

## Editorial

For the fifth year in a row Alexander Fax Booksellers <http://www.alexandertextbooks.com.au/> is supporting the society with a paid advertisement in every issue of the journal in 2008. Thank you Kristen and David for your continued support. I urge members to support Alexander Fax Booksellers and all other society members. The Society website lists members who offer services at [http://www.mhsa.org.au/member\\_services.html](http://www.mhsa.org.au/member_services.html) Members who are medal and/or militia dealers, booksellers and publishers and researchers are welcome to add their details to this page.

The just completed 49th Lifeline Bookfair in Canberra was held over three days, 7, 8 and 9 March and raised nearly \$300,000 for the Lifeline counselling services. It was featured on the ABC Stateline program on 7 March and the transcript and links can be found at <http://www.abc.net.au/stateline/act/content/2006/s2184934.htm> There was a special militia sale on Sunday, 9 March, and a friend made the comment that some people came in looking for one book and then left. I have been involved in assisting Lifeline in their warehouse for over ten years and have noticed the same thing. I encountered one person was looking for a particular unit history and while there are bargains at Lifeline, unit histories are quite rare and are priced accordingly. I am leading to the point that if you want to find a book that is likely to be hard to find go to a specialist bookseller such as Alexander Fax Booksellers or go online and check a search engine such as <http://www.booksandcollectibles.com.au/> for the title you are seeking. However, if you want a bargain come to the 50th Lifeline Bookfair which will be held over four days at the EPIC centre in Canberra on 25, 26, 27 and 28 September 2008.

Last Saturday I visited Alexander Fax Booksellers and I asked if they had C S Forrester's *Brown of Resolution* in stock. They did and for nine dollars I bought a slim hard back edition with dust jacket. I had forgotten that in the book Brown's stand at the fictitious Resolution Island in the Galápagos never became known because there were no survivors from the fictitious SMS *Ziethen*. The *Ziethen* in the novel was sunk several days before HMAS *Sydney* sank the *Emden*. In the renamed 1933 movie, Brown was played by Jeffery Hunter (the first captain of Star Trek's USS Enterprise) who survived to be awarded the Victoria Cross.

Anthony Staunton

## MARCH 2008 VOLUME XLIX — NUMBER 1

### CONTENTS

5. 'Rubbery figures': The puzzle of the number of AANS on active service in WW1  
*Dr Kirsty Harris*
  11. Hades' henchmen  
An abridged history of the Australian tunnelling companies in France & Belgium: 1916 – 1919  
*Damien Finlayson*
  25. An aspirational army:  
Australian planning for a citizen forces divisional structure before 1920  
*Jean Bou*
  31. Citizen armies:  
The locomotive of liberal democracy  
*Nathan James Frank Williams*
  37. A tale of two families' sacrifice  
*Clem Davis*
  39. Ceylon volunteers in World War I  
*Sergei DeSiva-Ranasinghe*
  48. Bhanbhagta Gurung VC  
*Anthony Staunton*
  49. Obituary - Clem Sargent - 1923-2007
  50. Around the water cart  
*Joe Furphy*
  53. Book reviews
- 
- Society Notices
- 4 Society mailing list by *Peter Evans*
  60. Society membership subscription to increase from 1 July 2008
  60. Research enquiries
  60. Society's website links page
  60. *Sabretache* Contributions

Published by authority of the Federal Council of the Military Historical Society of Australia. The views expressed in this journal are those of the relevant contributor and not necessarily those of the Society.

# SABRETACHE

The Journal and Proceedings of  
**The Military Historical  
Society of Australia**

ISSN 0048 8933

Price \$7.50

Vol XLIX

March 2008

Number 1

Each unit had a distinguished war record. With the disbandment of the daughter companies of the Australian Mining Corps came time to reflect on the magnificent achievements of the unpretentious men who took at least some part. The list of honours awarded to the men who passed through the units is one yardstick for measuring the mettle of the men who worked in these units and the list is impressive:

Officers of the Order of the British Empire (OBE) - 2  
 Member of the Order of the British Empire (MBE) - 1  
 Distinguished Service Orders (DSO) - 8  
 Distinguished Conduct Medals (DCM) 26 - 30  
 Military Crosses (MC) 27 - 47  
 Military Medals (MM) - 77  
 Meritorious Service Medals (MSM) - 27  
 Foreign Awards - 10

Forty-four individuals were mentioned in dispatches by army commanders on 54 occasions of which three officers were each mentioned in dispatches on three separate occasions.

