A Proof Theoretic Analysis of Intruder Theories

Abstract

We consider the problem of intruder deduction in security protocol analysis: that is, deciding whether a given message M can be deduced from a set of messages F under the theory of blind signatures and arbitrary convergent equational theories modulo associativity and commutativity (AC) of certain binary operators. The traditional formulations of intruder deduction are usually given in natural-deduction-like systems and proving decidability requires significant effort in showing that the rules are "local" in some sense. By using the well-known translation between natural deduction and sequent calculus, we recast the intruder deduction problem as proof search in sequent calculus, in which locality is immediate. Using standard proof theoretic methods, such as permutability of rules and cut elimination, we show that the intruder deduction problem can be reduced, in polynomial time, to the elementary deduction problems, which amounts to solving certain equations in the underlying individual equational theories. We further show that this result extends to combinations of disjoint AC-convergent theories whereby the decidability of intruder deduction under the combined theory reduces to the decidability of elementary deduction in each constituent theory. Although various researchers have reported similar results for individual cases, our work shows that these results can be obtained using a systematic and uniform methodology based on the sequent calculus.