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Economics of electric vehicle charging: A game theoretic approach

Tushar, Wayes; Saad, Walid; Poor, H. Vincent; Smith, David

Description

In this paper, the problem of grid-to-vehicle energy exchange between a smart grid and plug-in electric vehicle groups (PEVGs) is studied using a noncooperative Stackelberg game. In this game, on the one hand, the smart grid, which acts as a leader, needs to decide on its price so as to optimize its revenue while ensuring the PEVGs' participation. On the other hand, the PEVGs, which act as followers, need to decide on their charging strategies so as to optimize a tradeoff between the benefit...[Show more]

dc.contributor.authorTushar, Wayes
dc.contributor.authorSaad, Walid
dc.contributor.authorPoor, H. Vincent
dc.contributor.authorSmith, David
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-13T22:19:47Z
dc.identifier.issn1949-3061
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/71997
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, the problem of grid-to-vehicle energy exchange between a smart grid and plug-in electric vehicle groups (PEVGs) is studied using a noncooperative Stackelberg game. In this game, on the one hand, the smart grid, which acts as a leader, needs to decide on its price so as to optimize its revenue while ensuring the PEVGs' participation. On the other hand, the PEVGs, which act as followers, need to decide on their charging strategies so as to optimize a tradeoff between the benefit from battery charging and the associated cost. Using variational inequalities, it is shown that the proposed game possesses a socially optimal Stackelberg equilibrium in which the grid optimizes its price while the PEVGs choose their equilibrium strategies. A distributed algorithm that enables the PEVGs and the smart grid to reach this equilibrium is proposed and assessed by extensive simulations. Further, the model is extended to a time-varying case that can incorporate and handle slowly varying environments.
dc.publisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE Inc)
dc.sourceIEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
dc.subjectKeywords: Associated costs; Charging strategies; Energy exchanges; Equilibrium strategy; Extensive simulations; Game-theoretic; Plug-ins; Power system economics; Smart grid; Stackelberg equilibrium; Stackelberg Games; Time varying; Variational inequalities; Costs; Electric vehicles; energy exchange; energy management; game theory; power system economics; smart grids
dc.titleEconomics of electric vehicle charging: A game theoretic approach
dc.typeJournal article
local.description.notesImported from ARIES
local.identifier.citationvolume3
dc.date.issued2012
local.identifier.absfor080309 - Software Engineering
local.identifier.ariespublicationf5625xPUB2996
local.type.statusPublished Version
local.contributor.affiliationTushar, Wayes, College of Engineering and Computer Science, ANU
local.contributor.affiliationSaad, Walid, University of Miami
local.contributor.affiliationPoor, H. Vincent, Princeton University
local.contributor.affiliationSmith, David, College of Engineering and Computer Science, ANU
local.description.embargo2037-12-31
local.bibliographicCitation.issue4
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage1767
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage1778
local.identifier.doi10.1109/TSG.2012.2211901
dc.date.updated2016-02-24T09:04:43Z
local.identifier.scopusID2-s2.0-84872069170
local.identifier.thomsonID000325485000021
CollectionsANU Research Publications

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