The knowledge argument, diaphanousness, representationalism

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dc.contributor.authorJackson, Frank
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-08T22:17:04Z
dc.date.available2015-12-08T22:17:04Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.date.updated2015-12-08T08:06:46Z
dc.identifier.isbn9780195171655
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/30967
dc.publisherOxford University Press
dc.relation.ispartofPhenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge: new essays on consciousness and physicalism
dc.relation.isversionof1st Edition
dc.titleThe knowledge argument, diaphanousness, representationalism
dc.typeBook chapter
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage64
local.bibliographicCitation.placeofpublicationOxford
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage52
local.contributor.affiliationJackson, Frank, College of Arts and Social Sciences, ANU
local.contributor.authoremailu8606954@anu.edu.au
local.contributor.authoruidJackson, Frank, u8606954
local.description.notesImported from ARIES
local.identifier.absfor220314 - Philosophy of Mind (excl. Cognition)
local.identifier.ariespublicationu8908663xPUB78
local.identifier.uidSubmittedByu8908663
local.type.statusPublished Version

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