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Rewards and Regulation

Braithwaite, John


Rewards are less useful in regulation than they are in markets. Firms respond to market incentives because most markets are contestable. In markets that are not oligopolies it makes more sense to adopt a competitor mentality than a fixer mentality. Regulatory power in contrast is mostly not contestable. Firms are therefore more likely to adopt a fixer or game-playing mentality. Reactance to regulatory control through rewards is likely to be greater than reactance to market discipline. If a...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2002
Type: Journal article
Source: Journal of Law and Society


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