About Time

Abstract

This is a thesis about time. It is also a thesis about how philosophers argue about time.

In the first part of the thesis I introduce two key positions in contemporary philosophical debate about time: presentism, and eternalism. Initially I define these competing positions using the standard existence-oriented definitions one commonly finds in the literature. However, I later argue that the standard definitions lead to confusion, and suggest that new definitions - based on the notion of concreteness - are to be preferred.

In the second part of the thesis I look at the way that presentism and eternalism are positioned in the current temporal debate. I note that the presentist position is considered to be intuitively compelling, but that eternalism is regarded as being better supported by special relativity. I examine the place that common-sense has in philosophy, and explain why presentists continue to argue for their position despite the unambiguous scientific (and philosophical) evidence arrayed against it. I suggest that the standard arguments against presentism, while compelling, are unlikely to move presentists to reject presentism, as they fail to engage with presentism's underlying motivations.

In the final part of the thesis I argue against the presentist position by demonstrating that presentism is incompatible with the motivations generally taken to support it. I look at the way that everyday experience fails to mesh with presentism's account of the present, and then ask whether presentism's ontology is rich enough to support the arrow of time. In the end I argue that presentism is unable to support either everyday experience or a preferred temporal direction, and that presentism should be rejected as a result. Show more