A Practical Guide to Intellectualism
Date
2008
Authors
Cath, Yuri
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Abstract
In this thesis I examine the view—known as
intellectualism—that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that,
or propositional knowledge. I examine issues concerning both the
status of this view of knowledge-how and the philosophical
implications if it is true. The ability hypothesis is an
important position in the philosophy of mind that appeals to
Gilbert Ryle’s famous idea that there is a fundamental
distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. This
position appears to be inconsistent with the truth of
intellectualism. However, I demonstrate in this thesis that the
ability hypothesis can be restated using the intellectualist view
of knowledge-how. With regards to the status of intellectualism,
I argue that the two main traditional arguments against
intellectualism do not succeed. I also provide new and, I claim,
successful arguments against intellectualism. These arguments
point to a new view of knowledge-how that is distinct from both
the standard intellectualist and Rylean views of knowledge-how.
Description
Keywords
knowledge-how, knowledge-that, intellectualism, Gilbert Ryle, the ability hypothesis, Gettier, epistemic luck, justification, belief
Citation
Collections
Source
Type
Thesis (PhD)
Book Title
Entity type
Access Statement
Open Access
License Rights
Restricted until
Downloads
File
Description