Thai foreign policy from Sarit to Seni : adaptation during the second Indochina war

Abstract

Shortly after General Sarit's coup in November 1957 Thailand was confronted by successive crises in Indochina: a rapid expansion of communist insurgency in Laos and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), together with bilateral conflicts with Cambodia, particularly over the border temple of Phra Viharn. Problems in Indochina continued to grow over subsequent years, and together with the issue of great power involvement - particularly that of the U.S. - became the main focus of Thai foreign policy concerns. Policy towards Indochina was directed at supporting anti-communist governments through encouraging U.S. intervention, providing a base for U.S. activities in the region, extending its own military aid, and mounting a major diplomatic effort on behalf of the RVN. When the U.S. began a slow withdrawal from the region in the late 1960s Thailand sought to strengthen the u.s. will to persist, but also moved cautiously towards rapprochement with China, and sought to strengthen regionalism through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. This process was extended in the 1970s with moves to distance Thailand from the U.S. and establish the basis for future relations with neighbouring communist movements. After communist victories throughout Indochina in 1975 lingering Indochinese suspicions and domestic opposition made a modus vivendi difficult to establish, but slow progress in this direction was made until interrupted by the coup of October 1976. Events in Indochina were a major determinant of Thai foreign policy, however such systemic influences were not the only factor. "National" influences, including Thailand's geopolitical location in relation to the Indochina countries, and historical links with the region, were also important. So too were decision-making factors. For most of the period foreign policy was closely held by a strongly anti-communist military, assisted by a conservative foreign ministry. In the 1970s the foreign ministry became less anti-communist, and more committed to charting an independent foreign policy for Thailand. After the overthrow of the Thanom government in October 1973 it largely supplanted the foreign policy role of the military. Elements in the military were strongly opposed to the new policy, but the ministry were able to push ahead with the assistance of an increasingly anti-U.S. public opinion. The coincidence of an expanding communist threat and u.s. intervention in the 1960s with control of foreign policy by a small military-led elite, and the decline of U.S. influence in the 1970s with an increasing foreign policy role for the foreign ministry and public opinion, meant that systemic and decision making influences were difficult to separate, and reinforced one another.