The Australian tunnelling companies and their support unit, the "Alphabet" company, had unique roles in Australian military history. They reported to a British chain of command on operational matters yet their administration was via the AIF. They worked without rest for extended periods of time and in the case of the 3rd ATC, without a rest, in the same sector of front line yet worked right along their assigned sector. They worked more closely with English, Scottish, Welsh and Canadian infantry units than Australian units and with the exception of the Somme Offensive, they had played a role in all the major Allied offensives on the British Western Front between July 1916 and November 1918. A party of eight Australian tunnellers even marched across the German border in December 1918. They were subjected to the same terrors of front line trench warfare as the infantry yet they compounded this by entering a world of terror underground to which the infantry was largely ignorant and civilian populations, totally ignorant.

They could rightly have claimed to be the true Australian 'diggers' of the First World War.

--oOo--

26 including a bar awarded to Cpl 1306 Jack Nancarrow  
 27 including a bar awarded to Maj Alexander Sanderson DSO, and two bars awarded to Capt Oliver Woodward.

## AN ASPIRATIONAL ARMY: AUSTRALIAN PLANNING FOR A CITIZEN FORCES DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE BEFORE 1920

Jean Boui

This brief article will revisit the early development of the Australian Army and, drawing on new evidence, reveal that contrary to the generally accepted historical view, the establishment of citizen force divisions was being contemplated well before 1920.

### Introduction

The history of Australia's citizen land forces was for many years a forlorn topic, almost forgotten in the push to examine the Australian contribution to wars, large and small. In the last fifteen years or so this has, thankfully, begun to change and a number of historians have made a contribution to our understanding of Australian citizen soldiers and the military institutions they were part of. Indeed whilst there are interpretational differences, some of which will be outlined below and one of which, John Mordike's, will be disputed, much of the broader organisational narrative has already taken on something of an established air. Recent research, however, reveals that at least one aspect of the early history of the citizen forces, that the first divisional structure was not contemplated until 1920 in light of the experience gained with the First Australian Imperial Force (AIF), is not in fact entirely accurate. As this article will show there was a clear intention for the Commonwealth, later Australian, Military Forces to form divisions from the brigades which already existed, even before the outbreak of the First World War. A development which, despite being a small episode in the army's history, deserves to be understood.

### Divisions – what do we think we know?

The claim that divisions were being considered as an evolutionary organisational step before the First World War in not a new one by any means, but thus far the evidence provided has been decidedly thin or, in some cases, the assertions made to that effect have reflected earnestness rather than scholarship. Given the lack of good evidence it is, therefore, not terribly surprising that the most recent scholarly works regarding the development of the Australian Army have not made any claims about a divisional organisation for the militia being considered before 1920. Al Palazzo's 2001 organisational history of the army makes no mention of it before going on to outline the deliberations and decisions made about army organisation, including divisions, in the years immediately after

1 Dr Jean Boui is a historian at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, where he is working on the *Official History of Australian Peacekeeping and Post-Cold War Operations*. He is an associate editor of the forthcoming revised edition to the *Oxford Companion to Australian Military History*, and co-editor, with Professor David Horner, of the forthcoming revision of the history of the Royal Australian Regiment, *Duty First*. Also a captain in the Army Reserve, he is a member of the Army History Unit in Canberra. He is currently writing an institutional history of the Australian Light Horse.

2 The author would like to thank Dr Al Palazzo, Dr Craig Wilcox, Dr John Connor and Professor Jeffrey Grey for their views on the new evidence used in this article.

however, so far fetched. Kitchener's memorandum set out a force organisation in which, if it were followed, there would be:

- 21 brigades of 4 battalions each – 84 battalions of infantry
- 28 regiments of light horse
- 49 four gun field batteries
- 7 four gun heavy and howitzer batteries
- 7 communications companies, and
- 14 field companies of engineers<sup>10</sup>

To anyone familiar with army organisation it does not take much imagination or mental arithmetic to quickly realise that such a force could be rearranged to create up to seven light horse brigades (themselves perhaps in divisions) and seven infantry divisions, each properly supported by the then correct proportions of artillery, divisional cavalry, engineers and signallers.<sup>11</sup> If Kitchener or his supporting officers had such a step in mind in 1910, however, it was only an implied one and, as mentioned above, his report is silent on the raising of divisions.<sup>12</sup>

New evidence, however, reveals that it was not long before the Australian military authorities did begin to consider forming divisions from the brigades they were already working on.

