potential abuses committed in the military. In addition, the government would revise the Code of Court Martial Procedure 軍事審判法 to allow cases to be reviewed in the civil judiciary (*Taiwan News* 2013).

The following week, amendments were passed in the Legislative Yuan dictating that military cases would be transferred to civil courts during peacetime. On 6 August Andrew Yang also resigned from the position of Ministry for Defence, although his official reason was for plagiarism charges over a book he had published in 2007.

With these achievements, Citizen 1985 shifted their focus to other civic issues in Taiwan. On 10 October 2013, they, amongst other civic groups, held a counter demonstration to the official events organised for the Republic of China's National Day Holiday 國立日. Their event 'On 10 October, All under heaven is for the public 十月十日，天下為公', drew a crowd of over 60000 and included the raising of a 'Citizen Flag 公民旗'. They called for the revision of

legislation that seemed outdated or an obstacle to democratic participation, such as the Referendum Act 公民投票法. Following the event, participants marched to Liberty Square and occupied the steps of Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall.

Through this protest Citizen 1985 solidified their political style and presence in Taiwan's civil society. The organisers remained focused on keeping their event peaceful and ensuring attendees did not cause disturbances. As a result, they continued to successfully mobilise participants, receive media coverage and tolerance from the authorities. In this instance, despite their large crowd, few policemen monitored the group and instead targeted student-led organisations like Black Island Nation Youth Front.

Regardless, Citizen 1985 had their final moment as a predominant force in early March 2014. On 7 March the Taoyuan District Court 桃園地方法院 delivered its verdict on the role of the military in the Hung Chung-chiu case, which found thirteen of the eighteen military officials facing charges guilty of 'abuse of power' (*Focus Taiwan* 2014). Far from the potential decades' long sentences, however, each received only a few month's jail time. The former commander of the 542nd Brigade Hsu Shin-cheng 徐信正 received the longest sentence for confining Hung, of eight months. The majority would be imprisoned for six months, and others for a period between three to five months, while some of the briefer sentences were commuted to a fine.

The verdict marked the transition of the issues surrounding Hung Chung-chiu's death from being promoted by Citizen 1985, to part of the platform of Taiwan's 'third force'. Shortly after the verdict, on March 18, the Sunflower Movement erupted and the group's members began to join other alliances and political parties. In 2016, Hung's sister, Hung Tzu-yung 洪慈庸, was elected to parliament as a member of the New Power Party 時代力量 (NPP) and continues to campaign for reform of the military justice system, and the improved treatment of recruits. The

issues of military conscription and Taiwan's relationship to China remain as contentious topics in parliament.

In this way, the White Shirts Army Movement helped drive debates over conscription, the military justice system, and the treatment of recruits to prominence in Taiwan's politics. Citizen 1985 and their cautious political style strengthened and mobilised new participants in civil society. Although short-lived, the movement therefore played an important role in shaping Taiwan's socio-political structure during this period. Student activists had a peripheral role in the protests against Hung Chung-chiu's death but drew from and leveraged the movement's momentum so as to influence Taiwan's politics.

The Complex and Non-Linear Development of Taiwan's Civil Society

For participants and academic analysis alike, the Sunflower Movement gave new meaning to the social movements that had preceded it (Hawang 2016, 110-115). At their conclusion, the protests against forced evictions in Dapu and Huaguang, along with Hung Chung-chiu Incident, seemed to have had limited success or the ability to maintain relevance. In hindsight, however, they reveal how civil society was strengthened and prepared for the 318 Occupation. These movements made protesting accessible to new participants, developed activists' strategies, and unified disparate groups.

Yet these protests also represent the difficulty for activists who sought to mobilise citizens and shape political debate during this period. Participants differed in their values, concerns and understanding of appropriate political action, leading to conflicts within the community. These particular movements also faced the challenge of addressing the emotive elements of their campaigns, while achieving tangible political goals. The apparent success of the Sunflower Movement and 2016 election have not resolved these tensions, and they continue to be negotiated within parliament and civil society (Hioe 2018b).

Unlike other movements explored in this thesis, protests against forced evictions and the White Shirts Army Movement have not been classified as ‘student movements’. Young activists were often on the margins of events, while participants drew legitimacy from tactics and ideas outside the student activist tradition. Even so, in reflexively navigating this environment, students developed new networks and repertoires of protest. They adapted their approach and made cooperation possible, strategically drawing from the momentum these movements had created. While not nominally ‘student movements’, these protests therefore provided the opportunity for young activists to redefine the nature of their political participation. They challenged the traditional role of young people in Taiwan’s socio-political environment, and therefore how ‘student movements’ themselves are understood.

Chapter 6: The Shifting Significance of Taiwan's 318 Occupation

Introduction

Between 18 March and 10 April 2014 thousands of protesters led by a group of student activists, the Black Island Nation Youth Alliance, and a coalition of NGOs and civic groups, occupied the Legislative Yuan and surrounding streets in Taipei. On 17 March the governing KMT had prematurely ended a parliamentary review meeting and sent the controversial CSSTA, directly to be approved in a plenary session. Opponents occupied the parliament in an attempt to delay this process. In the movement that followed – now known as the Sunflower Student Movement or 318 Occupation – the CSSTA became a metaphor for Taiwan's changing relationship with China's power, growing economic inequality in Taiwan, and how society engages with the KMT's authoritarian past. It received widespread international recognition, and a rally on 30 March drew crowds of an estimated 500000 people. After Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, promised that legislation increasing the monitoring of cross-strait agreements would be introduced before the CSSTA was reviewed again, the protest ended on 10 April.

Over the next few years this unprecedented event continued to shape the course of Taiwan's politics. Later in 2014, participants staged large-scale anti-nuclear protests (Ho 2018b, 456-458) and help elect an independent candidate, Ko Wen-je 柯文哲, as Mayor of Taipei. They built momentum within civil society throughout 2015 by supporting labour unions and the Anti-Curriculum Changes Movement, before channelling their discontent into establishing new political parties (Fell 2016, 45-47). In early 2016, along with the DPP, these minor parties became part of the political opposition to the KMT, in the elections in which Tsai Ing-wen was voted in as president, and several minor party representatives won seats in the Legislative Yuan.

As a result of this trajectory, the 318 Occupation as it will hereafter be referred to, and the group of student activists who initiated the occupation, have become popular topics of

academic inquiry. It has served as a case study for researchers to examine national identity amongst the younger generations in Taiwan (Pan 2015; Chen and Yen 2017; Wang 2017); consider the future of cross-strait relations and Taiwan's democracy (Rowen 2015; Beckershoff 2017; Jones and Su 2015); test theories of social media use and mobilisation among young activists (Chen, Ping, and Chen 2015; Skoric, Zhu, and Pang 2016), and analyse abstract concepts like 'political opportunity structure' (Ho 2015). The occupation has also become synonymous with the idea that civil society unified against the KMT in a democratic "awakening" (Ho 2014; Yan, Lo, Liang, and Jiang 2015; Cole 2015; Fell 2017a).

More recently, however, there has been a growing criticism of the 318 Occupation, particularly from those who were involved. Recent conferences on the event have reflected a degree of disillusion and remorse, with focus shifting to how things could have been done differently, and what legacy can be salvaged (Bao et al. 2018; Brian Hioe, as quoted in Morris 2018b). This reassessment expresses on the one hand the porous boundary between institutionalised academic analysis and political practices in Taiwan, which has flowed into growing frustration with the DPP government young activists helped elect (Ihara 2018; *The Economist* 2018). Many have consequently returned to academia to more systematically study and contribute to Taiwan's political future.

In line with much of the established research on the topic, this chapter examines the 318 Occupation as a part of these narratives, and a moment of change in Taiwan's socio-political environment. It gives particular focus to the role of young activists in intervening in institutionalised legislative politics, through their self-reflexive engagement in civil society. At the same time, it seeks to add to analyses by exploring the complex and often open-ended aspects of the movement. It examines the contradictory nature of political action as a period of contention the meaning of which continues to be negotiated long after the specific political event.

This chapter begins by examining the origins of the 318 Occupation. A direct response to the KMT accelerating the approval of a Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement, the movement signalled that a significant part of Taiwanese society was discontented with debates over geopolitics, national identity, democratic practice and economics, and seeking new ways of discussing these issues. Having engaged in direct political action in the lead up to the 318 Occupation, it was young activists who drove the initial occupation. To do so, they drew on the tactics and networks they had developed in past social movements, including the support of other civic groups, and the use of social media.

Once inside the parliament, the protesters remade the political space of the legislative chamber, articulating their criticism of the political status quo and intention to disrupt the centre of institutionalised political power in Taiwan. Over the following three weeks their actions enabled the burgeoning of organised and individualised forms of political expression, including experiments in idealised forms of democracy. However, establishing a site for free speech and the pursuit of ideals in this way, also exposed tensions and contradictions from within the community of young activists. Conflicts emerged over political values, the distribution of power, and modes of political practice, severe enough to lead to breakaway protests and ongoing animosity. In this sense, achieving political space made visible significant divisions, which had been strategically obscured in the past. The movement accordingly became a symbol of a diverse and disparate civil society's ability to cooperate in the pursuit of political goals.

The course of the 318 Occupation was also shaped by the failure of an attempt to occupy the Executive Yuan and the response by police. Young activists used that moment to position themselves as the victims of political violence and write themselves into the history of protests against authoritarianism in Taiwan. Yet the incident was also a turning point and source of trauma in many participants' lives. Political violence became a core part of their experience and shaped how they understood their own activism.

Through its strength, the 318 Occupation also revealed the limits of civil society in Taiwan. The movement's most direct tangible achievement, halting the CSSTA, was incomplete and still dependent on the actions of the KMT government and Legislative Yuan. Indeed, for the young activists involved, this realisation led to the creation of minor parties and a focus on the 2016 presidential election. Since then, cognizant of the obstacles to legislative success, student activists have extended their focus to reforming the political system.

In this sense, the 318 Occupation was indicative of a form of modernity in which idealism coincided with a reflexive awareness of political process. Young activists had displayed their ability to, in Margaret Archer's words, "consider themselves in relation to their (social) contexts and vice versa" (Archer 2007, 4), and continuously monitor and adapt their behavior based on the outcome, as predicted by Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash (1994). At the same time, their pursuit and experimentation with an ideal form of democracy was reminiscent of Jean Francis-Lyotard's concept of "grand narratives" (Lyotard 1984), and the suggestion of teleological progress. Their actions can accordingly be interpreted as the expression of a form of modernity in which reflexivity coincides with the pursuit of moral standards.

The Origins of Conflict over the CSSTA and the 318 Occupation

When activists occupied the Legislative Yuan on 18 March 2014 in opposition to the CSSTA, for many analysts their motivations were clear (Tiezzi 2014; Cole 2014a; Harrison 2014). The agreement converged with several deep-rooted and highly contentious debates in Taiwan, including calling into question the very meaning of 'Taiwan' itself. The agreement touched on the issue of cross-strait relations and Taiwanese independence, economic fairness in trade with China, and the effectiveness of neoliberal economics. The KMT's approach to passing the deal also exposed differing understandings of democracy, and appropriate parliamentary conduct.

From this perspective, the CSSTA embodied the concerns of a significant portion of Taiwan's population. The 318 Occupation was an extension of the years of legislative negotiations and civic action designed to shape Taiwan's socio-economic environment.

The CSSTA as epitomising tensions over Taiwan's geopolitics

The CSSTA was a multifaceted treaty signed on 21 June 2013 by the organisations who represent the two sides of the strait: The SEF for Taiwan and ARATS for China. Designed to strengthen the economic connections between the two, the agreement intersected with the issues of geopolitics and Taiwan's national status. As explored throughout this thesis, divisions over cross-strait relations have long shaped Taiwan's politics, influencing policies and debates at multiple levels. These issues were brought to a head through the CSSTA, which encompassed the ideological dimensions of, and had the potential to directly influence, the island's future.

The CSSTA was a follow up to the ECFA, signed in June 2010. The ECFA was a preferential trade pact reducing tariffs and barriers between the two sides of the strait, targeting eleven sectors ranging from goods to the film industry (Mainland Affairs Council 2010).

At the time, the KMT government presented the ECFA as important to fostering cooperation with the PRC, and the promotion of neoliberal globalised trade policy for which Taiwan had in many ways been a prototype since the 1960s. The agreement was promoted as primarily beneficial to Taiwan, with economic gains predicted to be five times more than those of China (Shih and Chao 2010). It was also argued that the ECFA would allow Taiwan to strengthen economic ties with other countries and join multilateral economic bodies. The PRC had previously pressured other countries not to sign similar pacts with the island and had dictated the conditions through which it could join organisations like the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

Although framed as benign, the agreement was part of the KMT's long-term strategy towards China that held open the possibility of eventual unification (D. Chen 2014, 33-36). Since 2008, this goal had been pursued through initiatives like the 'Three Links' agreement, which had opened postal services, transportation and trade between the two sides. These policies were designed to enhance the interconnection between China and Taiwan in such a way that normalized the possibility of so-called 'peaceful reunification'.

Within this context, advocates for Taiwanese independence and critics of the KMT opposed the deal. Their discourse often retraced the historical legacy of relations between Taiwan, as the ROC or 'Free China' and the PRC, framing the PRC as an enemy. For example, tens of thousands of people who rallied against the ECFA on 26 June 2010 chanted that the deal was "embracing communist China" (Chao and Chang 2010).

