Skip navigation
Skip navigation

The Liar Paradox: A Consistent and Semantically Closed Solution

Young, Ryan

Description

This thesis develops a new approach to the formal de nition of a truth predicate that allows a consistent, semantically closed defiition within classical logic. The approach is built on an analysis of structural properties of languages that make Liar Sentences and the paradoxical argument possible. By focusing on these conditions, standard formal dfinitions of semantics are shown to impose systematic limitations on the definition of formal truth predicates. The alternative approach to the...[Show more]

dc.contributor.authorYoung, Ryan
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-23T04:52:28Z
dc.date.available2012-02-23T04:52:28Z
dc.identifier.otherb25699908
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/8898
dc.description.abstractThis thesis develops a new approach to the formal de nition of a truth predicate that allows a consistent, semantically closed defiition within classical logic. The approach is built on an analysis of structural properties of languages that make Liar Sentences and the paradoxical argument possible. By focusing on these conditions, standard formal dfinitions of semantics are shown to impose systematic limitations on the definition of formal truth predicates. The alternative approach to the formal definition of truth is developed by analysing our intuitive procedure for evaluating the truth value of sentences like "P is true". It is observed that the standard procedure breaks down in the case of the Liar Paradox as a side effect of the patterns of naming or reference necessary to the definition of Truth as a predicate. This means there are two ways in which a sentence like "P is true" can be not true, which requires that the T-Schema be modified for such sentences. By modifying the T-Schema, and taking seriously the effects of the patterns of naming/ reference on truth values, the new approach to the definition of truth is developed. Formal truth definitions within classical logic are constructed that provide an explicit and adequate truth definition for their own language, every sentence within the languages has a truth value, and there is no Strengthened Liar Paradox. This approach to solving the Liar Paradox can be easily applied to a very wide range of languages, including natural languages.
dc.language.isoen_AU
dc.subjectLiar Paradox
dc.subjectTruth
dc.subjectLogic
dc.subjectTheory of Truth
dc.subjectParadox
dc.subjectReference
dc.subjectT-schema
dc.subjectformal semantics
dc.titleThe Liar Paradox: A Consistent and Semantically Closed Solution
dc.typeThesis (PhD)
local.contributor.supervisorRoeper, Peter
dcterms.valid2012
local.description.notesPrincipal Supervisor: Dr Peter Roeper
local.description.refereedyes
local.type.degreeDoctor of Philosophy (PhD)
dc.date.issued2011
local.contributor.affiliationSchool of Philosophy
local.identifier.doi10.25911/5d78dcbebe66c
local.mintdoimint
CollectionsOpen Access Theses

Download

File Description SizeFormat Image
02whole_Young.pdfWhole thesis961.79 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
01front_Young.pdfFront matter321.63 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail


Items in Open Research are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Updated:  19 May 2020/ Responsible Officer:  University Librarian/ Page Contact:  Library Systems & Web Coordinator