#### Divisions – what we should know.

The creation of brigades in Australia had been mooted as far back as 1890 when an inspecting British officer, Major-General J. Bevar Edwards, had proposed the creation of a field force which included brigades that would be drawn from the various colonies.<sup>13</sup> The 1893 creation of the Mounted Brigade in New South Wales was probably the first attempt in Australia to create a formation that was, theoretically at least, more than a mere administrative arrangement and it included artillery, engineers and elements of the service corps.<sup>14</sup> The same man that created this formation, Major-General (later Sir) Edward Hutton, ensured that a brigade structure (though subjected to subsequent adjustments after 1906) was adopted by the new Commonwealth Military Forces when he became its first General Officer Commanding after federation.<sup>15</sup> Whilst Edwards had mentioned the possibility of divisions in his field force plans, no steps in this direction had been taken by any colonial or immediate post-federation military authorities. In the years between Kitchener's visit and the outbreak of the First World War, however, there was a significant

10 Memorandum on the Defence of Australia by Field Marshal Viscount Kitchener of Karroum NAA A1194, 45.3027801, p. 6. Also available in *Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers*, 1910, Vol II, no. 8. One can only speculate as to whether Mordike made this calculation.

11 Kitchener was accompanied on his visit and tour by the British staff officer Colonel George Kirkpatrick, who would later be made a local Major-General and the Inspector-General of the Commonwealth Military Forces. Much of the organisational planning and groundwork for what Kitchener later included in his report had been done before his visit by Colonel (later Lieutenant-General) J.G. Legge, as well as other members of the Military Board.

12 Memorandum on the Proposed Organisation of the Military Forces of the Australian Colonies, Serial 11, Correspondence Relating to the Inspection of the Military Forces of the Australasian Colonies By Major-General J. Bevan Edwards, Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1890, Volume 49, p. 22.

13 Jean Bou, 'The Evolution and Development of the Australian Light Horse, 1860-1945', PhD thesis, UNSW@ADFA, 2005, pp. 57-59.

14 Palazzo, *The Australian Army, 1901-09* (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2007), pp. 23-27.

the First World War.<sup>3</sup> Jeffrey Grey's institutional history of the army published in the same year similarly pays the idea no attention.<sup>4</sup>

Others have been more forthcoming, however. A 1963 article by George Vazeny in the *Australian Army Journal* baldly states that a divisional structure was created for the militia during the First World War but it is clear that, whatever evidence he may have drawn on, he overstated his case. There is no extant evidence to support the assertion that militia divisions were formed during this period.<sup>5</sup> Craig Wilcox mentions the prospect of the formation of divisions during the introduction of the Universal Training scheme in his book on citizen soldiering, *For Hearts and Homes*, but does not elaborate.<sup>6</sup>

The historian which has made the most of whatever thinking there may have been about militia divisions before 1920, however, is John Mordike in his book, *An Army for a Nation*. Mordike makes no specific claims about any scheme for a divisional organisation, but when considering the 1910 memorandum by Field Marshal Lord Kitchener on Australian defence, he conflates his analysis of that report with his views on imperial agendas to conclude that Kitchener intended any Australian divisions would be commanded by British officers.<sup>7</sup> Mordike's views on British officers and Australian divisions (militia or otherwise) are, however, seemingly based only on suppositions made from his reading of Kitchener's memorandum.<sup>8</sup> He concludes that because Kitchener made no clear provision for Australians to reach ranks higher than colonel (who then commanded brigades) and made no explicit allowance for any formations higher than a brigade, then any divisions which might be raised had to be commanded by British officers because that was the only source for such officers. That Kitchener's memorandum makes no mention of a divisional structure, or that no other evidence is produced to support his argument that divisional command would go to British officers does not appear to have swayed Mordike in reaching this conclusion. It appears also to have completely missed that provision was made for officers to be promoted to ranks higher than colonel in Australia through the agency of 'special appointments'.<sup>9</sup>

In arguing that imperialist plots were at play and that any Australian divisions would go to British commanders Mordike has, in this case, clearly gone beyond what the evidence he presented would support. The idea that a divisional structure was being considered is not,

3 Albert Palazzo, *The Australian Army: a history of its organisation* (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 48-76.

4 Jeffrey Grey, *The Australian Centenary History of Defence, Volume 1: The Australian Army* (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 22-80.