At the same time, opposition to the ECFA also recognised the nuance of the PRC's approach to achieving unification. The economic benefits of the agreement were seen as part of attempts create a 'One China market' and increase Taiwan's reliance on the PRC.

As described by one interviewee in relation to the ECFA and CSSTA:

> "If you look into all the details of these agreements, the evil is in the details. They actually create lots of backdoors for China to have a say in things like media, in publishing; in our daily lives…They allow China to actually buy companies and have control of our economy… I think historically you can compare [these agreements] to the agreement used in Tibet…the 'Peaceful Liberation Agreement' [the Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet 中央人民政府和西藏地方政府关于和平解放西藏办法的协议], signed in 1951...If you look at the two documents I think you would find many similarities [in that] in the beginning they are both sold like a peaceful agreement

> but then the controls begin. They [the CCP] tried to dilute, to lower the density of Tibetan influence in their own area. So, everybody knew that the trade agreement was just a precursor… people perceived the trade agreement as the beginning of the disaster" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 27 March, 2015).

On this basis, after members of the Executive Yuan approved the ECFA in early July 2010, a heated review process followed. The KMT persistently refused the DPP's proposals to review the agreement article by article, and in one legislative sitting a violent brawl broke out between legislators in response, where various objects were thrown, and one legislator was injured (Wang and Mo 2010). With such resolute opinions over the ECFA, calls were made to hold a referendum on its outcome. The government refused, however, and the deal was ratified on 2 July, officially becoming law on 1 January 2011. The CSSTA therefore was introduced into a tense political and policy environment that was already divided over trade deals with China. Opinions largely fell along ideological lines, and the agreement became inseparable from debates over the future of cross-strait relations.

Economic concerns with the CSSTA

With the signing of the ECFA and CSSTA, the issue of Taiwan's geopolitics also converged with debates over economic fairness. The agreements exposed broader power dynamics in the region, and exemplified Taiwan's economic vulnerability in relation to China.

In 2013, China was Taiwan's largest trading partner, with a relationship worth over US$190 billion annually, and many companies operating across the two markets. The CSSTA sought to solidify this arrangement by opening service industries to investment. It would also create new avenues for businesses to setup branches in the opposite territory through changes to visa arrangements.

In response to these details, opponents quickly identified the threats that the new deal posed to Taiwan's economy and local businesses. In particular, Taiwan's services industries comprised nearly 70 percent of its economy, and encompassed mostly small and medium sized companies. In contrast, China's economy was worth ten times that of Taiwan, and included multinational and state-owned conglomerates. Thus, there was concern that the imbalance in economy size would favour China and allow its large companies to undermine the smaller ones in Taiwan (Mo 2013).

These issues dominated protests against the CSSTA throughout July 2013. At this time, rallies were attended by a few hundred participants mostly associated with a coalition of NGOs and civic groups known as the Democratic Front against Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement 反黑箱服貿民主陣線, and the DPP. The arguments against the CSSTA included "worry about the negative impacts…on Taiwan's business" (Chang 2013c), in addition to the island's loss of sovereignty. Protesters demanded that unions representing Taiwan's workers be included in any future reviews of the deal.

Hence, the CSSTA triggered concerns in Taiwan over the relationship between China's economic strength and geopolitical power. These dynamics created solidarity between those engaged in labour politics with independence advocates.

A broader critique of neoliberalism through opposition to the CSSTA

From mid-2013, young people also became increasingly visible critics of the economic threat posed by the deal. Their opposition addressed not only the potential effects to the services industry, but a larger disillusionment with the global economic system.

In 2013, Taiwanese youth faced a difficult socio-economic environment. They were confronted by a growing youth unemployment rate, already at thirteen percent (*Focus Taiwan* 2013), some of the world's most expensive housing costs (Guilford 2014) and a graduate wage on average

of just NT$22,000 a month for those who could find work, barely above the legal minimum of NT$21,000 (Hung 2015). According to Beckershoff, young participants in protests against the CSSTA were unhappy with this situation and felt let down by those who had promised prosperity through closer ties with China (Beckershoff 2017). As the CSSTA potentially threatened Taiwan's largest industries, it was believed that it would exacerbate the negative environment young people already faced (Wang 2014a).

In this sense, the participation of young people in the 318 Occupation is reminiscent of protests around the world against neoliberalism in the post-Global Financial Crisis era. According to Paul Mason (2012), unrest and revolutions across Europe, America and Africa during this time were ultimately the product of a failure in the global economic system, felt most acutely by young people. In Taiwan, however, this loose global movement against neoliberalism found a distinctive expression mediated by the geopolitics of cross-straits relations and Taiwan's domestic politics. According to one postgraduate student, the CSSTA represented how the failure of neoliberalism for the younger generation was tantamount with Taiwan's relationship with China. The student said:

> "The CSSTA issue was emblematic… Because [of] Taiwan's relationship with China you can talk about the issue with traditional nationalist discourses, but you can also view it as a neoliberal problem. China is a massive practitioner of phony capitalism. And companies with close ties with China tend to maintain [this] dubious relationship with the ruling party, so [problems with] economic liberalism [are combined with] maintaining national sovereignty" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 21 May, 2015).

For young Taiwanese, opposition to the CSSTA can consequently be understood as a display of dissatisfaction with the global neoliberal economic system and China's role within it.

Activists did not trust the promises of economic prosperity through the deal, nor did they believe that the geopolitical threat it posed was worth the risk.

The CSSTA highlighting the limitations of Taiwan's democracy

This coalition of opponents to the CSSTA originally focused their efforts on blocking the agreement through the legislative process. In doing so, they expressed a willingness to work within parliamentary procedures, but also made known their distrust of the KMT government's approach to policy and political process. The CSSTA consequently became a proposition through which the parameters of Taiwan's democracy could be negotiated and a metaphor for Taiwan's democracy more generally. Concerns with the CSSTA developed into a broader campaign against the KMT's lack of political transparency, and for reform of the process of legislating trade agreements.

The issue of appropriate legislative procedure came to light on 1 August 2013. At this time, activists and other stakeholders were excluded from the first of sixteen scheduled public hearings over the CSSTA (Shih 2013a). President Ma Ying-jeou justified his government's actions by announcing that on 15 September he would publicly debate DPP chairman Su Tseng-chang 蘇貞昌 over the agreement. This decision was designed to placate the public and to act as a substitute for other public contributions to the legislative review process.

The concerns of opponents to the CSSTA were further exacerbated as it became public that there was infighting within the KMT over the deal. On 31 July, one of Ma's advisors Rex How 郝明義 had resigned, stating that he felt the President's behaviour had been autocratic and "stupid" (Shih 2013b), over the deal. Now it emerged that President Ma had unfairly accused Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng of illegal lobbying, as he was unlikely to support the ratification of the CSSTA. On 30 September 2013, the High Court ruled against President Ma's

attempts to revoke Wang's KMT membership, but rumours remained that a number of KMT officials did not want to back the deal.

This hostility persisted into November, after President Ma requested the review of the CSSTA be expedited. Ma stated that he was concerned that the deal would be undermined by a free-trade agreement between South Korea and China that was being discussed at the time. Later in the year, the Executive Yuan also began linking the need to pass the CSSTA with Taiwan's bid to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a US-led trade agreement. The President claimed that only ratifying the pact as soon as possible would ensure other countries perceived Taiwan as "a responsible signatory for every trade pact it signs" (Shih 2013c).

In response, protesters began to characterise the KMT's approach as opaque and undemocratic. They adopted the term 'black box 黑箱' to describe both the lack of transparency surrounding the CSSTA and also the need for laws that facilitated public input in the legislative process (Cole 2015, 116). As such, this concept implied an idealised form of democracy, which was open and beholden to citizens. It suggested that even if actions were legal, they could undermine moral standards, and the philosophical underpinnings of Taiwan's political system.

Indeed, throughout late 2013 it appeared that these concerns were justified, when it was revealed that even the few review mechanisms in place had not been fulfilled before the CSSTA was signed. Amongst other incomplete review procedures, only two of three externally commissioned assessment reports on the effects of the CSSTA by the Mainland Affair Council had been finalised (Lee and Hsu 2013a).

In response, the movement against the CSSTA began to modify its demands. At demonstrations throughout November and December 2013, outside the Straits Exchange Foundation, the Presidential Office, and following ARATS Chairman Chen Deming 陳德銘 during his eight-day visit to the island (Lee and Hsu 2013b), protesters called for extra legislation to be passed

before the CSSTA was ratified. The proposed laws would address how treaties with China were negotiated, the regulation of Chinese investment, and labour in Taiwan, and the introduction of procedures to assess of the impact of free trade (Wang 2013b). They were designed to institutionalise openness within the review process, while recognising the distinct relationship between China and Taiwan.

Conflict over the CSSTA therefore revealed the gap between activists' assertion of democratic ideals and the practices being deployed by the KMT. The campaign to block the agreement thereafter began to focus on restructuring the legislative process, and institutionalising a system more closely aligned with their ideals.

Parliamentary chaos over the CSSTA

By 2014, a clear impasse had emerged over the CSSTA. Between 2 and 19 January, divisions over understandings of cross-strait relations and democratic practice materialised in fierce conflict, and legislative deadlock.

For example, from January 2014, activists and DPP legislators called for trade deals with China to be included in a treaty act that was being debated. As part of this new legislation, the CSSTA and future agreements with the PRC would be subject to the same oversight mechanisms as those with other countries. Yet the KMT refused on the basis that "ties between Taiwan and China (were) not country-to-country relations" (Wang 2014b). Within this environment, any compromise over the deal seemed to signal a defeat for one side in the issue of Taiwan's national status.

Even so, disputes over the CSSTA also re-emerged within the KMT government. In mid-January Wang Jin-pyng proposed that a cross-strait affairs panel be introduced to give the legislative members more input into the review process. Further revealing the government's determination to pass the deal, minister for the Mainland Affairs Council Wang Yu-chi 王郁

琦 quickly dismissed the decision. Wang argued that any dissension over the deal would complicate matters and may lead to a "constitutional dispute" (S. Hsu 2014).

By March 2014 tensions over the CSSTA were high, with no clear path for the issue to be resolved in a way that was satisfactory for both parties. In the wake of the final public hearing held on 9 March 2014, the DPP again called for the agreement to be completely renegotiated before it passed to the Legislative Yuan for review. The KMT responded by threatening to employ Article 60 of the Act Governing the Legislative Yuan's Powers 立法院職權行使法, which would enable it to institute the pact immediately (Wang and Shih 2014). There was also conflict over who should convene the joint committee meeting in parliament, with both sides feeling that the leading party would have an advantage in directing the outcome of the process.

Continuing with this discord, the final parliamentary review of the CSSTA opened on 12 March with fights between lawmakers. Legislators pushed, shoved, hurled insults and assaulted each other for the following five days; not a single article in the CSSTA was debated (Loa 2014a). The DPP had purposefully instigated conflicts as a way to obstruct the ratification of the deal. Even so, they were shocked when on 17 March the KMT ended the review process by sending the CSSTA straight to the plenary session. The act would now immediately be voted on, and most likely passed by the KMT majority, without further review.

Thus, the 318 Occupation grew out of years of tension and fierce debate over trade deals with China. These divisions encompassed ideological perceptions of Taiwan's national status, concerns over economic inequality, the global neoliberal capitalist system, and the nature of democracy. Opponents to the CSSTA had campaigned against the deal both in protests and through parliamentary avenues. The KMT government appeared resolute on instituting the deal, ignoring dissension from within the party, and eventually utilising extra-parliamentary means to have it passed.

Hence, conflict over the CSSTA represents the culmination of years of protest and negotiation over a number of intersecting issues in Taiwan's socio-political environment. As explored in the following section, through the occupation of the Legislative Yuan, activists channelled this momentum into creating a platform for civic expression.

Youth Activism in the 318 Occupation

From 18 March young people took charge of opposition to the CSSTA. After seizing the Legislative Yuan, they mounted a sustained campaign, drawing thousands of people to occupy the site in the following weeks. To do so, they utilised the tactics and networks they had established in proceeding social movements, relying on the support of civic groups and their skills with social media. Thus, the occupation signalled the realisation of a salient political space for young people, long pursued in their protests.

With an unparalleled platform, young participants began to self-reflexively remake the Legislative Yuan into a version of their socio-political goals and ideals. The space was used as a site of free expression and debate, offering education, community, and experiments in direct democracy. In this sense, the occupation became an articulation of a distinct form of liberal modernity by young activists, defined by their self-conscious engagement in its idealised precepts. The movement also captured a liberal teleology, becoming an expression of an idealised future for Taiwan through a critical self-reflexive engagement with the current system.

Young activists become visible in Taiwan's politics through the occupation of parliament

For student activists, the occupation of the Legislative Yuan on 18 March 2014 was the culmination of a series of protests against the KMT government's political agenda of formalising closer ties with the PRC. In the preceding years, they had learned to mobilise participants, adjust their tactics, and work cooperatively with other groups in civil society, in a way that established a significant presence in Taiwan's politics. Indeed, these practices were

prominently drawn on in the initial occupation of parliament and facilitated what was an unprecedented event in Taiwan's history. While unclear before its occurrence, the occupation can accordingly be understood as the culmination of young activists' reflexive navigation of Taiwan's civil society.

