Laying Groundwork for a 'Theory of Hegemonic Tendencies': How Diplomatic Styles and Strategic Cultures Enhance Understanding of Variations in Foreign Policy Behaviours Among Rising Middle Powers

Abstract

This Ph.D project argues that existing scholarly works and frameworks are insufficient to explain the variations in hegemonic behaviours among contemporary rising middle powers. This significant research gap can be filled by analysing hegemonic behaviours outside the traditional confines of established theories of international relations and diplomacy, so that the focus primarily could be the hegemon and its strategies. This thesis reviews the literature on the types of powers, theories of international relations, theories of hegemony, works on diplomatic style and strategic culture, and state-specific research to explore why some rising middle powers pursue hegemony differently from others. This project argues that power is not something that self-uses or self-maximises. Rather, how power is perceived, and ultimately employed, is dependent on the historical experiences and the ideological makeup of the states, as well as on the worldview of the individuals making decisions over when and how to use that power. This makeup of the state comes from both its diplomatic style as well as its strategic culture. The project lays the groundwork for a new theory of hegemonic tendencies, which specifically calls for rising middle powers to be divided into two analytical categories: "primacy-aspiring states" and "supremacy-aspiring states." Primacy-aspiring rising middle powers, such as Brazil and Indonesia, enjoy good relations with states in their neighbourhoods and are more integration-oriented. These states promote the strengthening of regional institutions and are more likely to abstain from resorting to political and military threats and/or interventions. On the other hand, supremacy-aspiring rising middle powers, such as India and Iran, do not enjoy good relations in their neighbourhoods. They are less integration-oriented, less likely to strengthen regional power-sharing institutions, and more likely to make political and military threats and/or interventions. These variations in hegemonic tendencies between primacy-aspiring and supremacy-aspiring states is a result of these states' respective diplomatic styles and strategic cultures. Show more