5 Sergeant G.R. Vazeny, 'Reorganisation: The Australian Military Force 1800-1962', *Australian Army Journal* 165, February 1963, pp. 40-41.

6 Craig Wilcox, *For Hearts and Homes: Citizen Soldiering in Australia 1854-1945* (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1998), p. 62. The thesis on which his book is partly based also makes mention of divisions but, like his book, skirts over the matter. Craig Wilcox, 'Australia's Citizen Army', PhD thesis, Australian National University, 1993, pp. 331-332; see also Craig Wilcox, 'Defending Australia 1914-1918', Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, 1918: *Defining Victory, Proceedings Chief of Army's History Conference 1998* (Canberra: Army History Unit, 1998), p. 177.

7 John Mordike, *An Army for a Nation: A history of Australian Military Developments 1880-1914* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), p. 259.

8 Mordike, *An Army for a Nation*, pp. 229-230 & 290-291.

9 Military Board deliberations on the rates of pay for the permanent forces under the new defence scheme, for example, made it clear that whilst no rates of pay had been established for ranks higher than colonel, this was only 'because such officers would hold special appointments.' In this case the immediate matter was the pay of senior officers holding administrative appointments, such as on the Military Board, but the principle was obviously extant and presumably extendable. Pay of Permanent Forces, Item 1905/2475, 4 July 1911, Military Board Proceedings, NAA. A2653, 1908/1911. That Australia had produced a major-general of its own, John Hoad, also does not seem to have concerned him.

change to the nation's military organisation which seems to have prompted the consideration of such a step.

The adoption of a nationwide compulsory military service system in mid-1912, in the form of the Universal Training scheme, which would ultimately see every able-bodied male British subject in the country serve in the cadets and militia from the age of 12 to 26 years, meant that Australia's military organisation was to expand dramatically.<sup>16</sup> Such an expansion was presumably seen as an organisational opportunity and in that same year the military authorities released a set of war establishments that expressly facilitated the creation of divisions. Under it the light horse was not to progress beyond a brigade organisation but a generic infantry wartime divisional structure was set out. Each of these was to consist of three infantry brigades, two squadrons of light horse as divisional mounted troops, divisional artillery of three field batteries plus a howitzer or heavy battery, divisional engineers (including signallers), a divisional train and three field ambulances.<sup>17</sup> When the decision was made to create such an establishment is, so far, unknown, as is the particulars of why such a step was taken.<sup>18</sup> That such a decision should be taken, however, is not all that surprising. The division was the next step on the organisational ladder, had perhaps been implicit in Kitchener's memorandum, and whilst key questions about commanders and staffs to control such formations would no doubt require attention, was a logical progression. That the Australian military had been progressively adopting the organisational templates of the British Army following the Imperial Conferences of 1907, 1909 and 1911 was probably also of some import.

This organisation was merely a theoretical one so long as the country was at peace, but it was not long before moves were made to create something more permanent. Just weeks before the outbreak of the First World War, on 1 July 1914, the Military Board met to consider, among other things, a proposal titled the 'Ultimate Organisation of the Commonwealth Military Forces'. Based on a memorandum prepared by the Director of Military Operations, Major C.B.B. White, and submitted by the Chief of the General Staff, Brigadier J.M. Gordon, it stated, that as the division was the 'approved military organization for the Empire...its adoption is therefore recommended.' Recognising the problems in creating higher formations in an army of militia neophytes in which brigades were perhaps still more theoretical than real, the submission nevertheless went on to propose the nominal establishment of a 'Field Army' of three light horse brigades and two infantry divisions to be drawn from the 2nd and 3rd Military Districts (essentially New South Wales and Victoria), District Field Forces, which in the 1st and 4th Military Districts (Queensland and South Australia) included under strength infantry divisions, were also to be established in the smaller states.

In considering such an idea the issue of command was necessarily of some import but, contrary to Mordike's assertions, there was no suggestion that British officers would be imported to fill the appointments. Instead it was recommended that the commanders and their divisional staffs be appointed from the ranks of the Australian permanent forces by reorganising the already existing military district headquarters. In conclusion the

16 The scheme was based in amendments made to the Defence Act in 1909 and the structure that Kitchener had outlined in his report of 1910. The senior cadet element of the scheme had commenced in mid-1911 and the volunteer and part-paid (militia) units converted to the new scheme in mid-1912.