As already described, young people had been involved in protests against the ECFA and CSSTA since the deals were first announced. Student participation had been distinct from other groups in their criticism of the contemporary neoliberal capitalist system and China's role within it. Even so, the mobilisation of young people came about through broader dissatisfaction with Taiwan's socio-political environment, beyond their opinion on trade deals with China. As detailed in previous chapters, students had already pivoted towards the issue of the CSSTA in 2013, after the demolition of houses in Dapu and Huaguang, and as the White Shirts Army Movement lost momentum. Their activism throughout these protests, as in the Wild Strawberry Movement and Anti-Media Monopoly Movement before it, had been focused against the KMT and into improving Taiwan's democratic system, strengthening civil society, protecting the rights of the disadvantaged, equalising economic opportunities, and defending Taiwan's sovereignty. Throughout these movements, young activists had cooperated with other parts of civil society to develop their skills, strengthen their community, and map a distinctive terrain of progressive and democratic politics in Taiwan.

Young people solidified this strategy in their opposition to the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement. On 5 September 2013, despite the existence of organisations already addressing the CSSTA (such as Cross-Strait Agreement Watch 兩岸協議監視聯盟 CSWA and Taiwan Democracy Watch), Tsing Hua University student Wei Yang 魏揚 formed Black Island Nation Youth Front. From this time, the group became representative of a specific 'youth' voice in debates over cross-strait relations and worked closely with well-known activists like Lin Fei-

fan and Chen Wei-ting. The group allowed young protesters to differentiate themselves from other parts of civil society, while working cooperatively to shape their political terrain.

This approach was present in the conduct of student activists in the lead up to the 18 March occupation of the Legislative Yuan. During this time, they negotiated their tactics and worked collectively with other civic groups, so as to present a united front against the CSSTA.

For example, the occupation on the evening of 18 March came about after days of deliberation between participants over how best to resist the implementation of the CSSTA. Protesters had been assembled outside the Legislative Yuan since 12 March, led by the Democratic Front against the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (Hsu 2017, 135). In order to avoid conflict, young activists had put their desire for a more aggressive protest aside, agreeing to stage a series of carefully planned demonstrations and press conferences to call for a line-by-line review of the pact (Rowen 2015, 7). By 18 March, however, after the KMT cut the review process short, Black Island Nation Youth took the lead in entering the parliament.

The tactic of occupation itself had also been practiced and normalised by young activists in preceding movements. Throughout the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement and protests over Huaguang and Dapu, students had attempted to forcibly enter government buildings and use their bodies to obstruct demolitions. In the process they had become skilled at peacefully resisting arrest, mobilising support through social media, and efficiently communicating their message before they were removed from sites (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 9 June, 2015). While never sustained before March 2014, this strategy had allowed young activists to gain significant attention and force a response from the government, despite their lack of resources.

These skills were utilised at 9pm on 18 March, when around 300 people jumped the fence to the Legislative Yuan compound and tore down the front gate. With only a few police at the site,

they were able to enter the legislative chamber and occupy the podium before barricading the door with furniture from within the room. Later, protesters also brought ladders to the site so that they could climb into the second story of the building. This level became the occupation headquarters and a point of entry for those wanting to enter or leave the building.

The occupation was also made possible by support from sympathetic politicians. While aligned with their own agendas, the actions of these legislators undermined police and government authority to expel the protesters. For example, politicians from the DPP and TSU, including Tsai Ing-wen, who became chair of the DPP shortly after the occupation, cited their right to bring guests to parliament as a way to justify the occupation. As Legislative Speaker, Wang Jin-pyng had legal responsibility over parliament and prevented Premier Jiang Yi-huah from using riot police to remove the students (Rowen 2015, 7).

Originally, the protesters planned to stay in the Legislative Yuan until March 21, at which time the plenary session was due to vote on the CSSTA. To do so, they once again drew on their practices and organised relationships from past protests in order to transform the site into a habitable space. As explored in previous chapters, young activists had developed networks through their participation in a variety of social movements. This process had required adaptability and compromise from the students, who had to alter their political styles and rhetoric in order to fit the requirements of different protests. In the 318 Occupation, however, these networks provided logistical support to facilitate protesters' presence within the Legislative Yuan. For example, civic groups and members of the public donated food, water and medical supplies, and even brought in generators after the government cut electricity to the building. From March 19, members of Citizen 1985, who student activists had worked alongside in the White Shirts Army Movement, largely took responsibility for traffic control, receiving and distributing supplies, and maintaining order in encampments surrounding the

legislature (Hioe 2017b). This included Taiwan Rural Front, who young activists had supported during protests against the demolition of houses in Dapu.

Protesters also drew on their past experiences to mobilise large crowds, particularly through social media. Soon after entering the Legislative Yuan the civic 'hacker' group g0v installed wireless internet and set up a live stream documenting activity inside the chamber. As with other student-led movements in Taiwan, Facebook and the bulletin-board system PTT became central sources of information for participants and the media alike, for which teams of volunteers ran pages in a variety of languages. Public *Google Docs*[8] included a list of items needed by the occupation for those wanting to donate, while participants used private platforms to discuss strategy (Cheng 2014).

The use of social media has been attributed to the mobilisation of the large crowds of supporters from March 19. By March 20 over 2000, mostly young, protesters had assembled in the compound surrounding the Legislative Yuan, calling for the CSSTA to be revised. Several interviewees described the role that these technologies played in their own experience of the 318 Occupation. In a way that research suggests was typical throughout the movement (Rowen 2015; Lo, Wei, and Lu 2017; Ho 2015; Tsatsou and Zhao 2016), one participant recounted how they decided to join the occupation after learning about it via social media.

They said: "So on the day of occupation everyone saw on Facebook what was happening… We were already really worried about what was happening in Taiwan [in terms of the government's actions and the CSSTA]. We thought though: 'Maybe it's too dangerous with the police [being at the Legislative Yuan], and everything". But actually, we could see through social media that it was okay, that it was safe. So we, me and my sister, we went over and had

[8] *Google Docs* is a free word processing service offered as part of *Google Drive*, which allows users to write and edit documents in real-time, whilst working collaboratively with other users.

a look because we were in Taipei, and I decided I should stay…I didn't know anyone there at the time but after seeing what was going on for myself, felt I could contribute" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 21 April, 2015).

While this participant had become aware of the occupation through social media, their proximity to the Legislative Yuan allowed them to go and observe activities firsthand. In contrast, another interviewee was originally based overseas and therefore dependent on the online community to learn about the protests.

They said: "Before the Sunflower Movement I had already participated in some organisations back in Taiwan through the internet that protested against the government and also wrote articles about the politics of the different protests…At that time I was more like a semi-member, like in a consultant role…But then during the occupation I was talking to people online, and the global online Sunflower initiator, [who] is actually in London and she asked if anyone was willing to be a part of the Sunflower Movement in the city where you're located. So, I actually told them, yeah, I'm in [location redacted], I'm willing to organise all [of this] region. The region was actually the only one in the global protest, which consists of seven or eight cities. Most of them are just one city, say Amsterdam. So I would say that considering the population scale, I think I did a good job of coordinating communication, which showed that I had real skills that could really be useful…So about half way through the movement I get invited to the Legislative Yuan to help… I was a negotiator, mediator, between different stakeholders…In that way my experience and actually the occupation of the parliament in general is the conjunction point between the cyber world and the real world… There was the basic thinking that [we needed to stage an occupation] to directly stop the parliament, to paralyse the parliament. [But at the same time] we needed social media to support and to sustain the occupation. On the internet you can communicate with anyone you like. It's very decentralised" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 27 March, 2015).

Thus, the 318 Occupation can be understood as the apex of years of cooperation between civic groups in Taiwan against the CSSTA and the different socio-political issues embedded within it. Young people had often been the driving force behind this process, forming networks of activists, developing their skills and strategies before combining their experience by seizing the Legislative Yuan. In particular, the occupation had been made possible through the support students had engineered, their practice in embodied forms of protest, and mobilising participants over social media. In this way, the occupation represented young activists' realisation of a distinctive political space that traversed urban space, sites of power like the Legislative Yuan, campuses, and also the virtual space of social media. Navigating this terrain was made possible by the students' self-reflexive engagement with Taiwan's politics.

The occupied parliament as an idealised version of Taiwanese politics

The occupation against the CSSTA continued to grow throughout March 2014, establishing its place as an extraordinary act of political resistance. With the end-date becoming unclear, participants began to explore and experiment with different forms of politics, including direct democracy and a culture of open discussion. Through this process, the occupied space of the Legislative Yuan became a metaphor for a new future for Taiwan, driven by a diverse and powerful civil society. Participants formed new bonds and ways of being political, finding community and empowerment through their activism.

As such, the 318 Occupation reflected the contradictory forms of modernity contained within the politics of young activists in Taiwan. From one perspective, it represented a moment of hope, the belief in enduring change, and the realisation of the narrative of Taiwan's democratisation. At the same time, the occupation was a practical step in the campaign against the CSSTA, which had to be managed to have long term relevance. It ultimately exposed many of the limitations and obstacles to the campaign's goals.

By 20 March participants had organised the site of the Legislative Yuan and developed daily routines. Both those inside and outside the Legislative Yuan slept on flattened cardboard boxes or donated sleeping bags, finding the time to rest or study whenever it was available (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 2 August, 2015). More food and drink were donated, as was a box of sunflowers, which consequently became the symbol of the movement. In order to maintain the occupation's profile, participants established a designated media and translation divisions, whose role it was to liaise with the media and generate continued interest in the protest. A team of young medical students and professionals also joined the occupation, where they primarily treated protesters for dehydration and exhaustion.

Participants began to focus on upholding the security of the parliament and staging a peaceful protest. 'Rationality' had been a distinguishing feature of student activism for several years, adopted in response to the highly emotional and violent displays by politicians and other civic groups (see the chapter on the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement). During the 318 Occupation, around 80 student protesters formed a security team who patrolled the legislative chamber. Their main tasks were to monitor police movements, dissuade participants from damaging the Legislative Yuan, and circumvent conflicts either between protesters or with police (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 9 June, 2015).

By this time, Lin Fei-fan and Chen Wei-ting had also emerged as the movement's leaders. They continued to work with other activists, including Wei Yang and Huang Kuo-chang from the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement, but had become the faces of the protest and, subsequently, minor celebrities. In their regular appearances, Chen and Lin delivered words of encouragement to participants, while defining the occupation's demands for the media. These included that the government reject the CSSTA and cease cross-strait negotiations until appropriate supervisory mechanisms had been legislated.

Yet both President Ma and Premier Jiang Yi-huah publicly dismissed these requests, and in so doing, did not engage with the fundamental differences expressed by the Sunflower Movement over how Taiwan's national status and economic future were understood. Instead they argued that the trade agreement would be beneficial to Taiwan and would have to be ratified to preserve the island's international credibility.

Other sections of the government and pan-blue media remained hostile towards the occupation, drawing on arguments that had been used to discredit earlier student-led protests. Several commentators accused participants of having been brainwashed, refusing to acknowledge their agency or understanding of politics. For example, members of the KMT accused the DPP of being the "masterminds behind the protest" (Shih 2014a) and manipulating students into doing their bidding.

Critics of the occupation sought to delegitimise the movement by framing protester's behaviour as emotional and disorderly. For example, Secretary-General of the National Security Council King Pu-tsung 金溥聰, depicted the occupation as "violent" (Shih 2014b), and focused on the arrests and property damage that had occurred during the initial take-over of parliament.

Support for the occupation was steady, but often within the confines of partisan politics. For example, DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang 蘇貞昌 used a speech on 21 March inside the Legislative Yuan, notionally in support of the student protesters, to endorse a mayoral candidate for Taichung. Pan-green media also idolised participants and used their 'righteousness' to criticise the KMT. During the less eventful days of the movement, media outlets such as the *Liberty Times* 自由時報 ran feature articles profiling individual student activists, where they were portrayed as self-sacrificing and noble (Tu and Pan 2014).

By 20 March, with no tangible progress, protesters issued an ultimatum with a vague threat to extend their action if they did not receive a positive response from the government. Wang Jin-

pyng now promised to find a solution that would satisfy the students, refusing to meet with President Ma and Premier Jiang on 21 March, because he felt they were not "listening to public opinion" (Shih 2014b). Indeed, polls had begun to show that over 60 percent of Taiwan's population supported the occupation and believed that the CSSTA should be revised (Loa 2014b). In response, President Ma increased the police presence at the site.

Even so, the 318 Occupation had begun to develop relevance beyond the CSSTA. In the first few days of the protest, the site of the Legislative Yuan was transformed into a space for artistic expression, debate, and experimentation with different forms of political organisation.

Reflecting the diversity of the crowd and consistent flow of new participants, the compound around parliament took on an atmosphere of freedom and celebration. Stalls selling food and merchandise appeared, while live music and contemporary dance performances were staged most nights. Through this, the occupation became a point of interest in Taipei and a popular evening destination, frequented by parents with young children or office workers who had finished their shifts (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 1 September, 2015). While many activists kept focus on the particularities of legislation, others imbued their participation with festiveness, and incorporated their politics into a reimagined everyday.

