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Auctions with synergies and asymetric buyers

Menezes, Flavio; Monteiro, Paulo K


In this paper we consider sequential auctions with synergies where one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each. We show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by Branco [Econ. Lett. 54 (1997) 159]. Indeed we show that expected prices can actually increase.

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2004
Type: Journal article
Source: Economics Letters
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2004.04.017


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