Thai foreign policy from Sarit to Seni : adaptation during the second Indochina war
Date
1989
Authors
Funston, Neil John
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Shortly after General Sarit's coup in November 1957
Thailand was confronted by successive crises in Indochina:
a rapid expansion of communist insurgency in Laos and the
Republic of Vietnam (RVN), together with bilateral
conflicts with Cambodia, particularly over the border
temple of Phra Viharn. Problems in Indochina continued to
grow over subsequent years, and together with the issue of
great power involvement - particularly that of the U.S. -
became the main focus of Thai foreign policy concerns.
Policy towards Indochina was directed at supporting
anti-communist governments through encouraging U.S.
intervention, providing a base for U.S. activities in the
region, extending its own military aid, and mounting a
major diplomatic effort on behalf of the RVN. When the
U.S. began a slow withdrawal from the region in the late
1960s Thailand sought to strengthen the u.s. will to
persist, but also moved cautiously towards rapprochement
with China, and sought to strengthen regionalism through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. This process
was extended in the 1970s with moves to distance Thailand
from the U.S. and establish the basis for future relations
with neighbouring communist movements. After communist
victories throughout Indochina in 1975 lingering Indochinese suspicions and domestic opposition made a
modus vivendi difficult to establish, but slow progress in
this direction was made until interrupted by the coup of
October 1976.
Events in Indochina were a major determinant of Thai
foreign policy, however such systemic influences were not
the only factor. "National" influences, including
Thailand's geopolitical location in relation to the
Indochina countries, and historical links with the region,
were also important. So too were decision-making factors.
For most of the period foreign policy was closely held by
a strongly anti-communist military, assisted by a
conservative foreign ministry. In the 1970s the foreign
ministry became less anti-communist, and more committed to
charting an independent foreign policy for Thailand.
After the overthrow of the Thanom government in October
1973 it largely supplanted the foreign policy role of the
military. Elements in the military were strongly opposed
to the new policy, but the ministry were able to push
ahead with the assistance of an increasingly anti-U.S.
public opinion. The coincidence of an expanding communist
threat and u.s. intervention in the 1960s with control of
foreign policy by a small military-led elite, and the
decline of U.S. influence in the 1970s with an increasing
foreign policy role for the foreign ministry and public
opinion, meant that systemic and decision making
influences were difficult to separate, and reinforced one
another.
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