A sense of liveliness and audacious political practice was also created in the occupation through the use of art. Initially commissions from university clubs and small businesses, later added to by participants with varying degrees of skill, image-making sought to unify the crowds while allowing for diversity and open contributions. Participants drew inspiration from the movement's sunflower motif and the symbols of past protests, generating a visual representation of Taiwan's civil society. They also found commonality in mocking President Ma, who was regularly depicted as a Nazi, trying to placate China in a panda suit, or with deer

antlers, making fun of his mistaking antler velvet used in Chinese medicine for “hair from the deer’s ears” (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 1 September, 2015).

In addition to this festive atmosphere, the legislative compound also became a safe space for personal expression and the discussion of ideas. In makeshift ‘citizen classrooms’, experts ran seminars on the potential effects of the CSSTA, or lectured on broader issues of economics, democratic process, and class politics. Participants established support groups where they discussed their motivation for protesting, and difficulties they were having with their families, such as being pressured not to attend the protests. Members of historically dispossessed groups, such as aboriginal tribes like the Atayal and Amis, also used the opportunity to educate others about their experience of oppression, and to form alliances with other parts of civil society (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 2 August, 2015).

Within the 318 Occupation, these exchanges eventually developed into experiments with alternative types of democracy. Drawing on the concept of ‘radical 基進’, or direct democracy, participants acted out their own idealised form of decision making to expose the problems with what the protesters referred to as the KMT’s ‘black box’ approach (Hioe 2017d). From late March protesters held ‘People’s Assemblies 人民會議’, where were open to all participants. Here, civic issues were discussed in a grassroots manner and collective decisions over how to proceed with the occupation were made (Hioe 2017d).

These types of interactions were part of the reflexive representation of the 318 Occupation as a democratic ‘awakening’, and the realisation of Taiwanese nationhood. The liveliness, freedom and improved political practice, drove and were driven by the idea that within the occupation was a collapsing together of the notions of both civic and subjective realisation. In this way, a distinctive notion of Taiwanese modernity was being articulated, in which this realisation or awakening offered what Harrison has described as “the promise of a resolution

of Taiwan's address to its own nationhood" (Harrison 2009, 57) This depiction is captured in the song 'Island's Sunrise 島嶼天光' by Fire Ex. 滅火器, which became the movement's anthem. Instead of making any specific mention to the CSSTA within the song, lyrics such as "we are braver than before", and "dawn is near, let's sing out loud until the rays of hope shine upon all people of this island" (Fire Ex. 2014), universalise and temporalise the movement's cause. The central imagery of the island figuratively and literally "awakening" along with the idea of the "brave Taiwanese" are also reminiscent of the concepts of 'displacement' often associated with Taiwan in literary works. In the case of *Orphan of Asia* (Wu 2006) by Wu Zhuoliu 吳濁流, for example, the experiences of colonialism and martial law, along with Taiwan's unstable position in relation to China, creates an ambiguous identity (Corcuff 2002). In 'Island's Sunrise', the 318 Occupation is positioned as the moment when "the day is gradually dawning", and that "today is the day for the brave Taiwanese" (Fire Ex. 2014). This suggests that the movement offers resolution to the problem of Taiwan's identity and political status.

Hence, participants in the 318 Occupation utilised the political space created by young activists to article an idealised form of democracy and civic unity. In part a challenge to the KMT's opaque politics and the perceived failure of representative democracy, the Legislative compound was deliberately cultivated as a site for personal expression and open discussion. In this way, the movement became a self-consciously articulated symbol of a better future for Taiwan and a critique of Taiwan's past. It sought to represent the rise of a diverse, but harmonious, civil society, and new form of political participation in Taiwan, and in this sense restated Taiwan's transition to democracy and national moment.

The Failed Occupation of the Executive Yuan and 30 March Rally

In its first few days, the occupation of the legislature failed to secure tangible achievements. In response, participants resolved to extend the movement, hoping to seize the nearby Executive Yuan and the surrounding compound. The students involved were testing the parameters of acceptable protesting behaviour but their plan to occupy the Executive Yuan was marred by vague direction and confusion. The government's reaction, deploying riot police, was swift and uncompromising, however, quickly ending the attempt as events turned chaotic and both police and protesters were injured, while several young activists faced arrest. However, while seemingly achieving their aims, the KMT's government's actions echoed the history of authoritarianism and police actions in earlier protests such as the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979. In the days following, young activists compounded this view and skilfully drew on their victimhood to achieve widespread support. In particular, they positioned their campaign as part of the tradition of sacrifice in the pursuit of democracy. The momentum they generated was eventually channelled into an unparalleled rally on March 30.

Escalating tactics in the 23 March attempt to occupy the Executive Yuan

Within days of the initial occupation of the Legislative Yuan, an opportunity emerged for the government and protesters to potentially resolve their differences. Premier Jiang Yi-huah scheduled a meeting with Lin Fei-fan and a supporting lawyer, Lai Chung-chiang 賴中強 for 22 March, to be held outside the parliament. On the morning of 21 March Lin Fei-fan had specified that the meeting would only take place if the students' demands – that the CSSTA be discarded and legislation be passed monitoring cross-strait negotiations – were first met. Jiang attended the site anyway, and instead used the opportunity to advertise the government's position. When Jiang admitted that only President Ma had the power to meet the movement's demands, protesters shouted him out of the compound. They considered the visit to have been

futile and called on the President to meet with them instead (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 9 June, 2015).

Through these actions, Jiang Yi-huah revealed the disregard held by some in the government for the protesters and their central concerns. They remained focused on explaining the benefits of the deal "for the liberalization of the economy" (Loa and Shih 2014), and adamant that adequate review mechanisms were already in place. Following the failed meeting, Jiang also continued to portray the protesters as ignorant and misinformed about the deal. Jiang stated that they felt "saddened" (Loa and Shih 2014), that young people had chosen to participate in politics in a "disorderly manner" (Loa and Shih 2014), that protesters were anti-China, and would resist anything associated with cross-strait relations.

With the government unwilling to meet the occupation's demands, its leaders' tactics were brought into question. At this time, the occupation was driven by a core decision making group, which included Lin Fei-fan, Chen Wei-ting, Huang Kuo-chang and members of Black Island Nation Youth, amongst others. The group held private meetings on the second floor of the Legislative Yuan, with either Lin or Chen then acting as a spokesperson. While largely a response to the size and complexity of the movement (Lin Fei-fan, as quoted in Hioe 2018c), this approach led to frustration amongst participants who felt disconnected and increasingly impatient with the pace of progress (Rowen 2015, 11).

From early in the occupation, a group of students from National Taiwan University's Department of Social Sciences had been attempting to expand the movement (Hioe 2017e). They had established an alternative encampment in NTU's nearby Xuzhou 徐州 campus where participants could meet or rest and planned to solidify the occupation by taking-over more government buildings.

Their opportunity came on the evening of 23 March, after President Ma finally acknowledged the protesters' demands. At a press conference earlier that day, Ma had invited student leaders to personally discuss the CSSTA with him but refused any pre-conditions. Believing this response was inadequate, students from NTU now assembled over 100 people in the Department of Social Sciences. From here, at 7.30 pm that night, they travelled to Zhongxiao East Road and charged the Executive Yuan, attempting to occupy the site from three directions.

In the chaos that followed, it became unclear who was leading the action and how best to proceed. While leadership in the Legislative Yuan were aware of the general plan to take to nearby Executive offices, their information was limited. Confusion was further raised by the thousands of protesters who joined the crowds and were themselves unsure of who was in charge (Rowen 2015, 11). In addition, journalists and members of the public became involved, many of whom were difficult to distinguish form participants.

Within a few hours, one group had managed to overcome police and assemble in the foyer of the Executive Yuan. There they linked arms and chanted "repeal the CSSTA" (Shih and Loa 2014), while police and journalists looked on. Others used ladders to enter the second-floor offices, which included that of Jiang Yi-huah. Those who had attempted to enter via the backdoor were unsuccessful, however, and found themselves being 'kettled' by police, which involves being corralled and contained into a small area (Hioe 2017a).

With different laws governing the Executive Yuan to the legislature, the authorities were also able to use the police to remove protesters from other parts of the building. By 11pm on 23 March, with the approval of President Ma, Jiang Yi-huah had ordered for around 1000 riot police to be deployed at the site. Over the next ten hours police then proceeded to evict the protesters by force, injuring dozens with their batons and shields. Trucks with mounted water cannons were also used to disperse the crowd, further causing injuries.

Reframing the 318 Occupation

This response by the government and the police action introduced the discourse of political violence and associated power relations to the 318 Occupation. As Taiwanese citizens debated the meaning of the events of March 23, the subject of 'violence' and its role in state-society relations was negotiated. For young activists, it represented an opportunity to mobilise support by aligning their protest with the history of opposition to KMT authoritarian rule. Beyond strategy, however, the emotional trauma some suffered became a defining feature of their political participation.

Representatives of the KMT and institutions sympathetic to the government justified their response to the Executive Yuan occupation by seeking to define legitimate violence. They defended the deployment of riot police and their tactics by emphasising that the protesters had broken the law and inflicted property damage. Sixty-one were arrested and 21 participants were later charged with offences such as incitement to commit a crime, obstructing police and causing damage to public property. Eleven were found guilty in April 2017 (Tong 2017). News outlets and KMT spokespersons reported on the alleged destruction and theft that occurred during the occupation, along with the recovery process of the 51 police officers who had been injured. Deputy Secretary-General of the Executive Yuan Hsiao Chia-chi 蕭家淇 was particularly outspoken against the protesters, who he accused of stealing NT$1000 and a box of sun cakes.

The government was not the only side to use the concept of legality to justify their actions. Sympathetic lawyers offered to represent participants who had been charged pro-bono, and to seek recompense from those they deemed responsible. In late July 2014 a lawsuit was filed against Jiang Yi-huah, National Police Agency Director-General Wang Cho-chiun 王卓鈞, Taipei Police Commissioner Huang Sheng-yung 黃昇勇, and Zhongzheng First Police Precinct

Chief Fang Yang-ning 方仰寧 (Chang and Pan 2014), on behalf of 23 protesters. Charges included violent coercion, causing grievous bodily harm, and attempted murder.

Supporters of the student protesters also drew on the KMT's history of authoritarian violence to condemn the government's response. As previously described, during martial law the KMT had used authoritarian practices to silence dissent, and acts of resistance had become synonymous with the pursuit of a democracy. In the days following the 24 March Incident (hereafter referred to as the 324 Incident), connections were made between the plight of protesters, and the 228 Incident and White Terror Period. For example, images of young people with blood dripping from their foreheads, being kicked by riot police or overwhelmed by water cannons circulated around the domestic and international media with reference to police "assault" (*Vice News* 2014), and "brutality" (Cole 2014b). High profile celebrities, such as a film director Ko I-chen 柯一正 and musician Deserts Chang 張懸 publicly labelled President Ma and Premier Jiang "dictators" (Feng and Hsu 2014), and a global social media campaign was launched, during which millions of Taiwanese changed their Facebook profile picture to black, signifying the 'dark time' the country was experiencing. The Association of Taiwan Journalists, many of whom had personally witnessed events, also made allegations against law enforcement for having used unnecessary force and violating the right to free speech.

Participants themselves framed the government's actions as a violent response to democratic political practice. In the following week they placed advertisements in the *Apple Daily* and *New York Times*, paid for with the NT$6.74 million (US$221,000) raised on 24 March through the crowd funding website *Flying V*. The advertisements pictured black and white images of students being manhandled by police, and a caption describing how they had "occupied the Legislative Yuan… peacefully and rationally, to defend (their) hard-earned democracy" (Democracy at 4am 2014). The *New York Times* version also had a link to an English language

website called *Democracy at 4am*, designed to inform the citizens of Western countries about the occupation. This name made reference to their belief that "constitutional democracy [was] sinking to its shadiest moment" (Democracy at 4am 2014), while their protests represented the "coming dawn" (Democracy at 4am 2014).

In the weeks that followed the 324 Incident, one of the leaders from the NTU Social Sciences group, Lin Chuan-Kai 林傳凱, also began a project to clarify the details of what had happened during the failed Executive Yuan occupation. Lin was a PhD student researching the White Terror Period and utilised this institutional subjectivity to investigate police conduct (Hioe 2017a). The project's name itself, the '324 Truth And Reconciliation Working Group', was reminiscent of the 'Truth and Reconciliation' processes in many post-authoritarian states, and was later proposed by Tsai Ing-wen in 2016 as a mechanism for transitional justice from the martial law period. Thus, it further encoded the incident's meaning as an example of authoritarian political practice and brutality against liberalism and democracy.

Participants can therefore be understood as having utilised the government response to the 324 Incident to legitimise their protest. By equating the KMT government's actions with the party's history of totalitarian rule in Taiwan, they were able to position the attempted occupation of the Executive Yuan as resistance against authoritarianism. This narrative ultimately drew attention away from the legality of participants' actions towards their morality. The issue was simultaneously framed as one of power imbalance and institutionalised violence, in which the students mobilised the moral force of victimhood.

Yet beyond its tactical use in Taiwan's partisan politics, the history of authoritarianism also had emotional resonance for participants. In addition to providing a strategic opportunity for the 318 Occupation, the events of March 24 were significant in the trauma they caused to many involved. In the healing process that followed, a connection to events like the 228 Incident and

the Kaohsiung Incident, already institutionalised and incorporated into Taiwan's historiography, added meaning to participants' own experience. The failed occupation became a turning point not only in the movement against the CSSTA, but also in individual lives.

