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Trust in the Shadow of the Courts

Brennan, H Geoffrey; Gueth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut

Description

Even if contract enforcers are as opportunistic as ordinary traders, a system of adjudication can increase the degree to which contractual obligations on large anonymous markets are fulfilled. Only if arbitrators receive a fixed income, occasional mistakes will not favour the untrustworthy. It can be shown that the presence of the courts may further the prospects of the trustworthy in a large class of situations. But under non-optimal court policies and unfavorable parameter constellations...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2003
Type: Journal article
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1885/88622
Source: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

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