17 War Establishments of the Australian Military Forces, 1912, NAA: A1194, 22.14/6970.

18 This plan seems to have had its genesis at least as early as 1911 as the Military Board, considering proposals on the organisation of the forces, set out then that the new war establishments would come into effect in 1912-1913, and that the forces would approach full strength under them by 1914-1915. Minutes of Military Board Meeting, 15 September 1911, Military Board Proceedings, NAA: A2653, 1908/1911.

submission recommended that this structure be adopted as the basis for planning until 1920.<sup>19</sup> The Military Board approved the principles of the submission and directed that the Chief of the General Staff and Adjutant-General begin work on creating the new divisional staffs. Whatever happened thereafter is not known and it is probable that any planning that may have commenced was overtaken by the outbreak of war, at least in the short term.

Yet the matter did not disappear and in April 1915 new tables of peace and war establishments were produced and issued which, going further than the Military Board had intended the year before, allowed, this time as part of the peace establishment, for the 'provisional' creation of two light horse divisions and six infantry divisions. The headquarters for each being allocated as such:

- 1st Light Horse Division — 2nd Military District
- 2nd Light Horse Division — 3rd Military District
- 1st Division — 1st Military District
- 2nd Division — 2nd Military District
- 3rd Division — 2nd Military District
- 4th Division — 3rd Military District
- 5th Division — 3rd Military District
- 6th Division — 4th Military District<sup>20</sup>

The supporting tables for these formations were detailed and the organisation of all arms in relation to the divisional structure was set out. Every field unit in the military establishment, including units which did not yet exist but which were to be raised as Universal Training progressed, were allocated to brigades and then divisions.<sup>21</sup> Similar tables were thereafter released again in 1916, 1918 and 1919.<sup>22</sup>

There is no evidence that these tables of organisation were ever acted upon, indeed such a development would have been impossible during the war years. Despite early undertakings to maintain the militia and senior cadets alongside the Australian Imperial Force, even by mid-1915 this was proving increasingly difficult. By late 1915 there was only sufficient permanent staff available to maintain basic administrative functions. At the same time militia unit command was frequently being passed to officers as low as captain, and brigades were being commanded by majors.<sup>23</sup> Citizen force unit training was also repeatedly disrupted, even suspended, for periods during the war. Anyone who may have been deemed suitable to command a division before the war, permanent or citizen force, was now overseas and the idea that the resource and manpower starved militia could be arranged into divisions can only be described as fantastic.

19 Ultimate organisation of the Commonwealth Military Forces, minutes of Military Board meeting, 1 July 1914, Military Board Proceedings, NAA: A2653, 1914. The district commanders were to be made the new divisional commanders and their district staffs would form the nucleus of the divisional staffs.

20 The location of military districts did not conform directly to state boundaries but was close enough that the following is representative of the period under discussion: 1 MD — Queensland; 2 MD — NSW; 3 MD — Victoria; 4 MD — South Australia; 5 MD — Western Australia; 6 MD — Tasmania.

21 Tables of Peace Organization and Establishments 1915-16, issued with Military Order 245, 1915, NAA: A1194, 21.20/6895. The cover of the tables is in fact in error and they were actually issued with Military Order 244, 27 April 1915.

22 Tables of Peace Organization and Establishments, 1916-17, issued with Military Order 176, 1916, NAA: A1194, 21.20/6896; Tables of Peace Organization and Establishments, issued with Military Order 575, 1918, NAA: A1194, 21.20/6897; Tables of Peace Organization and Establishments, 1919-20, issued with Military Order 463, 1919, NAA: A1194, 21.20/6898.

23 Palazzo, *The Australian Army*, pp. 71-75; and Bou, 'Evolution and Development of the Australian Light Horse,' pp. 224-226.

Whether these plans had any effect on post-war deliberations about the future structure of the nation's army is another matter. The 1920 committee into the defence of Australia chaired by Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Chauvel also proposed the creation of a Field Army based on divisions which was, outwardly at least, quite similar to the organisation first set out in the establishments of 1915. It advocated the establishment of two cavalry divisions and four, expandable to six, infantry divisions.<sup>24</sup> Chauvel and two of the committee's other members, C.B.B. White and J.G. Legge, had all held key high level administrative appointments in Australia before or during the war when these divisional proposals were under consideration. Chauvel had been Adjutant-General from 1911 until his despatch to London in 1914. White had of course prepared the divisional scheme presented to the Military Board in 1914, and it is extremely unlikely that Legge, as twice the Chief of the General Staff during the war, would not have been aware of the subsequent organisational tables first promulgated in 1915.<sup>25</sup> Ultimately, however, there is no clear evidence to link the 1920 plan with any that may have preceded it and, however likely that there may have been an influence, it remains a matter of conjecture as to whether more than wartime experience with the AIF was part of their thinking.

