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Budgetary policy with unified and decentralized appropriations authority

Dharmapala, Anurudha


The divestiture of the House Appropriations Committee in the 1880's has received considerable attention of an empirical nature. This paper presents a formal model of legislative decisionmaking, using a common agency formulation to represent interest group lobbying of legislators. This framework is used to analyze the effects of decentralizing appropriations authority. The conditions under which decentralization leads to higher spending are characterized. It is argued that the conventional view...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2003
Type: Journal article
Source: Public Choice


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