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Vague Credence

Lyon, Aidan

Description

It is natural to think of precise probabilities as being special cases of imprecise probabilities, the special case being when one’s lower and upper probabilities are equal. I argue, however, that it is better to think of the two models as representing two different aspects of our credences, which are often (if not always) vague to some degree. I show that by combining the two models into one model, and understanding that model as a model of vague credence, a natural interpretation arises that...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2015
Type: Journal article
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1885/98369
Source: Synthese
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0782-5

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