Safety cases: success or failure?

Abstract

This paper sets out the historical background to the development of safety cases as a tool to manage and regulate major hazard industries, primarily in the UK. The main features of successful safety case systems are described and an assessment made of the successes and failures in their application. 1. It is probably only possible to achieve absolute safety if as a society we do not undertake hazardous activities. However we know that the application of technology brings great benefits to us as a society. The skill comes in exploiting potentially hazardous technology whilst minimising the risks - accepting it is probably not possible to totally eliminate the risks. 2. The concept of using the mechanism of a safety case as a tool to help manage major risks, although around for some considerable time, particularly in the nuclear field, continues to expand into new areas. This alone tells us something about the worth and success of the safety case concept. This paper will briefly trace some of the history of its development in the UK and Europe, outline some of the features of successful safety case regulatory regimes as well as some of the difficulties. 3. In the context of this paper the term “safety case” is used to cover the variety of legislative requirements which variously require “safety cases” or “safety reports”. The term “installation” is used to describe the site that presents the major hazard whether it be a nuclear power station, an oil refinery or an offshore oil and gas facility and the term “operator” to describe the owner or employer in charge of the installation.