For example, in her psychoanalysis of those involved in the 324 Incident, Jenyu Peng found that White Terror Period provided a frame of reference for participants wanting to make sense of their experience. Participants justified their trauma as a sacrifice in the pursuit of democracy, creating a "symbolic filiation with the victims of successive political repressions during the period of KMT dictatorship" (Peng 2017, 8).

The damage was such that in the weeks after the incident, participants set up support groups both around the site of the occupation and in private locations. Here, psychologists ran therapy sessions for those involved, having them recount and discuss their experience as a means of recovery (*The Sun is Not Far* 2015). They were in a sense re-enacting the trauma of the authoritarian period and attempting to heal not just their own trauma but also that of Taiwan's. The experiences of participants in the 324 Incident were also incorporated into books, films, interpretative performances, and walking tours of the site. These initiatives helped acknowledge and legitimise their feelings, while memorialising their personal struggle as a part of Taiwan's politics.

As such, the 324 Incident revealed the complex and sometimes incongruent nature of young activists' political experience in Taiwan, as epitomised by the trauma they suffered even as the incident benefited their campaign. Focusing on the KMT's totalitarian past as a common source of pain in place of the less emotive CSSTA, participants skilfully employed events to draw attention and support to their movement. Burdened with lingering psychological effects, however, the incident also established violence as a core part of civic participation for those

involved, in a way that spoke to the ongoing effects of authoritarianism and violence in Taiwan's politics.

Redirecting anger over the 324 Incident into the 30 March rally

The government's response to the occupation of the Executive Yuan sparked an outpouring of anger. Protest leaders now channelled this discontent into solidifying the legacy of the 318 Occupation. The rally that they subsequently organised for 30 March became one of the largest in Taiwan's history. It came to represent the apex of the movement against the CSSTA, and the strength of civic power.

The 324 Incident helped elevate the occupation of the Legislative Yuan in the international news media, along with the constant domestic coverage and debate. In the days following, the movement's leaders were invited onto talk shows, and had their personal lives discussed as if they were celebrities. In the sympathetic, pan-green media articles were also published detailing where people could buy clothes to copy Lin Fei-fan's 'signature look' and offered features of Chen Wei-ting's teddy bear collection.

In order to utilise this visibility and enthusiasm for the occupation, its leaders planned a rally for Sunday 30 March. The event, held on Ketagalan Boulevard outside the Presidential Office, was designed as one final push to pressure President Ma to withdraw the CSSTA and introduce oversight mechanisms into trade deals with China. Dozens of civic groups joined in organising the event, as did artists and bands such as Fire Ex., who planned to release the music video for 'Island's Sunrise' the same day. Ancillary rallies were also held in 50 cities around Taiwan and 21 countries across the globe.

The crowds who assembled on 30 March surpassed the organisers' expectations and became the largest ever to join a politically unaligned rally in Taiwan. Some analysists have estimated that over 500000 people attended the event (Hioe 2017a), which accounts for nearly two

percent of Taiwan's population. Wearing black, protesters chanted for the "black box deal to be revoked" and "9% Ma to step down", referring to Ma Ying-jeou's record low approval rates of nine percent (Bashi and Persio 2014), as they marched towards the Presidential Office. They later returned to the Legislative Yuan to watch speeches, movies and music performances, or hold videoconferences with simultaneous protests happening in in places such as the UK, Canada, Australia, Hong Kong and Japan.

The profile of this march was such that in the days following, new waves of protesters travelled from across the country to join the occupation. Spokespeople for Taiwan's premier music festival 'Spring Scream 春天吶喊' held in Taiwan's south during this time, announced that hundreds of tickets had been refunded, with young people instead choosing to visit the Legislative Yuan (Pan 2014). While the movement had already been covered in some international media outlets, this reporting reached new heights with sympathetic coverage in places like *CNN* (Brown and Li 2014), *Al Jazeera* (*The Stream* 2014), and the *BBC* (*BBC News* 2014).

The March 30 rally signalled that the 318 Occupation had been accepted as a legitimate political action in Taiwan. Despite its failure, the attempt to occupy the Executive Yuan on March 23 helped position the movement in opposition to authoritarianism and as part of the aspiration for an idealised democracy that has motivated Taiwan's democratic activism and party politics. In the aftermath, young activists had demonstrated their ability to adapt to and utilise the government's attempts to inhibit their protest, garnering widespread coverage and support. The emotional trauma inflicted on those who had participated helping to write the movement into the political history of Taiwan.

Navigating the End of the 318 Occupation

The final stage of the 318 Occupation was characterised by continued animosity with the government and internal divisions within the movement itself. Beyond the rhetoric deployed by the KMT and their supporters against protesters, the movement became increasingly aware of the legislative obstacles that confronted them. During this period, the occupation was also seemingly hindered by infighting between participants and criticism of its leaders. The previously unified coalition began to focus on the elitism, power imbalances, and differences in interests and approach present within the movement

These factors led participants to begin to reorganise into new civic groups, which both continued to address and went beyond the issue of the CSSTA. These groups demonstrated a variety of tactics and priorities amongst the activist community, along with a longer-term focus on improving Taiwan's political system. In this sense, the occupation was also a moment of empowerment and readjustment for civil society, where previously underrepresented groups had the opportunity to mobilise. These factors were celebrated when the occupation eventually came to end, marking one step in the ongoing campaign against the CSSTA.

The continuous struggle for young activists in Taiwan's politics

Despite the scale and visibility of the March 30 rally, the occupation still remained unsuccessful in fulfilling its demands. From this time, the KMT and opponents to the protesters fortified their efforts to discredit the movement and push for the ratification of the CSSTA. To do so, they delegitimised young activists, and adopted techniques of intimidation. However, the greatest obstacles were ultimately presented by partisanship, geopolitics, and inefficiencies in legal and political institutions.

Recognising the significance of the 30 March rally, in the days that followed, the KMT government initiated a new campaign to advocate for the CSSTA. Their attempts to do so were

somewhat inconsistent, often emphasising the youth of protesters and framing them as 'ignorant', while simultaneously seeking the support of young Taiwanese not involved with the movement.

For example, from 31 March the Ministry of Education began a series of seminars at various schools and universities across the island to "clarify widespread misunderstanding" (Ku 2014), and promote the benefits of the CSSTA amongst students. On 4 April Lung Ying-tai 龍應台, the Minister for Culture and well-known author, commended the creativity of the students but said the logic behind the protest was "weak, full of contradictions and immature" (Chang and Loa 2014). The following day a letter posted on PTT, allegedly written by the Premier's wife Lee Shu-jen 李淑珍, called the students' behaviour "appalling (and) nihilistic" (Shih 2014c). KMT politicians were also critical of parents who had brought young children along to the occupation, who they said should not be misled into supporting students who had "broken the law" (Chang and Loa 2014).

The KMT's actions were indicative that it had been put in a position in which its need for support conflicted with its embedded views of youth. Their attempts to engage with students over the CSSTA seemed to recognise that young people were important politically and had legitimate beliefs. Later, in the wake of its electoral defeats in November 2014 and January 2016, KMT politicians admitted that they had underestimated student concern surrounding the CSSTA and lost the support of the younger generations (Liang 2016). At the same time, rhetoric applied to student activists reflect the government's ongoing efforts to define the parameters of acceptable political action for young people. Activists had achieved salient political space through subverting these expectations and would continue to be challenged.

Indeed, from early April 2014 other pan-blue groups became increasingly direct in their attempts to impair the movement against the CSSTA. On 1 April, Chang An-le 張安樂 led

hundreds of protesters to march on the Legislative Yuan. Chang is known as the 'White Wolf' in Taiwan from his time leading the Bamboo Union 竹聯幫, a triad criminal organisation, for which an arrest warrant had been issued in 1993. Chang fled to China at the time, but returned without legal consequence in 2013, when he opened a branch of the China Unification Promotion Party 中華統一促進黨.

The group who attended the Legislative Yuan on 1 April comprised members of Chang's party, along with people claiming to be representatives of labour unions (Hioe 2017a). Their aim was to force the protesters to evacuate parliament, including through violent means. Once at the site, Chang's group were restrained from clashing with student activists by lines of police, while they shouted at occupation participants for being traitors to the 'Han race' and "employed protesters" (Hsiao 2014a). Despite the group not having a protesting permit Taipei police claimed they could not arrest Chang An-le because he was just "passing by 路過" (Hsiao 2014a).

As a further blow to the occupation, a political stalemate persisted over the CSSTA. The KMT consistently rejected protesters' demands, while inter-party negotiations over the deal also stalled. Emboldened by the high turnout at their rally, on 31 March students had called for a citizens' constitutional conference to review the CSSTA. Yet, the KMT refused, arguing that a planned national affairs conference on economics and trade to discuss the deal would be sufficient. Around this time, talks held between the DPP and KMT also turned hostile. KMT legislators maintained that they would only participate in a line-by-line review of the CSSTA if Wang Jin-pyng convened the meeting and DPP legislators agreed not to occupy the podium, a procedural tactic they had previously utilised to prevent voting over a motion. Now directly pursuing the goals of the 318 Occupation, however, DPP representatives demanded that new legislation guaranteeing more systematic monitoring of cross-strait negotiations be introduced

before the agreement was reviewed. When the KMT failed to accommodate this request, DPP legislators locked them out of a review of the agreement in the Legislative Yuan's Internal Administration Committee (Loa 2014c), which was due to take place from 2 April.

A potential end to the deadlock presented itself on 4 April, when President Ma unveiled legislation introducing oversight mechanisms to cross-strait negotiations. While this law would allow the Legislative Yuan to revise and demand the renegotiation of trade agreements, it would not be applied retroactively to the CSSTA (Shih 2014d). As a result, protesters rejected the proposal and refused to leave the Legislative Yuan. KMT legislators called a press conference the following day, where, maintaining their focus on economics, they accused the protesters of having blocked legislation "crucial to people's livelihood" (Hsiao 2014b).

As a further obstacle to protesters, observers within the international media also used the occupation to make a statement about geopolitics. While representatives from the US government remained silent over the issue – unable or unwilling to comment on Taiwan's political situation since they do not engage in official diplomatic relations – several high-level academics and ex-diplomats considered a proxy for the government began to speak out (Smith 2014). Concerned primarily with maintaining the cross-strait status quo and increasing trade with China through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), these commentators were supportive of the KMT, which they had long considered to be less threatening to regional security than the DPP. For example, on March 31 David Brown, an American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) board member and professor at Johns Hopkins University sent a letter to a newspaper in Washington, arguing that the "illegal", occupation had been orchestrated by the DPP to give them a strategic advantage in the upcoming presidential election (Wang 2014c). The following day Richard Bush, the former chairman of the AIT and the director of a centre for East Asia Policy Studies also commended President Ma on his handling of the situation and his calls to resolve the issue "rationally" (Wang 2014c). Although officially personal opinion, these

statements were a significant intervention from the US system in the 318 Movement and asserted the received position of Taiwan as a proxy for US-China relations. While influenced by geo-politics and the interests of the US, the assertion of this reductionist interpretation from the US was a challenge for protesters in controlling the narrative of the movement internationally.

The legal system also continued to provide a source of contention for young activists in the Legislative Yuan. As both they and the government sought tactical advantage over the other, the legal implications of the occupation remained unclear. On 1 April an official complaint was registered with the Control Yuan – the agency responsible for monitoring other government departments – against those who gave the orders to disperse protesters on 23 May. Individuals who had not already done so, began to file lawsuits against the government for what they believed was the use of excessive force. One 76-year-old man even accused President Ma and Premier Jiang Yi-huah of attempted murder, although the case did not progress. However, it was also announced on 4 April that Lin Fei-fan and Chen Wei-ting were being investigated on five charges for their role in leading the occupation. These charges included "trespassing, interference with public functions, destruction of property, infringing on personal liberty and contempt of authority" (Chang, Chien, and Hsu 2014), some of which included jail time as a penalty.

Thus, the unprecedented March 30 rally did not secure the success of the 318 Occupation nor dramatically move it forwards towards an outcome. Rather, political partisanship, geopolitics, the judicial system and embedded intolerance towards young people in politics by Taiwan's political establishment, continued to shape the political dynamic. Young activists themselves began to recognise the limitations of protest as a way to shape legislative outcomes or broader political discourse. They subsequently set about finding new forms of political participation and ways to hinder the CSSTA.

Diversity in the 318 Occupation

With no adequate response from the government, from early April 2014, young activists used their time in the Legislative Yuan to organise over other issues. Having recognised the limits of mass protests, these new groups often targeted the structure of the legislative system or the aspects of Taiwan's democracy they considered problematic. Yet, this reorganisation also reflected discordance from within the occupation itself. Participants became critical of leadership and divided over which issues and tactics to prioritise.

