Debunking Perceptual Beliefs about Ordinary Objects

Date

Authors

Korman, Daniel

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

University of Michigan

Abstract

Debunking arguments are arguments that aim to undermine some range of beliefs by showing that those beliefs are not appropriately connected to their subject matter. Arguments of this sort rear their heads in a wide variety of domains, threatening beliefs about morality, mathematics, logic, color, and the existence of God. Perceptual beliefs about ordinary objects, however, are widely thought to be invulnerable to such arguments. I will show that this is a mistake. I articulate a debunking argument that purports to undermine our most basic perceptual beliefs. I then challenge a number of responses to the argument, including the �permissivist� response that there are a plenitude of objects before us, virtually guaranteeing the accuracy of our object beliefs.

Description

Keywords

Citation

Source

Philosophers' Imprint

Book Title

Entity type

Access Statement

License Rights

DOI

Restricted until

2037-12-31