Reference, context and propositions
Abstract
This thesis is a detailed investigation of a web of philosophical problems surrounding what I call Kripke' s Thesis: if proper names are directly referential then such identity statements as 'Hesperus is Phosphorus', which are constructed from two distinct but co-referential proper names, are necessary and yet a posteriori.
Chapter 1 clarifies some confusions surrounding Kripke's view about rigidity (rigid designation) and his theory of naming. Problems concerning the scope interpretation of rigidity, rigid descriptions, and Kaplan-rigidity are dealt
with. My major claim is that the fundamental notion of Kripke's theory of naming is direct reference, not rigidity. In Chapter 2, I first establish the 'modal half of Kripke's Thesis. Then an objection against Kripke's Thesis is presented. The central claim of the objection is this: given that proper names are directly referential and that the proposition expressed by (e.g.) 'Hesperus is Hesperus' is a priori, 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' expresses the same proposition as 'Hesperus is Hesperus', and is therefore a priori. An attempt, based on a suggestion by Plantinga, to defend Kripke's
Thesis is shown to be unsuccessful.
In Chapter 3, it is first noted that the objection previously presented involves the assumption (T): 'a priori' applies primarily to propositions and derivatively to sentences. Then, on the basis of Stalnaker's semantic apparatus of propositional concepts, a two-dimensional account of a priority is developed. By rejecting (T) and embracing a sentence-relative view of 'a priori propositions', this account provides a defence of Kripke's Thesis. It is argued
that this is not an ad hoc defence.
In Chapter 4, attention turns to some problems concerning context dependence, a central feature of the two-dimensional account proposed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 starts with the observation that the account seems to be committed to an indexical treatment of proper names. This prompts a
demonstration of the compatibility of indexicality and rigidity. The demonstration, drawing on Kaplan's semantics for indexicals, introduces, however, the more serious problem of how to square the purported indexicality of proper names, as revealed by the two-dimensional account, with Kaplan's contention that proper names have a stable character. A solution which invokes the notion of frame relativity is proposed. The first section of Chapter 5 aims to clarify the intricate relation between 'singular propositions' and 'direct reference'. The rest of the chapter is a detailed analysis of Salmon's attempt to refute Kripke's Thesis. It is argued that Salmon's attempt fails, and that the source of his failure lies in his characterization of a priority. Some objections to this analysis are considered and rejected.