Prioritizing Consumers in Smart Grid: A Game Theoretic Approach
-
Altmetric Citations
Tushar, Wayes; Zhang, Jian (Andrew); Smith, David; Poor, H. Vincent; Thiebaux, Sylvie
Description
This paper proposes an energy management technique for a consumer-to-grid system in smart grid. The benefit to consumers is made the primary concern to encourage consumers to participate voluntarily in energy trading with the central power station (CPS) in situations of energy deficiency. A novel system model motivating energy trading under the goal of social optimality is proposed. A single-leader multiple-follower Stackelberg game is then studied to model the interactions between the CPS and...[Show more]
dc.contributor.author | Tushar, Wayes | |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Zhang, Jian (Andrew) | |
dc.contributor.author | Smith, David | |
dc.contributor.author | Poor, H. Vincent | |
dc.contributor.author | Thiebaux, Sylvie | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-12-13T22:15:31Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1949-3053 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1885/70448 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper proposes an energy management technique for a consumer-to-grid system in smart grid. The benefit to consumers is made the primary concern to encourage consumers to participate voluntarily in energy trading with the central power station (CPS) in situations of energy deficiency. A novel system model motivating energy trading under the goal of social optimality is proposed. A single-leader multiple-follower Stackelberg game is then studied to model the interactions between the CPS and a number of energy consumers (ECs), and to find optimal distributed solutions for the optimization problem based on the system model. The CPS is considered as a leader seeking to minimize its total cost of buying energy from the ECs, and the ECs are the followers who decide on how much energy they will sell to the CPS for maximizing their utilities. It is shown that the game, which can be implemented distributedly, possesses a socially optimal solution, in which the sum of the benefits to all consumers is maximized, as the total cost to the CPS is minimized. Numerical analysis confirms the effectiveness of the game. | |
dc.publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers | |
dc.source | IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid | |
dc.title | Prioritizing Consumers in Smart Grid: A Game Theoretic Approach | |
dc.type | Journal article | |
local.description.notes | Imported from ARIES | |
local.identifier.citationvolume | 5 | |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
local.identifier.absfor | 090601 - Circuits and Systems | |
local.identifier.ariespublication | U3488905xPUB2313 | |
local.type.status | Published Version | |
local.contributor.affiliation | Tushar, Wayes, Singapore University of Technology and Design (SUTD) | |
local.contributor.affiliation | Zhang, Jian (Andrew), CSIRO ICT Center | |
local.contributor.affiliation | Smith, David, College of Engineering and Computer Science, ANU | |
local.contributor.affiliation | Poor, H. Vincent, Princeton University | |
local.contributor.affiliation | Thiebaux, Sylvie, College of Engineering and Computer Science, ANU | |
local.description.embargo | 2037-12-31 | |
local.bibliographicCitation.issue | 3 | |
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage | 1429 | |
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage | 1438 | |
local.identifier.doi | 10.1109/TSG.2013.2293755 | |
local.identifier.absseo | 970108 - Expanding Knowledge in the Information and Computing Sciences | |
dc.date.updated | 2015-12-11T07:18:00Z | |
local.identifier.scopusID | 2-s2.0-84899909530 | |
local.identifier.thomsonID | 000335155800030 | |
Collections | ANU Research Publications |
Download
File | Description | Size | Format | Image |
---|---|---|---|---|
01_Tushar_Prioritizing_Consumers_in_2014.pdf | 1.69 MB | Adobe PDF | Request a copy |
Items in Open Research are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
Updated: 17 November 2022/ Responsible Officer: University Librarian/ Page Contact: Library Systems & Web Coordinator