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A Neuron Doctrine in the Philosophy of Neuroscience

Gold, I; Stoljar, Daniel

Description

Many neuroscientists and philosophers endorse a view about the explanatory reach of neuroscience (which we will call the neuron doctrine) to the effect that the framework for understanding the mind will be developed by neuroscience; or, as we will put it, that a successful theory of the mind will be solely neuroscientific. It is a consequence of this view that the sciences of the mind that cannot be expressed by means of neuroscientific concepts alone count as indirect sciences that will be...[Show more]

dc.contributor.authorGold, I
dc.contributor.authorStoljar, Daniel
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-13T23:41:24Z
dc.date.available2015-12-13T23:41:24Z
dc.identifier.issn0140-525X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/94883
dc.description.abstractMany neuroscientists and philosophers endorse a view about the explanatory reach of neuroscience (which we will call the neuron doctrine) to the effect that the framework for understanding the mind will be developed by neuroscience; or, as we will put it, that a successful theory of the mind will be solely neuroscientific. It is a consequence of this view that the sciences of the mind that cannot be expressed by means of neuroscientific concepts alone count as indirect sciences that will be discarded as neuroscience matures. This consequence is what makes the doctrine substantive, indeed, radical. We ask, first, what the neuron doctrine means and, second, whether it is true. In answer to the first question, we distinguish two versions of the doctrine. One version, the trivial neuron doctrine, turns out to be uncontroversial but unsubstantive because it fails to have the consequence that the nonneuroscientific sciences of the mind will eventually be discarded. A second version, the radical neuron doctrine, does have this consequence, but, unlike the first doctrine, is highly controversial. We argue that the neuron doctrine appears to be both substantive and uncontroversial only as a result of a conflation of these two versions. We then consider whether the radical doctrine is true. We present and evaluate three arguments for it, based either on general scientific and philosophical considerations or on the details of neuroscience itself, arguing that all three fail. We conclude that the evidence fails to support the radical neuron doctrine.
dc.publisherCambridge University Press
dc.sourceBehavioral and Brain Sciences
dc.subjectKeywords: cognition; learning; neuroscience; philosophy; review; theory; Cognition; Humans; Models, Neurological; Neurons; Neurosciences; Psychological Theory; Psychophysiology Churchlands; Classical conditioning; Cognitive neuroscience; Kandel; Learning; Materialism; Mind; Naturalism; Neurobiology; Neuron doctrine; Neurophilosophy; Philosophy of neuroscience; Psychology; Reduction; Theoretical unification
dc.titleA Neuron Doctrine in the Philosophy of Neuroscience
dc.typeJournal article
local.description.notesImported from ARIES
local.description.refereedYes
local.identifier.citationvolume5
dc.date.issued1999
local.identifier.absfor220312 - Philosophy of Cognition
local.identifier.ariespublicationMigratedxPub24589
local.type.statusPublished Version
local.contributor.affiliationGold, I, College of Arts and Social Sciences, ANU
local.contributor.affiliationStoljar, Daniel, College of Arts and Social Sciences, ANU
local.bibliographicCitation.issue22
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage1
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage22
local.identifier.doi10.1017/S0140525X99002198
dc.date.updated2015-12-12T09:32:16Z
local.identifier.scopusID2-s2.0-0033373167
CollectionsANU Research Publications

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