Political Economy Dynamics in the Arab Gulf States: Implications for Political Transition

Abstract

Political science predicts that monarchies lack the flexibility to modernize without losing power: "the king's dilemma." Yet, Gulf regimes are remarkably durable, strengthened by late-stage rentierism, entrepreneurial state capitalism, careful globalization, elite-based networks, and political narratives to manage state-society interactions. These characteristics impede socioeconomic or political reform and democratization, as political and commercial elites have strong incentives for continuity. Rents provide freedom from accountability, reciprocity, or negotiation with society. But the Gulf elites are still not autonomous, in fact embedded in and reliant upon society. Revolution or political unrest remains a threat. Yet, this chapter argues that despite recent developments, as long as Gulf rentier wealth and state capitalism prove beneficial, monarchies will maintain the co-optive, repressive, and regulatory capacity to avoid substantial political change.