Subjectivity, freedom and history : Michel Foucault's contribution to critical thought

Falzon, Christopher Anthony

Subjectivity, freedom and history : Michel Foucault's contribution to critical thought

Date

1989

Authors

Falzon, Christopher Anthony

Abstract

This thesis aims to defend Foucault, who pursues an 'anti-humanistic' critique of the subject, from the charge that he thereby falls into political pessimism, irrationalism and uncritical objectivism. Habermas in particular makes these criticisms. I argue that these criticisms depend on reading Foucault in terms of the very humanism that he rejects - more specifically, in terms of a 'humanistic subject-object framework', in which human beings are either free, autonomous subjects or determined, unfree objects. By questioning the subject in terms of history, Foucault seems to represent the latter alternative, and is criticised accordingly. But this situation can be turned around. In terms of this framework, it is not possible to give a historical account of the subject without destroying it, but by the same token, the autonomous subject lacks any historical context or any plausible account of its emergence. The freedom it represents turns out to be abstract and unworldly. Existentialism is discussed in this connection. I then argue that the subject -object framework of thinking is itself the outcome of a subordination of the notion of history to a metaphysical First Philosophy, in the form of a foundational subjectivism. From the standpoint of the humanist subject, historical contextualisation appears only as the objectivistic dissolution of the subject, critique and freedom. And as long as thought proceeds in these terms, it is unable to take history seriously or use it to comprehend and interrogate the subject. On the contrary, thought is impelled by the threat of a reductive objectivism to affirm a historically transcendent standpoint The Frankfurt School, or 'Critical Theory', provides an illustration of the difficulties thought experiences in doing justice to history when it proceeds in terms of the subject-object framework. Horkheimer and Habermas seek to save the subject and the possibility of social critique from what they see as their eclipse through an oppressive process of social objectification. In the process, however, they are unable to avoid assuming a transhistorical perspective as the basis of critique, flying in the face of their own historical awareness. This allows Habermas's criticisms of Foucault to be put into perspective. A form of thought that is unable to do justice to history is unable to properly grasp Foucault's historicising strategy. Finally, I argue that Foucault does not represent an objectivistic denial of critique and freedom. He goes beyond the humanistic alternatives of autonomous subject versus reductive objectivism, freeing historical reflection for this constraining framework in order to pursue the project of a historical critique of metaphysics. That is, he presents a historical analysis of the subject that is taken by humanism to be given, foundational, absolute, and capable of explaining society and history. What he thereby undermines is not critique and freedom per se but only their specifically humanist forms. Critique for Foucault no longer presupposes an essential subjectivity that has been historically distorted or denied, and freedom is no longer a matter of living in accordance with this subjectivity. It involves revealing the historical contingency in what we take for granted as essential and eternal in our existence, freeing us from the limitations on what we think and do engendered by these presuppositions, and opening up the possibility of rethinking our forms of thought and action. In developing this approach, Foucault gives expression to the historico-critical awareness that is also present in the Frankfurt School, and contributes to the activity of critical thought understood as a confrontation with metaphysics.