With the fate of the CSSTA uncertain, participants in the 318 Occupation became increasingly focused on continuing their efforts once they left the Legislative Yuan. While protests would be a significant feature of civil society during the KMT presidency, for many activists this period marked the beginning of the transition to other types of political participation. As described by one interviewee: "Actually the idea to start our own political party was not new [at the time of the 318 Occupation] but had first been discussed during the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement, around 2013 or so. Then, there were students who would support Huang Kuo-chang if he wanted to start one… he was in the best position to do so… So, in 2015 the idea already had been permeating for a number of years, and suddenly appeared like the only option. We were tired… [and asked ourselves] what could protests even achieve anyway if the parliament and Taiwan's constitution were broken?... So, we had this idea. But then we had grown up and that sort of thing, and actually had different views of the best way to really make a change" (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 9 June, 2015).

So too, in an interview with Brian Hioe, Lin Fei-fan described one of the consequences of the occupation as a disillusion with the power of protesters. Lin said: "After people seem to feel that it's not like in the past where street protests were [a] means of resolving many social issues. The Sunflower Movement would let you feel that street protests and division had reached a

high point… [And now] society is less enthusiastic… about large-scale activities" (Lin Fei-fan as quoted in Hioe 2018c).

Within this context, a number of new civic groups began to emerge from the 318 Occupation concerned with reshaping the nature of Taiwan's democracy. These groups were led by a variety of activists and organised around issues in which participants had expertise or were relevant to their daily life or place of residence. For example, Democracy Kuroshio 民主黑潮 was formed on 3 April 2014 by from students across the island, with the purpose of recalling corrupt KMT politicians. They immediately identified 'four bandits': Chang Ching-chung 張慶忠, Lin Te-fu 林德福, Wu Yu-sheng 吳育昇, and Lin Hung-chih 林鴻池. They accused the 'bandits' of blindly following President Ma rather than representing their constituents (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 1 September, 2015). From 4 April with the support of the occupation's leaders, the group began a campaign to have these politicians recalled. They staged marches in Banqiao, the district for which Lin Hung-chih was the representative, and in Wu Yu-sheng's constituency of Tamsui.

In late April 2014, the Appendectomy Project 割闌尾計畫 was founded to take over the work of Democracy Kuroshio (Hioe 2017f). It began a campaign to recall KMT legislator Alex Tsai 蔡正元, along with lowering the number of signatures needed to hold a recall vote, at which it succeeded in November 2016 after the election of DPP president Tsai Ing-wen and a DPP majority in the legislature. Around 60 student-activists, including some with high-profile roles in the occupation, also formed Democracy Tautin in April 2014. The group's name translates as 'Democracy Struggle', and it was accordingly focused on deepening democracy and civic participation, throughout grassroots outreach and education. The movement's celebrity leaders, including Lin Fei-fan, Chen Wei-ting and Huang Kuo-chang also formed Taiwan March 島國前進, as a platform to continue the work of the occupation. While engaging in protests

throughout 2014 and 2015, this group eventually targeted electoral politics and helped form the NPP.

In this way, the 318 Occupation marked a transition for young activists from relying on protests for political influence to a more institutionalised form of participation. The movement had revealed the need to restructure the dominant forms and themes of Taiwanese democratic politics and Taiwan's legislative system in order to achieve the type of idealised democracy they sought. The groups they formed were notably aimed at achieving direct democratic participation and representing a diverse range of voices in Taiwanese society.

Yet the process of reorganising the occupation into new groups was not always smooth or amicable. Instead, divisions emerged that revealed frustration with the occupation's leadership, or conflict over priorities and tactics. For example, on 2 April, one of the student groups which had helped initiate the occupation, Le Flanc Radical 基進側翼, issued a statement criticising the movement's central leadership. During the 30 March rally, some of the group's materials had been confiscated and destroyed, allegedly by order of Huang Kuo-chang. For members of Le Flanc Radical, the incident was indicative of the leadership's lack of respect for free speech, and refusal to push an agenda for Taiwanese independence (Hioe 2017g). Members of the group ran for office as part of the pro-independence TSU in 2016 and successfully won a seat in the Legislative Yuan in 2020 after joining the Taiwan Statebuilding Party 台灣基進黨.

From 3 April, other protesters established an alternative forum site around the corner from the Legislative Yuan, outside the NTU Alumni Hall 台大校友會館 on Jinan Rd. The group was led by civic groups such as the Taiwan International Workers Association 台灣國際勞工協會 and the Taiwan Alliance for Victims of Urban Renewal 台灣都市更新受害者聯盟, who were critical of what they perceived as the controlling student leadership, and the exclusion of the

dispossessed members of society for whom they were advocates. Instead, they wanted to establish an open forum for discussion where all parts of society could be heard. This was reflected in the name they chose 'Jianmin Liberation Zone 賤民解放區', with *jianmin* 賤民 referring to the 'untouchable' or 'Dalit' caste in India and used in Taiwan to describe the poorest people (Laskai 2014).

Another breakaway protest also emerged on 7 April. It was facetiously called the Large Intestine Flower 大腸花, the mandarin for which is wordplay for the term used for 'sunflower'. Led primarily by students who had been excluded from the parliament and were frustrated by the polite and well controlled political style used by the leaders, the forum was designed as a place where participants could vent. Discussion often included swearing and making fun of Lin Fei-fan and Chen Wei-ting's new-found celebrity.

While less combative than these examples, the 318 Occupation also exposed gender and LGBT issues in Taiwan's civil society. Tensions had emerged early in the occupation when a rainbow flag was removed from the Legislative Yuan, while some women felt underrepresented in the movement's leadership or isolated from the 'macho' protesting culture (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 1 September, 2015). As a result of these experiences, several LGBT and female participants had started designated gender and 'gay 同志' rights teams at the university campuses following the occupation. Their aim was to provide support for their members and elevate gender and LGBT issues in civil society.

The prevalence of these divisions in the 318 Occupation have often been interpreted as attempts to seize power or the failure of the movement's leadership to recognise certain groups. The leaders themselves apologised to those who criticised them and expressed a willingness to reflect on and learn from the mistakes they may have made in their conduct (Hioe 2018c).

Several interviewees described the issue to me as one of "jealousy" because of the attention the leaders of the 318 Occupation received, despite the multitude of people who had contributed to the occupation (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 9 June, 2015). They also felt, however, that the leaders had been "scapegoats" who were ready to take responsibility for the protest if anything went wrong (Anonymous. Interview with student activist by author. 27 March, 2015).

However, divisions in the 318 Occupation could also be interpreted as signalling the growth and diffusion of civic power. For years, Taiwan's civil society had been divided over which issues should be prioritised, who should represent protests, and which tactics were most appropriate. This thesis has documented the obstacles these issues presented to young activists in the Wild Strawberry Movement and Anti-Media Monopoly Movement, and how they were able to cooperate with Taiwan Rural Front and Citizen 1985, despite fundamental differences. These groups had self-consciously and deliberately dismissed tensions in order to stage the 318 Occupation, prioritising unity over their individual agendas. The proliferation of new civic groups after the occupation is accordingly indicative of how many people had been empowered through their participation, having acquired the skills and resources to run campaigns independently on a number of disparate issues. As they did to work cooperatively against the KMT in the 2014 and 2016 elections, these civic groups continued to navigate Taiwan's socio-political environment with self-awareness and pragmatism, putting tensions aside to bolster their position.

The 318 Occupation's provisional conclusion

Within this context, the end of the 318 Occupation was complex, marking a moment of conditional triumph and uncertain success. Even as they prepared to leave the legislature, participants were divided and ambivalent, aware that the outcome was a compromise. While

the immediate threat of the CSSTA seemed to have been tempered, its fate was still dependent on the actions of the KMT-led legislature. Celebration therefore coincided with preparations for the future.

The conclusion to the 318 Occupation was initiated on the morning of 6 April. At this time, without consulting other senior members of the government, Wang Jin-pyng visited the Legislative Yuan. Accompanied by two-dozen DPP and KMT legislators, Wang staged a press conference before meeting with student leaders. During the visit Wang promised that legislation increasing the monitoring of cross-strait agreements would be introduced before the CSSTA was reviewed again. Many of the protesters welcomed the news and both Lin Fei-fan and Chen Wei-ting shook Wang's hand. Later that day they announced that they "welcomed the response that Wang [had] made to [their] demands" (Hsiao and Loa 2014).

Yet other members of the government did not support the promise. Immediately following Wang's visit to the parliament, KMT whip Lin Hung-chih 林鴻池 delivered the official KMT position that Wang had "betrayed and sold out" the party (Hsiao 2014c). Instead, the government maintained that monitoring legislation could be developed concurrently to the revision of the CSSTA. The issue triggered a crisis in the party, which met without resolution over the following day.

Even so, on the evening of 7 April the leaders of the 318 Occupation declared that they would take Wang's promise in good faith. While their objectives had not been fully realised, they would end the occupation on 10 April and continue to fight the CSSTA through other political avenues. During the announcement Lin Fei-fan and Chen Wei-ting reiterated that even without Wang's visit, the movement had already transcended their leadership. Through the new civic groups that had formed around it, the movement "would continue to bloom across the country" after protesters left the parliament (Hsiao 2014d).

Reflecting the variety of voices in the movement, the decision to end the occupation was not unanimous. From the night of 7 April, members of primarily pro-independence civic groups assembled around the Legislative compound and began their own protest against the plan. Shortly after, dissatisfied participants reorganised into the Free Taiwan Front 自由台灣陣線, and decided to stay in the parliament after 10 April, intending to monitor legislators while they debated the various draft acts on cross-strait trade deals.

Despite the promise to vacate the Legislative Yuan, the government remained hostile towards the occupation. They seemed willing to utilise any legal or political means available to them, in order to punish protesters. For example, in the days leading up to 10 April, university presidents, DPP, and TSU legislators called on Minister for Justice Luo Ying-shay 羅瑩雪 to avoid laying criminal charges against protesters. They argued that protesters had been motivated by a constitutional issue and should be shown leniency as a result. Yet Luo ignored these pleas, and instead threatened to prosecute "with the full extent of the law" (Chang 2014b). Luo accordingly despatched forensic investigators to collect fingerprints as soon as the parliament was vacated.

The government also attempted to impede the movement by obstructing public donations. From 7 April participants had begun a crowdsourcing campaign to raise money to repair damages that had occurred in the initial occupation of the parliament. Yet on 9 April, the government announced that any financial contributions to the campaign would violate the Political Donation Law 政治獻金法, and those who broke this law would be punished with hefty fines.

Government officials also refused to cede any ideological defeat to the occupation. For example, Minister of Economic Affairs Chang Chia-juch 張家祝 reiterated that the protests had damaged Taiwan's economy and international reputation. They remained resolute that the CSSTA was critical for Taiwan's future, and that the occupation had deprived the population

their rights. Thus, while the KMT were willing to negotiate the deal, their overall approach to China and trade had not changed.

The government's attitude did not impede celebration of the 318 Occupation nor early analysis of its significance. Media reports began to discuss the movement as having altered the political status quo, and the idea of 'third force', large enough to challenge the major political parties, also emerged. From 9 April, researchers representing the sociology, philosophy and history institutes of Academia Sinica began collecting protest art and signs. These 'artefacts' were considered "public goods…symbolizing a society striving for democracy" (Lee and Liu 2014), and would later be used in an exhibition held across Taiwan, designed to tell a particular story about student activism and the process of democratisation (See Chapter Two on 'The Study of Student Movements in Taiwan').

The actions by Academia Sinica academics expressed the distinctive reflexivity of Taiwanese politics. In Taiwan's unstable political terrain, reflection, analysis and institutionalisation takes on an urgency so as to fix and codify the meaning of political events almost in real-time. Not only did the 318 Occupation generate a large amount of art and protest ephemera, as it progressed it also motivated a self-reflexive practice of recording and analysing the movement by academics, artists, journalists and filmmakers.

The official end of the occupation was a moment of ceremony and commemoration that spoke to that process of self-reflexive legitimisation. At 6pm on 10 April movement leaders assembled on the podium in front of participants, where they thanked them for their support, and bowed three times as a sign of respect. Their speeches were similarly deferential, emphasising the small role they as leaders had played in the movement, and the overall strength of civil society. They acknowledged the disagreements that had occurred and asserted that the movement belonged to "all citizens of this country" (Loa 2014d). The speeches were also used

to communicate a warning to the KMT, and to reiterate that the movement had not ended. Lin Fei-fan stated that if the government did not fulfil Wang Jin-pyng's promise then the protesters would be back and "will definitely win" (Loa 2014d). Participants cheered, sang songs, and gave each other tearful embraces. Protest signs were removed, and evidence of the occupation cleaned up before they finally vacated the site.

The 318 Occupation therefore ended as a reminder that it was only one point in a long campaign to transform Taiwan. Having staged an unprecedented act of resistance, young activists were poised to continue this journey through new political channels. Throughout the occupation they had mobilised resources and support, but also gained a refined sense of what was possible in the current system. They remained in conflict with the KMT government and faced with the new task of coordinating an exhausted civic force.

Conclusion: The Ongoing Construction of Meaning in the 318 Occupation

On 11 April, one day after the 318 Occupation ended, legislators assembled in the parliament to resume their duties. Their agenda included discussing the appointment of a new prosecutor general, and the review of seven versions of legislation on cross-strait agreements.

Although protesters celebrated this achievement, the course of the CSSTA was once again subject to the dynamics of the parliamentary process. By the end of the year, legislative delays and disagreements had led the KMT government to threaten to employ its executive powers and pass the CSSTA unaltered.

