Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem

dc.contributor.authorManiquet, Francois
dc.contributor.authorMongin, Philippe
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-07T22:45:03Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.date.updated2015-12-07T11:31:47Z
dc.identifier.issn0176-1714
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/25466
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.sourceSocial Choice and Welfare
dc.titleApproval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
dc.typeJournal article
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage532
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage519
local.contributor.affiliationManiquet, Francois, CORE, Universite Catholique de Louvain
local.contributor.affiliationMongin, Philippe, College of Arts and Social Sciences, ANU
local.contributor.authoremailrepository.admin@anu.edu.au
local.contributor.authoruidMongin, Philippe, u5343165
local.description.embargo2037-12-31
local.description.notesImported from ARIES
local.identifier.absfor220319 - Social Philosophy
local.identifier.absseo970122 - Expanding Knowledge in Philosophy and Religious Studies
local.identifier.ariespublicationu5343215xPUB38
local.identifier.citationvolume44
local.identifier.doi10.1007/s00355-014-0847-2
local.identifier.scopusID2-s2.0-84910638475
local.identifier.uidSubmittedByu5343215
local.type.statusPublished Version

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