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Deflationism and the Success Argument

Damnjanovic, Nicolas


Deflationists about truth typically deny that truth is a causal-explanatory property. However, the now familiar 'success argument' attempts to show that truth plays an important causal-explanatory role in explanations of practical success. Deflationists have standardly responded that the truth predicate appears in such explanations merely as a logical device, and that therefore truth has not been shown to play a causal-explanatory role. I argue that if we accept Jackson and Pettit's account of...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2005
Type: Journal article
Source: Philosophical Quarterly, The


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