The KMT's plans were curbed, however, by its crushing electoral defeats in November 2014 and January 2016. In the latter election, the Tsai Ing-wen led DPP, took executive office and immediately abandoned the CSSTA. These elections also marked a significant shift in parliamentary politics in Taiwan; several independent candidates and minor parties gained seats, disrupting the bi-partisan status quo.

It has long been argued in both the media and academia that the conditions that enabled these electoral outcomes were the product of the 318 Occupation (Chan and Chung 2016; Connors 2016; Denyer 2016; Horwitz 2016; Subba 2016; Wang 2016). The successful minor parties were formed directly from the occupation and continued to pursue the movement's goals. Disapproval of the KMT government and their actions had also been magnified by the 318 Occupation and maintained over the following 21 months in other widespread protests. The DPP aligned itself with these protests and minor-parties, forming a large block against Ma Ying-jeou's government and instituting many of the policies first raised in civic protests, after coming to power.

Even so, this process continued to be mediated by the underlying power structures that led to the original occupation of parliament on 18 March 2014. The addition of legislators from outside the KMT and DPP to parliament had not dramatically altered the legislative process or Taiwan's political discourse. Since this time, new legislative delays and protests have emerged, including over labour laws. Parliamentarians also remain concerned with issues of cross-strait relations and identity politics, which tend to constrain all other policy discussions. For young people, the 318 Occupation signalled a shift in their role in civil society and, more generally, their social and political subjectivity in Taiwan. Where in 2008 young people relied on the 'student movement' identity for legitimacy, by the end of the 318 Movement they could reject this label. Through their reflexive engagement in civil society young activists had developed the tactics and networks that allowed them to pursue a diverse range of agendas. This has not only led political parties to actively focus on the needs of and include young people in their ranks, but also allowed individual activists to pursue legislative careers.

The 318 Occupation was significant in the opportunity it provided for participants to explore an idealised form of democratic practice. Since this time, young activists had continued to experiment with direct democracy, with groups such as g0v conducting public opinion polls in

order to inform government policy (O'Flaherty 2018). This approach has become a way to legislate meaningfully on a variety of issues without being overcome by partisanship. While geopolitics and Taiwan's national status remain prominent, this strategy gives focus and nuance to lower high profile or emotive concerns.

The occupation also played a role, however, in exposing the limitations of Taiwan's legislative system and the possibility of change in the current socio-political environment. Throughout the movement young activists recognised and were challenged by irresolvable divisions in both institutionalised politics and their own community. Thus, they have continued to demonstrate their capacity for idealism, while reflexively adapting their approach in line with political realities. This distinct expression of modernity can accordingly be understood as a response to the domestic environment, and broader global power dynamics.

In considering the meaning of the 318 Occupation, it can also be used as a moment to reflect on the role of violence in politics. The 324 Incident elevated this issue and revealed the uneasy relationship between emotional suffering and the strategic framing of events for political gain. Activists had made sense of their trauma by garnering momentum against the KMT and positioning their protest as part of the long struggle for democracy in Taiwan's history.

A similar dynamic emerged in Taiwan's civil society just over a year later. On 30 July 2015, during his participation in the Anti-Senior High School Curriculum Fine-Tuning Movement 反高中課綱微調運動, Dai Lin 林冠華, a young student activist, committed suicide. The movement – also known as the Anti-Black Box Curriculum Movement 反黑箱課綱運動 or Anti-Curriculum Changes Movement 反課綱 – was opposed to the KMT's Chinese-centric changes to the national high-school curriculum. Many of its high-school aged participants had their first experience of activism during the 318 Occupation and had learned tactics by attending talks and seminars held by its young leaders (Anonymous. Interview with student

activist by author. 9 June, 2015). Since May 2015, the movement had been targeting the Ministry of Education (MOE), which a few dozen members had attempted to occupy on the evening of 23 July. Dai Lin was one of the 24 students who had subsequently been arrested and charged with criminal offences.

In the days leading up to his death, Lin had mentioned to a friend that he was planning to commit suicide in a way that would help the movement reaffirm its purpose and stop the implementation of the curriculum changes. Just hours before his death, Lin had also posted to Facebook that his one wish was for the "Minister to withdraw the curriculum guidelines" (Gerber and Loa 2015).

Within this context, participants quickly blamed the Minister for Education Chiang Wei-ling for Lin's death. Student protesters occupied the grounds of the MOE on 31 July where they set up shrines to Lin and posted signs calling Minister Chiang a 'murderer'. This framing helped elevate the movement and position it as part of the tradition of personal sacrifice in the pursuit of democracy. Hundreds of participants joined the occupation over the following week, while the media covered the students' activities in a way that was reminiscent of the 318 Occupation.

Yet this representation also disguised other issues in Dai Lin's life, and detracted from the legitimacy of his parent's grief. In the days following Lin's suicide, it was exposed that he had long-term mental health issues, possibly intensified by the criminal charges he faced, but also connected to his sexuality (Hsu 2015). Dai Lin's parents did not originally support the movement and expressed gratitude for the way the authorities had responded to his death. They nonetheless became embroiled in political tensions, and their own complicity in Lin's participation in the curriculum movement.

This demonstrates that although Lin's mother eventually changed her mind about the movement and Tsai Ing-wen rescinded the curriculum guidelines in 2016, the significance of Dai Lin's suicide was more complex than its politicisation suggested. As with the 324 Incident, the trauma it caused would be ongoing, and its meaning open to interpretation in other contexts. While the 318 Occupation has been addressed from a number of perspectives and embedded in the narrative of Taiwan's politics it therefore remains in many ways unresolved. Some aspects are beyond or only simplified by academic analysis, reflecting the complexity of human experience in politics.

Chapter 7: Conclusion – The Possibility of Change in Taiwan's Democracy

The election of Tsai Ing-wen as the seventh president of the Republic of China on 16 January 2016, marked a significant shift in Taiwan's politics. It saw the end of a KMT government who had actively promoted and developed significant parts of their policy around securing closer ties with China. In contrast, the DPP advocates Taiwanese sovereignty in their constitution, and when previously in government had taken steps to 'de-sinicise' the island. As head of the party, Tsai had committed to stimulating Taiwan's economy through forming new international trade relationships outside that with the PRC (DeAeth 2018).

Tsai also promised to distinguish the DPP government from that led by Ma Ying-jeou through a number of social and environmental policies. This included pension and welfare reform, legalising gay marriage, improving food safety standards, sustainable development, and increased environmental protection standards, amongst others (Loa 2016).

In response to Ma Ying-jeou's use of the office of president, Tsai also proposed to reduce executive power and enhance that of the legislature (Templeman 2018). Electoral reform and an increase in the accountability of political and legal institutions were proposed as a way to further pursue a fairer and more inclusive democracy.

The DPP also promised to address some of the island's institutionalised inequalities, with a focus on enhancing a sense of Taiwanese identity. To do so, Tsai's government sought to recognise and empower the indigenous population, recover and illuminate previously supressed material from the martial law era, and to hold to account those who had committed human rights abuses or made corrupt gains through their position as part of the authoritarian KMT government before democratisation.

In this sense, Tsai's win was understood as a rejection of the KMT, and a judgement of their eight years of government. During his presidency, Ma Ying-jeou had been markedly unpopular,

and had ended his term with the potential to face prosecution for his dealings with China, and for which he was sentenced in May 2018 (Chung 2018). The KMT had been widely criticised for the ailing Taiwanese economy, and their lack of action to improve the lives of disenfranchised groups. Towards the end of their government, the DPP and the government's critics had framed the KMT's political conduct and use of the legislative process as autocratic and corrupt.

The 2016 presidential elections were also notable in the significant number of candidates from new political parties who had been elected. These parties had aligned with the DPP to ensure Tsai's win, but represented an alternative to the traditional bi-partisan system. They had emerged from civil society and advocated for a number of issues that had been addressed in social movements during Ma's presidency. This included topics as diverse as environmental concerns, human rights, economic, urban development, social, and trade policy. Through their election, these parties hoped to improve the legislative process and bring nuanced discussion to parliament.

As a result of these changes, Ma Ying-jeou's presidency from 2008 to 2016, has become read as a period of growing scepticism towards China, of advocacy for progressive policies and of improved democratic practice. Even as Ma reached out to Beijing, leading up to his meeting with CCP chairman Xi Jinping in Singapore in November 2015, his term was shaped by an increasingly active civil society, and the consequent changes in the nature of political power in Taiwan.

Young activists and student groups were often the driving force behind protest movements during these years. They displayed a unique approach to their activism, including a reflexive recognition of their socio-political position with ability to cooperate with a variety of groups, and adapt their political style in different contexts. Through doing so, young protesters

developed a strong network of activists and rich repertoire of protest. By 2016, they had become prominent members of civil society, leading or valued members of both major and minor parties, and well-placed to affect government policy.

At the time of their initial mobilisation in the 2008 Wild Strawberry Movement, however, young activists had few resources. In order to occupy Liberty Square, they had relied on their networks from university-based clubs, assistance from academics, and student-led social media platforms. Their self-referential identification as part of the tradition of Taiwanese student movements was designed to generate legitimacy and broader support. This led them to adopt several seemingly elitist and exclusive tactics, at odd with their political beliefs. These aspects had also made young activists vulnerable to manipulation by the media and major political parties, as they struggled to control the narrative of their movement. They left the square in early 2009 with new lessons in civic organisation and protesting tactics but believing that their action had been a failure.

Thus, when they began protesting against a merger between Want China and China Network Systems in the 2012 Anti-Media Monopoly Movement, young activists were driven by the search for political space and legitimacy outside the student movement tradition. Throughout the movement, young activists learned to navigate partisan politics, cross-strait relations, and conflict over the appropriate role of young people in politics. They utilised social media and the tradition of protests for freedom of the press, to refine their stance on the Want China deals and position themselves outside Taiwan's divisive political environment. They were also willing to compromise and adapt their original objectives and ideologies, in order to secure tangible success in the form of new media ownership laws in parliament.

When young activists joined protests against the destruction of houses in Dapu, Miaoli County, and Huaguang in Taipei throughout 2013, they adjusted their political style and discourse again

to fit the setting. While often focused on the legal particularities of urban development legislation, they also engaged in direct action and embodied forms of protest to obstruct the demolition process and intervene in the state's capitalist plans for Taiwan. During these movements, young activists also invested in building community links and a sense of belonging based around local cultures and quotidian practices. In doing so, they helped construct activist networks and sites of political meaning outside academia and the tradition of student movements.

Yet the use of direct action by young activists faced criticism in the White Shirts Army Movement of mid-2013. Here, the Citizen 1985 Alliance sought to establish legitimacy and avoid government suppression by promoting themselves as less disruptive and exclusive than the student leaders of other movements. Concerned by the issues of conscription and the capacity of the military justice system to serve citizens, student groups accordingly tempered their approach to join the protests without conflict. Their ability to adapt and cooperate despite ongoing animosity, was further revealed when they worked with members of Citizen 1985 in the pursuit of other political causes.

As a result of this approach, young activists had built an array of practices that enabled them to occupy the Legislative Yuan on 18 March 2014 in opposition to a cross-strait trade agreement. Although dominated by students, the movement that followed was supported by donations from the public and the assistance of civic groups with whom young activists had built alliances over the previous years. Young activists also drew on their skills they had developed in other movements in mobilising participants and communicating their message through social media. By doing so, they generated widespread support, staged an unprecedented rally, and forced the government to alter their approach on trade agreements with China.

The occupation marked the realisation of a salient political space for young people and the empowerment of civil society in potent ways in democratic Taiwan. It facilitated an explosion of personal expression, the emergence of new civic groups, and a proliferation of social movements for the remainder of Ma Ying-jeou's presidency.

However, these dynamics also worked to expose and test the unity of civil society. Conflict arose over tactics and priorities, leading to divisions between participants and ongoing tensions. Prominent student leaders faced criticism for their elitism and the political styles they adopted, while the failed occupation of the Executive Yuan on 23 March 2014 generated a risk to participants' personal safety and revealed the human cost of protesting. Thus, the occupation was also indicative of the limits of what protests could achieve politically, the unintended consequences, and tangible dangers of staging a social movement.

Young activists themselves have sought to analyse and make sense of the role of protests during the Ma Ying-jeou presidency. Publications such as *Loser Spring* (Zhang, Huang, and Yu 2015) and *With Our Eyes We Saw The Island Sunrise* (Hsiao et al. 2014), have done so by taking ownership of the various dimensions, beliefs and tactics of youth activism, and institutionalising their legacy in Taiwan's civil society through subjective accounts of the events. Recent conferences and publications on the 318 Occupation in particular, have taken a more analytical stance (Yan 2015; Wang 2017; Bao et al. 2018; Morris 2018), in which activists have been particularly critical of their approach to leadership, disorganisation in the 324 Incident, and the nationalistic and potentially divisive discourses they espoused.

When discussed as a part of this narrative, student-led movements in Taiwan therefore appear to have developed in a linear way. The relationship between where young activists began and where they ended gives the sense of teleology and an inevitable destination. The framing of these movements against eight-years of a Ma Ying-jeou-led KMT government further binds

and gives narrative meaning to this story. They become a response and counterpoint to this particular government, and part of the origins of the next.