#### Conclusion

Taken in perspective these deliberations and plans regarding the formation of citizen force divisions before 1920 are little more than historical 'small beer' in regard to the army's development. But that is not say they should be overlooked. It is clear that the nation's military authorities thought that a divisional organisation was a suitable one, even for a militia army, well before the First World War and took steps to realise that goal. The introduction of the Universal Training scheme was the means by which that goal could be achieved. Such developments deserve to be recognised. It is also entirely possible that the plans had a genuine influence on post-war defence deliberations. Moreover it is evident that under the plans presented in 1914 the commanders who would be appointed to these divisions were not, as has been claimed, to be British officers, but Australian permanent officers. Organisational matters aside, whether there is any underlying nationalist significance to this final decision is moot, and it seems worthwhile to wonder that in an army frequently riven by discord between citizen and permanent soldiers (a situation already in evidence before the First World War) whether it is perhaps just another episode in that often sorry tale.

--oOo--

<sup>24</sup> Report on the Military Defence of Australia, by a Conference of Senior Officers of the Australian Military Forces, 1920, Volumes 1 and 2. AWM1, 207.

<sup>25</sup> Legge was CGS 1 August 1914-19 May 1915, and again 1 October 1917-31 May 1920.

## MILITARY HISTORY SOCIETY OF AUSTRALIA AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE ACADEMY 2007 PRIZE ESSAY

### CITIZEN ARMIES: THE LOCOMOTIVE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

Nathan James Frank Williams<sup>1</sup>

The statement of professional militaries have generally proved superior to citizen armies' appears to be self-evident. After all, the making of war is a technical skill akin to engineering or medicine, and as with these vocations, proficiency is gained only through training and experience. Few of us would feel comfortable being operated on by a surgeon who had only been hastily schooled in the rudiments of medicine because there was a sudden demand for doctors which could not be fulfilled by a professional cadre. And yet this situation is tantamount to the employment of citizen armies during wartime. Professional militaries have time and time again shown their supremacy on the battlefield, and for this reason are often assumed to be 'superior'. However, an army's worth must not be determined solely by its prowess on the battlefield, but all of the benefits it brings to the state it represents. Therefore, it is short-sighted to evaluate the merit of an army solely on territorial aggrandisement or the effectiveness with which it provides security from external threats; these are but two, albeit the most obvious, products of an army but not the only ones. State stability, prosperity and longevity is, as often as not, determined by the internal socio-political factors, and it is on this front that citizen armies emerge as superior to their professional counterparts. In particular this essay will examine the concept of citizen armies as a precursor and vanguard of liberal democracy.

Before proceeding, it is pertinent to clarify two points. Firstly, this is not an essay arguing the case for militarism. War is not in and of itself good. Regardless of any positive side-effects of war, such as instilling courage and honour in its participants, the pain and suffering caused by war always outweighs the good. The benefits which this essay refers to as a result of citizen armies simply refers to the marginal benefits which citizen armies provide over professional militaries. Secondly, for the purpose of this essay, a 'citizen army' is one in which the 'rank and file' is composed from the civilian population who are not permanently serving professional soldiers. They normally pursue another vocation and are called upon to react to a given event or serve a short tenure through conscription or national service. Such citizen armies may be supported by a small core of professionals, generally officers, but the majority of the fighting men (and, in some cases, women) must be derived from the civilian population. Furthermore, citizen armies are "military institutions in which these conscripts and military reservists are citizens rather than 'mere subjects'".<sup>2</sup>

The Peloponnesian War which pitted the very model of a professional army of the classical era, Sparta against the citizen forces of Athens, the world's first democracy, provides a valuable case for comparison. On face value, Sparta won the war (albeit with help from the Persians). Athens had imposed upon it the rule of 'the thirty tyrants', and was deprived of its naval fleet and city walls. It would never again return to its former might following the war. But it is arguable whether or not Sparta's military triumph was worth the negative externalities that maintaining a

<sup>1</sup> Officer Cadet Williams of the New Zealand Army was presented with his prize at the ADFA Graduation ceremony by Federal President Major Robert Morrison. He also received the Chief of Army Prize.

<sup>2</sup> M. Jarowitz, 'Military institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies' in *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 185-204 (1976), p. 186