Power Corrupts, but can office enoble?
| dc.contributor.author | Brennan, H Geoffrey | en_AU |
| dc.contributor.author | Pettit, Philip | en_AU |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-12-13T22:28:46Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-12-13T22:28:46Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2002 | en_AU |
| dc.date.updated | 2015-12-11T08:41:36Z | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper investigates the effects of increased power associated with higher office on the quality of agent performance, within the context of a model in which agents care about what others think of them. They care that is about the esteem they enjoy. The object is to conduct a simple comparative static exercise in the 'economy of esteem', isolating the various dimensions of the relation between office held and esteem-related incentives to perform in a more estimable way. | en_AU |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en_AU |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0023-5962 | en_AU |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1885/74359 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_AU | en_AU |
| dc.publisher | Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag | en_AU |
| dc.source | Kyklos | en_AU |
| dc.subject | Keywords: corruption; theoretical study | en_AU |
| dc.title | Power Corrupts, but can office enoble? | en_AU |
| dc.type | Journal article | en_AU |
| local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage | 178 | |
| local.bibliographicCitation.startpage | 157 | |
| local.contributor.affiliation | Brennan, H Geoffrey, College of Arts and Social Sciences, ANU | |
| local.contributor.affiliation | Pettit, Philip, College of Arts and Social Sciences, ANU | |
| local.contributor.authoruid | Brennan, H Geoffrey, u8308431 | |
| local.contributor.authoruid | Pettit, Philip, u8306678 | |
| local.description.notes | Imported from ARIES | |
| local.description.refereed | Yes | |
| local.identifier.absfor | 160603 - Comparative Government and Politics | |
| local.identifier.ariespublication | MigratedxPub4083 | |
| local.identifier.citationvolume | 55 | |
| local.identifier.scopusID | 2-s2.0-0036097897 | |
| local.type.status | Published Version | en_AU |