Indeed, there has been a tendency in the study of Taiwan to define politics by 'periods' or the 'era' of government. The election of Tsai Ing-wen in 2016 sparked an outpouring of publications whose objective it was to assess and understand the Ma Ying-jeou presidency as a distinct time in Taiwan's history (Cabestan and deLisle 2014; Matsuda 2015; Fell 2017; Beckershoff and Schubert 2018; Sullivan and Lee 2018). So too, the Chen Shui-bian-led DPP government was widely studied as a confined period (Copper 2009; Copper 2010; Amae and Damm 2011; Chu, Diamond, and Templeman 2016) as were the transition from martial law, and the presidency of Lee Teng-hui (Dickson and Chao 2002; Tsai 2005; Jacobs and Liu 2007;). Within this, the broader structural significance of social movements has been emphasised over the particularities of individual events.

One dominant theme across these publications is to assess each presidency in the context of Taiwan's process of democratisation. For example, several academics identified the Chen Shui-bian era as 'challenging democracy' (Copper 2010), due to the ineffectiveness of the legislature and allegations of corruption. In contrast, while Ma's government was criticised for its undemocratic political tactics, the rise of social movements has been understood as signalling the consolidation of civil society. The Ma Ying-jeou era and the role of student-led social movements within it, are considered to have 'deepened' democracy in Taiwan (Fell 2017), and to have signified that the transition from martial law is almost 'complete' (McAllister 2016).

Other analyses have identified that the various 'eras' in Taiwan's politics reflect a cyclical, rather than linear pattern. Mirroring Sidney Tarrow's idea of 'protest cycles' (Tarrow 2011), this approach suggests that each presidency has coincided with heightened conflict, mobilisation and innovation in civil society, which helps alter power dynamics before it

dissipates or is absorbed into established political institutions (Tarrow 2011, 199; Hsiao 1990; Ho 2010; Ho 2015, 72; Ho 2018a, 109-111). This understanding helps account for the similar rise and fall of social movements across periods, such as those identified in the 1990s and the Ma Ying-jeou presidency, along with the corresponding trajectory taken by individual activists during these times. They also explain institutional and discursive shifts in Taiwan's political system without dramatic systemic changes, and while avoiding the suggestion that there is an ultimate end point to the process.

Overall, the periodisation of student-led social movements and politics more generally, is a useful way to understand the structural dimension of change in Taiwan's socio-political environment. This approach gives a clear frame to an otherwise chaotic and open-ended topic and can aptly reflect the relationship between institutional politics and civil society. The inclination to argue for an 'end point' or repetitive pattern, however, poses the risk of ignoring social actors and the role of their agency. Although analytically neat, restricting social movements to the era in which they fall also limits recognition of the alternative ways they could be interpreted.

While sharing the frame of the Ma Ying-jeou presidency to discuss student-led movements, this thesis has sought to add nuance to this narrative by adopting the concept of 'reflexivity'. In general, reflexivity has been used in academia as a way to explain the interrelationship between structure and agency. According to this concept, social change and individual behaviour are mutually dependent, and shape one another in an ongoing, cyclical process. This means that social actors engage with and shape, but are also restricted by social structures, and vice versa.

Some theorists have approached the problem of reflexivity with a focus on its structural dimensions. Those such as Foucault (1972), tended to privilege the role of institutionalised

power in dictating actor behaviour, and limiting their perception of the world. Similarly, Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck and Scott Lash (1994) gave attention to global systemic changes in their understanding of actor conduct in everyday life. They argued that the contemporary era is one of 'reflexive modernisation' and 'risk societies', where catastrophic, global threats have challenged previously established social divisions (Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994). This has created the opportunity and demand for new identities and forms of knowledge, conditions of instability and threat, but also new sites of potential. Social actors are consequently required to be self-aware and flexible, able to judge and take advantage of the world around them.

In contrast, this thesis adopted an approach which placed more emphasis on the role of agency in the process social change. It drew on Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration and idea that "society only has form… in so far as structure is produced and reproduced in what people do" (Giddens and Pierson 1998, 77). Margaret Archer has similarly focused on social actors and defined reflexivity as "*the* regular exercise of *the* mental ability, shared by all normal people, to consider themselves in relation to their [social] contexts and vice versa" (Archer 2007, 4). Archer understood reflexivity as materialising in an 'internal conversation', in which actors consider systemic "constraint and enablements as they pursue reflexively defined 'projects'" (Archer 2010).

From this perspective, young protesters in Taiwan have been aware of and actively involved in conducting social movements as part of long-term systemic change. While unable to always successfully predict the outcome of their actions, ideas such as 'democratisation' and the periodisation of politics have self-consciously informed how they have conducted and understood their protests. Young activists were also able to identify and navigate systemic constraints, such as mainstream media coverage, the competing agendas of other groups in civil

society, and the dynamics of legislative politics. They were shown to modify their approach and make compromises in their political objectives, in order to achieve incremental results.

As with criticisms of Archer (Caetano 2015), this approach poses the risk of overestimating the consciousness and abilities of social actors. In the case of this thesis, where young activists' 'true intention' could not be known, it was assumed that their actions were reasoned and deliberate. Thus, the role of young activists in Taiwan's contemporary politics was primarily judged through their political practice, the outcome of their actions, and when they took ownership of or recorded their plans and behaviours. It followed that not every mistake, decision, and 'internal conversation' was evident, and that the thesis could not always account for the breadth of activists' feelings nor the 'truth' of their motivations. The development of political movements through the Ma era, however, points to a distinctive self-reflexivity in Taiwanese student and activist politics, in which activists occupied the discursive space within Taiwan's contemporary identity and democracy to create salient political practices.

Reflexivity was also a useful way to account for the subjectivity of both my position as a researcher and the social actors studied. According to Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, a reflexive approach can help acknowledge inherent bias and the way a researcher's presence may influence the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Similarly, Michael Foucault saw a 'reflexive attitude' as necessary to account for the power dynamics embedded in the production of knowledge (Foucault 1972), and the academic's role within the process. A 'reflexive researcher' will attempt to recognise their own positionality and deconstruct their relationship with their subjects.

Within this context, this thesis's use of reflexivity attempted to acknowledge the student activists studied their own involvement in the fields of sociology and political science. It assumed that they were capable and self-aware, with the ability to analyse their actions and

employ and understand academic concepts. Thus, my purpose was not to expose a group who were unable speak for themselves, but to draw on my position as a researcher outside Taiwan's political system. My subjects' positionality was primarily different to my own, in their stated intention to use their self-analysis as a way to further their political cause. This thesis's understanding of reflexivity also reinforces the idea that academic inquiry can only reveal a partial, subjective, and temporary view of any topic. Even with a 'reflexive attitude', new information or a change in context may alter the significance or results of this research.

In line with this perspective, while this thesis has been framed as a linear narrative, the meaning of student and youth activism in Taiwan does not begin and end with the dates and movements cited. Each chapter has hoped to touch upon some of the other stories, ideas, and experiences that emerged or were interwoven into the protests discussed. These aspects could be drawn out and elevated to reinterpret this era and the role of young activists within it. The meaning of student movements in Taiwan will continue to shift and be debated as new factors and power dynamics develop.

This story could have been told as that of Taiwan as the site of multiple overlapping cultures and identities. The history of settlement, colonialism and contentious claims over ownership on the island have created a diverse population with fractured views of nationhood. These elements were visible in and have been mediated through the tradition of student movements and contentious politics more generally. The influence of global protest cultures and ideas of anti-neoliberalism have also become increasingly forceful in contemporary civil society.

Youth-led social movements during Ma Ying-jeou's presidency also intimated to the relationship between politics and everyday life practices. Quotidian practices and cultural traditions were given new meaning through being incorporated into protests and rallies, while activists' daily lives were progressively shaped by their political commitments. This

relationship hints to the conscious deconstruction of the division between the two settings, and the promotion of activism as a socio-cultural identity. It speaks to the creation and legitimisation of place-based identities as an act of political resistance.

This period could also have been explored more in terms of the individual concerns and political debates addressed, of which student-led movements were only one iteration. Issues of media ownership, urban development, and economic inequality have complex histories and resonance in other countries. Cross-strait relations prominently shapes Taiwan's politics and the way the island is understood in the international arena. Young activists have also begun to incorporate traditional left- and right-wing political divisions into the way they think about Taiwan's unique socio-political environment.

The protests explored in this thesis also intersected with issues of what it means to be young in Taiwan and the role of familial relationships in democracy. Protests such as those over Hung Chung-chiu's death and the Anti-Curriculum Changes Movement challenged traditional power dynamics and parents' expectations of filial piety. In doing so, these examples drew attention more broadly to how Confucian ideals mobilised by conservative politics are reconciled with the contemporary political system along a vector of their place in narratives of modernity and modernisation. Addressing deeply embedded cultural attitudes, however real, has often been secondary to the focus on political progress.

This thesis only touched upon the story of Taiwan as that of violence, and how it continues to pervade contemporary politics. Young activists have avoided emotional displays and the confrontational aspects of their political practice, in order to promote their activities as reasoned and rational. So too, in more formal political settings, violence is often positioned as the antithesis of legitimate conduct or overshadows the content of discussion. Even so, the

trauma of recent experiences of authoritarianism and state-sanctioned brutality remain resonant and unresolved at both a personal and institutional level.

These alternative narratives bring attention to the second of the research questions initially proposed in this thesis, which was to ask what youth-led social movements reveal about contemporary Taiwan. To answer this question, I have argued that student protesters displayed a distinct form of modernity, which was embedded in Taiwan's socio-political environment. This version of modernity was critical, self-aware, and self-referential, producing political actions with double meanings and multiple concurrently pursued objectives. It presented a Taiwan in which politics is ubiquitous, diffuse, and accessible, focused on progress, resolution, and national healing as a way to counter the presence of existential threats.

The political style established by young activists was distinctive in the way it blurred previously defined boundaries. Their protests operated seamlessly across the online and offline worlds, with mobilisation, the discussion of strategy, and build-up of momentum happening simultaneously on the internet and in the streets. The openness of online platforms and young activists' access to them also obscured the divide between assessments of their movement's power and significance, and their own strategic representation. So too, the politically embedded nature of the traditional media meant their coverage of protests often acted to legitimise or undermine the cause.

The ideology expressed by the community of young activists was shown to be inseparable from their political practice. Protesters self-reflexively shaped their identity and approach to appeal to their audience, building skills and legitimacy in the process. Their beliefs were developed within their movements, and their tactics shaped to fit their ideal, in a way that meant the strategy adopted by young activists was an embodiment of their goals.

This relationship is reminiscent of the politics of Taiwan's national status, and the strategy to challenge the PRC party-state's position on Taiwan. Although de jure independence is theoretically unavailable it is partly realised through practice, continuously enacted in everyday life. In particular, the democratic system and political protests are undeniable examples of action independent of the PRC. In this sense, social movements in Taiwan act not only to address a number of social and political issues, but also inherently make a statement about Taiwan's right to exist.

Indeed, the protests explored in this thesis have been set against the backdrop of Xi Jinping 习近平's rise to and consolidation of power in the PRC, and the consequent hardening of the relationship between China and Taiwan. The highly reflexive approach taken by student protesters reflects an environment open to change and self-analysis, a search for an inclusive type of democracy and progression. Within their protests, young activists remained critical both of the world around them and their own attempts to change it, while advocating for the continued questioning and negotiation of Taiwan's history. In contrast, Xi's chairmanship marks the strengthening of an authoritarian system and the institutionalisation of a particular form of state capitalism and Leninist power. China's future has been dictated by Five Year Plans 五年計劃 (Hu 2013), while its past has been defined and resolved through political and ideological work by the CCP. Through reactions to events like the 1989 Beijing Democracy Movement, different forms of protest and civic action have become increasingly symbolically unavailable (Lanza 2010). Within this context, any form of unification between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait threatens to destabilise the quotidian experience, political values, and world view of the people of Taiwan.

Taiwan's security has also been complicated by their uneven relationship with the US. Heightened tensions between the US and China may benefit the island if America seeks to

maintain its presence in Asia. Indeed, since 2017, the US's military commitment to Taiwan has been reinforced through naval manoeuvres in the Taiwan Strait (*CNBC* 2019), Tsai Ing-wen has received signs of positive recognition and diplomatic contact has been elevated (Dickey 2018). At the same time, President Donald Trump has advocated a narrow version of US patriotism and postured towards an isolationist agenda (Stanage 2018). This has placed the future of American-led democratic and 'rules-based' international order in doubt. Taiwan's own claims on nationhood fit uncomfortably into this environment, where the assumption of support has been framed as a way to enhance liberal values in Asia (Chen 2015; Tham 2018; Thu and Yang 2018). Taiwan therefore remains in an ambiguous position, caught between aggressive US military policy and resurgent American nativism, and a transformation in ideological priorities.

As such, the activities of student protesters in Taiwan between 2008 and 2016 have also signalled a challenge to shifts in global power, and the rise of inward-looking state agendas. The movements explored in this thesis, with their undercurrent of a distinctive Taiwanese nationalism, emerged against the forces that have threatened Taiwan's sovereignty and ability to operate separately from China. Their protests were indicative of the possibilities of change in democratic societies, and a reminder of the implicit value of political liberalism for accommodating citizens' views and indeed the concept of citizenship itself. As Taiwan's future has been made uncertain by changing US and Chinese priorities and the dynamics of neoliberal capitalism, the movements may also become a symbol of the moral consequences of contemporary global politics.

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