Preconceived Perceptions: Operational Codes and Deterrence in the 2017/18 North Korean Nuclear Crisis

Abstract

Are debates over the deterrence of an adversary reflective of an apparent complexity in its application within a given situation or simply indicative of conflicting preconceived political beliefs? Specifically, can perceptions towards the deterrence of an adversary be traced to an individual’s operational code? This thesis examines the linkages between the operational codes of John Bolton and William Perry and their perceptions of whether the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea can be deterred within the context of the 2017/18 North Korean nuclear crisis. The aim of this study is to explain the specific perceptions held by Bolton and Perry through reference to their operational codes. For this paper, I adopt Stephen Walker and Lawrence Falkowski’s refined typology of the operational code. Deterrence theory literature is examined to establish the principal causes of deterrence failure. These conditions are cross-referenced with the operational code typology to construct the expected perceptions of each belief type, thereby creating a framework against which Bolton and Perry can be measured. I hypothesis that the operational codes of Bolton and Perry will systematically account for their perceptions towards the deterrence of North Korea. A notable contribution of this paper is the specific and unique application of the operational code approach to deterrence. In addition, this thesis adds to the literature emphasising the subjective nature of deterrence, highlighting the inadequacy of traditional rational-actor paradigms. Further, it provides a nuanced account of the role of beliefs as a cause of substantial disagreement in the contemporaneous debate within Washington. Ultimately, this study finds that knowledge of Bolton and Perry’s operational codes is useful for understanding their specific perceptions towards the deterrence of North Korea. Show more