The game theoretic analysis of the amakudari practice in the Japanese banking system

dc.contributor.authorAsano, Akihitoen_US
dc.contributor.authorEto, Takaharuen_US
dc.date.accessioned2004-07-12en_US
dc.date.accessioned2004-09-28T04:50:09Zen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-05T08:54:51Z
dc.date.available2004-09-28T04:50:09Zen_US
dc.date.available2011-01-05T08:54:51Z
dc.date.created2003en_US
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.description.abstractThe amakudari practice in the Japanese banking system officials from the Ministry of Finance obtaining post-retirement jobs in private banks is analysed within a game theoretic framework. We consider a game in which asymmetric information between depositors and banks regarding banks riskiness exists. Banks may hire amakudari officials to signal their riskiness, even when they are not contributing to improving banks projects. Various equilibria emerge depending upon productivity of officials, depositor's risk aversion, and the riskiness of banks. We discuss the veracity of these equilibria in the Japanese economy during the bubble and its preceding periods.en_US
dc.format.extent462410 bytesen_US
dc.format.extent350 bytesen_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/octet-streamen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/42006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/42006
dc.language.isoen_AUen_US
dc.subjectrisken_AU
dc.subjectamakudarien_AU
dc.subjectsignallingen_AU
dc.subjectJapanese banking systemen_AU
dc.titleThe game theoretic analysis of the amakudari practice in the Japanese banking systemen_US
dc.typeWorking/Technical Paperen_US
local.citationWorking Paper Series in Economics and Econometrics no.434en_US
local.contributor.affiliationANUen_US
local.contributor.affiliationFaculty of Economics and Commerceen_US
local.description.refereednoen_US
local.identifier.citationmonthocten_US
local.identifier.citationyear2003en_US
local.identifier.eprintid2656en_US
local.rights.ispublishedyesen_US

Downloads

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
wp434.pdf
Size:
451.57 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
2656-~#6.XSH
Size:
350 B
Format:
Unknown data format