Consequentialism and action guidingness

Date

2020

Authors

Jackson, Frank

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

Oxford University Press

Abstract

Consequentialism says that consequences settle what ought to be done. What does this imply for how we should decide, on some given occasion, what ought to be done in the light of our beliefs about the consequences of the actions available to us, our options? We explore the issues generated by the fact that typically there is substantial uncertainty about the consequences of the actions we need to choose between—we perforce must rely on the subjective probabilities of the possible outcomes of those actions. We distinguish objective “oughts” from expective “oughts” and note the complications that arise with compound actions—actions that have actions as parts.

Description

Keywords

compound actions, consequentialism, expective oughts, Mill, objective oughts, Sidgwick, subjective probability

Citation

Source

Type

Book chapter

Book Title

The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism

Entity type

Access Statement

License Rights

Restricted until

2099-12-31

Downloads

File
Description