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How to Think about the Modularity of Mind Reading

Currie, Gregory; Sterelny, Kim


It has been suggested that the fixation of beliefs about people's beliefs, desires and intentions is modularized. We argue that this is unlikely. We argue that there is modularity lower down: social-intentional 'markers' are produced by an encapsulated mechanism intermediate between perception and belief-fixation, and that these markers make a distinctive contribution to the fixation of beliefs about the mental. But belief fixation itself is not modular. Finally, we suggest some complications...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2000
Type: Journal article
Source: Philosophical Quarterly, The


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