Skip navigation
Skip navigation

Potentially Harmful International Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Cornes, Richard; Rubbelke, Dirk


Experience from climate policy suggests that full cooperation among all countries is not a likely outcome. In this paper we therefore consider the case where only members of a subgroup of countries cooperate by reciprocally matching their public good contributions. In a two-stage game, matching rates are set at stage 1 then national contributions are chosen at stage 2. In the case of small coalitions, negative matching may result in the subgame-perfect equilibrium that decreases global public...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2014
Type: Journal article
Source: Economica
DOI: 10.1111/ecca.12074


File Description SizeFormat Image
01_Buchholz_Potentially_Harmful_2014.pdf191.73 kBAdobe PDF    Request a copy

Items in Open Research are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Updated:  23 August 2018/ Responsible Officer:  University Librarian/ Page Contact:  Library Systems & Web Coordinator